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Petition - 4 - of - 2012 RAI Vs RAI
Petition - 4 - of - 2012 RAI Vs RAI
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF KENYA
AT NAIROBI
PETITION NO. 4 OF 2012
BETWEEN
1. JASBIR SINGH RAI
2. IQBAL SINGH RAI
3. DALJIT KAUR HANS
4. SARJIT KAUR RAI......................................................................PETITIONERS
AND
1. TARLOCHAN SINGH RAI, ESTATE OF
2. JASWANT SINGH RAI
3. SARBJIT SINGH RAI
4. RAI PLYWOODS (KENYA) LIMITED
5. SATJIT SINGH & RAM SINGH, ESTATE OF ...........................RESPONDENTS
RULING
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CALL FOR RECUSAL BY SUPREME COURT JUDGE
[1] The substantive matter before the Court is an application asking for a departure from an
earlier decision which would bar the case for a “review of [the] judgment and decision of the
Court of Appeal dated 30th September, 2002 in….Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. 63 of
2001”. In the said earlier decision, in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v. Kenya
Commercial Bank Limited & Two Others, Supreme Court Application No. 2 of 2011, this
Court, for the material part, held:
“…we hold that Section 14 of the Supreme Court Act is unconstitutional
insofar as it purports to confer ‘special jurisdiction’ upon the Supreme
Court, contrary to the express terms of the Constitution.”
It is by virtue of the said Section 14 of the Supreme Court Act, 2011 (Act No. 7 of 2011) that
the applicant herein has brought Petition No.4 of 2012 seeking leave to appeal against the
Petition 4 of 2012 | Kenya Law Reports 2024 Page 1 of 11.
Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR
decision of the Court of Appeal. Following the delivery of the Ruling in the Macharia case
on 23rd October, 2012 learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Nowrojee asked the Court to
depart from its position, and still hear an application for leave to appeal on the basis of the
said s.14 of the Supreme Court Act.
[2] Pending the hearing of the petitioner’s application, Mr. Nowrojee moved the Court by a
letter seeking the recusal of one of the Judges, on the ground that the Judge had similarly
recused himself as a Judge of Appeal, at the commencement of proceedings pursuant to which
the decision of that Court is now being contested. This application was duly heard, and is the
subject of today’s Ruling.
[3] Mr. Nowrojee submitted that no reasons had been expressed for Mr. Justice Tunoi’s
recusal from the Court of Appeal Bench hearing the case in question, and that whatever
reasons led to that decision, ought again to justify recusal from the Supreme Court Bench
hearing the matter now.
B. RECUSAL BY SUPREME COURT JUDGE: THE RELEVANT ISSUES
[4] This is the first application of its kind before this new Supreme Court, and, on that
account, it is necessary to identify the most relevant issues, as a basis for establishing guiding
principles, considering especially the fact that this Court of restricted numerical strength, is
the ultimate judicial forum, bearing the mandate of defining the jurisprudential terrain for this
country.
[5] It is pertinent to consider several specific questions, the answers to which will yield
guiding principles from which more specific rules would emerge. In this regard, we pose to
ourselves the following questions:
(a) in what circumstances should the recusal of a Judge be sought by a party"
(b) when ought a Judge, as a matter of personal conviction, or of ethical
considerations, to recuse himself or herself from decision-making by the
collegiate Bench"
(c) should the grounds for single-Judge-Bench recusal apply in an identical
manner to the case of the collegiate-Bench Judge"
(d) should the principles of recusal for other superior Courts, such as the
High Court and the Court of Appeal, apply in an identical manner to the
Supreme Court, the membership of which is limited to seven, under the
Constitution"
(e) should the principles of recusal for other superior Courts apply
unexeptionably to the Supreme Court, even where this Court requires a full
Bench, as for instance, where it is sitting to reconsider its earlier precedent
rendered by a majority of the Judges"
(f) how ought the Supreme Court to guide itself on the issue of recusal by its
members, in the light of its unique position in relation to the integrity of the
Constitution, as spelt out in the Supreme Court Act, 2011 (Act No. 7 of 2011),
s.3 (a) and (b), thus –
“The object of this Act is to make further provision with respect to the
operation of the Supreme Court as a court of final judicial authority to,
among other things –
(a) assert the supremacy of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the
people of Kenya;
(b) provide authoritative and impartial interpretation of the
Constitution…."”
C. THE COMPARATIVE LESSON
[6] Recusal, as a general principle, has been much practised in the history of the East African
judiciaries, even though its ethical dimensions have not always been taken into account. The
term is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (2004) [p.1303]:
“Removal of oneself as judge or policy maker in a particular matter,
[especially] because of a conflict of interest.”
[7] From this definition, it is evident that the circumstances calling for recusal, for a Judge,
are by no means cast in stone. Perception of fairness, of conviction, of moral authority to hear
the matter, is the proper test of whether or not the non-participation of the judicial officer is
called for. The object in view, in the recusal of a judicial officer, is that justice as between the
parties be uncompromised; that the due process of law be realized, and be seen to have had its
role; that the profile of the rule of law in the matter in question, be seen to have remained
uncompromised.
[8] It is an insightful perception in the common law tradition, that the justice of a case does
not always rest on the straight lines cut by statutory prescriptions, and the judicial discretion
in its delicate profile, is critical to equitable outcomes. This is what Sir David Maxwell Fyfe
meant when he attributed to Lord Atkin a “constructive intuition which operates after
learning and analysis are exhausted” [in G. Lewis, Lord Atkin (London: Butterworths,
1983), p. 166]. It is precisely such delicate elements of judicial fairness that will also feature
in the judgment as to whether or not the recusal of a Judge, particularly in the case of a
collegiate Bench, is of any materiality, in a given case.
[9] Different jurisdictions make provisions, through statute or practice directions, for certain
grounds for the recusal or disqualification of Judges hearing matters in Court. The most
common examples, in this regard are: where the judicial officer is a party; or related to a
party; or is a material witness; or has a financial interest in the outcome of the case; or had
previously acted as counsel for a party.
[10] In R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No.1) [2000] 1 A.C. 6, the English House of Lords [now the Supreme Court] had just
rendered a judgment when it became known that a member of the collegiate Bench involved,
was an unpaid director and chairman of Amnesty International Charity Limited, an
organization set up and controlled by Amnesty International; and the same member’s wife
Petition 4 of 2012 | Kenya Law Reports 2024 Page 3 of 11.
Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR
was also employed by Amnesty International. In the said judgment, it had been held that
General Pinochet, the former Chilean Head of State, was not immune from arrest and
extradition, in relation to crimes against humanity which he was alleged to have committed
while in office. The House of Lords, at the commencement of the hearing, had given
permission for Amnesty International to join in as intervener. A newly constituted Bench of
five Judges held unanimously that the earlier judgment must be set aside, because one of the
members of the Bench should have been disqualified from hearing the case; as that member
had had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
[11] In an American case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 671 F. 3d 1052 (9th Circ. February 7,
2012) it was held that the test for establishing a Judge’s impartiality is the perception of a
reasonable person, this being a “well-informed, thoughtful observer who understands all the
facts”, and who has “examined the record and the law”; and thus, “unsubstantiated suspicion
of personal bias or prejudice” will not suffice.
[12] Such a broad test is adopted too in South African Defence Force and Others v. Monnig
and Others (1992) (3) SA 482 (A), p.491:
“The resusal right is derived from one of a number of rules of natural justice
designed to ensure that a person accused before a court of law should have a
fair trial.”
D. RE-EXAMINING THE APPLICANT’S CASE
[13] In the instant case, the Judge is being asked to recuse himself, because he had done so
when he served on the Court of Appeal Bench – simpliciter. The legal or factual grounds for
the said recusal are not discernible from the Court records. Nor have our collegiate
consultations yielded any results to guide the Court in filling this lacuna. We are therefore left
with no option but to begin from broad principle, in constructing a framework of
rationalization.
[14] We will dispose of the matter after considering the relevant questions, and on this basis
we hope to provide general principles on the functioning of the Supreme Court.
(a) The Supreme Court’s Limited Numerical Strength
[15] By Article 163(2) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court membership comprises seven
Judges; and this Court is properly composed for normal hearings only when it has a quorum
of five Judges. We take judicial notice that, for about a year now, the Court has had a vacancy
of one member; and also that half of the current membership were previously in service in
other superior Courts – and so having the possibility of having heard matters which could
very well come up now before the Supreme Court. Recusal, in these circumstances, could
create a quorum-deficit which renders it impossible for the Supreme Court to perform its
prescribed constitutional functions.
[16] Such a possibility would, in our view, be contrary to public policy and would be highly
detrimental to the public interest, especially given the fact that the novel democratic
undertaking of the new Constitution is squarely anchored firstly, on the superior Courts, and
secondly, on the Supreme Court as the ultimate device of safeguard.
The Court noted that it was faced with a novel case since the disqualification was sought on
grounds which did not indicate that any person would get any pecuniary interest out of the
decision of the Court since the matter was a criminal case. It opined:
“[t]he rationale of the whole rule is that a man cannot be a judge in his own
cause. In civil litigation the matters in issue will normally have an economic
impact; therefore a judge is automatically disqualified if he stands to make a
financial gain as a consequence of his own decision of the case. But if, as
the present case, the matter at issue does not relate to money or economic
advantage but is concerned with the promotion of the cause, the rationale
disqualifying a judge applies just as much if the judge is involved together
with one of the parties.”
Further, the Court explained that it is only in exceptional circumstances as in this case
“should a judge normally be concerned either to recuse himself or disclose the position to the
parties. However, there may well be other exceptional cases in which the judge would be well
advised to disclose a possible interest.”
Lord Nolan in concurring with the decision of Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Goff in Ex
parte Pinochet stated that “in any case where the impartiality of a judge is in question the
appearance of the matter is just as important as the reality.”
Similarly, Lord Hutton observed that if the nature of the interest was such that public
confidence in the administration of justice required that the judge implicated disqualifies
himself, it was irrelevant that there was in fact no bias on the part of the judge, and there is no
question of investigating whether there was any likelihood of bias or any reasonable suspicion
of bias on the fact of that particular case.
In Sellar vs Highland Rly Co. the Court emphasized on the need to preserve the principle as
much as possible. Lord Buckmaster stated that the rule was one that he would “greatly regret
to see even in the slightest degree relaxed.” He added that “the importance of preserving the
administration of justice from anything which can even by remote imagination infer a bias or
interest in the Judge upon whom falls the solemn duty of interpreting the law is so grave that
any small inconvenience experienced in its preservation may be cheerfully endured.”
These precedents clearly indicate the weight with which the principle has been held by the
Courts and the extent to which the Courts will jealously guard it. Even if it results in some
inconvenience on the part of the Court it would be gladly borne for justice to prevail.
In R vs Gough[1993] 2 All E. R 724, [1993] AC 646 Lord Goff of Chieveley observed that:
“[T]he nature of the interest is such that public confidence in the
administration of justice requires that the judge must withdraw from the case
or, if he fails to disclose his interest and sits in judgment upon it, the decision
cannot stand. It is no answer for the judge to say that he is in fact impartial
and that he will abide by his judicial oath. The purpose of the
disqualification is to preserve the administration of justice from any
suspicion of the impartiality.”
The Court must therefore, take into consideration the impact that the failure of the judge to
disqualify himself will have on the public concerning their perception of the process of
administration of justice.
The Test
Lord Justice Edmund Davis in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. Vs Lannon [1969]
1 QB 577 stated that disqualification was imperative even in the absence of a real likelihood
of bias if a reasonable man would reasonably suspect bias. Acker LJ in R vs Liverpool City
Justices, ex parte Topping [1983] 1 WLR 119 elaborated on the test applicable. The Court
has to address its mind to the question as to whether a reasonable and fair-minded man sitting
in Court and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial
for the applicant was not possible. If the answer is in the affirmative, disqualification will be
inevitable.
In an article by a writer, Holly Stout (11 KBW) on the subject of “Bias’, the author states:
“… The test to be applied by a judge who recognizes a possible apparent
bias is thus a “double real possibility” test; the question he/she must ask
him/herself is whether or not there is a real possibility that fair-minded and
informed observer might think that there was a real possibility of bias.”
(referred to PORTER –V- MAGILL (2002) 2 AC 357).
Necessity and Statutory Authority
In circumstances in which all the members of the only tribunal competent to determine a
matter are subject to disqualification, they may be allowed to sit and determine the matter
under the doctrine of necessity to avoid a miscarriage of justice. This common law principle
will however, only apply in very exceptional circumstances which are required to be very
clear.
The Supreme Court of the United States of America in the case of Caperton vs Massey
vacated a decision by Justice Benjamin, a judge of the West Virginia Supreme Court, in
which he had declined to recuse himself. The Justice had been requested to recuse himself on
the ground that his campaign to ascend to office as judge had been heavily funded by the
respondent.
Jeffrey W. Stempel in his article “Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense
through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal” expounded on the
reasoning of the court in arriving at its decision and stated that:
“While acknowledging that ‘extreme cases often test the bounds of
established legal principles’ and that ‘sometimes no administrable standard
may be available to address the perceived wrong … in extreme cases
intervention [is] required to protect the integrity of the legal system … the
Court dealt with extreme facts that created an unconstitutional probability of
bias that 'cannot be defined with precision.”
He added that in each case the Court had to articulate an objective standard to protect the
parties' basic right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.
Petition 4 of 2012 | Kenya Law Reports 2024 Page 8 of 11.
Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others [2013] eKLR
Further, that the Court should recognize that any error in failing to recuse deprives the
affected litigant of a fundamental constitutional right to have the case heard by a neutral
person. Consequently, a rejection of a request to recuse which has no legal justification is one
of a constitutional nature that should be potentially subject to U.S. Supreme Court review and
correction.
Steve Sheppard in his article “Caperton, Due Process, and Judicial Duty: Recusal
Oversight in Patrons’ Cases” published in the Arkansas Law Review volume 64 opines that:
“There are times, of course, when motions to recuse are brought tactically
by an opponent to a former patron, seeking to amplify the appearance of
obligation of the judge toward a former sponsor. Such motions are likely to
provoke anger, resentment, and defiance in the judge whose impartiality is
questioned. Even so, there is simply no loss to justice in that judge stepping
aside and allowing another judge to be assigned. The appearance of
impropriety is all that is in issue, not impropriety itself.”
He strongly supports the decision of the Court in Caperton’s case in the following words:
“[T]he other litigant has a right to a fair trial. No amount of reassurance by
the seemingly tainted judge can assure the litigant that the judge is not
tainted. And, the litigant has a fundamental right to a neutral judge, who is
not apparently biased against that litigant’s cause.”
In Laird vs Tatum 409 U.S. 824 (1972) Justice Rehnquist declined to recuse himself in a
case that came before him as judge in which he had testified as an expert witness at Senate
hearing before joining the bench. The case was decided 5-4 in the U. S. Supreme Court, and a
motion for recusal and rehearing was filed. Justice Rehnquist found that he had a duty to sit,
particularly because there was no replacement for a recused Justice, which could lead to an
equally divided Court. This could be said to have been out of necessity to ensure that the
quorum of the court was maintained.
Principle applicable in the Current Case
Article 163 (1) establishes the Supreme Court comprising of seven judges. Sub-article 2
states that the Supreme Court shall be properly constituted for the purposes of its proceedings
if it is composed of five judges. The total number of the Supreme Court judges that this
country can have at any given time under the Constitution is seven. The minimum that must
sit and determine a matter is five. This means that the only allowance given by the
Constitution of the judges who may be away for whatever reason, including illness or worse
still, death, is two. If one of the remaining five is required to disqualify him/herself, it may be
argued that out of necessity the judge would have to sit to ensure that there will be no failure
of justice due to the bench being below the quorum set by the Constitution.
The decision in Laird vs Tatum would form persuasive precedent. Therefore, it would be of
utmost importance that the judges of the Supreme Court sparingly and cautiously allow
disqualification in order to ensure that the Court is not at any time incapacitated due to lack of
quorum. Indeed the Court should consider the high likelihood that several judges may be
required to recuse themselves in the same case. Take for instance two judges recuse
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themselves at a time when there is a vacancy in one of the positions of a judge of the Court.
The Court will become paralyzed and administration of justice will not be as expeditious as
envisioned in the Constitution.
There are myriad of issues that may affect the delicate quorum of the Court including s. 8 (2)
of Supreme Court Act 7 of 2011 which provides:
“A judge of the Supreme Court shall not sit at a hearing of an appeal
against a judgement or order given in a case previously heard before the
judge.”
Currently, three of the judges will potentially be affected by this provision. Should another
slight issue such as illness cause a judge to be incapable of attending to duty for a prolonged
period of time, the operations of the Supreme Court would stall.
This is a unique case that the Court is faced with, and caution must be exercised because the
Court will in its determination set guidelines for the circumstances under which litigants can
seek disqualification of a judge at the same time ensuring that administration of justice is
conducted in a manner that is not only fair and impartial but is seen to be fair and impartial.
The Supreme Court Act has no specific provision requiring that on reviewing its decision a
greater number of judges should sit. This is contrary to the submissions made by Mr. Oraro,
counsel for the respondents that under the Supreme Court Rules the term “full bench” has
been defined to mean a bench of the seven judges and on review the full bench is required to
sit. Counsel should note that the Supreme Court Rules cited have since been deleted by the
Supreme Court Rule, 2012 which did away with the definition of “full bench” and only
defined the term “bench”. “Bench” means a judge or any number of judges as may be
constituted by the Chief Justice in connection with any proceedings. In that case, the Court
may in reviewing its decision sit as five judges just as it sat in the previous matter whose
decision is sought to be reviewed.
As a result, it is possible for the Court to consist of five judges in a review application.
Ordinarily, the Honourable the Chief Justice would have power to constitute a bench of seven
in view of the powers conferred on him. In such circumstances if there is a vacancy, as it is
currently the case in the office of the Deputy Chief Justice, a bench of six could still sit.
Section 4 of the Supreme Court Act provides that a vacancy in the Supreme Court as
constituted under Article 163 (1) of the Constitution shall not affect the jurisdiction of the
Court. However, there is a catch in that s. 25 (2) provides that if the bench is equally divided
the decision sought to be reviewed is deemed affirmed.
The upshot is that I would also hold that in the circumstances Justice Tunoi is not
disqualified since the doctrine of necessity must operate in order for the Supreme Court to
perform its Constitutional functions
DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI ON THIS 6TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2013.
JUSTICE M.K. IBRAHIM
JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT
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