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Study Unit 2-Defining Religion and The Comparative Study of Religion
Study Unit 2-Defining Religion and The Comparative Study of Religion
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1. UNISA
2. 2023
3. RST1502-23-S2
4. Section 1
5. 2STUDY UNIT 2
CONTENT PAGES
2STUDY UNIT 2
Open course index
Completion requirements
Mark as done
OUTCOMES
After completing this unit, you should be able to:
• Discuss the problems associated with the use of the term “religion.”
• Explain why the term “religion” is useful for science and academic research.
• Assess the theosophical, interfaith, and critical approaches to the study of religion and
provide examples of each from the South African and/or Indian contexts.
KEY QUESTIONS
1. What are some of the problems associated with the term “religion”?
2. Is the term “religion” useful for science and academic research?
3. What are the differences between the theosophical, interfaith, and critical
approaches to the study of religion?
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will look at the definition of religion. It may seem odd to devote a whole
study unit to the definition of a term of which the meaning appears obvious. Most of us
have a clear idea of what the word “religion” is supposed to refer to. For example, one
might think of a church, or mosque, or some “religious” practices, such as praying, when
one hears the word. What comes to mind when you hear the word? You will soon discover
that many prominent scholars defined religion with reference to belief in the supernatural,
or in spiritual beings. However, if one considers that some religions, like Buddhism, are
more philosophies of life without much regard for spiritual beings or divinities, such
definitions seem inadequate. It is therefore not surprising that there is still no consensus
among scholars about what precisely constitutes religion. While this lack of agreement
may persist, it is still useful to look at ways in which “religion” has been defined and used in
the academic study of religion.
We will begin our discussion by considering various definitions of religion, particularly with
reference to the founding figures in the modern study of religion. Many of these definitions
will be explored in more detail in later units. It is interesting to note that scholars of the
19th and 20th century tended to focus on what they regarded as “primitive” religion in
colonised territories in order to contrast it with “science” in modern, “civilised” Europe. In
addition to the “scientific,” or critical study of religion, we will also consider interfaith
approaches, which focus on elements that are thought to be common to various faith
traditions, and theosophy, which is a more intuitive and esoteric approach to religion.
FEEDBACK
Watch the following video about the value and criticism of religion (“History of Ideas –
Religion”):
Play Video
2STUDY UNIT 2
3DEFINING RELIGION AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION
OUTCOMES
After completing this unit, you should be able to:
• Discuss the problems associated with the use of the term “religion.”
• Explain why the term “religion” is useful for science and academic research.
• Assess the theosophical, interfaith, and critical approaches to the study of religion and
provide examples of each from the South African and/or Indian contexts.
KEY QUESTIONS
1. What are some of the problems associated with the term “religion”?
2. Is the term “religion” useful for science and academic research?
3. What are the differences between the theosophical, interfaith, and critical approaches to
the study of religion?
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will look at the definition of religion. It may seem odd to devote a whole study
unit to the definition of a term of which the meaning appears obvious. Most of us have a clear
idea of what the word “religion” is supposed to refer to. For example, one might think of a
church, or mosque, or some “religious” practices, such as praying, when one hears the word.
What comes to mind when you hear the word? You will soon discover that many prominent
scholars defined religion with reference to belief in the supernatural, or in spiritual beings.
However, if one considers that some religions, like Buddhism, are more philosophies of life
without much regard for spiritual beings or divinities, such definitions seem inadequate. It is
therefore not surprising that there is still no consensus among scholars about what precisely
constitutes religion. While this lack of agreement may persist, it is still useful to look at ways in
which “religion” has been defined and used in the academic study of religion.
We will begin our discussion by considering various definitions of religion, particularly with
reference to the founding figures in the modern study of religion. Many of these definitions will
be explored in more detail in later units. It is interesting to note that scholars of the 19 th and
20th century tended to focus on what they regarded as “primitive” religion in colonised territories
in order to contrast it with “science” in modern, “civilised” Europe. In addition to the “scientific,”
or critical study of religion, we will also consider interfaith approaches, which focus on elements
that are thought to be common to various faith traditions, and theosophy, which is a more
intuitive and esoteric approach to religion.
FEEDBACK
Watch the following video about the value and criticism of religion (“History of Ideas –
Religion”):
Play Video
However, the problems associated with the term “religion” had already been
recognised by intellectuals in the 19 th century. Already then many scholars suggested
that the term should be rejected. In order to understand the background of the
contemporary debate surrounding the term “religion,” it is well worth taking a closer
look at criticism of the concept during the rise of comparative religion in the 1870s.
These theorists employed various methods to study what they believed to be the
“essence” of religion. In the chapters that follow, we will discuss the philological,
anthropological, sociological, and psychological approaches to the study of
comparative religion in more detail. For now, let’s consider the ways in which scholars
have used the term “religion” in their work despite the problems associated with its
definition.
What, in your view, are the most important differences in the classic definitions of
religion of Max Müller, E. B. Tylor, and C. P. Tiele?
FEEDBACK
Despite this severe criticism and the fact that the term “religion” have been
regarded as unstable and ambiguous right from the outset of comparative religious
studies, scholars have used it in fruitful research throughout the history of the
discipline. Let’s briefly consider some of the ways in which various scholars have
employed “religion” in their work before moving on to the definition of religion.
Chidester (2014:13) points out that some theorists, choosing to retain “religion” for
science, associated religion with empirical measurements of human abilities and
limitations.
• For example, at a meeting of the Ethnological Society in 1870, where E. B. Tylor also
presented, Cornelius Donovan argued that phrenology constituted a scientific method
to measure mental, emotional, and religious capacity in humans through the
measuring of skulls. However, Donovan’s search for the cephalic index for “veneration”
could be compared to the contemporary search for the “religious gene,” rather than
with sound scientific research. Indeed, phrenology is widely regarded as
pseudoscience today, since its practitioners tended to extrapolate beyond empirical
knowledge in a way that departed from scientific principles. Nevertheless, phrenology
was clearly committed to empiricism and in this limited way may be regarded as a
crude forerunner of twenty-first-century methods of cognitive science or evolutionary
psychology.
• Although E. B. Tylor agreed with Distant that the term “religion” lacked scientific
precision and that it was theologically loaded, he still chose to use the term for
scientific purposes (Chidester 2014:13). He suggested that “religion” was an element
of “primitive” psychology that prevented human progress. Instead of abandoning the
term to theology, he used it to identify destructive superstitions in the modern world
that “survived” from “primitive” ages and that needed to be eliminated. He therefore
regarded his science of religion as a reforming endeavour. Admitting that it was
sometimes painful and harsh to expose remnants of old religions that turned out to be
harmful, he regarded the elimination of superstitions as essential for the well-being of
modern society. In this way, E. B. Tylor started an enterprise that is continued today by
scientific atheists, who also use the term “religion” to mark it out for annihilation.
• Another interesting phenomenon with reference to the use of the term “religion” in
science, is the utilisation of religious terminology and metaphors in scientific speech.
Chidester (2014:14) recounts how Thomas Huxley developed a “religion” of science by
awarding science a kind of religious significance and even spiritual awe. This is
comparable to what Richard Dawkins recently called “Einsteinian religion.” Although an
atheist, Einstein sometimes invoked the name of God, which, unfortunately, has often
been misinterpreted by believers as an indication that he was religious. Dawkins
cautions that Einstein used these religious metaphors merely for scientific insights
and that his “natural religion” should not be confused with supernatural religion.
• Another example of the use of the term “religion” in scientific research is the work of
Charles Darwin, who found in his dogs the key to understanding religion as a universal
ability shared by humans and animals (Chidester 2014:14–15). This paved the way for
cognitive and evolutionary explanations of religion and for campaigns to eliminate
harmful elements associated with religion. Darwinism has also been used to advocate
for a separation of religion and science, although it has also been associated with
“secular religion.”
• Chidester (2014:17–18) also draws attention to the fact that although “religion” may be
a Western concept, the ubiquitous claim that Asian religions were invented by
European scholars with the aid of colonial administrators and missionaries may not be
entirely true. Recent research on the invention of Hinduism, for example, demonstrates
that Europeans discovered religious categories that were already present in India. The
category of Hinduism was therefore created in an ongoing process involving both
indigenous and European intellectual inventions. The objection by some scholars, such
as Wilfred Smith and Russell McCutcheon, that many cultures, such as the Chinese or
Indian, do not have a word for religion, is therefore only partly true. Further, while the
terms for major world religions today, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Shintoism,
were only invented in the 19th century, this was not done by Europeans without any
indigenous input.
Since the 1990s the project of questioning the meaning and use of the term
“religion” was continued by a group of scholars who criticised the academic study of
religion as a theological venture which imposed views onto the people it was
supposed to study. Russel T. McCutcheon (1997), for example, criticised traditional
academic approaches to the study of religion for assuming that religion is
somehow sui generis, or unique, self-caused, and mysterious. According to
McCutcheon, this sui generis argument had an ideological basis. It led to the study of
religion in a way that was ahistorical and a political and helped to create religious
study departments, jobs, and publication outlets for scholars of religion who were
uncritical, unskilled, and theoretically naïve. Most importantly, in his view, the study of
religion as an ahistorical category significantly contributed to the system of political
domination and economic exploitation of colonised peoples.
Similarly, in 1998, tracing the history of the term religion, Jonathan Z. Smith
(1998:269– 284) suggested that the contemporary understanding of ‘world religions’
is a modern Christian and European construct with its roots in the European colonial
expansion of the sixteenth century. Shortly after, Timothy Fitzgerald (2000) argued
that the comparative religion enterprise of the twentieth century was driven by a
hidden theological agenda which distorted the practices of non-Western societies and
interpreted them against Christian norms. Adding to this critique with her The
Invention of World Religions (2005), Masuzawa suggested that the Christian
supremacists of the 19 th ordered “world religions” hierarchically with reference to the
supposed superiority of Protestant theology. In addition, she suggests that the
pluralism implied by the term “world religions” could be regarded as an attempt to
reintroduce the ideals of European modernity to dominate in the twentieth century.
SELF-ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY 2.3: MYUNISA DISCUSSION
FORUM
FEEDBACK
Watch the following video about the definition of religion to help you formulate your
own definition (“What is Religion?”):
Play Video
Play Video
Do you agree with Jonathan Z. Smith that “religion” is a term that scientist can define
according to their analytical needs? What aspects of religion does your definition address –
cognitive belief aspects, emotional and feeling aspects, or behavioural aspects, such as
rituals?
Your lecturer or online tutor will summarise and conclude the discussion. Note that,
although you will not be assessed on this activity, your participation may assist you in
your assignment tasks and exam preparation.
Towards the end of the conference, most presenters focused on nature mysticism.
This reflected Younghusband’s idea that nature and God were one and the same. Of
particular interest is the presentation on “The Bantu Religious Ideas” of Albert Thoka
of Pietersburg. Thoka’s exposition of the religion of nature and nature mysticism
echoed the ideas of Younghusband in surprising detail. In fact, his reinterpretation of
African indigenous religion in terms of universal nature mysticism and the imperial
spirituality of Younghusband is so striking that Chidester (2014:267) suspects that
Thoka may have been an invention, or “mask,” of Younghusband rather than an actual
historical figure.
The interfaith notion that only adherents of a faith are authoritative sources of
information about a religion is known as the insider-outsider problem in the academic
study of religion. In his Critics not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of
Religion (2001), McCutcheon has argued that the assumption that there is a distinct
‘insider’ perspective as opposed to an outsider view is the result of the sui generis, or
essentialist, viewpoint. Religion is approached as independent, timeless truth that
needs to be protected. In McCutcheon’s view, however, the academic study of religion
is primarily concerned with the beliefs, behaviours, and institutions of human beings,
rather than with assessing the ‘truth’ of their various beliefs or behaviour. On the other
hand, scholars in the essentialist tradition, like Robert Orsi (2011:84–106), insist that
anthropological and sociological explanations of religion, as proposed by
McCutcheon, fall short of the realness of the phenomena they purport to describe in
people’s experience. Although pretending to be exhaustive, such descriptions diminish
and distort the “realness” of religious phenomena and experience.
FEEDBACK
Watch the following video about interfaith initiatives in South Africa (“Interfaith –
religious leaders promo”):
Play Video
Play Video
Do you think interfaith movements have a role to play in addressing social issues in South
Africa? Is an interfaith approach useful for the academic study of religion?
2.3.2 Theosophical comparative religion
Max Müller complained about Theosophy’s “Esoteric Buddhism,” which he felt was
misleading. Since he insisted that there was nothing mysterious about Hinduism and
Buddhism, theosophists accused Max Müller of being a sexist academic elitist who
was jealous of Madame Blavatsky’s accomplishments (Chidester 2014:271). However,
a later leader of the Theosophical Society, Mohandas Gandhi, used Müller’s authority
in his struggle against British imperialism in India and South Africa. Interestingly,
Annie Besant, who led the Theosophical Society after Madame Blavatsky and before
Mohandas Gandhi, also played a crucial role in anti-imperialist politics (Chidester
2014:271). She campaigned for Indian independence, founded the Home Rule League,
and even served as president of the Indian National Congress.
The Theosophical Society’s headquarters in Ireland was based in Dublin and led by
Captain Patrick G. Bowen (1882–1940). Dissatisfied with his prospects in Ireland,
Bowen moved to South Africa, where he developed a keen interest in indigenous
languages and local ways of thinking. While in South Africa, he discovered the
theosophical “secret” of the Itongo (Chidester 2014:272–276). In an article entitled
“The Ancient Wisdom in Africa,” published in the Theosophist in 1927, he reports on
his encounter with a secret African brotherhood, the Bonabakulu Abasekhemu – the
Brotherhood of the Higher Ones of Egypt, who supposedly were custodians of ancient
wisdom that could be traced to a priest of Isis during the reign of Pharaoh Cheops in
ancient Egypt. Although unacknowledged by Bowen, the secret wisdom he claimed to
have discovered had obvious parallels with Blavatsky’s theosophy. Chidester
(2014:274) explains: “While the Great White Brotherhood of the Himalayas taught that
the goal of life was union with the Atma, the African Brotherhood of the Higher Ones
of Egypt taught that the goal for every human is ‘union with the source of his being –
the Itongo.’”
Bowen claimed to have gained his knowledge by mastering a sacred, secret ur-
Bantu language called Isinzu. He further claimed to have gained access to secret texts
that were written on parchment or the entrails of a hippopotamus in hieroglyphic
symbols and that he received instruction from a spiritual master, Mandhlalanga, who
represented an occult brotherhood. Surprisingly, the recurrence of theosophical
themes in his discoveries were taken to confirm theosophical truth rather than raise
the question of plagiarism. As this example illustrates, theosophical comparative
religious knowledge was created by combining myth, fiction, and scholarship.
FEEDBACK
Watch the following video about Helena Blavatsky to help you answer the question
(“A Look Into “Isis Unveiled” by Helena Petrovna Blavatsky”):
Play Video
Play Video
. Do you think the approach is useful for the academic study of religion?
2.3.3 Critical comparative religion
Again, Chidester reviews critical comparative religion with reference to the way in
which theorists treated the Zulu term Itongo. In line with his definition of religion as a
sense of the infinite, Max Müller uncritically followed his colonial source, Henry
Callaway, in appropriating the term Itongo as a word to designate the Supreme.
Looking for Zulu data to support his theory of religion as animism, E. B. Tylor referred
to reports by Callaway’s informants, who suggested that sneezing was caused by
the Itongo (ancestral spirit). Similarly, in support of his dream theory of religion, the
Zulu accounts of Itongo visiting a person in a dream provided support for the notion
that religion developed from primitive dream-life and psychological processes. Finally,
James Frazer finds support for his pragmatic theory of ritual in Zulu transactions with
the Itongo. Also citing Callaway, Frazer suggests that ritual sacrifices to
the Itongo (ancestral spirit) were concerned with practical issues, such as food and
children.
In this way, Chidester demonstrates how imperial theorists drew upon the same
body of evidence to support their differing theories of religion. This was possible
because of the ambiguity of Callaway’s data, which constituted a “chaos” of
indigenous voices, all influenced, in one way or another, by colonial interferences and
missionary impacts. All these imperial theorists depended heavily on texts produced
by colonial experts, such as Henry Callaway and Henri-Alexandre Junod. To further
complicate matters, these colonial experts’ indigenous sources were often social
isolates who were strongly affected by colonial relations and contexts in which data
about religion were being produced. This process of knowledge creation, which
Chidester calls “triple mediation,” since it involves three parties, will be discussed in
more detail in the chapters that follow. As we will demonstrate, the introduction of the
footnote by imperial theorists – although creating an air of authenticity and opening
their work to verification and falsification – could never overcome all the challenges
associated with the triple mediation process of knowledge creation.
FEEDBACK
2.5 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fitzgerald, T. 2000. The Ideology of Religious Studies. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. Hanegraaff, W. J. 1996. New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in
the Mirror of Secular Thought. Leiden: Brill.
Huxley, A. L. 1945. The Perennial Philosophy. New York: Harper & Brothers
Masuzawa, T. 2005. The Invention of World Religions or, How European Universalism
was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
York: SUNY.
Mehta, P. D. 1976. The Heart of Religion. Tisbury: Compton Russell.
Orsi, R. 2011. “The Problem of the Holy,” in: Orsi, R (ed.) The Cambridge Companion
to Religious Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, W. C. 1962. The Meaning and End of Religion: A New Approach to the
Religious Traditions of Mankind. New York: Macmillan.
Von Stuckrad, K. 2004. Was ist Esoterik? Kleine Geschichte des geheimen Wissens.
München: C. H. Beck Verlag