IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, G.R. NO.

150274, AUGUST 4, 2006

FACTS:

The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against
petitioner Tel-Equen and several others.

On March 28, 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found
respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties.

On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as
charged and dismissed them from the service while the other two respondents were exonerated from
administrative liability for lack of evidence.

Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, while appeal was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum
Order.

Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.

Petitioner contends that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R.
No. 144694, Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse
of discretion and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court, thereby directly or
indirectly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice, and pre-empting the Court’s
sole right to make a decision in accord with the evidence and law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of
abuse of discretion and an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the Court, thereby directly or
indirectly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice, and pre-empting the Court’s
sole right to make a decision in accord with the evidence and law.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit.

After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court find that the
issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. A conduct, to be
contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in
the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have been dismissed immediately after the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its decision on March 28,
1994. It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 2, 2000 affirming the
dismissal that Secretary Datumanong issued the memorandum and after ascertaining that no injunction or
restraining order was issued by the Court.

At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different
rules regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.

Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any
personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no
vested right of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on
appeal. Moreover, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office.

In fine, Secretary Datumanong cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order in
the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition
to cite him in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correctio
FRANK COLMENAR VS APOLLO COLMENAR ET AL, G.R. NO. 252467, JUNE 21, 2021

FACTS:

Frank Colmenar filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
deeds of sale, cancellation of titles, and damages against respondents Philippine Estates Corporation
(PEC), Amaia Land Corporation (Amaia), Crisanta Realty Development Corporation (Crisanta Realty),
and Property Company of Friends (ProFriends).

In his complaint, Frank Colmenar claimed that he was a child of Francisco Jesus Colmenar and American
Dorothy Marie Crimmin. Fransisco Colmenar died and left properties.

Frank Colmenar claimed that Apollo Colmenar (Apollo), Jeannie Colmenar Mendoza (Jeannie), and
Victoria Jet Colmenar (Victoria) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Francisco Jesus
Colmenar dated May 16, 2008 and another Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Francisco
Jesus Colmenar and Loida Colmenar dated July 8, 2011 where they made it appear that they were the
surviving heirs of Francisco Jesus Colmenar, and by virtue thereof, allocated unto themselves the
interests of his late father in the aforesaid properties.

These sales were made without his consent and knowledge which deprived him of his successional rights
under Philippine laws as a legitimate son of his late father.

ProFriends, PEC, and Crisanta Realty filed their respective answers. ProFriends invoked as affirmative
defense lack of cause of action, while PEC and Crisanta Realty, averred that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action against them. They also invoked the following common defenses: (1) they are innocent
purchasers for value; and (2) petitioner's claim is barred by laches and/or prescription.

Apollo and Amaia, on the other hand, filed their respective motions to dismiss. Amaia, like PEC and
Crisanta Realty, averred that the complaint stated no cause of action against it and that it was a buyer in
good faith.

In its assailed Order dated May 22, 2020, the RTC statedthat it was applying Section 12, Rule 8 of
the 2019 Amendments, which states that the court shall motu proprio resolve affirmative defenses
within thirty (30)calendar days from the filing of an answer, and dismissedpetitioner’s complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action as against the respondent companies.

ISSUES:

1. Does the petition raise pure questions of law?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure (now known as the 2019 Rules of Procedure) to resolve the affirmative defenses
pleaded by respondent companies?

3. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint against respondent
companies on ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them?

RULING:

1. Yes, the petition raises pure questions of law.

A "question of law" exists when the doubt hinges on what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the issue raised on appeal
pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of "law" or "fact" is not the
appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can
resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is one of fact.

Here, the first question of whether the trial court committed reversible error when it applied the
2019 Amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by the respondent companies,
albeit the same was already pending when these Amendments took effect is one of law.

2. Yes, the trial court commit reversible error when it applied the 2019 Amendments to the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondent
companies.

The 2019 Amendments have been incorporated into the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure,
now known as the 2019 Rules on Civil Procedure. And as with all things new, precedence is
generally scarce, hence, its application must be done with utmost caution and in strict adherence
to its provisions.
 Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules, provides:

The 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern all cases filed
after their effectivity on May 1, 2020, and also all pending proceedings, except to the extent that
in the opinion of the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which
case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.

The records though readily show that when Judge Gill motu proprio resolved the affirmative
defenses on May 22, 2020, the prescribed thirty (30) day period had long expired. ProFriends
filed its answer with affirmative defense in December 2018; PEC and Crisanta Realty on January
3, 2019; and Amaia on February 27, 2020. Judge Gill should have, therefore, desisted from
applying the 2019 Amendments to the case below, specifically Section 12, Rule 8 thereof,
because when she did, the same was no longer feasible.

Judge Gill ignored the injustice caused by the application of the 2019 Amendments to the case.
For as a consequence, petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative
defense of PEC, Crisanta Realty, and Amaia, and his right to seek a reconsideration of the order
of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure.

3. Yes, the trial court commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint against respondent
companies on ground that it failed to state a cause of action against them.

there are two (2) sets of affirmative defenses raised below, viz.: (1) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, raised by PEC, Amaia, and Crisanta Realty; and (2) lack of cause of action,
raised by ProFriends.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to
dismiss a particular action. Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran57 explained that failure to state a
cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of
action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable.

In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the second situation,
the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations based on the evidence presented.

The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against the defendants is this:
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, may a judge
validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint?

Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner as legitimate child and lawful heir
of Francisco Jesus Colmenar has the right to the relief prayed for. i.e., to declare as void the
extrajudicial settlement of estate effected by the individual respondents who, not being lawful
heirs of his father, had no legal right to settle the estate; and to declare as void the subsequent
deeds of sale executed by these individual respondents in favor of respondent companies which
consequently also did not derive any valid title from the individual respondents.

The allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true, are all about the unlawful
conveyances of the properties by the respondent individuals who had no right to do so since the
true and lawful owner of these properties is petitioner, no other.

All told, the trial court gravely erred when it held that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action against respondent companies, and based thereon, dismissed the complaint against them.
LABAO VS. FLORES, G.R. NO. 187984, NOVEMBER 15, 2010

FACTS:

The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective Security Agency
(SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor.

Respondents were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao
Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. Each of the respondents had a monthly salary of
₱7,020.00.

On July 27, 2004, the petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their
updated personal data files, security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents by July
30, 2004 for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSA’s new service contract with the NPC-MRC.

When respondents failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive, despite several notices to do so, the
petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and October 2004.

Respondents filed individual complaints with the Iligan City Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and money claims, claiming they were
constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for a period of over 6 months,
despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for new assignments.

The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal. They countered that the
respondents’ relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Furthermore, they issued a notice (dated January 17, 2005) directing the respondents to report to
SMPSA’s main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any valid
reasons.

The Labor Arbiter Ruling:

Dismissed the consolidated complaints for lack of merit. He held that the respondents’ relief from NPC-
MRC duty was due to their failure to comply with SMSPA’s requirement for its employees to submit
updated documents to meet NPC-MRC contract renewal requirements. According to the LA, this was a
legitimate exercise of NPC-MRC’s management prerogative, in light of the information it received that
some security guards carried falsified documents.

The NLRC Ruling:

The NLRC affirmed the LA decision. It noted that the respondents’ relief was in good faith, without grave
abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise since SMPSA merely exercised its
management prerogative and discretion to protect its business interest.

Eighty-eight (88) days later, or on January 9, 2007, the respondents, through their new counsel, filed with
the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that they were informed of the
September 29, 2006 resolution on December 6, 2006, while Bicoy received a copy of the resolution
on November 6, 2006.

The CA Ruling:

In its September 5, 2008 decision, the CA set aside the NLRC resolution, finding that the respondents
were constructively dismissed when they were not given new assignments for more than 6 months, from
September and October 2004, when the respondents were "off-detailed," until March and April 2005,
when they filed their individual complaints for illegal dismissal. The appellate court noted that the January
17, 2005 notice to report for new assignments did not toll the 6-month "floating status" period since the
respondents failed to receive the notice before the appointed date, as SMPSA sent the notice by
registered mail, which normally takes at least 5 working days to reach the intended recipients.

Finding that reinstatement was no longer viable under the circumstances, the CA awarded the
respondents separation pay at one (1) month’s salary for every year of service, plus full backwages,
allowances and other statutory benefits under the law.

The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the
petition outright for late filing, and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA and the
NLRC’s factual findings.

In its April 22, 2009 resolution, the CA modified its September 5, 2008 decision by dismissing Bicoy’s
petition for having been filed out of time. However, it considered the respondents’ petition as timely filed. It
also opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice.
The petitioner argues that: (a) the respondents’ CA petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late; (b) the
respondents’ new counsel concealed Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 26, 2006
resolution and relied on the respondents’ December 6, 2006 notice of the resolution; and (c) the evidence
on record supports the LA and NLRC decisions.

In contrast, the respondents submit that: (a) December 6, 2006 is the reckoning date of the 60-day period;
(b) Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt did not bind them because his secretary, Sonia M. Barnachea,
misplaced the September 29, 2006 resolution and they should not suffer for her negligence; and (c) the
evidence on record does not support the LA and NLRC rulings.

ISSUE:

The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition despite its late
filing, and in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.

RULING:

Supreme court finds the petition meritorious.

Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed.14 The 60-day
period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of
parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants;
the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial
system.16 While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.17 The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional
caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.18

Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be
followed.1avvphi1

However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and
weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits
of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13)
exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.19 Thus, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
for his/her failure to comply with the rules.1av

Negligence of former counsel binds the respondents

In the present case, the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-eight (28) days late from Atty.
Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they
should not suffer for Atty. Plando’s negligence in failing to inform them of the September 29, 2006
resolution, and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December 6, 2006 notice.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique.20 The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court.21 The failure of a party’s counsel to notify
him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal therefrom, is negligence that is not
excusable. We have repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.2

The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the respondents’ failure to
file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious to any attack through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to review the resolution.23
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land.24 All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes
final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired
by the winning party.25 Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.26 After all, a denial
of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.27 Otherwise, there will be no
end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of
the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01472-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor
Arbiter is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

‘
GIOS-SAMAR INC. VS DOTC, G.R. NO. 217158, MARCH 12, 2019

FACTS:

On Dece-*mber 15, 2014, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached
agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid
(Invitation} on the airport development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo,
Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao ), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects).

On March 10, 2015, the DOTC and the CAAP issued the Instructions to Prospective Bidders
(ITPB), which provided that prospective bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the development,
operations, and maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two groups (collectively, the
Bundled Projects).

The general procedure for the bidding of the Bundled Projects stated that "prospective bidders may bid
for only Bundle 1 or Bundle 2, or bid for both Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. The [Pre-Qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC)] shall announce in a Bid Bulletin prior to the Qualifications Submission Date
[,] its policy on whether a prospective bidder may be awarded both bundles or whether a prospective
bidder may only be awarded with one (1) bundle."

On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao
(petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present
petition for prohibition. Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of
subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying
on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from
proceeding with the bidding of the same.

Petitioner raises the following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the grant
of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities."

Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airpm1s, thus
establishing a monopoly.

Third, bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of trade. “Mid-sized Filipino companies which
may have previously considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no longer have a
realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because the separate projects became two (2)
gargantuan projects. This effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-sized Filipino
companies.

Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
when it bundled the projects without legal authority.

Fifth, bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher
than what it would have been, had the projects been bidded out separately.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the bundling of the projects is constitutional.

RULING:

1. The bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions on the anti-dummy and the
grant of opportunity to the general public to invest in public utilities."

Petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the bundling of projects violated the Anti-dummy
law. It did not identify what corporation or association falsely simulated the composition of its stock
ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law limiting, reserving, or requiring that
infrastructure or development projects must be awarded only to corporations, a certain percentage of
the capital of which is exclusively owned by Filipinos.

2. Bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies under Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution because it would allow one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airpm1s,
thus establishing a monopoly
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

Supreme Court clarified that the constitution does not prohibit operation of monopolies per se. certain
public services or public utilities such as those which supply water, electricity, transportation,
telephone, telegraph, etc., must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such
exclusive franchises are not violative of the law against monopolies) Anglo-Fil Trading corporation vs
Lazaro).

Petitioner has failed to point any provision in the law which specifically prohibits the bundling of bids.
Petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation upon which the court could grant the relief the
petitioner prayed for.

3. Bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of trade. “Mid-sized Filipino companies which
may have previously considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no longer
have a realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because the separate projects became
two (2) gargantuan projects. This effectively placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-
sized Filipino companies.

Petitioner failed to sufficiently state a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts to support its
conclusion that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or results in unfair competition
under provisions of RA No. 10667.

Sec. 26. Determination of Anti-Competitive Agreement or Conduct. - In determining whether anti-

competitive agreement or conduct has been committed, the Commission shall:

(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected by the anti-competitive agreement or conduct,
following the principles laid out in Section 24 of this Chapter;

(b) Determine if there is actual or potential adverse impact on competition in the relevant market
caused by the alleged agreement or conduct, and if such impact is substantial and outweighs the
actual or potential efficiency gains that result from the agreement or conduct;

(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking perspective, recognizing future developments, any overriding
need to make the goods or services available to consumers, the requirements of large investments in
infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the need of our economy to respond to international
competition, but also taking account of past behavior of the parties involved and prevailing market
conditions;

(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not prevented or substantially restricted and the
risk that competition efficiency, productivity, innovation, or development of priority areas or industries
in the general interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous or undue intervention; and

(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more likely than not that the entity has engaged in
anti-competitive agreement or conduct including whether the entity's conduct was done with a
reasonable commercial purpose such as but not limited to phasing out of a product or closure of a
business, or as a reasonable commercial response to the market entry or conduct of a competitor.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Similar to its assertion that bundling will create a monopoly prohibited by law, we find that petitioner,
again, utterly failed to sufficiently state a cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts to support
its conclusion that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or results in unfair competition
under the provisions of RA No. 10667.

To support the legal conclusion that bundling is an anti-competitive agreement, there must be
evidence that: (1) the relevant market is that of airport development, maintenance, and operation
(under the facts-based criterion enumerated in Section 24 of RA No. 10667); (2) bundling causes, or
will cause, actual or potential adverse impact on the competition in that relevant market; (3) said
impact is substantial and outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that results from bundling;
and (4) the totality of evidence shows that the winning bidder, more likely than not engaged, in anti-
competitive conduct.

4. The PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
when it bundled the projects without legal authority.

The allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a conclusion of law. As shown, no facts
were even alleged to show which specific law was violated by the decision to bundle the Projects.

5. Bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the reasonable bar to a level higher
than what it would have been, had the projects been bidded out separately.
Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady companies direct access to the
Projects, also raises questions of fact. Foremost, petitioner does not identify these "shady
companies." Even assuming that petitioner is referring to any or all of the five companies who have
been pre-qualified to bid in the projects,[53] its assertion that these companies are not financially able
to undertake the project raises a question of fact, financial ability being a pre-qualification
requirement. As already stated earlier, such question is one which this Court is ill-equipped to
resolve.

This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its function to make its own findings of certain vital
facts different from those of the trial court, especially on the basis of the conflicting claims of the
parties and without the evidence being properly before it. For this Court to make such factual
conclusions is entirely unjustified

Sec. 2. The Court Not a Trier of Facts. - The Court is not a trier of facts; its role is to decide cases
based on the findings of fact before it. Where the Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the
exercise of its discretion, decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence may be delegated to
a member of the Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one of the Division Clerks of Court, or to one of
the appellate courts or its justices who shall submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the
basis of the evidence presented.

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue
the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefore.

Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement
must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.
CONNIE L. SERVO VS PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., G.R. NO. 234401, DECEMBER 5,
2019

FACTS:

By Affidavit dated August 22, 2014, petitioner filed a claim for deposit insurance with respondent
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). She essentially alleged that sometimes in October
2011, she lent Teresita Guiterrez Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for the repair of the
latter’s bus units. On January 19, 2012, petitioner met with Guiterrez at the Rural Bank of San Jose Del
Monte to receive the latter’s loan payment. For this purpose, petitioner opened a time deposit account
with the bank under Special Savings Deposit (SSD) Account No. 001 03-00904-1. Per her agreement
with Gutierrez, the latter’s name was used as the account holder since she was a preferred bank client.

A few years later, however, the bank was closed down. Consequently, petitioner filed with PDIC her claim
for deposit insurance, together with certain documents.

By letter dated August 27, 2014, PDIC, through its Claims Deposit Department, denied petitioner's claim
for deposit insurance, citing as ground the absence of any bank records/ documents indicating that
petitioner, not Gutierrez, owned the account.

Petitioner consequently filed the action below, imputing grave abuse of discretion on PDIC for denying her
claim for deposit insurance, albeit she submitted the necessary documents in support of her claim.

On the other hand, PDIC riposted that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition as the same fell exclusively within its quasi-judicial jurisdiction. It emphasized that
there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when after evaluation
and analysis of available bank documents, it arrived at the conclusion that petitioner was not entitled to
deposit insurance.

By Decision dated July 27, 2017, the trial court sustained PDIC's argument and dismissed the case on
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The trial court cited Section 5(g) of Republic Act (RA) 3591 (PDIC Charter), as amended by RA 10846,
providing that actions of PDIC shall be final and executory, and may only be re trained or set aside by the
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.

In her subsequent special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that
PDIC was not among the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
whose decisions and rulings are appealable via a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

By Resolution dated September 22, 2017, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. It ruled that the jurisdictional issue involved, being a pure legal question, should have been
filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner now prays that the aforesaid resolution be reversed and set aside, and the main case be
remanded to the proper court for resolution on the merits.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing the petition for certiorari on ground of lack of jurisdiction?

RULING:

Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, viz:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi- judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
For one, Section 9 of BP 129 vests concurrent jurisdiction in the regional trial courts, the Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court over special civil actions and auxiliary writs and processes.
The law does not distinguish whether the issues involved are pure fact all or legal issues or mixed issues
of fact and law for the purpose of determining which of the courts should take cognizance of the case.

For another, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue extraordinary writs, such as a
petition for certiorari vis-a- vis the hierarchy of courts, was eloquently enunciated in Gios - Samar, Inc.,
etc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, et al., viz:

In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs became concurrent with the CA, pursuant
to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed
RA No. 296 and granted the CA with "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction."

the filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of
certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, [extraordinary] or compelling reasons that
justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental
and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.

There is no compelling reason for the Court of Appeals here not to adhere to and observe the hierarchy of
courts.

In any event, although the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case, we will no longer remand the
case to the Court of Appeals to avert any further delay in its resolution. The. Court, therefore, deems it
prudent to resolve once and for all, here and now, the issue of jurisdiction involving PDIC.

Petitioner asserts that the amendatory provisions under RA 10846 should not be applied to her case
considering that her claim was denied on July 16,2015 or prior to the effectivity of RA 10846 on June 11,
2016.

SECTION 7. Section 4 of the same Act is accordingly renumbered as Section 5, and is hereby amended
to read as follows:

SEC. 5. As used in this Act-

The actions of the Corporation taken under Section 5(g) shall be final and executory, and may only be
restrained or set aside by the Court of Appeals, upon appropriate petition for certiorari on the ground
that the action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed within thirty (30) days from notice
of denial of claim for deposit insurance.

Clearly, a petition for certiorari, questioning the PDIC’s denial of a deposit insurance claim should be filed
before the CA, not the RTC. This further finds support in Section 22 of the PDIC's Charter, as amended,
which states that Section 22. No court, except the Court of Appeals, shall issue any temporary restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the Corporation for any action
under this Act.

As it stands, the controversy as to which court has jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari filed to question
the PDIC’s action is already settled. Therefore, we find no reversible error from the findings and
conclusion of the court a quo.

Finally, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals should have treated her petition for certiorari as an
original action against the assailed PDIC dispositions.

The argument must fail. The Court of Appeals could not have granted petitioner’s prayer to consider her
petition to have been filed in accordance with the PDIC rules simply because the petition was filed beyond
the thirty (30)-day reglementary period prescribed under RA 10846.

Notably, petitioner's RFR was denied on July 16, 2015. She filed her petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals only on September 7, 2017 or more than two (2) years from PDIC's denial of her claim. When
the case was brought before the Court of Appeals, there was nothing more for it to act on since the
assailed trial court's ruling had already lapsed into finality.
DY VS. BIBAT-PALAMOS, AND ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORP., G.R. NO. 196200,
SEPTEMBER 11, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of Limchia
Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping business. In 1990, Limchia Enterprises, with Lourdes as
co-maker, obtained a loan from Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its
acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel. As additional security for the loan, Limchia Enterprises executed
the Deed of Chattel Mortgage over M/V Pilar-I.

Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the
scheduled payments as required in their promissory note. After receiving several demand letters from
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring of their loan.

On August 18, 1992, respondent filed the Complaint and Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred
Ship Mortgage under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer for Attachment with the RTC.
Following the filing of an affidavit of merit and the posting of bond by respondent, the RTC ordered the
seizure of M/V Pilar-I and turned over its possession to respondent. On September 28, 1994, respondent
transferred all of its rights, title to and interests, as mortgagee, in M/V Pilar-I to Colorado Shipyard
Corporation.

On July 31, 1997, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet
defaulted on their loan because respondent agreed to a restructured schedule of payment. There being
no default, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on M/V Pilar-I was premature. The RTC ordered that
the vessel be returned to Spouses Dy. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), with the
modification that Spouses Dy be ordered to reimburse the respondent for repair and dry docking
expenses while the vessel was in the latter’s possession.7 On appeal, the Court promulgated its Decision,
dated September 11, 2009, upholding the findings of the CA but deleting the order requiring Spouses Dy
to reimburse respondent.8

Consequently, on August 17, 2010, petitioner filed a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC. In
the intervening period, Colorado filed its Manifestation/Motion, dated July 29, 2010, informing the RTC
that M/V Pilar-I, which was in its possession, had sustained severe damage and deterioration and had
sunk in its shipyard because of its exposure to the elements. For this reason, it sought permission from
the court to cut the sunken vessel into pieces, sell its parts and deposit the proceeds in escrow. In his
Comment/Objection, petitioner insisted that he had the right to require that the vessel be returned to him
in the same condition that it had been at the time it was wrongfully seized by respondent or, should it no
longer be possible, that another vessel of the same tonnage, length and beam similar to that of M/V Pilar-I
be delivered.

The RTC issued its questioned December 13, 2010 Order granting the motion for execution but denying
petitioner’s prayer for the return of M/V Pilar-I in the same state in which it was taken by respondent. In so
resolving, the RTC ratiocinated:

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the RTC in its March 7, 2011 Order.

ISSUES:

Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:

1. Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant petition?

2. Whether or not the honorable trial court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in finding that petitioner is not entitled to the return of M/VPilar-1 in the
condition that it had when it was wrongfully seized by Orix Metro, or in the alternative, to a vessel
of similar tonnage, length, beam, and other particulars as M/VPilar-1;

3. Whether or not petitioner is estopped from asking for the return of the vessel in the condition it
had at the time it was seized?

4. Whether or not it was petitioner’s duty to look out for the vessel’s condition?
RULING:

The Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.

Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper because the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its docket.

The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on the law or the facts of the case or on the
wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal.21 In contrast, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct errors of jurisdiction, defined to
be those "in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
of in excess of jurisdiction."22 A court or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion if its exercise of judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be
equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be extremely patent and gross that it would
amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility."

On this matter, the Court finds for petitioner. In

this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be considered a supervening event.1âwphi1 Petitioner,
who did not have possession of the ship, was only informed of its destruction when Colorado filed
its Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court in
Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation v. M/V "Pilar-I" and Spouses Ernesto Dy and
Lourdes Dy attained finality on January 19, 2010. During the course of the proceedings in the
RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner could not have known of the worsened condition of the
vessel because it was in the possession of Colorado. Having
declared that a modification of our earlier judgment is permissible in light of the exceptional
incident present in this case, the Court further rules that petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V
Pilar-I in the same condition in which respondent took possession of it. Considering, however,
that this is no longer possible, then respondent should pay petitioner the value of the ship at such
time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Respondent is ordered to pay petitioner

the value of M/V Pilar- I at the time it was wrongfully seized by it. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Makati City, for the proper determination of
the value of the vessel at said time.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ATTY. ELEANOR ECHANO ET AL VS. HON. ERWIN VIRGILIO
FERRER AND GOV. LUIS RAYMUND VILLAFUERTE G.R. 218870, NOVEMBER 24, 202

FACTS:

During his term as Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, private respondent approved several
disbursements for the years 2006 to 2010 for various activities and projects of the provincial government.

Upon audit, the COA found several deficiencies.

As a result, the COA, through Echano and Embestro, the COA Audit Team Leader (ATL) and Supervising
Auditor (SA) for the Province of Camarines Sur, issued ten (10) Notices of Disallowance (NDs) on the
provincial government's disbursements for the foregoing transactions.

On 15 October 2014, private respondent filed two (2) petitions for certiorari and prohibition.

The RTC subsequently issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) on 20 October 2014, and set
a summary hearing on 23 October 2014 for the possible extension of the TRO.19 The TRO was
subsequently extended on 23 October 2014 for another 17 days, or until 09 November 2014. It also set
the hearing on the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on 07 November 2014.

Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the prayer for a writ of injunction
on the following grounds: 1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions; 2) the
NDs have already become final and executory pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, or the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, and the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA; 3)
respondents have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a condition precedent for the filing of the
petitions; and 4) the requisites for the issuance of the writ are not present.

On 17 November 2014, petitioners moved to dismiss the two (2) petitions on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the 18 December 2014 Order which private
respondent opposed.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion to dismiss the
petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed by private respondent.

RULING:

Petition is granted.

The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law. The
matter of allowing or disallowing the requests for payment is within the primary power of COA to decide.

Article IX of the 1987 Constitution is clear:

D. The Commission on Audit

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners
x x x.

SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
Likewise, under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.

Section 26. General jurisdiction. — The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit
and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort
due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has
put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.

Verily, the Constitution and law bestow primary jurisdiction on the examination and audit of government
accounts to the COA. As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has the
power to define the scope of its audit and examination, and to establish the techniques and methods
required therefor. It also has the power to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Private respondent committed a procedural blunder by raising COA's supposed grave abuse of discretion
with the RTC. Section 7 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution is clear:

ARTICLE IX

Constitutional Commissions

A. Common Provisions

xxx

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The exceptions to the rule on primary

jurisdiction do not apply in the case
at bar

In any event, the circumstances of the case do not qualify as one of the exceptions to the general rule on
COA's primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government.

Private respondent cites public welfare, advancement of public policy, and broader interests of justice to
justify his recourse to the RTC. However, he miserably failed to establish how a belated judicial review of
the NDs would advance the interests of public policy and/or justice.

Given that the disallowances have become final and executory, the RTC could no longer alter the same. It
should have dismissed private respondent's petitions.

The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained
finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law,61 and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, ATTY. ELEANOR ECHANO ET AL VS. HON. ERWIN VIRGILIO
FERRER AND GOV. LUIS RAYMUND VILLAFUERTE G.R. 218870, NOVEMBER 24, 2020

FACTS:

During his term as Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, private respondent approved several
disbursements for the years 2006 to 2010 for various activities and projects of the provincial government.

Upon audit, the COA found several deficiencies.

As a result, the COA, through Echano and Embestro, the COA Audit Team Leader (ATL) and Supervising
Auditor (SA) for the Province of Camarines Sur, issued ten (10) Notices of Disallowance (NDs) on the
provincial government's disbursements for the foregoing transactions.

On 15 October 2014, private respondent filed two (2) petitions for certiorari and prohibition.

The RTC subsequently issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO) on 20 October 2014, and set
a summary hearing on 23 October 2014 for the possible extension of the TRO.19 The TRO was
subsequently extended on 23 October 2014 for another 17 days, or until 09 November 2014.

Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the prayer for a writ of injunction
on the following grounds: 1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petitions; 2) the
NDs have already become final and executory pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, or the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, and the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA; 3)
respondents have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a condition precedent for the filing of the
petitions; and 4) the requisites for the issuance of the writ are not present.21 Nonetheless, the RTC, in a
07 November 2014 Order, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from implementing
any writ of execution pursuant to the NDs.

On 17 November 2014, petitioners moved to dismiss the two (2) petitions on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion in its 18
December 2014 Order.24 Citing Section 4, Rule XII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA,
it ruled that only decisions, rulings, or resolutions of the commission proper can be brought to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the 18 December 2014 Order.

RULING:

Petition granted.

COA has primary jurisdiction over

issues involving disallowances

The jurisdiction of courts and quasi-judicial bodies is determined by the Constitution and the law.43 The
matter of allowing or disallowing the requests for payment is within the primary power of COA to
decide.44

Article IX of the 1987 Constitution is clear:

D. The Commission on Audit

SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners
x x x.

SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
Likewise, under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities.

Section 26. General jurisdiction. — The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit
and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort
due from or owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including nongovernmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has
put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.

Private respondent committed a procedural blunder by raising COA's supposed grave abuse of discretion
with the RTC. Section 7 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution is clear:

ARTICLE IX

Constitutional Commissions

A. Common Provisions

xxx

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

The exceptions to the rule on primary

jurisdiction do not apply in the case
at bar

In any event, the circumstances of the case do not qualify as one of the exceptions to the general rule on
COA's primary jurisdiction over money claims against the government.

Private respondent cites public welfare, advancement of public policy, and broader interests of justice to
justify his recourse to the RTC. However, he miserably failed to establish how a belated judicial review of
the NDs would advance the interests of public policy and/or justice.

This Court, likewise, notes that private respondent is seeking to modify an already final and executory
disallowance by COA's provincial government auditors. Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
144557 lays down the procedure to appeal notices of disallowance issued by agency auditors, viz:

Appeal from decision of auditors. — Any person aggrieved by the decision of an auditor of any
government agency in the settlement of an account or claim may within six months from receipt of a copy
of the decision appeal in writing to the Commission.

In this case, private respondent admits that he failed to file the appeal within the reglementary period set
forth under Section 48 of PD 1445.59 He claims, however, that he may still seek relief from the courts.

Given that the disallowances have become final and executory, the RTC could no longer alter the same. It
should have dismissed private respondent's petitions.

The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts from modifying decisions that have already attained
finality, even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law,61 and whether it be made
by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down.
LIHAYLIHAY VS THE TREASURER OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. 192223 JULY
23, 2018

FACTS:

This resolves a Petition for Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a Writ of Garnishment,1 praying
that former Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan (Treasurer Tan), former Secretary of Finance
Margarito B. Teves (Secretary Teves), the Governor of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (collectively, respondents) be ordered to deliver to
Danilo A. Lihaylihay (Lihaylihay) the amounts of P11,875,000,000,000.00 and P50,000,000,000.00, and
several government lands as informer's rewards owing to Lihaylihay's alleged instrumental role in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos), his family,
and their cronies.

Lihaylihay identified himself as a "Confidential Informant of the State (CIS) pursuant to Republic Act No.
2338, duly accredited and registered as such with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)."

Lihaylihay particularly recalled sending two (2) letters, both dated March 11, 1987, to Atty. Eliseo Pitargue
(Atty. Pitargue), the former head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good
Government Task Force, concerning information on former President Marcos' ill-gotten wealth.

Almost 20 years later, on November 29, 2006, Lihaylihay wrote to then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Jose Mario C. Buñag (Commissioner Buñag), demanding payment of 25% informer's reward on
the P118,270,243,259.00 supposedly recovered by the Philippine government through compromise
agreements with the Marcoses. He also insisted on the need for the government to collect Fortune
Tobacco Corporation's tax deficiencies.

On January 10, 2008, Lihaylihay wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-
Arroyo), insisting on the need to recover the Marcos' wealth that he identified and his corresponding
entitlement to an informer's reward.

Lihaylihay wrote to then Department of Finance Secretary Teves on August 11, 2009, reiterating his
entitlement to an informer's reward.
On May 31, 2010, without waiting for Secretary Teves' and Treasurer Tan's official actions on his letters,
Lihaylihay filed the present Petition... dubbed a Petition for "Mandamus and Damages, with a Prayer for a
Writ of Garnishment."
Insisting on his entitlement to informer's rewards, he prays that Treasurer Tan and Secretary Teves be
ordered to deliver to him the amount of P11,875,000,000,000.00; that the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources be ordered to transfer to him several government lands; and that the Governor of
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas be ordered to garnish in his favor P50,000,000,000.00 worth of jewelry
recovered from former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Danilo A. Lihaylihay is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
then Treasurer of the Philippines Roberto C. Tan, then Secretary of Finance Margarito B. Teves, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and the Governor of Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas to deliver to him proceeds and properties representing 25% informer's reward pursuant to
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338.
Ruling:
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless it is shown that there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. While this Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for
mandamus, it will not exercise jurisdiction over those filed without exhausting administrative remedies, in
violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the principle of hierarchy of courts, and when their filing
amounts to an act of forum shopping.
This Petition should clearly be denied.
Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spells out the parameters for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus:

Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.
The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary.
This Court distinguished discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the exercise of
discretion to judicial and quasi-judicial powers. In Sanson v. Barrios:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of
acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments and
consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty, in
contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of
discretion of an inferior tribunal, when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial. It is the
proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of judicial discretion.
Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it, is shown that "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
A writ of mandamus is equally unavailing because there is evidently another "plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANGELO O MONTILLA GR NO. 241911, SPS. RODOLFO
PALMES AND ESMAELITA PALMES VS. CA AND ANGELO O. MONTILLA GR NO. 242375.
FEBRUARY 8, 2023

FACTS:

 Criminal case for double murder filed against Angelo O. Montilla and Doris P. Lapuz
 Case initially filed before RTC of Cotabato City, Branch 15
 Montilla and Lapuz included as additional accused in the case
 RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15 issued Second Amended Information including Montilla and Lapuz
 Provincial Prosecutor filed motions to recall and dismiss Second Amended Information
 Case transferred to RTC-Davao City, Branch 16
 Case dismissed for lack of probable cause based on evidence presented during preliminary
investigation
 Prosecution filed motion for reconsideration, granted by RTC-Davao City, Branch 15, reinstating
criminal proceedings
 Montilla and Lapuz appealed reinstatement of case to Court of Appeals (CA)
 CA granted their petition and reinstated dismissal of case
 CA ruled that doctrine of judicial stability was misapplied
 People of the Philippines and Spouses Palmes challenged CA ruling before Supreme Court

ISSUE:

 Whether the CA erred in reinstating the dismissal of the case against Montilla and Lapuz

RULING:

 Appeal dismissed as to Montilla, who passed away during the case

 Death of accused extinguishes criminal and civil liabilities
 CA ruling upheld as to Lapuz
 Doctrine of judicial stability does not apply when another court with concurrent jurisdiction acquires
jurisdiction pursuant to a sanctioned change of venue
 RTC-Davao City, Branch 16 had complete authority to dismiss the case against Lapuz based on lack
of probable cause
 Lapuz's right to a judicial determination of probable cause was violated when RTC-Davao City,
Branch 15 reversed finding of probable cause without making a personal determination
 Dismissal of case against Lapuz justified as there was no factual circumstance to raise a well-
engendered belief that Lapuz was probably guilty of the crime
 Doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is a
basic procedural precept
 Doctrine does not apply when another court with concurrent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction pursuant
to a sanctioned change of venue
 RTC-Davao City, Branch 16 had complete authority to dismiss the case against Lapuz based on lack
of probable cause
 Lapuz's right to a judicial determination of probable cause was violated when RTC-Davao City,
Branch 15 reversed finding of probable cause without making a personal determination
 Dismissal of case against Lapuz justified as there was no factual circumstance to raise a well-
engendered belief that Lapuz was probably guilty of the crime
 Supreme Court affirmed CA ruling and dismissed criminal case against Lapuz.
REBECCO PANLILIO v. JOSEFINA G. SALONGA, GR No. 113087, 1994-06-27

FACTS:

• Michael Lancelot F. Panlilio is the natural child of Jose Marcel E. Panlilio and Fe V. Federis.
• Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, the natural grandparents of the minor, felt obliged to exercise substitute
parental authority due to the neglect of the private respondent.
• Special proceedings were initiated on December 14, 1993, to secure their appointment as guardians ad
litem of the ward.
• The Regional Trial Court issued an order for the appointment of the grandparents as guardians ad litem.
• A petition for habeas corpus was submitted by the private respondent, which was assigned to Branch
149 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati.
• The Makati court ordered the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
• The petitioners moved to dismiss the petition on grounds of litis pendentia and lack of cause of action.

ISSUE:

 Appointment as guardians ad litem by the Cavite court was rendered illusory by private respondent's
expedient act of filing in Makati a petition for, and issuance of the writ of, habeas corpus.

RULING:

• Judicial stability doctrine hinders Makati court's ability to entertain habeas corpus case due to previous
jurisdiction assumption by Cavite court.
• The immediate assumption of authority by Makati court defeats the essence of the order from Cavite
court.
• Habeas corpus is the remedy to regain custody of minor children, but it requires no other previous case
interwoven with the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding.
• Existence of an anterior suit, such as termination of parental authority in Cavite court, can temporarily
prevent a short-cut attempt to regain custody at another forum.
TERESITA TAN v. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, GR No. 213054, 2016-06-15

FACTS:

• Dante Tan, a borrower, was granted a P50,000,000 loan by SLHI, Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe,
Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr., facilitated by PentaCapital Investment Corporation.
• Dante failed to repay the loan and proposed to sell his shares in Best World Resources Corporation
(BWRC) to settle the debt.
• Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid.
• The respondents filed a lawsuit against Dante before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
• The Makati RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, levying a tax on a property registered in Dante's
name.
• Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit from his wife, Teresita Tan, attesting to
the conjugal nature of the property.
• The Makati RTC denied Dante's Omnibus Motion, stating that the property was a family home and the
obligation had already been resolved.
• The Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the nullification case on the grounds of res judicata.
• However, upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration, the Parañaque RTC reversed its initial disposition
and nullified the auction sale, certificate of sale, and Final Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:

 whether or not the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance
of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate
of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.

RULING:

• The doctrine of judicial stability prohibits court interference with the judgments of a co-equal court.
• The rule is based on jurisdiction, allowing a court to control its judgment, execution, and ministerial
officers' conduct.
• The law acknowledges that a court may violate the law when issuing a writ of execution.
• The remedy against this violation is to resort to a higher court with authority to nullify the issuing court's
action.
• The Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability by taking cognizance of Teresita's
nullification case, despite the case falling within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
• The Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the case, but reconsidered upon Teresita's motion for
reconsideration, committing a reversible error.
• The determination of the validity of a property's levy and sale in the execution of a judgment falls within
the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
GMA NETWORK ET AL VS. ABC DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 205986, JANUARY 11, 2023

FACTS:

 GMA Network, Inc. and Citynet Network Marketing and Productions, Inc. filed a complaint against
ABC Development Corporation (ABC), Media Prima Berhad, and MPB Primedia, Inc.
 The complaint sought to nullify a Blocktime Agreement between ABC and Primedia, alleging
constitutional violations and unfair competition.
 The lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUES:

 Whether the issue of unfair competition must be resolved ahead of the issue of constitutionality of the
Blocktime Agreement.
 Whether the regular courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
 Whether GMA and Citynet complied with the requirements of a certification against forum shopping.
 Whether the action filed by GMA and Citynet is a quo warranto suit.
RULING:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

 The Court held that the National Telecommunications Commission has the special competence to
determine the factual issues involved in the case.
 The Court found that the certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was
defective.
 Therefore, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires courts to defer jurisdiction to administrative agencies on
cases that involve matters within their special competence.
 The National Telecommunications Commission has the authority to determine the factual issues
related to the Blocktime Agreement.
 The certification against forum shopping must comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court,
and failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the complaint.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION REP BY MR. ROMULO A. PAGULAYAN VS.
HON. ROZZANO RUFINO B. BIAZON, HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA ET.AL., G.R. NO. 205836, JULY
12, 2022

FACTS:

Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) Petition for Overtime Work Payment Issuance
Validation

• BOCEA filed a petition to invalidate several administrative issuances related to overtime work payment.
• The disputed issuances include Customs Administrative Order No. 7-2011, a memorandum by the
Secretary of Finance, a memorandum by the BOC Commissioner, and a Customs Memorandum Circular.
• BOCEA argues these issuances are unconstitutional, patently illegal, and abuse of discretion.
• They claim the discontinuation of charging private entities for overtime work has worsened the situation
of already economically dislocated customs personnel.
• They seek direct court recourse through a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction.
• Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue the petition is procedurally infirm
and should be dismissed.

ISSUES:

• Whether the instant petition seeking direct recourse to the Supreme Court via the instant petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and injunction is proper.

• Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed administrative orders
and memoranda laying down a policy of 24/7 shifting and charging overtime work for Customs employees
only against the government and not against private entities or airline companies.

Other issues discussed in the text include:

• The expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Court and whether it was properly invoked.

•The limitations on the expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the courts and the principle of hierarchy of
courts.

• The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial recourse.

• The ripeness requirement for adjudicating the constitutionality of a governmental act.

RULING:

• Respondents' solution, prescribing three 8-hour shifts and limited overtime to weekends and holidays, is
a valid exercise of the Executive's ordinance-making power.
• The solution, exempting airline companies and private entities from paying overtime work, contravened
Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).
• Section 3506 requires importers, shippers, or other persons served by Customs employees to pay for
overtime work, with rates not less than those paid to private enterprise employees.
• Section 1508 of Republic Act No. 10863 (RA 10863) repealed Section 3506 of the TCCP, adopting the
policy on overtime pay set forth in the administrative issuances.
• Respondents committed grave abuse of discretion by prohibiting Customs employees from collecting
overtime pay before the effectivity of RA 10863 on June 16, 2016.
• The resulting prejudice or injury caused by the administrative issuances requires evidence presentation
and cannot be adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
• The court declared Customs Administrative Order (CAO) No. 7-2011 valid until superseded by a later
order.
• Memorandums issued by the Secretary of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and CMC No. 195-2012
are declared invalid for the period starting from August 1, 2012, until June 16, 2016.
• Prior to June 16, 2016, overtime work rendered by Bureau of Customs personnel should be paid by
importers, shippers, or other entities served, including private airlines.
ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE ELON VS. LOURDES S. ASUMBRADO-LACUNA, G.R. 246127, MARCH 2,
2022

FACTS:

Dispute Over Property Ownership in Marikina City

• Lourdes S. Asombrado-Llacuna purchased Lot 39 of Block 4 from Provident Securities Corporation in

1983, but did not receive the title.
• Provident Savings Bank (PSB) executed an Assignment of Mortgage, assigning its rights to J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc.
• Lourdes discovered the assignment in 2012 and filed a complaint against PSB and Atty. Roberto F. De
Leon.
• Atty. De Leon argued HLURB does not have jurisdiction and the complaint fails to state a cause of
action.
• HLURB dismissed the complaint, stating no evidence proving PSB is the successor-in-interest of
Prosecor.
• Lourdes' petition for review was denied by the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
• Atty. De Leon filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the HLURB Board of Commissioners seriously erred in denying the appeal and
affirming the decision of the HLURB Arbiter.
 Whether or not the HLURB Arbiter committed serious error in dismissing the complaint for failure to
implead an indispensable party.
 Whether or not respondents can be held liable for the delivery of title and damages.

RULINGS:

 The CA set aside the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners and remanded the case to the
HLURB Expanded National Capital Region Field Office for the inclusion of Provident Securities
Corporation (Prosecor) as an indispensable party-defendant and for the conduct of appropriate
further proceedings.
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry out
their functions and discharge their responsibilities, but there are exceptions to this doctrine.
 The failure to implead indispensable parties does not warrant the outright dismissal of the case, but
the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
 Non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for dismissal, but if a party refuses to implead
an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the court may dismiss the complaint for failure
to comply with a lawful court order.
 Ordering the inclusion of a dissolved corporation as an indispensable party is an exercise in futility.
 Officers of a corporation are generally not liable for the obligations of the corporation, unless there is
fraud, an illegal act, evasion of an existing obligation, circumvention of statutes, or confusion of
legitimate issues.
LUCIA BERNABE ET AL VS. DOMINGO VERGARA, G.R. NO. L-48652, SEPTEMBER 16, 1942
(JUSTICE MORAN)

FACTS:

The case involves a dispute over the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a judgment for the amount of
P350.

The plaintiffs-appellees, Lucia Bernabe and others, filed a lawsuit seeking the annulment of a public
auction conducted by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija.

The auction was conducted to satisfy a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
Civil case No. 5714, which ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendant, Domingo Vergara, the amount of
P350 with legal interest.

The plaintiffs alleged irregularities in the auction proceedings as the basis for their claim for annulment.

The plaintiffs argued that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or competence in ordering the payment
of money.

ISSUE:

Did the trial court have jurisdiction to render its judgment for the amount of P350?

RULING:

The trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the amount of P350.

The trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the amount of P350 because there was a
counterclaim in the case where the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded.

The case involved the liquidation and partition of an inheritance, where debts left by the deceased
ancestors may be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties.

The plaintiffs knew that the trial court had jurisdiction, as shown by their failure to raise any question
regarding jurisdiction in their appeal to the Supreme Court.

The question of jurisdiction raised in the case was not the kind of question that confers jurisdiction upon
the Supreme Court.

The jurisdiction involved was not over the subject matter but at most over the issue or over the persons of
the parties.

A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over a case involving P200 or more, and therefore the trial court
had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of P350.

The question of whether there was a proper issue raised in the pleading as to said amount was not a
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter but jurisdiction over the issue.

The Supreme Court ordered that the case be returned to the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on
the merits.
DOMINGA PALACAT VS. HEIRS OF FLORENTINO HONTANOSAS, G.R. NO. 237178, DECEMBER 2,
2020

FACTS:

Dispute over possession of a piece of land between the heirs of Florentino Hontanosas (respondents) and
Dominga Palacat (petitioner).

Respondents filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, Specific Performance, and
Damages against the petitioner before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dauis-Panglao, Bohol.

Respondents claimed ownership of Lot No. 6662-B, an unregistered land, which shared a boundary with
Lot No. 6450 registered under the name of Placido Palacat, the petitioner's late husband.

Respondents applied for a free patent over Lot No. 6662-B, but petitioner opposed it, claiming that
respondents' lot encroached on her lot.

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) conducted a survey and found that it was the
fence of Lot No. 6450 that encroached on Lot No. 6662-B.

Respondents informed petitioner about the encroachment and requested a joint survey, but petitioner
refused.

Dispute went to the barangay for conciliation, but no compromise agreement was reached, leading to the
filing of the complaint.

ISSUES:

Whether the MCTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaint.

Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in the case.

Whether the case is dismissible on the ground of prescription.

RULING:

Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and denied the petition for review on
certiorari.

MCTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended complaint, which is essentially a suit for
recovery of possession.

Jurisdiction is determined based on the allegations in the complaint, and once vested, it remains even if
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover on all or some of the claims.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable in this case since ownership was not
raised as an issue.

Regular courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions even if the land in question is public land.

Issue of prescription cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss and would require a full-blown trial
on the merits.

Case was remanded to the MCTC for trial on the merits.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint.
Regular courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions even if the land in question is public land.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when ownership is not raised as an

issue.

Issue of prescription cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss and requires a full trial on the merits.
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. SPS. ALISON ANG-SY AND GUILLERMO SY, GR No.
204753, 2019-03-27

FACTS:

• UCPB filed a complaint for money and/or damages against Nation Granary, Inc., Sps. Sy, and Nation
Petroleum Gas, Inc.
• The complaint sought a writ of preliminary attachment for a sum of US$15,000,000.00 and a case-to-
case Letter of Credit/Trust Receipt in the amount of US$3,800,400.00.
• The defendants executed Surety Agreements securing credit accommodations.
• UCPB argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, citing that personal service of
summons was not first resorted to before substituted service was effected.
• UCPB argued that if there was valid service of summons or substantial compliance of the rules, the
defendants voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

CA's Error of Law Case

• CA found RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over defendant corporations.
• Corporations failed to challenge RTC's Order.
• CA compelled a negative decision.

RULING:

• Jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear, try, and decide a case.
• Jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired through service of summons or voluntary court
appearance.
• In the case, the service of summons was defective, denying the court jurisdiction over the defendant's
person.
• The Sheriff's Report showed that the prerequisites for valid substituted service were not met, indicating
that no multiple attempts were made to effect personal service.
• The court found only a single day's effort to personally serve summons on the defendants.
BOBIE ROSE D. V. FRIAS, as represented by MARIE REGINE F. FUJITRA, Petitioner vs. ROLANDO
F. ALCAYDE, Respondent G.R. No. 194262, 28 February 2018 TIJAM, J.:

FACTS:

• Bobie Frias and Rolando Alcayde entered into a lease contract in 2003 for a residential house and lot in
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City.
• Alcayde refused to fulfill his contractual obligations, leading to a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
• The MeTC ordered Alcayde to vacate the premises and pay Frias the accrued rentals (P30,000) plus
attorney's fees.
• Alcayde filed a petition for annulment of judgment with a prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injuction,
which was allegedly served to Frias.
• Alcayde filed an Ex-Parte Motion to declare Frias in default, arguing that no pleading was filed.
• Frias filed a Special Appearance/Submission (Jursdictional Infirmity Raised) alleging that Alcayde's
Motion to Revive Relief re: Issuance of a TRO merits neither judicial cognizance nor consideration.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that summons and copies of the petition were not duly served
upon Frias, and no proof was provided that Ms. Gonzales or Atty. Frias was authorized by Frias to receive
summons on her behalf.
• The CA denied the petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for lack of merit, leading to the petitioner filing a
Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not special appearance to question the court's jurisdiction is considered voluntary
appearance. 3.Whether or not petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy.

RULING:

• The petitioner's summons was not served in person or substituted, indicating the impossibility of prompt
service.
• The Sheriff's attempts to personally serve the summons were unsuccessful, resulting in at least three
unsuccessful attempts within a month.
• The Sheriff's attempts were not detailed in the Officers Return, indicating a lack of diligent efforts to
locate and serve the summons.
• The petitioner's special appearance to challenge the court's jurisdiction over her person was not
considered a submission to its authority.
• The petitioner claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her due to invalid and improper
service of summons.
• The petition for annulment of judgment was filed in a "special" character, defying the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction over her.
• The manner of substituted service by the process server was deemed invalid and ineffective.
• The petition for annulment of judgment was not an improper remedy, as the respondent failed to
interpose an appeal rendering the same decision final and executor.
• The RTC is now precluded from further examining the MeTC Decision and examining the petitioner's
perceived errors.
EMILIO V. REYES v. APOLONIO R. DIAZ, GR No. 48754, 1941-11-26

FACTS:

Jurisdiction in Trial Court Cases

• Both parties agree that if the protestant's certificate of candidacy is filed, the trial court has jurisdiction.
• If not proven, the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case.
• The real question is whether the protestant's certificate of candidacy has been duly filed.
• Jurisdiction is not about the subject-matter but about the issue.
• A court must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the persons of the parties for valid case trial
and decision.
• Some cases suggest the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue, meaning the issue being
tried and decided should be within the issues raised in the pleadings.

ISSUES:

Protestant's Certificate of Candidacy

• Evidence required for duly filed candidacy certificate.
• Trial court's authority to validate adjudicated ballots.
• Protestee's counter-protest challenge to validity of adjudicated ballots.

RULING:

• Jurisdiction in constitutions and statutes refers to jurisdiction only over the subject-matter.
• Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class.
• Jurisdiction over the issue is conferred by consent of the parties, not by the subject-matter.
• Jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle involved in jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties.
• The question of whether the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue requires only an examination of
the pleadings.
HELEN DENILA VS. REPUBLIC ET AL G.R. NO. 206077 JULY 15, 2020

Facts:

Petitioner: Helen P. Denila

Respondents: Republic of the Philippines, City Government of Davao, neighborhood associations, and
individuals

Date: July 15, 2020

Place: Supreme Court's Third Division

Brief account of events: The case involves the reconstitution of certificates of title. The Court of Appeals
(CA) found that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
petition for reconstitution of title. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision.

Brief account of the case in the lower court: The RTC granted the petition for reconstitution of title, but the
CA found that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:

Whether the Supreme Court erred in affirming the CA's decision denying the petitioner's efforts to
reconstitute the certificates of title.

Whether the Supreme Court erred in finding one of the lawyers, Atty. Pangilinan, remiss in her ethical
duties as a member of the Bar.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denies the motions for reconsideration.

Reasons for denial:

The petitioner failed to present new and compelling arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's
previous decision.

The petitioner's invocation of a different case (Manotok) is misplaced, as it pertains to the validity of titles,
not the reconstitution of certificates of title.

The records and established jurisprudence contradict Atty. Pangilinan's claim of good faith.

Atty. Pangilinan disregarded the principles of res judicata and pursued a baseless claim, wasting the
Court's time and resources.

Atty. Pangilinan misquoted and misrepresented the text of a previous decision, violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The petitioner's donation of a portion of the subject lands during the pending case is considered an
obstruction and degradation of the administration of justice.

The petitioner is directed to show cause why she should not be cited for indirect contempt.

The Court's decision is based on the following arguments:

The petitioner failed to present new and compelling arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the
previous decision.

Atty. Pangilinan's claim of good faith is contradicted by the records and established jurisprudence.
Atty. Pangilinan misquoted and misrepresented a previous decision, violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The petitioner's donation of a portion of the subject lands during the pending case obstructs and degrades
the administration of justice.
ROBERT SAN PEDRO v. WILLY ONG, GR No. 177598, 2008-10-16

Facts:

• San Pedro purchased two parcels of land from Guillermo Narciso and Brigida Santiago for P35,000.00.
• Adora Dela Peña was hired to transfer the Title Transfer Certificates (TCCs) to the properties.
• The properties were registered in the Narciso spouses' names and mortgaged to Willy Ong.
• Ong's agent Normita Caballes registered the mortgages.
• San Pedro filed a Petition for Nullification of Mortgage with Damages against the Narciso spouses, Dela
Peña, Landayan, Ong, and Caballes.
• Narciso admitted to selling the properties to San Pedro and denied authorizing the mortgage.
• Dela Peña misrepresented the necessity of the SPAs to facilitate the transfer of TCTs.
• Ong alleged that the properties were used as collateral for a loan, amounting to P170,000.00.
• A document examiner confirmed that the signatures of Narciso and Santiago were forged.
• Ong instituted a case against Dela Peña for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
• The RTC declared the mortgages null and void in Ong's favor, citing failure of diligence.
• Ong and Caballes appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing the lack of jurisdiction
over Dela Peña.
• The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision, stating that the service of summons on Dela Peña
was invalid and the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her.
• The court emphasized that in quasi in rem proceedings, the court need not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants, as long as it has acquired jurisdiction over the res.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT DE LA PEÑA IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE CASE.

Ruling:

• Dela Peña was not an indispensable party in the case, as she did not claim title to the properties.
• The case was a quieting of title action to remove any cloud on San Pedro's title to the properties.
• Dela Peña's involvement was not necessary for the determination of the title of San Pedro to the
properties.
• The judgment of the RTC upholding San Pedro's title over Ong's would not have affected Dela Peña as
she only misrepresented her authority to mortgage the properties on behalf of the registered owners, the
Narciso spouses.
• Dela Peña's presence in the proceedings only permitted complete relief, not making her presence
indispensable.
• San Pedro's title was superior to Ong's, as the properties were sold to him prior to the mortgage of the
same to Ong.
• An expert witness affirmed that the signature of Guillermo Narciso on one of the purported SPAs in favor
of Dela Peña was forged, while the signatures of his wife Brigida Santiago on both SPAs were spurious.
• Ong and Caballes cannot point out any defect in San Pedro's title to the subject properties.
• The court emphasized the need for a higher degree of diligence when dealing with an agent, especially
when the agent's act is unusual.
• Ong's claim to the properties cannot prevail over that of San Pedro, but he can proceed against those
who perpetrated the fraud.
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, GR NO. 161417, 2007-
02-08

Facts:

• Ernesto Biaco, husband of Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco, obtained loans from the Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank (PCRB) as a branch manager.
• Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage as security for the loans, which bore the signatures of the
Biaco spouses.
• When Ernesto failed to settle the loans on the due date, the bank sent him a written demand for
payment.
• The bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage against the Biaco spouses, but Ernesto failed
to file an answer.
• The judge ordered the Biaco spouses to pay within 90 days or 100 days from receipt of the decision.
• If non-payment was not made, the Sheriff of the Court ordered the sale of the mortgaged lot at public
auction.
• The Biaco spouses did not appeal the adverse decision, and the bank filed an ex parte motion for
execution to direct the sheriff to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction.
• The petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision, claiming extrinsic fraud
prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings.
• The Court of Appeals ruled that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem, and
jurisdiction over the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Issues:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction

Ruling:

• Actions in personam and rem are actions against a person based on their personal liability.
• In rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the defendant's person is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case.
• Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either by seizure of the property under legal process or through the
institution of legal proceedings.
• Summons must be served upon the defendant to satisfy due process requirements.
• A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court must be personally served with summons.
• If summons cannot be served within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected by leaving
copies at the defendant's residence or office.
• In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the res.
• The petitioner avers that she was not personally served summons, but summons was served through
her husband at his office without any explanation.
• The violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process arising from lack of valid service of
summons on her warrants the annulment of the judgment of the trial court.
CRC 1447 INC. VS. ROSALINDA CALBATEA ET AL, G.R. NO. 237102, MARCH 4, 2020

Facts:

• The case involves a property owned by Liberty Hizon Vda. De Luna and Eufemia Rivera.
• The property was subjected to a Notice of Coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) in 1993.
• Rivera filed a petition for extension in 2004, which was denied by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR).
• CRC 1447, Inc. purchased the property in 2006 and registered it under its name.
• The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage in 2007, denying Rivera's extension.
• The petitioner received a Notice of Coverage in 2008, but a petition to lift it was denied.
• The petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against respondents, who sought dismissal
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
• The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.
• The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the courts correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
 Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.
 In this case, the subject property is an agricultural land placed under the coverage of the CARP.
 The issue of possession or use of the property falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
 The DARAB has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.
 The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform.
 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the issue of the recovery of possession of a property under
the CARP falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB, resulting in the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
ROSIE COLLANTES LAGUNDI VS PACITA BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 207269 JULY 26, 2021

Facts:

• Pacita Bautista filed a complaint against Rosie Collantes Lagundi for ownership, possession, and
damages.
• Lagundi responded with an answer and counterclaim.
• Bautista amended her complaint for ejectment, title quieting, and damages.
• The Regional Trial Court initially denied Bautista's motion for summary judgment but later granted
reconsideration.
• Bautista's motion for a writ of execution was granted.
• Lagundi's motion for reconsideration was denied.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's orders, finding Lagundi estopped from challenging the court's
jurisdiction.
• Lagundi filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Lagundi is estopped by laches from challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC during the execution
of judgment.

Ruling:

Supreme Court's Decision on Lagundi's Jurisdiction Challenge

• The Supreme Court denied Lagundi's petition, confirming the Court of Appeals' decision.
• Lagundi's late questioning of jurisdiction was deemed unfair and inequitable, as it occurred after the final
decision and execution writ.

• Jurisdiction is lawful and can be challenged at any stage.

• Laches prevents parties from challenging court jurisdiction if they actively participated and sought
affirmative relief without jurisdiction.
• Estoppel by laches prevents invoking court's lack of jurisdiction after affirmative relief or adverse
judgment.
• Timely jurisdiction issue must be raised to prevent unfairness.
VICTORIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION v. VICTORIA
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, GR No. 234446, 2019-07-24

Facts:

VMC vs VMCEU Wage Structure and Tax Issues

• VMC, a domestic textile corporation, sought the BIR's opinion on the tax implications of its wage
structure in a March 2014 letter.
• The BIR ruled that VMCEU's members were not exempt from income tax as their earnings were above
the statutory minimum wage.
• VMC withheld the income tax due on the wages of VMCEU's members.
• A grievance meeting was held in May 2015 to resolve the issue, but the parties failed.
• After failing to reach an amicable settlement, VMC and VMCEU executed a Submission Agreement,
designating AVA Renato Q. Bello to resolve the issue.
• On May 26, 2016, the VA ruled in favor of VMCEU, reversing the VA's ruling.
• VMC sought relief before the CA through a petition for certiorari, which was reaffirmed in May 2017.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the VA's decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

Ruling:

Court's Decision on Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes

Jurisdiction in Civil Cases
• Jurisdiction is the power of a court, tribunal, or officer to hear, try, and decide a case.
• Two types of jurisdiction are required for valid civil case trials: jurisdiction over the subject matter and
jurisdiction over the parties.
• Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint based on the
character of the relief sought.
• A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter produces no legal effect.
Jurisdiction in the Labor Code
• The Labor Code vests in VAs the power to hear and decide labor disputes.
• The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies.
• The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear
and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.
Jurisdiction in VMCEU's Arguments
• The Court found that VMC's execution of the Submission Agreement and active participation in the
arbitration proceedings did not rectify the VA's lack of jurisdiction.
• Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be conferred upon a tribunal by the parties alone.
• The doctrine of estoppel by laches may operate to bar jurisdictional challenges.
Court's Decision
• The Court cannot conclude that VMC was estopped from assailing the VA's jurisdiction.
• Lack of jurisdiction was timely raised and VMC never prayed for affirmative relief.
• Public policy considerations found no application in this case to stop VMC from questioning the VA's
jurisdiction.
SERAFIN TIJAM v. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, GR No. L-21450, 1968-04-15

Facts:

Tagalog Civil Case Against Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio

• The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio.
• A writ of attachment was issued against defendants' properties, but was dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.
• After the trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution
against the defendants.
• The plaintiffs moved for a writ of execution against the Surety's bond, which was denied by the Court.
• The plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond, which was granted by the
Court.
• The Surety moved to quash the writ, arguing it was issued without the required summary hearing.
• The Court of Appeals decided the case, affirming the orders appealed from.
• The Surety filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by
the Court of Appeals.
• The Surety filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to try
and decide the case.

Issues:

Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea

Ruling:

• The court ruled that the Surety is barred from invoking a plea to annul everything done in the case with
its active participation.
• The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, almost fifteen years
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963.
• The Surety could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which was within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
• Instead, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits.
• The court declared the conduct of the Surety as useless and compelled the judgment creditors to go up
their Calvary once more.
• If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any bond given
pursuant to the provisions of this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally charged
on such bond and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon demand the amount due under the judgment.
• The surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that
the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer.
• The bond filed for discharge of attachment is to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he
may recover in the action, and stands 'in place of the property so... released'.
• If the surety fails to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand, writ of execution may
issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.