Fishere - Egypt.mainstreaming Radicalism
Fishere - Egypt.mainstreaming Radicalism
from scratch. They then seek to impose this new vision of the past
on the existing social order. Radicalism, in this sense, is modern in
every sense, even when it seeks to resist modernisation.4 In this sense
Islamists are not advocates of a return to the past; ‘Islam becomes a
reserve on which the promoters of new identities draw’.5 From Fascism
to Fundamentalism, radical projects reflect social actors’ determina-
tion to control modernisation and its consequences.
Egyptians’ reaction to modernity was marked by the specific his-
toric conditions in which this encounter took place, namely its asso-
ciation with imperialism, its intertwinement with cultural alienation,
and the deliberate and selective character of its expansion. Let us deal
with each of these in turn.
First, Egyptians’ encounter with modernity took place in mayhem
and in blood. It is true that the French expedition of 1798, which
occupied the Ottoman-ruled Egypt for three years, brought within
its ranks scientists who dazzled Egyptians with their knowledge,
skills and capabilities. But the expedition was primarily a military
one, inflicting destruction, humiliation and foreign domination on the
country. It announced to the Egyptians that a whole new world was
emerging in science, politics, administration and social organisation
and – at the same time – that their country was falling under the rule
of the foreign masters of this new order. The association can rarely have
been stronger, and if some had doubts about the causal link between
modernity and foreign domination, they were convinced when the
French artillery repeatedly crushed their revolts. When finally the
French were driven out, it was the equally modern British who did
this, not the Egyptians or their Ottoman protectors. These crucial
three years 1798 to 1801, conditioned the Egyptians’ take on moder-
nity. And when an Ottoman soldier, backed by an anxious populace,
propelled himself to rule Egypt, his approach to modernisation was to
be first and foremost military-oriented. The construction of a strong
modern army led the modernisation of Egyptian economy, adminis-
tration, and education throughout the nineteenth century. The return
of the modernity masters in 1882, this time to anchor Egypt in the
British Empire for 70 years, would once again reinforce this association
Egyptians make between modernity and foreign domination.6
Disappointing Nationalists
As the nationalists extended their control to engulf all the institu-
tions of the state, Egyptians expected them to live up to the chal-
lenges of modernity: asserting the country’s independence vis-à-vis the
domineering Western powers, protecting national identity against the
alienating Western culture, and enabling Egypt to rise to the place
it deserved among the nations. This might be too tall an order for
any regime, but Nasser’s promises were not less ambitious. His record,
though, was mixed. Nasser’s anti-imperialist policies bought him by
staunch support from the population. His assertive rhetoric engendered
a sense of pride among a population for long subjugated to foreigners.
His social and economic reforms were equally popular, and covered to
a large extent – together with his charisma – his political failures. The
inconsistencies of the new regime’s identity discourse were relegated to
a secondary position, given the primacy of a successful national mobi-
lisation behind the two other goals of modernisation; independence
and development. But this worked only for a while: when the external
assertiveness came crumbling down in June 1967, all the other flaws
of the regime became painfully apparent.
The defeat of June 1967 stunned the Egyptians: the extent of the
military humiliation, the loss of territory, the brevity of the war, the
finality of its outcome, and above all, the identity of the enemy –
insignificant Israel – brought down the edifice of national pride and
assertive independence that Nasser had built. The regime, believed
to be a Third World leader supporting revolutionary movements near
and far, turned out to be incapable of protecting its own territory. If
in 1956 Israel occupied Sinai, it did so in collision with two empires
who led the attack. This time around there was no empire to blame;
only the Zionist entity that the regime belittled and dismissed. The
shock of the Egyptians explains the mass rallies of 9th and 10th June,
1967, after Nasser acknowledged the defeat and took responsibility for
it. The masses who took to the streets shouted ‘we will fight’ – not
‘long live Nasser’. They wanted to fight for what they had lost; not
merely Sinai, but their independence in the broadest possible sense.
This is largely why Sadat’s reconciliation with Israel was – and remains
– unpopular. Many Western analysts fail to understand that Egyptian
attitudes towards Israel are not solely a function of sympathy towards
the Palestinians. It is also part of Egyptians deep-seated revulsion of
Western domination. In their eyes, the creation of Israel, and the con-
tinued support it receives, is a consequence and a sign of this loathed
domination. Israel plays the role of a lightning rod for Western domi-
nation; its presence and policies reflect the destructive power of the
‘West’. For many Egyptians, accepting Israel is tantamount to surren-
dering the dream of standing up to ‘Western domination’ as much as
it is accepting the loss of Palestinian rights.
The 1967 defeat dealt an indirect but strong blow to the discourse
of nationalist identity. Nasser’s regime was not particularly successful
been achieved, and probably will not be. For those who are not in
charge of the State, the culprit is quite obvious.
Sadat’s version of nationalism emphasised the Islamic dimension of
Egyptian identity more than any of his predecessors. In order to bal-
ance the Nasserite and leftist influences in Egypt’s limited public space
(mainly universities and trade unions), Sadat tolerated Islamic revival-
ists’ activities and released scores of Muslim Brothers from prison. At
the same time, he relaxed state control over the media and allowed
competing political voices to emerge. Pan-Arab nationalists and left-
ists who were familiar voices in state-controlled media were inevitably
associated with the State and suffered from its credibility deficit. By
contrast, Islamic revivalists were fresher voices, untainted by the fail-
ures of the State. Their discourse sounded anachronistic sometimes,
but their overall message resonated with the popular perceptions of
morality and capitalised on Egyptian anxieties regarding ‘decadence’
and the loss of a distinct identity.
Nationalists were losing the battle on the account of both inde-
pendence and identity preservation. As for the third challenge of mod-
ernity – remedying domestic weakness and generating an overall rise
in the country – it was obviously the area where the nationalist state
failed most. This is not the place to detail the shortcomings of Egypt’s
state-sponsored development; the United Nations’ Arab Human
Development Report (2002) provides an excellent analysis of the state
of Egyptian development in its various aspects. But to put the macro-
economy figures in context, the analyst is well served by trying to
witness how a majority of Egyptians experience this state of develop-
ment. Visiting any of the slums inside and around Cairo is one way
of doing that, where poverty, and absence of clean water, sanitation,
or any form of public services, have become a fact of life for millions
of people who simply gave up hope that their living standard would
improve. A visit to a random public school, university, hospital, gov-
ernment office, or a police station could also show the analyst how the
macro-economic figures are translated into reality. Another way is to
attempt – or watch someone attempting – to start a business and go
through the Kafkaesque layers of corruption – big and small – and
bureaucratic absurdities. Local newspapers and contemporary Egyptian
al-Bishri, Adel Hussein and Hasan Hanafi moved from socialist and
nationalist positions to embrace a more Islamic discourse. The trans-
formation of their political orientation seems to have been influenced
mostly by re-integrating identity politics and cultural heritage argu-
ments in their analysis, while keeping some of the fundamental aspects
of their earlier writings about social change. Khaled Mohamed Khaled
moved from liberal constitutionalism to a discourse based on accepting
the unity of state and religion. Yet, Khaled did not move all the way
to embrace the divine sovereignty advocated by al-Gama’at or, albeit
in a lesser manner, by certain segments of the Brotherhood. Instead, he
preserved the idea of a ‘social contract’ between the ruler and the ruled
as a foundation for the political order. But he emphasised the consist-
encies between this contract and the implementation of Islamic law.
Some analysts see in these writings a deliberate attempt by its authors
to use Islam in order to legitimise a positivist approach to politics.
Others see it as a natural evolution of their thinking, inspired by the
same changes and disappointments that affected Egyptian society as a
whole. But ultimately the result is the same: the ‘acknowledgement of
the political nature of Islam played into the hands of the Islamists in
their demand to establish an Islamic system of governance in Egypt’.46
This is certainly the case, but they also enriched and expanded the
Islamist discourse. What is interesting about these writers – and oth-
ers who embarked on similar attempts – is that they completed the cir-
cle that al-Afghani and Abdu started. If al-Afghani and Abdu started
from the question of how to revive Islam in response to the challenges
of ‘Western’ modernity, these writers started from the ‘modern’ think-
ing and moved back to Islamic revivalism. In doing so, they inserted
their modern understanding of governance, reason, and social change
into Islamic conceptual frameworks. It is this combination that makes
their writings an enrichment of the otherwise narrow Islamist vision
based on Rashid Reda’s reading of revivalism.
Al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi and Imara are closer to the core of the
Brothers’ discourse on modernity, but their work also expanded it. All
three brought a fresher look to the nature of Islamic teachings and
their role in the daily – and political – lives of contemporary Muslims.
They articulated what they described as a centrist view, defining
do so. But this zeal also translated a deep-seated belief among al-
Azhar scholars and leaders that Islam is a Din wa Dawla. In this,
al-Azhar was in agreement with the basic tenet of Islamic revivalism
if not outright fundamentalism. Its objection, as Hatina puts it, was
directed at the extremist interpretations of Islam including Muslim
militant accusations of other Muslims that they were apostates.50 In
other words, al-Azhar was opposed to the visions articulated by al-
Gama’at (not the one presented by the Brotherhood) of how religion
and state can be integrated, not to the principle of their integration.
In the 1980s and beyond, al-Azhar leaders and other traditional reli-
gious leaders played an instrumental role in promoting Islam as a
framework for both personal and public affairs, relegating the idea
of separating religion and politics to a marginal place, if any, in the
public debate.
The violent margins of Islamic revivalism have, after a bloody and
lengthy confrontation with the state, moved back to the revivalist dis-
course as articulated by the Muslim Brothers. In 1997, after a complex
process, the militants of al-Gama’at al-Islamiya unilaterally declared
an end to their recourse to violence. Ten years later, al-Jihad’s prom-
inent theoretician and former Emir followed suit51. Ending violence
developed quickly into comprehensive reviews of al-Gama’at vision
and tactics. This is not the place to discuss these reviews, which by
their depth, comprehensiveness and the credentials of their authors
could have dramatic implications for the use of violence in the name
of Islam worldwide.52 The most basic aspects of these reviews are two:
abandoning the belief that current Muslim societies and regimes are
apostate and, consequently, accepting that the only acceptable means
of reviving Islam is peaceful advocacy, not armed struggle.53 In so
doing, al-Gama’at, together with the Egyptian Jihad54, moved right
back to the ‘mainstream’ Islamic revivalist discourse in its definition
of the challenges Egyptian society faces, the need for reviving Islam in
order to meet them, and the need for ijtihad to achieve this revival. All
this should be promoted solely through public education and advo-
cacy, not through violence or attempts to seize power from above. It
goes as far as suggesting dialogue as a permanent state of relations
with non-Islamic civilisations. In this revised vision, one can still see
Notes
1. Giddens, A. 1994. Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics. Stanford
University Press: Stanford, CA. p.1.
2. Munson, Z. 2001. ‘Islamic Mobilisation: Social Movement Theory and the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’, The Sociological Quarterly, 42 (4), pp.487–510.
Modernity, in this chapter, is not a pre-defined structure that imposes conse-
quences on social actors: it is rather a group of dynamics that create opportu-
nities and constraints for social actors. In this sense, there is no contradiction
in approaching Islamism as a reaction to modernisation and at the same time
approaching Islamist movements using social movement and mobilisation
analysis.
3. Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford University Press:
Stanford, CA.
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