ISO TS 18683-2021 Ed.2 Id.76811 Publication PDF (En)

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TECHNICAL ISO/TS
SPECIFICATION 18683
Second edition
2021-11
Guidelines for safety and risk

assessment of LNG fuel bunkering
operations
Lignes directrices pour la sécurité et l'évaluation des risques des
opérations de soutage de GNL
Reference number
ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
© ISO 2021
ISO/TS 18683:2021(E) Printed / viewed by: [[email protected]] @ 2024-03-18
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ii © ISO 2021 – All rights reserved

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Contents Page
Foreword......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... iv
Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... vi
1 Scope.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative references...................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms............................................................................................................................... 1
3.1 Terms and definitions....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
3.2 Abbreviated terms............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
4 Bunkering supply scenarios..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
5 Properties and behaviour of LNG........................................................................................................................................................ 6
5.1 General............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
5.2 Description and hazards of LNG.............................................................................................................................................. 6
5.3 Potential hazardous situations associated with LNG bunker transfer................................................. 7
5.4 Composition of LNG as a bunker fuel................................................................................................................................... 8
6 Safety................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
6.1 Objectives..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
6.2 General safety principles................................................................................................................................................................ 8
6.3 Approach....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
7 Risk assessment..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
7.1 General............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
7.2 Types of risk assessment................................................................................................................................................................ 9
7.3 Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders.................................................................................................................. 10
7.4 Approach, scope and basis......................................................................................................................................................... 11
7.5 Mitigation measures........................................................................................................................................................................ 14
7.6 Reporting................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
7.7 Safety Zone and controlled areas........................................................................................................................................ 16
7.8 Safety zone determination......................................................................................................................................................... 17
7.9 Determination of monitoring and security areas................................................................................................. 18
7.10 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs)................................................................................................................................... 18
8 Functional requirements for LNG bunker transfer system................................................................................. 19
8.1 General......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
8.2 Functional requirements............................................................................................................................................................. 20
9 Training....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Annex A (informative) Risk acceptance criteria................................................................................................................................... 23
Annex B (informative) Examples of safety zone calculations................................................................................................. 28
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 37
© ISO 2021 – All rights reserved iii

Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment and offshore
structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Subcommittee SC 9, Liquefied natural
gas installations and equipment.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 18683:2015), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— title and scope restricted to Guidelines for safety and risk assessment of LNG fuel bunkering
operations;
— list of bunkering supply scenarios updated with experience gained since 2015 in Clause 4;
— addition of concept of design stage risk assessment and operational risk assessment in 7.1;
— addition of Quantitative Consequence Assessment in 7.2;
— addition of roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in 7.3;
— design requirements removed from Clause 8 to avoid duplication with ISO 20519;
— individual Risk Criteria added in Annex A;
— three methods added to determine safety zone in Annex B;
— to avoid duplication with ISO 20519, the following clauses and annexes have been removed:
— Clause 9 Requirements to components and systems;
— Clause 11 Requirements for documentation;
— Annex C Functional requirements;
iv © ISO 2021 – All rights reserved

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
— Annex D Sample Ship supplier checklist;

— Annex E Sample LNG delivery note;
— Annex F Arrangement and types of presenting connection;
— Annex G Dry disconnect coupling.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
© ISO 2021 – All rights reserved v

Introduction
The properties, characteristics, and behaviour of LNG differ significantly from conventional marine
fuels, such as heavy fuel oils and distillate fuels as marine diesel oil (MDO) or marine gas oil (MGO).
For these reasons, it is essential that all LNG bunkering operations are undertaken with diligence and
due attention is paid to prevent leakage of LNG liquid or vapour and to control all sources of ignition.
Therefore, it is important that throughout the LNG bunkering chain, each element is carefully designed
and has dedicated safety and operational procedures executed by trained personnel.
It is important that the basic requirements laid down in this document are understood and applied to
each operation in order to ensure the safe, secure, and efficient transfer of LNG as a fuel to the ship.
The objective of this document is to provide guidance for the risk assessment of LNG fuel bunkering
operations and thereby ensuring that an LNG fuelled vessel and bunkering supply facilities are operating
with a high level of safety, integrity, and reliability regardless of the type of bunkering supply scenario.
The LNG bunkering interface comprises the area of LNG transfer and includes manifold, valves, safety
and security systems and other equipment, and the personnel involved in the LNG bunkering operations.
This document is based on the assumption that the receiving ships and LNG bunkering supply facilities
are designed according to the relevant and applicable codes, regulations, and guidelines such as the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), ISO, EN, and NFPA standards and the Society for Gas as a
Marine Fuel (SGMF) and other recognized documents during LNG bunkering. Relevant publications by
these and other organizations are listed in the Bibliography.
This document should be combined with the requirements set on ISO 20519.
In cases where the distance to third parties is too close and the risk exceeds acceptance criteria, the
bunkering location should not to be considered.
vi © ISO 2021 – All rights reserved

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Guidelines for safety and risk assessment of LNG fuel

bunkering operations
1 Scope
This document gives guidance on the risk-based approach to follow for the design and operation of the
LNG bunker transfer system, including the interface between the LNG bunkering supply facilities and
receiving LNG fuelled vessels.
This document provides requirements and recommendations for the development of a bunkering site
and facility and the LNG bunker transfer system, providing the minimum functional requirements
qualified by a structured risk assessment approach taking into consideration LNG properties and
behaviour, simultaneous operations and all parties involved in the operation.
This document is applicable to bunkering of both seagoing and inland trading vessels. It covers LNG
bunkering from shore or ship, mobile to ship and ship to ship LNG supply scenarios, as described in
Clause 4.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC Guide 73, Risk management — Vocabulary
ISO 31010, Risk management — Guidelines on principles and implementation of risk management
ISO 20519, Ships and marine technology — Specification for bunkering of liquefied natural gas fuelled
vessels
IMO, IGF Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low flashpoint fuels
IMO, IGC International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in
Bulk
IMO, International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC Guide 73 and the
following apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://w ww.iso.org/obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https://w ww.electropedia.org/
© ISO 2021 – All rights reserved 1

3.1.1
as low as reasonably practical
ALARP
reducing a risk to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble,
difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the
additional risk reduction obtained
3.1.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE
sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurized flammable liquid followed by a fireball
3.1.3
bunkering
process of transferring fuel to a ship
3.1.4
bunkering facility
system designed to be used to transfer/bunker liquefied gas as fuel to a gas-fuelled vessel
Note 1 to entry: It may consist of a floating, shore-based, fixed or mobile fuel-supply facility, such as a bunker
vessel, terminal or road tanker.
3.1.5
bunkering site
location dedicated for bunkering comprising the bunkering installations, port and jetty, and other
facilities and equipment that should be considered in the planning of bunkering
3.1.6
competent authority
organization or organizations that implement the requirements of legislation and regulate installations
that must comply with the requirements of legislation
3.1.7
consequence
outcome of an event
3.1.8
drip tray
spill containment manufactured of material that can tolerate cryogenic temperatures
3.1.9
emergency shut-down
ESD
method that safely and effectively stops the bunker/transfer of natural gas and vapour between the
supply facilities and receiving ship
3.1.10
gas-fuelled vessel
GFV
vessel using gas as marine fuel
3.1.11
hazard
potential source of harm
3.1.12
hazard identification
HAZID
brainstorming exercise using checklists where the potential hazards in a project are identified and
gathered in a risk register for follow up in the project
2 © ISO 2021 – All rights reserved

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
3.1.13
impact assessment
assessment of how consequences (fires, explosions, etc.) affect people, structures the environment, etc.
3.1.14
individual risk
probability on an annual basis for an individual to be killed due to accidental events arising from the
activity
3.1.15
mist
fog
cloud that will be generated by condensing humidity in air when in contact with cold surfaces during
bunkering
Note 1 to entry: This mist will reduce visibility and can mask minor leaks.
3.1.16
monitoring and security area
area around the bunkering facility and ship where ship traffic and other activities are monitored (and
controlled) to mitigate harmful effects
3.1.17
probability
extent to which an event is likely to occur
3.1.18
rapid phase transition
RPT
shock wave forces generated by instantaneous vaporization of LNG upon coming in contact with water
3.1.19
receiver
one or more organizations with ownership, operational and/or legal interests in a gas-fuelled vessel
Note 1 to entry: The receiver can be the vessel owner(s), the charterer or the operator.
[SOURCE: Reference [24]]

3.1.20
risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm
3.1.21
risk analysis
systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk
3.1.22
risk assessment
overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation
3.1.23
risk contour
two-dimensional representation of risk (e.g. individual risk on a map)
3.1.24
risk evaluation
procedure based on the risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk has been achieved
3.1.25
safety
freedom from unacceptable risk

3.1.26
safety zone
area around the bunkering station where only dedicated and essential personnel and activities are
allowed during bunkering
3.1.27
stakeholder
individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a
risk
3.28
supplier
one or more organizations with ownership, operational and/ or legal interests in a bunkering facility
Note 1 to entry: The supplier can be the bunker vessel owner, charterer or operator; the LNG bunkering terminal
owner or operator; the road tanker fleet manager; the LNG producer; and so on.
[SOURCE: Reference [24]]

3.1.29
tolerable risk
risk that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society
3.1.30
topping up
final sequence of LNG transfer to ensure correct filling level in receiving tank
3.1.31
water curtain
sprinkler arrangement to protect steel surfaces from direct contact with LNG
3.2 Abbreviated terms
BASiL bunkering area safety information for LNG

ERC emergency release coupling
ERS emergency release system
HFO heavy fuel oil
HSE health, safety, and environment
IMO international maritime organization
LNG liquefied natural gas
MGO marine gas oil
PPE personal protective equipment
QualRA qualitative risk assessment
QCA quantitative consequence assessment
QRA quantitative risk assessment
SGMF society for gas as marine fuel
SIMOPS simultaneous operations
STCW seafarers’ training, certification and watch-
keeping
NOTE LNG is defined in ISO 16903.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
4 Bunkering supply scenarios

Selection of the bunkering supply scenario should consider the following factors:
a) LNG process conditions (e.g. LNG bunkering volumes, transfer rates and LNG pressure and
temperature);
b) simultaneous operations (e.g. loading/unloading cargo, embarkation of passengers, transfer of
other bunker fuels);
c) possible interference with other activities in the bunkering location (e.g. port area);
d) bunker transfer equipment;
e) type of receiving LNG fuelled ship and bunkering facility;
f) safety studies undertaken for the bunkering operations (e.g. risk assessment and safety zone
defined in Clause 7);
g) local conditions (e.g. weather, traffic).
Three typical LNG bunkering supply scenarios have been considered in this document (see Figure 1):
— Mobile-to-Ship: An LNG bunkering operation to a gas-fuelled vessel from a mobile bunkering facility
located onshore. Mobile bunkering facilities can consist of a truck, rail car or other mobile device
(including portable tanks) used to bunker LNG (see Figure 1).
— Shore-to-Ship: An LNG bunkering operation to a gas-fuelled vessel from a fixed bunkering facility or
terminal (see Figure 1).
— Ship-to-Ship: An LNG bunkering operation to a gas-fuelled vessel from a floating storage or bunker
vessel (see Figure 1).

Receiver Supplier Receiver Supplier

Gas-fuelled vessel Bunkering facility Gas-fuelled vessel Bunkering facility
Mobile to Ship bunkering from a truck Mobile to Ship bunkering from multiple trucks/port-
able tanks, throughout a jointed manifold/pumping
station
Receiver Supplier Receiver Supplier

Gas-fuelled vessel Bunkering facility Gas-fuelled vessel Bunkering facility
Ship to ship bunkering from a floating storage or bun- Shore to ship bunkering from a fixed bunkering facili-
ker vessel ty/terminal
Figure 1 — Typical LNG supply bunkering scenarios
5 Properties and behaviour of LNG
5.1 General
The properties, characteristics and behaviour of LNG differ significantly from conventional marine
fuels for example HFO and MGO, etc. For these reasons, it is essential that all LNG bunkering operations
are undertaken with diligence, that due attention is paid to prevent leakage of LNG liquid or vapour and
that sources of ignition in the vicinity (i.e. inside the safety zone) of the bunkering operation are strictly
controlled. Therefore, it is necessary that throughout the LNG bunkering supply chain, each element
is carefully designed and has dedicated safety operational and maintenance procedures executed by
trained and competent personnel.
5.2 Description and hazards of LNG

Description of LNG is fully covered in ISO 16903 but for the purposes of LNG bunkering, the most
important characteristics compared with marine gas fuel are described in this subclause.
At atmospheric pressure, depending upon composition, LNG boils at approximately ‒160 °C. Released
LNG will form a boiling pool on the ground or on the water where the evaporation rate (and vapour
generation) depends on the heat transfer to the pool.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
LNG for fuel supply may be delivered at an elevated pressure and at a temperature exceeding its boiling
point at atmospheric conditions (e.g. at 5 bar and at ‒155 °C). Release of LNG under such conditions will
result in instantaneous flashing and larger vapour release compared to evaporation from liquid pools.
The vapour release will form a flammable cloud which at these temperatures is denser than air. The
dispersing gas becomes lighter than air (buoyant) at approximately ‒110 °C so will drift with wind and
be diluted by atmospheric turbulence and diffusion. The coldness of the gas will condense moisture in
the air making the dispersing gas visible as a white cloud.
Cold surfaces in the bunker transfer system can also cause mist or fog by condensing humidity in the
air that might mask a release.
LNG can cause brittle fracture if spilled on unprotected carbon steel.
Natural gas has a flammable range between 5 % and 15 % when mixed with air.
Natural gas has a flashpoint of ‒187 °C and a high self-ignition temperature (theoretically, approximately
540 °C. The properties of traditional fuels are different; MGO has a flashpoint in excess of 60 °C and a
self-ignition temperature of 300 °C for MGO or a gas oil vapour/aerosol air mixture.
The ignition energy of natural gas/air mixtures is 0,25 mJ, which is lower than most other hydrocarbons.
Natural gas releases are not easily ignited by hot surfaces that ignite most conventional fuel oil fires in
engine rooms, but low energy sparks represent a higher risk.
Methane has a high greenhouse gas potential and venting to the atmosphere shall not be part of normal
operations.
The following are the main hazards associated with LNG applicable to bunkering operations:
— fire (pool fire, jet/torch fire, flash fire) explosion (in confined spaces) from ignited natural gas
evaporating from spilled LNG;
— vapour dispersion;
— brittle fracture of the steel structure exposed to LNG spills;
— frostbite or cold burn from liquid or cold vapour spills;
— asphyxiation from vapour release;
— over-pressure or pressure surge of the bunker system caused by thermal expansion or vaporization
of trapped LNG;
NOTE The thermal expansion coefficient of LNG is high.
— release in confined spaces causing over-pressure due to vaporization of liquid;

— possible RPT (rapid phase transition from liquid to gas);
— possible stratification with existing LNG in tanks (might later lead to inadvertent venting of gas);
— possible BLEVE of a pressurized tank subjected to a fire.
5.3 Potential hazardous situations associated with LNG bunker transfer

The planning, design, and operation should focus on preventing release of LNG and vapour and avoiding
occupational accidents related to the handling of equipment. The risk and hazards related to the LNG
bunkering are closely linked to the potential rate of release in accidental situations and factors such as
transfer rates, inventories in hoses and piping, protective systems such as detection systems, ESD, and
spill protection are essential.

5.4 Composition of LNG as a bunker fuel

The specification of the LNG supplied as fuel is defined in ISO 23306.
The composition will change with ageing also known as weathering (due to preferential evaporation),
commingling from different sources/suppliers and will modify the fuel composition.
6 Safety
6.1 Objectives
Safety shall be the primary objective for the planning, design, and operation of facilities for the delivery
of LNG as marine fuel taking into consideration simultaneous operations and the interaction with third
parties.
LNG bunkering might be carried out without simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), but more often some
SIMOPS such as cargo operations, bunkering with passengers on-board or embarking/disembarking is
occurring at the same time and these need acceptance by all parties involved as competent authority,
port authorities, terminal, ship and bunkering operator, and supplier operator.
Furthermore, in all LNG bunkering cases a risk assessment must be performed for the specific
bunkering operations, location, bunkering scenario and process conditions. This risk assessment should
be appropriate to the operation and risks and it should provide evidence that risks have been identified
and sufficiently mitigated to allow their acceptance by the competent authority. Risk assessment
methodology for the different conditions as described in factors above are recommended in Clause 7.
The safety of the bunkering operation shall not be compromised by commercial requirements.
6.2 General safety principles

The planning, design, procurement, construction, and operation should be implemented through
quality, health, safety, and environmental management systems.
6.3 Approach
The safety targets for the operation of the bunkering scenarios shall be demonstrated by meeting the
requirements as defined in Clause 8, and supported by a risk assessment as outlined in Clause 7.
7 Risk assessment
7.1 General
An assessment of risk to individuals, local populations, assets and the environment shall be undertaken
as a part of the development of the bunkering facility and the gas fuelled vessel and their operations.
The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide confidence to all stakeholders that the specific risks of
LNG bunkering have been appropriately considered and assessed.
The risk assessment will also help with the determination of the required controlled zones around the
bunkering operation, as per 7.6 that limit access, equipment and activities within them.
The risk assessment shall be conducted in accordance with IEC 31010:2019 or equivalent. ISO/TS 16901
and ISO 17776 provide guidance on risk assessment techniques used in other sectors. They can also be
a useful reference, although the risk criteria might not be directly applicable to the bunkering of LNG.
The risk assessment shall be undertaken by suitably qualified and experienced individuals and ensure
an objective and independent assessment.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
The main steps in the risk assessment shall be to

a) identify what can go wrong (hazard identification),
b) determine the effects (consequence and impact assessment),
c) assess the likelihood,
d) determine the level of risk,
e) compare the risk against agreed criteria, and
f) if the risk is unacceptable, identify risk reducing measures.
After applying risk reduction measures, the above steps shall be repeated until the risk is deemed to
satisfy the agreed criteria.
An LNG bunkering risk assessment shall be completed before any operations can be undertaken,
however different parties might decide to carry out only one or multiple risk assessments at different
stages of the LNG fuelled vessel and bunkering facility development.
For example, a design stage risk assessment might be performed. This is carried out in the early design
stage of a bunkering facility or gas-fuelled vessel as it provides specific design recommendations which,
if considered at this stage, mitigate more substantial costs of implementation later during construction
or after the build. At this stage, the design and particulars of the gas-fuelled vessel and bunkering facility
as well as the specific bunkering location might not be fully available, and a number of assumptions
might be required, which will need to be validated at the next stage.
In addition, an operational risk assessment is performed to identify and address operational, and
location specific risks and mitigations based on the previous design stage risk assessment. At this
stage, the design and particulars of the gas-fuelled vessel and bunkering facility as well as the specific
bunkering location should be available. This stage might be repeated/validated as bunkering operations
become clearer or change over time, e.g. different bunkering location or bunkering scenario.
The risk acceptance criteria are defined in Annex A.
7.2 Types of risk assessment

The risk assessment can follow one of several forms. Typically, these include:
a) Qualitative Risk Assessment (QualRA) where analysis is undertaken to categorize the likelihood of
events and their consequences using judgements to provide a combined assessment in the form of a
grading that can be compared against criteria.
b) Quantitative Consequence Assessment (QCA) of the predicted outcome of selected events in terms
of magnitude and distance, etc. to determine the extent to which casualties and damage can occur.
c) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) where numerical analysis is undertaken for a range of event
likelihoods and their consequences to provide a combined assessment in the form of a number, rate
or contour that can be compared against criteria.
The principal differences between the risk assessment types are as follows:
a) QualRA uses expert judgement to identify events and categorize their likelihood and consequences
based upon experience, knowledge and reference to appropriate work and research.
b) QCA uses expert judgement to identify the events to be analysed and numerical models to estimate
the potential consequences of those events.
c) QRA uses expert judgement to select a representative set of events; numerical models to
estimate the potential consequences of those events; operational and empirical data to estimate

their likelihood; and numerical models to calculate and sum the risk from each likelihood and
consequence combination.
The type of risk assessment to be undertaken will depend upon a number of factors, such as the
requirements of the competent authorities, the type and number of persons potentially at risk, and the
complexity of the bunkering operation. The stakeholders shall agree which type(s) is used.
A QualRA is the minimum required by this document and can suffice where the bunkering supply
scenarios are as outlined in Clause 4. Furthermore, in some cases, QualRA can be sufficient to
demonstrate that the agreed risk acceptance criteria are met, and risks are ALARP. In other cases, it
may be used as an initial evaluation prior to carrying out a QCA and/or a QRA.
A QCA or QRA can be appropriate when
— the bunkering operation is considered complex,
— many persons can be in close proximity, for example, when bunkering is close to population centres,
— bunkering deviates from the standard bunkering supply scenarios outlined in Clause 4; and/or,
— simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) are anticipated, for example, bunkering with passengers
disembarking.
A QCA or QRA can also be necessary to adequately determine the Safety Zone and/or the Monitoring
and Security Area.
A QCA can be the preferred tool in non-sensitive locations (e.g. remote areas not in proximity to
populations centres).
A QRA can be used, if the competent authority allows, to reduce the size of QCA events by considering
the likelihood of occurrence
7.3 Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders

The bunkering operation can involve and impact many organizations with differing interests and views.
These stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities should be identified during the planning of the
risk assessment and they should be considered when undertaking the risk assessment. As a minimum,
the following stakeholders should be taken into consideration:
a) LNG supplier;
b) LNG receiver;
c) designer;
d) regulator;
e) port authority;
f) terminal operator;
g) emergency services;
h) port users;
i) neighbours and the public.
The typical roles and responsibilities of these stakeholders are noted in Table 1.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Table 1 — Typical Stakeholders - roles and responsibilities

Stakeholder Role Responsibility
LNG supplier Conduct/organize risk assessment Make available technical specification
and obtain permit/license to operate of bunkering facility and operating
conditions and procedures
LNG receiver Input to risk assessment covering Make available technical specification
specific vessel and operation of vessel and operating procedures
Designer Can provide input to risk assessment Make available design criteria and
covering equipment and system design technical specifications of equipment
Regulator Can be involved as subject matter expert Will set the risk assessment criteria and
or approve risk assessment define applicability of local legislation
Port authority Consider impact of LNG bunkering Make available detailed information
on port activities and vice versa. Can concerning port activities, as required.
conduct port level risk assessment and Issue permit or license
set permit requirement
Terminal operator Consider impact of LNG bunkering on Make available detailed information
terminal activities and vice versa concerning terminal activities, as re-
quired
Emergency services Informed party and/or input to risk as- Make available information as
sessment covering emergency response applicable
Port users Informed party Make available information through
port authority if required
Neighbouring facilities Informed party Make available information through
port authority/local authority if re-
quired
Public Informed party None
NOTE 1 Port authority/regulator role can be interchangeable or be the same entity and acting as competent authority with
jurisdiction over the bunkering operation/location.
NOTE 2 Designer, includes facility(s), vessel(s) and equipment designers, as applicable.
NOTE 3 All stakeholders are responsible for the implementation of agreed mitigation measures, as applicable.
This table should be reviewed for each area/application.
7.4 Approach, scope and basis

The core activities of the risk assessment are listed in steps ‘a’ to ‘f’ in 7.1 above but prior to
commencement of the risk assessment there is a need to define the scope and basis of the study. For
example, it is important to identify and agree the equipment, facilities, operations, vessels and locations
to be studied, and the risk criteria to be used. Table 2 summarizes information requirements and the
principal considerations in determining the scope and the study basis.
Table 2 — Scope and study basis – information requirements and considerations

Risk criteria Identification of the risk criteria to be used (e.g. qualitative or quantitative criteria
used by the competent authority)
Location Description of the bunkering location together with details of port operations, ma-
rine traffic, neighbouring facilities and the type and number of persons normally in
proximity (e.g. bunkering personnel, port workers and members of the public)
Layout General description of the bunkering installation including the layout and arrange-
ment of the equipment
Equipment Detailed description, including function and design, of mechanical and electrical
equipment, control systems, safety systems and their sub-systems and components
Process conditions Detailed description of the process conditions for each bunkering supply scenario e.g.
flowrates, pressures, temperatures, etc.
a More details on the operations can be found in SGMF bunkering guidelines[24] the IACS[35] and SGMF FP10-01[28].

Table 2 (continued)
Operations a Description of the sequence, duration and number of operations, and operational
limitations with respect to:
Pre-bunkering phase - ensuring all the assessment and authorizations have been
completed and/or obtained and procedures are agreed between the LNG supplier
and receiver before commencing the operations.
Preparation for bunker phase - Covering the mooring of the vessel(s) and the preparation
of the transfer and safety equipment including checking that the location, quantity,
suitability, condition etc. are all as assessed and agreed during the pre-bunkering phase.
Connection and testing phase - safe transfer, connection and testing of all the neces-
sary equipment, including leak testing and inerting.
Bunkering Phase - Cooling down followed by the LNG bunker transfer and including
the topping up/ramp down phase.
Completion Phase - Draining, purging and inerting before the secure, safe discon-
nection and retrieval of the transfer and safety equipment prior to separation of the
receiving ship and bunkering facilities
Other and special operations - Commissioning, security, vessel traffic and port/har-
bour specific issues and characteristics, de-bunkering, warming up, etc.
Management control Organization of the bunkering activities with clear definitions of the roles, respon-
sibilities and communication/documentation for the gas fuelled vessel crew and the
bunkering facility personnel
SIMOPS Description of simultaneous operations being undertaken by the receiving vessel and
other vessels in proximity to the bunkering operation
Environmental Conditions Review of local met ocean information and weather data
a More details on the operations can be found in SGMF bunkering guidelines[24] the IACS[35] and SGMF FP10-01[28].
A summary of the study basis shall be documented or referenced in the risk assessment report, as
appropriate.
To facilitate the risk assessment process, example causes and consequences of hazardous events and
commonly adopted safeguards/mitigation measures are provided in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
Table 3 — Example hazardous events and consequences

Causes Consequences
Failure of vessels pipes etc. containing LNG or NG Release of LNG and/or NG leading to large flammable
vapour cloud which could result in:
Use of unsuitable materials due to incorrect design Brittle fracture of metal structures and other nearby
criteria, material specification or fabrication equipment
Failure due to high/low pressure or high/low tem- Rapid phase transition
perature
Failure due to corrosion Injuries to personnel due to exposure to cold (e.g. frostbite)
Environmental impacts
Failure due to over pressurization Damage to equipment
Malfunction of pressure control systems and devices
Inadequate protection against thermal expansion
Overfilling of tank
Pressure surge in transfer line
NOTE 1 Some causes or consequences might not always be applicable.
NOTE 2 Some causes can also be consequences, and some consequences can be causes.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Table 3 (continued)
Causes Consequences
LNG rollover
Poor/inadequate inspection and maintenance of
pressure containing equipment
Incorrect written procedures
Operational error
Fire in the vicinity due to other fuel release or
cargo fire
Failure due to low temperature

Brittle fracture due to release of LNG or other
cryogenic fluid
Blockage due to ice formation
Failure due to impact

Collision with ship, truck or other vessel/vehicle
Falling object
Sabotage, vandalism or malicious act
Failure of quay berthing equipment or structure
Explosion in the vicinity due to other fuel release,
cargo fire or dust release
Failure due to brittle fracture from LNG or Liquid
Nitrogen spill
Subsidence
Ignition sources present in hazardous area due to: Fire/explosion/BLEVE if ignition of gas release occurs
Use of non-compliant electrical or control equipment Secondary fires
Inadequate maintenance of mechanical equipment
Inadequate protection against lightning
Static from personnel clothing or cargo equipment
Use of mobile equipment
Incorrect operational procedures
Incorrect operation (human error)
Sabotage, vandalism or malicious act
Failure of vessels pipes etc. containing Liquid Release of Liquid Nitrogen

Nitrogen
Asphyxiation of personnel
Brittle fracture of equipment
NOTE 1 Some causes or consequences might not always be applicable.

NOTE 2 Some causes can also be consequences, and some consequences can be causes.
The risk assessment shall assess all hazard scenarios identified and agreed and, as a minimum, consider:
a) flash fires;

b) jet/torch fires;
c) pool fires;
d) explosions;
e) Rapid Phase Transitions (RPTs);
f) structural damage.
7.5 Mitigation measures

The measures or safeguards to be taken to mitigate a potentially hazardous event can be classified into
three categories:
— A passive safeguard - one that is always in place, for example a physical barrier. It does not depend
upon any action, either manual or automated, to be taken in response to a potentially hazardous
event.
— An active safeguard - one that requires the activation of a protective device in order to implement
a measure(s) to mitigate the hazard. For example, a signal from a gas detector initiating the closure
of a valve.
— A procedural/operational safeguard - one that is an active following a human response.
Passive, active and procedural/operational safeguards are essential for safe bunkering. Examples of
typical safeguards are listed Table 4. This table is non-exhaustive, and as illustrated by the examples, a
safeguard could be active, passive or procedural dependent upon the context of use and design.
Wherever possible, passive safeguards should be adopted in preference to active safeguards, and an
automated active safeguard is preferable to a procedural/operational safeguard.
Table 4 — Safeguard examples (risk reduction measures and controls)

Safeguards Passive Active Procedural/
Operational
Separation
e.g. (1) distant equipment arrangement or physical boundary; (1) (2)
(2) bunkering safety zone or security zone
Containment

e.g. drip trays and double-walled pipework
Fire protection
e.g. (1) A-60 boundary; (2) water spray on fire detection; (3) portable (1) (2) (3)
fire extinguishers
Structural protection
e.g. (1) fixed sheath to protect hull from LNG spills; (2) water curtain (1) (2)
initiated on leak detection to protect hull from LNG spills
Design specification
e.g. more dependable and robust equipment, materials & design 
standards
Insulation and coatings
e.g. (1) foam/block insulation of liquefied storage tanks; (2) vacuum (1) (2)
insulation system for liquefied storage tanks
Control of ignition sources
e.g. (1) ex-rated equipment; (2) access control of portable equipment (1) (2)
and personnel

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Table 4 (continued)
Safeguards Passive Active Procedural/
Operational
Venting
e.g. (1) tank PRVs & burst discs; (2) automated opening of valves (1) (2) (3)
on set pressure value; (3) manual opening of vent valves
Ventilation
e.g. (1) air rate change upon gas detection; (2) closure of ventila- (1) (2)
tion inlets on gas detection
Process Monitoring
e.g. (1) automated warning for specified pressure increase; (2) (1) (2)
operator monitoring;
ESD system/ESD link

e.g. detection of vessel separation, overfilling, overpressure, etc.
ERS (Emergency Release System)
e.g. (1) break-away coupling; (2) disconnection of hose given leak (1 (2)
detection onboard ship
Release detection

e.g. low temperature detectors, gas detectors
Low oxygen detection

e.g. oxygen detectors
Mooring monitoring

e.g. manual observation and warning
Procedures

e.g. task sheets, manuals, checklists, compatibility checks
Training and qualifications

e.g. courses/tests to provide knowledge and proficiency
Maintenance and Inspection

e.g. planned periodic maintenance and inspection
Evacuation and emergency response plans

e.g. crew procedures in the event of a gas release
Access restriction and controls

e.g. restricting access to appropriately trained personnel
Port/terminal rules, procedures and security

e.g. vessel traffic management
Weather forecasting

e.g. checking weather and met-ocean forecasts before bunkering
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

e.g. use of appropriate clothing, hand and eye wear
7.6 Reporting
The risk assessment shall be documented in a report that, as a minimum, describes the following:
a) study basis including description of design, operations, software and assumptions;
b) description of the risk assessment process;

c) information on the relevant qualifications and expertise of the risk assessment team;
d) summary of the identified hazards and results of the risk assessment;
e) failure scenario(s) to be used as a basis for determination of the Safety Zone;
f) summary of follow up actions, if any;
g) detailed records from the workshop.
It also might include the following where determined during the course of the risk assessment:
h) determined Safety Zone;
i) determined Monitoring & Security Area.
The risk assessment report should be shared with the relevant stakeholders.
7.7 Safety Zone and controlled areas

A Safety Zone is required during the bunkering operation. Its purpose is to ensure that non-essential
personnel and potential ignition sources are not in close proximity to LNG/NG containing equipment.
The Safety Zone is active as soon as connections between the supplier and receiving vessel are being
prepared, and until the bunkering operation is complete.
Permitted entry to the Safety Zone and other restrictions shall be clearly communicated to those
involved in the bunkering operation, and the zone shall be clearly designated/marked as illustrated in
Figure 2.
In addition to the Safety Zone, Hazardous Zones are also present. The purpose of these is to minimize the
likelihood of ignition where LNG/NG might be present near to connections, equipment and ventilation
outlets, etc., e.g. flanges, couplings, valves and ventilation exhausts. These zones are determined by
reference to hazardous area classification standards, such as IEC 60079-10-1 (or similar). Typically,
zones are referred to as Zone 1 or Zone 2, and place requirements on electrical equipment located
within these zones.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Key
hazardous zones
safety zone
monitoring and security area
Figure 2 — Safety zone and controlled areas
The Monitoring and Security Area is a defined three-dimensional space established around a bunkering
facility within which activities, including vessel and personnel movements, need to be identified and
monitored to ensure that they do not affect the safety of the bunkering operation by encroaching on the
Safety Zone of the gas-fuelled ship, the quayside or the LNG bunkering infrastructure. Activities in the
Monitoring and Security Area can be subject to regulatory restrictions. The Monitoring and Security
Area is only relevant during bunkering operations.
7.8 Safety zone determination

The determination of the Safety Zone is specific to each bunkering scenario, and can be determined
— as the calculated distance to a specified level of harm, e.g. for the maximum credible release, the
dispersion distance to the lower flammable limit (LFL), or
— as the calculated distance to a specified level of individual risk.
The approach to determining the Safety Zone needs to be agreed with the relevant stakeholders. and
should reflect the project specific factors such as but not limited to the following:
— LNG inventory in the bunkering facilities;
— properties of the LNG in the bunkering system (temperature, pressure);
— operational modes (e.g. hose bunker system, loading arm);

— implemented safeguards (e.g. bunkering ESD system);

— LNG transfer rates and pressures;
— weather conditions;
— failure scenarios (e.g. release rate, quantity and duration).
The inputs and constraints used for determining the boundaries of the Safety Zone should be clearly
defined.
Regardless of the calculation method
— the Safety Zone shall fully encompass the Hazardous Zones, and
— it is presupposed that the size and configuration of the Safety Zone will not be less than the minimum
distances defined by the competent authorities.
Examples of the determination of Safety Zone are provided in Annex B.
7.9 Determination of monitoring and security areas

Detailed procedures for establishing Monitoring and Security Areas are beyond the scope of this
document.
The size and configuration of the Monitoring and Security Area are established by the LNG supplier, the
local authorities and other stakeholders, as appropriate.
As the reasons for creating the Monitoring and Security Area are many and wide-ranging, it is generally
not possible to define or justify its size by calculation. It should be considered as an extension of the
Safety Zone.
All the findings from the risk assessment shall be taken into account in the determination of the
Monitoring and Security Area in order to:
a) ensure that all port activities (e.g. ship movements) that could put the bunkering operation at risk
are strictly monitored and controlled;
b) all areas where personnel could be at risk from the bunkering operations are identified.
Any restrictions caused by the Monitoring and Security Area that might limit access for emergency
personnel and/or impact specific actions required by the emergency response plan shall be considered.
The Monitoring and Security Area shall always be larger than the Safety Zone and shall extend well
beyond the boundaries of the Safety Zone.
Monitoring and Security Areas can fall within, or partially within, Restricted Areas within the port
facility, required by the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, but are typically smaller than
these Restricted Areas.
7.10 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs)

Where it is proposed to carry out bunkering operations concurrently with other operations that
can impact or be impacted by the bunkering, then a further risk assessment should be carried out to
demonstrate that the required level of safety can be maintained.
SIMOPs are defined as: LNG bunkering plus one, or more, other activity and/or operation conducted
at the same time where their interaction may adversely impact safety, ship integrity and/or the
environment. It might affect the extent of the safety zone.
SIMOPs can take place anywhere in the locality of the bunkering operations, including on the receiving
ship, on the bunker vessel, on the quayside, or in surrounding waters.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
SIMOPs involve the actions taken by several parties including but not limited to crew of the receiving
ship, personnel of the bunker facility, terminal/port personnel and third-party people and personnel.
Before any SIMOPs are carried out, the risk level for each SIMOP should be shown by risk assessment to
be at an acceptable level and shall be agreed by all parties involved. A permit is issued by the relevant
authority before any simultaneous operations are carried out.
The following list gives examples of where risk assessment for simultaneous operations should be
considered (the list is not exhaustive):
— cargo handling;
— ballasting operations;
— passenger embarking/disembarking;
— vehicles embarking/disembarking;
— dangerous goods loading/unloading;
— loading or unloading of any other good (i.e. stores and provisions);
— chemical products handling including toxic cargos;
— bunkering of fuels other than LNG;
— maintenance and testing of equipment and systems including software;
— any hot work or activity that could create sparks.
The risk assessment should take into account as a minimum, but not be limited to, the following:
— size of the bunkering Safety Zone and the Monitoring and Security Area;
— SIMOPs and how this interacts with the bunkering Safety Zone;
— failure scenarios;
— access, egress and escape/evacuation routes;
— access, including evacuation routes and times;
— the type of cargo operation;
— safeguards in place to control passenger/cargo movements;
— dropped objects;
— positions of vent mast and air intakes;
— locations of hazardous cargo handling;
— other restrictions that can apply.
8 Functional requirements for LNG bunker transfer system
8.1 General
The functional requirements for LNG bunker transfer systems have been determined assuming:
a) internationally recognized standards, such as ISO 20519, and good engineering practices for LNG
bunkering (e.g. Reference [24]) shall be adopted for the supplier and the LNG fuelled ship;

b) systems shall be designed and operated to prevent releases of LNG/natural gas, and venting shall
be only undertaken to prevent or mitigate an emergency situation;
c) engineering and procedural means shall be provided to safely vent, disperse, contain and detect an
LNG/natural gas release, and prevent subsequent ignition;
d) engineering and procedural means shall be provided to safely contain, detect and extinguish fires,
and protect against radiation and explosion;
e) emergency preparedness procedures and plans shall be established to minimize escalation
following an accidental release and to protect individuals and the environment.
The functional requirements are numbered as [Fx] in this document for easy cross-referencing.
8.2 Functional requirements

[F1] The compatibility assessment between supplier and LNG fuelled ship shall be confirmed and
documented prior to commencement of bunkering operations as part of the LNG bunker checklist as
given in ISO 20519 or in a suitable equivalent agreed by involved parties.
[F2] The bunker transfer system shall be arranged so that it can be commissioned, decommissioned,
and operated (including purging and inerting) without release of LNG/natural gas to the atmosphere.
Appropriate operating procedures shall be established.
[F3] LNG transfer shall be carried out in closed systems where the components are connected, and leak
tested before commencement of LNG transfer.
[F4] The design shall reflect the full range of operating conditions and shall conform to the applicable
standards published by IMO and ISO. It should reflect good engineering practice and guidance published
by SDOs and industry organizations (e.g. SGMF).
[F5] The design shall reflect the conditions under which bunkering will be undertaken (local conditions,
e.g. ship motions, weather, and visibility).
[F6] The bunker transfer system shall be capable of being drained, de-pressurized, and inerted before
connections and disconnections are made.
[F7] The bunker transfer system shall be designed to avoid liquid lock (trapped liquids in absence of
relief valve).
[F7bis] The bunker transfer system shall prevent air and moisture ingress into the ship fuel gas system.
[F8] Operating procedures shall be established and documented to define the bunkering process and
ensure that components and systems are safely operated within their design parameters during all
operational phases:
a) receiving tank(s) is sufficiently empty to commence bunkering;
b) monitoring and control instrumentation is in working order and appropriately calibrated;
c) monitoring and control of ship traffic and other activities within the security zone that can
influence the bunkering process are aligned with regulatory requirements;
d) equipment and procedures for safe mooring;
e) connection and inerting/purging;
f) leak testing;
g) cool down/testing;
h) monitoring of the operation;

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
i) transfer;
j) topping up and shutdown;
k) draining/purging/inerting;
l) disconnection;
m) storage and handling of components.
[F9] All systems and components shall be operated, maintained, inspected and tested according to the
vendor requirements and recommendations.
[F9bis] All individuals involved with the bunkering operation shall be appropriately trained, competent
and equipped with PPE.
[F10] An organizational plan shall be prepared and implemented in operational plans and reflected in
qualification requirements. The plan shall describe the following:
a) organization;
b) roles and responsibilities for the ship crew and bunkering personnel;
c) communication lines and language for communication.
[F11] Operating procedures shall include a checklist to be completed and confirmed by the involved
parties prior to the commencement of bunkering (see F.1).
[F12] Emergency equipment and personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the approved
emergency response plan.
[F13] Prevention of ignition of natural gas releases by the elimination of ignition sources in classified
hazardous areas and by controlling activities in the safety zone for the bunkering operation.
[F14] Elimination of the potential spark or high currents from static or galvanic cells when the
bunkering system is connected or disconnected (see ISO 20519).
[F15] Effective leak detection of LNG and natural gas. Selection of sensors and their location should
consider possible presence of dust, mist and fog that can mask the leak.
[F16] The bunker transfer operation shall be capable of being safely shut down without release of LNG/
natural gas.
[F16bis] In event of emergency, a linked emergency shutdown system shall automatically or manually
initiate an emergency shutdown signal to the LNG fuelled ship and to the supplier to ensure that
appropriate actions are taken both on the supplier, as well as on the LNG fuelled ship.
[F17] The bunker transfer system shall be equipped with an emergency release system (ERS) that
allows it to be disconnected rapidly and minimize damage in the event of a potential emergency, e.g.
ships drifting or vehicle movement.
[F18] The release of LNG or cold vapour should not lead to an escalation due to brittle fractures of steel
structure. Arrangements shall be installed as required on bunkering facilities and on LNG fuelled ships
according to ISO 20519 and the IGF code as applicable.
[F19] A safety zone shall be implemented around the bunkering operation (see Annex B).
[F20] A monitoring and security area shall be established around the bunkering facility. Activities in
this area shall be monitored to reduce harmful effects on the bunkering operation.
[F21] A contingency plan shall be in place outlining the requirements for the following:
a) evacuation of personnel and third parties;

b) mobilizing fire-fighting;
c) mobilizing first aid, hospitals, and ambulances;
d) communication to authorities and third parties;
e) copies of the plan shall be communicated to all parties involved in the bunkering operation
including the planned emergency response team and be part of the training programme. This
should be practiced at regular intervals both as “table top” and practical exercises. Key information
from this plan related to access, evacuation, and ignition minimization shall be communicated.
9 Training
All personnel involved in LNG bunkering operations shall be adequately trained. Such training shall be
appropriate for the purpose and a record of training shall be maintained.
Personnel on the supply side and receiving vessels shall meet the applicable training requirements
outlined in the Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), IGF Code, IGC Code and
ISO 20519 whether the vessel is involved in international service or is under IMO size limits.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Annex A
(informative)
Risk acceptance criteria
A.1 General
Qualitative Risk Assessment (QualRA), Quantitative Consequence Assessment (QCA) and Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) provide a means to estimate the level or magnitude of risk presented by
bunkering LNG. Risk criteria are required to help judge if this risk is ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or
‘unacceptable’.
As with the numerous approaches to risk assessment, there are many different types of risk criteria.
It is therefore important that all stakeholders agree appropriate criteria to assist transparent and
consistent judgements on risk.
Examples of criteria for QualRA and QRA are given in A.2, A.3 and A.4.
A.2 Example of Risk Criteria for QualRA

The following example is based upon a review of risk criteria used by industry and governments in
assessing the risks from the oil, gas and chemical industries other. Alternative risk matrices are also
available and used.
The following matrix criteria might be used to rank major LNG bunkering operation risk only.
NOTE Above 10-2/year Consequence (severity) categories A, B and C are unacceptable. Similar examples can
be given for asset, societal or environmental risks.
Figure A.1 — Example of matrix criteria
Consequence Categories
A Major injury
Long-term disability/health effect

B Single fatality or multiple major injuries
One death or multiple individuals suffering long-term disability/health effects
C Multiple fatalities
Two or more deaths for third party people

NOTE Third party person and crew consequence category ranking might differ depending on the
matrix criteria chosen.
Likelihood Categories
1 Remote 1 in a million or less per year

2 Extremely Unlikely between 1 in a million and 1 in 100 000 per year
3 Very Unlikely between 1 in 100 000 and 1 in 10 000 per year
4 Unlikely between 1 in 10 000 and 1 in 1 000 per year
5 Likely between 1 in 1 000 and 1 in 100 per year
Risk Ratings
Acceptable
The risk can be accepted. Where practical and cost-effective it is good practice to implement
safeguards to further reduce the risk.
Tolerable
The risk can be tolerated and considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) provided
additional or alternative safeguards have been considered and implemented unless judged
impractical or the cost of implementation would be disproportionate to the reduction in risk.
Unacceptable
The risk cannot be accepted. Additional or alternative safeguards should be identified and
implemented before commencement of bunkering, and these safeguards should reduce the
risk to tolerable or acceptable.
A.3 Example of Individual Risk Criteria for QRA

Individual risk is a measure of the likelihood that a specified person incurs a certain level of harm.
Typically, this translates to an annual likelihood of fatal injury for a worker involved in the activity or
a member of the public (e.g. a bunkering operative, a third-party individual working at the harbour, a
passenger, or a member of the public at a given location onshore).
The following matrix criteria might be used to rank major LNG bunkering operation risk only.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Individual Risk Criteria (for bunkering operations only)
Key
acceptable ≤10-6 The risk can be accepted. Where practical and cost-effective it is good practice to
implement safeguards to further reduce the risk
tolerable >10-6 – 10-4 The risk can be tolerated and considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) provided additional or alternative safeguards have been considered and implemented unless
judged impractical or the cost of implementation would be disproportionate to the reduction in risk
unacceptable >10-4 The risk cannot be accepted. Additional or alternative safeguards should be identified
and implemented before commencement of bunkering, and these safeguards should reduce the risk to
tolerable or acceptable
Figure A.2 — Example of matrix criteria with individual risk
The individual risk criteria are in-line with publications issued by the Health & Safety Executive
(HSE) [34] and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) [36].
A.4 Examples of Societal (Group) Risk Criteria for QRA

The following are examples of societal (group) risk criteria, referred to as FN Criterion Lines. This
might be used in some circumstances to assess the larger risk to people and society.
Figure A.3 illustrates an FN Criterion line and the QRA results as an FN Curve, that is the frequency (F)
of incurring a certain number of fatalities (N) or more. The FN Curve is shown below the FN Criterion
Line and so in this example the risk is considered ‘broadly acceptable’ provided the risk is as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Key
X number of fatalities
Y frequency of N or more fatalities (per year)
1 broadly acceptable ALARP region
2 intolerable region
3 FN curve
4 FN criterion line
Figure A.3 — Example 1: Fictitious FN Criterion Line and FN Curve

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Figure A.4 illustrates differences in terminology, aversion to multiple fatalities, and categorization of
risk using one or more FN Criterion Lines.
Key
X number of fatalities
Y frequency of N or more fatalities (per year)
1 acceptable (Netherlands) negligible (Australia New South Wales)
2 unacceptable (Netherlands) intolerable (Australia New South Wales)
3 ALARP
Netherlands
Australia New South Wales
Figure A.4 — Example 2: Netherlands & Australia NSW FN Criterion Line – Petrochemical
Industry
Netherlands government expectation is that the criterion will be met[37]; but where it is exceeded the
societal risk might be tolerated following a detailed deliberation and demonstration process outlined in
the Societal Risk Accountability Guidelines[38].
Australia New South Wales (NSW) government expectation is that the criteria will be met. However,
the criteria are not mandatory, being referred to as “indicative and provisional”[39].

Annex B
(informative)
Examples of safety zone calculations
B.1 General
The safety zone is defined in Clause 7. In this annex, different methods of calculation are presented.
Figure 2 illustrates the relative location of the safety zone and the hazardous areas related to a mobile
to ship bunkering supply scenario with a truck bunkering from the quayside.
The calculation of the Safety Zone is specific to each bunkering supply scenario.
B.2 Approaches for calculating the safety zone

The safety zone can be determined by the following:
a) a consequence-based approach that for selected release scenario(s) calculates the distance
to a defined gas concentration. The chosen concentration is typically dependant on the lower
flammability limit (LFL);
b) a risk-based approach that considers the likelihood of a range of release scenarios to determine the
distance to a defined risk value (e.g. an annual individual risk).
The consequence-based approach
— determines the distance using a recognized and validated dispersion model, and
— selects a scenario(s) for specific release parameters and weather conditions as agreed between the
bunkering stakeholders.
Compared to the risk-based approach, the consequence-based approach is simpler and requires less
time and effort. It can also in some cases result in a relatively large safety zone compared to the risk-
based approach.
The risk-based approach
— uses a recognized and validated risk calculation method,
— uses recognized and validated dispersion and consequence calculation models,
— selects a range of scenarios for specific release likelihood, release parameters and weather
conditions as agreed between the bunkering stakeholders, and
— sets zone extent based upon agreement of the bunkering stakeholders of the risk criterion or criteria
(e.g. the risk of a stated methane-air concentration, individual risk of fatality).
Compared to the consequence-based approach, the risk-based approach is generally a more detailed
process requiring more time and effort. It can also result in a smaller safety zone compared to the risk-
based approach.
A consequence-based approach is often the preferred approach to setting the safety zone. However,
the risk-based approach can be required by local or national regulators, or it can be used to provide
additional insight to control and set a practical zone.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Regardless of the chosen calculation method, the selected scenario(s) should reflect the characteristics
of the bunkering supply and release conditions. For example, consideration of the following:
— bunker supply pressure and temperature;
— release mass/volume, flow rate and duration;
— release orientation, elevation, impingement and impacted surface;
— weather conditions (i.e. wind speed and atmospheric stability).
It should be recognized that all calculation methods have limitations and generally provide an
indicative result. For example, it can be difficult to account for pool spreading onto the sea or quayside,
the influence of obstacles such as the ship or nearby buildings, or gas ingress to buildings via entrances
and ventilation inlets, etc.
B.3 Methods for the consequence-based calculation of the safety zone

In the consequence-based approach, the safety zone is defined as the area within the distance to the
LFL as determined by a recognized and validated dispersion model for the maximum credible release.
Three examples of a consequence-based method to calculate the safety zone are presented below:
a) BASiL calculation tool;
b) Phenomenological consequence modelling;
c) Computational fluid dynamics (CFD).
All are based on a calculated distance to the LFL.
a) BASiL calculation tool
BASiL (Bunkering Area Safety Information for LNG) is a modelling tool developed by the Society for Gas
as Marine Fuel (SGMF) specifically to help determine safety zone distances (see Figure B.1) in the three
dimensions.
BASil inputs, variables and outputs are summarized below.
BASiL inputs/variables Remarks

BASiL will select from its database the closest information about the
bunkering location environmental condition using a Pasquill atmospheric
Bunkering Location
stability factor D.
Latitude and Longitude
NOTE D is not always the most representative stability class and it might
not provide the maximum distances.
Primary Leak Source Depending on the selection BASiL will use different hole size representa-
Hose Failure or Fitting/Flange tion based on statistical data extrapolated from Process Leak for Offshore
Failure installation Frequency Assessment Model[40].
Volume Transfer,
Transfer System Diameter
Transfer Pressure
Supply Storage Pressure Bunkering transfer process data.
LNG Storage Temperature
LNG Net Calorific Value
LNG Density
Based on the user selection BASiL will consider the ESD system safeguard
ESD Type
effect on the dispersion calculation.

BASiL inputs/variables Remarks

Bunkering type
Reflecting a mobile to ship or ship to ship bunkering scenario.
Road Tanker or Bunker Vessel
Minimum Hose Elevation
Specific bunkering scenario configuration data, used in BASiL calculation
Hose Entry Location
to improve the accuracy of the results for a specific application.
Distance Below Deck
Gas fuelled Vessel - Particulars
Particulars of the size and dimensions of the supplier and receiver used
Road tanker - Particulars
for graphical representation of the bunkering scenario.
LNG bunker vessel - Particulars
The calculation provides as output representative distances (from the point of leakage) for the extent of
a flammable vapour cloud assuming a jet release and LNG pool leak over land, deck or water.
BASiL outputs Remarks

Horizontal and Vertically upwards
jet Horizontal and vertical distances representative of a jet leak.
R1 and H1
Downward release onto land/deck Horizontal and vertical distances representative of an LNG pool over land
R2, H2 and R4 or the deck of the vessel.
Downward release onto water Horizontal and vertical distances representative of an LNG pool over
R3 and H3 water.
Figure B.1 provides an example of a BASiL calculation. This example should not be used in place of a
BASiL calculation based on the actual bunkering scenario.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Figure B.1 — BASiL safety distances – ship to ship calculation example

b) consequence modelling
Consequence modelling software such as PHAST and similar can examine the progress of a potential
incident (leak) from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and
evaporation, and flammable effects.
NOTE PHAST is developed by DNV.
These models can be used to address the release scenarios as agreed by the stakeholders and
validate the LFL distances as a function of project/scenario specific process transfer parameters and
environmental conditions.
Figure B.2 provides examples of a PHAST calculation. These examples should not be used in place of a
PHAST calculation based on the actual bunkering scenario.
PHAST calculations example

Input data
Parameter Data
LNG composition Pure methane
Weather conditions 2F 5D; 8D for wind conditions; 20 °C for air and seawater tempera-
tures; 70 % air humidity - Surface roughness length 30 mm; 500 W/m2
solar radiation
Operating conditions 5,0 barg; -162 °C
Leak sizes 10 mm
Leak directions Horizontal (first figure below) and Vertical (second Figure below)
Leak elevation 10 meters above sea water
Calculation Tool PHAST rev 4.2

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Side View
Horizontal Leak
Side View
Vertical leak
Key
X cloud height [m]
Y distance downwind [m]
Figure B.2 — Examples of PHAST calculation for an LNG bunkering ship-to-ship supply scenario
c) Computational fluid dynamics (CFD)

Computational fluid dynamics analysis can provide a more detailed representation of the leak cloud
behaviour as a function of project/scenario specific process transfer parameters and environmental
conditions as well as taking into consideration the actual 3D geometry of the surroundings (see
Figure B.3).
Often CFD is used to refine some LFL distance calculations, in particular where the overall 3D geometry
can play a major role. It might be used to address the release scenarios as identified in the HAZID.

Figure B.3 — Examples of CFD analysis for an LNG bunkering ship-to-ship supply scenario
B.4 Methods for the risk-based assessment of the safety zone

A risk-based approach can be a more detailed way to assess the safety zone than a consequence-based
one, since it is assessing a wider range of possible release scenario associated with their likelihood.
While this approach might be more laborious and complex, in some cases it results in a smaller
safety zone provided that it can be demonstrated that risk acceptance criteria can be met for people,
environment and assets.
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is allowing for quantitative estimation of the risk, on a given set of
parameters by establishing
— how far a hazardous event can reach,

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
— how many people could foreseeably be affected, and

— to what impact or degree.
A risk-based approach for defining the safety zone employing QRA should follow the steps provided in
the example below and examines but is not limited to the following considerations:
1. The risk assessment should address all release scenarios as agreed by the stakeholders and reflect
validated (or conservative failure data).
a. The risk assessment can recognize implemented, “hard-wired” safeguards based on
conservative assumptions.
2. The consequence modelling of the release and dispersion should take into account the following:
a. hole size reflecting the installed equipment and validated failure data;
If validated failure data is not available, conservative assumptions shall be made.
b. outflow conditions;
c. evaporation/flashing of LNG reflecting LNG properties and heat transfer from ground/water;
d. heavy gas dispersion;
e. weather/wind conditions;
f. properties of the LNG, reflecting release conditions.
3. Ignition probabilities should reflect installations and operations and be applied with reference to
IEC 600079-10-1 for the following:
a. hazardous areas (Zone 1 and Zone 2);
b. inside the safety zone;
c. outside the safety zone.
4. The risk assessment typically assumes that the following:
a. first-party personnel (crew and bunkering personnel) are continuously present in the safety
zone during bunkering;
b. second-party personnel (port and terminal operator, other ship crew) are continuously present
directly outside the safety zone during bunkering;
c. third-party personnel (passengers and other persons visiting the site) should not be
continuously exposed to the risk;
d. third-party personnel can be present (e.g. other port activity, residential and community
facility), but may not be continuously exposed to the risk and can be outside the risk contour
for third-party acceptance.
5. The risk assessment assesses all hazard scenarios identified in the HAZID and, as a minimum,
assess:
a. flash fires;
b. jet/torch fires;
c. pool fires;
d. explosions;

e. Rapid Phase Transitions (RPTs);

f. structural damage.
6. The impact on personnel primarily assesses the initial events.
a. Escalating events will be delayed and the impact should consider the efficiency of evacuation
and emergency preparedness.
7. The risk assessment should consider the risk exposure for first-, second-, and third-party personnel.
8. If the risk is acceptable in accordance with the acceptance criteria (as agreed with authorities), the
smaller safety zone is acceptable.

ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
Bibliography
[1] ISO 9000, Quality management systems — Fundamentals and vocabulary

[2] ISO/TS 16901, Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations
including the ship/shore interface
[3] ISO 16903, Petroleum and natural gas industries — Characteristics of LNG, influencing the design,
and material selection
[4] ISO 16904, Petroleum and natural gas industries — Design and testing of LNG marine transfer
arms for conventional onshore terminals
[5] ISO 17776, Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Major
accident hazard management during the design of new installations
[6] ISO 23306, Specification of liquefied natural gas as a fuel for marine applications
[7] ISO 28460, Petroleum and natural gas industries — Installation and equipment for liquefied natural
gas — Ship-to-shore interface and port operations
[8] IEC 60079-0, Explosive atmospheres — Part 0: Equipment – General requirements
[9] IEC 60079-10-1, Explosive atmospheres — Part 10-1: Classification of areas — Explosive gas
atmospheres
[10] IEC 62305-3, Protection against lightning — Part 3: Physical damage to structures and life hazard
[11] IEC 60092-502, Electrical installations in ships — Part 502: Tankers — Special features
[12] API RP 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents, Sixth
Edition
[13] BS 4089:1999, Metallic hose assemblies for liquefied petroleum gases and liquefied natural gases
[14] EN 1473, Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas — Design of onshore installations
[15] EN 1474-2, Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas — Design and testing of marine
transfer systems – Part 2: Design and testing of transfer hoses
[16] EN 1474-3, Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas — Design and testing of marine
transfer systems – Part 3: Offshore transfer systems
[17] EN 13645, Installations and equipment for liquefied natural gas — Design of onshore installations
with a storage capacity between 5 t and 200 t
[18] NFPA 52, Vehicular Gaseous Fuel System Code, 2010 Edition
[19] NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
[20] NFPA 59A, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
[21] NFPA 70, National Electrical Code
[22] NFPA 302, Fire protection standard for pleasure and commercial motor craft
[23] Directive 94/9/EC on equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive
atmospheres (ATEX)
[24] SGMF FP 07-01, Safety Guidelines: Bunkering

[25] SGMF FP 04-02, Bunkering of ships with Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) competency and assessment
guidelines
[26] SGMF FP 02-01, Recommendation of Controlled Zones during LNG bunkering.
[27] SGMF FP 08-01, Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) during LNG bunkering.
[28] SGMF FP 10-01, Work practices for maintenance, repair and dry dock operations
[29] SGMF BASiL automated Bunkering Area Safety Information for LNG model.
[30] SGMF TGN 06-04, Manifold arrangements for gas-fuelled vessels
[31] SGMF TGN 06-07, Bunker Station Location: Considerations and Recommendations
[32] SGMF TGN 06-05, recommendations for linked emergency shutdown (ESD) arrangements for LNG
bunkering
[33] SGMF TGN 06-06, LNG bunkering with hose bunker systems: considerations and recommendations
[34] Health & Safety Executive, (2001). Reducing Risks, Protecting People. R2P2.
[35] IACS bunkering guidelines N 142
[36] International Maritime Organization, (18 June 2015). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA). MSC-MEPC.2 /Circ.12/Rev. 1.
[37] Besluit externe veiligheid inrichtingen – in Dutch, Trans. Decree of 27 May 2004, concerning
environmental quality standards for public safety of environmental management (Decree
external safety devices). Full translation from Dutch to English at https://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0016767/geldigheidsdatum_ 21-06-2011. Refer to Section 5, Article 12, 1b.
[38] Handreiking verantwoordingsplicht groepsrisico – in Dutch, Trans. Societal Risk Accountability
Guidelines. Also refer to: VROM. (2004). Guidance on the Duty of Accountability for Societal Risk.
[39] NSW Government Planning, (2011). Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 4. Risk
Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning.
[40] Process Leak for Offshore installation Frequency Assessment Model (PLOFAM)- Main Report,
Lloyds Register report number 105586/R1, 2016

ICS 75.200
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Guidelines for safety and risk

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— Annex D Sample Ship supplier checklist;

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Guidelines for safety and risk assessment of LNG fuel

3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms

3.1 Terms and definitions

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[SOURCE: Reference [24]]

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3.2 Abbreviated terms

BASiL bunkering area safety information for LNG

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4 Bunkering supply scenarios

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Receiver Supplier Receiver Supplier

Receiver Supplier Receiver Supplier

Figure 1 — Typical LNG supply bunkering scenarios

5 Properties and behaviour of LNG

5.2 Description and hazards of LNG

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— release in confined spaces causing over-pressure due to vaporization of liquid;

5.3 Potential hazardous situations associated with LNG bunker transfer

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5.4 Composition of LNG as a bunker fuel

6.2 General safety principles

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The main steps in the risk assessment shall be to

7.2 Types of risk assessment

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7.3 Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders

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Table 1 — Typical Stakeholders - roles and responsibilities

7.4 Approach, scope and basis

Table 2 — Scope and study basis – information requirements and considerations

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Table 3 — Example hazardous events and consequences

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Failure due to low temperature

Failure due to impact

Failure of vessels pipes etc. containing Liquid Release of Liquid Nitrogen

NOTE 1 Some causes or consequences might not always be applicable.

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