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ISO TS 18683-2021 Ed.2 Id.76811 Publication PDF (En)
ISO TS 18683-2021 Ed.2 Id.76811 Publication PDF (En)
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TECHNICAL ISO/TS
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SPECIFICATION 18683
Second edition
2021-11
Reference number
ISO/TS 18683:2021(E)
© ISO 2021
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Contents Page
Foreword......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... iv
Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... vi
1 Scope.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative references...................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms............................................................................................................................... 1
3.1 Terms and definitions....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
3.2 Abbreviated terms............................................................................................................................................................................... 4
4 Bunkering supply scenarios..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
5 Properties and behaviour of LNG........................................................................................................................................................ 6
5.1 General............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
5.2 Description and hazards of LNG.............................................................................................................................................. 6
5.3 Potential hazardous situations associated with LNG bunker transfer................................................. 7
5.4 Composition of LNG as a bunker fuel................................................................................................................................... 8
6 Safety................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
6.1 Objectives..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
6.2 General safety principles................................................................................................................................................................ 8
6.3 Approach....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
7 Risk assessment..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8
7.1 General............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 8
7.2 Types of risk assessment................................................................................................................................................................ 9
7.3 Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders.................................................................................................................. 10
7.4 Approach, scope and basis......................................................................................................................................................... 11
7.5 Mitigation measures........................................................................................................................................................................ 14
7.6 Reporting................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
7.7 Safety Zone and controlled areas........................................................................................................................................ 16
7.8 Safety zone determination......................................................................................................................................................... 17
7.9 Determination of monitoring and security areas................................................................................................. 18
7.10 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs)................................................................................................................................... 18
8 Functional requirements for LNG bunker transfer system................................................................................. 19
8.1 General......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
8.2 Functional requirements............................................................................................................................................................. 20
9 Training....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
Annex A (informative) Risk acceptance criteria................................................................................................................................... 23
Annex B (informative) Examples of safety zone calculations................................................................................................. 28
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 37
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment and offshore
structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Subcommittee SC 9, Liquefied natural
gas installations and equipment.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 18683:2015), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— title and scope restricted to Guidelines for safety and risk assessment of LNG fuel bunkering
operations;
— list of bunkering supply scenarios updated with experience gained since 2015 in Clause 4;
— addition of concept of design stage risk assessment and operational risk assessment in 7.1;
— addition of Quantitative Consequence Assessment in 7.2;
— addition of roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in 7.3;
— design requirements removed from Clause 8 to avoid duplication with ISO 20519;
— individual Risk Criteria added in Annex A;
— three methods added to determine safety zone in Annex B;
— to avoid duplication with ISO 20519, the following clauses and annexes have been removed:
— Clause 9 Requirements to components and systems;
— Clause 11 Requirements for documentation;
— Annex C Functional requirements;
Introduction
The properties, characteristics, and behaviour of LNG differ significantly from conventional marine
fuels, such as heavy fuel oils and distillate fuels as marine diesel oil (MDO) or marine gas oil (MGO).
For these reasons, it is essential that all LNG bunkering operations are undertaken with diligence and
due attention is paid to prevent leakage of LNG liquid or vapour and to control all sources of ignition.
Therefore, it is important that throughout the LNG bunkering chain, each element is carefully designed
and has dedicated safety and operational procedures executed by trained personnel.
It is important that the basic requirements laid down in this document are understood and applied to
each operation in order to ensure the safe, secure, and efficient transfer of LNG as a fuel to the ship.
The objective of this document is to provide guidance for the risk assessment of LNG fuel bunkering
operations and thereby ensuring that an LNG fuelled vessel and bunkering supply facilities are operating
with a high level of safety, integrity, and reliability regardless of the type of bunkering supply scenario.
The LNG bunkering interface comprises the area of LNG transfer and includes manifold, valves, safety
and security systems and other equipment, and the personnel involved in the LNG bunkering operations.
This document is based on the assumption that the receiving ships and LNG bunkering supply facilities
are designed according to the relevant and applicable codes, regulations, and guidelines such as the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), ISO, EN, and NFPA standards and the Society for Gas as a
Marine Fuel (SGMF) and other recognized documents during LNG bunkering. Relevant publications by
these and other organizations are listed in the Bibliography.
This document should be combined with the requirements set on ISO 20519.
In cases where the distance to third parties is too close and the risk exceeds acceptance criteria, the
bunkering location should not to be considered.
1 Scope
This document gives guidance on the risk-based approach to follow for the design and operation of the
LNG bunker transfer system, including the interface between the LNG bunkering supply facilities and
receiving LNG fuelled vessels.
This document provides requirements and recommendations for the development of a bunkering site
and facility and the LNG bunker transfer system, providing the minimum functional requirements
qualified by a structured risk assessment approach taking into consideration LNG properties and
behaviour, simultaneous operations and all parties involved in the operation.
This document is applicable to bunkering of both seagoing and inland trading vessels. It covers LNG
bunkering from shore or ship, mobile to ship and ship to ship LNG supply scenarios, as described in
Clause 4.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC Guide 73, Risk management — Vocabulary
ISO 31010, Risk management — Guidelines on principles and implementation of risk management
ISO 20519, Ships and marine technology — Specification for bunkering of liquefied natural gas fuelled
vessels
IMO, IGF Code of Safety for Ships using Gases or other Low flashpoint fuels
IMO, IGC International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in
Bulk
IMO, International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
3.1.1
as low as reasonably practical
ALARP
reducing a risk to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble,
difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the
additional risk reduction obtained
3.1.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE
sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurized flammable liquid followed by a fireball
3.1.3
bunkering
process of transferring fuel to a ship
3.1.4
bunkering facility
system designed to be used to transfer/bunker liquefied gas as fuel to a gas-fuelled vessel
Note 1 to entry: It may consist of a floating, shore-based, fixed or mobile fuel-supply facility, such as a bunker
vessel, terminal or road tanker.
3.1.5
bunkering site
location dedicated for bunkering comprising the bunkering installations, port and jetty, and other
facilities and equipment that should be considered in the planning of bunkering
3.1.6
competent authority
organization or organizations that implement the requirements of legislation and regulate installations
that must comply with the requirements of legislation
3.1.7
consequence
outcome of an event
3.1.8
drip tray
spill containment manufactured of material that can tolerate cryogenic temperatures
3.1.9
emergency shut-down
ESD
method that safely and effectively stops the bunker/transfer of natural gas and vapour between the
supply facilities and receiving ship
3.1.10
gas-fuelled vessel
GFV
vessel using gas as marine fuel
3.1.11
hazard
potential source of harm
3.1.12
hazard identification
HAZID
brainstorming exercise using checklists where the potential hazards in a project are identified and
gathered in a risk register for follow up in the project
3.1.13
impact assessment
assessment of how consequences (fires, explosions, etc.) affect people, structures the environment, etc.
3.1.14
individual risk
probability on an annual basis for an individual to be killed due to accidental events arising from the
activity
3.1.15
mist
fog
cloud that will be generated by condensing humidity in air when in contact with cold surfaces during
bunkering
Note 1 to entry: This mist will reduce visibility and can mask minor leaks.
3.1.16
monitoring and security area
area around the bunkering facility and ship where ship traffic and other activities are monitored (and
controlled) to mitigate harmful effects
3.1.17
probability
extent to which an event is likely to occur
3.1.18
rapid phase transition
RPT
shock wave forces generated by instantaneous vaporization of LNG upon coming in contact with water
3.1.19
receiver
one or more organizations with ownership, operational and/or legal interests in a gas-fuelled vessel
Note 1 to entry: The receiver can be the vessel owner(s), the charterer or the operator.
3.1.26
safety zone
area around the bunkering station where only dedicated and essential personnel and activities are
allowed during bunkering
3.1.27
stakeholder
individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a
risk
3.28
supplier
one or more organizations with ownership, operational and/ or legal interests in a bunkering facility
Note 1 to entry: The supplier can be the bunker vessel owner, charterer or operator; the LNG bunkering terminal
owner or operator; the road tanker fleet manager; the LNG producer; and so on.
5.1 General
The properties, characteristics and behaviour of LNG differ significantly from conventional marine
fuels for example HFO and MGO, etc. For these reasons, it is essential that all LNG bunkering operations
are undertaken with diligence, that due attention is paid to prevent leakage of LNG liquid or vapour and
that sources of ignition in the vicinity (i.e. inside the safety zone) of the bunkering operation are strictly
controlled. Therefore, it is necessary that throughout the LNG bunkering supply chain, each element
is carefully designed and has dedicated safety operational and maintenance procedures executed by
trained and competent personnel.
LNG for fuel supply may be delivered at an elevated pressure and at a temperature exceeding its boiling
point at atmospheric conditions (e.g. at 5 bar and at ‒155 °C). Release of LNG under such conditions will
result in instantaneous flashing and larger vapour release compared to evaporation from liquid pools.
The vapour release will form a flammable cloud which at these temperatures is denser than air. The
dispersing gas becomes lighter than air (buoyant) at approximately ‒110 °C so will drift with wind and
be diluted by atmospheric turbulence and diffusion. The coldness of the gas will condense moisture in
the air making the dispersing gas visible as a white cloud.
Cold surfaces in the bunker transfer system can also cause mist or fog by condensing humidity in the
air that might mask a release.
LNG can cause brittle fracture if spilled on unprotected carbon steel.
Natural gas has a flammable range between 5 % and 15 % when mixed with air.
Natural gas has a flashpoint of ‒187 °C and a high self-ignition temperature (theoretically, approximately
540 °C. The properties of traditional fuels are different; MGO has a flashpoint in excess of 60 °C and a
self-ignition temperature of 300 °C for MGO or a gas oil vapour/aerosol air mixture.
The ignition energy of natural gas/air mixtures is 0,25 mJ, which is lower than most other hydrocarbons.
Natural gas releases are not easily ignited by hot surfaces that ignite most conventional fuel oil fires in
engine rooms, but low energy sparks represent a higher risk.
Methane has a high greenhouse gas potential and venting to the atmosphere shall not be part of normal
operations.
The following are the main hazards associated with LNG applicable to bunkering operations:
— fire (pool fire, jet/torch fire, flash fire) explosion (in confined spaces) from ignited natural gas
evaporating from spilled LNG;
— vapour dispersion;
— brittle fracture of the steel structure exposed to LNG spills;
— frostbite or cold burn from liquid or cold vapour spills;
— asphyxiation from vapour release;
— over-pressure or pressure surge of the bunker system caused by thermal expansion or vaporization
of trapped LNG;
NOTE The thermal expansion coefficient of LNG is high.
6 Safety
6.1 Objectives
Safety shall be the primary objective for the planning, design, and operation of facilities for the delivery
of LNG as marine fuel taking into consideration simultaneous operations and the interaction with third
parties.
LNG bunkering might be carried out without simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), but more often some
SIMOPS such as cargo operations, bunkering with passengers on-board or embarking/disembarking is
occurring at the same time and these need acceptance by all parties involved as competent authority,
port authorities, terminal, ship and bunkering operator, and supplier operator.
Furthermore, in all LNG bunkering cases a risk assessment must be performed for the specific
bunkering operations, location, bunkering scenario and process conditions. This risk assessment should
be appropriate to the operation and risks and it should provide evidence that risks have been identified
and sufficiently mitigated to allow their acceptance by the competent authority. Risk assessment
methodology for the different conditions as described in factors above are recommended in Clause 7.
The safety of the bunkering operation shall not be compromised by commercial requirements.
6.3 Approach
The safety targets for the operation of the bunkering scenarios shall be demonstrated by meeting the
requirements as defined in Clause 8, and supported by a risk assessment as outlined in Clause 7.
7 Risk assessment
7.1 General
An assessment of risk to individuals, local populations, assets and the environment shall be undertaken
as a part of the development of the bunkering facility and the gas fuelled vessel and their operations.
The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide confidence to all stakeholders that the specific risks of
LNG bunkering have been appropriately considered and assessed.
The risk assessment will also help with the determination of the required controlled zones around the
bunkering operation, as per 7.6 that limit access, equipment and activities within them.
The risk assessment shall be conducted in accordance with IEC 31010:2019 or equivalent. ISO/TS 16901
and ISO 17776 provide guidance on risk assessment techniques used in other sectors. They can also be
a useful reference, although the risk criteria might not be directly applicable to the bunkering of LNG.
The risk assessment shall be undertaken by suitably qualified and experienced individuals and ensure
an objective and independent assessment.
their likelihood; and numerical models to calculate and sum the risk from each likelihood and
consequence combination.
The type of risk assessment to be undertaken will depend upon a number of factors, such as the
requirements of the competent authorities, the type and number of persons potentially at risk, and the
complexity of the bunkering operation. The stakeholders shall agree which type(s) is used.
A QualRA is the minimum required by this document and can suffice where the bunkering supply
scenarios are as outlined in Clause 4. Furthermore, in some cases, QualRA can be sufficient to
demonstrate that the agreed risk acceptance criteria are met, and risks are ALARP. In other cases, it
may be used as an initial evaluation prior to carrying out a QCA and/or a QRA.
A QCA or QRA can be appropriate when
— the bunkering operation is considered complex,
— many persons can be in close proximity, for example, when bunkering is close to population centres,
— bunkering deviates from the standard bunkering supply scenarios outlined in Clause 4; and/or,
— simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) are anticipated, for example, bunkering with passengers
disembarking.
A QCA or QRA can also be necessary to adequately determine the Safety Zone and/or the Monitoring
and Security Area.
A QCA can be the preferred tool in non-sensitive locations (e.g. remote areas not in proximity to
populations centres).
A QRA can be used, if the competent authority allows, to reduce the size of QCA events by considering
the likelihood of occurrence
Table 2 (continued)
Operations a Description of the sequence, duration and number of operations, and operational
limitations with respect to:
Pre-bunkering phase - ensuring all the assessment and authorizations have been
completed and/or obtained and procedures are agreed between the LNG supplier
and receiver before commencing the operations.
Preparation for bunker phase - Covering the mooring of the vessel(s) and the preparation
of the transfer and safety equipment including checking that the location, quantity,
suitability, condition etc. are all as assessed and agreed during the pre-bunkering phase.
Connection and testing phase - safe transfer, connection and testing of all the neces-
sary equipment, including leak testing and inerting.
Bunkering Phase - Cooling down followed by the LNG bunker transfer and including
the topping up/ramp down phase.
Completion Phase - Draining, purging and inerting before the secure, safe discon-
nection and retrieval of the transfer and safety equipment prior to separation of the
receiving ship and bunkering facilities
Other and special operations - Commissioning, security, vessel traffic and port/har-
bour specific issues and characteristics, de-bunkering, warming up, etc.
Management control Organization of the bunkering activities with clear definitions of the roles, respon-
sibilities and communication/documentation for the gas fuelled vessel crew and the
bunkering facility personnel
SIMOPS Description of simultaneous operations being undertaken by the receiving vessel and
other vessels in proximity to the bunkering operation
Environmental Conditions Review of local met ocean information and weather data
a More details on the operations can be found in SGMF bunkering guidelines[24] the IACS[35] and SGMF FP10-01[28].
A summary of the study basis shall be documented or referenced in the risk assessment report, as
appropriate.
To facilitate the risk assessment process, example causes and consequences of hazardous events and
commonly adopted safeguards/mitigation measures are provided in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
Failure of vessels pipes etc. containing LNG or NG Release of LNG and/or NG leading to large flammable
vapour cloud which could result in:
Use of unsuitable materials due to incorrect design Brittle fracture of metal structures and other nearby
criteria, material specification or fabrication equipment
Failure due to high/low pressure or high/low tem- Rapid phase transition
perature
Failure due to corrosion Injuries to personnel due to exposure to cold (e.g. frostbite)
Environmental impacts
Failure due to over pressurization Damage to equipment
Malfunction of pressure control systems and devices
Inadequate protection against thermal expansion
Overfilling of tank
Pressure surge in transfer line
NOTE 1 Some causes or consequences might not always be applicable.
NOTE 2 Some causes can also be consequences, and some consequences can be causes.
Table 3 (continued)
Causes Consequences
LNG rollover
Poor/inadequate inspection and maintenance of
pressure containing equipment
Incorrect written procedures
Operational error
Fire in the vicinity due to other fuel release or
cargo fire
Ignition sources present in hazardous area due to: Fire/explosion/BLEVE if ignition of gas release occurs
Use of non-compliant electrical or control equipment Secondary fires
Inadequate maintenance of mechanical equipment
Inadequate protection against lightning
Static from personnel clothing or cargo equipment
Use of mobile equipment
Incorrect operational procedures
Incorrect operation (human error)
Sabotage, vandalism or malicious act
The risk assessment shall assess all hazard scenarios identified and agreed and, as a minimum, consider:
a) flash fires;
b) jet/torch fires;
c) pool fires;
d) explosions;
e) Rapid Phase Transitions (RPTs);
f) structural damage.
Table 4 (continued)
Safeguards Passive Active Procedural/
Operational
Venting
e.g. (1) tank PRVs & burst discs; (2) automated opening of valves (1) (2) (3)
on set pressure value; (3) manual opening of vent valves
Ventilation
e.g. (1) air rate change upon gas detection; (2) closure of ventila- (1) (2)
tion inlets on gas detection
Process Monitoring
e.g. (1) automated warning for specified pressure increase; (2) (1) (2)
operator monitoring;
ESD system/ESD link
e.g. detection of vessel separation, overfilling, overpressure, etc.
ERS (Emergency Release System)
e.g. (1) break-away coupling; (2) disconnection of hose given leak (1 (2)
detection onboard ship
Release detection
e.g. low temperature detectors, gas detectors
Low oxygen detection
e.g. oxygen detectors
Mooring monitoring
e.g. manual observation and warning
Procedures
e.g. task sheets, manuals, checklists, compatibility checks
Training and qualifications
e.g. courses/tests to provide knowledge and proficiency
Maintenance and Inspection
e.g. planned periodic maintenance and inspection
Evacuation and emergency response plans
e.g. crew procedures in the event of a gas release
Access restriction and controls
e.g. restricting access to appropriately trained personnel
Port/terminal rules, procedures and security
e.g. vessel traffic management
Weather forecasting
e.g. checking weather and met-ocean forecasts before bunkering
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
e.g. use of appropriate clothing, hand and eye wear
7.6 Reporting
The risk assessment shall be documented in a report that, as a minimum, describes the following:
a) study basis including description of design, operations, software and assumptions;
b) description of the risk assessment process;
c) information on the relevant qualifications and expertise of the risk assessment team;
d) summary of the identified hazards and results of the risk assessment;
e) failure scenario(s) to be used as a basis for determination of the Safety Zone;
f) summary of follow up actions, if any;
g) detailed records from the workshop.
It also might include the following where determined during the course of the risk assessment:
h) determined Safety Zone;
i) determined Monitoring & Security Area.
The risk assessment report should be shared with the relevant stakeholders.
Key
hazardous zones
safety zone
The Monitoring and Security Area is a defined three-dimensional space established around a bunkering
facility within which activities, including vessel and personnel movements, need to be identified and
monitored to ensure that they do not affect the safety of the bunkering operation by encroaching on the
Safety Zone of the gas-fuelled ship, the quayside or the LNG bunkering infrastructure. Activities in the
Monitoring and Security Area can be subject to regulatory restrictions. The Monitoring and Security
Area is only relevant during bunkering operations.
SIMOPs involve the actions taken by several parties including but not limited to crew of the receiving
ship, personnel of the bunker facility, terminal/port personnel and third-party people and personnel.
Before any SIMOPs are carried out, the risk level for each SIMOP should be shown by risk assessment to
be at an acceptable level and shall be agreed by all parties involved. A permit is issued by the relevant
authority before any simultaneous operations are carried out.
The following list gives examples of where risk assessment for simultaneous operations should be
considered (the list is not exhaustive):
— cargo handling;
— ballasting operations;
— passenger embarking/disembarking;
— vehicles embarking/disembarking;
— dangerous goods loading/unloading;
— loading or unloading of any other good (i.e. stores and provisions);
— chemical products handling including toxic cargos;
— bunkering of fuels other than LNG;
— maintenance and testing of equipment and systems including software;
— any hot work or activity that could create sparks.
The risk assessment should take into account as a minimum, but not be limited to, the following:
— size of the bunkering Safety Zone and the Monitoring and Security Area;
— SIMOPs and how this interacts with the bunkering Safety Zone;
— failure scenarios;
— access, egress and escape/evacuation routes;
— access, including evacuation routes and times;
— the type of cargo operation;
— safeguards in place to control passenger/cargo movements;
— dropped objects;
— positions of vent mast and air intakes;
— locations of hazardous cargo handling;
— other restrictions that can apply.
8.1 General
The functional requirements for LNG bunker transfer systems have been determined assuming:
a) internationally recognized standards, such as ISO 20519, and good engineering practices for LNG
bunkering (e.g. Reference [24]) shall be adopted for the supplier and the LNG fuelled ship;
b) systems shall be designed and operated to prevent releases of LNG/natural gas, and venting shall
be only undertaken to prevent or mitigate an emergency situation;
c) engineering and procedural means shall be provided to safely vent, disperse, contain and detect an
LNG/natural gas release, and prevent subsequent ignition;
d) engineering and procedural means shall be provided to safely contain, detect and extinguish fires,
and protect against radiation and explosion;
e) emergency preparedness procedures and plans shall be established to minimize escalation
following an accidental release and to protect individuals and the environment.
The functional requirements are numbered as [Fx] in this document for easy cross-referencing.
i) transfer;
j) topping up and shutdown;
k) draining/purging/inerting;
l) disconnection;
m) storage and handling of components.
[F9] All systems and components shall be operated, maintained, inspected and tested according to the
vendor requirements and recommendations.
[F9bis] All individuals involved with the bunkering operation shall be appropriately trained, competent
and equipped with PPE.
[F10] An organizational plan shall be prepared and implemented in operational plans and reflected in
qualification requirements. The plan shall describe the following:
a) organization;
b) roles and responsibilities for the ship crew and bunkering personnel;
c) communication lines and language for communication.
[F11] Operating procedures shall include a checklist to be completed and confirmed by the involved
parties prior to the commencement of bunkering (see F.1).
[F12] Emergency equipment and personnel shall be mobilized in accordance with the approved
emergency response plan.
[F13] Prevention of ignition of natural gas releases by the elimination of ignition sources in classified
hazardous areas and by controlling activities in the safety zone for the bunkering operation.
[F14] Elimination of the potential spark or high currents from static or galvanic cells when the
bunkering system is connected or disconnected (see ISO 20519).
[F15] Effective leak detection of LNG and natural gas. Selection of sensors and their location should
consider possible presence of dust, mist and fog that can mask the leak.
[F16] The bunker transfer operation shall be capable of being safely shut down without release of LNG/
natural gas.
[F16bis] In event of emergency, a linked emergency shutdown system shall automatically or manually
initiate an emergency shutdown signal to the LNG fuelled ship and to the supplier to ensure that
appropriate actions are taken both on the supplier, as well as on the LNG fuelled ship.
[F17] The bunker transfer system shall be equipped with an emergency release system (ERS) that
allows it to be disconnected rapidly and minimize damage in the event of a potential emergency, e.g.
ships drifting or vehicle movement.
[F18] The release of LNG or cold vapour should not lead to an escalation due to brittle fractures of steel
structure. Arrangements shall be installed as required on bunkering facilities and on LNG fuelled ships
according to ISO 20519 and the IGF code as applicable.
[F19] A safety zone shall be implemented around the bunkering operation (see Annex B).
[F20] A monitoring and security area shall be established around the bunkering facility. Activities in
this area shall be monitored to reduce harmful effects on the bunkering operation.
[F21] A contingency plan shall be in place outlining the requirements for the following:
a) evacuation of personnel and third parties;
b) mobilizing fire-fighting;
c) mobilizing first aid, hospitals, and ambulances;
d) communication to authorities and third parties;
e) copies of the plan shall be communicated to all parties involved in the bunkering operation
including the planned emergency response team and be part of the training programme. This
should be practiced at regular intervals both as “table top” and practical exercises. Key information
from this plan related to access, evacuation, and ignition minimization shall be communicated.
9 Training
All personnel involved in LNG bunkering operations shall be adequately trained. Such training shall be
appropriate for the purpose and a record of training shall be maintained.
Personnel on the supply side and receiving vessels shall meet the applicable training requirements
outlined in the Seafarers’ Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), IGF Code, IGC Code and
ISO 20519 whether the vessel is involved in international service or is under IMO size limits.
Annex A
(informative)
A.1 General
Qualitative Risk Assessment (QualRA), Quantitative Consequence Assessment (QCA) and Quantitative
Risk Assessment (QRA) provide a means to estimate the level or magnitude of risk presented by
bunkering LNG. Risk criteria are required to help judge if this risk is ‘acceptable’, ‘tolerable’ or
‘unacceptable’.
As with the numerous approaches to risk assessment, there are many different types of risk criteria.
It is therefore important that all stakeholders agree appropriate criteria to assist transparent and
consistent judgements on risk.
Examples of criteria for QualRA and QRA are given in A.2, A.3 and A.4.
NOTE Above 10-2/year Consequence (severity) categories A, B and C are unacceptable. Similar examples can
be given for asset, societal or environmental risks.
Consequence Categories
A Major injury
C Multiple fatalities
Risk Ratings
Acceptable
The risk can be accepted. Where practical and cost-effective it is good practice to implement
safeguards to further reduce the risk.
Tolerable
The risk can be tolerated and considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) provided
additional or alternative safeguards have been considered and implemented unless judged
impractical or the cost of implementation would be disproportionate to the reduction in risk.
Unacceptable
The risk cannot be accepted. Additional or alternative safeguards should be identified and
implemented before commencement of bunkering, and these safeguards should reduce the
risk to tolerable or acceptable.
Key
acceptable ≤10-6 The risk can be accepted. Where practical and cost-effective it is good practice to
implement safeguards to further reduce the risk
tolerable >10-6 – 10-4 The risk can be tolerated and considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) provided additional or alternative safeguards have been considered and implemented unless
judged impractical or the cost of implementation would be disproportionate to the reduction in risk
unacceptable >10-4 The risk cannot be accepted. Additional or alternative safeguards should be identified
and implemented before commencement of bunkering, and these safeguards should reduce the risk to
tolerable or acceptable
The individual risk criteria are in-line with publications issued by the Health & Safety Executive
(HSE) [34] and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) [36].
Key
X number of fatalities
Y frequency of N or more fatalities (per year)
1 broadly acceptable ALARP region
2 intolerable region
3 FN curve
4 FN criterion line
Figure A.4 illustrates differences in terminology, aversion to multiple fatalities, and categorization of
risk using one or more FN Criterion Lines.
Key
X number of fatalities
Y frequency of N or more fatalities (per year)
1 acceptable (Netherlands) negligible (Australia New South Wales)
2 unacceptable (Netherlands) intolerable (Australia New South Wales)
3 ALARP
Netherlands
Australia New South Wales
Figure A.4 — Example 2: Netherlands & Australia NSW FN Criterion Line – Petrochemical
Industry
Netherlands government expectation is that the criterion will be met[37]; but where it is exceeded the
societal risk might be tolerated following a detailed deliberation and demonstration process outlined in
the Societal Risk Accountability Guidelines[38].
Australia New South Wales (NSW) government expectation is that the criteria will be met. However,
the criteria are not mandatory, being referred to as “indicative and provisional”[39].
Annex B
(informative)
B.1 General
The safety zone is defined in Clause 7. In this annex, different methods of calculation are presented.
Figure 2 illustrates the relative location of the safety zone and the hazardous areas related to a mobile
to ship bunkering supply scenario with a truck bunkering from the quayside.
The calculation of the Safety Zone is specific to each bunkering supply scenario.
Regardless of the chosen calculation method, the selected scenario(s) should reflect the characteristics
of the bunkering supply and release conditions. For example, consideration of the following:
— bunker supply pressure and temperature;
— release mass/volume, flow rate and duration;
— release orientation, elevation, impingement and impacted surface;
— weather conditions (i.e. wind speed and atmospheric stability).
It should be recognized that all calculation methods have limitations and generally provide an
indicative result. For example, it can be difficult to account for pool spreading onto the sea or quayside,
the influence of obstacles such as the ship or nearby buildings, or gas ingress to buildings via entrances
and ventilation inlets, etc.
The calculation provides as output representative distances (from the point of leakage) for the extent of
a flammable vapour cloud assuming a jet release and LNG pool leak over land, deck or water.
Figure B.1 provides an example of a BASiL calculation. This example should not be used in place of a
BASiL calculation based on the actual bunkering scenario.
b) consequence modelling
Consequence modelling software such as PHAST and similar can examine the progress of a potential
incident (leak) from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and
evaporation, and flammable effects.
NOTE PHAST is developed by DNV.
These models can be used to address the release scenarios as agreed by the stakeholders and
validate the LFL distances as a function of project/scenario specific process transfer parameters and
environmental conditions.
Figure B.2 provides examples of a PHAST calculation. These examples should not be used in place of a
PHAST calculation based on the actual bunkering scenario.
Side View
Horizontal Leak
Side View
Vertical leak
Key
X cloud height [m]
Y distance downwind [m]
Figure B.2 — Examples of PHAST calculation for an LNG bunkering ship-to-ship supply scenario
Figure B.3 — Examples of CFD analysis for an LNG bunkering ship-to-ship supply scenario
Bibliography
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guidelines
[26] SGMF FP 02-01, Recommendation of Controlled Zones during LNG bunkering.
[27] SGMF FP 08-01, Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPs) during LNG bunkering.
[28] SGMF FP 10-01, Work practices for maintenance, repair and dry dock operations
[29] SGMF BASiL automated Bunkering Area Safety Information for LNG model.
[30] SGMF TGN 06-04, Manifold arrangements for gas-fuelled vessels
[31] SGMF TGN 06-07, Bunker Station Location: Considerations and Recommendations
[32] SGMF TGN 06-05, recommendations for linked emergency shutdown (ESD) arrangements for LNG
bunkering
[33] SGMF TGN 06-06, LNG bunkering with hose bunker systems: considerations and recommendations
[34] Health & Safety Executive, (2001). Reducing Risks, Protecting People. R2P2.
[35] IACS bunkering guidelines N 142
[36] International Maritime Organization, (18 June 2015). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA). MSC-MEPC.2 /Circ.12/Rev. 1.
[37] Besluit externe veiligheid inrichtingen – in Dutch, Trans. Decree of 27 May 2004, concerning
environmental quality standards for public safety of environmental management (Decree
external safety devices). Full translation from Dutch to English at https://wetten.overheid.nl/
BWBR0016767/geldigheidsdatum_ 21-06-2011. Refer to Section 5, Article 12, 1b.
[38] Handreiking verantwoordingsplicht groepsrisico – in Dutch, Trans. Societal Risk Accountability
Guidelines. Also refer to: VROM. (2004). Guidance on the Duty of Accountability for Societal Risk.
[39] NSW Government Planning, (2011). Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 4. Risk
Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning.
[40] Process Leak for Offshore installation Frequency Assessment Model (PLOFAM)- Main Report,
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ICS 75.200
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