EN BANC

[G.R. No. 209835. September 22, 2015.]

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR. ,
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J :p

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a

temporary restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution 1 dated
November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc
which affirmed in toto the Resolution 2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC
First Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner
Rogelio Batin Caballero.
Petitioner 3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr. 4
were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of
Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private
respondent filed a Petition 5 to deny due course to or cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false
representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a non-
resident thereof.
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and
the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition
during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a
Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in
his petition.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012,
he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and
became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1,
2012 to conform with Section 5 (2) of RA No. 9225. 6 He claimed that he did
not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a
Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter
future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his
vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.
 On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate
of Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED. 7
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency
raised by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also
in consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the
qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while
petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had
taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his
Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements
provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year
residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted
in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus,
having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove
that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible
to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.
acEHCD

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election
returns showed that petitioner won over private respondent. 8 Private
respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation. 9
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul
Proclamation. 10
On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution 11 of
the May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the
En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate
correction of the certificate of canvass to reflect that all votes in favor of
petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation
and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of
Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
issued a Writ of Execution. 12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office 13
on December 20, 2013.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
THE CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER
2012.
THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE
WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS
PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS
REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY. 14
Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal
Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally
served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to
him by registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on
why registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues
that private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1) 15 and (4), 16 Rule
23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.
We are not convinced.
While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned
requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may
exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4,
Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 4. Â Suspension of the Rules. — In the interest of justice
and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with
all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time,
provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired. 17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC, 18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal
treatment of respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
COC despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e.,
pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation
as to why his petition was not served personally on petitioner, respectively,
and held that:
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to
be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice
of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite
period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is
imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the
benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can
only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that
protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was
reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and
De Castro v. Commission on Elections , where the Court held that "in
exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to
protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to
liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the
interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives
— ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but
also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command,
whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 19 SDHTEC

Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a
resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held
on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification
and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest,
which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the
COMELEC's ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply
strictly with the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to
or cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolu tion
No. 9523, which requires service of a copy of the petition to
respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the
efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to
respondent after being made aware that such service is necessary.
We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to
personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in
Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel
records.
 The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent
is to afford the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations
contained in the petition even prior to the service of summons by the
Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the
petition during the conference held on 10 December 2012 and was
ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against
him. He even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to
petitioner's allegations. For all intents and purposes, therefore,
respondent was never deprived of due process which is the very
essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural
rules to bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal
construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of
the application of the rules is in order. . . . .
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public
interest which warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules
of [P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in
several cases. 20
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile.
He argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and
had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax
certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of
suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually
comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad,
thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of
the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public
office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to
be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents'
vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay
in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the
law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
canceling his COC. HSAcaE

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003 , declares that natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. 21 The law does not
provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. 22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is
only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. 24 However,
when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5 (2) of RA No.
9225 provides:
SEC. 5. Â Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those
who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)Â Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code
of 1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local
official. Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Â Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must
be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for
cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to
"domicile" or legal residence, 25 that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)." 26 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the
same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It
consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 27
 Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in
Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a
Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 28 we ruled that naturalization in a
foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. 29 Hence, petitioner had
effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during
his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC, 30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in
issue, we had the occasion to state, thus: HESIcT

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under

Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on
his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA,
and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the
option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it
shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 31
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No.
9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent
evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan
within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by
virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully
claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was
accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by
law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition forcertiorari,
findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the
instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such
factual determinations. 32 Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions,
we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence. 33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been
a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding
the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in
Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on
Elections, 34 we held:
. . . A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In
a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner
clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City
would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself. 35
AcICHD

Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC

that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to
Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due
course to COCs, to wit:
SEC. 74. Â Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the
best of his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 78. Â Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
 decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under
Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision
would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the
elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. 36 We concluded
that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age,
citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local
elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. 37
Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. 38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated
November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., see: separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza * and Perlas-Bernabe, * JJ., are on official leave.
Reyes, ** J., is on leave.
Leonen, J., with separate concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, *** J., took no part, prior OSG action.

Separate Opinions
BRION, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia's dismissal of the petition since the

Commission on Elections (Comelec) did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it cancelled the certificate of candidacy (CoC) of petitioner
Rogelio Batin Caballero for the mayoralty post of Uyugan, Batanes in the
May 13, 2013 Elections.
I agree that the issue of Caballero's residency 1 in Uyugan — an issue
that pertains to Caballero's qualification and eligibility to run for public office
— is imbued with public interest. In the absence of any grave abuse of
discretion, this characterization is sufficient to justify the Comelec's move to
suspend its own rules of procedure in handling Caballero's case. TAIaHE

I also agree with the ponencia's conclusion that Caballero failed to

comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code (LGC). Likewise, I hold that Caballero's reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 2
did not have the effect of automatically making him a resident of Uyugan
since RA 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. As I will discuss
below, citizenship and residency are distinct from one another and are
separate requirements for qualification for local elective office; thus, they
must be considered under the laws respectively governing them.
I concur as well with the ponencia's conclusion that, by stating in his
CoC that he had completed the required one-year residency when he
actually did not, Caballero made a material misrepresentation that justified
the Comelec's cancellation of his CoC.
I submit this Separate Concurring Opinion to add that, as the loss and
acquisition of residence involve the determination of intent, the action taken
pursuant to the intent and the applicable laws and rules on residency and
immigration, these laws and rules must necessarily be considered to
ascertain Caballero's intent and to determine whether Caballero had actually
complied with the one-year residency requirement.
As well, given Caballero's undisputed Canadian citizenship by
naturalization, due notice of the conditions required for Canadian
naturalization should assist the Court in examining Caballero's intention and
in resolving any perceived doubt regarding the loss of his domicile of origin
in Uyugan and the establishment of a new domicile of choice in Canada.
To be sure, Canadian laws are not controlling and cannot serve as
basis for the resolution of the loss and re-acquisition of domicile issue; the
Court, too, cannot take cognizance of foreign laws as these must first be
properly proven to be given recognition. Nonetheless, I believe that the
Court can look up to them, not as statutory basis for resolving the residency
issue, but as supporting guides in determining Caballero's intent.
As the ponencia defined, the issues for the Court's resolution are: first,
whether the Comelec should have denied outright the petition to deny due
course or to cancel private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud's CoC, as
Caballero failed to personally serve him a copy of the petition and to attach
an affidavit explaining the use of service by registered mail, in violation of
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 3
A n d second, whether Caballero abandoned his Philippine domicile
when he became a Canadian citizen; assuming that he did, whether his nine-
month residency in Uyugan prior to the May 13, 2013 elections constitutes
substantial compliance with the residency requirement.
I shall no longer touch on the first issue as I fully agree with the
ponencia on this point. My subsequent discussions will deal only with the
issue of Caballero's residence in Uyugan for the required duration.
My Positions
a)Â RA 9225 does not touch on residency;
citizenship and residency are separate
and distinct requirements for
qualification for local elective office
 RA 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipinos (who lost their
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country) to expeditiously
re-acquire their Filipino citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines . Upon taking the oath, they re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship and the accompanying civil and political rights that
attach to citizenship.
RA 9225 does not touch on a person's residence; does not mention it;
and does not even require residence in the Philippines prior to or at the time
he or she takes the oath to re-acquire Philippine citizenship. In fact, RA 9225
allows former natural-born citizens to re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
while still residing in the country that granted them naturalized citizenship
status. 4
Residency in the Philippines becomes material only when the
natural-born Filipino availing of RA 9225, decides to run for public
office. As provided under Section 5 of this law, those who seek elective
public office shall, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship and meet
the qualifications for holding such public office that the Constitution and
existing laws require.
The qualifications for holding local elective office are found in Section
39 of the LGC. Among others, Section 39 requires a candidate for a local
elective post to be a citizen of the Philippines and a resident of the locality
where he or she intends to be elected for at least one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
RA 9225 provides the citizenship requirement when the former natural-
born Filipino re-acquires Philippine citizenship under this law's terms.
Residency, on the other hand, is the domain of Section 39 of the LGC. These
two laws complement each other in qualifying a Filipino with a re-acquired
citizenship, for candidacy for a local elective office.
cDHAES

Notably under this relationship, RA 9225 does not require any

residency allegation, proof or qualification to avail of its terms. RA 9225 does
not even require Filipinos with re-acquired citizenship to establish or
maintain any Philippine residence, although they can, as Filipinos, come and
go as they please into the country without any pre-condition other than
those applicable to all Filipino citizens. By implication, RA 9225 (a dual
citizenship law) allows residency anywhere, within or outside the Philippines,
before or after re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under its terms. Re-
acquisition of citizenship, however, does not — by itself — imply nor
establish the fact of Philippine residency. In these senses, RA 9225 and the
LGC are complementary to, yet are independent of, one another.
Another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating RA 9225
and residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights that come
with the re-acquired citizenship comes only when the requirements have
been completed and Filipino citizenship has been re-acquired. Only then can
re-acquiring Filipinos secure the right to reside in the country as Filipinos and
the right to vote and be voted for elective office under the requirements of
t h e Constitution and applicable existing laws. For would-be candidates to
local elective office, these applicable requirements include the taking of an
oath of renunciation of all other citizenships and allegiance, and allegation
and proof of residency for at least a year counted from the date of the
election.
b)Â Principles governing loss of domicile of
origin and change or acquisition of new
domicile
Under our election laws, the term "residence" is synonymous with
domicile and refers to the individual's permanent home or the place to
which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. 5
Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of origin , which
is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice , which is
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by
operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention.
Caballero's indisputable domicile of origin is Uyugan, Batanes. He
subsequently went abroad for work, established his residence in Canada
beginning 1989, and acquired Canadian citizenship in 2007. On September
12, 2012, and while still residing in Canada, he applied with the Philippine
Consul General of Toronto, Canada for the re-acquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225.
Jurisprudence provides the following requirements to effect a change of
domicile or to acquire a domicile by choice:
(1)Â residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2)Â a bona fide intention to remain there; and
(3)Â a bona fide intention to abandon the old domicile.
These are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that
jurisprudence requires to be satisfied.
Under these requirements, no specific unbending rule exists in the
appreciation of compliance because of the element of intent 6 — an abstract
and subjective proposition that can only be determined from the surrounding
circumstances. Separately from intent is the question of the actions taken
pursuant to the intent, and the consideration of the applicable laws, rules
and regulations.
Jurisprudence has likewise laid out three basic foundational rules in
the consideration of domicile:
First, a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
Second, when once established, it remains until a new one is acquired;
and
Third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 7
As jurisprudential foundational rules, these should be fully applied in
appreciating Caballero's circumstances.
c)Â Permanent residency is a requirement
for naturalization as Canadian citizen
Under Section 5 (1), Part I of the Canadian Citizenship Law,8 Canadian
citizenship may be granted to anyone who, among other requirements:
makes an application for citizenship; IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT; and
who, if granted citizenship, intends to continue to reside in Canada. 9
d)Â Caballero lost his domicile of origin (in
Uyugan) when he established a new
domicile of choice in Canada; to
transfer his domicile back to Uyugan,
he has to prove the fact of transfer and
the consequent re-establishment of a
new domicile in Uyugan.
Given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who had been
living in Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen in
2007) would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not applied
for it and had he not shown proof of permanent residence in that country.
This is the indicator of intent that I referred to in considering the question
of Caballero's Philippine residency and his factual claim that he never
abandoned his Philippine residence.
Parenthetically, the requirement that a foreign national be a resident of
the State for a given period prior to the grant of the State's citizenship is not
unique to the Canadian jurisdiction. The requirement proceeds from the
State's need to ensure that the foreign applicant is integrated to the society
he is embracing, and that he has actual attachment to his new community
before citizenship is granted. The requirement can be said to be a
preparatory move as well since the grant of citizenship carries with it the
right to enjoy civil and political rights that are not ordinarily granted to non-
citizens.ASEcHI

Even the Philippines, through our laws on naturalization, recognizes

these requirements prior to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Our existing
laws require continued residency in the Philippines for a given period 10
before any foreign national who wishes to become a Philippine citizen is
conferred this status.
In this limited sense, I believe that the Court may look into the
Canadian citizenship laws to get an insight into Caballero's intent. To
reiterate, Caballero would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had
he not applied for it and had he not been a Canadian permanent resident for
the required period. Under the foundational rule that a man can only have
one domicile, Caballero's moves constitute positive, voluntary, overt and
intentional abandonment of his domicile of origin. His moves signified, too,
the establishment of a new domicile of choice in Canada.
Thus, to comply with Section 39 of the LGC by transferring his domicile
anew to Uyugan, Caballero has to prove the fact of transfer and his re-
established domicile by residing in Uyugan for at least one year immediately
before the May 13, 2013 elections. In accordance with the jurisprudential
rules on change of domicile, he must establish substantial physical presence
in Uyugan during the required period.
Moreover, under the terms of RA 9225 and its provisions on the grant
of civil and political rights, 11 Caballero can be said to have acquired the
right to reside in and re-establish his domicile in Uyugan (or any part of the
Philippines) only from September 12, 2012, i.e., when he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
Unfortunately for him, his Uyugan residency, even if counted from
September 12, 2012, would still be short of the required one-year residency
period. And he was not simply absent from Uyugan before September 12,
2012 during the period the law required him to be in residence; he never
even claimed that he was in Uyugan then as a resident who intended to
stay.
Of course, existing immigration laws allow former natural-born
Filipinos, who lost their Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign
country, to acquire permanent residency in the Philippines even prior to, or
without re-acquiring, Philippine citizenship under RA 9225.
Under Section 13 (f) of Commonwealth Act No. 61312 (the Philippine
Immigration of 1940), as amended, "a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
who has been naturalized in a foreign country and is returning to the
Philippines for permanent residence . . . shall be considered a non-quota
immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines." The returning former
Filipino can apply for a permanent resident visa (otherwise known as
Returning Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall entitle the person
to stay indefinitely in the Philippines. 13 Other than through such permanent
resident visa, Caballero could have stayed in the Philippines only for a
temporary period. 14 Any such temporary stay, of course, cannot be
considered for purposes of Section 39 of the LGC as it does not fall within
the concept of "residence."
In the present case, the records do not contain any evidence that
Caballero ever secured a permanent resident visa and has been residing in
the Philippines prior to his re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA
9225. Thus, Caballero's re-established domicile in Uyugan can be counted
only from the time he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. This period, as
earlier pointed out, is less than the required one-year residency.
e)Â The nature of a CoC cancellation
proceeding should be considered in the
resolution of the present certiorari
petition
The present Rule 65 petition for certiorari, 15 filed in relation with Rule
64 of the Rules of Court, arose from the petition to cancel the CoC of
Caballero. In this context, the nature and requisites of CoC cancellation
proceedings are and should be the primary considerations in the resolution
of the present petition.
 A petition to cancel CoC is governed by Section 74 in relation with
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). As these provisions operate,
the would-be candidate must state only true facts in the CoC, as provided
by Section 74; any false representation of a material fact may lead to the
cancellation or denial of his or her CoC, under Section 78. These provisions
read:
SEC. 74. Â Contents of certificate of candidacy . — The
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation;
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 78. Â Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen
days before the election. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied] ITAaHc

I n Mitra v. Comelec, 16 the Court explained that the false

representation that these provisions mention necessarily pertains to material
facts, or those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective office. The
false representation must also involve a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible,
as provided under Section 78 of the OEC.
Notably, the positive representation in the CoC that the would-be
candidate is required to make under Section 74 of the OEC, in relation with
the residency requirement of Section 39 of the LGC, complements the
disqualifying ground of being an immigrant or permanent resident in a
foreign country under Section 40 of the LGC . 17 In plainer terms, the
assertion that the would-be candidate is a resident of the locality where he
intends to be elected carries with it the negative assertion that he has
neither been an immigrant nor a permanent resident in a foreign country for
at least one year immediately preceding the election.
In the present case, Caballero filed his CoC on October 3, 2012. He
asserted in his CoC that he is a resident of Uyugan (and impliedly, not a
permanent resident of a foreign country) for at least one year immediately
preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. By making this assertion, Caballero
committed a material misrepresentation in his CoC since he effectively re-
established his domicile in Uyugan and could have been a permanent
resident only from September 12, 2012.
f)Â Under the circumstances, the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in cancelling Caballero's
CoC
Jurisprudence has consistently defined grave abuse of discretion as a
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment . . . equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion, to be grave, must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility." 18
Based on this definition, the grave abuse of discretion that justifies the
grant of certiorari involves an error or defect of jurisdiction resulting from,
among others, an indifferent disregard for the law, arbitrariness and caprice,
an omission to weigh pertinent considerations, or lack of rational
deliberation in decision making. 19
It should also be remembered that the remedy ofcertiorari applies
only to rulings that are not, or are no longer, appealable. Thus, certiorari is
not an appeal that opens up the whole case for review; it is limited to a
consideration of the specific aspect of the case necessary to determine if
grave abuse of discretion had intervened. 20
In short, to assail a Comelec ruling, the assailing party must show that
the final and inappealable ruling is completely void, not simply erroneous,
because the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in considering the case or
in issuing its ruling.
It is within this context that I fully concur with the ponencia's dismissal
of the petition. Caballero's assertion in his CoC that he has been a resident
of Uyugan for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013
elections — a clear material misrepresentation on his qualification for the
mayoralty post — undoubtedly justified the Comelec in cancelling his CoC
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. In acting as it did, the Comelec simply
performed its mandate and enforced the law based on the established facts
and evidence. Clearly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to its
actions.
In closing, I reiterate that RA 9225 is concerned only with citizenship; it
does not touch on and does not require residency in the Philippines to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship. Residency in the Philippines becomes material
only when the natural-born Filipino who re-acquires or retains Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225 decides to run for public office.
Even then, RA 9225 leaves the resolution of any residency issue to the terms
of the Constitution and specifically applicable existing laws.
For all these reasons, I vote to dismiss Rogelio Batin Caballero's
petition for lack of merit.

LEONEN, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and join Justice Arturo D. Brion's Separate

Concurring Opinion in that "citizenship and residency are separate and
distinct requirements for qualification for local elective office." 1
Domicile is distinct from citizenship. They are separate matters.
Domicile is not a mere incident or consequence of citizenship and is not
dictated by it. The case of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero who, as it is not
disputed, has Uyugan, Batanes as his domicile of origin must be resolved
with this fundamental premise in mind.
It is settled that for purposes of election law, "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile." 2 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent for business, pleasure, or like reasons, one
intends to return. 3 Jurisprudence has established three fundamental
principles governing domicile: "first, that [one] must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and third, [one] can have but one domicile at a time." 4
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that, for election purposes, the term
"residence" contemplates "domicile." 5
For the same purpose of election law, the question of residence is
mainly one of intention. 6 As explained in Gallego v. Verra: 7
The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous
with "domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus
non revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time. The
acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change of
residence must be voluntary; the residence at the place chosen for
the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of residence there must
be added the animus manendi. 8 CHTAIc

Section 39 (a) 9 of the Local Government Code provides that in order to

be eligible for local elective public office, a candidate must possess the
following qualifications: (a) a citizen of the Philippines; (b) a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, province, or in the case of a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang
Bayan, the district where he or she intends to be elected; (c) a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election ; and (d) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language
or dialect.
 A position equating citizenship with residency is unwarranted.
Citizenship and domicile are two distinct concepts. 10 One is not a function of
the other; the latter is not contingent on the former. Thus, the loss of one
does not necessarily result in the loss of the other. Loss of domicile as a
result of acquiring citizenship elsewhere is neither inevitable nor inexorable.
This is the clear import of Japzon v. COMELEC, 11 where this court dissociated
domicile from citizenship by disproving the obverse, i.e., explaining that the
reacquisition of one does not ipso facto result in the reacquisition of the
other:
As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein,
Ty's reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Ac t No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily
regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he
made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of
his birth. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no shortcut to determining one's domicile. Reference to
formalities may be helpful — they may serve as guideposts — but these are
not conclusive. It remains that domicile is a matter of intention. For domicile
to be lost and replaced, there must be an intention to abandon the domicile
of origin before a domicile of choice can be had. Consequently, if one does
not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice, his or her (old)
domicile of origin remains. To hearken to Japzon, one who changes his or her
citizenship merely acquires an option to establish his or her new domicile of
choice. Accordingly, naturalization — a process relating to citizenship — has
no automatic effect on domicile.
The primacy of intention is settled. In Limbona v. COMELEC, 13 this
court stated, in no uncertain terms, that "for purposes of election law, the
question of residence is mainly one of intention." 14
This primacy is equally evident in the requisites for acquisition of
domicile by choice (and concurrent loss of one's old domicile): "In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, these must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile." 15
These requisites were refined in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: 16

[D]omicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change

of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose. 17
Intention, however, is a state of mind. It can only be ascertained
through overt acts. Ascertaining the second requirement — a bona fide
intention to abandon and replace one's domicile with another — further
requires an evaluation of the person's "acts, activities[,] and utterances." 18
Romualdez-Marcos' inclusion of the third requirement evinces this. Bona fide
intention cannot stand alone; it must be accompanied by and attested to by
"[a]cts which correspond with the purpose." 19
Examining a person's "acts, activities[,] and utterances" 20 requires a
nuanced approach. It demands a consideration of context. This court has
made it eminently clear that there is no expedient solution as to how this is
determined: "There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a
person actually resides." 21 Domicile is ultimately a factual matter and is not
so easily resolved by mere reference to formalities that may have occurred
and that pertain to the entirely different matter of citizenship.
I nevertheless manifest my reservation about the reference to and
application of the Canadian Citizenship Law.
The standards and requisites for applying foreign law in Philippine
tribunals are settled. As aptly explained in Zalamea v. Court of Appeals: 22
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officers having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer
has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. 23
EATCcI

Respondent Jonathan Enrique Nanud, Jr.'s Comment 24 on the present

Petition 25 never referred to, alleged the existence of, or otherwise averred
that the Canadian Citizenship Law supported his cause. Neither did this
statute find its way in any of the assailed Commission on Elections
Resolutions in support of the position that petitioner's naturalization resulted
in the loss of his domicile.
It is not for a court to, out of its own initiative, address the lacunae and
fill the deficiencies in the arguments of a party or the reasoning of the
tribunal whose ruling it is reviewing. The task of alleging and proving the
existence and the accuracy of supposed statements of any foreign law that
could have helped his cause was respondent's alone. Failing in this, he
should not find solace before the court adjudicating his claims so it can do
his work for him, buttress his arguments where their weakness were
apparent, and ultimately, obtain his desired conclusion.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The assailed
Resolutions dated May 3, 2013 of the First Division of public respondent
Commission on Elections and November 6, 2013 of public respondent sitting
En Banc must be AFFIRMED.
Â
 Footnotes

* On official leave.

** On leave.

*** No part.

1. Rollo , pp. 23-28.

2. Composed of Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, Commissioner Christian

Robert S. Lim and Commissioner Al A. Parreño; Docketed as SPA No. 13-196
(DC) (F); id. at 67-72.

3. Rollo , p. 146.

4. Id. at 144.

5. Id. at 117-121.

6. Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities . — Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxx xxx xxx.

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

7. Rollo , p. 72.

8. Id. at 128-129.

9. Id. at 130-133.

10. Id. at 135-142.

11. Id. at 181-187.

12. Id. at 204-207.

13. Id. at 209.

14. Id. at 8.

15. Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the following
procedure:

1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal
service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or
the respondents' whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall
execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances therefor and resort
 to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of service or the affidavit
shall be attached to the Petition to be filed.

16. 4. No Petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the preceding

paragraphs have been complied with.

17. See Mentang v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 110347, February 4, 1994,
229 SCRA 666, 675.

18. G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 223.

19. Hayudini v. COMELEC, supra , at 242-243.

20. Rollo , pp. 25-26. (Citations omitted)

21. Secs. 2 and 3.

22. Japzon v. Commission on Elections , 596 Phil. 354, 367 (2009).

23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861, 871-872 (2002), citing
Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Gallego v. Verra , 73 Phil. 453 (1941);
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September 14,
1993, 226 SCRA 408.

26. Id. at 872, citing Aquino v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1965,
248 SCRA 400, 420.

27. Id., citing 25 Am. Jur. 2d, §11.

28. Id. at 873.

29. Citizenship Act (Canada)

Section 5. (1) The Minister shall grant citizenship to any person who:

• (a) makes application for citizenship;

• (b) is eighteen years of age or over;

• (c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, has, within the four years
immediately preceding the date of his or her application, accumulated at
least three years of residence in Canada calculated in the following manner:

• (i) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada before
his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be
deemed to have accumulated one-half of a day or residence, and

• (ii) for every day during which the person was resident in Canada after
his lawful admission to Canada for permanent residence the person shall be
deemed to have accumulated one day of residence;

xxx xxx xxx

30. Japzon v. Commission on Elections, supra note 22, at 367.

31. Id. at 347. (Emphasis supplied)

32. Pangkat Laguna v. Commission on Elections , 426 Phil. 480, 486 (2002).

33. Domingo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 372 Phil. 188, 202 (1999), citing
Nolasco v. Commission on Elections, 341 Phil. 761 (1997); Lozano v. Yorac ,
G.R. No. 94521, October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 256; Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, 276 Phil. 301 (1991).

34. 318 Phil. 467 (1995).

35. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, supra , at 509.

36. Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 386 (1999).

37. Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014,
717 SCRA 312, 323, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra, at
389, citing RA 7160, Section 39 on qualifications.

38. Id. at 323.

BRION, J., concurring:

1. Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

2. Enacted on August 29, 2003.

3. The Section 4, paragraphs (1) and (4), Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure provides:

Section 4. Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the

following procedure:

1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where personal
service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the Petition, or
the respondent's whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the petitioner shall
execute an affidavit stating the reason and circumstances therefor and resort
to registered mail as mode of service. The proof of service or the affidavit
shall be attached to the Petition to be filed.

xxx xxx xxx

4. No petition shall be docketed unless the requirements in the preceding

paragraphs have been complied with.

4. See The Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles Website, Consular Services
(Dual Citizenship),
http://www.philippineconsulatela.org/consular%20services/conserv-
dual.htm#overseas, (last visited on September 24, 2015); and The
Commission on Filipinos Overseas Website, Programs and Services — Dual
Citizenship, http://www.cfo.gov.ph/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=1362%3Adual-
citizenship&catid=145%3Aintegration-and-reintegration&Itemid=833 (last
 visited on September 24, 2015).

5. See Macalintal v. Comelec, 453 Phil. 586 (2003); and Japzon v. Comelec, 596
Phil. 354 (2009).

6. See Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larazzabal v. Commission on

Elections, 278 Phil. 275 (1991). See also Pundaodaya v. Comelec, 616 Phil.
167 (2009).

7. See Pundaodaya v. Comelec, supra note 6; and Jalosjos v. Comelec, G.R. No.
191970, April 24, 2012.

8. See http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-29/page-2.html#docCont (last

accessed September 10, 2015).

9. This provision pertinently reads:

(a) makes application for citizenship;

(b) is eighteen years of age or over;

(c) is a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2 (1) of the

Immigration and refugee Protection Act, has, subject to the regulations, no
unfulfilled conditions under the Act relating to his or her status as a
permanent resident and has, since becoming a resident,

(i) been physically present in Canada for at least 1,460 days during the six
years immediately before the date of his or her application,

(ii) been physically present in Canada for at least 183 days during each of
four calendar years that are fully or partially within the six years immediately
before the date of his or her application, and

(iii) met any applicable requirement under the Income Tax Act to file a return
of income in respect of four taxation years that are fully or partially within
the six years immediately before the date of his or her application;

(c.1) intends, if granted citizenship

(i) to continue to reside in Canada ,

(ii) to enter into, or continue in, employment outside Canada in or with the
Canadian Armed Forces, the federal public administration or the public
service of a province, otherwise than as a locally engaged person, or

(iii) to reside with his or her spouse or common-law partner or parent, who is
a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and is employed outside Canada in
or with the Canadian Armed Forces, the federal public administration or the
public service of a province, otherwise than as a locally engaged person;

(d) if under 65 years of age at the date of his or her application, has an
adequate knowledge of one of the official languages of Canada;

(e) if under 65 years of age at the date of his or her application,

demonstrates in one of the official languages of Canada that he or she has an
adequate knowledge of Canada and of the responsibilities and privileges of
 citizenship; and

(f) is not under a removal order and is not the subject of a declaration by the
Governor in Council made pursuant to section 20.

10. See Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which enumerates the
qualifications for naturalization as Philippine citizen. It reads:

Sec. 2. Qualifications. — Subject to Section four of this Act, any person

having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous

period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles

underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with
the community in which he is living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any one of
the principal Philippine languages;

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of Private
Education of the Philippines, where the Philippine history, government and
civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. [Emphasis
supplied]

See also Section 3 of RA 9139, which reads:

Section 3. Qualifications. — Subject to the provisions of the succeeding

section, any person desiring to avail of the benefits of this Act must meet the
following qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein
since birth;

(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the
time of filing of his/her petition;

(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the
underlying principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire
period of residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted
government as well as with the community in which he/she is living;
 (d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary
education in any public school or private educational institution dully
recognized by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, where
Philippine history, government and civics are taught and prescribed as part
of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor children of school age,
he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;

(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support
and if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family:
Provided, however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to practice their profession because they are
disqualified to do so by reason of their citizenship;

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and

(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people. [Emphasis supplied]

11. See Section 5 of RA 9225.

12. Enacted on August 26, 1940.

13. See www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/returning-former-natural-born-

filipino (last visited on September 20, 2015). The other rights granted to
former natural-born Philippine citizens under the Returning Former Filipino
Visa are:

1. He/she is allowed to stay indefinitely in the Philippines.

2. He/she can establish a business.

3. He/she can invest in shares of stock.

4. He/she may form an association and corporation.

5. He/she has the right of access to the courts.

6. He/she is allowed to work without securing an alien employment permit.

7. He/she may leave private lands or purchase a condominium.

8. He/she may purchase an automobile.

14. See www.immigration.gov.ph/faqs/visa-inquiry/balikbayan-privelege (last

visited on September 20, 2015). The one year period of stay in the
Philippines can be extended for another one, two or six months, up to thirty-
six months, subject to certain requirements.

15. Rollo , pp. 23-28.

16. 636 Phil. 753 (2010).

17. Section 40 of the LGC read in full:

Section 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from

running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral

turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have

acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded. [Emphasis supplied]

18. See J. Brion's Separate Opinion in Atty. Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections

and Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GR No. 206666, January 21, 2015.

19. Id., citing Aratuc v. Comelec, 177 Phil. 205, 222 (1979).

20. Id.

LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. Justice Brion's Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 3.

2. Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 455-456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

3. Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960,
226 SCRA 408 (1993) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].

4. Limbona v. COMELEC , 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En

Banc].

5. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc];

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 276 Phil. 758 (1991)
[Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

6. Limbona v. COMELEC , 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En

Banc].

7. 73 Phil. 453 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

8. Id. at 456, citing Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928) [Per J. Villareal, En Banc]
and 17 Am. Jur., section 16, pages 599-601.

9. SECTION 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of

the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
 province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent

component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or

sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the

sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

10. Japzon v. COMELEC, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

11. 596 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, En Banc].

12. Id. at 369-370.

13. 578 Phil. 364 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].

14. Id. at 374.

15. Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453, 456 (1941) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].

16. 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En Banc].

17. Id. at 386.

18. Faypon v. Quirino , 96 Phil. 294, 298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].

19. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 318 Phil. 329 (1995) [Per J. Kapunan, En

Banc].

20. Faypon v. Quirino , 96 Phil. 294, 298 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].

21. Limbona v. COMELEC , 578 Phil. 364, 374 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En
Banc].

22. G.R. No. 104235, November 18, 1993, 228 SCRA 23 [Per J. Nocon, Second
Division].

23. Id. at 30, citing Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher and Court of Tax
 Appeals, 110 Phil. 686, 700 (1961) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc] and JOVITO
SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-83 (1979).

24. Rollo , pp. 96-111.

25. Id. at 3-19. Â