The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |

Geschke Center
Sport Management College of Arts and Sciences

2017

CONCACAF Strategic Repositioning: Rebuilding

Trust in the ‘Beautiful Game’
Michael Goldman
University of San Francisco, [email protected]

Aaron Burks
University of San Francisco

Nola Agha
University of San Francisco, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation
Goldman, Michael; Burks, Aaron; and Agha, Nola, "CONCACAF Strategic Repositioning: Rebuilding Trust in the ‘Beautiful Game’"
(2017). Sport Management. 26.
https://repository.usfca.edu/sm/26

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 Case 01 1

CONCACAF STRATEGIC REPOSITIONING: REBUILDING

TRUST IN THE ‘BEAUTIFUL GAME’
Aaron Burks, University of San Francisco, Michael M. Goldman,
University of San Francisco, and Nola Agha, University of San
Francisco
Learning outcomes
Upon completion of this case the reader should be able to:
• Identify the role of leadership in creating a shared vision.
• Examine the core ideology and intended future components of an organisational vision.
• Evaluate an organisation’s strategy development process.
• Develop an appreciation of the complexities involved in an organisation’s strategic
repositioning.
Overview of case
This case presents the strategic repositioning challenge faced by the Confederation of North
American, Central American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) after a period of
leadership and strategy instability. It reports the allegations and findings of misconduct, and discusses
the steps taken by the new leadership to define a new mission and strategy.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Jurgen Mainka for his support and assistance with the research for this case study.
The authors also acknowledge the initial research contributions of Giovanni Vaglietti and Trenton
Lively in preparing this case study.
Case study
Jurgen Mainka stepped out of the main conference room at the Ritz-Carlton, Grand Cayman in
October 2013 to take another call from a journalist interested in the discussions underway at the
CONCACAF Sports Summit. As a spokesperson for CONCACAF, Mainka was delighted to share the
positive developments of the past year, which had seen a marked shift in the way football fans and
other stakeholders were viewing the organisation. He spoke of the increasing number of social media
followers that were now regularly engaging with content about the confederation’s tournaments and
development programmes, and the greater awareness and optimistic associations now linked to
CONCACAF. Mainka recalled how even his business travel experiences had been impacted - with
customs officials, who previously stared blankly when he provided his reason for visiting their
country, now recognising CONCACAF and excitedly sharing their views on recent games.
As Mainka slipped back into the room, he also knew that the job was not yet done. Questions
remained about whether CONCACAF had made a clean enough break from its difficult past.
Observers also wondered whether the strong words and new vision could be carried through to
tangible actions on the fields of play and administration boardrooms across the region. Mainka took
his chair as FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, began speaking about the power of football:
There are three powers in our game. The first one is the social power – football is education,
entertainment, based in discipline, respect and fair play. But more than that, football gives
emotions and hope… The second power, a big power, it is the economic power. Football has
 Case 01 2
become, and specifically in the past 25 years, a very significant economic power… Naturally
football has a political dimension. It is important for the development of the game all around
the world but especially in smaller countries.
CONCACAF
The Confederation of North American, Central American and Caribbean Association Football
(CONCACAF) is one of six continental confederations of FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football
Association). It serves as the governing body of football for the national associations from Canada in
the north to Guyana, Surinam and French Guyana in the south, including three North American
countries, seven Central American countries, and 31 Caribbean countries. As the administrative body
for the region, CONCACAF manages competitions, offers technical and administrative training
courses, and actively promotes and develops the game of football. This mandate is located within the
objectives of FIFA to improve the game of football constantly and to promote integrity, ethics and fair
play. A General Secretariat, Executive Committee, Congress and several committees lead
CONCACAF. The Executive Committee is composed of seven elected members, including a
President, three regional Vice-Presidents, and three members, and serves as the Board of Directors of
the non-profit company.
Prior to 2012, three Presidents had led CONCACAF during its 50-year history: Ramon Coll Jaumet
from Costa Rica from 1961 to 1968; Joachim Soria Terrazas from Mexico from 1968 to 1990, and
Austin Jack Warner from Trinidad and Tobago from 1990 to 2011. When Warner assumed his
leadership position, CONCACAF was a “languishing confederation with few resources, little or no
sponsorships or broadcast revenues, and events and competitions that, at best, had achieved limited
success” (Simmons, Urbina & Hempe 2013, p. 5). Supported by his General Secretary, Charles
“Chuck” Blazer, Warner oversaw an extended period of development and prosperity for the
organisation. By 2010, CONCACAF reported annual revenues of over $25 million, with assets of
more than $45 million.
Allegations of misconduct surfaced in 2006 when Warner was implicated in the reselling of large
blocks of tickets to the 2006 FIFA World Cup at inflated prices (Longman & Carvajal 2011). Other
reports in 2011 alleged that Warner sought funds from the English Football Association to cover some
of the $1.6 million rights cost of broadcasting the 2010 FIFA World Cup at Haitian public viewing
venues, after the devastating 2010 earthquake. FIFA confirmed that no public viewing license had
been granted for Haiti (Bond 2011). In June 2011, FIFA’s ethics committee found “comprehensive,
convincing and overwhelming” evidence that Warner and Mohamed bin Hammam, the President of
the Asian Confederation and candidate for the FIFA Presidency, were involved in attempted bribery
(Phillips 2011). The investigation was conducted at Blazer’s request as a member of FIFA’s
Executive Committee, and followed an affidavit from the Vice President of the Bahamas soccer
federation that he had been offered $40,000 as a gift from Bin Hammam. Warner resigned as a FIFA
Vice-President and President of CONCACAF on 20th June, essentially ending the FIFA investigation
with “a presumption of innocence” (Phillips 2011). Later that month, Warner accused Blazer of
misusing and misappropriating CONCACAF funds. Blazer resigned from CONCACAF at the end of
2011.
After a period of instability during which the Vice-President of CONCACAF, Alfredo Hawit, acted as
President, Jeffrey Webb was elected the next President in May 2012, becoming “one of the most
important men in the sport of football worldwide” (Cayman Islands Government 2012). Webb had
served as President of the Cayman Islands Football Association since 1991 and was Deputy Chairman
of the FIFA Internal Audit Committee and a member of the FIFA Transparency and Compliance
 Case 01 3
Committee (Simmons, Urbina & Hempe 2013). Within a month, Webb announced the establishment
of an Integrity Committee to oversee investigations of alleged misconduct as part of his pledge to
promote transparency, accountability, and reform within CONCACAF. By April 2013, the Integrity
Committee determined that Warner had committed fraud against CONCACAF and FIFA in the
development, financing and ownership of the Centre of Excellence, a multi-purpose sports complex in
Trinidad and Tobago (Simmons, Urbina & Hempe 2013). The Committee’s report concluded that
Blazer misappropriated more than $15 million of CONCACAF funds and violated U.S. Federal tax
laws by failing to file tax returns from 2006 to 2010. The Committee also found that Warner and
Blazer repeatedly issued financial statements that they knew contained misrepresentations and
material omissions, while employing a non-independent accountant as an auditor (Simmons, Urbina
& Hempe 2013).

A new mission
As Webb accepted the Presidency at the CONCACAF Congress in Hungary on 23rd May 2012, he
declared: “What has our focus been? Politics and economics; let us focus on our game… We must
move the clouds and allow the sunshine in” (Liburd 2012). He went on to say:
Over the last year, our mission and our vision have been blurred, from lawyers, to audit
reports to compensation. We have deviated from our mission. I am here; we are here, because
of our love for football. The passion for the game drives and motivates our every action. Our
core focus must be football: its development, its growth and its ability to transform nations.
We must… restructure our confederation. The events over the past year will not define and
determine our destiny. We have a responsibility to ensure that history isn’t repeated. Let us
use the events over the past year as a catalyst to promote positive change. Let’s see it as an
opportunity to return to the core values of the beautiful game - the values which enchanted
and sparked our love affair with this game (Cayman Net News 2012).
Webb appointed Columbian-born Enrique Sanz as the new General Secretary in July 2012, replacing
Ted Howard, the Deputy General Secretary who had held the position in an acting capacity since
Blazer resigned. Sanz had been Vice-President of South American soccer marketing agency Traffic
Sports USA. Additional personnel changes followed in November with the appointments of Horace
Donovan Reid as Director of Competitions and Jurgen Mainka as Director of Communications and
Marketing. Reid had previously served as General Secretary of the Jamaica Football Federation and as
the Chairman of CONCACAF’s Administration Committee. Mainka was born in Mexico and grew up
idolising Argentinian goalkeeper Ubaldo Fillol. Mainka previously worked as Vice-President of
Community Relations for the New York Red Bulls Major League Soccer (MLS) franchise, and was
also responsible for MasterCard’s Latin American sponsorship activations during his time at Octagon.
Crafting a new strategic agenda
As Mainka walked into his new office in Miami, the leadership of CONCACAF was defining a new
strategic agenda. Webb stated, “I want to focus on the field of play and on the players and on
grassroots programs and player development. The game is about players, coaches and referees and
that should be the foundation of the game” (Evans 2012). Reflecting on the role of the Confederation
as the hub for member countries, Webb questioned whether it had adequately serviced that
responsibility: “I think we should be sharing the wealth with those countries, helping them participate
in competitions” (Evans 2012).
For Mainka, the new strategic agenda was captured in two core messages: “The development of the
game was 100% of our focus, regardless of how big or small our member associations were, and
 Case 01 4
CONCACAF works for its members, not the other way around.” In repositioning the public
perception of CONCACAF, Mainka’s goal was to regain the “business trust” of the market and
stakeholders, including commercial partners, through “very clear transparency in everything we did.”
Specifically, Mainka’s first objective was to develop a stronger platform for the organisation’s
external messaging, in order to raise communication levels with all stakeholders. Secondly, Mainka
set an objective to change the stakeholder’s negative perceptions of CONCACAF. These goals were
echoed in Webb’s public comments that, “…in rebuilding the vision and the image of the
confederation, actions speak louder than words. We have to rebuild that trust and integrity and
reestablish that credibility that we've lost” (Wahl 2013).
Mainka’s team employed a SWOT analysis to reassess the internal and external context facing the
organisation. As he arrived, Mainka recognised strength in the passion for the game felt by many of
the management team based in Miami. One of the important weaknesses the analysis found was the
passive way in which CONCACAF had performed marketing activities, which Mainka felt was “very
different to the way in which I would do it.” Looking externally, the SWOT analysis suggested that
the increasing fan use of social media presented an opportunity to more consistently and frequently
communicate where “nothing was done in the past.” Mainka was conscious that the window of
opportunity to affect change was small and needed to be capitalized on to avoid the dominant themes
of corruption and fraud setting in for good. Given FIFA’s espoused commitment to the spirit of fair
play, Mainka recalled a worrying Facebook post example in March 2013 exclaiming, “Fair play does
not exist in Concacaf!!!” (Andrey Samper Jimenez 2013). With this context top of mind, and
reinforced by weekly strategic conversations with Sanz, the new General Secretary, Mainka focused
his team on execution.
We began by revamping our webpage to be able to have a direct touch point with not only the
fans but every single stakeholder, whether it was a member of the association or a sponsor, a
partner, or whether it was any official within the football world… to make sure that our
information was accurate, current, and really reflected that transparency we spoke about.
These actions followed a set of new business practices that Sanz led to professionalise the
administration of the organisation, including a strict budget for every division, including marketing,
public relations, and competitions.
Capitalizing on the Gold Cup & Champions League
One of the implications of the new strategic agenda was the intent to involve all 41 countries in all
CONCACAF activities. Reassessment of the confederations’ competitions such as the Gold Cup and
Champions League were seen as immediate remedies in achieving a new strategy.
The Gold Cup is the bi-annual international tournament of 12 qualified national teams within the
CONCACAF region. Tournament games are held on U.S. soil and televised by Fox in English and
Univision Deportes in Spanish. The Gold Cup is the premier tournament competition within the
CONCACAF with the 2011 edition contributing nearly $20m in revenues (Wahl 2013). In fact, the
2011 Gold Cup competition between United States and Mexico drew a 93,000 sellout crowd at the
Rose Bowl in Pasadena in addition to its record setting 1.43 Nielsen viewership rating in the U.S. In
2013, the United States and Panama Gold Cup match achieved the second highest television rating for
any soccer match in the U.S. The Gold Cup results determine which CONCACAF national teams will
earn a place in the FIFA World Cup every four years.
The CONCACAF Champions League is the annual tournament of 24 qualified club teams within the
CONCACAF region. Spots are selected based on each country’s strength of inter-league quality. For
 Case 01 5
example, the United States and Mexico are given four spots each. Costa Rica, Panama and Honduras
are provided with two spots each. Canada and the remaining countries within the region are left with
one spot each. The current CONCACAF Champions League group stage is a six-week process with
several scheduled matches per week. In many cases the competition receives no coverage by
traditional sports media broadcasters, raising questions about the value of the tournament for teams
across the region (Hickey 2013).
Mainka recognized that “people didn’t quite understand what it meant to win the league… You are
the reigning champions of CONCACAF? And?” From his time with the New York Red Bulls,
Mainka knew that teams would rather focus on their more lucrative national tournaments, with the
Mexican Liga MX recognised as the fourth highest average attended league in the world. Eighty
percent of CONCACAF countries, however, were without a professional league (Nicholson 2013).
Because the CONCACAF Champions League winner is automatically qualified for the annual FIFA
Club World Cup, Mainka’s team therefore focused their communication with clubs on the prestige
and financial rewards of the global tournament. The Club World Cup involves seven teams competing
for the title at venues within the host nation over a period of about two weeks. The seven participating
clubs include the winners from the AFC Champions League (Asia), CAF Champions League (Africa),
CONCACAF Champions League (North America), Copa Libertadores (South America), OFC
Champions League (Oceania) and UEFA Champions League (Europe), along with the host nation's
national champions. In December 2012, Club de Futbol Monterrey, the Mexican representative of
CONCACAF at the tournament in Japan, beat Al Ahly Sporting Club from Egypt to take third place,
which included prize money of $2.5 million.
Beyond the brand positioning and appeal of the CONCACAF Champions League, Mainka focused on
“reassessing the structure of the entire tournament, from dates we are playing, to formats, to really
exploring in language with the new approach to everything.” Mexican clubs won the previous five
years of the tournament, with nine of the 10 finalists and 14 of the 20 semifinalists being from the
Liga MX. Critics of the tournament also pointed to the poor broadcast and online streaming product,
when covered at all (Hickey 2013).
Conclusion: Ongoing transformation
Jeffrey Webb kicked off the CONCACAF Sports Summit in the Cayman Islands on 22nd October
2013 by highlighting the 43 million athletes playing football at various levels across the region. With
the theme of “Transformation through partnership,” the two-day event aimed to “build bridges; create
dialogue; examine and highlight some of the best practices throughout the region; analyze strengths
and to set goals and objectives to improve shortcomings” (Wilson 2013). For the first time in the
region’s football history, Sports Ministers from each of the 41 countries were invited to join
CONCACAF’s regional and country leadership teams. In addition, business, media and non-profit
stakeholders were invited to “create synergies and dialogue… to foster the development of the game
for the future” (Wilson 2013).
Nic Coward, the General Secretary of the English Premier League, argued during the summit that
their transformation from a “league that brought in a few million pounds a year to one that brings in
over two billion [was] directly attributable to the partnerships we have built with the media, fans,
businesses and above all with the local communities where our teams play” (Riccio 2013). Webb
suggested that the Caribbean nations should cooperate to create a professional, region-wide
“Caribbean League”. This league could bolster the chances of a Caribbean nation qualifying for the
World Cup. In addition, it could change the balance of football revenues in the region where currently
80% of revenues are generated by less than 20% of the countries (Nicholson 2013). The CONCACAF
 Case 01 6
President also suggested that the region should have the opportunity to host the FIFA World Cup in
2026.
Mainka wondered whether his team’s efforts over the previous year had re-established a strong
enough foundation for CONCACAF’s ambitious growth intent. As the numbers of Twitter followers
and Facebook likes for CONCACAF continued to grow, Mainka questioned whether a strong enough
strategy was in place to achieve the developmental goals of the organisation. Reflecting on his role in
executing the new strategic agenda, Mainka wondered whether the Gold Cup and Champions League
products were strongly enough aligned to the new mission, and pondered what else he needed to do to
accelerate the transformation of CONCACAF.
Questions
1. Identify and discuss the ways in which Webb created a shared vision.
2. Discuss the extent to which CONCACAF’s core ideology and intended future are related.
3. Critique CONCACAF’s strategy development process.
4. What risks does CONCACAF face in executing their strategic agenda?
5. How should CONCACAF mitigate these risks to enhance the likelihood of successful execution?
Recommended reading
In order to deepen analysis of the case study, students are encouraged to read the following strategy
development resources. Firstly, students are directed to review Collins and Porras’ (1996) and Kouzes
and Posner’s (2009) Harvard Business Review articles on developing a corporate vision. An
additional view on this step in the strategy process is offered by Colakoglu’s (2012) Thunderbird
International Business Review article. In order to fully critique CONCACAF’s strategy development
process in question three above, students should refer to Kaplan, Norton, and Barrows’ (2008)
Harvard Business Publishing Newsletters contribution. Finally, students are directed to review
Neilson, Martin, and Powers’ (2008) Harvard Business Review article when reflecting on strategic
risks and execution.
Bibliography
Bond, D. (2011). E-mail adds pressure on Fifa’s Jack Warner, BBC, 26 May, viewed 14 April 2014, <
http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/13559384>.
Cayman Islands Government (2012). Congrats to Cayman’s CONCACAF President, viewed 14 April
2014, < http://www.gov.ky/portal/page?_pageid=1142,6789226&_dad=portal >.
Cayman Net News (2012). Jeff Webb confirmed as CONCACAF President, 25 May, viewed 14 April
2014, < http://caymannetnews.com/2012/05/25/jeff-webb-confirmed-as-concacaf-president/ >.
Colakoglu, S. (2012). Shard vision in MNE subsidiaries: The role of formal, personal, and social
control in its development and its impact on subsidiary learning. Thunderbird International Business
Review, 54(5), 639-652.
Collins, J.C. & Porras, J.I. (1996). Building your company’s vision. Harvard Business Review, 74(5),
65-77.
Evans, S. (2012). Webb keen to usher in new era for CONCACAF, Reuters, 12 July, viewed 14 April
2014, < http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-soccer-concacaf-webb-
idUSBRE86B1G820120712 >.
 Case 01 7
Hickey, K. (2013). How to fix the CONCACAF Champions League, Sporting News, 27 September,
viewed 14 April 2014, < http://www.sportingnews.com/soccer/story/2013-09-27/concacaf-
champions-league-mls-liga-mx>
Kaplan, R.S., Norton, D.P. & Barrows, E.A. (2008), Developing the strategy: vision, value gaps, and
analysis, Harvard Business Publishing Newsletters (B0801A-PDF-ENG), Harvard Business School
Publishing, Boston.
Kouzes, J.M. & Posner B.Z. (2009). To lead, create a shared vision. Harvard Business Review, 87(1),
20-21.
Liburd, L. (2012). No business as usual yet at CONCACAF, Play the Game, 4 June, viewed 14 April
2014, < http://www.playthegame.org/news/detailed/no-business-as-usual-yet-at-concacaf-5401.html
>.
Longman, J. & Carvajal, D. (2011). FIFA power broker is out after years of whispers, New York
Times, 20 June, viewed 14 April 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/sports/soccer/jack-
warner-fifa-and-concacaf-power-broker-resigns.html?pagewanted=4&_r=0&pagewanted=all>.
Neilson, G.L., Martin, K.L. & Powers, E. (2008). The secrets to successful strategy execution. Harvard
Business Review, 86(6), 60-70.
Nicholson, P. (2013). Webb calls for CONCACAF federations to grasp their future, Inside World
Football, 23 October, viewed 14 April 2014, <http://www.insideworldfootball.com/world-
football/football-americas/concacaf-news/13484-webb-calls-for-concacaf-federations-to-grasp-their-
future>.
Phillips, M. (2011). FIFA found “overwhelming” evidence of bribery, Reuters, 22 June, viewed 14
April 2014, < http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/22/us-soccer-fifa-
idUSTRE75L4PY20110622>.
Riccio, R.J. (2013). CONCACAF 2013 Sports Summit in the Cayman Islands concludes,
Examiner.com, 22 October, viewed 14 April 2014, <http://www.examiner.com/article/concacaf-2013-
sport-summit-the-cayman-islands-concludes>.
Simmons, D.A.C., Urbina, R.M. & Hempe, E. (2013). CONCACAF Integrity Committee Report of
Investigation, Report presented to the Executive Committee of CONCACAF, 18 April, Business of
Soccer, viewed 14 April 2014, < http://www.businessofsoccer.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/CONCACAF-IntegrityCommittee-ReportofInvestigation-20120418.pdf>.
Wahl, G. (2013). Jeffrey Webb hopes his presidency will transform CONCACAF, Sports Illustrated,
10 July, viewed 14 April 2014 < http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/20130710/jeffrey-webb-
concacaf-gold-cup>.
Wilson, F. (2013). Historic CONCACAF Sports Summit opens today in Cayman Islands, Kaieteir
News Online, 22 October, viewed 14 April 2014 <
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cayman-islands/>.
Recommended websites
CONCACAF – http://www.concacaf.com
Official CONCACAF – http://www.facebook.com/officialconcacaf
@CONCACAF – http://www.twitter.com/concacaf
 Case 01 8
FIFA – http://www.fifa.com
Harvard Business Review: Strategy Execution - http://hbr.org/balanced-scorecard