PETITIONER

Sl. No. CASE NAME Page No.

1. State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal

2. Kushum v. UOI and Ors

3. Janata Dal v. H S Chawdhary

4.

National Legal Services Authority of India v. Union of

India

5. Anuj Garg v. Hotel Assn of India

6. Shafin Jahan v. Ashok Km

7. Independent Thought v. UOI, 2017

8. Jugraj Singh and another v/s state of Punjab and others

9. M. Janaki Vs. K. Vairamuthu

 10. Kokkula Suresh vs the State of AP

11. Vijayalakshmi & Anr. v. State & Anr

12. Sabari v. Inspector of police

State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010

Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, Mukundakam Sharma

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

State of Uttaranchal .. Appellant

Versus
Balwant Singh Chaufal & Others .. Respondents

JUDGMENT
Dalveer Bhandari, J.

to justice to the deprived, discriminated and otherwise vulnerable sections of society have
touched almost every aspect of human life while dealing with cases filed in the label of the
public interest litigation. The credibility of the superior courts of India has been tremendously
enhanced because of some vital and important directions given by the courts. The courts'
contribution in helping the poorer sections of the society by giving new definition to life and
liberty and to protect ecology, environment and forests are extremely significant.

ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:

161. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has
been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the
courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think
time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged
whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged.

162. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in
the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to

Janata Dal vs H.S. Chowdhary And Ors. on 28 August, 1992

Bench: S Pandian, K J Reddy

JUDGMENT S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.

Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal
grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Article 32, are entertained it would amount to abuse of
process of the Court, preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal
interest cannot be enforced through the process of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in
the garb of a public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceedings for
vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not
able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. A
person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 must approach this Court for the
vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his
personal grudge or enmity. It is duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the
course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court for personal matters under the garb of the public interest litigation.

109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding
of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and
needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or
private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the
colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at
the threshold.

110. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts,
innumerable days are wasted which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of
the genuine litigants. Though we are second to none in fostering and developing the newly invented
concept of PIL and extending our long arm sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the
needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed,
unrepresented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants
with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of
rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and
persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering
from the undue delay in service matters, Government or private persons awaiting the disposal of tax
cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorised collection of tax amounts are locked
up, detenus expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. - are all standing in a long
serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances
redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having
absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either for themselves or as
proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue
muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation, and get into the Courts by filing
vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of Courts and as result of
which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves which piquant situation creates a
frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of
our judicial system.

111. In the words of Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) "the Courts must be careful in entertaining public
interest litigations" or in the words of Sarkaria, J. "the application of busy bodies should be rejected at
the threshold itself and as Krishna Iyer, J. has pointed out, "the doors of the Courts should not be ajar
for such vexatious litigants".

112. Further, we would like to make it clear that it should not be misunderstood that by the expression
of our above view, there is any question of retreating or recoiling from the earlier views expressed by
this Court about the philosophy of public interest litigation in many outstanding judgments which we
have already referred to; on the other hand we look back to the vantage point from which we started
our journey and proceed on our onward journey in the field of PIL.

Kushum Lata vs Union Of India And Ors

Kushum Lata

Vs

Union of India and Ors.

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 12/07/2006

BENCH:

ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA

J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is
nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out.
Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to
consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has
now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be
"publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation"
or the latest trend "paise income litigation". The High Court has found that the case at
hand belongs to the second category. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it
becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as
well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not
merely an adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be
invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy
his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be
polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person
acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest
litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation
of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal
gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were
highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305) and
Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A
writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only
with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and
clean objective. (See Ramjas Foundation vs. Union of India, (AIR 1993 SC 852) and K.R.
Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand, (1994 (6) SCC 620).

It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression 'public interest litigation'. In

Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:

"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is
interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which
a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected."

In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as follows:

"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal
rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which
may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."

In Janata Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In
para 52 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as
follows:

"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated
in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically
the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the
enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the
community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or
liabilities are affected."

National Legal Ser.Auth vs Union Of India & Ors on 15 April, 2014

Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan, A.K. Sikri

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

National Legal Services Authority … Petitioner

Versus
 Union of India and others … Respondents
JUDGMENT

127. Aristotle opined that treating all equal things equal and all unequal things unequal
amounts to justice. Kant was of the view that at the basis of all conceptions of justice, no
matter which culture or religion has inspired them, lies the golden rule that you should
treat others as you would want everybody to treat everybody else, including yourself.
When Locke conceived of individual liberties, the individuals he had in mind were
independently rich males. Similarly, Kant thought of economically self- sufficient males
as the only possible citizens of a liberal democratic state. These theories may not be
relevant in today’s context as it is perceived that the bias of their perspective is all too
obvious to us. In post-traditional liberal democratic theories of justice, the background
assumption is that humans have equal value and should, therefore, be treated as equal, as
well as by equal laws. This can be described as ‘Reflective Equilibrium’. The method of
Reflective Equilibrium was first introduced by Nelson Goodman in ‘Fact, Fiction and
Forecast’ (1955). However, it is John Rawls who elaborated this method of Reflective
Equilibrium by introducing the conception of ‘Justice as Fairness’. In his ‘Theory of
Justice’, Rawls has proposed a model of just institutions for democratic societies. Herein
he draws on certain pre-theoretical elementary moral beliefs (‘considered judgments’),
which he assumes most members of democratic societies would accept. “[Justice as
fairness [….] tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the
political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of
their interpretations. Justice as fairness is a political conception in part because it starts
from within a certain political tradition. Based on this preliminary understanding of just
institutions in a democratic society, Rawls aims at a set of universalistic rules with the
help of which the justice of present formal and informal institutions can be assessed. The
ensuing conception of justice is called ‘justice as fairness’. When we combine Rawls’s
notion of Justice as Fairness with the notions of Distributive Justice, to which Noble
Laureate Prof. Amartya Sen has also subscribed, we get jurisprudential basis for doing
justice to the Vulnerable Groups which definitely include TGs. Once it is accepted that
the TGs are also part of vulnerable groups and marginalized section of the society, we are
only bringing them within the fold of aforesaid rights recognized in respect of other
classes falling in the marginalized group. This is the minimum riposte in an attempt to
assuage the insult and injury suffered by them so far as to pave way for fast tracking the
realization of their human rights.

128. The aforesaid, thus, are my reasons for treating TGs as ‘third gender’ for the
purposes of safeguarding and enforcing appropriately their rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. These are my reasons in support of our Constitution to the two issues in
these petitions.
Anuj Garg & Ors vs Hotel Association Of India & Ors on 6 December, 2007

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Harjit Singh Bedi

Judgement

48. The test to review such a Protective Discrimination statute would entail a two pronged
scrutiny:

(a) the legislative interference (induced by sex discriminatory legalisation in the instant
case) should be justified in principle,

(b) the same should be proportionate in measure.

49. The Court's task is to determine whether the measures furthered by the State in form
of legislative mandate, to augment the legitimate aim of protecting the interests of women
are proportionate to the other bulk of well-settled gender norms such as autonomy,
equality of opportunity, right to privacy et al. The bottom-line in this behalf would a
functioning modern democratic society which ensures freedom to pursue varied
opportunities and options without discriminating on the basis of sex, race, caste or any
other like basis. In fine, there should be a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means used and the aim pursued.

Supreme Court of India

Shafin Jahan vs Asokan K.M. on 8 March, 2018

Author: D Y Chandrachud

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the State.” 21 The right to marry a person of one’s choice is
integral to Article 21 of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees the right to life.
This right cannot be taken away except through a law which is substantively and
procedurally fair, just and reasonable. Intrinsic to the liberty which the Constitution
guarantees as a fundamental right is the ability of each individual to take decisions on
matters central to the pursuit of happiness. Matters of belief and faith, including whether
to believe are at the core of constitutional liberty. The Constitution exists for believers as
well as for agnostics. The Constitution protects the ability of each individual to pursue a
way of life or faith to which she or he seeks to adhere. Matters of dress and of food, of
ideas and ideologies, of love and partnership are within the central aspects of identity. The
law may regulate (subject to constitutional compliance) the conditions of a valid
marriage, as it may regulate the situations in which a marital tie can be ended or annulled.
These remedies are available to parties to a marriage for it is they who decide best on
whether they should accept each other into a marital tie or continue in that relationship.
Society has no role to play in determining our choice of partners.

22 In Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India37, this Court in a decision of nine judges

held that the ability to make decisions on matters close to one’s life is an inviolable aspect
of the human personality:

“The autonomy of the individual is the ability to make decisions on vital

matters of concern to life… The intersection between one’s mental integrity
and privacy entitles the individual to freedom of thought, the freedom to
believe in what is right, and the freedom of self-determination… The family,
marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are all integral to the dignity of
the individual.” A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Common Cause (A
Regd. Society) v Union of India38, held:
“Our autonomy as persons is founded on the ability to decide:
on what to wear and how to dress, on what to eat and on the food that we
share, on when to speak and what we speak, on the right to believe or not to
believe, on whom to love and whom to partner, and to freely decide on
innumerable matters of consequence and detail to our daily lives.” The
strength of the Constitution, therefore, lies in the guarantee which it affords
that each individual will have a protected entitlement in determining a choice
of partner to share intimacies within or outside marriage.

Supreme Court of India

Independent Thought vs Union Of India on 11 October, 2017

Author: M B Lokur
Bench: D Gupta

70. There can be no dispute that every citizen of this country has the right to get good
healthcare. Every citizen can expect that the State shall make best endeavours for
ensuring that the health of the citizen is not adversely affected. By now it is well settled
by a catena of judgments of this Court that the “right to life” envisaged in Article 21 of
the Constitution of India is not merely a right to live an animal existence. This Court has
repeatedly held that right to life means a right to live with human dignity. Life should be
meaningful and worth living. Life has many shades. Good health is the raison d’etre of a
good life. Without good health W.P. (C) No. 382 of 2013 Page 113 there cannot be a good
life. In the case of a minor girl child good health would mean her right to develop as a
healthy woman. This not only requires good physical health but also good mental health.
The girl child must be encouraged to bloom into a healthy woman. The girl child must not
be deprived of her right of choice. The girl child must not be deprived of her right to
study further. When the girl child is deprived of her right to study further, she is actually
deprived of her right to develop into a mature woman, who can earn independently and
live as a self sufficient independent woman. In the modern age, when we talk of gender
equality, the girl child must be given equal opportunity to develop like a male child. In
fact, in my view, because of the patriarchal nature of our society, some extra benefit must
be showered upon the girl child to ensure that she is not deprived of her right to life,
which would include her right to grow and develop physically, mentally and economically
as an independent self sufficient female adult.

71. It is true that at times the State, because of paucity of funds, or other reasons beyond
its control, cannot live up to the expectations of the people. At the same time, it is not
expected that the State should frame a law, which adversely affects the health of a citizen,
that too a minor girl child. The State, under Article 15 of the Constitution, is in fact,
empowered to make laws favouring women. Reservation for women is envisaged under
Article 15 of the Constitution. In W.P. (C) No. 382 of 2013 Page 114 Vishakha v. State of
Rajasthan62, this Court held that sexual harassment of working women amounts to
violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 23 of the Constitution.

72. When a girl is compelled to marry before she attains the age of 18 years, her health is
put in serious jeopardy. As is evident from various reports referred to above, girls who
were married before the age of 19 years are likely to suffer medical and psychological
problems. A 15 or 16 year old girl, when forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse by her
“husband”, undergoes a trauma, which her body and mind is not ready to face. The girl
child is also twice as more likely to die in child birth than a grown up woman. The least,
that one would expect in such a situation, is that the State would not take the defence of
tradition and sanctity of marriage in respect of girl child, which would be totally violative
of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, this Court is of the view that
Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC is arbitrary since it is violative of the principles enshrined
in Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Jugraj Singh and another v/s state of Punjab and others CRWP No.6733 of 2021 The court
insisted that since article 21 of the Indian constitution comes under a fundamental right of
every citizen irrespective of the validity of the marriage, the court decided to dismiss the
petition by directing the respondents(No.2 -4) (Police) to protect the lives and the liberty of
the petitioners from the harm or any kind of threat generated by the respondents

Madras High Court

M.Janaki vs K.Vairamuthu on 29 February, 2016

8.Though Section 15 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 informs offences
there against to be cognizable and non-bailable, Section 3 makes provision for avoidance
of marriage by contracting party, who was a child at the time thereof, through filing a
petition for annulling the marriage by such party. The same is reproduced hereunder:
?Child marriages to be voidable at the option of contracting party being a child. - (1)
Every child marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act,
shall be voidable at he option of the contracting party who was a child at the time of
marriage:

Provided that a petition for annulling a child marriage by a decree of nullity, may be filed
in the district court only by a contracting party to the marriage who was a child at the time
of the marriage.

(2) If at the time of filing a petition, the petitioner is a minor, the petition may be filed
through his or her guardian or next friend along with the Child Marriage Prohibition
Officer.

(3) The petition under this section may be filed at any time but before the child filing the
petition completes two years of attaining majority.

(4) While granting a decree of nullity under this section, the district court shall make an
order directing both the parties to the marriage and their parents or their guardians to
return to the other party, his or her parents or guardian, as the case may be, the money,
valuables, ornaments and other gifts received on the occasion of the marriage by them
from the other side, or an amount equal to the value of such valuables, ornaments, other
gifts and money:

Provided that no order under this section shall be passed unless the concerned parties
have been given notices to appear before the district court and show cause why such order
should not be passed.?

9.In Full Bench judgment of this Court in T.Sivakumar v. Inspector of Police, Thiruvallur
Town Police Station (FB) reported in AIR 2012 Madras 62, it has been observed thus:

?56.A plain reading of sub-section (3) would reflect that a petition under the above
Section may be filed at any time but before the child completes two years of attaining
majority.

Madras High Court

Vijayalakshmi vs State Rep. By on 27 January, 2021

18.In the present case, the 2nd Petitioner who was in a relationship with the 2nd
Respondent who is also in his early twenties, has clearly stated that she was the one who
insisted that the 2nd Respondent take her away from her home and marry her, due to the
pressure exerted by her parents. The 2nd Respondent, who was placed in a very
precarious situation decided to concede to the demand of the 2nd Petitioner. Thereafter,
they eloped from their respective homes, got married and consummated the marriage.
Incidents of this nature keep occurring regularly even now in villages and towns and
occasionally in cities. After the parents or family lodge a complaint, the police register
FIRs for offences of kidnapping and various offences under the POCSO Act. Several
criminal cases booked under the POCSO Act fall under this category. As a consequence
of such a FIR being registered, invariably the boy gets arrested and thereafter, his
youthful life comes to a grinding halt. The provisions of the POCSO Act, as it stands
today, will surely make the acts of the boy an offence due to its stringent nature. An
adolescent boy caught in a situation like this will surely have no defense if the criminal
case is taken to its logical end. Punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship
with a minor girl by treating https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ him as an offender, was
never the objective of the POCSO Act. An adolescent boy and girl who are in the grips of
their hormones and biological changes and whose decision-making ability is yet to fully
develop, should essentially receive the support and guidance of their parents and the
society at large. These incidents should never be perceived from an adult’s point of view
and such an understanding will in fact lead to lack of empathy. An adolescent boy who is
sent to prison in a case of this nature will be persecuted throughout his life. It is high time
that the legislature takes into consideration cases of this nature involving adolescents
involved in relationships and swiftly bring in necessary amendments under the Act. The
legislature has to keep pace with the changing societal needs and bring about necessary
changes in law and more particularly in a stringent law such as the POCSO Act.

19. The main issue that requires the consideration of this Court is as to whether this Court
can quash the criminal proceedings involving non- compoundable offences pending
against the second respondent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parbathbhai
Aahir @ Parbathbhai https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ Vs. State of Gujrath, reported in
2017 9 SCC 641 and in case of The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dhruv Gurjar and
Another reported in (2019) 2 MLJ Crl 10, has given sufficient guidelines that must be
taken into consideration by this Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
of Cr.P.C, to quash non-compoundable offences. One very important test that has been
laid down is that the Court must necessarily examine if the crime in question is purely
individual in nature or a crime against the society with overriding public interest. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that offences against the society with overriding public
interest even if it gets settled between the parties, cannot be quashed by this Court.

20. In the present case, the offences in question are purely individual/personal in nature. It
involves the 2nd Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent and their respective families only. It
involves the future of two young persons who are still in their early twenties. The second
respondent is working as an Auto driver to eke his livelihood. Quashing the proceedings,
will not affect any overriding public interest in this case and it will in fact pave way for
the 2nd Petitioner and the 2nd Respondent to settle down in their
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ life and look for better future prospects. No useful
purpose will be served in continuing with the criminal proceedings and keeping these
proceedings pending will only swell the mental agony of the victim girl and her mother
and not to forget the 2nd Respondent as well.

21. In view of the above, this Court is inclined to quash the criminal proceedings in
Special S.C.No.24 of 2018 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court (Fast
Track Mahila Court) Erode in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Accordingly, the same is quashed and this Criminal
Original Petition is allowed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also
closed.

Madras High Court

Sabari @ Sabarinathan @ ... vs The Inspector Of Police on 9 January, 2019

18.More so, the trial Court appears to have placed undue reliance on the official witnesses
in order to come to such conclusion. It appears from the conclusion of the trial Court that
the trial Court has weighed the circumstances pointing out the involvement of the
appellant/accused in the offences charged against him. This Court is unable to appreciate
such conclusion by the trial Court and unable to understand as to which circumstances
weighed with the trial Court to come to such conclusion. This Court is unable to see any
circumstances, which can ultimately establish the offences against the appellant/accused.
In the absence of evidence by crucial witnesses, mere existence of some evidence, cannot
give rise to valid presumption http://www.judis.nic.in in favour of the prosecution. Any
presumption could be drawn by the Court in favour of the prosecution must be sound,
reasonable and concrete and such presumption cannot be allowed to hang over a baseless
premise.

19.In this case, the trial Court has erred in drawing presumption without any material
whatsoever in support of such presumption. On the whole, the conclusion by the trial
Court is totally flawed and the findings of the trial Court are unsustainable and cannot be
countenanced both in law and on facts. In view of all the above, this Court holds that the
prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubts and therefore, the
appellant is entitled for acquittal.

20.In the result, this criminal appeal is allowed; the conviction and sentence imposed on
the appellant by the trial Court are set aside and the appellant/accused is acquitted. Bail
bond, if any, executed by him shall stand cancelled. Fine amount, if any, paid by him is
ordered to be refunded forthwith. The appellant shall be set at liberty forthwith, if he is
not required in connection with any other case.

26.04.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in

21.When this case was taken up for hearing, this Court became concerned about the
growing incidence of offences under the POCSO Act on one side and also the Rigorous
Imprisonment envisaged in the Act. Sometimes it happens that such offences are slapped
against teenagers, who fall victim of the application of the POCSO Act at an young age
without understanding the implication of the severity of the enactment.