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The Numbers Game Why Everything You Know About Football Is Wrong 9780241963630
The Numbers Game Why Everything You Know About Football Is Wrong 9780241963630
7. Guerrilla Football
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
To our home teams
Kathleen, Nick and Eli
Serena, Ben, Mike, Tom and Rachel
Football for Sceptics – The Counter(s)
Reformation
In sports, what is true is more powerful than what you believe, because what is true will give
you an edge.
Bill James
Asking Questions
It was a simple question, asked in that bewildered tone Americans often
use when discussing football.
‘Why do they do that?’
Dave and I were watching Premier League highlights, and something
had caught his eye. Not a moment of dazzling skill, or bewitching
beauty, or even inept refereeing, but something altogether more
mundane. Dave was baffled, like countless central defenders before him,
by Rory Delap’s long throws.
Every single time Stoke City won a throw-in within hurling distance of
the opposition box, Delap would trot across to the touchline, dry the ball
with his shirt – or, when at home, with a towel handily placed for that
very purpose – and proceed to catapult it into the box, over and over
and over again.
To me, as a former goalkeeper, the benefits of Delap’s throws were
obvious. I explained it to Dave: Stoke had a decent team, but one
lacking a little in pace and even more in finesse. What they did have,
though, was height. So why not, when the ball goes out of play, take the
opportunity to create a chance out of nothing? Why not cause a little
havoc in your opponents’ ranks? It seemed to work.
That did not sate Dave’s curiosity, though. It simply served to make
him ask the next logical question.
‘So why doesn’t everyone do it?’
The answer to that was equally obvious: not everyone has a Rory
Delap, someone capable of hurling the ball great distances with that flat
trajectory, like a skimmed stone, that panics defenders and confuses
goalkeepers.
Dave, himself a former baseball pitcher, tried another tack: ‘But can’t
you try and find one? Or make one of your players lift weights and
practise the javelin and the hammer?’
There was a problem with this. Yes, Dave’s questions, like those of a
persistently inquisitive child, were getting annoying; more irritating
still, I did not have a good answer.
‘You could play the game the way Stoke do,’ I countered, ‘if you have
a Delap and loads of tall central defenders. But it’s just not very
attractive. It’s not what you do unless you have to.’
‘Why?’ Dave responded, with crushing logic. ‘It seems to work for
them.’
And that was it. All I had left, like a frustrated parent, was one word.
‘Because.’
Because there are some things you don’t want to do when playing
football. Because, even though a goal created by a long throw is worth
just as much as one from a flowing passing move, it’s almost like it
doesn’t count as much. Because, to a purist, they’re somehow not quite
as deserved.
And yet, when we visited them at the club’s Finch Farm base on the
And yet, when we visited them at the club’s Finch Farm base on the
outskirts of Liverpool, we found that their office is just one of many
along a corridor leading to the canteen. It is a functional, unspectacular
space. There are few clues as to the nature of the work that goes on here:
file folders sit on top of standard-issue desks next to desktop computers;
Steve and Paul sit on ordinary swivel chairs. It could be any office,
anywhere, in any industry.
Only the tactics whiteboard in the corner, and the software on screen,
hint that this is a room dedicated to analysing the best way to maximize
performance in one of the world’s most glamorous, rich and exciting
leagues.
It is somehow fitting that the analysts at Everton – and those we’ve
seen elsewhere – are but one spoke in the wheel of a club’s football
operation. Brown and Graley and their ilk are relatively novel creatures.
Generally, in football, nobody is quite sure what to do with them. They
are the latest addition to the manager’s back-room staff; not as
established as coaches, scouts, physiotherapists or even psychologists,
their place in the pecking order is uncertain.
Their arrival, though, has not gone unnoticed by the market. In the
decade or two since the first football analysts were appointed a whole
industry of data providers has emerged to satisfy their appetite, their
endless desire, for more – and better – information to pass on to their
managers.
The first of these companies to emerge was Opta Sports, started by a
group of management consultants who, in the 1990s, decided to create
an index of player performance in football. As Content Director Rob
Bateman told us, the aim was simply ‘to get the brand into the public
eye’. Opta contacted the Premiership (as the top tier of English football
was known between 1993 and 2007); they were given funding by
Carling, who sponsored the league at the time, and former Arsenal and
England coach Don Howe came on board to provide football expertise.
They launched the index in 1996 on Sky Sports and in the Observer
newspaper, but soon discovered that the information they were
collecting was far more valuable than the publicity the index brought
the company. They could sell it to media outlets, near and far; later,
they would discover that clubs were just as desperate for it.
When Opta started, each game’s events took about four hours to code,
using a pen and paper and pressing stop/start on a video recorder. The
actions they noted were basic: passes, shots, saves. The level of detail
their analysts record now is a world away from those unassuming
beginnings. Take the 2010 Champions League final between Bayern
Munich and Inter Milan. That night, Opta’s team of three analysts logged
a total of 2,842 events, around one every two seconds of the game. One
was designated to monitor Inter, one Bayern, each one an expert in their
subjects – they had been following their games, tracking all their actions
and movements, all season. They were joined by a teammate in the role
of overseer, pointing out mistakes and omissions.
More than a decade on from their birth, though, Opta are just one of a
number of path-breaking companies formed to satisfy football’s
increasing addiction to data. Everton, as we saw when we were
welcomed into Steve Brown’s inner sanctum, subscribe to Prozone, a
Leeds-based company set up to deliver data specifically designed to help
with the coaching and scouting of players. In summer 2011 it merged
with a French rival, Amisco, and between them the two brands now are
among the industry’s leaders.
Where clubs had once relied on good relations with their opponents to
obtain videos of their most recent games – a system dependent on
reciprocal trust which often proved misplaced when match videos were
inexplicably lost – Amisco and Prozone developed the technology not
only to allow the rapid analysis of a team’s matches, but to collect even
more data.
They mounted cameras high above the pitch to track individual
players, to give coaches, sports scientists and the like the sort of
information they craved: how much running a player did and at what
speed, how the flow of the game affected events. Later they combined
the video with software that allowed players and actions to be tagged:
now it is easy to compile footage of an individual’s actions, or of all the
goals your opponents have conceded. Martínez can watch all his team’s
corners or all his midfield’s misplaced passes from a comfy armchair at
home at the click of a button.
Prozone and Opta are not alone. There are many other companies
working in the same arena across the world: Impire in Germany,
Infostrada in the Netherlands and Match Analysis and StatDNA in the
United States …
All are benefiting from the boom as the markets to which they sell
their data expand seemingly without limit. There are the coaches,
players, executives, journalists, fans and even academics who have a
growing appetite for football’s numbers, and then the video game
manufacturers, fantasy football leagues and the betting houses which use
them to make money.
Those involved in assessing, managing and exploiting risk, whether it
be in financial markets or sports gambling, tend to build elaborate
forecasting models. For that, they need data. Bookmakers’ odds are not
set on a whim; all the data they can access is fed into one of their
algorithmic engines, and favourites and outsiders are determined
accordingly. Algorithms are equally key when determining prices on the
financial markets. Football is right at the intersection of the two areas.
Just as the betting companies are raking in the profits from their
analytical, odds-setting engines – and using them to fund expensive
sponsorship deals with the biggest names in sport, such as bwin’s
current arrangement with Real Madrid – those men who made their
fortunes playing the markets are buying into the game: Sunderland,
Brentford, Brighton, Stoke, Liverpool, Millwall and many others all have
owners who do not place a bet or invest a penny without examining the
numbers first.
That is the true power of data: to change our relationship with the
game. Owners no longer have to rely on their own judgment to discern
whether their team is performing well or if their investment is sound –
the numbers can be slipped on to their desk every Monday, or even sent
Sunday morning to their mobiles or iPads. After every training session
managers can post data on the dressing-room door showing how far each
player ran.
And some of that information is available to fans, published in
newspapers or flashed up on the television screen, available at the push
of a button on a smartphone and recorded for ever online. There is no
hiding place. The eye in the sky is always watching. No wonder Paul
Barber, formerly a director at Tottenham Hotspur and now Chief
Executive of Brighton and Hove Albion, refers to the rise in and
increased sophistication of video analysis as being ‘like an X-Ray’.4 This
is the age of the see-through footballer: it is little surprise that the
game’s radiographers – men like Steve Brown and Paul Graley – are
finding themselves slowly, incrementally, welcomed in from the cold.
The days of relying purely on gut instinct, conjecture and tradition to
judge what constitutes good and bad football are over; instead, we can
turn to objective proof. The implications are profound. The use of
objective information is reshuffling the balance of power in the beautiful
game. Instead of being run by a mix of command, habit and guesswork,
football is entering a new, more meritocratic phase.
That is threatening to the game’s traditional power brokers, because it
suggests there may be something they have been missing all these years.
In that sense football is a little like a religion: there has long been a
perception that, to be an expert, you must have been born in the right
place and been steeped in its rituals from a young age. There are creeds,
dogmas, communion with your fellow fans, confessions, dress codes,
imbibing and chanting and all the rest.
But if the data allow just anyone to become an expert, to have an
informed opinion, those immersed in the old ways become less powerful,
less special, more open to question. Ultimately they can be proved
wrong, and the more they are proved wrong the less power they have. If
they are the priests and the papists, our role as authors of The Numbers
Game is to teach you both to be and to appreciate the iconoclasts and
counters of football’s reformation.
This, perhaps, explains the degree of resistance football’s analytics
pioneers have encountered.
We were tasked by one club, before one recent transfer window, with
a research project that focused on strengthening their squad in particular
areas. We were delighted to hear that our results had been received well
by the board. The manager, though, was rather less enthusiastic. ‘Stats
can’t tell me who to sign,’ he said. ‘They can’t measure the size of a
player’s heart.’
It is the same with using data to adapt your approach to a particular
match. ‘The manager believes it when he sees it with his own eyes,’ one
Premier League match analyst told us. ‘He likes to watch the video, and
he tries to go out and see as many matches as he can for himself.’
This is not only an English problem; reluctance to embrace new
technology, new sources of information, spreads far and wide.
Boris Notzon, the Director of 1. FC Köln’s SportLab, showed us
around one of the most advanced analytics enterprises in professional
football. Köln employs three full-time and thirty part-time analysts from
fifteen countries to collect and manage everything from opposition
scouting reports to physical data from the club’s first, reserve and youth
teams. Even he, though, admits that Köln are unusual. As part of a joint
project, all German first and second division clubs have access to match
data provided by Impire, who use technology similar to that of Opta and
Prozone/Amisco. Yet, few actually trust or use the data that are
accumulating with every match. They don’t want football on a
spreadsheet; they want to see it with their own eyes.
‘In comparison to historical medicine, football analytics is currently in
the time of leeches and blood lettings,’ says Mark Brunkhart, founder of
Match Analysis. ‘Not that we should stop progressing and working, but
we should realize how little we understand.’
Note: Horizontal axis shows the number of successful passing moves, where 0 means that a
pass attempt was immediately intercepted; 1 means one successful pass before possession lost
and so on. Numbers atop bars indicate the percentage of moves in a match. Reep and Benjamin
found only 8.5 per cent of passing movements contained more than three passes.
That is the thing with football: it does not always reward those who
That is the thing with football: it does not always reward those who
take more shots or complete more passes. It only repays those who score
goals. As the Guardian’s Richard Williams wrote after that night in
Munich: ‘Football is a contest of goals, not aesthetics. We love it when
the two elements are combined, but that is not the primary purpose of
the exercise.’3
These examples are one-offs, coincidences, just like the beach ball and
the miracles and the missed penalty that ended up as a goal. But this is
how we – and those scientists with that unlikely interest in football –
choose to react when we encounter randomness: we do not ignore it, or
attempt to explain it away as the work of the gods, or concentrate on
beauty instead. No, we gather up the coincidences into a large enough
set and apply analytical tools to try to understand them. And when we
do, we find that – just as Cruyff said – there is a logic to coincidence.
This takes two forms. It applies at the level of leagues and seasons,
across cup competitions, where the distribution of goals is reliable and
incredibly predictable; and, of more concern to most fans, it applies to
individual games, to home and away ties, where the role of chance in
producing goals is considerable. In fact it’s about 50/50. Half of the
goals you see, half of the results you experience, are down not to skill
and ability but to random chance and luck.
There are two routes to success in football, we have found. One is
being good. The other is being lucky. You need both to win a
championship. But you only need one to win a game. The correspondent
from Die Zeit was right: the history of football is a record of football
accidents that follow Cruyff’s dictum. Toeval is logisch.
But, by taking the average number of goals per game – 2.66 for the
But, by taking the average number of goals per game – 2.66 for the
top flights in England, Germany, Spain, Italy and France between 1993
and 2011 – and applying the Poisson distribution, we can predict how
many games over the last seventeen years saw no goals, how many saw
one, how many two and so on. We do not need to know anything about
formations, tactics, line-ups, injuries, the manager, or the crowd – none
of it – to find that there is a structure to goal scoring. Football might be
random, but it is also predictable.
Figure 6 Distribution of goals in European football, 1993–2011
Away goals
Home goals 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total*
9 – 0.03 – – – – – 0.03
Note: *Rows and columns may not sum precisely owing to rounding.
The most common score is a 1–1 draw – occurring 11.63 per cent of
the time – just narrowly ahead of a 1–0, 2–1, and 2–0 home win, a
goalless draw, and a 1–0 away win.
Goals really are rare and precious events: more than 30 per cent of
matches end with one goal or none. A little less than half of all games
end in the home side scoring once or twice and winning; then there is a
group of mixed home and away wins and moderately high-scoring draws
(1–2, 3–1, 2–2) which occur about 5 per cent of the time each. Finally,
there’s everything else. On our selected weekend, only one result was
truly unusual – Bolton’s 4–2 win against Spurs.
This might surprise football aficionados, but not football scientists. All
these results very closely mirror the Poisson distribution. Lots of
outcomes of games are possible, but not all scores are equally likely.
True, according to the formula there should be 7.7 per cent of games
ending goalless – not 8.34 per cent, as in the Premier League – and 19.7
per cent, not 18.5 per cent, should end with just one goal. But it’s pretty
close.
Figure 9 Most common scores in Serie A
That the fit is better for horse kicks than human kicks can be
attributed to the importance of drawing matches in football; there are
more goalless games and 1–1 ties than the Poisson would expect. There
is a slightly greater complexity in the randomness at play in Borussia
Dortmund’s Westfalenstadion than was present in the bygone Prussian
stables. The ball bounces more erratically than the horses bucked.
There is no question that at the level of seasons and leagues there is a
mathematical logic to the randomness of goals. That is a fact of football
life. That may console managers and encourage gamblers, but what will
really concern fans is the other side of the coin: how much of a part will
chance play in the game you go and see this weekend? Will your team
win or lose because of their abilities – or lack of them – or will they
simply be betrayed by fate?
Figure 10 Most common scores in La Liga
Figure 12 shows the median odds for the favourites during the season
for each of the five sports described in Figure 11. The vertical lines show
the spread of odds: the bottom of the line is the shortest odds for the
biggest favourite of the season; the top of the line is the narrowest
favourite for a game in the season.
Football is clearly very different from the other four. Handball has
many more large ‘overdogs’ than football, and the favourites almost
always win, with median odds of 1.28; the NBA and NFL have medians
of 1.42 and 1.49, respectively. In baseball the spread of odds is most
restricted: there are no overwhelming favourites, with the shortest odds
being 1.24. But in football, the median odds for a favoured club to win
are 1.95.
What does that mean in real terms? Almost half the time in football,
the favourite is not really much of a favourite. Why that should be can
be explained by two factors – in football, goals are rare and draws are
common. That combination makes setting odds in football much more
difficult, and makes favourites less likely to win.
Figure 12 Median and spread of odds across team sports
The idea that football’s favourites only win about 50 per cent of the
time clashes with everything we think we know about the game. Surely,
Manchester United against Wigan is not like flipping a coin? Besides,
this is hardly a conclusive use of the data: isn’t it natural that the
bookmakers will get it wrong more often, simply because football,
unlike the other sports, has more marginal favourites – teams just
fancied to win, but hardly racing certainties?
To find out if that’s the case, we need to establish whether strong and
weak favourites win at different rates in the various sports. To determine
how much a favourite is advantaged over their opponents, we calculate
the gap between the odds of the favourite winning and the odds of the
underdog winning. Matches that are toss-ups will have a gap close to
zero, while mismatches with hot favourites will have a gap of fifty or
more percentage points.10
Much like a ratings agency in the financial markets, we went back to
the data and separated games into six groups with similar risk ranging
from ‘blue chips’ to ‘junk bonds’. The blue chips were games in which a
bet on the winning favourite would earn you a secure and very modest
return, while a bet on the underdog followed by an improbable victory
would yield enough to feed the punter’s family for a month. For each of
these six slices of a sport’s season, we determined how often the
differently favoured overdogs won. In other words, we wanted to
discover the connection, as in a bond, between risk and performance.
The results are shown in Figure 13.
What does this chart show us? Well, football’s trend line –
representing the relationship between risk and performance for clubs in
2010/11 – sits significantly below the lines of other sports, and it does
so regardless of how favoured a team may be.
Take favourites who are fancied 50 per cent more than their
opponents: in football, they win 65 per cent of the time, but in
basketball, they win more than 80 per cent of games. It is the same
across the whole range of risk: the favourite in football is less likely to
actually win the match than those in other sports, significantly so in the
cases of basketball, baseball and American football where the margin is
ten to fifteen percentage points. Football is just a dicier proposition.
Bookmakers clearly think football is more susceptible to chance
regardless of how lopsided the contest appears to be; and these
businessmen know their market.11
Our findings take into account only one season, but an even more
Our findings take into account only one season, but an even more
comprehensive study – undertaken by Eli Ben-Naim, a theoretical
physicist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, along with Boston
University’s Sidney Redner and Federico Vazquez – used the entire
historical record of a number of sports and came to a very similar
conclusion.12
Figure 13 How often do favourites win?
And so, after all those hours and hours of watching goals, how many
did Lames and his team qualify as fortunate, as owing more than a little
to luck? The answer is 44.4 per cent, though that varied a little from
league to league and competition to competition. Lucky goals are
particularly common when the score is 0–0. ‘That is when teams are still
playing according to their system,’ says Lames. ‘Something coincidental
has to happen for a goal to be scored.’22
So, about half of all goals contain a detectable, visible portion of good
fortune. Football, both goal scoring and favourites winning, is a 50/50
proposition. The game you see this weekend, the one that will leave you
in a state of utter jubilation or bitter disbelief, might as well be decided
by the flip of a coin.23
Figure 14 Odds of win for team with more shots in a match, 2005/06–2010/11
Andrew Lornie was a tinsmith and gas fitter by trade, and a cricketer by
inclination. He was not, by any objective measure, a goalkeeper.1 Still,
Lornie, like any good Scot, was not one to turn down a free meal, a
drink, and the prospect of a good afternoon’s sporting endeavour. And
so, when he and his teammates at Aberdeen’s Orion Cricket Club
received an unexpected invitation to play in the 1885 Scottish
Association Football Cup, they leapt at the chance. Alas, the invite had
not been meant for them; it was supposed to have been delivered to
their neighbours at the Orion Football Club. In the early days of the
game, though, such things hardly mattered. The cricketers begged, stole
and borrowed whatever kit they could, renamed themselves Bon Accord
and on 12 September struck out for Angus – in the middle of a ten-hour
rainstorm – to face the might of Arbroath. Lornie would have the
unenviable task of keeping goal.
Their opponents, known as the Red Lichties, after the light used to
guide fishing boats into harbour from the perils of the North Sea, were
an experienced, well-organized side. The faux footballers did not stand a
chance.
‘The leather,’ the Scottish Athletic Journal noted, ‘was landed between
the posts forty-one times, but five of the times were disallowed. Here
and there, enthusiasts would be seen, scoring sheet and pencil in hand,
taking note of the goals as one would score runs at a cricket match.’
It must have been a disheartening afternoon for Lornie, not least
because Arbroath’s ground, Gayfield Park, had no nets between the
posts: every time the hosts scored, Lornie had to scamper after the ball,
retrieve it and bring it back for more. It is testament to his
sportsmanship that he kept coming back. His reward was a 36–0 defeat,
still the heaviest recorded defeat in British senior football.
Only just, though. As Bon Accord were being hit for six, eighteen
miles down the road things were scarcely better for Aberdeen Rovers.
They had been drawn against Dundee Harp in the same competition,
and they were faring almost as badly. When the match was over, the
referee thought Dundee had won by 37 goals to 0; here too, though, the
spirit of sportsmanship came up trumps. The Harp players admitted they
had only managed a more modest 35. Arbroath would have their place
in history.2
In one day in 1885, the two sides between them scored seventy-one
home goals. A century and a quarter later league football continues to
grace both towns. In the season ending in 2011, though, their two
teams – Arbroath FC and now Dundee United (the Harp having expired
in 1897) – managed sixty-eight home goals between them all season.
The weather is much the same, but the goals have dried up in Angus.
The decline in goals is not unique to one corner of Scotland. It is
almost unheard of in the modern game to see a team reach double
figures; flick through clubs’ historical records and their most emphatic
victories and heaviest defeats almost always date back several decades.
Lornie would not believe it, but goals are rare, and goals are precious,
and they are treated as such.
That is why strikers, all over the world, tend to be so revered by
supporters and coveted by clubs. Trevor Francis, Britain’s first £1
million player, was a forward; so was Alan Shearer, the last Englishman
to hold the title of most expensive footballer in the game, after his £15
million transfer from Blackburn to Newcastle in 1996; and Newcastle’s
Andy Carroll – a striker, naturally – became the most expensive English
player when Liverpool bought him for £35 million in January 2011.
Football’s Uniqueness
The goal is more than just football’s primary product, the point of all the
huffing and puffing over the course of ninety minutes. It’s also more
than the reason teams buy wonderful, skilful attacking players and
managers develop intricate, complex defensive strategies. It is what
makes the game what it is. It is something that has to be worked for,
that only happens very occasionally, that we spend hours waiting to see.
Football is special, that much is clear. It is not just the beautiful game,
but the world’s game, a language spoken from the favelas of Rio de
Janeiro to the steppes of Asia. We would not have it any other way. But
its universal appeal demands investigation and, if possible, explanation.
Why is football so enduringly, so ubiquitously, popular? What is it about
football that people love?
The answer, of course, lies in the goal. The goal is football. Its rarity is
its magic.
Perhaps the easiest way to see what makes football special is by
establishing just what it is not. For that, we will need a mechanism to
compare it to other, similar sports, defined scientifically as being
‘invasion games’ that are ‘time dependent’.4 That means, in slightly less
convoluted terms, sports that take place on a defined pitch, with a final
whistle, and two teams trying to score against each other. Basketball,
lacrosse, the two codes of rugby, American football and hockey, both
field and ice, are all games belonging to the same genus as football.
But while football is similar to all these sports in broad terms, it is
clearly distinct. Football is defined by rare events – goals – but they exist
in a sea of hundreds, thousands of extraneous events: tackles, passes,
long throw-ins. Football is different because the things that decide who
wins and who loses happen only occasionally, while other things – such
as passes – happen all the time. And it is this rarity – the lopsidedness
between effort and scoring – we believe, that lends football its allure.
But rarity is a subjective concept: if you score once a month and I
score once a year, what is rare to you may seem frequent to me. So to
establish just how rare goals are, we need to compare football to the
other members of its family.
To do so, we collected data on team scores for games over the course
of a whole season, in 2010 and 2011, in the top leagues for basketball,
ice-hockey, football, American football, rugby union and rugby league.
That meant analysing 1,230 NBA games, 1,230 in the NHL, 380 in the
Premier League, 256 in the NFL, 132 rugby union matches and 192
from Australia’s NRL. We also calculated the ratio of goals (and shots,
where possible) per minute, as well as goals per attempt for each sport.
We had to make a few adjustments to make the scoring comparable;
American football’s scoring system of six points for a touchdown and
three points for a field goal or basketball’s two points for a basket, three
for a long shot and one for a foul shot, for example, had to be
transformed so that we could compare them to football scores.
The point was to count the number of times a team scored a goal or
The point was to count the number of times a team scored a goal or
the equivalent of a goal. In the simple experiment, we counted up the
total number of times a team scored; in the more complicated test, we
adjusted these for the relative values of scores. But we needn’t have
bothered – the conclusions we come to are unaffected by how we do the
maths.
Two of the bars in Figure 15 stand out immediately. Basketball is
clearly different from the others by a huge margin. If football is a sport
of rarity, basketball is a sport of plenty, of frequency, of an almost
relentless abundance. There are more scores in basketball than in any
other sport by a considerable order of magnitude (note that the left-hand
scale in the figure is logarithmic).
*Football and ice hockey: goals; basketball: total of field goals, free throws and 3 pt shots;
American football: total of touchdowns, extra points, field goals, 2pt conversions and safeties;
rugby union and rugby league: total of drop goals, tries, conversions and penalty kicks.
But more relevant is the distance by which football anchors the other
end of the scale. If basketball’s bar looks like LeBron James on a
stepladder, football’s is Lionel Messi in a pothole, crouching down to tie
his boots. It is hardly a dramatic revelation to say that football is the
lowest scoring of the team sports. The extent by which it achieves this
distinction, though, is stunning.
Just as important is the fact that footballers make fewer attempts to
score. In comparison to those other sports where attempted scoring is a
relevant statistic, the numbers show that football teams shoot a little
more than twelve times per match. In hockey, that rockets up to thirty,
and in basketball, 123.
Once time is factored in, it becomes even clearer that football’s genius
lies in the way it makes fans and players alike wait for their reward. In
American football, there is a score every nine minutes on average; in
rugby, it is every twelve and a half minutes and in hockey every twenty-
two. In football, a team scores a goal once every sixty-nine minutes.
Football is a sport of deferred gratification.
It is also a sport of glorious inefficiency.
In the introduction we mentioned that Opta recorded 2,842 events
during the 2010 Champions League final between Inter Milan and
Bayern Munich. Two of those were goals, both scored by Diego Milito,
signed by José Mourinho for more than £20 million the previous
summer. Two events of 2,842 that count. That’s one goal per 1,421
events. No other sport demands so much effort from a team before
anything happens that actually matters.
That is what makes football special, and what makes football what it
is. It takes so much effort to score that each goal is celebrated that little
bit more joyously, and means that little bit more. That is why the game
is so exciting. Any one goal, at any time in the game, can be the
difference between victory and defeat, between delight and despair. The
goal is football’s beauty, and she’s a rare and reluctant beauty indeed.
Why, then, are goals becoming more and more rare? Rule changes
Why, then, are goals becoming more and more rare? Rule changes
have had only a fleeting effect – the change in the offside law in 1925,
the introduction of three points for a win in 1981 and disallowing the
back-pass to the goalkeeper in 1992 – if any at all. Likewise, the
disruption caused by the two world wars did not alter the long-term
trend.
If talent by itself – not tactics or training – had something to do with
the increasing rarity of goals, then we should see differences in scoring
across the divisions, and those differences in scoring should change over
time. The logic goes something like this: let’s assume that there was a
gap between the aptitude of the players in the top tier and second tier of
the Football League around the turn of the twentieth century. Given the
nascent professionalism circa 1900, this talent gap was likely to have
been quite modest early on. But over time, the rise in salaries, the
dramatic growth of resources for training and the global sourcing of
players have increased the talent gap between what is now the Premier
League and the Championship. Put simply, the difference in the average
player’s talent between first and second division should be greater now
than it was a century ago.
It is reasonable to suppose that a similar trend has taken place since
the end of World War II in the difference in ability levels among the
second, third and fourth levels of professional football. Logically, then, if
skill and talent alone – athletic goalkeepers able to cover more of the
goalmouth more quickly, defenders quicker to the ball and more lethal
in the tackle, midfielders with more speed and stamina able to track
back rapidly and continually – were responsible for the decline in goals,
then changes in the relative talent levels across the leagues should mean
that their scoring levels should also diverge over the course of the
twenty-first century and into the present.8 Divergent trends in talent
should have gone hand-in-hand with divergent trends in goals. So goals
should have become more rare in the top division than the next division
and so on, and differences in goal frequencies should increase over time.
For us to establish whether that is correct, the key assumption – the
widening of the talent gap among the tiers of English football – has to be
true. And so, for proof, we can look at the FA Cup, the one tournament
where the various levels of football skill have met one another for well
over one hundred years. Because teams from different divisions regularly
play each other in the competition, it also allows us to see if the best
really have got better.
Figure 16 shows the number of clubs from the top tier, the second
flight and all the lower levels who have reached the FA Cup quarter-
finals since 1900. Each trophy represents an average of one club;
trophies missing their tops and handles represent proper fractions.
Hence, in the first decade of the twentieth century, on average, 4.8 top-
tier clubs, 1.7 second-tier clubs and 1.5 non-league clubs made the
quarter-finals.
The chart shows that, today, the quarter-final spots and the silverware
are being hoarded by the big boys at the expense of their smaller rivals.
There are exceptions, of course, such as Millwall and Cardiff City
reaching the final in 2004 and 2008 respectively, but the general trend
is clear: since the immediate post-war years, the second tier has lost
almost a spot and a half to the top division.
This is strong evidence that the gaps in talent and skill among the tiers
of English football have indeed widened through the years.
But now the key question: have the growing gaps in talent
corresponded with divergences in scoring rates across the tiers of
football?
Conducting a series of sophisticated statistical tests, Palacios-Huerta
found that, as far as goals go, the top tier and the second were the same.
Their historical, year-by-year distributions of goals were identical.
Similarly the post-war pattern of goals was shared between all divisions,
top to bottom. The general impression was the same, no matter how
good players were: occasional bumps, caused by rule changes or the
wars, set against a trend towards fewer goals. Skill levels have increased
and they have diverged. And yet, the present-day top-tier defender who
is so very much better than his 1948 counterpart, and the League Two
defender who is only moderately better than his post-war foil,
nevertheless thwart goal scoring with equal efficacy. Hence, we can say
definitively that the scoring drought in Angus and all other parts of the
football world is not due solely to the increased skill and athleticism of
footballers.
Figure 16 English FA Cup performance by tier, 1900–2012
So we know goals, since the end of the Victorian age, have always
been rare, and we know that they’re getting rarer. We know that is not
because of rule changes, major international cataclysms, or the rising
level of skill. No, it is something entirely different that is leading to
football becoming the most abstinent of sports. Goals are more rare now
than they were before because the very nature of the sport has changed.
Figure 18b repeats Figure 18a, adding labels for each league. The top
leagues all average slightly fewer than three goals per match, and there
is little variation. The production numbers in these leagues are
extremely consistent – especially considering that we are talking about a
span of a decade and very different countries and leagues – and it’s hard
to detect any real-time trends or cross-league differences. Virtually
without fail, spectators in the biggest leagues of European football saw
more than two and a half and fewer than three goals per average match
over the last decade – no matter where they went to the stadium.
That is not what we are taught to believe. We are informed
consistently that differences in styles, tactics and personnel all matter,
that in Italy the game is more defensive, in Spain it is more elegant and
in the Premier League more physical, more exciting. Football’s culture
changes from country to country and continent to continent. We all
know that.
So what about how those goals are produced? ‘Tell me how you play
and I’ll tell you who you are,’ as Galeano wrote. Surely in England the
majority of goals came from inswinging crosses being met by thunderous
headers, in Spain from long, flowing passing moves and in Italy from
lightning-fast counter-attacks?
But here, too, features of a game that we can count – things like
passes and shots – look very similar between leagues. Opta figures from
the 2010/11 season show that the average team in the average match
in the top four leagues in Europe completed between 425 (Bundesliga)
and 449 (Serie A) passes. In Italy, only 54 of those passes were long,
whereas the high was in Germany, too, with 59; those two countries
provided the bookends for short passes: Germany with 332 per game,
Italy 356. The differences between nations are cosmetic, shallow. The
game is the same across the world’s elite football leagues. If it was not
for the shirts, you would not be able to tell them apart.
Figure 18b Goals per match in Europe’s top four leagues, 2000/01–2010/11
Table 2 Passes per game in the top four European leagues, 2010/11
This convergence holds true for many other key measures. The data
also show that teams took roughly the same number of total shots on
goal (14) and shots on target (4.7), they earned a similar number of
corners (about 5), and they are awarded roughly the same number of
penalty kicks (0.14) per game, too.
We also found that the number of free kicks, crosses from open play,
or headed goals were pretty much the same.
Table 3 Shots, corners and penalties in the top four European leagues, 2010/11
The Budget Minister was furious. It was, he said, ‘indecent’. The Sports
Minister described it as ‘deplorable’, while his predecessor pronounced
herself ‘disgusted’. Even the President of the Republic got involved. This
was not some parliamentary sex scandal, though, or an affair which had
caused outright fury in France. No, this was simply the reaction to the
decision by Paris Saint-Germain’s Qatari owners, in summer 2012, to
pay their star striker €1 million every month for four years, after tax –
meaning footing a bill of €35 million every year for one player, in
addition to his €25 million transfer fee.
How can a club justify spending such an exorbitant sum on one
footballer, no matter how talented, even when the money is coming
from an oil-rich Arab state determined to build one of the world’s
foremost clubs? In PSG’s case, it’s simple: they were not spending €165
million on a player. They were spending it on a guarantee of success.
Zlatan Ibrahimović, the player in question, is a serial title winner.
Between 2003 and 2011, the giant Swedish striker won a league
championship every single year, wherever he played. That’s eight
straight titles, including one in Holland, one in Spain and six in Serie A.
He is more than just a good-luck charm: only once did he fail to score
more than fourteen goals in a league season. Ibrahimović is not a
passenger, along for the ride; he is a difference-maker.
But that is not the same as saying that every goal has equal value.
But that is not the same as saying that every goal has equal value.
Some goals are worth rather more than others.
It also shouldn’t come as a surprise that not scoring at all doesn’t yield
very much in terms of points. But that is not the same as saying that
scoring no goals does not glean any points at all: between 7 and 8 per
cent of games end in goalless draws, so zero goals on those occasions
will earn a team a point.
Those are extremes. It is in the middle of the distribution where our
graph rises most sharply before levelling off. It is in this incline that
goals are most valuable.
A single goal virtually guarantees at least a point, statistically
speaking; two goals gets a team closer to a win than a draw; at more
than two goals, teams get very close to a win, though even three or four
goals do not quite guarantee victory; Newcastle, having recovered from
four goals down against Arsenal and poor Reading, scorers of four goals
against both Tottenham and Portsmouth in 2007 but losers on each
occasion, will confirm that.
This pattern holds across all four leagues. There are slight variations –
a single goal is slightly less valuable in the Bundesliga than in La Liga –
but generally, goals are worth the same number of points in England and
Germany, Italy and Spain. At the top of the game the value of football’s
currency is remarkably similar.2
The shape of the curve proves one critical thing: goals are not created
equal. Some are worth more than others, depending on whether they are
the only goals scored or whether they already have company. The
numbers tell us that scoring three goals doesn’t give you three times as
many points as one single goal, and four goals – an increase of 33.3 per
cent in goals from having scored three – doesn’t give you 33.3 per cent
more points than three goals do.
In other words, the exchange rate of each goal varies according to
how many other goals have been scored in the game.
As Figure 20 reveals, the most valuable goal is the second (increasing
the team’s predicted point value by 0.99). In contrast, going from a
likely thrashing to a probable stomping (that is, a fifth goal) is
exchanged for only 0.1 points. This does not change between countries:
two goals in Italy are worth about the same number of points as are two
goals in Spain. Strikers struggling for form – as happened to both Carroll
and Torres after that dramatic deadline day in 2011 – would disagree,
but not all goals mean as much as each other, at least to the team’s
chance of success.
There are times when those extra, worthless goals later become
extraordinarily important: that 6–1 rout at Old Trafford in October
2011 effectively handed Manchester City the Premier League title, on
goal difference, in May 2012. These are exceptions, though. Teams
looking to win more games need to know which players can score the
goals that matter most.
Figure 20 Marginal points produced by goals
Strike Price
This may seem an abstract exercise but it has some very real
ramifications for the game. If a team’s second goal is the most valuable,
and between them the first and the second are vastly more valuable than
the rest, then it suggests that the old technique of simply tallying up a
striker’s goals as an assessment of his productivity – and a basis for his
estimated value – is simply wrong.
Strikers who score the key goals, the ones that can be directly
translated into more wins and more points, are worth rather more than
the flat-track bullies who appear to rub salt into wounds, scoring the
third and fourth goals as victory turns into a drubbing. Simply counting
strikes can be deceiving: one goal is not the same as another.
This is a truth that seems to have eluded the transfer market thus far.
When we looked at the goals and games from the Premier League
between 2009 and 2011, we found neither Torres nor Carroll – the two
most expensive players transferred to English sides in that period – were
the most valuable scorers of goals in the league; their goals did not lead
to as many points as the goals of others.
With the help of data on the timing of goals in the Premier League
supplied by Opta Sports, we counted up how many first, second, third,
etc. goals players scored; we then applied the standard exchange rate to
create the marginal points contributions of the goals these players
produced for their teams.3 By and large the rankings of the actual goals
players scored and the points those goals produced lined up, but it is
interesting to note that, in the lists of players who produced the most
points, the Premier League’s top scorer in 2009/10 (Chelsea’s Didier
Drogba) was third and one of the two joint top scorers in 2010/11
(Manchester United’s Dimitar Berbatov) was fourth.
In 2009/10 that honour went to Wayne Rooney (though it should be
noted that seven of his goals came from penalties), and in 2010/11 it
went to Berbatov’s former teammate and the joint winner of that year’s
Golden Boot, Carlos Tevez of Manchester City. So what does this tell us?
Drogba and Berbatov managed to score goals when it counted for less,
points-wise, to their club.
But it’s not just at the top that these data are interesting. Some of the
performers further down – players at teams that weren’t contending for
the title – were much more important to their club’s fortunes than a
simple tally of goals might suggest. For example, in 2010/11 Berbatov’s
marginal points contributions were just a notch above West Bromwich
Albion’s Peter Odemwingie, who scored five fewer goals than the
Bulgarian. For West Brom and Odemwingie, less was actually more
points-wise. The same could go for Louis Saha’s tally for Everton the
previous year, when his thirteen were almost as valuable in real terms as
the eighteen Jermain Defoe scored for Tottenham.
The real hero of this list is Darren Bent. Indeed, if Chelsea had
analysed goals using our methodology, rather than a simple count of
who had scored the most, perhaps they would have realized that the
way to turn around their desperate league form in January 2011 was not
by splashing £50 million on Torres, but by paying half that for Bent, the
most consistent marginal points producer each of the two seasons. And if
Roman Abramovich had taken time to notice what proportion of his
team’s points were directly down to Bent’s goals, his mind would have
been made up. Here, too, Bent’s star is in the ascendant.
When we calculated the portion of all points a club won that were due
to points contributions from individual players, Darren Bent was the
most valuable player both years. In 2009/10 he topped the list with
45.5 per cent of Sunderland’s points, followed at some distance by West
Ham’s Carlton Cole at 27.9 per cent.
In 2010/11, he was again tops (if we take the points he contributed
to each of the teams he played for that year – at 31.5 per cent), closely
followed by Blackpool’s DJ Campbell (29.7 per cent), and Odemwingie
(26.7 per cent) who also managed to score at the right time and in the
right order.
It is not all bad for Torres and Carroll, though. The Spaniard was
ranked fifth in the league in marginal points contributions in 2009/10,
but fell to eighteenth (just ahead of Wolves’ Steven Fletcher and level
with Sunderland’s Asamoah Gyan) the following year. Carroll doesn’t
rank in 2009/10 (as Newcastle were playing in the Championship that
season), but in 2010/11 he turns up fifteenth on the list. Perhaps when
Liverpool bought him they did know what they were doing, even if
subsequent evidence makes that hard to believe.
Table 4 Top 20 marginal point contributors in the Premier League, 2009/10 and 2010/11
SEASON 2009/10
SEASON 2009/10
There are two strategies for producing points in the Premier League:
you get more points if you score more goals, but conceding fewer is
equally effective. The steepness of our trend lines is similar and both sets
of points cluster tightly to those lines. These numbers do not prove
Menotti right, nor do they suggest he is wrong. But they do suggest there
may be more to the story than siding with one or the other. Maybe
football is a sport of shades of grey.
There’s one flaw with this technique: it does not show us how teams
won these points. They could have done it by winning games, or they
could have done it by avoiding defeat; thanks to Jimmy Hill, one win
and two losses produce the same number of points as three successive
draws.
Which of those two options you prefer may well say a lot about your
approach to football – whether you are one of Menotti’s scorned right-
wingers, or whether you join him on the left. Would you rather your
team tasted victory once, and then had to endure defeat twice, or is it
better that it does not lose at all? We know which way Menotti would go
but there are others – José Mourinho, for one – who would sacrifice
glory to avoid the ignominy of defeat. What we want to know is not
which one is prettier, or morally superior, but something rather more
rudimentary: is it better to win, or not to lose?
Figure 23 The relationship between goals and points, Premier League, 2001/02–2010/11
We See a Game
Daniel Alves may be one of the finest right backs on the planet, but it
should be no surprise that a Brazilian playing for Barcelona falls on the
left-hand side of Menotti’s politics of football.
‘Chelsea,’ the shaven-headed full back said of the team Pep
Guardiola’s men had beaten to a place in the Champions League final of
2009, ‘did not reach the final because of fear. The team that has got a
man more, is playing at home and is winning should have attacked us
more. If you don’t have that concept of football that Barcelona have, you
stay back, and you get knocked out. You have to go forward. Stay back:
losers. Go forward: winners. Chelsea lacked the courage to take a step
forward and attack us. At that moment, we realized they had renounced
the game.’6
Stay back: losers. Go forward: winners. Alves is not alone in his stark
assessment of football. There is a right way and a wrong way to play the
game, and the right way will always bear out. This contrast dates back
to the very earliest days of organized football: a piece in the Scottish
Athletic Journal of November 1882 roundly condemned the habit of
‘certain country clubs’ of keeping two men back twenty yards from their
own goal. Defending, even then, simply was not the right way to play
the game; the sport was supposed to be about all-out attack, attempting
to outscore the opposition.
This early imprint on football left a powerful legacy that has
continued to affect how we see the game. Italy’s perfection of catenaccio
is used as a stick with which to beat Serie A as dull, defensive; Greece’s
triumph in Euro 2004 was not exactly celebrated outside Athens. (And,
we suspect that even results-minded Italians and Greeks would prefer to
win by attacking than by not conceding.) Where attacking play is
lionized, impressive defences are shunned. Strikers attract the fat fees
and the high salaries, and win awards and hearts; centre backs are
condemned to toil in relative anonymity, if not relative penury.
That is true in Argentina, as it is around the globe; the country’s
footballing motto is best expressed as Ganar, gustar, golear: to win, to
delight, to thrash. La Nuestra, the Argentine vision of football,
concentrates on the art of dribbling and a dash of trickery; it is held to
be more individual than the game played in Europe. No wonder Menotti
was so enamoured of attack. His footballing culture, just like all our
footballing cultures, compelled him to be.
There is nothing inherently wrong with that. Most of our favourite
memories of football are of flowing moves and wonderful goals; most of
us idolize George Best or Lionel Messi rather than Bobby Moore or
Carles Puyol. But football’s obsession with attack does have one negative
consequence: the role played by defence, and defenders, is
underestimated and misunderstood. Remember our earlier discussion of
the dismal performance of defenders and goalkeepers in the Ballon d’Or
balloting. There are deep psychological reasons for this; reasons that
give us an explanation for why we remember the goals that were scored
more than those that were not, and, by extension, why we believe that
attack is more important, more worthy, than defence, even though the
numbers suggest that is not the case at all.
At the most basic level, there is the Hedonist Principle, which assumes
people will seek pleasure and avoid pain to satisfy their basic biological
and psychological needs. Football is a game that has long associated
scoring with winning and vice versa, and so putting the ball in the net
means immediate pleasure; preventing someone else from doing so
denies them that same joy. All of football’s positive emotions go with
attacking: creating, conquering, overcoming, releasing. Defence is
inherently negative, repressive, playing to avoid defeat.
We remember the positives much more easily. This is to do with what
psychologists call ‘decision bias’ and ‘motivated reasoning’. We are
hard-wired to reach biased interpretations of data that run counter to
beliefs we hold and care deeply about. So when we are called on to
examine objective evidence or information, we are predisposed to look
at the evidence that supports what we already believe. We see what we
expect to see, and we see what we wish to see. This makes collecting and
interpreting football information particularly difficult, given the tribal
loyalties we have.
In a 1954 study aptly titled ‘They Saw a Game’, Albert Hastorf and
Hadley Cantril investigated how people ‘saw’ what happened in a game
of (American) football between Dartmouth College and Princeton
University.
The game had been played in 1951; Princeton won what had turned
out to be a rough contest with lots of penalties for both sides. The game
had been controversial because the Princeton quarterback, an academic
standout playing in his last college game, had to leave the field in the
second quarter with a broken nose and a concussion. In the third
quarter, the Dartmouth quarterback had to leave the field with a broken
leg after another brutal tackle.
Hastorf (on the faculty of Dartmouth) and Cantril (a Princeton
professor) asked spectators what, exactly, had happened. The game had
been filmed, and the professors made their subjects watch it once again
before questioning them about what they thought had taken place, and
who they considered was to blame for the game turning ugly.
Not surprisingly, the answers varied. Even immediately after watching
the game only 36 per cent of the Dartmouth students but 86 per cent of
the Princeton students said it was Dartmouth who had started the rough
play. In contrast, 53 per cent of the Dartmouth students and 11 per cent
of the Princeton students said that both teams were at fault. When asked
if they thought the game had been played fairly, 93 per cent of
Princeton students thought it was rough and dirty but fewer than half
(42 per cent) of Dartmouth students agreed with them. Princeton
students also thought they saw the Dartmouth team make over twice as
many rule violations as were reported by Dartmouth students.
Clearly, the ‘facts’ that people ‘saw’ depended on whether the
observers were motivated to view one or the other side in a more
positive light. As Dan Kahan, a professor at Yale University’s Law
School, explains about Hastorf and Cantril’s classic study, ‘the emotional
stake the students had in affirming their loyalty to their respective
institutions shaped what they saw on the tape … The students wanted to
experience solidarity with their institutions, but they didn’t treat that as
a conscious reason for seeing what they saw. They had no idea … that
their perceptions were being bent in this way.’7
This happens all the time, of course: English fans of a certain vintage
swear the third goal in the 1966 World Cup final crossed the line, but
Germans are less convinced. To some, Cristiano Ronaldo is an artist who
gets fouled a lot; to others, he is a diving con man. Our brains see what
they wish to see, and once we believe what we believe, we are not for
moving.8
Tom Gilovich, a psychologist at Cornell University, knows exactly
how this works. He studies how people process information and make
decisions. He was the co-author of one of the most famous sports studies
ever published, ‘The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of
Random Sequences’. The paper revealed that there is no such thing as
‘the hot hand’, basketball terminology to describe a player who is in a
rich vein of form. ‘Streak shooting’ in basketball, therefore, is a powerful
myth:9
Basketball players and fans alike tend to believe that a player’s chance of hitting a shot
are greater following a hit than following a miss on the previous shot. However,
detailed analyses of the shooting records of the Philadelphia 76ers provided no
evidence for a positive correlation between the outcomes of successive shots. The same
conclusions emerged from free-throw records of the Boston Celtics, and from a
controlled shooting experiment with the men and women of Cornell’s varsity teams.
The outcomes of previous shots influenced Cornell players’ predictions but not their
performance.
There is more to it, and it matters for football analysis. To answer the
question posed of us by Menotti, we cannot simply look at goals scored
against goals conceded. We need a more sophisticated analysis. We
know that goals scored and conceded both matter to teams’ success and
they do so to roughly equal degrees, though not conceding matters more
for avoiding defeats. But to value attack and defence properly, the
relevant comparison is really between the value of a goal scored and the
value of one not conceded. So let’s compare the two.
We found earlier that a goal is worth slightly more than one point for
a team. In the same way we can also quantify the point value of a clean
sheet – a goal not conceded. It may help to think about it this way: not
conceding guarantees a team at least one point from a match and
potentially gives it three (if the team scores). Over the course of a
decade of Premier League play between 2001/02 and 2010/11, we can
calculate the average value of points associated with a clean sheet (and
goals conceded per match generally).
It turns out that clean sheets on average produce almost 2.5 points per
match, as Figure 25 reveals. Compared to scoring a goal, which on
average earns a team about one point per match, not conceding is more
than twice as valuable. And even conceding only one goal still gives a
team around 1.5 points on average, about 30 per cent more in value
than scoring a one.
Another way to think about this is to ask how many goals a team
needs to score to generate the points produced by a clean sheet. The
answer for the Premier League is ‘more than two’ – as the graph shows,
a clean sheet produces almost as many points for a team as scoring two
goals does. The numbers for the other top leagues aren’t very different.
In top-level football, a clean sheet or zero goals conceded is more
valuable than scoring a single goal. To put this in Numbers Game terms,
then, an inequality central to understanding football is this: 0 > 1.
Goals that don’t happen are more valuable than those that do.
Figure 25 Point values of goals scored and conceded, Premier League, 2001/02–2010/11
Sepp Herberger was never short of a maxim. The legendary coach of the
West Germany team that overcame Hungary’s Magic Magyars to produce
the Miracle of Bern and win the 1954 World Cup had a fine line in
simple, instructive aphorisms. Many survive to this day; some have
passed into cliché. Herberger is the man who coined the phrase ‘the next
opponent is always the hardest’.
His most famous dictum, though, was to do with the ball. The ball
formed a core part of Herberger’s thinking.1 He knew that
understanding the ball is central to understanding the game. The ball, as
he saw it, ‘is always in better shape than anyone’; the ‘fastest player’, he
believed, ‘is the ball’. His most famous quote is even simpler. It is so
obvious that if anyone else had said it they may have been mocked.
Having a World Cup on your résumé tends to help avoid such a fate.
‘The ball,’ Herberger used to say, ‘is round.’
To Herberger, that phrase was a useful way of reminding fans,
players, journalists and his employers that football is a game of the
unexpected. Or rather the original quote was. His axiom has been
abbreviated over the years, but it’s worth knowing in full. His words
were not just ‘The ball is round,’ but ‘The ball is round, so that the game
can change direction.’ When the ball is in play, he meant, anything can
happen.
Football is the goal. The game is defined by its end product. Each side
possesses a light side, seeking the goal, and a dark side, hoping to divert
it. And at the centre of that collision between the positive and the
negative, the yin and the yang, is the ball. One side has it, the light, and
one side, the side that does not, remains in the dark. To understand the
game, as Herberger knew, we must understand the ball: what it means
to have it, and what it means to be without it.
In recent years it has become fashionable to want to retain the ball.
There are teams who almost seem to keep possession of it for its own
sake, teams who want to bask in its light as much as possible. Barcelona
and Spain are the most notable exponents. They treasure the ball,
cherish it, and it has duly rewarded them, with Spanish league titles,
with the Champions League trophy and with the championships of
Europe and the world.
Plenty of other sides are just as enamoured of the ball, though, and in
very different ways. It is beloved of Arsenal, of course, and the club’s
manager Arsène Wenger, who drastically changed the team’s style after
taking over from the more cautious, direct George Graham in 1996.
‘Arsène Wenger’s training is all about possession of the football,
movement of the football and support of one another,’2 explains Nigel
Winterburn, who played under both managers.
Such a system was beloved of Brendan Rodgers’s Swansea. But ask
Arsenal’s French manager whether he sees similarities in the two styles
of play and he will dismiss it out of hand: Swansea, to Wenger, engage
in what he terms ‘sterile domination’, the endless recycling of
possession, sweeping mandalas painted on the pitch to no end or
purpose. Bayern Munich, under Louis van Gaal, were accused of the
same thing. Possession for possession’s sake, circulation football, an
addiction to the light.
And then there are those teams who do not seem to want the ball,
who are happy to spend most of their lives in the dark. There are the
counter-attacking units of José Mourinho and Portugal, or the frenetic,
swarming teams of Zdeněk Zeman and Antonio Conte and Jürgen
Klopp’s Borussia Dortmund. It is possible, as in the latter cases, to be
attractive without dominating possession. There is true beauty in the
dark. And there is ugliness, too, the charge often levelled at teams like
the Wimbledon of the 1980s, Graham Taylor’s Watford or, more
recently, Tony Pulis’s Stoke. These are the wilful have nots: the sides
who have made a virtue, an art form, out of not having the ball.
The contrast between the two styles is stark. Let’s take Arsenal and
Stoke, teams at opposite ends of the modern Premier League possession
spectrum. According to Opta Sports, over the course of the 2010/11
season, for example, Arsenal players had almost 30,000 touches of the
ball.3 They topped the league with 60 per cent possession in the average
match, never had less than 46 per cent, and frequently achieved more
than two-thirds of possession in a match.
Stoke, on the other hand, in the same season, saw their players touch
the ball 18,451 times – the lowest in the league – and have an average
of 39 per cent possession. When the two sides met at Stoke’s Britannia
Stadium that year, in fact, the home team had just 26 per cent of
possession.4 Stoke were only marginally more possessive of the ball on
other occasions; only once that entire year did Stoke have more
possession of the ball than their opponents.
There are plenty of managers out there who make light of such
statistics, and we suspect Pulis is among them. Having more possession
of the ball is no guarantee of victory. In fact, that day in May when
Arsenal visited the Britannia and enjoyed almost 75 per cent possession
– completing 611 passes to Stoke’s 223 – they lost 3–1.
That is far from an isolated example. Take Barcelona, widely regarded
as the finest club side in the world, contriving to lose on aggregate to
Chelsea over two legs in the 2012 Champions League semi-finals. Pep
Guardiola’s side, brimming with the talents of Lionel Messi, Xavi
Hernández, Andrés Iniesta and the rest, had 79 per cent of the
possession in the first leg and 82 per cent in the second. They won
neither match. It was the same that season against Mourinho’s Real
Madrid: Barcelona had 72 per cent of the ball, and lost. The ball is
round, as Herberger would say. The unexpected does happen.
It would be comforting to chalk those results up to chance or the law
of large numbers. We have seen already what a powerful factor fortune
can be when it comes to football and that anything can happen if you
play football often enough. We also know that, roughly half the time,
the better side does not win. But we cannot just accept that sometimes
the best teams lose simply because of the vicissitudes of fate. We need to
establish whether, in these cases, they lost despite having all that
possession or – as Herbert Chapman might suggest – because of it. Is it
possible that the artists are wrong and the artisans right: can possession
be worthless unless you do something with it? Is keeping the ball a
means to an end or an end in itself?
To find out, there is one thing we have to do: we have to establish
what being ‘in possession’ means. It is one of those football phrases that
trips easily off the tongue; one of the rare football numbers that is
discussed on television and radio, in pubs and bars, considered vastly
important in determining how well a team has played or describing its
characteristics. In the age of Barcelona and Spain, possession is all the
rage. But what does being in possession actually mean? Once we’ve
answered that, we can start to work out just how valuable possession is.
Figure 26 Ball movement between 11th and 20th minutes, Aston Villa vs Wolves, 19 March
2011
At first glance, the ball’s movement appears entirely random, its x–y
locations on the pitch seemingly devoid of rhyme or reason. When we
fill in the graph with data from the entire match, the lines become more
numerous, but the pattern no more clear. It paints a picture of a game
where the ball has a mind of its own, eluding any form of control or
possession. Football’s flow seems ever present.
That doesn’t mean there is no point in players honing their skills in
touching the ball with every permitted body part to try to influence its
movement, its speed and direction. They might even generate something
on the pitch that creates the illusion they possess the ball, if only
because it is out of reach of the other side. But an illusion it is: no team
has complete control of the ball, except when it lies in the goalkeeper’s
hands, or when they have a set piece. Only then are they truly in
possession of the ball because the rules of the game allow them to be.
That has not stopped ‘ball possession’ becoming a cornerstone of our
understanding of the game. Perhaps this is to do with football’s close
kinship with rugby and its cousin, American football, games in which
discussing possession makes rather more sense.
But aside from set pieces, throw-ins and the safe hands of the
But aside from set pieces, throw-ins and the safe hands of the
goalkeeper, for the vast majority of the game a team does not have
possession of the ball. It simply has more control over it, at that fleeting
moment, than its opponents.
What matters in football, of course, is where the ball ends up: ideally,
at the back of the other side’s net. Teams are worried about what they
can do to get it there and what the other side can do to get it into theirs.
Possession, as we have seen, is something of a misnomer; instead, to
understand the game better, we need to discuss how the ball moves
around the pitch with more or less control by one side or the other.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to do that – to measure the
various states of incomplete control that feet can have over a ball, and to
understand how the ball comes to zoom about as in the game between
Villa and Wolves – is to count how much and how often players touch
the ball, moving it in their preferred direction.
It follows, then, that the teams who are better at passing the ball
should concede fewer turnovers. But pass volume and completion
It follows, then, that the teams who are better at passing the ball
should concede fewer turnovers. But pass volume and completion
percentage aren’t equally useful indicators when it comes to predicting
turnovers and repossessions. While those teams who complete passes at
a higher rate are less prone to giving the ball back to the opposition,
pass volume – how many times a team passes – is only tangentially
related to how often the ball is turned over.
While none of the teams that pass around 500 times a game or more
turn over the ball a lot (Arsenal, Chelsea and the Manchester clubs), all
the others give it away with varying degrees of frequency – unrelated to
how many passes they have played. So in the 2010/11 season
Sunderland, Aston Villa, Newcastle and West Bromwich Albion passed
roughly the same amount, on average about 400 times per match; but
they had very different turnover rates – at about 170, 180, 190 and
200 per match.
The teams who don’t concede turnovers, who don’t give the ball back
to the opposition as much, are the ones that know how to play piggy in
the middle. They can pass more safely around their opponents. They are
not necessarily the ones who pass the most. Volume of passing is a
tactical decision. The rate at which passes find their man is the true
gauge of possession quality, and that completion rate is less about the
fine calibration of the passer’s foot than about the shared coordination
of passer and receiver to create simple connections in difficult locations.
The successes of Barcelona and Spain, though, have given the passing
The successes of Barcelona and Spain, though, have given the passing
school the advantage, for now at least. Passing’s in fashion at the start of
the twenty-first century. Possession, the theory goes, helps you win
games. Have more possession, win more games.
We are not concerned with theory. We are concerned with facts. We
wanted to know whether keeping the ball better gives you a better
chance of success. If possession matters, we should see it reflected in
results on the pitch.
Football analysts who have looked into this have often based their
conclusions on their analyses of data from international competitions.
Twenty-five years ago, Mike Hughes from the Centre for Performance
Analysis at the University of Wales Institute in Cardiff made the case
that possession matters by analysing matches from the 1986 World
Cup.14 Hughes and his co-authors wanted to see if successful teams
played differently from unsuccessful ones. Armed with a coding sheet for
categorizing different events on the pitch and styles of play, they
compared teams that reached the semi-finals with those that were
eliminated at the end of the first round.
Their findings strongly suggested that possession matters and that
possession football is a viable strategy for success. Successful teams had
significantly more touches of the ball per possession than unsuccessful
teams; successful teams played a passing game through the middle in
their own half and approached the other end of the pitch predominantly
in the central areas of the field, while the unsuccessful teams played
significantly more to the wings. Finally, unsuccessful teams lost
possession of the ball significantly more at both ends of the pitch – they
turned the ball over more.
A follow-up analysis by Hughes and his colleague Steve Churchill
based on the 2001 Copa América confirmed that successful teams
played a different kind of football from unsuccessful teams. Among other
things, successful teams were able to keep the ball for longer and create
shots after possessions which lasted more than twenty seconds with
more frequency than unsuccessful teams. They also were significantly
better at transporting the ball from one end of the pitch to the other and
into prime shooting areas. The data showed that the ability to pass
effectively – again, to make complex situations simple – was at the heart
of these teams’ success.15
And it wasn’t just the South Americans who successfully kept the ball.
In 2004, a team of scientists from the Research Institute for Sport and
Exercise Sciences at Liverpool John Moores University collected detailed
data from forty matches that involved successful and unsuccessful teams
in the 2002 World Cup tournament.16 They too found that successful
teams had a higher number of long passing sequences and made more
consecutive forward passes.
But international competitions may be special: chance plays a
disproportionate role in such tournaments, while the knockout format
means we are only working with a small sample size of matches. What if
we look at a league season? Academics P. D. Jones, Nic James and
Stephen Mellalieu did just that, analysing twenty-four matches from the
2001/02 Premier League campaign to compare successful and
unsuccessful teams.17 Did possession matter for the outcome of any
given game? Did it matter more at different times, depending on the
score at that instant?
Yes, no matter where or when you looked. Mind you, both successful
and unsuccessful teams had longer durations of possession when they
were losing matches compared to when winning. Teams that were ahead
gave the ball away more, and those losing by a goal or two chased the
game and thus saw more of the ball. The real difference between victory
and defeat was that successful teams retained possession significantly
longer than unsuccessful ones, whatever the score was at the time.
Possession is related to success, not because of specific strategies
related to what the score in the game was, but because of teams’ relative
skill levels. Possession is about ability, and that ability is chiefly to
create easy passing situations where others would be pressured and face
narrow windows. And that means that, over the course of a season,
those teams who cherish the ball – and know how to treat it – will win
out.
A Game of Two Halves
Most of Bill Shankly’s wry observations on football have passed into
folklore. But there is one that – at first glance – seems a little misguided.
Shankly once complained that the Ajax who had scored five goals on a
misty night in Amsterdam, with the young Johan Cruyff heavily
involved, was ‘the most defensive team we have ever faced’.18
We doubt Cruyff would dispute that description. The young maestro
would have understood that having the ball is both an offensive and
defensive measure. As he explained after orchestrating a 2–0 win for
Holland against England at Wembley without ever crossing the halfway
line: ‘Without the ball, you can’t win.’ He would later add: ‘If we have
the ball, they can’t score!’ This should mean that, by completing more
of the passes they attempt, by ceding fewer turnovers and by having
more opportunities to pass, teams not only score more goals and concede
fewer, but also win more games.
To find out whether Cruyff’s assertions were true, we looked at 1,140
matches over three Premier League seasons. That is 2,280 team
performances.19 The answers, shown in Figures 29 and 30, were clear.
In attack, teams who do a better job of keeping the ball away from
their opponents do have more shots and do score more goals. In defence,
they restrict their opponents to fewer attempts and they concede fewer
goals. They have more shots on goal and suffer fewer. This, naturally,
has a significant impact on goal production and goal prevention: teams
that pass the ball well outscore their opponents by 1.44 to 1.19 goals
per game, and they outperform them by an almost identical margin
defensively. The data also show that, whatever possession statistic you
look at – overall, completion percentage, volume – having more, rather
than less, possession of the ball increases offensive output.
Figure 29 Goals scored as a function of possession, Premier League, 2008/09–2010/11
Figure 30 Goals conceded as a function of turnovers, Premier League, 2008/09–2010/11
When we turn to the other kind of possession – not turning over the
ball – we see equally important effects. Teams that turned the ball over
less than the other side outscored their opponents by roughly 1.5 goals
to 1.1; they outperformed them defensively by a similar margin.20
Keeping possession of the ball helped teams score more goals and
concede less by about 0.3 to 0.5 goals at both ends of the pitch. That’s
almost a goal per match.
It seems natural to assume that more possession should lead to more
wins and fewer losses. And it’s quite right: keeping hold of the ball,
completing at a higher rate, and not surrendering it so often to the
opposition means more wins, more points and more success. Teams that
had the greater share of possession won 39.4 per cent of their games,
compared to just 31.6 per cent if they had less. However possession is
measured – volume, completion, or overall – having more of the ball
generated between 7.7 per cent and 11.7 per cent more wins (Figure
31).
Figure 31 Match win percentage as a function of possession, Premier League, 2008/09–
2010/11
All this pays off come the end of the season. Clubs that had more
possession dominated the top end of the league and those that didn’t
were more likely to fight relegation. To see how pronounced this pattern
is, we plotted the number of points clubs produced in a season and the
average amount of possession they had in the matches they played
(Figure 33; each circle represents a club’s performance for the year).21
Figure 33 League points and average possession, Premier League, 2008/09–2010/11
Clubs with more possession will not win every match – far from it –
but they will win more and lose less. The average league position of
clubs with more possession than the opposition was 6.7; the average for
clubs with less was 13.8. Ultimately more possession and fewer
turnovers added up to a more successful campaign.
And yet, if we examine Figure 33 closely, we see that there are some
distinct outliers to the overall pattern, especially on the left side of the
graph. It seems there really are two distinct leagues in English football.
In the bottom half are the teams with less possession, and in the top the
teams with more.
Figure 34 League points and average possession, Stoke City, 2008/09–2010/11
And if we look more closely still, we can see that, in that second
league, there is one team that truly stands out. One side who win the
battle for survival, over and over again, without seeing much of the ball.
They even manage to finish above clubs with significantly more
possession. That side is Stoke City (Figure 34). Somehow, Stoke have
mastered the art of not having the ball.
Are they just a statistical anomaly, or do they have a secret?
6.
It’s not about the long ball or the short ball; it’s about the right ball.
Bob Paisley
Whether or not you like what Stoke do, it’s hard to argue with their
results. Since promotion in 2008 manager Tony Pulis, an unremarkable
defender during his playing days, has established the club not just as a
Premier League side but as a cornerstone of English football thinking:
how teams hoping to challenge for the title cope on a cold and
windswept afternoon at the Britannia Stadium is often taken as a test of
their credentials. New imports to the league are widely expected to wilt.
Pulis must take enormous credit. If Stoke are the Barcelona of route
one football, then he is their Pep Guardiola. He made the Financial
Times list of overachieving managers in England between 1973 and
2010,1 and the authors of Pay As You Play, a path-breaking book on
transfer finances, calculated that Pulis at Stoke spent less on transfer fees
per point won than any other long-serving Premier League manager.2
But he has also faced enormous criticism. Stoke’s long-ball style is
considered unattractive and even philistine by many observers. Such
scorn is borne out by the statistics: Stoke play more long balls and have
less possession in the opposition half than any other Premier League
team. According to these data Stoke should have disappeared long ago
from the rarefied air of English football’s top flight. And yet they
continue to thrive. Why?
The answer is simple: Stoke are happy not to have the ball. In this age
where possession is king, they are devout republicans. For Pulis, the Pep
of the Potteries, less is more. It is as though Stoke believe they are more
likely to score, and less likely to concede, if they don’t have the ball.
And the only possession they really seem to believe in is when Rory
Delap is able to cradle the ball in both hands as he gets ready to throw
the ball into the box.
Stoke are perfectly happy to play less football than anyone else. Not
just in the philosophical sense of not being concerned with getting the
ball on the floor and keeping it, but in a very literal way. It’s simple: the
more the ball is in play, and the more Stoke have the ball, the worse
they do. That is the key to understanding Pulis’s success.
That is the chief difference between success and – if not failure – then
a lack of success in football. As may be seen in Figure 36, teams such as
Arsenal, Chelsea and Manchester City – the sides that we found to play a
possession-based game – had a similar conversion rate (goals from shots
on target) to more direct sides; indeed, Stoke were actually more
efficient in front of goal than Arsenal, whereas relegated Blackpool were
roughly as effective as champions Manchester United. The difference is
that Arsenal and Manchester United have 50 per cent more shots every
game than those teams.5
The effect of this is clear: long-ball clubs have fewer chances to score
and therefore score fewer goals, and they end their seasons battling
relegation. Sides that treasure possession tend to be at the other end of
the table, contesting titles (Figure 37). Those exceptions – from Pulis’s
clock-watching Stoke in Figure 37 back to Bolton under Sam Allardyce,
who was among the first to apply analytics to the long-ball game – have
found a style that helps them maximize their resources and fulfil their
ambitions.
Figure 36 Long-ball ratio and conversion rates, Premier League, 2010/11
For them, the long ball is the right ball; they might never win the
Premier League, but by perfecting their approach, at least both were
able to secure their place in it for another season.
Restoring Reep
Football managers – never the fastest students in the class – appear
finally to have worked this out. Reep’s doctrine of maximal efficiency,
the philosophy he and his followers had absolute faith in, is starting to
disappear from the game. Yes, there are still teams who defy fashion –
and logic – to play a more rudimentary, long-ball style, but the overall
pattern is clear: possession, in the twenty-first century, is king.
Figure 37 Long-ball ratio and league rank, Premier League, 2010/11
That’s what Sarah Rudd of StatDNA found when she looked at the
passing sequences for the 2011/12 Premier League season (Figure 38).
Reep’s standout discovery, the curve that sharply declines with every
extra pass in the move, has developed a spike in its tail. Advances in
technology, training, technique and pitches have led to the dominion of
the passing game. Moves involving seven passes are now as common as
those composed of just two.
Yet it would be unfair to dismiss Reep as just a relic of times past. Yes,
the football he espoused might seem a little dated, it may not be pretty
to watch, and he failed to discover football’s ‘winning formula’, but his
approach was in many ways thoroughly modern.
Figure 38 Passing move distributions, Premier League, 2011/12
Data source: StatDNA.
It was Reep who first tried to use data to help us see to the core of
football, and in many ways it is from his work that the game’s future
will probably spring. He simply did not have the open mind or the
techniques required to make sense of the wormball of information that
every football match, every tournament, every season provides us. He
recognized that football may look anarchic and disordered, but it can
nevertheless be dissected into manageable elements, and those elements
can be analysed.
We know the possession game is becoming more widespread, and we
have the numbers to show that keeping the ball does help a team create
more shots, and that more shots lead to more goals, and that more
possession helps a side concede less frequently, which means they win
more and, crucially, lose less. But is it the case that every team must
play that way? No. The very title of Charles Hughes’s book was
completely askew; Reep’s aim for a universal cure for football’s
inefficiency was misguided.
There is no winning formula. But try telling Watford, Wimbledon or
Stoke that the long-ball game doesn’t work; try telling the Greece of
2004 that attacking football wins out more often than the defensive
variety; try telling Barcelona or Spain to clear their lines. To each their
own. As Bob Paisley, the Liverpool manager, once said: ‘It’s not about
the long ball or the short ball, it’s about the right ball.’ For some teams,
the long ball is the correct one. Indeed, as the possession game becomes
ever more popular, the chances that there will always be one team
playing in the style Reep preached increase. There will always be a
benefit in going against the grain.
Reep was wrong on what the numbers implied; his findings were
based on too rudimentary an analysis. But his assertion that football’s
numbers offered us a chance to see things that we had not yet glimpsed
was absolutely correct. Unfortunately, Reep’s system was peculiarly one-
sided: it concentrated on how a team might best deploy its resources so
as to score goals, rather than on how it might go about trying to keep
them out. As we have seen, underestimating the role of the defence has
been a characteristic of football ever since its first codification, and Reep
was no different.
That is the failing of the long-ball game, too. It ultimately did not
catch on as a generic prescription for a winning strategy, in part because
it was too easy for more skilled sides to negate. It wasn’t designed to
adapt to a better opponent or teach a team how to keep a clean sheet.
Ultimately, Reep wasn’t a strategist and didn’t know how to do defence.
There was nothing wrong with his general conclusion, though: it is in
a team’s best interests to be efficient. Bayern Munich, in their
Champions League final against Chelsea, or Barcelona, in the 2012
semi-finals, would both have welcomed the intervention of efficiency;
for all their possession it was their profligacy that, ultimately, cost them
the grandest of prizes. Efficiency was how Reep believed football teams
could best overcome the role of fortune but he could never quite grasp
the idea that his solution was not the only solution. There are many
ways to control your own destiny in football. Perhaps the most effective
way is not to be efficient; perhaps the most effective way is to control
the ball.
It would be a shame to see Reep’s legacy forgotten. Like many a
revolutionary before him, he may have been a tad dogmatic, and a
product of his time. But his was also the first sustained attempt at
collecting football numbers and winning with them. The industry of data
companies would not have evolved without him, and every club that has
started out on its own journey to find out what the data say, owes Reep
a debt of some sort.
Not every team wants to be Stoke. Not every team can be Barcelona.
But every side can find a way to win, if they use all the intelligence at
their disposal: that of their own talents and that offered to them by the
numbers. That was at the heart of Reep’s approach, and should not be
forgotten. It is just that the numbers we have today are rather more
advanced, rather more nuanced. Our intelligence – in terms of both
gathering it and using it – is increasing.
7.
Guerrilla Football
So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles
without a single loss.
Sun Tzu
Not only did they score from fast breaks and free kicks, but when
Not only did they score from fast breaks and free kicks, but when
Larcada calculated the average distances from which Premier League
clubs attempted shots that season, Wigan were the overall league
leaders. Their average shooting distance was some twenty-six yards. This
is why they were a significant outlier at the wrong end of Figure 36
comparing conversion of shots to goals and possession. This looked
deliberate: their goals came from a longer distance than any of their
peers – an average of 18.5 yards, way ahead of second-placed
Tottenham, while Charles N’Zogbia and Hugo Rodallega both finished in
the top five scorers from distance in the Premier League in 2010/11.
Martínez was thinking outside the box in the most literal fashion.
Indeed, his team had the lowest number of goals scored from inside the
penalty area of any side in the league – just twenty-eight, compared to
Manchester United’s sixty-nine.
This sounds very defensive – hitting teams on the break, relying on set
pieces and long-range shots – but Wigan’s formations told a more
nuanced story. Opta’s data showed that, while Premier League teams
played 34 per cent of their matches with a traditional 4–4–2 formation
that year, Wigan didn’t play 4–4–2 in a single match. Instead their most
common formation was a 4–3–3 system, usually thought to represent a
more offensive tactical approach. Wigan’s 4–3–3s accounted for one in
eight instances of that formation in the Premier League. But they haven’t
used it slavishly year in and year out. Instead, they adapt when
necessary: Martínez masterminded his side’s survival in 2012 by
switching to a highly unorthodox 3–4–3 formation for the final third of
the season.7 It worked.
Martínez was trying to surprise his opponent and make sure he was
not surprised himself. When we throw into the mix that Wigan led the
league in recoveries, a clear approach crystallizes. Martínez’s strategy
relied on highly accurate long-range shooting, firing from distance –
allowing his team to recover their defensive shape more easily – and
persistence. He did not place any emphasis on corners – Wigan scored
just one goal from a corner in the entire 2010/11 season – because it
meant allowing his troops out of hiding and into open sight, leaving
them vulnerable. Martínez was playing guerrilla football.
He had his team lie in wait for their opponents and then punish them
on the counter-attack. He employed sharpshooters, to let fly from
distance, and snipers, to hit free kicks. His team were adaptable,
unpredictable. With his neat jumpers and kind smile, Martínez looks a
decent man. Underneath that veneer, though, beats the heart and mind
of a natural insurgent.
Intelligent Football
As it is for any revolutionary, information is at the heart of everything
Martínez does. No rebel worth his salt would plan an uprising without
gathering intelligence first, on the strength of his troops, of the ruling
regime’s weak points. The same principle applies in football.
That intelligence takes two forms: first, there is information. Managers
have always gathered information in the traditional manner – scouting,
talking to coaches, watching players in training, reading the news – and
tapping into this network remains a crucial part of their work.
Most of that information, though, is subjective: to make the best
decisions possible, managers must also tap into the objective sources of
knowledge available to them. This is where the numbers come in.
Nothing is more objective than data. Every manager now, whether he
knows what to do with them or not, has one or more match analysts,
housed at his club, with whom he will examine previous games and
prepare for forthcoming battles.
Others are even more obsessive: Martínez, we suspect, is not the only
manager to have his home TV connected to a data-analysis software
package. Thanks to companies like Opta Sports, Amisco/Prozone,
StatDNA, Match Analysis and all the others, Martínez and his peers can
now call up at the touch of a button accurate data on all their team’s
corners, or shots, or passes. Managers are inundated with numbers. Yet
having facts at your disposal is not the same as knowing what each of
them means.
Sadly the Patriots didn’t make that first down. They turned the ball
over to the Colts, who drove down the short field to score a game-
winning touchdown with thirteen seconds remaining. Belichick was
ridiculed for not doing the ‘right’ thing. In reality, he had done exactly
the right thing. It’s just that it went wrong this time. But if you do the
right thing often enough, the odds will be with you.
A team that commits errors in no more than 15 to 18 per cent of its actions is unbeatable.
Valeriy Lobanovskyi1
A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or
somehow make them go wrong.
Carl von Clausewitz
Every department has more people doing more specialized jobs as you
move up the division ladder. For example, Liverpool have a Head of
Sports Sciences, a Head of Fitness and Conditioning, a Head of Physical
Therapies, two Senior Physiotherapists, a Physiotherapist and a Rehab
Fitness Coach; League One’s Doncaster Rovers have three
Physiotherapists; Wycombe Wanderers in League Two have little more
than three ice packs and a jumbo pack of sticking plasters.8
Just like rich countries that specialize in complicated products such as
aircraft, software and luxury resorts, rich football clubs invest more
capital and technology into their organizations and play the game in a
way that poorer clubs cannot duplicate.
This takes two forms: richer clubs utilize far greater amounts of
human capital, while they also spend millions on information technology
and sophisticated databases, as well as on equipment and facilities for
training, fitness and rehabilitation. Everton have ten full-size training
pitches at their Finch Farm base, a well-equipped weights room, a state-
of-the-art physiotherapist’s suite, recovery pools and all the rest, while
Walsall, their training ground just fifteen acres compared to Everton’s
fifty-five, have two pitches, some changing rooms, a gym, a physio’s
room and a canteen. Finch Farm cost around £17 million; Walsall’s new
training base cost about £1 million.
That complexity of product appears on the field. As the German
journalist Raphael Honigstein noted in Englischer Fussball, his
perceptive look at his adopted homeland’s game, football is played in a
much more sophisticated fashion in the Premier League – or the
Bundesliga, or Serie A, or whatever – than it is in the lower divisions.
‘At the very top,’ Honigstein writes, ‘pure Route One (that is, classic
kick and rush) is generally proscribed and discredited as a tactic. One
level down – below the radar, if you will – English football has
preserved its own unique ideology: it’s still a very territorial game. At
this level, in other words, territory is often more important than the ball
… Each corner is celebrated as if it were a last-minute winning goal.
“Box ’em in!” the coach screams when the opposition have a throw-in
near their own goal.’9
We have already seen that rich clubs pay their players more just as
companies in richer countries do in Kremer’s Economic League of
Nations, but do they also spend more resources screening potential
employees? There’s no systematic information on the size of scouting
networks – which operate on a relatively informal basis, with scouts,
contacts and agents all recommending players – but there is abundant
anecdotal evidence that this is an activity elite clubs invest much more
time in than their counterparts in the lower leagues.
One hugely respected Premier League scout, someone as likely to be
found on a Wednesday night watching the Champions League at the Nou
Camp as he is to be at Harlington watching Queens Park Rangers’
reserves, informed us in detail of the gulf between the top and the
bottom in terms of the time and money they invest in evaluation and
recruitment of players. He confirmed that the number of scouts at the
top, middle and bottom clubs and leagues varies widely, and is typically
tied to financial and league status. His best estimate was that the top
Premier League clubs have fifteen to twenty of their own employees
working on various aspects of scouting, from watching matches to
providing background research and so-called ‘technical scouting’ –
evaluating players’ statistical information. With greater resource
constraints and more holes in their squads, mid-table Premier League
clubs will have about ten to fifteen scouts. Top Championship clubs have
five or six employees engaged in scouting activities, while further down
the table, perhaps three or four are. Once we move into League One and
League Two, a club’s devotion of precious resources to scouting
activities quickly dries up, with perhaps two or three employees in
League One, and fewer than that in League Two.
‘There isn’t much difference between Leagues One and Two’, he said,
‘quality of player-wise and otherwise. They don’t have full-time guys
working on scouting. Typically, someone has to double up and do
opposition scouting, video analysis, and scouting players, or some
combination thereof. But the jump to the Championship is noticeable,
and the jump is even bigger to the Premier League.’
This is true across all Europe’s major leagues, though there are some
clubs where that gap is even larger. Udinese have around fifty full-time
scouting and video analysis staff all round the world, as well as a vast
informal network of contacts. It’s this resource that has enabled the
anonymous club from Italy’s misty north-east to unearth some of the
world’s brightest young talent and transform itself into a contender for a
Champions League place.
Because clubs at the top in Italy, Germany, Spain, France and England
spend more time making sure they recruit the right players, it’s no
surprise to find that – according to figures from the CIES Football
Observatory in Switzerland – those teams tend to hold on to their
players for rather longer than smaller sides. The typical player will stay
with a top side 30 per cent longer than he will remain at a lower-
ranking club. That translates to an additional year or so: a significant
portion of a player’s career.
This is reflected in the length of contract on offer at clubs with
different ambitions: according to the Premier League scout we spoke
with, ‘clubs in the lower leagues tend to give one- to two-year contracts,
clubs in the Championship two- to three-year contracts, and in the
Premier League, it’s two to four years.’
This reflects the financial realities of life among the minnows. ‘The
lower league clubs have less control and more financial worry,’ said the
scout. ‘They don’t want to be tied to long contracts. Clubs in the Premier
League make huge investments, and they want to protect those
investments. One way to do that is to try and recoup that investment in
the transfer market if things don’t work out twelve to eighteen months
into the contract. The last thing you want is for that player to be a free
agent. In the lower leagues, it’s too risky for clubs to give players long
contracts. In the Premier League it’s risky not to.’
Clubs hire players of similar skill and quality. Real Madrid will not
bring in a journeyman midfield player from League Two – though they
did their best when they signed Thomas Gravesen – while Alcorcón, the
village team which knocked Real out of the Copa del Rey in 2009, will
not go out and sign a superstar. This even has a fancy name in football’s
blossoming library of theoretical literature: the Zidane Clustering
Theorem.10
Sacchi is not the only manager to have seen football this way. Valeriy
Lobanovskyi, while propelling Dynamo Kiev to greatness over a period
Sacchi is not the only manager to have seen football this way. Valeriy
Lobanovskyi, while propelling Dynamo Kiev to greatness over a period
of more than thirty years, strived to multiply his own team’s abilities, to
make them more than the sum of their parts.
Lobanovskyi was a trained engineer, and a pioneer of the numbers
game. Early in his coaching career he brought Dr Anatoliy Zelentsov to
his side in order to collaborate on a scientific, systematic approach to
football. Lobanovskyi had studied cybernetics, a field whose central
concept is circularity, and which deals with problems of control and
regulation in dynamic systems. He and Zelentsov viewed a football
match as an interaction between two sub-systems of eleven elements
(players), whose outcome depended upon which sub-system had fewer
flaws and more effective integration. The key characteristic of a team is
that ‘the efficiency of the sub-system is greater than the sum of the
efficiencies of the elements that comprise it’.16 In another interview
Zelentsov said, ‘Every team has players which link “coalitions”, every
team has players which destroy them. The first are called to create on
the field, the latter – to destroy the team actions of [the] opponent.’17
Using different concepts, this describes an O-ring production process.
To these wise words we can add indicative statistics. Returning to the
2010/11 Castrol rankings, we can examine the connection between a
team’s weak and strong links and its goal difference and number of
points earned. To do that properly, we had to transform the Castrol
numbers into percentages.
Because the tasks of players differ by position, we gave each player a
quality score based on the tasks of his position and relative to the top-
ranked performer at his position. For example, in May 2011 Joe Hart of
Manchester City was the top-ranked goalkeeper and so he will be given
a score of 100 per cent, while all other clubs’ keepers will be less than
100 per cent (their Castrol scores will be divided by Joe Hart’s). The
same applies in defence and midfield, though not in attack.
Forwards are necessarily different because of the numbers of the only
true genius in the present football universe, Lionel Messi. Messi is to
other forwards as Mozart was to Salieri, as Rembrandt was to the
average court painter, and as Muhammad Ali was to Sonny Liston. Table
5 shows the percentage difference in the scores of the top-ranked and
second-ranked players at each position at the end of the 2011 season.
Table 5 Percentage difference in the scores of the top-ranked and second-ranked players at each
position at the end of the 2011 season
Position Player Ranked 1st Score Player Ranked 2nd Score Difference
To prove this, the critical test we need to conduct is to see how vital a
role the weakest link plays in a team’s success and ultimate position in
the league table. Figures 44 and 45 reveal that the relative strengths of
both the best and eleventh-best players are significantly and positively
related to a club’s goal differential for the season and the points secured
in each game.
Every club on the chart has two points: Barcelona and Madrid are in
the upper right, with Arles-Avignon in the bottom left. These are the
clubs’ strongest and weakest players. It’s obvious that both are relevant
to team performance. What isn’t immediately apparent is which is more
relevant: is football more a strongest-link game or a weakest-link one?
Figure 44 Effect of top-ranked and eleventh-ranked European club players on average goal
differential, 2010/11
For this, we will need the most important piece of kit in the
economist’s toolbox: regression analysis. This will allow us to see if we
can predict a club’s success based on information about its weak and
strong links, and which is a more powerful performance-enhancer.20
For many teams, that is the difference between success and failure: a
Champions League place compared to the ignominy of the Europa
League, survival and relegation, winning the title or finishing an
agonizing second. Those five points (for each 10 per cent upgrade) are
why even very good teams are prepared to sink millions into another
superstar signing.
Pérez felt that Madrid’s superstars would compensate for any
remaining weaknesses. Analytically, this could happen: the significant
effects of the strong links might leave no room for the weak links to have
any statistical impact. After all, the strong link and weak link are
positively correlated – good strong links tend to play with better weak
links – and so, numerically, the strong links might be capturing all the
explanatory action in the regression analysis in the same way that they
capture all of the fans’ attention.
However, strong and weak links are far from completely overlapping,
leaving room for each to matter independently.21 In fact the weak links
are not marginalized at all: they have a strong independent effect on
club performance. Improving your weak link from 38 per cent to 48 per
cent is worth thirteen goals a season, or nine points in the league table.
That means that upgrading its weak link can help a club more than
improving its best player. Take the mid-table La Liga club Levante. With
a strong link of midfielder Juanlu (quality 74.4 per cent) and a weak
link of defender Juanfran (quality 56.8 per cent), Levante finished
fourteenth in the league table with forty-five points in the 2011 season.
If through training, hard work, or magic Juanfran were to have
boosted his quality by four points, then we would have expected the
Granotes to jump up the table: they could have finished the league in
eighth place with forty-nine points; in contrast, had they focused on
improving their strongest link, Juanlu, by the same amount, their points
total would have risen only by two and their table position by three
spots.
The last way we can compare the importance of weak and strong links
is to decrease or increase their quality by a commonly used statistical
step, one standard deviation – a measure of the spread of qualities of all
players around the mean. So, what happens to the average club if the
form of its weak or strong link decreases a step due to, say, injury, or
advances a step due to a transfer signing? Again, galoots are more
influential than stars. The differences add up: a one-step decline in the
form of your weakest link rather than your strongest link means 4.6
fewer points over the course of a season. More importantly, perhaps,
improving your weakest link over your strongest link by one standard
deviation translates into 13.7 more points in the final league table. Our
results also show that performance differences in weak links are 30 per
cent more important when it comes to goal difference, and almost twice
as important with regard to points per game.
Imagine if Reading had not been forced to field Zurab Khizanishvili on
that bright May afternoon at Wembley. Imagine if they had been able to
choose someone just 5 per cent better. The whole course of football
history might be different: maybe Brian McDermott would be Liverpool
manager, not Brendan Rodgers, and Jem Karacan, not Joe Allen, would
be at the heart of the Anfield midfield.
Or what if Pérez had paid as much attention to strengthening his
Pavones as he had to garnering his Cracks? Perhaps then the galáctico
experiment would not have, ultimately, disappointed. Perhaps he would
have more than one Champions League and one La Liga title to show for
all his hundreds of millions of euros in investment. He knew that football
was an O-ring process. He just tried to solve it in the wrong way.
It is easy, as Pérez did, to think of football as a game of superstars.
They provide the glamour, the genius, the moments of inspiration. They
sell the shirts and fill the seats. But they do not decide who wins games
and who wins championships. That honour falls to the incompetents at
the heart of the defence or the miscommunicating clowns in midfield.
Football is a weak-link game. Like the space shuttle, one small,
malfunctioning part can cause a multimillion-pound disaster.
This has profound implications for how we see football, how clubs
should be built and teams constructed, how sides should be run and
substitutions made. It changes the very way we think about the game.
9.
The measure of success is not whether you have a tough problem to deal with, but whether it is
the same problem you had last year.
John Foster Dulles
Then there are red cards that are sustained in the heat of the match –
Then there are red cards that are sustained in the heat of the match –
think Zinedine Zidane on Marco Materazzi in the 2006 World Cup final,
or Wayne Rooney on Ricardo Carvalho in the quarter-finals of that
tournament. These are, it would seem reasonable to suggest, more
common in games when your team is condemned to defeat, when things
are going badly and frustration has set in, or when a player is lashing
out in response to provocation from the other side. In statistical terms,
our simple test above might be biased towards showing a big negative
impact from red cards. This means we need to apply a more
sophisticated analysis if we are to confirm the negative effects of red
cards and the harm of simply hiding the weakest link.
By running a regression on data from all four leagues for the five most
recent seasons, while accounting for match-specific differences – home
advantage, shots, goals and fouls – we can show the connection between
the number of red cards and the likelihood of a team losing or winning a
match.5 Here, too, it is clear that red cards increase a team’s chances of
defeat.
Going from no red cards to one increases the probability of earning no
points from 24 per cent to 38 per cent. If your team gets a second red
card, losing becomes the most likely outcome, even more probable than
gaining a point. The chances of taking three points decreases from 36
per cent to 22 per cent when a team has a man sent off, and the odds
against winning to more than 7–1 when a team has two players
dismissed.
The most fitting comparison is with being at home: playing on familiar
territory, as opposed to at an away ground, increases a team’s chances of
winning from 27 per cent to 42 per cent, while decreasing the chances
of losing from 32 per cent to 19 per cent. A single red card costs a team
0.42 expected points, while changing where a match takes place from
home pitch to away costs a team 0.43 expected points. Having a man
sent off is roughly the same as giving your opponent home advantage.6
Removing your weakest link entirely, then, hiding him in the safety of
the dressing room, is simply not a risk worth taking. But would it work
to play him in a position where he can do the least damage?
Traditionally, there has only been one place where poor players are
stationed: right and left back, the Elbas of the pitch. Jonathan Wilson
describes Gianluca Vialli’s theory that ‘the right back is always the worst
player on the team’, because the good defenders are moved into the
centre, the good ball-players are moved into midfield and the left-footers
are so rare that they have to be nurtured.7 Simon Kuper, on the other
hand, believes that ‘nobody cares about left-backs’. His example is
Roberto Carlos, one of Real Madrid’s galácticos, who ‘passed largely
unnoticed until the age of twenty-four’.8
Perhaps, years ago, a manager would have been able to get away with
hiding his worst player at full back, but with the rise of video analysis,
extensive scouting and a more intensive pace of the game, it seems
unlikely that a team could conceal a weak link for long. Look at Arsenal,
who saw Gaël Clichy, their left back, endure a horrible period of form in
the second half of the 2009/10 season. When he faced Manchester
United in a home fixture at the end of January, a match the visitors won
3–1, he was tortured by the pace and power of Nani, the visitors’
Portuguese winger. This was no accident: Michael Cox of the tactics
website Zonal Marking noticed that United’s goalkeeper, Edwin van der
Sar, had placed the vast majority of his goal kicks towards the area
patrolled by Clichy (Figure 46).9
Arsenal couldn’t hide Clichy and had to counteract United’s targeted
bombardment. William Gallas, the central defender, edged left to cover
his full back. Cesc Fábregas and Samir Nasri dropped further back to
add support.10 This is what we would call the ‘finger-in-the-dam
solution’: you improvise and reinforce the weak spot with whatever
materials you have on hand. This is the second option open to a
manager: if you have a weak link, get your other players to help him
out.
Figure 46 Passes made by goalkeeper Edwin van der Sar for Manchester United against
Arsenal in January 2010
José Mourinho might lay claim to being the greatest manager in the
world. The Portuguese is just one of three men in history to win the
European Cup with two different clubs, and the only man to do so in the
competition’s Champions League era. He is one of only four coaches to
win league titles in four different countries, and he is the only man on
both lists. Whether it was at FC Porto in his homeland, at Chelsea, at
Internazionale or at Real Madrid, like him or loathe him, Mourinho has
a golden touch.
But then so does Sir Alex Ferguson. He’s picked up twelve Premier
League titles in his time at Manchester United, as well as two
Champions League trophies, five FA Cups, four League Cups, the
European Cup Winners’ Cup and the Fifa World Club Cup. He has
remained in place at England’s largest club for more than a quarter of a
century. Surely that durability must count for something, putting him
ahead of the bright, but brief, flame that is Mourinho?
In that case, maybe Jimmy Davies should be considered for the title.
That’s right, not Carlos Bianchi, who forged one of the finest teams of
the modern age at Boca Juniors, or Pep Guardiola, inspiration behind
Barcelona’s domination in recent years, or Marcello Lippi, World Cup
winner with Italy and Champions League winner with Juventus, or
Vicente del Bosque, who managed the same trick with Spain and Real
Madrid, or Fabio Capello, or Marcelo Bielsa or Arsène Wenger or any of
the other usual contenders. When it comes to longevity, none of them
are a patch on Jimmy Davies, the manager of Waterloo Dock AFC, a
non-league team on Merseyside.
Davies has all the hallmarks of a great manager. He’s a straight-talker,
unafraid to tell his players when they’ve underperformed. He’s a micro-
manager in the truest sense: he makes sure the corner flags are correctly
planted, his squad’s shirts hung neatly on their pegs, and he fills in the
team-sheet himself. The method obviously works: he’s won twenty-eight
cups in his time at Waterloo Dock, as well as twenty-one league titles,
including five straight between 2007 and 2011. He is, by his own
admission, a nurturer of talent. ‘Some of the finest footballers on
Merseyside have passed through our ranks. Our list of honours bears
witness to this ability. The future players of today and tomorrow have a
tremendous task ahead of them if they are to emulate the feats of their
predecessors. For our part we never fail to remind them of our history
and the expectations we place upon them.’1
He is also the longest-serving manager in the illustrious history of the
Football Association. He has been in charge at Waterloo Dock for fifty
years; he has a quarter of a century on even Ferguson, the standard-
bearer for gnarled and wizened old masters.
Before we dismiss the minor-league manager’s case out of hand in
favour of Ferguson, consider the similarities: the burden of a glorious
history, the demand for results, man management across a wide
generation gap. Of course Davies has not had to deal with major-league
pressure: the relentless media attention, the superstar egos and the
constant challenge to his primacy that Ferguson has endured at Old
Trafford. But then Ferguson has not had to put up with the travails of
minor management: a crippling lack of budget, empty stands, an ego-
shattering dearth of attention and the loss of his best players to overtime
shifts in their full-time jobs.
Given these vastly different environments, it can seem impossible to
compare managers. What might Davies have done had he been given the
chance at Manchester United? Would Ferguson have coped with the
rigours of coaching a team, never mind hand-washing the kits, while
buried deep in England’s non-league pyramid?
This issue raises its head with enormous frequency across the world.
The manager’s position is totemic, and with good reason. In his hands
rest most of those decisions that can influence that part of a team’s
fortunes not determined by luck. He must decide how to handle the
weak links, he must strike a balance between the light of attack and the
dark of defence, he must find a way to cope with football’s
multitudinous and glorious inefficiencies. He must secure as many of
those beautiful, rare goals as possible. He is cast as the modern major
general, the centre of power in football’s galaxy.
And yet there is no universal measure to assess how good he is at his
job. Is it tenure? Is it cups or titles? Is it the undying support of fans?
One strong answer is that there is no universal measure: who the best
manager is does not matter, because the manager himself is irrelevant.
This modern opinion on leadership declares that the manager has all the
significance of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Major General Stanley and all the
impact of a stuffed teddy bear. That is to say: none. Before arguing over
the qualities that make for an excellent manager, we have to establish
whether leaders – Mourinho, Ferguson, or Davies – matter at all in the
first place.2
For the past decade in the Premier League, wages explain 81 per cent
of the variation in average final position. That’s a little lower than Kuper
and Szymanski’s figure, but that could be explained by using different
years, or because they chose to include the Championship. The message
is clear: if you pay better you do better.
Before the anti-cultists scent victory and wheel out the guillotine,
though, there are several problems. First, according to our calculations,
the scraps for managers to influence seem to be nearer 19 per cent. Still
not much, maybe, but at least better than the relatively paltry 11 per
cent offered by Kuper and Szymanski.
The second problem we see is that clubs that pay their players more
also tend to pay their managers more – the wages data include
managerial salaries, not just those of players – so it’s plausible that
better managers also end up with better clubs.13 Bolton can’t hire José
Mourinho or Guus Hiddink; Chelsea won’t appoint Sammy Lee. The
correlation between club wage spending and managerial talent may not
be perfect, but it is unlikely to be zero.
The third issue is that player wage data are not pure measures of
players’ ability; they are also measures of managers’ coaching and
scouting skills. Like a team, a player is the product of his parts: not just
his inherent talent, but all the work that has gone into honing it from a
succession of coaches, what he has learned from his teammates, all of it.
A player’s ability – a key factor in determining how much money he
earns – includes the input of his current coach, and all the coaches he’s
ever been with. Add in the fact that it may well have been his current
manager who plucked him off the transfer market, and suddenly the role
of the mister is not quite so irrelevant.
So credit for the very strong correlation between wage spending and
league finish must be shared with the managers, who are an intrinsic
part of finding and developing the best players.14 Moreover when the
decade-long numbers are sliced into individual seasons, the power of the
paymaster starts to weaken.15 According to Sue Bridgewater from
Warwick University, the average tenure of football managers in England
has dropped from over three years to less than a year and a half over the
past two decades.16 When clubs have half a dozen managers over a
period of ten years, it is probably more useful to see what the connection
is between wages and league position for this year and the next rather
than over an entire decade. Managers are concerned with the here and
now.
And when we look at the year-on-year figures (Figure 50), a very
different picture emerges.
There is still a strong positive correlation between paying top wages
and finishing high in the Premier League, but the rule is not that simple.
There are plenty of clubs below the regression line – these are clubs that
do worse than their wage bill – and above – the clubs that outperform
their salary tab in any given season. Over the course of a single
campaign, the amount of variation in league position explained by
relative wages drops from 81 per cent to 59 per cent. There is a lot
more room for immediate managerial influence; the Great Men are no
longer condemned to fighting over the scraps; accountants, push the
guillotine back out of the square.
Football is a game of balance, of light and dark. Whether it is in
choosing between attack and defence, winning or not losing or
prioritizing whether to keep the ball or not to give it back, it is a sport
defined by choices. Much of it – as much as half – is decided by fortune,
cruel or kind, but there is a substantial part of it that is not, that is
influenced by human endeavour. Some of that is players’ skill. Some of it
is managerial ability. It is these men who make the choices that
determine a club’s fate, or at least determine that part of a club’s fate
which cannot be attributed to luck.
Figure 50 Wages and league position, Premier League, 2001/02–2010/11 (year on year)
If ever there was a season that encapsulated the varying impact a bad
manager and a good manager can have on a football club, it must be the
roller-coaster experienced by Chelsea, vintage 2011 to 2012.
Ever since Roman Abramovich took charge there, Stamford Bridge has
provided the backdrop for English football’s most captivating costume
drama. It has been home to some of the game’s most enthralling
characters, with a heady mix of heroism, villainy and scheming, with a
few power plays thrown in for good measure. The cast has been so rich
and the twists so jaw-dropping that Shakespeare would have been proud.
In the Russian oligarch overseeing it all, there’s even the perfect deus ex
machina to resolve the knottiest of tangles.
The months between June 2011 and May 2012 were pretty
impressive even by Chelsea’s standards. The season started with
Abramovich appointing as manager André Villas-Boas, the thirty-three-
year-old coach of FC Porto. He had worked at Chelsea before, under his
now estranged mentor José Mourinho, before embarking on his own
managerial career. He had, like Mourinho, found himself at Porto,
where, like Mourinho, he had achieved considerable success in very
short order. He was hailed by no less an authority than Gabriele
Marcotti, the respected European sports journalist, as ‘Portugal’s boy
genius’.1 He seemed a natural fit for Chelsea: one of the most promising
coaches in the world, with an added soupçon of the homecoming of the
prodigal son.
Villas-Boas promised exciting, attacking football, overhauling
Chelsea’s reputation for dour, mechanized, heartless efficiency. He
would provide the scintillating style that Abramovich longed for. And he
would do it all with far more humility than Mourinho, the self-
proclaimed Special One, could ever have managed.
Except it didn’t work out like that. After eight and a half months, with
Chelsea exiled from the top four of the Premier League and after a 3–1
first leg defeat in the last sixteen of the Champions League against
Napoli, Abramovich felt he had no option but to dismiss the boy prince.
He had enjoyed just 256 days in charge. Richard Bevan, Chief Executive
of the League Managers Association, said the next man to take over
would find himself walking into ‘hell’.2
Not quite. Roberto Di Matteo, Villas-Boas’s assistant and a former
player at the club, took charge for the final three months of the season.
He led the very same players whom Villas-Boas had so alienated to
victory in the FA Cup against Liverpool, guided them past Napoli,
Benfica and the mighty Barcelona to reach the Champions League final,
and there, in Munich, against Bayern, he won the trophy that
Abramovich had craved for a decade.
Bad managers fail, good managers succeed. The only changing factor
in Chelsea’s season was the identity of the man in the dugout.
Everything else was constant. History will record that Chelsea made a
mistake in appointing Villas-Boas and only drew back on course when
they sacked him.
Knowing what we now know, though, about fortune’s role in football,
about the fleeting nature of possession and the importance of weak links,
maybe that assessment is too harsh or insufficiently analytical. There is
only a certain amount of influence – perhaps just 15 per cent – a
manager can have. Thankfully, just as the numbers can help a manager
choose the right path, they can also help a club choose the right
manager. Not only that, they can guide them as to how to make sure
their choices are successful.
Andrew Friedman, general manager of the Tampa Bay Rays, a club
we’ve seen are at the forefront of analytics, says his club always ‘post-
mortem’ decisions at a later date. ‘We keep copious notes on the
variables we knew, everything we knew going in,’ he says. ‘Then we go
back and look at it to review the process. It’s something we’re
continuing to refine and will be in perpetuity. I hope to never get to the
point where we’re content, or we feel great about everything and go into
autopilot mode.’3
Perhaps it is time to apply the same logic to the appointment of
football managers. And what better case study, what better post-
mortem, than the boy wonder who flew too close to the sun?
Groysberg has proven that his principle, unlike free agents themselves,
Groysberg has proven that his principle, unlike free agents themselves,
transfers easily to other fields, even sport. In American football the
punter has just one job. When teams (incorrectly, remember) choose to
punt on fourth down, he receives the ball from the snap and is tasked
with booting it as far down the field as he can. Wide receivers, on the
other hand, are part of a unit: they run in patterns, coordinating with
the quarterback, adjusting to the opposition’s defence on the fly.
Groysberg found that the performance of free-agent punters, who are
literally standalone players, does not decline after switching teams, but
the key statistics of the receivers dropped for a full year after signing
with a new team. In football there are no true standalone players –
goalkeepers come closest, but even they must interact with their defence
– so we must expect a period of adjustment.
In Chasing Stars, Groysberg recommends that, to minimize these
effects, companies or clubs do their best to promote from within.15
Where they cannot, they must have a systematic plan to add only those
outsiders who fit the culture and who are then assimilated deliberately
and carefully into the team. He writes, ‘Hire with care but integrate
deliberately and fast.’
This does not seem to occur to football clubs. Until very recently, very
few of them employed specialists to help players settle in off the field,
often leaving them to find their own homes and trail round schools to
sort out the children’s education. At Chelsea, too, there was a culture of
leaving new players to get on with it.
‘I plunged into problems linked to my situation as an expatriate,’
Drogba, Torres’s predecessor, wrote in his autobiography. ‘Chelsea
didn’t necessarily help me. We sometimes laughed about it with Gallas,
Makélelé, Kezman, Geremi. “You too, you’re still living in a hotel?”
After all these worries, I didn’t feel like integrating.’16
This can be helped by executing what is known in the corporate world
as a ‘lift-out’: hiring a star and some of his teammates. Groysberg found
that top analysts brought into a new company alongside several co-
workers experienced no decline in performance. Chelsea did this in
hiring Mourinho – four staff, including Villas-Boas, followed him from
Porto, as well as two players – but did not repeat the trick when they
appointed his young protégé seven years later. Villas-Boas brought just
two staff with him. His assistant, Roberto Di Matteo, having left
Chelsea’s playing staff some nine years earlier, was to all intents also
new, acclimatizing. No wonder Villas-Boas did not feel comfortable.
Nor did Torres, despite joining his former teammate Yossi Benayoun
at Stamford Bridge and quickly being reunited with Raul Meireles, too.
That is not enough. Mourinho had six familiar faces around him. Maybe
he, and not his former protégé, should have referred to himself as the
Group One.
November 2011 saw the UK’s first Sports Analytics conference, styled
after the MIT Sloan conference in Boston. Held at Manchester
University’s Business School, the gathering was a relatively small, less
glamorous affair than its American cousin. There were around 150 in
attendance, drawn largely from football and rugby clubs, with a couple
of Olympic sports thrown in. There were scouts, performance analysts,
consultants and executives, but there were also a few managers and
owners.
Phil Clarke, a star of the all-conquering Wigan Rugby League team of
the 1990s and one-time Great Britain captain, is behind the endeavour,
together with his brother Andy, formerly a fitness coach at Liverpool.
The Clarke brothers, with a growing number of others, have recognized
that sport is changing, and they have realized that with change comes
opportunity. They have a company called The Sports Office, which helps
clubs organize their in-house performance, administration, scheduling,
medical, training, conditioning and scouting data.
The football data business is becoming competitive; similar companies
are sprouting up around the world of professional sports. There’s a need
and a hunger for information – or rather, how to cope with information
– but few have a plan for how to use it. One of the best-received
presentations at the conference was by Tesco’s Retailing Director,
Andrew Higginson, on how Tesco mined its data to become number one.
Analysts from football clubs listened intently – they all want to be
number one – and as we have tried to explain in the chapters above,
every little helps.
What we know already can give us a hint as to where the analytics
reformation is heading over the next decade. This is our forecast for the
journey that football and all those in it are about to take in the next ten
years. We can never be certain, and some of our predictions will be
wrong, but they are based on the best research and information that we
have now.
Forecast 1
The biggest analytical breakthroughs will not occur at Manchester
United, Manchester City, Real Madrid, Barcelona or any of the twenty
richest clubs listed in Deloitte’s Football Money League.
Forecast 2
The football analytics movement will not feature a singular ‘Bill James’.
Bill James and Charles Reep, for their personalities and their obsessions,
were the perfect candidates to try to bring about fundamental shifts in
the understanding of their chosen sports.
True innovations rarely spring from individuals inside the clubhouse.
Outsiders can ask questions, they can query how things are done, and
they see opportunities insiders don’t. Because outsiders working in
obscurity cannot be influenced very easily by those who don’t know
about them or those who don’t believe in them, they can be the avant-
garde – and a certain stubbornness and a huge amount of discipline and
dedication will go a long way.
Where James and Reep differ is in their level of success: James was
eventually hired by the Boston Red Sox in 2003, the year before they
won the World Series for the first time since 1918. It was quite a leap
for a man who, in 1977, had simply published a seemingly insignificant
statistical pamphlet. By the time he joined the Sox, James’s approach
had been vindicated and imitated all around Major League Baseball, and
in the next four years, the club would win two championships.
Reep, too, was brought inside the clubhouse, working as an analyst for
Brentford and Wolves, among others, but his transformation of the
English game was associated with too few cups and championships to be
considered a real success. That may be because of his own personal
limitations, the quality of his data or deep differences between the
sports of baseball and football. Whatever the true reason, Manchester
City believe he fell short because of his limitations and those of his
numbers: that is what led the club’s match analysts, in the autumn of
2012 and with the support of Opta Sports, to take the unprecedented
step of releasing an entire season’s worth of match data to anyone with
an email account who asked for it.
As Gavin Fleig, City’s Head of Performance Analysis, explained to
Simon Kuper: ‘It’s play by play, player by player, game by game, week
in week out. I want our industry to find a Bill James. Bill James needs
data, and whoever the Bill James of football is, he doesn’t have the data
because it costs money.’2
City’s idea is well intentioned, but the idea of using crowds of
analytics-minded fans to find ‘Bill James’ in the style of The X Factor
may not work. The reasons are simple: Moneyball is already a
Hollywood movie and everyone knows about it; more importantly, there
is no analytical wilderness to explore. The Football Accountant has
already left his footprints there. There is no undiscovered country in
football’s numbers as there was when James ‘solved’ baseball by
inventing ‘Runs Created’ and ‘Win Shares’.
Reep’s failure also proves that the game is too fluid, contingent and
dynamic for there to be a single winning formula discovered by a single
great football mind. Instead, the multiple smaller insights generated by
many will move the game forward.
Forecast 3
The volume of football data will increase by at least thirty-two times.
Reep had a lot more to tackle than James. At least the American had
more than a century’s worth of baseball box scores to work with,
published in all American newspapers. Reep had to create the raw data
of a match, and once he had done so, he had to store it on rolls of
wallpaper.
As we have seen, Opta and StatDNA have partially computerized the
gathering of football’s numbers by employing analysts to code events
from digital video of matches, while Prozone let cameras do the job for
them. Together they have eliminated all traces of notebooks and paper
from the storage of the numbers; today they are all in digital files. There
is no reason to suppose that the leap from Reep’s method to Opta’s or
Prozone’s won’t be matched by a similar leap in the coming decade.
It is a characteristic of the modern world of Big Data that if a number
can be gathered, it will be, as cheaply and with as little human
intervention as possible. The result of this hoarding is an explosion in
the amount of data. According to The New York Times,
There is a lot more data, all the time, growing at 50 per cent a year, or more than
doubling every two years, estimates IDC, a technology research firm. It’s not just more
streams of data, but entirely new ones. There are now countless digital sensors
worldwide in industrial equipment, automobiles, electrical meters and shipping crates
… Data is not only becoming more available but also more understandable to
computers. Most of the Big Data surge is data in the wild – unruly stuff like words,
images and video on the Web and those streams of sensor data.3
Few things are more unruly than a football match with twenty-two
players and a ball in almost constant motion (except for those Stoke
games). There are two different ways in which more of the pitch’s
numbers could be gathered more cheaply. First, those same sensors we
just mentioned. It’s only a matter of time before players’ kits and the
ball itself will be fitted with GPS chips. The technology exists, and clubs
are already experimenting with it in training. It may not come in the
Premier League or the Bundesliga first; Brazil’s Serie A or the US’s MLS
may be the ones to start. In fact, MLS has already partnered with sports
equipment manufacturer Adidas to collect physical data through chips
implanted in players’ boots. This will produce a huge stream of
positional data, and the chip in the ball will eventually obviate the need
for goal-line video technology.
Some governing bodies will probably resist such advances, but the
second means of gathering these data may make their resistance futile –
crowd sourcing. Imagine, instead of Prozone’s installed and fixed set of
cameras which are very expensive, a handful of spectators scattered
about the stadium with cameras embedded in their hats, scarves, or
coats. As they watch the match, they record the action, and these video
streams are later integrated and decoded through advanced software.
Right now computers have a hard time distinguishing one player from
another when they cross paths in a video, but soon they will have no
more difficulty than the spectators.
As the cost of collecting football data plummets, more players in more
matches in more leagues in more countries will be tracked. It’s possible
that our evergreen friend Jimmy Davies of Waterloo Dock may even
begin to have access to computerized match reports. The surge in
football’s numbers will become a tidal wave, multiplying and doubling
over this decade at least as fast as data in the world.
Forecast 4
Geometry – space, vectors, triangles and dynamic lattices – will be the
focus of many analytical advances.
With the growing availability of positioning data and x–y coordinates for
players and ball, analysts will be able to employ the mathematical tools
of algebraic geometry and network theory to gain more insights into the
game. The focus will move away from the ball and the counting of the
‘ball events’ that Reep first started collecting in his notebooks. Statistical
attention will shift to players away from the ball, the clusters they form,
the spaces they enclose and the way the ball and information move
about the network they compose.
For this new stage of the reformation, Dynamo Kiev’s Valeriy
Lobanovskyi, with his interests in systems and space, will be recognized
as a numbers game pioneer. Inspired by seeing the manager’s bronze
statue outside his eponymous stadium in Kiev during Euro 2012, Barney
Ronay writes: ‘He addressed football management as a wide-ranging
empirical study, seeking informed scientific deduction about the more
nebulous folk-football wisdom of his dugout contemporaries. For [him]
the distillation of eleven competing blobs on a pulsing pre-modern
computer grid appears to have also contained thrilling human variables,
an applied chemistry to be grasped by study and fine adjustment.’4
The Ukrainian moved the grid from the computer to the pitch. He
rigorously trained his players to perform like kinged pieces in draughts
that could and would hop in any direction from square to square based
on the movements of the other pieces. Although his club’s play could
sometimes be mechanical, it could also be incredibly effective as
uncovered spaces, weak links and mistakes were minimized, and the
imbalances of the opponent’s defence were exploited. Positioning data
will enable these ‘draughty’ practices and tactics to become more chess-
like – sophisticated, creative and improvised.
When we look across the various sports, we can make a conjecture
about the essential geometrical figure for analysis. Baseball is a game of
ten points, a batter, a pitcher, a catcher and seven fielders, that are
largely static, consistently positioned and rarely connected. Basketball,
with its emphasis on the pick-and-roll, feeding a tall post player and the
simple give-and-go, is a single, stretching and shrinking line segment
connecting the two focal offensive players at any time during the game.
Football, as a more complex team game without a form of real
possession, is largely about triangles. One such triangle might be the
player currently touching the ball, the one about to receive it, and the
off-ball player currently causing the greatest deformation in the
defence’s shape. Triangles might replace ‘ball events’ as the key unit of
football analysis.
The use of networks to construct interacting webs of players and
formations is already infiltrating the sport. Some of these efforts have
already begun to identify the players that are central or peripheral to the
passing network of a team on the pitch. One recent study using Premier
League data for two seasons beginning in 2006 found that teams whose
passing networks were more centralized in one or two players scored
fewer goals, even though these central players may have been the
strongest players in the club.5 Once again, balance, this time in the
complex passing network, is a quality leading to success.
Forecast 5
There will be about 1,000 goals scored in the Premiership in both 2013
and 2023.
The power of numbers and of the models you can use lies in having
many data points. Once we go from the specific – a pass, a match, or a
player – to a bigger group – all passes, all matches, or all players – we
can see patterns that are hidden when our nose is too close to the action.
There are two key issues the numbers game has to contend with: that
football is defined by chance and by rarity. Chance, luck, randomness –
not skill – accounts for much and possibly most of what happens in
football. And the rarity of goals contributes hugely to that.
Goals have become rarer until, in recent years, they have levelled off
at the same time as the game has become more equal on the pitch.
Despite complaints about football being taken over by the super-rich,
the data show us that football’s long-term trend is towards ever fiercer
competition. In the modern era everyone’s more alike.
And at the very top, football production is the same. The best players
seem to be interchangeable across leagues. This matters for how and
where clubs recruit talent. If the very best English players play football
the same way the best Argentines do, then recruiting in Buenos Aires
may sound glamorous but may not be particularly cost-effective
compared to recruiting in Bristol, Leicester, or Preston. The sport in
England and across the globe has settled into a competitive equilibrium.
Goals are wonderfully rare, but they will not get any rarer.
Forecast 6
The gap between the salaries and transfer fees of strikers and defenders
and goalkeepers will shrink significantly.
Goals may not be the most reliable performance metric. When a team
can do all the right things and can still end up losing, goals are not the
best gauge of whether they played well.
Once you realize the power of chance and the value of a single goal
for your team’s fortunes, a few conclusions tumble out fairly easily.
While football has always been enamoured with goals that are scored
and victories celebrated, it has paid much less attention to goals that
weren’t conceded or losses that were averted. There are powerful human
tendencies that explain this, but for budding performance analysts it
means that, to fully grasp the nature of the game, we need to value
defence properly. It is as important – and on occasion more important –
than attack.
Understanding this has one very simple implication, one that will only
be reinforced by the flood of new numbers: the salaries and transfer fees
for defenders and strikers will become less skewed. As of today, the
opposite trend still appears to hold. Using transfer costs from Paul
Tomkins, Graeme Riley and Gary Fulcher’s Pay As You Play: The True
Price of Success in the Premier League Era to calculate the relative value
of different positions over the 1992/93 to 2009/10 period, the data
show goalkeepers to be the cheapest position, with prices rising in
increments as we move further up the pitch. Importantly, there does not
appear to have been any narrowing of the gap in the cost of goalkeepers
and defenders on one hand and strikers on the other. The ratio of striker
to defender prices was 1.5 in the five seasons from 1992/93 to
1996/97, but 1.65 in the period 2005/06 to 2009/10.6
Forecast 7
The 4–4–2 will be replaced by the 150–4–4–2; organization will be the
new tactics.
As Johan Cruyff knew, playing football with your brain allows you to
outwit your opponent by thinking ahead a step or two or three. Football
has always evolved with the times – albeit in fits and starts – and
ultimately there has never been a way of halting its progression. The ball
remains round. The game is played in more far-flung parts of the world
by more people than ever before, by both sexes and on better pitches,
with better equipment, by professionals who train to maximize their
performance with the help of the latest knowledge in medicine, nutrition
and computer science. As fans, we don’t always see these changes at
work – we don’t watch players train, we know little about what they
eat, or how they are monitored with modern technology. All we tend to
see is what happens when the whistle blows.
But it’s clear football analytics is continuing to infiltrate the game and
change how managers, players, fans and executives think. So it’s never
been a question of whether analytics will be coming, but how clubs can
best adapt to win.
The use of analytics has relatively little to do with specific statistics on
players or teams. Analytics does not equal statistics; playing the
numbers game is not really about numbers first and foremost. Instead
it’s a mindset and an information game – how much and what kind of
football information clubs have; how they look at it, interpret it; and
ultimately, what they do with it. There is no single truth; but there is an
advantage you can gain by being smart about the information you use.
As the sourcing of players has become a global pursuit, with scouts
and coaches scouring all corners for undervalued talent, the raw input
clubs work with has become more similar. This convergence of the raw
material of players at the top of the game and the worldwide diffusion of
training and playing practices means that what will differentiate clubs
will be their organization: which clubs and teams can organize
themselves most effectively and figure out ways to try the new,
unexpected and untested path to success. The history of innovation in
football has been the history of tactics: better ways of organizing players
in space and countering the opposition. But tactics is, at the core, about
organizing your whole team – on and off the pitch – to maximum
effectiveness.
When clubs are less differentiated with regard to their input – the
quality of players recruited globally – football will become more of a
team activity than simply the starting XI on the field. Instead all parts
that help produce winning football on the pitch – the 150 or so coaches,
nutritionists, physiologists, match analysts, scouts, you name it – will
come into play more than ever before. And those clubs that function as
teams of capable and willing learners, that can adapt to excel from week
to week or minute to minute, will win out.
Flexible adaptation is the name of the game, be it with regard to the
introduction of new technologies or countering an opponent’s game plan
on the fly.
Forecast 8
The current crop of absolutist managers are a dying breed. Once Sir Alex
Ferguson retires, all large clubs will have a General Manager/Sporting
Director – if not in name, then in function.
Does all this mean the end of former players who become managers,
Does all this mean the end of former players who become managers,
to be replaced by geeks? Is this a moment of transition in football’s long
and glorious history, from the dictatorship of the manager to the unruly
democracy of clubs run by vociferous fans and bench-warming
malcontents?
We suspect not. Instead, it will become a more even partnership where
managers are put in their place and become more cooperative team
players in the club. Instead of being handed a transfer kitty to spend and
facing accountability only when things go wrong, they will be forced to
become part of the club’s financial and organizational management. The
new model of the modern manager will be Joe Maddon of baseball’s
Tampa Bay Rays.
What’s needed is information and intelligence – managers that have
both and know how to use them will succeed. There is every reason to
believe that no manager of a top-flight club will be in sole command of
football operations in ten years’ time; rather, he will have an equal
partner. This model is already popular in continental Europe, where the
majority of clubs in Spain, Germany and Italy all employ Sporting
Directors. Men like Monchi at Sevilla have forged reputations as masters
of the market; some are former players – Matthias Sammer and Christian
Nerlinger at Bayern Munich, or Marc Overmars at Ajax – while others
have come from the back-room to work in recruitment.
Once Ferguson and Wenger have retired, the age of the absolutists will
be at an end.
Forecast 9
Just because a club does not play the numbers game will not preclude it
from enjoying success; analytics will help you win, but so will money.
One might think that the flood of numbers alone and organizational
changes will overwhelm all opposition to football analytics, but that
would be to ignore the history of both innovation and revolution. Within
ten years of the French Revolution, Danton and Robespierre were both
dead, and Napoleon was the head of state.
The number of technical staff has grown throughout the game and
across leagues, while top-flight clubs all over the world have invested in
match-analysis software coupled with video; some even use in-game
software, like SportsCode. Clubs now have technical scouts like
Hamburg’s Steven Houston, men who scour the numbers before making
a signing; they have sports and performance scientists like Paris Saint-
Germain’s Nick Broad or Lille’s Chris Carling; they have match analysts
like Everton’s Steve Brown.
Mobile devices and the internet have made the wall between clubs and
the rest of the world more permeable. A community of bloggers has
developed who use the internet to conduct their own analyses and some,
like Onfooty.com’s Sarah Rudd or Omar Chaudhuri from
5addedminutes.com have become professionally associated with the
game – in Rudd’s case with StatDNA and in Chaudhuri’s case Prozone.
This is exactly what we should expect, Houston told us. His own
experience working in basketball for the Houston Rockets of the NBA
taught him that bloggers with analytical skills commonly ended up
running the numbers for teams. As Bill James himself admitted in an
interview with ESPN’s Bill Simmons at the MIT conference, if the
internet had existed in his time, he probably would have been a blogger.
These developments are exciting if you’re into playing the numbers
game from a sofa in your living room or in the club’s front office. But
this doesn’t mean the picture is uniformly rosy. There are plenty of
sceptics and pessimists within football, wishing these ideas would simply
go away. As Real Madrid’s Jorge Valdano explained in an interview with
the German magazine Der Spiegel:
You see, in my eyes, the pitch is a jungle. And what happens in that jungle has hardly
changed over the past one hundred years. The thoughts that flash through a striker’s
mind today as he bears down on goal are the same ones that Maradona, Pelé and Di
Stefano had in their day. What has changed is what surrounds the jungle. A revolution
has taken place there, an industry has sprung up. We need to protect the jungle, to
defend it from civilization and all of its rules. Civilization should be kept out of the
game: Keep off the grass!7
Forecast 10
The reformation of the counters will in turn be countered.
The old guard never goes without a fight, as Dean Oliver, basketball’s
numbers guru, knows. The author of Basketball on Paper and the first
full-time statistical analyst in the NBA, Oliver worked for the Seattle
Supersonics and the Denver Nuggets, both teams in a sport and a
country where fans are familiar with and hungry for statistics. And even
he told us that it was hard for analytics to find a true, permanent and
accepted place inside clubs. Short-term pressures are too great and egos
too big; those already in situ are too territorial. So Oliver left. Today, he
is ESPN’s Director of Production Analytics – shaping fans’ knowledge
and thinking about numbers across sport.
Football hasn’t yet had its Moneyball moment, and whether it will is
still an open question – basketball or American football or ice hockey
haven’t either. Whatever barriers Oliver encountered in American
basketball are nothing compared to the walls that loom in football.
Tradition is a potent impediment to anyone trying to introduce new
ideas to clubs, trying to encourage their employers to play the numbers
game.
As StatDNA’s CEO Jaeson Rosenfeld explained to us: ‘There is a
system in place, existing power structures, ways that things have been
done that need to adapt. That doesn’t happen overnight. There are a lot
of barriers; they have seen what happened at Liverpool, so they say,
hey, Moneyball doesn’t work in soccer. Humanity has figured out how to
analyse more complex things than football. You never have an
immediate success case. The things we’re analysing now, it’ll take a long
time to figure out if we’re right, and when someone does it, it’ll take
time to see if it’s right. Once there’s a bona fide success, they’ll rush in.’
1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytics
2. Simon Kuper, ‘A Football Revolution’, Financial Times, 17 June 2011;
www.ft.com/cms/s/2/9471db52-97bb-11e0-9c37-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qzPfmj6H
3. Matt Lawton, ‘Roberto Martínez – The Man Who Shook Up the Season’, Daily Mail, 20 April
2012.
4. Globe and Mail (Toronto), Friday 13 May 2011.
5. Cited in Lyons (1997).
6. Pollard and Reep (1997), p. 542.
7. The origins of academic statistical analysis of football data date back a bit further, to another
Englishman, by the name of Michael Moroney, whose 1951 book Facts from Figures
included an analysis of the numbers of goals scored in 480 games in English football to
understand if they follow predictable patterns (Brillinger, 2010).
8. Simon Kuper, ‘A Football Revolution’, Financial Times, 17 June
2011;www.ft.com/cms/s/2/9471db52-97bb-11e0-9c37-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1qzPfmj6H
9. See the Journal of Sports Sciences, October 2002, special issue on performance analysis, for
an overview of how the field has evolved. For more insight into match performance analysis
and match analysis, see also Reilly and Thomas (1976), Larsen (2001), McGarry and Franks
(2003), and Hughes (2003).
10. Ayton and Braennberg (2008). Focusing on 1–1 ties eliminates those instances where a very
weak team happens to score first and then is overwhelmed by a more powerful squad. The
ideal experiment would be cloned squads of equal talent where there was a triggering goal
by one side to see how the other side responded (that is, when the only difference between
the squads is the fact of the goal itself).
11. Vialli and Marcotti (2006), p. 155.
12. On average, the teams in the sample took 5.4 corners per match, consistent with the long
run average of 5.5, and the clubs earned between 4 and 6 corners in the average match.
Shots and goals created from this particular match situation are defined here as occurring
within three touches of a corner.
13. There also is considerable variation across clubs on this. At the low end, some of the very
best clubs in the league managed relatively few shots – about 1 to 1.5 in 10 – relative to the
number of corners they produced. In contrast, some of the worst teams in the league
produced a relatively high number of shots in the aftermath of corners (Chelsea were the
exception), at a rate of 1 in 4 or even 1 in 3 (West Ham and Stoke).
Chapter 1. Riding Your Luck
1. Press Association, ‘World Cup Final: Johan Cruyff Hits Out at “Anti-football” Holland’,
Guardian, 12 July 2010; www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/12/world-cup-final-johan-
cruyff-holland
2. Christian Spiller, ‘Der Fußball-Unfall’, Die Zeit, 20 May 2010; www.zeit.de/sport/2012–
05/champions-league-finale-chelsea-bayern
3. http://m.guardian.co.uk/ms/p/gnm/op/sBJPm4Z87eCd_ev4Q2pP53Q/view.m?
id=15&gid=football/blog/2012/may/20/roberto-di-matteo-roman-abramovich&cat=sport
4. www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Biographies/Bortkiewicz.html and
http://statprob.com/encyclopedia/LadislausVonBORTKIEWICZ.html
5. Poisson’s technique is still widely used by statisticians. In his book, Das Gesetz der kleinen
Zahlen (The Law of Small Numbers) (1898), Bortkiewicz constructs a Poisson distribution
for each corps and then sums over all the corps to get an even more accurate match between
actual and estimate.
6. For the statistically minded: let λ be the base rate, then the probability that the number of
1. Will Springer, ‘A Day When Scottish Football Scorched the Record Books’, The Scotsman, 9
December 2005;
www.scotsman.com/news/arts/a_day_when_scottish_football_scorched_the_record_
books_1_466092
2. Fraser Clyne, ‘Arbroath Legends’; www.arbroathfc.co.uk/history/36-0-team.htm
3. In 2010 the Ballon d’Or and the Fifa World Player of the Year were merged into one award.
4. Hughes and Bartlett (2002); see also Read and Edwards (1992).
5. Palacios-Huerta (2004).
6. Some leagues started later than others, and there were interruptions because of two world
wars, of course. For details, see Palacios-Huerta (2004), p. 244.
7. Colvin (2010), pp. 8, 9.
8. We are attempting to hold all other factors constant and focus just on the effect of greater
skill on goal scoring and goal prevention. If scoring declined greatly in the first tier due to,
for example, much more skilled goalkeepers, whose abilities are proportionally so much
greater than their fourth-tier counterparts now than they were half a century ago, then goals
– unsuccessful saves – should have declined much more in the top tier than the fourth tier.
9. Wilson (2009).
10. This is a quote attributed to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the father of the idea of convergent
evolution.
11. Galeano (2003), p. 209.
12. See Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2011). Aside from the exposure to civil war, we can of
course imagine a number of alternative explanations. Perhaps they have a more strongly
developed need to fight for a place in the starting XI, given the relative poverty of their
youth and the dependence of others on their income. We also should think about the role of
referees in all this. Assuming that referees are not immune to ethnic stereotypes, we can
imagine that refs call systematically more fouls on players from certain regions or with
certain visible characteristics. In the NBA, for example, more fouls are called on black players
than on white ones. On the topic of referee stereotyping of players in football, see Gallo,
Grund and Reade (2013).
1. Dilger and Geyer (2009). Two other papers came to similar conclusions: Garicano and
Palacios-Huerta (2005) examine a couple of years of Spanish football data while Brocas and
Carrillo (2004) build a game theory model.
2. Here are the values of points per goal. 0 goals: 0.28 points; 1 goal: 1.13 points; 2 goals:
2.12 points; 3 goals: 2.67 points; 4 goals: 2.90 points; 5 and more goals: 3 points.
3. An alternative would be to condition all these values on the actual match score at the time.
However, it is not clear why this would be a preferable analytic strategy since, logically, a
second goal is not more valuable than a first goal without which there wouldn’t be a second
goal. One more thing: of course, these are not just the individual players’ contributions –
they’re really the teams’ goals’ contributions – since no one player, save perhaps Lionel
Messi or Cristiano Ronaldo – can score unaided.
4. But remember that football isn’t linear; because goals are rare, first and second goals count
for a whole lot more than third and fourth goals. And remember too that averages can be
deceiving: a thirty-eight-goal total achieved by scoring a single goal in every match will
produce far more points than two matches with six goals in each, five with a brace, sixteen
with a single goal and fifteen with none.
5. Galeano (2003), p. 209.
6. Ibid., p. 1.
1. http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=372107&root=worldcup&cc=5739
2. Wilson (2009), p. 324. There are wonderful echoes, echoes that Menotti was probably quite
aware of, of the dismissive sentiments expressed by Jorge Luis Borges, Argentina’s foremost
writer and intellectual: ‘el fútbol es popular porque la estupidez es popular’ – football is
popular because stupidity is popular.
3. Wilson (2009), p. 324.
4. The scientific approach, also called logical positivism and closely associated with the thought
of Karl Popper, generally is about disconfirming hypotheses – showing things to be wrong –
rather than confirming them.
5. To allow for a fair comparison, we needed the same number of clubs (and possible points
earned) each year. We chose to analyse data only from 2000 because the number of clubs in
the Premier League fluctuated before this period.
6. Sid Lowe and Dominic Fifield, ‘Chelsea Play With Fear and Lack Courage, Claims
Barcelona’s Dani Alves’, Guardian, 17 April 2012;
http://m.guardian.co.uk/ms/p/gnm/op/sipkZkk3hVpje3RtcOrYA_w/view.m?
id=15&gid=football/2012/apr/16/dani-alves-chelsea-barcelona-fear&cat=football
7. Chris Mooney, ‘What Is Motivated Reasoning? How Does It Work? Dan Kahan Answers’,
7. Chris Mooney, ‘What Is Motivated Reasoning? How Does It Work? Dan Kahan Answers’,
Discover Magazine, 5 May 2011;
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/intersection/2011/05/05/what-is-motivated-reasoning-
how-does-it-work-dan-kahan-answers/
8. This tendency was recognized some 400 years ago by Sir Francis Bacon: ‘the human
understanding, once it has adopted an opinion, collects any instances that confirm it, and
though the contrary instances may be more numerous and more weighty, it either does not
notice them or else rejects them, in order that this opinion will remain unshaken’. This
particular psychological predisposition is called ‘confirmation bias’. See Bacon (1994
[1620]), p. 57.
9. Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky (1985).
10. Samuel McNerney, ‘Cognitive Biases in Sports: The Irrationality of Coaches, Commentators
and Fans’, Scientific American, 22 September 2011;
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2011/09/22/cognitive-biases-in-sports-the-
irrationality-of-coaches-commentators-and-fans/
11. Simon Kuper, ‘A Football Revolution’, Financial Times, 17 June
2011;www.ft.com/cms/s/2/9471db52-97bb-11e0-9c37-
00144feab49a.html#ixzz1tAmHkURd
12. Hearst (1991). See also Kelley (1972).
13. Dunning and Parpal (1989).
14. The Secret Footballer (2012), p. 91.
15. For the original study, see Treisman and Souther (1985).
16. Wilson, Wood and Vine (2009).
17. Binsch et al. (2010). See also Wegner (2009).
18. David Staples, ‘A Quick Conversation with Bill James, the Baseball Stats King, about Hockey
Stats’, Edmonton Journal, 30 March 2012;
http://blogs.edmontonjournal.com/2012/03/20/a-quick-conversation-with-bill-james-the-
baseball-stats-king-about-hockey-stats/
19. Quoted in Jonathan Wilson, ‘Get-Well Wishes to Argentina’s El Flaco Whose Football Moved
the World’, Guardian, 16 March 2011;
www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2011/mar/16/cesar-luis-menotti-argentina
1. More specifically, Kuper and Szymanski (2009) studied the wage spending of forty English
football clubs (relative to the average club) across the top two divisions of English football
between 1978 and 1997 to see how well spending on wages can explain (in a statistical
sense) differences in league position. According to their analyses, wages explain 92% of that
variation.
2. A good technical discussion of the importance of money – wages and transfers – and on-field
success can be found on the excellent Transfer Price Index website and the associated
analysis; e.g., see Zach Slaton, ‘A Comprehensive Model for Evaluating Total Team Valuation
(TTV)’; http://transferpriceindex.com/2012/05/ a-comprehensive-model-for-evaluating-
total-team-valuation-ttv/
3. http://swissramble.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/wigan-athletics-unlikely-survival.html
4. When we estimate a logistic regression of the odds of relegation using twenty years’ worth of
financial data and a club’s wage spend relative to the average in the league, and then plug
the odds for Wigan into the equation calculating the cumulative odds of relegation over five
years, we find that Wigan’s cumulative odds of being relegated over the course of the five
years are closer to 99%, and those of Manchester United are essentially zero.
5. Opta data show that the Latics were among the league leaders for making passes in their own
defensive third of the pitch – as frequently as some of the high-possession teams like Arsenal.
Of course, they didn’t play nearly as many passes as the Gunners in front of the other teams’
goals.
6. A ‘fast break’ is defined by Opta as follows: ‘If possession is won in the team’s defensive half
and within two passes the team is in the final third [of the opposition team’s half] and there
is a shot, the pattern of play is logged as a fast break (counter attack)’.
7. www.zonalmarking.net/2012/05/16/wigan-stay-up-after-a-switch-to-3-4-3/
8. Vialli and Marcotti (2006), p. 136.
9. Malcolm Gladwell, ‘How David Beats Goliath – When Underdogs Break the Rules’, The New
Yorker, 11 May 2009;
www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/11/090511fa_fact_gladwell
10. Ibid.
11. David Whitley, ‘ “Perception of Craziness” or Flat-out Football Genius?’, Sporting News, 30
September 2011; http://aol.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2011-09-30/perception-
of-craziness-or-flat-out-football-genius. See also Romer (2006).
12. Jeff Ma, ‘Belichick Was Right’; www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-ma/belichick-was-
right_b_358653.html
Chapter 8. O! Why a Football Team Is Like the Space Shuttle
1. Excluding goalies, whose possession of the ball while they wave their forwards forward or
gripe to their defenders about their defending and the insult of having to make a save, may
sometimes take a few per cent of the game.
2. Mathematically, with the multiplicative production function, the total might increase
because you’re no longer multiplying the product of the qualities of the best ten players by a
small fraction such as 65% or 43% that represents the weak link’s efficacy.
3. Robin van Persie’s red card for shooting after the whistle in Arsenal’s Champions League
match against Barcelona in 2010, a whistle he might not have heard over the 95,000
screaming fans, stands as a stark counter-example. There are, of course, others, but it
remains true that the worst players attract a bigger share of dismissals.
4. See Jaeson Rosenfeld of StatDNA for a similar conclusion using statistics from Brazilian Serie
A: http://blog.statdna.com/post/2011/03/18/Impact-of-Red-Cards-on-net-goals-and-
standings-points.aspx
5. For the statistics-enamoured: we ran an ordered logit regression with home advantage, shots,
goals, fouls against and red cards received in a match, along with dummy variables for the
leagues (using the Premier League as the residual category).
6. Other analysts have come to a similar conclusion about the effects of red cards. Jan Vecer,
Frantisek Kopriva and Tomoyuki Ichiba of Columbia University, for example, examined the
effect of red cards on match outcomes in the 2006 World Cup and the 2008 Euros. Using
the instantaneous shift in the betting markets when one side receives a red card, they found
that the scoring intensity of the penalized team falls by a third while the scoring intensity of
the opponent rises by a quarter (Vecer, Kopriva and Ichiba, 2009). Another statistical paper
based on data from the Bundesliga showed that a red card cost the home team 0.30 expected
points, while its effects on the visiting team depended on the time of the card – at the
thirtieth minute, the visitors lose almost half an expected point, but if the red card is
awarded after the seventieth minute, they can play defensively and, on average, get away
with losing no points (Mechtel et al., 2010).
7. Jonathan Wilson, ‘The Question: Why is Full-back the Most Important Position on the
Pitch?’, Guardian, 25 March 2009; www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/mar/25/the-
question-full-backs-football
8. Kuper (2011), p. 69.
9. Michael Cox, ‘Did Manchester United Deliberately Target Gael Clichy?’;
www.zonalmarking.net/2010/02/02/did-manchester-united-deliberately-target-gael-clichy/
10. Phil McNulty, BBC match report;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/eng_prem/8485984.stm
11. Wilson (2009), p. 312.
12. Andy Brassell, ‘Retro Ramble: AC Milan 5 Real Madrid 0, 19th April 1989’;
www.thefootballramble.com/blog/entry/retro-ramble-ac-milan-5-real-madrid-0-19th-april-
1989
13. Goldblatt (2008), p. 432.
14. Quoted Wilson (2009), p. 173.
15. Del Corral, Barros and Prieto-Rodriguez (2008).
16. Myers (2012).
17. There are a few other conditions limiting this optimal substitution algorithm – no red cards
for either side, no injury replacements and no extra time.
18. Carling et al. (2010).
19. Carling and Bloomfield (2010).
20. Carling et al. (2010), p. 253.
21. Henle (1978).
22. Kerr and Hertel (2011).
23. Pat Forde, ‘ “No Way” Turns into “No Quit” for Lezak, Men’s Relay Team’;
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/summer08/columns/story?
columnist=forde_pat&id=3529125
24. Lisa Dillman, ‘A Team Player Who Rises to the Challenge’, Los Angeles Times, 12 August
2008; http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/12/sports/sp-olylezak12
25. Hüffmeier and Hertel (2011).
26. In the business world, supermarket cashiers have manifested the Köhler effect due to social
comparison when a more productive cashier takes the helm in a check-out lane near them
(Mas and Moretti, 2009).
27. Allen Iverson news conference transcript, 10 May 2002;
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/news/2002/05/09/iverson_transcript/
28. Quoted in Grant Wahl, ‘The World’s Team’, Sports Illustrated, 8 October 2012.
29. This section is based on the fabulous work and paper by Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan
(2003).
30. In keeping with standard economic models, Koret management believed that a piece-rate
system would generate maximum effort from each worker, which would then translate into
the fastest possible stitching. If each stitch in a skirt was done as quickly as possible, then
surely the piece-rate system was maximizing productivity. It’s classic Adam Smith/Charlie
Chaplin labour economics: thorough division of labour down to the narrowest task (Charlie
twisting two bolts), and then monetary incentives to focus the mind and produce the effort
(1/100¢ per twist).
31. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), pp. 468–9.
32. Berg et al. (1996).
33. Franck and Nüesch (2010).
34. Ibid., pp. 220–21.
1. Gabriele Marcotti, ‘Meet Portugal’s Boy Genius’, Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2010;
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704380504575530111481441870.html
2. Katy Murrells, ‘Chelsea an “Embarrassment” to League and Next Manager Faces “Hell” ’,
Guardian, 5 March 2012; www.guardian.co.uk/football/2012/mar/05/chelsea-manager-
scolari-villas-boas
3. Keri (2011), p. 101.
4. As quoted in Vialli and Marcotti (2006), p. 121.
5. The study sought to explain how a club’s table position was affected by manager
characteristics and club wages. Bridgewater, Kahn and Goodall (2009).
6. As quoted in Vialli and Marcotti (2006), p. 115.
7. Bridgewater Kahn and Goodall (2009), p. 17.
8. Michaels, Handfield-Jones and Axelrod (2001), p. 101.
9. Ibid.
10. It’s an amusing image though – the Newborn World Cup. You can almost hear Alan Smith
criticizing the neonate for an awfully heavy and awkward first touch. The media pile on: all
England ever produce are babies who play inelegant route one 4–4–2 football, choke in the
big competitions, are terrible at penalties and dirty their nappies.
11. Sloboda et al. (1996).
12. Duncan White, ‘André Villas-Boas: Chelsea’s New Manager Who Has Dedicated Himself to
Football’, Telegraph, 25 June 2011;
www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/chelsea/8597265/Andre-Villas-Boas-Chelseas-
new-manager-who-has-dedicated-himself-to-football.html
13. ‘Terry Venables: Fernando Torres Needs to Forget about Scoring’, Sun, 16 September 2011;
www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/sport/football/3819274/Terry-Venables-Fernando-
Torres-needs-to-forget-about-scoring.html?OTC-RSS&ATTR=Football
14. Groysberg (2010), p. 40.
15. This is a larger commitment for a club or organization than just refusing to interview outside
candidates. The club must put systems in place and dedicate resources to grooming and
developing assistants and making them ready for promotion when the time comes. American
sports franchises are much more successful in fostering the talents of their assistant coaches
and preparing them for the job of head coach than are European football clubs.
16. Didier Drogba, C’était Pas Gagné, Paris: Editions Prologations, 2008. Quoted in Kuper and
Szymanski (2012), p. 31.
17. A figure of 40% hits hasn’t been seen in Major League Baseball since Ted Williams had a
batting average of .406 in 1941.
18. Data from Nate Silver on the Baseball Prospectus website:
www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=1897
19. For Norway see Arnulf, Mathisen and Haerem (2012); for Germany see Heuer et al. (2011);
for Italy see De Paola and Scoppa (2009); and for England see Dobson and Goddard (2011).
20. ter Weel (2011).
21. Ben Webster, ‘Speed Camera Benefits Overrated’, The Times, 16 December 2005.
22. www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-autobio.html
23. Kelly and Waddington (2006).
24. Okwonga (2010), pp. 138–9.
25. Gallimore and Tharp (2004); Becker and Wrisberg (2008).
26. Quoted in Kelly and Waddington (2006).
27. Quoted in Ericsson, Prietula and Cokely (2007).
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Acknowledgements
It was 1974. My best friend and I were eight, two boys captivated by
the World Cup being played in West Germany, following every twist and
turn of the tournament’s progression with intense interest.
The football was just one side of it. We were equally fascinated by
gathering the collectable cards published for the tournament, using them
to compare Germany’s Franz Beckenbauer to the Netherlands’ Johan
Cruyff, or Sepp Maier to Poland’s awe-inspiring keeper Jan
Tomaszewski.
But we had another, more analytical use for the cards: we wanted to
know which players were most famous, and which ones most popular.
So we took pencil and paper and made our way to the town square.
There, overcoming our shyness, we approached passers-by and asked
them a simple question as we showed them a random sample of pictures
with players on them:
‘Do you know who this is?’
If they said no, we let them go and marked the player’s name on our
sheet with a no. If they said yes, we asked them whether they liked the
player, and we put a mark on our sheets next to his name if they said
yes.
I don’t remember who ‘won’, but I’m pretty sure it was Beckenbauer
or Gerd Müller – the Bomber; certainly not Paul Breitner, too
counterculture for this sleepy conservative town. That year was also the
summer I started playing football, re-enacting the day’s matches in a
small alleyway near my house with friends. I would always end up
playing in goal.
When Dave and I started talking about football, it was just one of those
chats about Stoke’s Rory Delap and his spectacular throw-ins. Dave is a
neighbour and friend, a fellow academic and economist. But more than
that, Dave, growing up steeped in basketball and baseball, is another
who found himself collecting cards as a child, drawn as much to the
pictures of the stars on the front as the mountain of statistics on the
back.
In his case, the cards in question were the 1969 edition of Topps’
baseball series. Dave’s beloved Chicago Cubs, that year, had a talented
team with an infield of Ron Santo, Don Kessinger, Glenn Beckert, Ernie
Banks and Randy Huntley, but withered as the season wore on and
eventually lost the Eastern Division to the New York Mets. Every dime
Dave had went on packs of those cards in the hope of collecting the
entire Cubs’ roster; not simply to have pictures of his heroes, but for the
statistical tables on the reverse side, just the kind of mound of data a
maths-loving kid could pore over.
The obsession with numbers never disappeared. Later, as a southpaw
pitcher for Harvard, Dave would study his own statistics before and after
starts and he would chart the pitches of his teammates when they were
on the mound. Not being blessed with an overpowering fastball, he had
to be crafty and analytical. The numbers gave him an edge.
It should be no surprise that, to a former pitcher, Delap’s powerful
hurling of the ball was eye-catching; to the analyst in him, the natural
reaction to such a phenomenon was to prompt and probe and question.
The trouble was, I didn’t have too many good answers. So off we
went, talking more frequently and then more seriously – about football,
and about football numbers. Why teams win and lose; how you can spot
a good player or manager; what it is that makes football football. The
end result is this book.