U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services

Office of the Director (MS 2000)
Washington, DC 20529-2000

November 11, 2017 PM-602-0149

Policy Memorandum
SUBJECT: Matter of V-S-G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-06 (AAO Nov. 11, 2017)

Purpose
This policy memorandum (PM) designates the attached decision of the Administrative Appeals
Office (AAO) in Matter of V-S-G- Inc. as an Adopted Decision. Accordingly, this adopted
decision establishes policy guidance that applies to and binds all U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) employees. USCIS personnel are directed to follow the
reasoning in this decision in similar cases.

Matter of V-S-G- Inc. clarifies that beneficiaries of valid employment-based immigrant visa
petitions who are eligible to change jobs or employers (“port”) and who have properly requested
to do so under section 204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), are
“affected parties” under DHS regulations for purposes of revocation proceedings of their visa
petitions and must be afforded an opportunity to participate in those proceedings. Other kinds of
visa petition beneficiaries, and the subsequent employers of beneficiaries who have ported or
sought to port, are not affected parties under DHS regulations and may not participate in visa
revocation proceedings.

Use
This PM is intended solely for the guidance of USCIS personnel in the performance of their
official duties. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or by any individual or other party in
removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner.

Contact Information
Questions or suggestions regarding this PM should be addressed through appropriate directorate
channels to the AAO.
 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090

ADOPTED DECISION

MATTER OF V-S-G- INC.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

November 11, 2017[1]

(1) Beneficiaries of valid employment-based immigrant visa petitions who are eligible to change jobs or
employers (“port”) and who have properly requested to do so under section 204(j) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), are “affected parties” under DHS regulations for purposes of
revocation proceedings of their visa petitions and must be afforded an opportunity to participate in
those proceedings.
(2) Other kinds of visa petition beneficiaries, and the subsequent employers of beneficiaries who have
ported or sought to port, are not affected parties under DHS regulations and may not participate in visa
revocation proceedings.

FOR THE PETITIONER: Leena Snellman, Esquire, Owings Mills, Maryland

This decision settles a tension between longstanding agency regulations and subsequent
developments in the law regarding who is a cognizable party to a Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for
Alien Worker. Most immigration benefit proceedings involve one recognized party, either an
“applicant” seeking a benefit for himself or herself (and possibly for derivative family members as
well) or a “petitioner” who seeks a benefit on behalf of someone else (who is known as a
“beneficiary”). Traditionally, the applicant or petitioner is the only recognized party to the
proceeding; that is, the beneficiary of a petition generally does not have the ability to participate in
the immigration proceeding initiated by the petitioner. Today, we explore a scenario in which a
Form I-140 beneficiary may become a recognized party in certain limited circumstances in light of
the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (AC21) and one of its
1
On April 28, 2017, we issued this decision as a non-precedent decision. We have reopened this decision on our own
motion under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(5)(i) for the purpose of making revisions in preparation for USCIS designating it as an
Adopted Decision.
Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

amendments to the immigration laws. In so doing, we will explain the current USCIS interpretation
of applicable regulations to allow such a beneficiary, described below, to participate in relevant
administrative proceedings.

I. INTRODUCTION

First, we need to set the stage by introducing the case-specific facts and procedural history, as well
as the evolving legal landscape that informs our analysis. The Petitioner in this case, Vision Systems
Group Inc. (VSG), is (or was) an information technology services company that sought to employ
the Beneficiary, an Indian national, in a permanent position as a software engineer. 2 More
specifically, the Petitioner sought second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification of the
Beneficiary as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree. 3 To this end, the Petitioner
first secured a labor certification from the Department of Labor (DOL) in 2005, the first step in the
process, and, in 2006, filed the certification with a Form I-140 immigrant petition with U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS later approved the Form I-140 petition.

A beneficiary of an approved I-140 visa petition may file a Form I-485, Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (the adjustment of status application), which, if approved,
affords the beneficiary lawful permanent residence in the United States. Before such an application
can be filed, however, a visa must be immediately available to the beneficiary. Visa availability is
determined by a beneficiary’s “priority date,” which, in this context, is set on the date of filing the
labor certification with DOL. This priority date is essential to each I-140 petition, and particularly
for nationals of certain countries (such as India, at present) where the demand for certain visa
categories greatly exceeds visa availability. 4 When demand exceeds supply for a particular visa
category or foreign state and, therefore, the preference visa category or foreign state is
oversubscribed, the Department of State must impose a cut-off date. When the Department of State
imposes a cut-off date, only beneficiaries with a priority date earlier than the cut-off date may apply
for adjustment. In 2007, the Beneficiary’s 2005 priority date became current (meaning, a visa
became immediately available), and he accordingly filed his adjustment of status application.

Priority dates generally advance with time, but when more people apply for a visa in a particular
category than there are visas available, a priority date that is current one month may not be current
the next month. This is called visa retrogression. Retrogression, along with general limits on visa
availability, can result in applicants from certain countries in certain preference categories waiting
years to be eligible to receive a visa number after filing an application for adjustment. This is what

2
We are uncertain whether VSG exists, in its own right or through a successorship, such that it can pursue its interests in
this petition. We notified VSG of this revocation proceeding by mail to the last known address of record, but we
received no reply. According to New Jersey records, VSG incorporated in that state, but we could not verify that it
currently is an actively registered company in New Jersey, the main location of the job offer in this matter.
3
See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A).
4
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin (August 2017). The Beneficiary’s priority date
recently again became current.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

happened in this case, when the Beneficiary’s priority date was no longer current, USCIS placed his
adjustment application on hold until his priority date had again sufficiently advanced, both for the
second preference immigration category and his country of origin. 5

Prior to 2000, if the beneficiary changed jobs or employers while waiting for his priority date to
become current, the new employer would have needed to file a new labor certification and Form I-
140 petition. Otherwise, the beneficiary would be bound to the same job with his sponsoring
employer until a priority date became current and he adjusted status to that of a lawful permanent
resident.

In 2000, however, Congress enacted the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act
of 2000 (AC21). 6 As explored further below, AC21 included a “portability” provision – codified at
section 204(j) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(j), that allows a
beneficiary of a valid employment-based immigrant visa petition, whose adjustment of status
application has been pending for 180 days or more, to change the intended job or employer if the
new job is in the same or similar occupational classification, without relying upon the new employer
to file a new labor certification or Form I-140 to support his or her adjustment of status. 7

And that is what happened here. The Beneficiary first changed employers and took a new position
with Z, Inc. in 2010 and then changed employers a second time to Marlabs, Inc. in 2011. 8
Meanwhile, the president of VSG (the original Petitioner) was convicted of mail fraud in connection
with another USCIS petition. As a result, USCIS sought to revoke the approval of this immigrant
visa petition filed by VSG on behalf of the Beneficiary (along with those of other VSG
beneficiaries). Following the then applicable regulations and practice, 9 USCIS sent a notice of intent
to revoke (NOIR) the approval of the petition to Petitioner’s counsel (who also happened to
represent the Beneficiary in this case). The NOIR stated that VSG’s two principals had pled guilty

5
See sections 201(d) of the Act (annual employment-based visa limitation), 202 of the Act (per country limitation) and
203(b)(2)(A) of the Act (second preference visas limitation), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(d), 1152, 1153(b)(2)(A).
6
Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251.
7
Today, we are concerned with Form I-140 beneficiaries and their porting scheme under section 204(j) of the Act, as
enacted by AC21, and for purposes of convenience, will refer to section 204(j) colloquially as “AC21.” We note,
however, that AC21 section 105(a) also sets forth a procedure permitting certain persons in nonimmigrant H-1B status to
accept new employment (i.e., change employers) upon the filing of a new nonimmigrant petition by the prospective
employer. Section 214(n)(1)-(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n)(1)-(2). In this decision, we expressly exclude
nonimmigrant H-1B beneficiaries under those provisions, as opposed to the immigrant beneficiaries who fall under
section 204(j), as affected parties. We note in this regard that, unlike portability for immigrant beneficiaries, which puts
the decision to file a port request in the hands of the beneficiary when that person meets the requirements of the statute,
nonimmigrant beneficiaries of H-1B petitions expressly require “the filing by the prospective employer of a new [H-1B
visa] petition on behalf of [the current H-1B visa holder]” before changing employers is permitted.
8
The Beneficiary in this case was working in the United States in H-1B nonimmigrant status while employed at VSG.
In August 2010, the Beneficiary properly notified USCIS that he intended to port the approved I-140 immigrant petition
to employment with Z, Inc. In February 2011, he then properly notified USCIS that he intended to port that same
petition to employment with Marlabs, Inc. instead.
9
See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 (establishing processes for visa petition revocation on notice).

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

to charges related to fraud, and that this fact cast doubt on the validity of this (and other) VSG
petitions. Counsel responded on behalf of the Beneficiary, contesting the NOIR; Petitioner VSG did
not respond to the NOIR through counsel or in its own right. USCIS revoked the petition’s approval
due to the Petitioner’s failure to respond. The Beneficiary appealed the revocation to this office, and
we dismissed the appeal. The matter is currently before us on a motion to reopen and reconsider.

This situation points to a tension between a benefit an I-140 beneficiary may request under AC21
and pre-existing USCIS regulations establishing who may be recognized or be an affected party in
proceedings relating to I-140 petitions. As noted above, AC21 allows certain I-140 petition
beneficiaries to move a valid, permanent offer of employment to a different employer than the one
who filed the original petition if his or her adjustment application has been pending for 180 days or
more. Even if the beneficiary seeks to “port” to another employer, however, the initial visa petition
may be subject to revocation in certain circumstances which, if revoked, could harm the beneficiary
by making him or her ineligible for adjustment of status. But the applicable revocation regulation,
which was originally promulgated 10 years before the enactment of AC21, provides that
“[r]evocation of the approval of a petition . . . will be made only on notice to the petitioner” who is
given an opportunity to reply in opposition. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (emphasis added). 10 That section
also states that notice of any revocation and its underlying reasons, as well as the right to appeal any
decision to revoke, will also be provided to the petitioner without reference to the beneficiary.
8 C.F.R. § 205.2(c), (d). Moreover, the agency’s broadly applicable appeal and motion regulations
explicitly deny beneficiaries the right to file motions or appeals in these case types. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) (“For purposes of [appeals, motions, and decisions certified for review],
affected party . . . means the person or entity with legal standing in a proceeding. It does not include
the beneficiary of a visa petition.”) (emphasis in original).

While AC21 lets a beneficiary port a permanent job offer to a new employer, the pre-existing
regulations contemplate the original petitioning employer as the only recognized party to an
immigration proceeding that may continue to affect the beneficiary’s immigration future. As
discussed below, these regulations do not take into account the fact that, under AC21, and as in this
case, while the original petitioner-employer and beneficiary may no longer intend to enter into an
employment relationship, they can remain connected for immigration law purposes.

10
8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) was last amended in 1996. 61 Fed. Reg. 13,078 (Mar. 26, 1996).

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

1. Traditional Petitioner-Beneficiary Relationship

Immigration law has long recognized that petitioners control the visa petitions that they file; a
beneficiary cannot compel a petitioner to pursue a visa petition on the beneficiary’s behalf. 11 Were
this not the case, awkward and undesirable circumstances would arise, in which employers could be
compelled to pursue immigration benefits for foreign workers whose services they no longer need. 12

As introduced in the previous section, the long-standing general rule – that beneficiaries do not
receive notice relating to the adjudication or revocation of a petition’s approval and are not accorded
standing to administratively challenge any unfavorable result – is codified in the regulations. See
8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(a)(3) (“A beneficiary of a petition is not a recognized party in [a benefit request]
proceeding.”), 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) (for administrative appeals, certifications, and motions, a
beneficiary is not an “affected party” with legal standing in a proceeding). Generally, unless a
beneficiary is permitted by law to self-petition, USCIS only communicates with petitioners, not the
beneficiaries of petitions that those petitioners have filed. 13

In like manner, USCIS currently serves NOIRs only to the petitioners, not the petitions’
beneficiaries. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (“Revocation of the approval of a petition [or] self-petition . . .
will be made only on notice to the petitioner or self-petitioner.”). The same applies to notifications
of the revocations themselves and of the resultant right to appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(c)-(d). And, as
noted above, beneficiaries are explicitly prohibited from filing a motion on or an appeal from a
denied or revoked immigration benefit. 8 C.F.R § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B).

11
See, e.g., Matter of Kurys, 11 I&N Dec. 315 (BIA 1965) (appeal from denial of a visa petition may only be filed by the
petitioner); Matter of C-, 9 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1962) (attorney who once represented petitioner but now represents only
the beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition has no standing to file an appeal of its revocation).
12
This distinction between a petitioner and a beneficiary is by far the majority rule, but the law includes certain
exceptions to allow discrete classes of individuals to self-petition for immigration benefits. See, e.g., section
203(b)(2)(B) of the Act (Secretary of Homeland Security may deem it in the national interest to waive the requirement of
a job offer by a U.S. employer and allow the foreign national to petition directly); 204(a)(1)(E) of the Act (alien with
extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics may self-petition for a visa); section
204(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act (alien spouse of a U.S. citizen may self-petition for a visa within two years of the citizen’s
death); and section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Act (alien spouse may self-petition for an immigrant visa if he or she has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the U.S. citizen spouse); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(2)(B), 1154(a)(1)(E),
1154(a)(1)(A)(ii), and 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii). These individuals are termed “self-petitioners,” and the very grounds for
benefit eligibility indicate why a separate, traditional petitioner is not required.
13
Petitioners and self-petitioners are accorded standing to appeal explicitly by regulation in several instances. See, e.g.,
8 C.F.R. §§ 204.2(a)(3) (petitioner for alien spouse will be notified of denial of petition and right to appeal),
204.2(c)(3)(ii) (self-petitioning spouse of abuser will be notified of denial and right to appeal), 204.2(d)(3) (petitioner for
son or daughter will be notified of the denial of the petition and the right to appeal), 204.2(e)(3)(ii) (self-petitioning child
of abuser will be notified of denial and right to appeal).

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

Thus, in this immigrant visa petition scenario, two distinct parties exist: the petitioner, who is the
individual or entity with the legal authority to request and pursue an immigration benefit, and the
beneficiary of such a request, who is dependent on the petitioner for that benefit. The regulations
mentioned above contemplate this context, and accordingly were drafted to limit USCIS’
interactions to the petitioner as the sole party to the immigration proceeding.

2. Individuals Described in Section 204(j) of the Act

The traditional distinction of petitioner, beneficiary, and affected party breaks down, however, when
the law allows the beneficiary to leave the employ of the original petitioner and take a job elsewhere
without disrupting the validity of the underlying immigrant visa petition on which the pending
adjustment application depends. As noted above, under AC21, when the beneficiary of a valid I-140
employment-based immigrant visa petition files an adjustment application, and that application
remains pending for 180 days or more, the beneficiary may then request to “port” the valid
immigrant petition to a new job if that job is the same or similar to the original one. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 245.25(a). 14 When such a request is submitted, the intent of the original petitioner to employ the
beneficiary and of the beneficiary to work for that employer in a permanent position may cease to
exist, although the original petition would remain valid for purposes of the beneficiary’s adjustment
of status if the request is approved. 15

But if USCIS later discovers fraud, material misrepresentation, or an overlooked material deficiency
in the underlying petition, and in turn takes steps to revoke its approval, the original petitioner and
the beneficiary may again become intertwined. Following the regulations, USCIS currently provides
the NOIR solely to the petitioner. Because the petitioner may no longer intend to employ the
beneficiary in a permanent position and thus may have no real interest in the petition’s ongoing
validity, the petitioner may elect not to reply to the NOIR, nor notify the beneficiary of its possible
revocation. If that happens, USCIS would then revoke the approval of the petition for the reason(s)
set forth in the NOIR. Consequently, USCIS would also deny the beneficiary’s pending adjustment
application for lack of an approved visa petition. Without prior notice of the NOIR or the petition
revocation, the beneficiary would typically learn that his ability to become a lawful permanent
resident is in jeopardy only at the time his or her adjustment application is denied. At that point,
there is no mechanism for the beneficiary to directly challenge the final agency decision revoking
the approval of the underlying visa petition.

14
This section was recently codified in the final rule, “Retention of EB–1, EB–2, and EB–3 Immigrant Workers and
Program Improvements Affecting High-Skilled Nonimmigrant Workers; Final Rule.” 81 Fed Reg. 82,398, 82,490 (Nov.
18, 2016). The rule, which took effect on January 17, 2017, clarified and codified longstanding policies and procedures
previously articulated in memoranda and precedent decisions implementing sections of AC21. The final rule did not
address notices and standing of INA 204(j) beneficiaries in Form I-140 revocation proceedings.
15
The intent to enter into an employment relationship should remain if the beneficiary moves to a new same or similar
position with the same petitioning employer, but we are discussing the effect of a change in employers in this case.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

3. Mantena v. Johnson

In a case very similar to this one, involving the same Petitioner, VSG, the beneficiary’s approved I-
140 was revoked for the same reasons as in this case. Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721 (2d Cir.
2015). In that case, the Second Circuit observed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
regulations dictating that the petitioner, and not the beneficiary, must be afforded notice of
revocation and an opportunity to respond to the notice or challenge the revocation, were originally
promulgated a decade before the 2000 enactment of the AC21 statute, which, for the first time, gave
beneficiaries the ability to port to new prospective employment from an approved I-140 petition.
The court went on to conclude that, in enacting AC21, Congress had altered the traditional
relationship between a petitioner and beneficiary such that beneficiaries who are porting under its
provisions now had standing to challenge the revocation of the petition’s approval in federal court.
Id. at 730-732.

The court in Mantena also rejected the argument that the regulations regarding beneficiary standing
in administrative proceedings at 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(a)(3) and 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) deprived the
beneficiary in that case of standing in federal court. The court stated: “the fact that Mantena may
not have satisfied USCIS’s definition of ‘legal standing’ before the agency does not mean she does
not have standing to bring this lawsuit in federal court.” Id. at 732 (citing Kurapati v. USCIS, 732
F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014)) (emphasis in original).

Having thus established the beneficiary’s standing to challenge the sufficiency of the notice of the
visa petition’s revocation, the court turned to the issue of the sufficiency of the notice itself and
found it to be inadequate, reasoning: “Because the [AC21] portability provisions altered the parties
who have an interest in opposing the revocation of a ported I-140 petition, we believe that the
regulations must be read to require notice to the real parties in interest.” Mantena, 809 F.3d at 734.
The court recognized the possibility that, even if the beneficiary had been given notice, the result
may have been the same. Id. at 730. Nevertheless, the court held:

USCIS acted inconsistently with the statutory portability provisions of AC21 by

providing notice of an intent to revoke neither i) to an alien beneficiary who has
availed herself of the portability provisions to move to a successor employer nor ii) to
the successor employer, who is not the original I–140 petitioner, but who, as
contemplated by AC21, has in effect adopted the original I–140 petition. 16

Id. at 736. It accordingly remanded the case to the district court with instructions to examine what
notice to which party, the beneficiary or the new employer, is required under AC21. 17

16
The court suggested in dicta that the beneficiary’s new employer had effectively “adopted” VSG’s Form I-140 petition
and that it makes sense to consider that subsequent employer the de facto petitioner and thus entitled to notice of the visa
petition revocation. But it explicitly declined to hold that notice to the new employer is required. Id. at 735-36.
17
The court also suggested that the district court might wish to further remand the case to this office to consider the
question first, in light of our particular expertise in the matter. Id.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

B. Amicus Curiae Briefing

Prior to the Second Circuit decision, but in light of this developing jurisprudence, 18 we solicited
amicus curiae briefing on the question of whether beneficiaries of certain employment-based
immigrant visa petitions, especially beneficiaries who are subject to the portability provisions of
AC21, have standing to participate in the administrative adjudication process, including standing to
appeal to this office. 19

Most of the briefs advocated generally for AC21 beneficiary standing. For example, one noted that
AC21 significantly changed the law by permitting beneficiaries who met its criteria to complete the
adjustment of status process independent of the original petitioner, and thus recommended that DHS
interpret the regulations to permit these beneficiaries – whether or not their adjustment of status
applications had been pending for more than 180 days – to receive notice and an opportunity to
respond to any adverse actions relating to their visas. This amicus also recommended that DHS
amend its regulations to afford all beneficiaries notice and an opportunity to respond in all visa
petitions.

Another amicus advocated for beneficiary standing in cases where the beneficiary of an
employment-based visa petition has an application for adjustment of status pending for at least 180
days, whether the visa petition has been approved or is still pending. This amicus noted that AC21
exists to protect the interests of sponsored workers and that, pursuant to recent developments in the
case law, a beneficiary who falls under AC21’s provisions must be given standing to defend the
employment-based visa petition in all contexts in which the petition’s validity is placed in question.

A third amicus stated that AC21 beneficiaries should have standing to prevent bad-faith employers
from taking advantage of beneficiaries’ dependence on employers for their immigration benefits.
Finally, one amicus noted that the employment-based immigration framework is designed to protect
U.S. workers, in that it permits U.S. employers to hire foreign nationals only if U.S. workers are not
available and there will be no adverse effect on U.S. wages or working conditions. Although
arguing for a general rule of a lack of judicial or administrative standing for employment-based
immigrant visa beneficiaries, this amicus apparently conceded an exception for AC21 beneficiaries.

18
See, e.g., Bernardo ex rel. M&K Eng’g, Inc. v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481 (1st Cir. 2016); Rajasekaran v. Hazuda, 815
F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2016); Kurapati, 732 F.3d 1255; Patel v. USCIS, 732 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2013); Mehanna v. USCIS,
677 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012); Green v. Napolitano, 627 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 2010); Abdelwahab v. Frazier, 578 F.3d
817 (8th Cir. 2009); Sands v. DHS, 308 F. App’x 418 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Ghanem v. Upchurch, 481 F.3d 222
(5th Cir. 2007); Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2006); El-Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562 (7th
Cir. 2004); ANA Int’l Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004); Mohammad v. Napolitano, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2009). But see Musunuru v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2016).
19
We appreciate the several thoughtful briefs we received in response to our solicitation.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

C. Analysis

1. Standing in Federal Courts and Administrative Proceedings

First, we will explain the distinction between “standing” as it relates to federal litigation and the
ability to pursue matters before USCIS under its regulations. “Article III,” or “case-and-
controversy” standing, is a constitutional limitation on the power of U.S. courts to entertain suits
brought before them. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377,
1368 (2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). This kind of standing
is not at play in this case.

Federal courts also apply a related filter called “prudential standing,” which is often described as
comprising at least three principles: “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
Lexmark, the Supreme Court clarified that prudential standing, whatever its boundaries, does not
include a “zone-of-interests” test. Rather, the zone-of-interests test is a determination, under
traditional approaches to statutory construction, “whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 1387. Or, put another way, the proper inquiry is
whether a plaintiff is a member of a class of persons Congress has authorized to sue under a
particular statute. Id.; see also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 401 (1987) (“[T]he [“zone
of interest”] test denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit.”).

Several courts have noted that these limitations on the ability to sue in federal court are distinct from
the ability to pursue immigration benefits in administrative proceedings before USCIS. See, e.g.,
Mantena, 809 F.3d at 732 (citing Kurapati, 775 F.3d at 1260). Nonetheless, after finding that AC21
beneficiaries have standing to sue in federal court, the Mantena court stated that the regulations
barring beneficiary standing as a general matter must be read in light of the AC21 portability
provisions to require notice and an opportunity to respond to “the real parties in interest.” Id. at 734.
The court remanded the case for consideration of “how to read the regulation so that it best comports
with the notice requirements implicit in, but nonetheless mandated by, AC21.” Id. Although there is
a distinction between a zone-of-interests analysis for purposes of the ability to sue in federal court
and the opportunity to participate in administrative revocation proceedings, the same or similar
factors and concerns apply in both circumstances, and the court so concluded in remanding the case
for further inquiry.

In sum, Congress in enacting AC21 gave a specifically delineated class of beneficiaries the ability to
choose another employer or job. The regulations regarding administrative standing for these
individuals, however, have never been amended or their application altered in light of this significant
change in the traditional stance of the parties. Consonant with the Mantena court’s invitation to do
so, and as set forth more fully below, we now interpret those regulations to recognize two affected

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parties in the context of AC21 portability: (1) a beneficiary who is eligible to port and has properly
requested to port an immigrant petition under AC21; and (2) the original petitioner-employer.
However, we decline to revisit our interpretation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B), 205.2(b), (c)-(d)
to include any other immigrant or nonimmigrant beneficiaries, or any subsequent employers of
ported or porting beneficiaries as entitled to any notice in this context.

2. The AC21 Beneficiary

First, we agree with the Second Circuit, amici, and the Beneficiary on this general proposition:
AC21 places certain beneficiaries of Form I-140 petitions within the zone of interests of its statutory
provisions that authorize porting to eligible new employment. As discussed above, a beneficiary
might not, by virtue of porting, become entirely independent of his or her petitioning employer.
Even so, or especially so, AC21 gives some beneficiaries a statutory interest in job flexibility that we
will recognize in our administrative immigration proceedings. But further analysis is necessary to
determine precisely which beneficiaries fall within the statute’s zone of interests.

Although the zone-of-interests analysis applies to standing in federal court, we conclude by analogy
that it is also appropriate for USCIS to interpret its agency regulations regarding standing in
administrative proceedings in a manner equally mindful of the benefit AC21 makes available to
certain beneficiaries. We will accordingly allow beneficiaries who are eligible to port and have
properly requested to port under AC21 to participate in proceedings to revoke underlying I-140
petitions filed on their behalf, including any appeals or motions in those proceedings.

We emphasize that, to fall within the statute’s zone of interests, a beneficiary must be eligible to and
have properly requested to port under AC21, which requires, among other things, that the new
employment be in the same or similar position. Therefore, USCIS must assess the characteristics of
the new position to ascertain if this is the case, and will only be able to do so if made aware of the
new job and its details. 20 If USCIS determines that a beneficiary is eligible to and has properly
requested to port under AC21 to a qualifying new job, USCIS will now afford that person notice of
any intent to revoke the underlying I-140 visa petition filed on his or her behalf, and an opportunity
to reply before it is revoked. In Mantena, the Court noted the relevance of the fact that the plaintiff
had, in fact, requested to port. 809 F.3d at 733 (“[T]he INA, as amended by AC-21, requires some
form of such notice for post-porting beneficiaries, at least as to those aliens who have notified
USCIS of their change in employment, ….”) (emphasis added).

20
Affirmative notification to USCIS of an intent to port is required before USCIS may adjudicate the application for
adjustment of status. A form is used for this purpose, the Form I-485 Supplement J, “Confirmation of Bona Fide Job
Offer or Request for Job Portability Under INA Section 204(j).” However, the form instructions indicate that the filing
of a Supplement J to request portability under INA 204(j) may be made as soon as the I-140 beneficiary’s Form I-485
application has been pending for 180 days or more.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

3. Other Beneficiaries

We are not, however, persuaded by assertions of some amici that a broader universe of beneficiaries
in various or even all immigration categories should receive similar consideration as affected parties
under the immigration regulations. Neither the statutory language in AC21 nor its legislative history
suggests that Congress was concerned with other beneficiaries beyond the specific scenario
redressed by AC21. 21 Other classes of beneficiaries have been subject to long delays in their
immigration benefits due, for example, to statutory caps, but Congress has taken no similar actions
to allow those beneficiaries any measure of independence from their original petitioners.

We do not agree with those courts that have suggested that a broader class of employment-based
beneficiaries have standing to challenge their denied or revoked I-140 visa petitions in federal court.
See e.g., Patel, 732 F.3d at 636 (stating that, for purposes of Article III and prudential standing, the
immigration laws make the visa available to the immigrant, not the employer, suggesting that the
immigrant had a stake in whether he was granted the visa). 22 We do not see in the relevant statutes
that Congress intended for beneficiaries to be within the statute’s zone of interests – in fact, the
opposite is the case. The immigration laws quite clearly place the power to pursue immigration
benefits with petitioners and self-petitioners, and the AC21 framework is a unique exception for the
reasons explained above. Upon careful review of the evolution of the statutory scheme and the
associated legislative history, we conclude that Congress did not intend all beneficiaries to be within

21
The court in Mantena cites to comments in the legislative history for the proposition that Congress intended, by
enacting AC21, to aid employers. 809 F.3d at 734. This is not the case. While it is clear Congress created job porting to
address perceived bureaucratic delays in adjudicating beneficiaries’ adjustment applications, no evidence exists in the
legislative history that Congress intended to benefit anyone else. In fact, the material that the court cited does not relate
to portability. The court stated: “Under the statute, as Congress recognized, such employers would be able to attract
skilled workers with aspirations of permanent residency by relying on a prior employer’s filings. See S. Rep. No. 106–
260, 2 (2000) (‘In the Information Age, when skilled workers are at a premium, America faces a serious dilemma when
employers find that they cannot grow, innovate, and compete in global markets without increased access to skilled
personnel.’)” Id. This language, however, does not refer to employee portability but instead to limitations on the
number of H-1B visas available prior to AC21. The next sentence of the cited Senate report reads: “That access,
however, was being curbed by a cap on H–1B visas put in place almost a decade earlier, in 1990, when no one
understood the scope of the information revolution that was about to hit.” S. Rep. No. 106-260 at 2. In AC21, Congress
temporarily increased – by a significant amount – the number of H-1B visas available annually, and it was this change
that Congress made to assist employers, not portability.
22
The Patel decision did not involve a foreign national beneficiary of an approved I-140 petition who had sought to port,
nor one who had ever been the beneficiary of an approved I-140 in the first instance. In that case, the beneficiary’s first
employer (a hotel) obtained a labor certification and filed an I-140 petition, which was denied on the merits. The first
employer did not pursue the matter further. A second employer (another hotel in another state) filed a second I-140
petition, using the labor certification from the first employer rather than filing its own. USCIS denied this second
petition solely on the ground that the first certification was pertinent only to the first position and could not substantiate
the second, unrelated petition. As the dissent in Patel points out, the Form I-140 was not in USCIS’ power to grant; the
second employer had to first secure from DOL a new labor certification before USCIS could consider the beneficiary’s
eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. 732 F.3d at 642. Under these circumstances, the question of the
beneficiary’s interest in an approved Form I-140 may not have been properly before the court, because any fault lay with
the second employer’s failure to file a new labor certification. Patel is not persuasive as he could not have pursued lawful
permanent residence status independent from its original petitioning employer without an approved I-140.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

the Act’s zone of interest. 23 We therefore decline to extend our construction of DHS regulations to
afford standing in revocation proceedings beyond the specific class of AC21, employment-based
beneficiaries outlined above.

4. The Petitioner

We also find that the original petitioner-employer remains an affected party under the regulations,
even if a beneficiary has properly requested to port to a new employer. We recognize some
petitioners may not be interested in the immigration outcome of beneficiaries who seek to port to a
new employer under AC21, but this will not always be so. As an initial matter, the regulations still
require that the petitioner be given notice and an opportunity to respond to a NOIR. In addition to
regulatory-prescribed standing, even if a beneficiary has properly requested to port to a new
employer under AC21, a petitioner remains interested because it may wish to protect itself against
USCIS questions (in a NOIR) of fraud or noncompliance that could impact its other and future
petitions. The petitioner may also remain interested because the departed beneficiary’s immigration
outcome may impact the petitioner’s efforts to recruit and retain other employees. Alternatively, the
petitioner may seek to support the beneficiary to encourage him or her to return to the petitioner’s
employ in the future (albeit to assume a permanent position rather than a temporary one). Finally,
and more simply, the petitioner is the party who filed the petition, paid the filing fee, and attested to
the accuracy of the filing. For all of these reasons, we will presume the original petitioner’s
potential interest in the participation in future proceedings and continue to permit them to participate
in the administrative proceedings.

5. Subsequent Employer(s)

Lastly, we conclude that a subsequent employer to whom an AC21 beneficiary is porting is not an
affected party who may participate in proceedings related to the underlying visa petition. We
acknowledge that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has recently held to the contrary
in a case involving facts very similar to this one. 24 In Musunuru v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 880 (7th Cir.

23
Some courts reach this conclusion as well. For example, in Vemuri v. Napolitano, 845 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 2012),
the court held that the beneficiary of an I-140 petition that had never been approved and was not within the zone of
interests protected by the applicable sections of the INA and lacked prudential standing to challenge the petition’s denial
in federal court. The court stated that “it is clear that Plaintiff’s interests are inconsistent with the purpose of the relevant
portions of the INA” 845 F. Supp. 2d at 131(citing Pai v. USCIS, 810 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2011). In Pai, the
plaintiff, a prospective employee, rather than the employer, challenged USCIS’s denial of an employer filed I–140
petition, in which the plaintiff was the named beneficiary. Pai v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 810 F. Supp. 2d
102, 105 (D.D.C. 2011) The court in Pai concluded that: “[L]ooking at the specific facts of this case and the zone of
interests that Congress intended to protect in this particular statutory scheme, this Court finds that it is the employer, not
Pai, that has standing in this case to challenge the USCIS' decision.” Id. at 111, Cf. Khalid v. DHS, 1 F. Supp. 3d 560
(S.D. Tex. 2014) (“The relevant INA provisions make clear that a religious employee’s interest [under section
101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C),] in coming to or remaining in the United States is, at best,
marginally related to Congress’ purpose in passing the statute.”).
24
In Mantena, the Second Circuit alluded to the possibility of a similar result, but left open the precise way to read the
notice regulations in light of AC21. 809 F.3d at 735-736.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

2016), the same petitioner as here (VSG) filed a Form I-140 immigrant visa petition on behalf of a
beneficiary who later sought to port to a different employer. USCIS revoked the approval of that
petition on similar grounds as in this case, i.e., the fraud VSG committed in another case. The court
did not find, however, that the beneficiary was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond, but
rather the beneficiary’s current employer was. 25

We respectfully disagree with this conclusion. The new employer did not pay for the filing, is not
responsible for maintaining the petition, is not liable for the original petitioner’s compliance or
malfeasance associated with it, and cannot withdraw the petition if it no longer requires the
beneficiary’s services. Nor can the new employer prevent the beneficiary from porting to yet
another employer (as happened here).

In this case, for example, the beneficiary has already moved on to a third employer. Although AC21
does contemplate new employers in the porting scheme it creates, it does so only as a result of giving
the beneficiary the independence to choose a new employer. Indeed, the title of INA section 204(j)
is “Job Flexibility for Long Delayed Applicants for Adjustment of Status to Permanent Residence.”
That title implies that the focus of the provision was job flexibility for adjustment of status
applicants, and not the availability of foreign workers to subsequent employers. Furthermore, as
noted above, the legislative history that discusses AC21 porting provisions only evidences
Congressional concern with beneficiaries who were enduring lengthy processing delays, no one else.

Also as a practical matter, in the case of a proposed revocation, any issues related to deficiencies in
the underlying immigrant visa petition would relate to either the original petitioner or to the
beneficiary. The new employer is presumably in no position to answer questions related to the
evidence the petitioner submitted in support of the petition, or to produce such evidence. 26 And
beneficiaries do not need the participation of a subsequent employer to answer questions about their
education or experience. Furthermore, because a beneficiary must be eligible for a requested benefit
at the time of filing and throughout the adjudication period, a subsequent employer cannot cure any
deficiencies that relate to the initial petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1).

Consistent with the finding in Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, that that there is no right of review if the
interests are only marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute, we
conclude that new employers’ interests are so marginally related to and inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the AC21 statute that we do not believe Congress intended to permit their
participation in other employers’ administrative proceedings. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S.
388, 399 (1987). Therefore, we are not revising our interpretation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B),
205.2(b), (c)-(d) to include the beneficiary’s subsequent employers, Z, Inc. or Marlabs, Inc., as

25
In Musunuru, the employers that Musunuru ported to were not parties to the litigation and never sought a copy of the
notices of intent to revoke or revocation.
26
In fact, the subsequent employer may be in a related industry to and a competitor of the original employer. USCIS
may not be in a position to share with a subsequent employer all the details of the potential deficiencies in the original
employer’s visa petition for privacy, operational, or other concerns.

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Matter of V-S-G- Inc. Adopted Decision

eligible to receive notice in this context or to participate in this administrative proceeding relating to
a petition that they did not file and to a beneficiary whom they may or may not still employ or intend
to employ. 27

III. CONCLUSION

Because we find that beneficiaries who are eligible to port and properly request to port under AC21
are within the statute’s zone of interests, USCIS interprets that statute as requiring a change in the
agency’s historical interpretation of the applicable DHS regulations. Our new interpretation is to
treat these beneficiaries as affected parties who may participate in revocation proceedings related to
their underlying immigrant visa petitions. Because the Beneficiary in this case, who is eligible to
port and properly requested to port in compliance with the requirements under AC21, did not have
an opportunity to so participate, we will reopen these proceedings and reinstate the Form I-140
immigrant visa petition relating to the Beneficiary and remand these proceedings to the Director,
who must afford the Beneficiary an opportunity to respond to any future NOIR related to this I-140
petition. Should the Director thereafter revoke the immigrant petition’s approval, the Beneficiary
may appeal or file a motion to reopen or reconsider from the revocation or he may participate in
proceedings arising from an appeal or motion filed by the Petitioner relating to this petition.

ORDER: The record is remanded to the Director of the Nebraska Service Center.

Cite as Matter of V-S-G- Inc., Adopted Decision 2017-06 (AAO Nov. 11, 2017)

27
See Matter of Cerna, 20 I&N Dec. 399, 401 (BIA 1991) (observing that “[a]uthority from one circuit is not binding in
another” and declining to follow particular Second Circuit precedent decision “outside the jurisdiction of the Second
Circuit”); Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31 (BIA 1989) (stating that “[w]here we disagree with a court’s position
on a given issue, we decline to follow it outside the court’s circuit”).

14