Pepsi Cola Vs Gallang

malicious prosecution = Regular courts
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991
PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., represented

by its Plant General Manager ANTHONY B. SIAN, ELEAZAR LIMBAB,
IRENEO BALTAZAR & JORGE HERAYA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG, SALVADOR NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO
OLIVA, WILFREDO CABAÑAS & FULGENCIO LEGO, respondents.
Aurelio D. Menzon for petitioners.

Mario P. Nicolasora co-counsel for petitioners.
Papiano L. Santo for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The question now before us has been categorically resolved in earlier

decisions of the Court that a little more diligent research would have
disclosed to the petitioners. On the basis of those cases and the facts now
before us, the petition must be denied.
The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were

suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty Pepsi Cola
bottles. On July 16, 1987, the petitioners filed a criminal complaint for theft
against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted with a criminal
complaint for falsification of private documents. On November 26, 1987,
after a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Tanauan, Leyte, the complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed
on April 8, 1988, by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private

respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company on November 23,
1987. As a result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City on December 1,
1987, and decisions manded reinstatement with damages. In addition, they
instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, on April 4, 1988, a separate
civil complaint against the petitioners for damages arising from what they
claimed to be their malicious prosecution.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because it involved employee-
employer relations that were exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter.
The motion was granted on February 6, 1989. On July 6, 1989, however,
the respondent judge, acting on the motion for reconsideration, reinstated
the complaint, saying it was "distinct from the labor case for damages now
pending before the labor courts." The petitioners then came to this Court
for relief.
The petitioners invoke Article 217 of the Labor Code and a number of
decisions of this Court to support their position that the private respondents
civil complaint for damages falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
They particularly cite the case of Getz Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, where it was held that a court of first instance had no jurisdiction
1
over the complaint filed by a dismissed employee "for unpaid salary and
other employment benefits, termination pay and moral and exemplary
damages."
We hold at the outset that the case is not in point because what was
involved there was a claim arising from the alleged illegal dismissal of an
employee, who chose to complain to the regular court and not to the labor
arbiter. Obviously, the claim arose from employee-employer relations and
so came under Article 217 of the Labor Code which then provided as
follows:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a)

The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of
the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and
other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-

payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation,
separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code,

including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

all cases decided by labor Arbiters. 2
It must be stressed that not every controversy involving workers and their
employers can be resolved only by the labor arbiters. This will be so only if
there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim asserted and
employee-employer relations to put the case under the provisions of Article
217. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular
courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal jurisdiction.
In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, two employees filed in the Court of First

3
Instance of Rizal a civil complaint for damages against their employer for
slanderous remarks made against them by the company president. On the
order dismissing the case because it came under the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiters, Justice Vicente Abad Santos said for the Court:
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged
any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for
tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the
case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong
premise.
In Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Paño, where the plaintiff was suing for
4
damages for alleged violation by the defendant of an "Agreement for a

Course of Conversion Training at the Expense of Singapore Airlines
Limited," the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Rizal over the
case was questioned. The Court, citing the earlier case of Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines Melale Veneer and Plywood, Inc., declared through Justice Herrera:
5
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and
claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The primary relief sought
is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The
other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers
generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such as payment of
wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items
claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an
obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
In Molave Sales, Inc. v. Laron, the same Justice held for the Court that the
6
claim of the plaintiff against its sales manager for payment of certain
accounts pertaining to his purchase of vehicles and automotive parts,
repairs of such vehicles, and cash advances from the corporation was
properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and not
the labor arbiter, because "although a controversy is between an employer
and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have nojurisdiction if the Labor Code
is not involved."
The latest ruling on this issue is found in San Miguel Corporation v.

NLRC, where the above cases are cited and the changes in Article 217
7
are recounted. That case involved a claim of an employee for a

P60,000.00 prize for a proposal made by him which he alleged had been
accepted and implemented by the defendant corporation in the processing
of one of its beer products. The claim was filed with the labor arbiter, who
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction but was reversed by the NLRC on
appeal. In setting aside the appealed decision and dismissing the
complaint, the Court observed through Justice Feliciano:
It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears
essential, in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be
granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement,
the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as
an incident to such claim.
xxx xxx xxx
Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by

reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a
collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the
jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice
and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations,
resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor
management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and
conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general
civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or
expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the
rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies
disappears.
xxx xxx xxx
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is

not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims
that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters.
xxx xxx xxx
For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do

not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee
relationship, and which would therefore fall within the general
jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the
legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the
courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the 'money claims of
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money
claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-
employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such
relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers
which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor
Arbiters are those money claims which have some reasonable
causal connection with the employer-employee relationship (Ibid.).
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages for
malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does not appear that
there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the complaint and the
relations of the parties as employer and employees. The complaint did not
arise from such relations and in fact could have arisen independently of an
employment relationship between the parties. No such relationship or any
unfair labor practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that
the petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal complaint
which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to harass the poor
employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed by the Provincial
Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish even a slightest probability
that all the respondents herein have committed the crime imputed against
them." This is a matter which the labor arbiter has no competence to
resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor Code but the Revised Penal
Code.
"Talents differ, all is well and wisely put," so observed the philosopher-
poet. So it must be in the case we here decide.
8
WHEREFORE, the order dated July 6, 1989, is AFFIRMED and the

petition DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., co

Pepsi Cola Vs Gallang

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pepsi Cola Vs Gallang

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

malicious prosecution = Regular courts

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991

PEPSI COLA DISTRIBUTORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., represented

Aurelio D. Menzon for petitioners.

The question now before us has been categorically resolved in earlier

The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who were

Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the private

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a)

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-

4. Cases involving household services; and

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code,

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, two employees filed in the Court of First

damages for alleged violation by the defendant of an "Agreement for a

The latest ruling on this issue is found in San Miguel Corporation v.

are recounted. That case involved a claim of an employee for a

xxx xxx xxx

Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by

xxx xxx xxx

While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is

xxx xxx xxx

For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do

WHEREFORE, the order dated July 6, 1989, is AFFIRMED and the

Narvasa (Chairman), Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., co

You might also like