Professional Documents
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Case Digest
Case Digest
Doctrine: All things, even future ones which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, except that no
contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article
1080.
b. Case Title: J.L.T. Agro vs. Antonio Balansag, GR. No. 141882, (J.
Tinga), March 11, 2005
c. Facts: Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena and had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he
married Milagros Teves and they had four children namely: Maria Teves,
Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to
the case entered into a Compromise Agreement.
When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the
compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of land known as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The property was to
remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio
likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant,
the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and the house where Don
Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don
Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed
of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets
with the Assumption of Liabilities dated 31 July 1973. This instrument
transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor
of petitioner. The appellate court ruled that the supplemental deed,
conveying ownership to JLT Agro is not valid because the Compromise
Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them and Don
Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court
in holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it
contained a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage.
e. Held: Yes. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the
twenty-year allowable period, the estate may be disposed of under
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition
of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
20 years.
The allowance for a permanent trust (under Article 1013 of the Civil
Code), approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the
State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void
testamentary provision which did not institute an heir.
c. Facts: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died
without issues in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was
admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila and said
court approved the project of partition presented by the executor of
Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will. As provided in her will Doña Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a
trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to
beneficiaries specified in the will. After almost 40 years later, herein
petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain,
Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to
dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been
in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of the law.
d. Issue: Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by Doña
Margarita Rodriguez can be dissolved.
e. Held: Yes. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a
perpetual trust for the administration of her properties and the income
accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The trust, only insofar as
the first twenty-year period is concerned should be upheld however after
20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct inmoving
for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period, but they are
not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent. The last will
and testament of the decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the
properties under the void clause. Hence, the case is remanded to the
lower court for the determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of
the decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the
decedent, should establish their status.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed.
2. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was,
in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate
to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as
the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed
the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within
the 3rd degree) excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the decedent
(a relative within the 5th degree), even if under the order of intestate
succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference. Moreover,
the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of
representation in order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer
degree because representation in the collateral line is limited to children
of brothers and sisters of the decedent.
b. Case Title: Ofelia Bagunu vs. Pastora Piedad, GR. No. 140975, (J.
Vitug), December 8, 2000
The RTC denied the motion. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal
ruling that appeal by certiorari should raise only questions of law. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari.
b. Case Title: Amelia Garcia-Quiason vs. Ma. Lourdes Belen, GR. No.
189121, (J. Perez), July 31, 2013
d. Issue: 1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.
e. Held: YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in
the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place and cannot be the source of rights. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
b. Case Title: Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, GR. No. 133778, (J.
Ynares-Santiago), March 14, 2000
d. Issue: Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
e. Held: Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have
no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties
of the alleged spouses, regarding coownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking
possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
b. Case Title: Spouses Dominador Marcos and Gloria Marcos vs. Heirs of
Isidro Bangi and Genoveva Diccion, G.R.No.185745, (J. Reyes),
October 15, 2014
b. Case Title: Thelma M. Aranas vs. Teresita V. Mercado, GR. No. 156407,
(J. Bersamin), January 15, 2014
The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve
the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval
of the inventory and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the
hearing on that issue.
The RTC denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory and
orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which
are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately
preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty
(60) days from notice hereof.
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty,
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed
the adverse orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari.
The CA partly granted the said petition. CA ruled that the RTC erred
when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be
included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent
court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but
the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not estopped,
since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which
were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir
Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law
possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and
in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
e. Held: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either
as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to
do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
b. Case Title: Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, GR. No.
183053, (J. Perez), October 10, 2012
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and
the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and
respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio
III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico
and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their
grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the
decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator who has shown an
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
SO ORDERED.