a.

Doctrine: All things, even future ones which are not outside the
commerce of man may be the object of a contract, except that no
contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article
1080.

b. Case Title: J.L.T. Agro vs. Antonio Balansag, GR. No. 141882, (J.
Tinga), March 11, 2005

c. Facts: Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena and had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he
married Milagros Teves and they had four children namely: Maria Teves,
Jose Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to
the case entered into a Compromise Agreement.

When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the
partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the
compromise agreement, the CFI declared a tract of land known as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don
Julian and his two children of the first marriage. The property was to
remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio
likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant,
the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and the house where Don
Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don
Julian.
 On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed
of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets
with the Assumption of Liabilities dated 31 July 1973. This instrument
transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor
of petitioner. The appellate court ruled that the supplemental deed,
conveying ownership to JLT Agro is not valid because the Compromise
Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them and Don
Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court
in holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it
contained a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second
marriage.

d. Issue: Whether or not future legitime can be determined, adjudicated,

and reserved prior to death of the testator.

e. Held: Yes. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones,
which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly

valid pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would
become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of
his heirs form the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him
under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a
bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the
prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It
had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at
the time nonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of deed of assignment cover Lot

No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the
property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his
heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the
owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been
adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30

September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The general rule remains that upon the expiration of the
twenty-year allowable period, the estate may be disposed of under
Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition
of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
20 years.

The allowance for a permanent trust (under Article 1013 of the Civil
Code), approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the
State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void
testamentary provision which did not institute an heir.

b. Case Title: Orendain vs. Trusteeship of the estate of Doña Margarita

Rodriguez, GR. No. 168660, (J. Nachura), June 30, 2009

c. Facts: On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doña Margarita Rodriguez, died
without issues in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. The will was
admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila and said
court approved the project of partition presented by the executor of
Doña Margarita Rodriguez’s will. As provided in her will Doña Margarita
Rodriguez’s testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a
trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to
beneficiaries specified in the will. After almost 40 years later, herein
petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain,
Sr. who was mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedent’s will, moved to
dissolve the trust on the decedent’s estate, which they argued had been
in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of the law.
d. Issue: Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by Doña
Margarita Rodriguez can be dissolved.

e. Held: Yes. The will of the decedent provides for the creation of a
perpetual trust for the administration of her properties and the income
accruing therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The trust, only insofar as
the first twenty-year period is concerned should be upheld however after
20 years the trust must be dissolved. Petitioners were correct inmoving
for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period, but they are
not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent. The last will
and testament of the decedent did not institute heirs to inherit the
properties under the void clause. Hence, the case is remanded to the
lower court for the determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of
the decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the
decedent, should establish their status.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No.
51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust approved by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is
DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4
in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to determine the following:

1. the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doña Margarita

Rodriguez’s will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are
still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and
 2. the intestate heirs of Doña Margarita Rodriguez, with the
nearest relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the
remaining properties.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a
language or dialect known to the testator.

Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed.

Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator written

below his signature must be dated and signed by him in order to make
them valid as testamentary dispositions.
b. Case Title: Dy Yieng Seangio vs. Hon. Amor Reyes, GR. No. 140371-
72, (J. Azcuna), November 27, 2006

c. Facts: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the

intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, praying for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition, contending,
among others, that Segundo left a holographic will, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.

Subsequently, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of

Segundo was filed by petitioners.

Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings

primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the
 estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will
under Article 783 of the Civil Code.

According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of

disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that
while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of
the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on
the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition
of the property of the decedent.
The RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be

considered as a holographic will.

2. Whether or not there was preterition.

e. Held: 1. Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a

mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance
of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself.
 In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the

testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law,
must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or
public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not

learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument
and the intention of the testator.

In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if

captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

2. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was,
in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate
to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as
the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic

will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is
probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed
the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October
14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and
hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within
the 3rd degree) excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the decedent
(a relative within the 5th degree), even if under the order of intestate
succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference. Moreover,
the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of
representation in order to elevate her status to a relative of a nearer
degree because representation in the collateral line is limited to children
of brothers and sisters of the decedent.

b. Case Title: Ofelia Bagunu vs. Pastora Piedad, GR. No. 140975, (J.
Vitug), December 8, 2000

c. Facts: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or

ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent [a third-
degree relative], while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the
deceased [a fifth degree relative]. In the intestate proceeding of his
estate in RTC Pasay, petitioner moved to intervene, seeking to inherit
from the estate, to assail the finality of the RTC order awarding the
entire estate to respondent contending that the proceedings were tainted
with procedural infirmities.

The RTC denied the motion. Upon appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal
ruling that appeal by certiorari should raise only questions of law. Hence,
the instant petition for review on certiorari.

d. Issue: Whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the

fifth civil degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which
would justify her intervention
e. Held: No. By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, “raised to the same place and degree”
of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent.
The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he
represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to
whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. In the
direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never
in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation
may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

The right of representation does not apply to “other collateral relatives

within the fifth civil degree” (to which group both petitioner and
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following,
firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate
parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in
Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs. SO

ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.

b. Case Title: Amelia Garcia-Quiason vs. Ma. Lourdes Belen, GR. No.
189121, (J. Perez), July 31, 2013

c. Facts: Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and

Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are common-law partners. When Eliseo died
instestate, Elise through her mother filed a Petition for Letters of
 Administration before the RTC, claiming that she is a natural child of
Eliseo having conceived at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and
Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia
Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was bigamous.

Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of administration

asserting that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. However,
the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison
was affirmed. Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the
argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters
of administration and that the CA erred in declaring that Eliseo and
Amelia were no legally married because Elise has no cause of action on
it.

d. Issue: 1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

e. Held: YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in
the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is

an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
 provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the
venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be
laid in the said city.

2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the

distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to
sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory
heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of
the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of

merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008
Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place and cannot be the source of rights. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

b. Case Title: Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, GR. No. 133778, (J.
Ynares-Santiago), March 14, 2000

c. Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones, out of their

marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit stating that they
had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license. Subsequently, Pepito
died in a car accident.

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of

nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
 assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would
affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage”
under Article 47 of the Family Code.

d. Issue: Whether or not the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

e. Held: Yes. The heirs of a deceased person may file a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that
is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have
taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have
no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties
of the alleged spouses, regarding coownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44
as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose
of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the

Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking
possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

b. Case Title: Spouses Dominador Marcos and Gloria Marcos vs. Heirs of
Isidro Bangi and Genoveva Diccion, G.R.No.185745, (J. Reyes),
October 15, 2014

c. Facts: Plaintiff respondents, filed an action for cancellation of transfer

certificate of title, two deeds of sale, restoration of the original certificate
of title, and recovery of ownership with the RTC. They alleged that they
acquired a parcel of land from Eusebio Bangi, who represented that he
acquired it from his father Alipio Bangi, by virtue of a Donation.
Defendant petitioners claim that they bought the property from Eusebio
thereafter, and that the sale made to respondents was invalid because
Eusebio, at that time, the subject property was part of the estate of Alipio
Bangi and thus owed in common by Eusebio along with his co-heirs.

d. Issue: Whether or not partition can be presumed to have been effected

in the instant case, even in absence of a Deed of Partition.
e. Held: Yes. Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing
held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs, legatees and
devisees is deemed to be a partition, as it may be inferred from
circumstances that support this presumption. The general priniple is
that, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partially
performed. It may also be sustained on the ground that parties thereto
have acquiesced in or ratified the ownership over it. Further, the Court
notes that Alipio died in 1918, while his wife Ramona died 1957. It is
quite suspect that the Deed of Partition was executed only in 1995. The
court found the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition a ruse to defeat the rights
of respondent.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the

petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated December 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89508 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of
ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from
the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of
the deceased spouse.

b. Case Title: Thelma M. Aranas vs. Teresita V. Mercado, GR. No. 156407,
(J. Bersamin), January 15, 2014

c. Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate, survived by his second wife,

Teresita V. Mercado, and their five children; and his two children by his
first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner
Thelma M. Aranas.

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He

owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there
was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued on September 7, 1992.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of

Emigdio for consideration and approval by the RTC. Claiming that
Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s
motion. Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her
inventory. Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined
under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days
within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory
and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.

The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve
the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval
of the inventory and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the
hearing on that issue.
The RTC denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory and
orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which
are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately
preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory
within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty
(60) days from notice hereof.

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty,
Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed
the adverse orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari.

The CA partly granted the said petition. CA ruled that the RTC erred
when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit
themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be
included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent
court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but
the manner in which it was exercised for which they are not estopped,
since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of
 discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which
were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir
Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law
possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and
in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.

d. Issue: Whether or not the RTC as a probate court may provisionally

pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
ownership.

e. Held: Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either
as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to
do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by

expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a

testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate action.
 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to
the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental
or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;

REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094
CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma
Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The paramount consideration in the appointment of an

administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration
 which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of
preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the

estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to
co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor
adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator.

b. Case Title: Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, GR. No.
183053, (J. Perez), October 10, 2012

c. Facts: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was survived by her

spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay and five grandchildren: three legitimate
grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay, who predeceased his parents.
After Cristina’s death, respondent Isabel, filed before the RTC, Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the petition, and filed a Motion to
Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that
Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being
an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’
marriage being declared null and void.
 Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer
the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration
issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-
Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition,
alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped
than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina. Federico died. Almost a year thereafter, the trial court rendered
a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s
intestate estate. On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court in an
earlier case reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. The
Court decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s
estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate.

d. Issue: Whether or not Isabel and Emilio III can be a co-administrator of

the estate of Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay.

e. Held: No. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists a sequence to be

observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an
administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the
appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s
interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule
is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference,
the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the

estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to
co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the
heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of
preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. In the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s un assailable interest
in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-
administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is
a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and depends on
the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and
the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and
respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it
becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-
administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio
III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico
and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their
grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility
towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the
decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator who has shown an
adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein
respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is
MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.