The Causes and Consequences of Interest Theory Analyzing Interest Through Conventional and Islamic Economics Cem Eyerci Full Chapter
The Causes and Consequences of Interest Theory Analyzing Interest Through Conventional and Islamic Economics Cem Eyerci Full Chapter
The Causes
and Consequences
of Interest Theory
Analyzing Interest through Conventional
and Islamic Economics
Cem Eyerci
Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey
Ankara, Turkey
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Preface
Interest has always been a part of humans’ daily economic life. Therefore,
the concept of interest has attracted intense attention and been studied
and discussed by philosophers, religious scholars, lawmakers, administra-
tors, and economists, regarding almost all its economic, social, moral, and
religious aspects. Receiving interest was mostly considered dishonorable,
disrespectable, uncharitable, unjust, and the source of many evils. It was
condemned in many societies for being a sin. For this reason, interest-
based lending has always been restricted by the authorities through legisla-
tive, administrative, and financial arrangements, religion, and ethics. In
cases when it was allowed, the rules of practicing interest were regulated
heavily. However, despite all these concerns and regulations, interest has
always been practiced in economic life.
By the seventeenth century, when the role of interest in economic
life became more significant, scholars began to deal with the concept of
interest more systematically, and many theories were developed on the
nature of interest. Among many others, Böhm-Bawerk’s comprehensive
time-preference theory of interest presented causes for the existence of
interest that may be claimed to be inherent.
On the other hand, a controversy emerged on the consequences
of interest rate control in the relevant literature. It was claimed that
prohibiting interest or limiting its rate, as a type of price control, has
undesired distortive effects on the market in general. If so, the means-ends
consistency in regulations may have to be reevaluated.
v
vi PREFACE
vii
viii CONTENTS
Index 163
List of Figures
xi
List of Tables
xiii
xiv LIST OF TABLES
Lending has been a practice of humans’ daily life presumably since the
prehistoric ages well before the beginning of the usage of coin money.
The first farmers, who lacked seed at sowing time but could not find a
benefactor to receive the seed as gift or aid from, might have borrowed
the seed. The lenders were lending to friends, neighbors, relatives, or
needy people consentingly to receive back an amount of seed equal to
the loan. On the other hand, some of these loans were made to receive
back more at harvest-time (Homer 1963). The increment in the quantity
of the loaned seed was called interest and had been paid for the other
loaned goods and money as well, afterward.
Even though not complicated as it is in modern times, surprisingly still,
the interest-based transactions were not merely comprised of ordinary and
uniform practices. From the beginning, at least since the third millen-
nium BC, there were standard values (Homer 1963) used in exchange,
and beside the basic interest , compound interest was being practiced
(Graeber 2011). The interest rates were changing in time and differen-
tiating according to the place, loaned good, lender, borrower, and the
purpose of the loan.
and normative aspects of the concept of interest. The positive and norma-
tive distinction is very crucial in modern economics in which the first one
focuses on what is, and the second one what ought to be. Böhm-Bawerk
(1890) claimed that the cause of mistakes made in economists’ works on
the theory of interest was the lack of the abovementioned distinction.
Time preference in economics is defined as people’s value attribution to
present goods higher than future ones that have exactly the same quality
and quantity. Thus, interest is the difference between the present and
future values of a good.
Böhm-Bawerk (1930) specified three causes that can be considered
valid in general, for the valuation of present goods higher than future
ones. The first two causes were the preference for more consump-
tion at present. People might prefer to consume more for consumption
smoothing or because of the underestimation of the future due to
the psychological traits of ordinary human beings. The third cause was
not about the preference of present consumption but the desire for
production more in value in the future.
Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interest has been in the focus of many
scholars, and a number of them criticized it in various aspects (Walker
1892; Clark 1894; Fetter 1902; Fisher 1907; Mises 2006; Keynes 2013).
However, after more than a hundred years of its assertion, the theory is
still being worked on (Olson and Bailey 1981; Becker and Mulligan 1997;
Frederick et al. 2002; Hülsmann 2002; Murphy 2003; Van Suntum and
Neugebauer 2014).
ceilings prevent high prices over a limit as done in rent control, and price
floors do not allow to transact at low prices under a limit as minimum
wages (Coyne and Coyne 2015a). Price controls in a specific market
are imposed for various purposes such as tackling inflation, protecting
the consumers from black-market and exploitation, achieving equity in
the workplace, preventing profiteering by property owners (Lipsey 1977;
Schuettinger and Butler 1979; Bashar 1997; Bourne 2015; Miller 2015;
Siebert 2015; Tabakoğlu 2016; Karadaği 2018).
Although used widely before, and still being used today, there have
been doubts about the usefulness of price controls and even concerns
about their adverse effects. Some controls are claimed to produce results
just opposite to the intention and to have undesired distortive conse-
quences on the market (Schuettinger and Butler 1979). Shortages;
increment in bribery and black-marketing; reduction in investment; wors-
ening in quality of existing properties; reduction in the construction
of new estates; increment in cost of labor; reduction in labor demand;
and increase in unemployment of the less qualified workers are some of
the claimed negativities of price controls (Lipsey 1977; Schuettinger and
Butler 1979; Booth and Davies 2015; Coyne and Coyne 2015b; Miller
2015; Siebert 2015; Snowdon 2015; Wellings 2015).
Yet another problem caused by price control that is argued is about the
signaling role of the price in the market (Schmidtz 2016). Since price is
considered a fast and effective transmitter (Sowell 1980) of a composite
signal that is formed by all the relevant information, any control prevents
this simplest way of the availability of required information in decision-
making and increases uncertainty. Furthermore, the masking effect of
price control may prevent to determine the real reasons for economic
troubles (Coyne and Coyne 2015b).
Being defined as the price of the use of a loan, controlling the rate of
interest is, no doubt, a form of price control. Then, interest rate control
may have effects on the market, similar to the impacts of other price
controls. A ceiling on interest under the market rate reduces the supply
of loans, increases the demand, and causes a shortage. In such a case,
although they are ready to borrow at a higher rate, the more needy
borrowers fall into trouble in finding a loan. Due to the distinction made
by lenders for being riskier, some of the borrowers that lost the opportu-
nity to borrow are guided to usurers, pawnshops, and loan sharks (Durkin
1993; Ellison and Forster 2008; Rigbi 2013). On the other hand, the less
6 C. EYERCI
needy borrowers, who borrow at a relatively lower interest rate, may not
use the loan efficiently.
Regarding the signaling role of price, interest rate control prevents
the transmission of some information, and a lack of information discour-
ages the new lenders from entering the loan market and distorts the free
competition.
The interest rate control may also have some macroeconomic nega-
tivity. The loss of the attraction of capital ownership may decrease
savings, and so, the investment may decline. In consequence, the adversely
affected output, employment, and income may reduce the total wealth
(Durkin 1993).
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29–52.
Becker, Gary S., and Casey B. Mulligan. 1997. “The Endogenous Determination
of Time Preference.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (3): 729–58.
Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen. 1890. Capital and Interest: A Critical History of Econom-
ical Theory. London: Macmillan.
———. 1903. Recent Literature on Interest (1884–1899): A Supplement to
“Capital and Interest.” New York: Macmillan.
———. 1930. The Positive Theory of Capital. New York: G.E.Stechert.
Booth, Philip, and Stephen Davies. 2015. “Price Ceilings in Financial Markets.”
In Flaws and Ceilings: Price Controls and the Damage They Cause, edited
by Christopher Coyne and Rachel Coyne, 135–57. London: Institute of
Economic Affairs.
Bourne, Ryan. 2015. “The Flaws in Rent Ceilings.” In Flaws and Ceilings:
Price Controls and the Damage They Cause, edited by Christopher Coyne
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Cheng, Hao. 2018. “The Death and Revival of Usury in China: An Institutional
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Coco, Giuseppe, and David De Meza. 2009. “In Defense of Usury Laws.”
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Conard, Joseph W. 1959. An Introduction to the Theory of Interest. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Coyne, Christopher, and Rachel Coyne. 2015a. “Introduction.” In Flaws and
Ceilings: Price Controls and the Damage They Cause, edited by Christopher
Coyne and Rachel Coyne, 1–7. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
———. 2015b. “The Economics of Price Controls.” In Flaws and Ceilings:
Price Controls and the Damage They Cause, edited by Christopher Coyne
and Rachel Coyne, 8–28. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
DeLorenzo, Yusuf Talal. 2006. “Introduction to Understanding Riba.” In
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Thomas, 1–9. New York: Routledge.
Durkin, Thomas A. 1993. “An Economic Perspective on Interest Rate Limita-
tions.” Georgia State University Law Review 9 (4).
Ellison, Anna, and Robert Forster. 2008. “The Impact of Interest Rate
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Miller, Robert C.B. 2015. “Price Ceilings: Ancient and Modern.” In Flaws and
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Market.” Review of Economics and Statistics 95 (4): 1238–48.
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and Price Controls: How Not to Fight Inflation. Washington, DC: Heritage
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Price Controls and the Damage They Cause, edited by Christopher Coyne
and Rachel Coyne, 118–34. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
CHAPTER 2
Interest had existed long before the beginning of the efforts to under-
stand and define it. In the first section of this chapter, the literal meaning
of the word interest is presented, and its ascribed meaning as an economic
term is scrutinized in aspects of various definitions and types. The history
of interest is reviewed beginning from the ancient times in terms of the
rates, causes, and regulations of interest, and the enforcement tools of
defaulted loans, in the second section.
Although the word has been used in some other meanings in the
past and today as well (Table 2.1), the earliest relevant usage was in the
sixteenth century (“Interest in Online Etymology Dictionary” 2019), the
same as in its present meaning of payment for the use of borrowed money.
At present, the relevant meaning of interest is defined in Merriam-
Webster (2019) dictionary as “a: charge for borrowed money generally a
percentage of the amount borrowed, b: the profit in goods or money that
is made on invested capital, c: an excess above what is due or expected”
(entry of interest ). The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000)
preferred a single definition as “the extra money that you pay back when
you borrow money or that you receive when you invest money” (p. 625).
Even though the dictionaries define interest as the increment in money
lent, it is clear that interest-bearing transactions of goods besides money
were made in the past and are still being partially made today.
However, some scholars used the word interest in various meanings as
an economic term (Table 2.2). Irving Fisher (1930) defined interest as
the name of all types of income. Joseph Schumpeter’s (1934) definition
was narrower than Fisher’s was, that named all returns, except the wages,
as interest.
Rent/hire Interest
interest. In other words, when there is a transaction cost, the interest rates
of a loan for a lender and a borrower are not equal.
Another breakdown is of natural interest and contract or loan interest .
The value of a product increases by the use of capital in production. In
general, the increment in the value of the product is higher than the value
of capital used. The increment above the invested capital is the profit of
capital, namely natural interest . The owner of capital does not always
employ it himself in production but gives it to someone else against
a fixed remuneration. The remuneration received from capital that is
durable such as building, vehicle, or tool, is called hire or rent. When the
capital is perishable as money, grain, or another commodity, the income is
2 THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST: MEANING AND HISTORY 17
called interest. Both rent and interest are called contract or loan interest
(Böhm-Bawerk 1890).
The distinction between nominal interest and real interest should also
be considered. Nominal interest is simply the interest on a loan or invest-
ment. In case of the existence of inflation, the real value of the capital at
the lending or investment time, especially when capital is money, cannot
be kept at the end of the lending or investment period. The real interest
is the normalized nominal interest by the inflation rate.
The interest rate, which is the ratio of the amount of increment to
the amount of capital lent, has some determinants. These determinants
are essential to understand what the rate means. The interest rate may
change according to the
2.2.1 Mesopotamia
In ancient Sumer, from the third millennium BC to 1900 BC, grain and
silver were standard values (Homer 1963). The Sumerian writings, avail-
able today, were mostly about records of commercial transactions and
contracts, including interest-based loans. In the twenty-fourth century
BC, a Sumerian legal code regulated the loan transactions and freed the
people imprisoned for the debt not paid back (Vincent 2014). The Sume-
rian people were familiar with loans not only at basic interest but also at
compound interest (Graeber 2011). The usual rate of interest for a loan
of barley was 331/3, and for a loan of silver was 20% (Homer 1963).
The Sumerian financial practices that survived until the Babylonian era
took place in the Code of Hammurabi, which came into force circa 1800
BC. The Code allowed lending at interest, but a maximum interest rate
was defined for each type of loan. It was mandatory to make the loan
contracts before an officer and witnesses in Babylonia. If not, the lender
could not claim anything. The lender also lost the repayment if an interest
rate over the maximum level was defined. Pledges and sureties were used
to protect the lender in a case of default. People such as wife, concubine,
children, and slaves or possessions like land, house, and door were allowed
to pledge. The slavery of such people was possible only for three years.
The limit on the slavery period has extended later (Homer 1963).
The loans were usually in grain and silver. Similar to the Sumerian era,
the maximum interest rate on loans of grain (one third per annum) was
higher than on loans of silver (20% per annum) for more than a thousand
years. Although the usual maximum interest rate on loans of silver was
20%, there were also examples as 25 and 12% per annum. The lenders
were not only the individuals, but the temples were also lending. The
2 THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST: MEANING AND HISTORY 19
temples used lower levels of interest rates such as 20% for loans of barley,
and 61/4% for loans of silver to help the poor people. Even the temples
lent without interest in some cases. The interest rates were higher in the
neighboring countries of Babylonia in that era (Homer 1963).
In the period of 732–625 BC, when the Assyrians dominated, the legal
maximum interest rate remained the same in Babylonia. However, the
interest rates in Assyria itself were not the same as the Babylonian rates.
Although there is no evidence of any interest rate limits used in Assyria
in the ninth and eighth century BC, the normal interest rates on grain
loans were 30–50%, and on silver loans were 20–40% per annum (Homer
1963).
Then, in the Neo-Babylonian Empire, from 625 to 539 BC, the
allowed maximum interest rate on grain loans was reduced to 20%, and it
became equal to the rate on silver loans. Lending with interest rates higher
than the defined maximum level was rarely allowed. However, usually, the
rates in the loan market were below the maximum rates of interest. There
were examples that professional creditors lent at 112/3% and some others
lent at interest rates varying between 162/3 and 20% (Homer 1963).
The loans at interest survived for thousands of years in Mesopotamia
with the frequent interventions of the authorities. However, the interven-
tions were not only for the regulation of lending. For the restoration of
justice and equity, the protection of widows and orphans, or other similar
reasons, the debts were abolished several times in Sumer, Babylonia, and
Assyria (Graeber 2011).
The earlier rules limited the interest rate of loans at 15% per annum,
except for commercial loans. Then, various limits were defined for each
caste in the range of 24–60% per annum (Graeber 2011).
and 8–9% in the first century AD. The interest rate on the real estate loans
varied between 62/3 and 18% in the period of fifth to second century BC.
The interest rate on loans to cities was 7–48%, to industry and commerce
was 12–38%, and the rate on the earnings of endowment funds was
6–16%. There were some other types of lending, such as personal and
usurious loans. The interest rates of these types varied in a wide range,
for example, 36% in the fifth century BC, various rates from 10 to 9000%
in the fourth, and 24% in the third century BC (Homer 1963).
2.2.5 Byzantium
About the era of the Eastern Roman Empire, regarding interest, only the
legal limits are known. Since the interest rates were considered too high,
the legal maximums of interest rates were reduced to a range of 4–8%
by the Justinian Code in the sixth century. Bankers and ordinary citi-
zens were allowed to charge 8 and 6%, respectively. The interest rates of
maritime loans per voyage and the loans of commodities payable in kind
were limited to 12%. The interest of the loans to churches and founda-
tions were lower, 3%. Besides, accumulated interest was not allowed to
exceed the principal. The legal limits in the seventh and eighth centuries
were the same as in the sixth century. In the ninth and tenth centuries,
the legal limits increased to 81/3–111/8% range (Homer 1963).
century, the interest rate was between 10 and 16% in the Netherlands, and
20% in Genoa (Homer 1963).
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the types of loans diver-
sified. There were loans to princes, personal loans, commercial loans,
deposits, mortgages, and loans to states. The interest rates varied due
to the type of loan and state. For example, the interest rates were in a
range of 5–40% in the thirteenth century. The upper limits defined for
pawnshops in some states were higher up to 300%. The variation of the
interest rates among the loan types and the countries remained similar
during a few centuries. In the second half of the seventeenth century,
the interest rates of various loan types decreased to some extent. In these
years, the interest rates of short-term commercial loans were 13/4–41/2%
in the Dutch Republic and 3–6% in England. Short-term deposits had
interest rates of 3–4% in the Dutch Republic and 4–6% in England. The
interest rates used in mortgages and other long-term debts were 3–121/2%
in the Dutch Republic, 4–6% in England, and 5–81/3% in France (Homer
1963).
The traditional Islamic view on interest did not become evident
during the lifetime of the Prophet, in the early decades of the seventh
century. Riba, which means increase, addition, or expansion (Chapra
1996), is prohibited both in the Quran (the holy book) and in Sunnah
(practices of the Prophet). However, there has been a long-continued
debate on the scope of riba after the Prophet. Although there are many
others, the widely accepted definition for riba is “any increment in the
amount of borrowed money or asset on the repayment day.” According to
this traditional and most common view, riba means interest. Since interest
is not allowed, at any rate, a riba-based or interest-based lending is the
same as usury.
Although not honored much, there have been various approaches
distinct from the traditional one. Some scholars differentiate the loans
for consumption from the ones for production. They claim that the
income from the former is not allowed due to being riba, and the income
from the latter is allowed since it is an interest. Some others assert that
the simple interest is not implied by riba, but the inhibited action is
receiving compound interest. Another approach defines the prohibited
riba to be the same as usury or excessive interest, but excludes interest at
an acceptable rate from riba and legitimates it.
The interest rates of some transactions in Ancient times and Medieval
Europe are summarized in Table 2.3.
26
Table 2.3 Some annual interest rates practiced in Ancient times and Medieval Europe
10–16 (Netherlands)
20 (Genoa)
Thirteenth century 5–40 300
(Pawnbrokers)
Seventeenth century 3–6 (England)
5–81/3(France)
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2 THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST: MEANING AND HISTORY 29
arguments for developing a new theory distinct from the existing ones
are presented, and his time preference theory of interest is introduced
in more detail. The critiques of Böhm-Bawerk’s theory made by various
scholars are reviewed in the third section. Lastly, the validity of the theory
in the current economic system is evaluated.
Bibliographers contend that the first title page was used in a book printed
by Arnold Ther Hoernen of Cologne in 1470. In this volume an extra leaf is
employed containing simply an introduction at the top. It has always seemed
to me that this leaf is more likely to have been added by the printer to correct
a careless omission of the introduction on his first page of text. Occasionally,
in the humanistic manuscript volumes in the Laurenziana Library, at Florence,
there occurs a “mirror” title (see opp. page), which consists of an illuminated
page made up of a large circle in the center containing the name of the book,
sometimes surrounded by smaller circles, in which are recorded the titles of
the various sections. This seems far more likely to have been suggestive of
what came to be the formal title page.
MIRROR TITLE
From Augustinus: Opera, 1485. Laurenziana Library, Florence
By the end of the fifteenth century the title page was in universal use, and
printers showed great ingenuity in arranging the type in the form of wine cups,
drinking glasses, funnels, inverted cones, and half-diamonds. During the
sixteenth century great artists like Dürer, Holbein, Rubens, and Mantegna
executed superbly engraved titles entirely out of keeping with the poor
typography of the books themselves. In many of the volumes the title page
served the double purpose of title and full-page illustration (see pages 228 and
241). What splendid examples would have resulted if the age of engraved titles
had coincided with the high-water mark in the art of printing!
As the art of printing declined, the engraved title was discarded, and the
printer of the seventeenth century seemed to feel it incumbent upon him to
cover the entire page with type. If you recall the early examples of American
Colonial printing, which were based upon the English models of the time, you
will gain an excellent idea of the grotesque tendency of that period. The
Elzevirs were the only ones who retained the engraved title (page 241). The
Baskerville volumes (page 247), in the middle of the eighteenth century, showed
a return to good taste and harmonious co-ordination with the text; but there
was no beauty in the title until Didot in Paris and Bodoni in Parma, Italy,
introduced the so-called “modern” face, which is peculiarly well adapted to
display (page 253). William Morris, in the late nineteenth century, successfully
combined decoration with type,—over-decorated, in the minds of many, but in
perfect keeping with the type pages of the volumes themselves. Cobden-
Sanderson, at the Doves Press, returned to the extreme in simplicity and good
taste (page 265), excelling all other printers in securing from the blank space on
the leaf the fullest possible value. One of Cobden-Sanderson’s classic remarks
is, “I always give greater attention, in the typography of a book, to what I leave
out than to what I put in.”