the basis of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after

[G. R. No. 154061 : January 25, 2012] petitioner failed to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The
corresponding TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., PETITIONER, VS. HEVA MANAGEMENT AND bank.
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, AND SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT AND EDMUNDO On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession
DAYOT, RESPONDENTS. against petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its
duly authorized manager and officer-in-charge and with the
DECISION assistance of counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw
SERENO, J.: Motion for Suspension of the Petition for the issuance of a writ of
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial possession. [2] The pertinent portions of the Manifestation and
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner's failure Motion state:
to pay the corresponding docket fees.cralaw 3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of
Traders Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI
The facts are as follows: is irrevocably withdrawing its Motion for Suspension referred to in
paragraph 1 above, and its Motion for Reconsideration referred in
On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government- paragraph 2 above and will accept and abide by the September 21,
owned and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage 1990 Order denying the Motion For Suspension;
Contract covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in
favor of Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure P20 million worth of 4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be the
loan and credit accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot 6159,
portions of Lot No. 6153: that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-84236;
to as 6153-B, a road referred to as 6153-C, and a squatter area T-84237, T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and
known as 6153-D.[1] encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5.
That Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful
Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to ownership and immediate physical possession of said real
extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No. properties.
6153. On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
the bank as the highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the 5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly
sale of Lot No. 6153 was registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure to
January 1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer certificates pay the loan of ?20,000,000.00. That TRB was the purchaser of
of title (TCT) covering the mortgaged properties. these lots mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriff's Auction Sale
as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated January 20, 1986 and
Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the Certificates of Titles issued to Petitioner;
 impleaded.
6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future
opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to TRB over the On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order[6] granting the Motion to
parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4 above and subject of this Dismiss of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion
Petition and even assuming "arguendo" that it has, PRI irrevocably filed by petitioner was a judicial admission of TRB's ownership of the
waives the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in securing disputed properties. The trial court pointed out that the
possession of said properties as witness against squatters, illegal Manifestation was executed by petitioner's duly authorized
occupants, and all other possible claimants; representative with the assistance of counsel. This admission thus
operated as a waiver barring petitioner from claiming otherwise.
7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical
possession and control of the premises of these lots to TRB, its On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without
successors or its assigns, together with all the buildings, paying the necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter,
warehouses, offices, and all other permanent improvements respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of
constructed thereon and will attest to the title and possession of nonpayment of docket fees.
petitioner over said real properties. (Emphasis supplied)
In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet
TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No. familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became
6153, which is under dispute. effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not
informed by the court personnel that docket fees needed to be paid
It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended
foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage that the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not
contract. Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of
Annulment of Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with the procedural rules on appeals.
Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of
Ownership of Real Property with Reconveyance plus Damages.[3] On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order[8] dismissing the
appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.
It then filed an Amended Complaint[4] on 1 January 1995 and again
filed a Second Amended Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995. Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the
Order[10] alleging that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case
Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss after the former had filed the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also
on these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) alleged that the court erred in failing to relax procedural rules for
there was a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of the sake of substantial justice.
petitioner's claim or demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of
action; and (4) an indispensable party, namely TRB, was not On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion.[11]
 The CA's action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider
the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner's counsel, Atty.
the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself
strictly applied procedural rules. with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over
a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not
On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision[12] on the aware that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the
Petition. It held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket dismissal of the case.
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground
for the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution[15] denying
Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
and not the trial court. Thus, appellate court ruled that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and Hence, this Petition.
set aside the latter's assailed Order dated 29 September 1997.
Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's dismissal
Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for of the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had
Reconsideration. exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of
filing. Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the appeal was
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA's Decision, this dismissible for failure to pay docket fees, substantial justice
Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which demands that procedural rules be relaxed in this case.
took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly The Petition has no merit.
provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000[13] was issued on 29 August 2000 passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and
and was addressed to all lower courts. to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the
rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to
By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any
questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
Amended Decision[14] in the present Petition granting respondents' objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right
Motion for Reconsideration. may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been
held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy,
and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the
procedure."[16] More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the
it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of
no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any
of Appeal. act performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently,
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result in
the appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.[21]cralaw
13 of Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC's dismissal of
the action may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for
Court. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it sustained lack of merit.
the dismissal of the appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter
prior to the promulgation of its Decision. SO ORDERED

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner,
step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction vs.
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., Respondents.
[18]

DECISION
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of BERSAMIN, J.:
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
exercised only in accordance with the law.[19] defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a
final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved,
We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice" is not or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
a magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the
suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or order.1 Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days
dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.2
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are Antecedents
required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of On September 8, 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita)
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice sold for consideration of ₱160,000.00 to respondent Ramon
not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not Javellana by deed of conditional sale two parcels of land with areas
complying with the procedure prescribed.[20] of 3,675 and 20,936 square meters located in Barangay Mallis,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana would pay filling materials in the parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered
₱80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final
₱80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the deed of sale in his favor.6
Torrens System (the registration being undertaken by Margarita Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was
within a reasonable period of time); and that should Margarita already barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state
become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. a cause of action.7
Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion to dismiss on February 4,
Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with 1998.8 However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC
the application for registration.3 reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss,
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her
Margarita without issue, the vendor’s undertaking fell on the not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of
shoulders of Priscilla, being Margarita’s sole surviving heir. conditional sale for not being a party thereto; that there was no
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the evidence showing the payment of the balance; that he had never
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, demanded the registration of the land from Margarita or Juvenal, or
instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling brought a suit for specific performance against Margarita or Juvenal;
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of and that his claim of paying the balance was not credible.9
land into a residential or industrial subdivision.4 Faced with Javellana moved for reconsideration, contending that the
Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced on February 10, presentation of evidence of full payment was not necessary at that
1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages stage of the proceedings; and that in resolving a motion to dismiss
against her in the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, the facts alleged
docketed as Civil Case No. 79-M-97 entitled Ramon C. Javellana, in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and only the
represented by Atty. Guillermo G. Blanco v. Priscilla Alma Jose. allegations in the complaint should be considered in resolving the
In Civil Case No. 79-M-97, Javellana averred that upon the execution motion.10 Nonetheless, he attached to the motion for
of the deed of conditional sale, he had paid the initial amount of reconsideration the receipts showing the payments made to
₱80,000.00 and had taken possession of the parcels of land; that he Juvenal.11 Moreover, he maintained that Priscilla could no longer
had paid the balance of the purchase price to Juvenal on different succeed to any rights respecting the parcels of land because he had
dates upon Juvenal’s representation that Margarita had needed meanwhile acquired absolute ownership of them; and that the only
funds for the expenses of registration and payment of real estate thing that she, as sole heir, had inherited from Margarita was the
tax; and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire about the obligation to register them under the Torrens System.12
mortgage constituted on the parcels of land; and that he had told On June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999.13
been sold to him.5 Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21,
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order 2000 order,14 which the RTC gave due course to, and the records
or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In his appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259), Javellana submitted the at most, an error of judgment correctible by appeal in issuing the
following as errors of the RTC,15 to wit: challenged orders.
I On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CV No. 68259,18 reversing and setting aside the dismissal of Civil
FACT THAT PLAINTIFF-APELLANT HAD LONG COMPLIED WITH THE Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC "for
FULL PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SALE OF THE further proceedings in accordance with law."19 The CA explained
SUBJECT PROPERTY AND HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN ACTUAL AND that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla,
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF SAID PROPERTY UPON THE SIGNING OF as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita
THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE; with respect to the parcels of land; that Margarita’s undertaking
II under the contract was not a purely personal obligation but was
THE TRIAL COURT OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN MAKING TWO transmissible to Priscilla, who was consequently bound to comply
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL with the obligation; that the action had not yet prescribed due to its
[CODE], PARTICULARLY ARTICLE 1911, IN THE LIGHT OF THE TERMS being actually one for quieting of title that was imprescriptible
OF THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE; brought by Javellana who had actual possession of the properties;
III and that based on the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLEE complaint, Javellana had been in actual possession since 1979, and
BEING NOT A PARTY TO THE CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE the cloud on his title had come about only when Priscilla had started
EXECUTED BY HER MOTHER IN FAVOR OF PLAINTFF- dumping filling materials on the premises.20
APPELLANT IS NOT BOUND THEREBY AND CAN NOT BE COMPELLED On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for
TO DO THE ACT REQUIRED IN THE SAID DEED OF CONDITIONAL reconsideration, 21 stating that it decided to give due course to the
SALE; appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention
IV to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did not even seek an
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AMENDED extension of time to file his appellant’s brief; that current
COMPLAINT WITHOUT HEARING THE CASE ON THE MERITS. jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to present
Priscilla countered that the June 21, 2000 order was not appealable; their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such that even
that the appeal was not perfected on time; and that Javellana was if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was given the
guilty of forum shopping.16 discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable reasons.
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for Issues
certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred
orders dismissing his complaint (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455). On August in not outrightly dismissing Javellana’s appeal because: (a) the June
6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had
certiorari,17 finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of been filed belatedly by three days; and (c) Javellana was guilty of
discretion in issuing the orders, and holding that it only committed, forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to assail
the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal
pending in the CA. She posited that, even if the CA’s decision to determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
entertain the appeal was affirmed, the RTC’s dismissal of the but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
complaint should nonetheless be upheld because the complaint order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
stated no cause of action, and the action had already prescribed. yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
On his part, Javellana countered that the errors being assigned by whether or not an order or a judgment is
Priscilla involved questions of fact not proper for the Court to interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave
review through petition for review on certiorari; that the June 21, something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
2000 RTC order, being a final order, was appealable; that his appeal the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
was perfected on time; and that he was not guilty of forum otherwise, it is final.
shopping because at the time he filed the And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
petition for certiorari the CA had not yet rendered a decision in C.A.- whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
G.R. appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
CV No. 68259, and because the issue of ownership raised in C.A.- Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal
G.R. CV No. 68259 was different from the issue of grave abuse of may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
discretion raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455. disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared
Ruling by these Rules to be appealable;"23 but the remedy from an
The petition for review has no merit. interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for
I certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
order of dismissal was a final order and appealable xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory
Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which
subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the
Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple
denying a motion for reconsideration. appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a
Priscilla’s submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained. considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as
nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as
dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but
interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,22 thuswise: only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or itself.
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that
the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal
under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. on time, as Priscilla insists.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh
an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,25 by which an aggrieved
clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is
motion for allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.24 motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
II The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days
which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days or more.
from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period. file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides: receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken reconsideration.
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
days from notice of the judgment or final order. Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration resolution.26
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated the
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely policy against forum shopping.
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of The Court expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping
procedure."27 According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:28 in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 303168
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and 303169 and Issuance of Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title
and forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner:30
administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and
retroactive operation of statues ― they may be given retroactive possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of
passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause or
that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
in rules of procedure. disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or
period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum
period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
present case. action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
rule" will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
the year 2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
and illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
the instant case, will not.29 not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
Consequently, we rule that Javellana’s notice of appeal was timely causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
filed pursuant to the fresh period rule. sought.
III
No forum shopping was committed
Should Javellana’s present appeal now be held barred by his filing of Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of
the petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner
was yet pending? couches it, becomes a "precautionary measure" for the rest,
We are aware that in Young v. Sy,31 in which the petitioner filed a thereby increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the
notice of appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of very evil that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right.
her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave
CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and
certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial court’s contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try
dismissal of both cases. The Court said: their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached.
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the
petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules
When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had results in the dismissal of the case.32
elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella,33 which likewise
under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of involved the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for
the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding
are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth the CA’s dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the through separate decisions.
same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the RTC Orders Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here
which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for even if the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and
failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the the petition for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists
reversal of the RTC orders.1âwphi1 The parties, the rights asserted, because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought
the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,
is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res Javellana aimed to undo the RTC’s erroneous dismissal of Civil Case
judicata in the other. No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific
xxxx performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC;
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective "to
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial prevent (Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from
policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally
more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags resolved," as the CA explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R.
significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this SP No. 60455.34
circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against
been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The
first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal INC., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA
was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B,
60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of ANTIQUE, Respondents.
the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of RESOLUTION
shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or BERSAMIN, J.:
judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the
the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of reconsideration1 of the resolution promulgated on August 19,
the petition for certiorari. 2014,2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for certiorari under
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court due to its non-
remedial approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for: (a) the
Javellana’s counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of
caretaker’s eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave
development of them into a residential or commercial subdivision abuse of discretion on the part of the
pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly respondents.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
averred that his appeal was "inadequate and not speedy to prevent
private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from Antecedents
developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to
the total deprivation of petitioner’s rights of possession and Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the
ownership over the subject property," and that the dismissal by the petitioner executed a memorandum of agreement concerning the
RTC had "emboldened private respondents to fully develop the life insurance coverage of qualified barangay secretaries, treasurers
property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium
against petitioner’s overseer xxx."35 Thereby, it became far-fetched payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding
that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the disbursement voucher to COA-Antique for pre-audit.4 The latter
policy against forum shopping. office disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis under Republic
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and but its appeal was denied.
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. Consequently, the petitioner filed its petition for money claim in the
COA.5 On November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying
the petition,6 holding that under Section 447 and Section 458 of
the Local Government Code only municipal or city governments are
G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015 expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance
coverage for barangay workers; and noting the LGU�s failure to I
comply with the requirement of publication under Section 21 of Petitioner did not comply with
Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act). the rule on proof of service

The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, The petitioner claims that the affidavit of service attached to the
2012,7 and filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14, petition for certiorari complied with the requirement on proof of
2013.8 However, the COA denied the motion,9 the denial being service.
received by the petitioner on July 14,
2014.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of
Hence, the petitioner filed the petition for certiorari on August 12, proof of service, namely: the affidavit and the registry
2014, but the petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated receipt, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
through the resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014 for (a) the Section 13. Proof of Service. � x x x. If service is made by
late filing of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the proof of registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
service and verified declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents.cralawred shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn
Issues copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it filed
the petition for certiorari within the reglementary period following Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered
the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals;11 and mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person
that the petition for certiorari included an affidavit of service in effecting the mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be
compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits appended to the paper being served.� A compliance with the rule
having overlooked the submission of a verified declaration; and is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both
prays that the declaration attached to the motion for are not submitted.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial compliance
with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule12 by previously submitting a Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the affidavit of service
compact disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its executed by one Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had
annexes. It disagrees with the Court, insisting that it showed and served copies of the petition by registered mail �under Registry
proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524 attached to
the assailed decision.cralawred the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the
petition.�14 The petition only bore, however, the cut print-outs of
Ruling what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers of the registered
We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit. matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to
be appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
the cut print-outs did not substantially comply with the rule. This judgment.18 Questions of fact cannot be raised except to determine
was the reason why the Court held in the resolution of August 19, whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of grave abuse of
2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
proof of service.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different.
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes In the former, the aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to file the
did not apply to the petition for certiorari petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration.19 In the latter, the petition is filed within 30 days
The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to
Rule 64 petition is akin to a petition for review brought under Rule be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
42 of the Rules of Court; hence, conformably with the fresh period if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
rule, the period to file a Rule 64 petition should also be reckoned interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the
from the receipt of the order denying the motion for aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
reconsideration or the motion for new which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
trial.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the notice of denial.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioner�s position cannot be sustained. The petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on January 14,
2013, which was 31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 COA on December 14, 2012.21� Pursuant to Section 3 of� Rule
and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. 64, it had only five days from receipt of the denial of its motion for
reconsideration to file the petition. Considering that it received the
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from notice of the denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014
the judgment or final order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in to file the petition. However, it filed the petition on August 13,
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Such appeal is on a 2014, which was 25 days too late.
question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and
is given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections22 that the belated
Regional Trial Court committed an error of fact or law warranting filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that
the reversal or modification of the challenged judgment or final the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such,
order.17 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly
similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes23 applied. Rules of
judgment or final order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice
or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is not designed to that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the prescribed procedure.24 Absent this reason delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither
for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper. arbitrary nor whimsical on its part. Secondly, the mere terseness of
III the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not a factor in
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that
Senator Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit. the Local Government Code in the Legislature, expressed an opinion
on the issues different from the COA Commissioners� own did not
The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed matter, for it was the latter�s adjudication that had any value and
grave abuse of discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was decisiveness on the issues by virtue of their being the
rendered by a divided COA proper; (2) the COA took almost a year Constitutionally officials entrusted with the authority for that
before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in resolving purpose.
the� motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express
mandate of the Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the motion It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim
for reconsideration was made up of only two sentences; (4)� the of the petitioner for the further reason of lack of sufficient
matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of the publication as required by the Government Procurement Act. In that
pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the
issuing the resolution, COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and petitioner�s claim.
Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they knew the Local IV
Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel Petitioner and its counsel
who offered an opinion on the matter.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the
jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or petitioner�s non-compliance with the requirement of the proof of
despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal service, alleging that even �a perfunctory scrutiny� of the
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to petition for certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform had attached an affidavit of service to the petition. It goes on to
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of make the following statements, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
law.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary 25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the
PETITION and its annexes up to its last page, thus, the erroneous
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not finding that there was non-submission of the proof of service;
sufficiently disclose how the COA committed grave abuse of its
discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the petitioner did not 26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members
approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed of this Honorable Court who took the observation from the office of
the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in his case, Atty. Fortaleza should further show cause why he should
fact, it is not;27 not be disbarred.chanrobleslaw

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for
to accept the ill consequences of their own shortcomings, and its lack of merit; ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty.
instead showed an unabashed propensity to readily lay blame on Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in writing within ten (10) days
others like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed from notice why they should not be punished for indirect contempt
harsh and disrespectful language that accused the Court and its of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the
Members of ignorance and recklessness in the performance of their same period why he should not be disbarred.
function of adjudication.
SO ORDERED
We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being
uttered against the Court and its Members. We consider the
accusatory language particularly offensive because it was
unfounded and undeserved. As this resolution earlier clarifies, the
petition for certiorari did not contain a proper affidavit of service. Fabian vs. Desierto
We do not need to rehash the clarification. Had the petitioner and G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
its counsel been humbler to accept their self-inflicted situation and Posted by: Zennia Marie V. Deleonio on 3 August 2018
more contrite, they would have desisted from their harshness and
disrespect towards the Court and its Members. Although we are not FACTS:
beyond error, we assure the petitioner and its counsel that our Promat participated in the bidding for government construction
resolutions and determinations are arrived at or reached with much project including those under the FMED, and private respondent. In
care and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the the course of their amorous relationship, private respondents gifted
litigants are always at stake. If there be errors, they would be PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
unintended, and would be the result of human oversight. But in this problems concerning the same in his office. Later, petitioner tried to
instance the Court and its Members committed no error. The terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
petition bore only cut reproductions of the supposed registry resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
receipts, which even a mere �perfunctory scrutiny� would not harassment, intimidation and threats. An administrative case was
pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules of Court. filed against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the
Ombudsman. It was ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. decision is final and executory.
Fortaleza, should fully explain in writing why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court for their harsh and Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that
disrespectful language towards the Court and its Members; and, in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) is
unconstitutional. She points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction
Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
Ombudsman),[2] when a respondent is absolved of the charges in presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
an administrative proceeding decision of the ombudsman is final which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The
and unappealable. Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate Jurisdiction.
She accordingly submits that the office of the ombudsman has no Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No.
6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of the Xxx
aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she
found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic
the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates on the Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
ISSUE: appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
the Supreme Court.
There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section
RULING: 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which, being substantive in
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making
pertinently provides that: power, especially if it results in a diminution, increase or
modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the
In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions law is procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against the
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from exercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or the question of whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 substantive or procedural.
of the Rules of Court.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those
It cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
substantive in another.[29] It is admitted that what is procedural appeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and
and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. not a substantive power. Neither can we consider such transfer as
[30] It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and
pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own still a competent tribunal to administer that remedy.[35]
procedural and jurisdictional system.
Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for transfer of cases from one court to another, are procedural and
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really pending at the time the statute went into effect[36] or, in the case
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly, even from the
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the transfer of
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
them.[31] If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural.
If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means o
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.[32] APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES, GR
No. 164195, 2011-04-05
Facts:
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme We resolve Land Bank of the Philippines' (LBP's) 2nd Motion for
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases Reconsideration of December 14, 2010 that addresses our
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in Resolutions of October 12, 2010 and November 23, 2010.
administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which In its original Decision of February 6, 2007, the Division affirmed the
shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, RTC's decision setting the just compensation to be paid and fixing
relates to procedure only.[33] This is so because it is not the right to the interest due on the balance of the compensation due at 12%...
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right per annum.
has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appeal is to In its Resolution of December 19, 2007, the Third Division resolved
be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that the parties' motions for reconsideration by deleting the 12%
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be interest due on the balance of the awarded just compensation.
changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he this Resolution were denied on
can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.[34] April 30, 2008;
Despite the entry of judgment, the present petitioners filed a
Furthermore, it cannot be said that transfer of appellate jurisdiction second motion for reconsideration that prayed as well that the case
to the Court of Appeals in this case is an act of creating a new right be referred to the Court en banc.
of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transfer
On December 4, 2009, the Court en banc denied the petitioners' Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the
second motion for reconsideration. constitutional rule on eminent domain - "Private property shall not
Maintaining their belief in their demand to be granted 12% interest, be taken for public use without just compensation."
the... petitioners persisted in filing another motion for This is a... very myopic reading of our ruling as the context clearly
reconsideration. In the interim, the Court promulgated its Internal shows that the phrase "transcendental importance" was used only
Rules that regulated, among others, 2nd motions for to emphasize the overriding public interest involved in this case.
reconsideration. LBP at fault for twelve-... year delay in payment
On October 12, 2010, the Court en banc granted - by a... vote of 8 On its face, the staggering difference between the LBP's initial
for and 4 against - the petitioner's motion and awarded the 12% valuation of the petitioners' properties (totaling P251,379,104.02)
interests the petitioners' prayed for, thus affirming the interests the and the RTC's valuation (totaling P1,383,179,000.00) - a difference
RTC originally awarded. of P1,131,799,895.98 amounting to 81% of the total price -...
The Court subsequently denied the respondent's motion for betrays the lack of good faith on the part of the government in
reconsideration, giving rise to the present dealing with the landowners.
2nd motion for reconsideration Thus, the landowners lost not only their properties, but the fruits of
Admittedly, the Court did not make any express prior ruling these properties.
accepting or disallowing the petitioners' motion as required by These were all lost in 1996, leaving the landowners without any
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. replacement income from their properties, except for the possible
since 12 Members of the Court opted to entertain the motion by interest for the trifling payment made at the time of the taking that,
voting for and against it, the Court simply did not register an express together with the subsequent payment, only amounted to a third of
vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule the total... amount due
through the participation by no less than 12 of its 15 An added dimension to this delayed payment is the impact of the
Members. delay. One impact - as pointed out above - is the loss of income the
the Court thus rejected Mr. Justice Abad's observations, and landowners suffered. Another impact that the LBP now glosses over
proceeded to vote on the question of whether to entertain the is the income that the LBP earned from the sizeable sum it...
respondents' present 2nd motion for reconsideration. withheld for twelve long years. From this perspective, the
We reject the basic premise of the LBP's and Mr. Justice Abad's unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust enrichment in its favor and an
arguments for being flawed. inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what the
The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it Court essentially addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12%...
involves a matter of public interest - the proper application of a interest.
basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely,... the right of a Two significant factors justify the attribution of the delay to the
landowner to receive just compensation when the government government.
exercises the power of eminent domain in its agrarian reform The first is the DAR's gross undervaluation of the petitioners'
program. properties - the government move that started the cycle of court
actions.
The second factor to consider is government inaction. Records show After examining and studying the documents relative to the loan
that after the petitioners received the LBP's initial valuation of their transactions, the Committee determined that they bore the
lands, they filed petitions with the DARAB, the responsible agency of characteristics of behest loans, as defined under Memorandum
the DAR, for the proper determination of just compensation. Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were
Instead of dismissing these petitions outright for lack of jurisdiction, known cronies of then President
the DARAB sat on these cases for three years. It was only after the Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was
petitioners resorted to judicial intervention, filing their petitions for undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted.
the determination of just compensation with the RTC, that the... Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact-
petitioners' case advanced. Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential Commission
Clearly, the payments made by the farmers-beneficiaries to the LBP on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the Office of the
are primarily based on a fixed percentage of their annual gross Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for violation of
production, or the value of the annual yield/produce of the land Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act
awarded to them. No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
Issues: respondents... the Ombudsman handed down the assailed
ruling deleting the 12% interest Resolution,[6] dismissing the complaint. The Ombudsman conceded
Justice Abad's stance could have been correct were it not for the that there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary
fact that the delay in this case is... ultimately attributable to the investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed... the complaint holding that
government. the offenses charged had already prescribed,... It bears mention
Ruling:
that the acts complained of were committed before the issuance of
On these considerations, we hereby DENY the Motion for
BP 195 on March 2, 1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in the
Reconsideration with FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be
instant case is ten (10) years as provided in the (sic) Section 11 of
entertained.
R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent's second motion
Equally important to stress is that the subject financial transactions
for reconsideration and the motion to set the case for oral
between 1978 and 1981 transpired at the time when there was yet
arguments are hereby DENIED WITH ABSOLUTE FINALITY.
no Presidential Order or Directive naming, classifying or categorizing
ORLANDO L. SALVADOR v. PLACIDO L. MAPA, GR No. 135080, them as Behest or Non-Behest Loans.
2007-11-28 the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on
Facts: October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No. 13. Subsequently,
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992, was issued
Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact- defining the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference in
Finding Committee on Behest Loans,... Several loan accounts were determining... behest loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are to be
referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan considered the bases of charging respondents for alleged offenses
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now committed, they become ex-post facto laws which are proscribed by
Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Constitution.
the Philippines (DBP).
The Committee filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an
Ombudsman denied it on July 27, 1998. action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent
Issues: when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which
WHETHER OR NOT THE CRIME DEFINED BY SEC. 3(e) AND (g) OF R.A. aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
3019 HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE PETITIONER FILED or (c) which... changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
ITS COMPLAINT. punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13 AND committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 61 ARE EX-POST FACTO LAW[S] receives less or different testimony than the law required at the
Ruling:
time of the commission of the offense in order... to convict the
The issue of prescription has long been settled by this Court in
defendant.[22] This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely:
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
(e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but
Desierto,[13] thus:
in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
[I]t is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
done was lawful; or (f) that which... deprives a person accused of a
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the...
proclamation of amnesty
loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law
period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the
The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No.
Since the prescriptive period commenced to run on the date of the
13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
discovery of the offenses, and since discovery could not have been
Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
made earlier than October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
was created, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the
Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference
respondents had not... yet prescribed when the complaint was filed
for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative
on October 4, 1996.
Order No. 13 and
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a
Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule
Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable implication; a law shall not
that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex
be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
post facto
beyond... reasonable doubt. The presumption is always in favor of
constitutionality.
In any event, we hold that Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws. ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NLRC, GR NO. 142351, 2006-
11-22
 employee relationship between the parties... motion for
Facts:
reconsideration was rejected by the NLRC... petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
petition for certiorari under Rule 6
payment of back wages, and damages filed by private respondent
Justice Jose Vitug, rendered the landmark Decision in this case then
Aricayos against petitioner.
docketed as G.R. No. 130866... holding for the first time that all
The owner of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Homes, Inc. (St. Martin)
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decisions of the
is Amelita Malabed.
NLRC should henceforth be filed... with the CA... the petition was
Prior to January 1996, Amelita's mother managed the funeral parlor
remanded to the CA... rendered
Sometime in 1995, Aricayos was granted... financial assistance by
Decision... dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit with the
Amelita's mother. As a sign of appreciation, respondent extended
finding that respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
assistance to Amelita's mother in managing St. Martin without
discretion,... Petitioner insists that... the Labor Arbiter actually
compensation.
concluded that there was no employer-employee relationship
There was no written employment contract between Amelita's
between the parties considering the memoranda, position papers,
mother and respondent Aricayos; furthermore, respondent
and the documentary evidence presented
Aricayos was not even listed as an employee in the Company's
St. Martin asserts that the Labor Arbiter already undertook the
payroll.
"appropriate proceeding" referred to by the NLRC and the CA
When Amelita's mother died Issues:
Amelita took over as manager of St. Martin. whether the Labor Arbiter made a determination of the presence of
she found out that St. Martin had arrearages in the payment of BIR an employer-employee relationship between St. Martin and
taxes and other fees owing to the government, but company respondent Aricayos based on the evidence on record.
records tended to show that payments were... made thereon. Ruling:
As a result, Amelita removed the authority from respondent it is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a question of fact
Aricayos and his wife from taking part in managing St. Martin's which is proscribed by the rule disallowing factual issues in appeal
operations. by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
respondent Aricayos accused St. Martin of his illegal dismissal as Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of
Operations Manager of the company. the documentary evidence as an exception to the general rule, we
believed that the cause of his termination was Amelita's suspicion are precluded by the abject failure of petitioner to attach to the
that he pocketed PhP 38,000.00 which was set aside for payment to petition important and material portions of the records as would
the BIR... the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, in favor of support the... petition prescribed by Rule 45, Section 4.
petitioner declaring that his office had no jurisdiction over the case the Labor Arbiter did not set the labor case for hearing to be able to
Aggrieved, respondent Aricayos appealed the Labor Arbiter's determine the veracity of the conflicting positions of the parties.
adverse ruling to the NLRC. while a formal trial or hearing is discretionary on the part of the
NLRC issued a Resolution annulling the Arbiter's Decision and Labor Arbiter, when there are factual issues that require a formal
remanded the case to him for appropriate proceedings, to presentation of evidence in a hearing, the Labor Arbiter cannot
determine the factual issue of the existence of... employer-
simply rely on the position papers, more so,... on mere thus disembarked in Manila on August 29. 2004.
unsubstantiated claims of parties.
In the case at bar, there are certain admissions by petitioner St. Petitioner was later to claim that he was not paid the promised
Martin that should have prodded the Labor Arbiter to conduct a "standby fee" in lieu of salary that he was to receive while awaiting
hearing for a more in-depth examination of the contrasting transfer to another vessel as in fact the transfer never materialized.
positions of the parties, namely; that respondent helped Amelita's
mother manage the... funeral parlor business by running errands for On October 20, 2004, petitioner signed a new Contract of
her,[11] overseeing the business from 1995 up to January 1996 Employment[3] for a six-month deployment as Chief Mate in a newly-
when the mother died, and that after Amelita made changes in the built Japanese vessel. M/T Haruna. He was paid a one-month
business operation, private respondent and his wife were no longer "standby lee" in connection with the Maritina contract.
allowed to... participate in the management of St. Martin.[12] These
facts, as admitted by the petitioner and the affidavits of St. Martin's Petitioner boarded the M/T Haruna on October 31, 2004 tat he
witnesses, could have been examined more in detail by the Labor disembarked a week later as MST claimed that his boarding of
Arbiter in a hearing to convince himself that there was indeed no... M/T Haruna was a "sea trial" which, MST maintains, was priorly
employment relationship between the parties as he originally made known to him on a "stand-by" fee. MST soon informed
found. petitioner that he would be redeployed to the M/T Haruna on
no reason to disturb the assailed judgment of the CA November 30, 2004, but petitioner refused, prompting MST to file a
complaint[4] for breach of contract against him before the Philippine
[G.R. No. 189314, June 15 : 2011] Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

MIGUEL DELA BARAIRO, PENA PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE Petitioner claimed, however, that he was placed on "forced
PRESIDENT AND MST MARINE SERVICES (PHILS,), INC. vacation'1 when he was made to disembark from the M/T Haruna,
RESPONDENT. and that not wanting to experience a repetition of the previous
"termination" of his employment aboard the Maritina, he refused to
DECISION be redeployed to the M/T Haruna.

CARPIO MORALES, J.: By Order[5] of April 5. 2006, then POEA Administrator Rosalinda D
Baldoz penalized petitioner with one year suspension from overseas
Miguel Barairo (petitioner) was hired[1] on June 29, 2004 by deployment upon a finding that his refusal to complete his contract
respondent MST Marine Services (Phils.) Inc., (MST) for its principal, aboard the M/T Haruna constituted a breach thereof.
TSM International, Ltd., as Chief Mate of the vessel Maritina, for a
contract period of six months. He hoarded the vessel and On appeal by petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, by Order[6] of
discharged his duties on July 23, 2004. but was relieved[2] on August September 22, 2006, noting that it was petitioner's first
28, 2004 ostensibly for transfer to another vessel, Solar. Petitioner offense, modified the POEA Order by shortening the period of
suspension from one year to six months. disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively
the of the Chief Executive. [10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Office of the President (OP), by Decision[7] of November 26,
2007. dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, It cannot be gainsaid that petitioner's case does not involve national
citing National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma.[8] interest.

The OP held that appeals to it in labor cases, except those involving Petitioner's appeal of the Secretary of Labor's Decision to the Office
national interest, have been eliminated. Petitioner's motion for of the President did not toll the running of the period, hence, the
partial reconsideration was denied by Resolution[9] of June 26, 2009. assailed Decisions of the Secretary of Labor are deemed to have
hence, the present petition. attained finality.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has
Following settled jurisprudence, the proper remedy to question the been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural
decisions or orders o the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.
Certiorari under Rule 65. nol via an appeal to the OP. For appeals to Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
the OP in labor cases have indeed been eliminated, except those period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also
involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules
jurisdiction. The rationale behind this development is mirrored in regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.
the OP's Resolution of June 26, 2009 the pertinent portion of which Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case
reads: irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no
. . [T]he assailed DOLE'S Orders were both issued by court - not even the Supreme Court - has the power to revise,
Undersecretary Danilo P. Cruz under the authority of the DOLE review, change or after the same. The basic rule of finality of
Secretary vvho is the alter ego of the President. Under the judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency," a corollary rule to the and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
control powers of the President, all executive and administrative judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads become final at some definite date fixed by law.[11] (underscoring in
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the original emphasis supplied)
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive
is required by Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies At all events, on the merits, (he petition just the same fails.
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are As found by the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor,
performed by and through the executive departments, and the through Undersecretary Danilo P. Cruz, petitioner's refusal to board
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and the M/T Haruna on November 30, 2004 constituted unjustified
promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless breach of his contract of employment under Section 1 (A-2) Rule II.
Part VI [sic] of the POEA Seabased Rules and Regulations.[12] That
petitioner believed that respondent company violated his rights
when the period of his earlier Maritina contract was not followed
and his "stand-by fees" were not fully paid did not justify his refusal
to abide by the valid and existing Haruna contract requiring him to
serve aboard M/T Haruna. For, as noted in the assailed DOLE Order,
"if petitioner's rights has been violated as he claims, he has various
remedies under the contract winch he did not avail of

Parenthetically, the Undersecretary of Labor declared that "the real

reason [petitioner] refused to re-join Haruna on November 30.
2004, is that he left the Philippines on November 29, 2004 to join
MT Adriatiki, a vessel of another maiming agency," which
declaration petitioner has not refuted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.