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THE MOST COMPLETE AND AUTHORITATIVE TEXTBOOK
ON DEMOCRATIZATION
Democratization provides insightful coverage of all important aspects of contemporary
democratization, including theories, actors, dynamics, and real-world developments.
lt brings together leading experts from a range of international backgrounds, including
some of the best-known names in the field, making it an invaluable resource for students
of democratization.
NEW TO THIS EDITION: :t\n important and brilliant book

• A new chapter on social media highlights this which will be essential reading
important new dynamic in democratization. for students and scholars of
democracy and democratization ·
• New chapters on Post-Communist Europe
and the Post-Soviet Space demonstrate the Yosef Kamal lbssa. Univers1ty of Copenhagen
significant changes and developments in these

ABOUT THE EDITORS:
regions in recent years.
Christian Haerpfer is Professor
• Updates throughout the text reflect dramatic
of Sociology at the United Arab
developments in world politics since the
Emirates University.
publication of the first edition, including the
aftermath of the Arab Spring, and autocratizing Patrick Bernhagen is Professor
tendencies in various regions of the world. of Comparative Politics at the
University of Stuttgart.
• lncreased coverage of resilient authoritarianism
highlights this key area of contemporary debate. Christian Welzel is Professor for
Political Culture Research at Leuphan
• An expanded glossary helps you to develop your
University of Lüneburg.
technical vocabulary in this complex field of study.
Ronald F. lnglehart is Professor
~ online resources of Political Science at the University
~ - www.oup.com/uk/haerpfer2e/ of Michigan.
This textbook is supported by a range of online resources

designed to help you take your learning further. Co\.,.er 1ma.9es r r~1c, ,:) S!ock com Lai'-"",~' _1:_
1tJottc:rni C) ,:~or;__::r)a,.~~. /\rtern S iru!!e~st, , . .._
OXFORD ISBN 978- 0-19 -8 73228 -0
UN I V ERSITY PR ESS
II I 11 1111 1111111111
9 780198 732280
www.oup.com
Democratization
SECOND EDITION
Christian W. Haerpfer
Patrick Bernhagen
Christian Welzel
Ronald F. lnglehart
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Oxford University Press 2019
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First edition 2009
Impression: 3
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
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Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
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contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
\
\
Preface and Acknowledgements
to the First Edition
Since the global wave of democratization peaked in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the subject has become of crucial concern for any attempt of understanding the contem-
porary political world. Consequently, over the past ten years, courses on democratization have
established themselves as core components of a large, and increasing, number of undergraduate
and postgraduate curricula in politics and international relations. At the same time, the availability
of high-quality textbooks in that field has been very limited.
The idea for a new book to fill this gap first surfaced in a conversation between the editors and
Ruth Anderson at Oxford University Press in October 2006. They agreed that an introductory text
that would introduce students to the theoretical and practical dimensions of democratization in
an accessible and systematic way has been lacking for quite some time. Bringing together leading
authors from diverse international backgrounds, including some of the best known names in the
field, as well as younger scholars, they decided to produce the present book. The resulting text treats
in a single volume all important aspects of contemporary democratization, including theories of
democratization, critical prerequisites and driving forces of democratic transition, pivotal actors,
and institutions, and the conditions and challenges for the consolidation of new democracies,
including the analysis of failed democratization. To demonstrate how all these factors have affected
democratization around the world, we decided that all major world regions should be covered, and
we included cases of successful democratic consolidation as well as countries in which the future
of democracy remains highly uncertain.
In the process of writing and editing this book, we have incurred great debt to an even greater
number of people-too many to list in detail. But we would like to particularly acknowledge the
help of Ecaterina McDonagh, who has been responsible for creating the Online Resource Centre
supporting the book. Of course we also thank all our contributors for fitting their expertise into
the general framework of this book. Thanks are also due to Ruth Anderson, Suzy Armitage, and
Thomas Sigel, who have been patient and supportive at different stages of the process.
The contribution of Christian W. Haerpfer to this volume has been supported by a Woodrow
Wilson Fellowship of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian and Ukrainian Studies in
Washington DC, and by the CINEFOGO network under the Sixth Framework Programme of the
European Union. The University of Aberdeen has been very supportive of this project and facilitated
the participation of five scholars from its Department of Politics and International Relations as
editors and/ or authors. We are also grateful to a considerable number of anonymous reviewers
whose comments early on in the process were immensely helpful in improving the structure and
content of this book. Needless to say, we are solely responsible for any remaining errors.
The Editors (Aberdeen, Ann Arbor, and Bremen) 2009
Preface and Acknowledgements
to the Second Edition
At the time of this writing, almost ten years have passed since the first edition of this volume. Dur-
ing this time, we have witnessed the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, followed by a reverse
wave of democratization, rising authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and electoral triumphs
of right-wing populism. This recent tum of events has nourished a new pessimism about the pros-
pects of democracy and a general sense of democracy in crisis. Coping with this change of the
academic and public mood prompted us to thoroughly re-write the introductory and concluding
chapters of this volume. Likewise, all authors of the first edition have profoundly updated and-
where necessary-modified their chapters, in recognition of the newly emerging sense of crisis.
Furthermore, we have recruited new authors to cover aspects in the context of democratization
(and autocratization) that require more attention. Above all, this holds true for Larry Diamond's
chapter on the role of the new media and the Internet. Furthermore, Christian Haerpfer's chapter
on the post-communist world has been divided into two separate chapters for Central/Eastern
Europe, on one hand, and the post-Soviet space, on the other. The glossary and references have also
been thoroughly updated.
In acknowledgement of all authors' formidable contributions to this second edition of
Democratization, we wish to express at this occasion our deep and sincere gratitude-in the hope
that a third edition will tum back to a more optimistic outlook on democracy. Last but not least,
our sense of sincere gratitude extends to our enormously competent and helpful editor at Oxford
University Press, Francesca Walker-thank you, indeed.
Key parts of the research embodied in Christian Welzel's contribution to this edition in Chapters
1, 2, and 9 have been funded by the Russian Academic Excellence Project '5-100'.
The Editors (Ann Arbor, Lilneburg and Moscow; Stuttgart, and Vienna) 2018
Brief Contents
How to use this book xxii

How to use the online resources xxiv
About the Editors XXV
About the Contributors xxvi
Introduction
Christian Welzel, Ronald lnglehart, Patrick Bernhagen, and Christian W. Haerpfer
PART ONE Theoretical and Historical Perspectives 19
2 Theories of Democratization 21
Christian Welzel
3 Democratic and Undemocratic States 40

Richard Rose
4 Measuring Democracy and Democratization 52

Patrick Bernhagen
5 Long Waves and Conjunctures of Democratization 67

Dirk Berg-Schlosser
6 The Global Wave of Democratization 82

John MarkDff and Daniel Burridge
PART TWO Causes and Dimensions of Democratization IOI

7 The International Context 103
Hakan Yilmaz
8 The Political Economy of Democracy 119

Patrick Bernhagen
9 Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change 134

Christian Welzel and Ronald F. lnglehart
I O Gender and Democratization 158

Pamela Paxton and Kristopher Velasco
x Brief Contents
I I Social Capital and Civil Society 171

Natalia Letki
12 Social Movements and Contention in Democratization Processes 182

Federico M. Rossi and Donate/la de/la Porta
PART THREE Actors and Institutions 195
13 Conventional Citizen Participation 197

Ian McAllister and Stephen White
14 Political Parties 212

Leonardo Morlino
15 Institutional Design in New Democracies 228

Matthijs Bogaards
16 The Media 239

Katrin Voltmer and Gary Rawnsley
17 Social Media 253

Larry Diamond and Zak Whittington
18 A Decade of Democratic Decline and Stagnation 267

Laura Jakli, M. Steven Fish, and Jason Wittenberg
PART FOUR Regions of Democratization 283
19 Southern Europe 285

Richard Gunther
20 Latin America 305

Andrea Oelsner and Mervyn Bain
21 Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe 322

Christian W. Haerpfer and Kseniya Kizilova
22 Post-Soviet Eurasia 341

23 The Middle East and North Africa 364

Francesco Cavatorta
24 Sub-Saharan Africa 384

Michael Bratton
25 East Asia 401

Doh Chu/I Shin and Rollin F. Tusa/em
Brief Contents xi
PART FIVE Conclusions and Outlook 421
26 Conclusion: The Future of Democratization 423

Glossary 432
Bibliography 440
Index 476
Detailed Contents
How to use this book xxii

How to use the online resources xxiv
About the Editors XXV
About the Contributors xxvi
Introduction
The New Pessimism about Democracy

A New Look at Democracy 2
Re-Examining the Centennial Democratic Trend: A Reversal? 2
Democracy's Persistent Culture-Boundedness 3
Democracy's Societal Pre-Conditions 7
Global Support for Democracy-A False Standard 10
Economic Inequality as Democracy's Key Challenge 14
The Value of Democracy 15
Plan of the Book 16
PART ONE Theoretical and Historical Perspectives 19
2 Theories of Democratization 21
Christian Welzel
Introduction 22
The Nature of Democracy 22
Ancient Democracy 23
The 'Cool Water' Origin of the West's Emancipatory Dynamic 24
The Principle of Representation 24
The West-East, North-South Gradient 25
Rent-Seeking States 25
Patterns of Colonialism 27
Industrialization and Class Divisions 27
Ethnic and Religious Cleavages 29
Socioeconomic Modernization 29
International Conflicts and Regime Alliances 30
Elite Pacts and Mass Mobilization 31
State Repression and Grassroots Pressures 32
The Role of Emancipative Values 32
•... ,;'~
Detailed Contents xiii
Elite Concessions versus Pressures from Below 33

Institutional Configurations 34
The Emancipatory Path to Sustainable Democracy 35
A Typology of Democratization Processes 36
Conclusion 36
3 Democratic and Undemocratic States 40

Richard Rose
Introduction 41
Defining Democratic States 41
The state as the starting point 41
The characteristics of a democratic state 42
The State of States Today 43
Different kinds of accountable democracies 44
Different kinds of undemocratic states 45
Most regimes are incompletely democratic or autocratic 45
Evolution, False Starts, and Democratization Backwards 47
Getting rid of tangible evils 47
Dynamics of Democratic and Undemocratic States 48
Dynamics of democratic regimes 49
Dynamics of constitutional autocracy 49
Dynamics of plebiscitarian autocracy 50
Dynamics of unaccountable autocracy 50
Conclusion 50
4 Measuring Democracy and Democratization 52

Patrick Bernhagen
Introduction 53
Is Democracy a Matter of Degree? 53
Conceptualizing democracy 53
Sortal versus scalar concepts of democracy 54
Dimensions and Indicators of Democracy 56
Dimensions of democracy 56
Indicators of democracy 57
Aggregating dimensions and indicators into scales 58
The global wave of democratization according to the four major indices 61
Hybrid Regimes and Sub-Types of Democracy 63
Conclusion 64
5 Long Waves and Conjunctures of Democratization 67

Dirk Berg-Schlosser
Introduction 67
The Overall Picture 69
The First Long Wave, 1776-1914 71
The first positive conjuncture, 19 I8/19 72
xiv Detailed Contents
The Second 'Long Wave' (with some Intermittent Turbulences), 1945-88 74
The Latest Conjuncture, 1989/90 75
A Period of Uncertainty 76
Conclusion 79
6 The Global Wave of Democratization 82

John Markoff and Daniel Burridge 1
Introduction 83
Democracy Ascending 83
National, Regional, and Global Processes 88
Mediterranean Europe, 1970s 89
Latin America, 1980s and early 1990s 89
Soviet/communist bloc, 1989 and beyond 91
Asia, 1980s and 1990s 92
Africa, early 1990s 93
Middle East and North Africa 94
Beyond the Global Wave 95
Into the twenty-first century 96
PART TWO Causes and Dimensions of Democratization IOI
7 The International Context 103

Hakan Yi/maz
Introduction 103
The International Context of Democratization: Theoretical Approaches 104
Democracy Promotion Strategies of the USA and the European Union 106
Democracy promotion by the USA 107
Democracy promotion by the EU II 0
Globalization, Global Civil Society, and Democratization 112
Conclusion 114
8 The Political Economy of Democracy 119

Patrick Bernhagen
Introduction 119
Economic and Political Development 121
What Capitalism Does for Democracy 123
What Democracy Does for Capitalism 126
The Role of Business Actors in Democratic Transition 128
Politico-Economic Reform 130
Reforming systems based on import substitution industrialization 130
Reforming systems with a history of export-led development 131
Reforming collectivist economies 131
Reforming rentier states 131
Conclusion 132
Detailed Contents xv
9 Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change 134

Christian Welzel and Ronald F. lnglehart
Introduction 134
Mass Beliefs-The Missing Link between Structure and Action 135
The Centrality of Emancipative Values 136
Measuring Emancipative Values 137
The Importance of Regime Legitimacy 138
The Emancipatory Impulse of Action Resources 140
Some Key Qualifications 142
The 'Tectonic Model' of Regime Change 143
Updated Evidence 145
Conclusion 154
IO Gender and Democratization 158

Pamela Paxton and Kristopher Velasco
Introduction 158
Gender in Definitions of Democracy 159
Women's Democratic Representation: Formal, Descriptive, Substantive, and Symbolic Representation 161
Women's Suffrage as an Aspect of Democratization 163
Women's Representation as an Aspect of Democracy 165
Women and Democratization Movements 167
Conclusion 168
I I Social Capital and Civil Society 171

Natalia Letki
Introduction 172
Defining Civil Society and Social Capital 172
Civil Society and Social Capital in Democratization 173
Networks as sources of information 174
Associations as schools of democracy 175
Trust and democracy 175
Reprise 176
Paradoxes of Civil Society and Social Capital in New Democracies 176
Are civil society and social capital necessary for democratization! 176
'Civil society against the state'! 177
Social capital, civil society, and democracy: what comes first! 177
Are all forms of social capital conducive for democracies! 177
Civil Society, Social Capital, and Democracy: the Western Perspective! 178
Conclusion 179
12 Social Movements and Contention in Democratization Processes 182

Federica M. Rassi and Danatel/a de/la Porta
Introduction 183
Social Movements in Research on Democratization 183
Structural approaches: modernization theory and historical class perspective 183
xvi Detailed Contents
Elite transactional process approach: transitology 184

The Role of 'Democratization from Below': Perspectives from Social Movement Studies 186
Cycles of protest and waves of strikes during democratization 187
Resistance to the non-democratic regime 188
Liberalization and the upsurge of mobilization 189
Transition to procedural democracy 190
Consolidation of a procedural (or substantive!) democracy 191
Expansion to post-representative democracy 191
Conclusion 192
PART THREE Actors and Institutions 195
13 Conventional Citizen Participation 197

Ian McAllister and Stephen White
Introduction 197
Dimensions of Political Participation 198
Election Turnout 201
Institutions and Political Participation 204
Citizens and Political Participation 205
Political Participation and its Consequences 208
Conclusion 209
14 Political Parties 212

Leonardo Morlino
Introduction: Parties as an Essential Component of Democracy 213

Are Parties the Key Actors of Transition! Are there Alternative Actors! 215
Variations in transitions to democracy 215
Elite continuity, party continuity, and elite and party discontinuity 217
International and external factors 218
Party role in democratic transition 219
How do Parties Anchor a Democracy! 220
Electoral stabilization 220
The establishment of definite patterns of partisan competition 220
Stabilization of party leadership 221
Legitimation 221
Anchoring 222
Interaction between legitimation and anchoring 223
When do Parties Fail! 224
Conclusion 225
15 Institutional Design in New Democracies 228

Matthijs Bogaards
Institutions and Institutional Design 228

Institutional Choices 229
President and Parliaments 230
Detailed Contents xvii
Duverger's and Sartori's Electoral Laws 231

Parties and Party Systems 232
The Evidence from New Democracies 233
Electoral System Design and Ethnic Conflict Management 235
Conclusion 237
16 The Media 239

Katrin Vo/tmer and Gary Rawnsley
Introduction 240
Media and Democracy: Normative Foundations 240
Media and the Dynamics of Regime Change 241
International broadcasting and the demonstration effect 241
Communication technologies and the convergence between 'old' and 'new' media 243
Democratizing the Media 244
Media-state relationships 245
Media regulation and media laws 245
The ambivalence of press freedom 246
The Media and the Market 247
Media after communism: Central and Eastern Europe 247
Media after capitalist dictatorship: Latin America and Asia 248
Post-colonial media: Africa 248
Media and the Quality of New Democracies 249
Conclusion 250
17 Social Media 253

Larry Diamond and Zak Whittington
Introduction 254
Social Media as Information Channels 255
Online news and opinion 255
Information crowdsourcing and government transparency 256
Social Media as Organizing Tools 257
Protest mobilization 257
The value and limits of social media in driving democratic change 259
The Empire Strikes Back: Digital Censorship and Repression 261
Conclusion 263
I8 A Decade of Democratic Decline and Stagnation 267

Laurajakli, M. Steven Fish, and Jason Wittenberg
Introduction 267
Theory and Central Concepts 268
Measuring Democracy 269
Democratic Stagnation 271
What Undermines Democracy? 272
The Limits of Explanations Based on Structural Factors 276
Agents of Democratic Failure 278
xvi ii Detailed Contents
Strengthening Legislatures and Curtailing Executive Power 280

Altering the Structural Factors 280
Conclusion 281
PART FOUR Regions of Democratization 283
19 Southern Europe 285

Richard Gunther
Introduction 286
Portugal 286
First transition to democracy 286
Second transition to democracy 287
Reasons for democratic transition 287
Greece 289
The Cyprus conflict as trigger of transition 289
The role of Karamanlis in transition 290
Founding elections and first democratic government 291
Spain 292
Elite pact as main feature of transition 292
Backward legitimacy 292
The new democratic constitution 293
Politics of consensus 294
Explaining Democratization in Southern Europe 296
The international context 296
Business and the economy 297
Social movements 298
Actors: the role of elite pacts 299
Conclusion 300
Epilogue 302
20 Latin America 305

Andrea Oelsner and Mervyn Bain
Introduction 306
Historical Overview 306
The historical impact of the Cuban Revolution 307
Argentina 307
Chile 307
Mexico 308
Venezuela 308
The International Context 309
Economic Factors 311
Political Culture and Society 312
Political Parties and Social Movements 315
Institutional Challenges 317
Conclusion 320
Detailed Contents xix
21 Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe 322

Introduction 323
Stage One: Failed Reforms and the Decline of Communist Regimes, 1968--88 324
Stage Two: The End of Communist Political Regimes, 1989-91 326
Stage Three: The Creation of New Democracies 326
From New Democracies towards Consolidated Democracies 327
From New Democracies towards Electoral Democracies 332
From New Democracies towards Emerging Democracies 336
Conclusion 338
22 Post-Soviet Eurasia 341

Introduction 342
Decline of the Soviet Union 1985-91 343
The End of the Soviet Union in 1991 344
The Creation of New Political Systems of the Russian Federation and
the Newly Independent States 345
From Soviet Republics towards Consolidated Democracies 347
From Soviet Republics towards Electoral Democracies 349
Georgia 349
Moldova 351
Ukraine 352
Kyrgyzstan 353
From Soviet Republics towards Electoral Autocracies 354
Russia 354
Armenia 356
Azerbaijan 356
Belarus 357
Kazakhstan 358
Tajikistan 358
From Soviet Republics towards Full Autocracies 359
Uzbekistan 359
Turkmenistan 360
Conclusion 361
23 The Middle East and North Africa 364

Francesco Cavatorta
Introduction 365
Authoritarian Persistence in the Arab World 367
The International Context 370
The role of lslamist political actors 371
Political Culture and Society 373
Business and the Economy 376
Agents of Democratization and Democratic Failure 378
Weak multi-party systems under state control 379
XX Detailed Contents
Challenges 380
Conclusion 381
24 Sub-Saharan Africa 384

Michael Bratton
Introduction 385
Africa's Democratic Wave 386
A period of transition 386
Features of transition 386
Key Cases of Regime Transition 388
South Africa 388
Ghana 389
Nigeria 390
Zimbabwe 391
Explanatory Factors 391
International influences 391
Economic conditions 392
Political culture and society 392
The roles of political actors 393
Conjuncture and causality 394
Institutional Challenges 394
Elections 395
Political parties 395
Civil society 396
Legislatures and courts 396
Conclusion 397
25 East Asia 401

Doh Chui/ Shin and Rollin F. Tusa/em*
Introduction 402
East Asia as a Region of Democratization 402
Democratic Transition 405
Modes of democratic regime change 405
The Philippines 407
South Korea 407
Taiwan 408
Thailand 408
Mongolia 409
Cambodia 409
Indonesia 410
Causes of democratic transitions 411
Substantive Democratization 412
Democratic governance 412
Prospects of Democratization in China 414
Conclusion 417
Detailed Contents xxi
PART FIVE Conclusions and Outlook 421
26 Conclusion: The Future of Democratization 423

Christian Welzel, Ronald lnglehart, Patrick Bernhagen, and Christion W. Haerpfer
Introduction 423
Tactics and Strategies 424
Varieties of Autocracy 425
Development 426
External Threats and Group Hostilities 427
An Evolutionary Perspective 427
The Democratic Agenda of the Future 429
Spreading Democracy to New Regions 429
Consolidating and Improving New Democracies 430
Deepening Old Democracies 430
Glossary 432
Bibliography 440
Index 476
:This textbook is ~nriched with-~ r~ge of learning f~a,ture~_ to help' you navigat~ ·i:heJ~ and-rclnfcirte your ·_-
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democratic states. Some are Incompletely democratic because t
of law; some are incompletely undemocratic because, even the
.'Key"F6(nts
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BOX 20.1 THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF u·s FOREIGI

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•········ Polity IV: Full Democracy .......... Freedom House:
How to use this book xxiii_
Questions
. . .
How can democracy be measured?

Critically reflect on y~ur learning and test your understanding of
2. Does it make sense to distinguish degrees of democracy when chapter material with questions at the e~d of each chapter.
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of a minimalist car
4. What an, hybrid n,~mes!
5. How many dimensions should an index of democracy capture?
6. Are some dimensions more important than others? If so, whid
Fur_ther Reading
Annony. A. C. and 5chamis. H. E. (2005), 'Babel in Democratizati Familiarize yourself.with the key academic literature in the field
D., and Levits<y. S. (1997), 'Democracy with Adjective< Concep ·· and deepen your knowiedge of important issues raised within the
49/11: 43~51. These two articles provide avervie-.vs and critiG
tocracy, democracy, and hybrid regimes. chapter through tailored further reading lists.
Ccilier. D. and Adcock. R. (1999), 'Democracy and Dichotomie
Annual Pe,iew ofPolmccl Sdence. 95!2: 537--65. A very helpful clari
versus gradations.
Important websites
www.cima.ned.org The Center for International Media Assi , Explore areas of further research interest with lists of useful web-
Democracy and aims to support independent media around tht
sites at _the end of every chapter.
www.freedomhouse.org A.swell as political and civil liberties, t
freedom around the world. Scores are given that rank~order t
reports.
www.gfmd.lnfo The Global Forum for Media Development

valved in supporting media, journalists and media activists.
How to.use the· online resources
The book is supported by online resources designed to help students_ take their
learnipg further. ' · ·
','. '
Dc~cription
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OXFORD
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About the Editors
Christian W. Haerpfer is Director of the Institute for Comparative Survey Research in Vienna, and President of
the World Values Survey Association.
Patrick Bernhagen is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Stuttgart, Germany.
Christian Welzel is Professor of Political Culture Research at the_ Center for the Study of Democracy at
Leuphana University in Lueneburg, Germany. He is also the Senior Foreign Advisor and Research Professor at
the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (LCSR) at the National Research University-Higher School
of Economics in Moscow; Russia.
Ronald F. Inglehart is Research Professor in the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan, USA.
About the Contributors
Mervyn Bain, University of Aberdeen, UK.

Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Philipps University Marburg, Germany.
Matthijs Bogaards, Central European University, Hungary.
Michael Bratton, Michigan State University, USA.
Daniel Burridge, University of Pittsburgh, USA.
Francesco Cavatorta, Laval University, Canada.
Donatella della Porta, Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy.
Larry Diamond, Stanford University, USA.
M. Steven Fish, University of California, Berkeley, USA.
Richard Gunther, Ohio State University, USA.
Laura Lakli, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Natalia Letki, University of Warsaw, Poland.
John Markoff, University of Pittsburgh, USA.
Ian McAllister, Australian National University, Australia.
Leonardo Morlino, LUISS Guido Carli, Italy.
Andrea Oelsner, University of Aberdeen, UK.
Pamela Paxton, University of Texas at Austin, USA.
Gary D. Rawnsley University of Nottingham Ningbo China
Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde, UK.
Federico M. Rossi, CONICET- Universidad Nacional de San Martin (UNSAM), Argentina.
Doh Chu II Shin, University of Missouri, USA.
Rollin F. Tusalem, Arkansas State University, USA.
Kristopher Velasco, University of Texas at Austin, USA.
Katrin Yoltmer, University of Leeds, UK.
Kseniya Kizilova, V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine
Stephen White, University of Glasgow, UK.
Zachary Whittington, Stanford University, USA.
Jason Wittenberg, University of California, Berkeley, USA.
Hakan Yilmaz, Bogazir;;i University, Istanbul, Turkey.
I
Introduction
Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, Patrick
Bernhagen, and Christian W Haerpfer
The New Pessimism about picture, only China, North Korea, Singapore, Cuba,
and the Islamic world remained unaffected by the
Democracy democratic trend and it seemed likely that this, too,
'We all agree that pessimism is a mark of superior intellect.' would eventually change.
Since then, the prevailing mood in the discipline
(John Kenneth Galbraith) has become dramatically more pessimistic. The
resilience of authoritarianism in such successfully
When we drafted the introductory chapter for the first modernizing countries as Singapore and China, the
edition of OUP's Democratization in 2008, there was revival of authoritarianism in Russia, Turkey; and Ven-
widespread enthusiasm about the centennial demo- ezuela, democratic backsliding in Hungary; Romania,
cratic trend and great optimism about the future of and Poland, the global spread of electoral autocracies,
democracy. Accordingly; we pointed out that, over and the ascension of autocratic China to world power
the last century; the world has experienced several status as well as the recent successes of right-wing
consecutive waves of democratization that led to a populism and its anti-democratic tendencies all are
situation in which a clear majority of countries are fuelling the new pessimism about the prospects for
democracies and most of the global population lives democracy.
in democracies. We documented this conclusion using Two widely cited articles by Roberto Foa and
the then standard democracy indicators from Polity Yascha Mounk (2016; 2017) represent the apex of the
and Freedom House. According to these indicators, new pessimism, sounding the alarm that even the most
Western countries had already started out at the top long-standing democracies of the West are now in a
level of democracy a hundred years ago and con- state of deconsolidation. But critics have pointed out
tinued to persist at the top all the way until the most that Foa and Mounk's discomforting conclusions may
recent observation. Besides the West's democratic not hold up to closer scrutiny (Alexander and Welzel
persistence, the world as a whole has become more 2017; Norris 2017; Voeten 2017). This debate leads us
democratic through consecutive waves by which re- to ask whether the new pessimism may be as exagger-
gion after region moved towards the Western level. ated as the optimism that prevailed not long ago. This
These waves affected, in sequential order, Southern question is all the more appropriate when one recog-
Europe (early-mid 1970s), Latin America (late 1970s/ nizes that, during the past 60 years, public discourse
late 1980s), East Asia (late 1980s), Central and Eastern and academic debate have experienced a recurrent ebb
Europe (late 1980s/ early 1990s), and parts of Sub- and flow in the 'crisis of democracy' discourse-while
Saharan Africa (early-mid 1990s). According to this democracy itself has weathered all these crises.
2 Christian Welzel, Ronald lnglehart, Patrick Bernhagen, and Christian W. Haerpfer
A New Look at Democracy electoral, participatory, and liberal components in a

scale range from a minimum of Oto a maximum of 1,
We conceive of democracy as a tool of human em- with decimal fractions for intermediate positions, the
powerment whose key purpose is to enable people to comprehensive democracy score is in the same scale
self-determine their personal lives and to help shape range.
their societies' policies. The Varieties of Democracy 01- In calculating regional and yearly averages, we
Dem) project (see Chapter 4 for more on the measure- weight nations for the proportional size of their
ment of democracy) uses the most advanced methods population. From the viewpoint of humanity as a
of expert coding to create several dozen indicators whole, the weighted treatment of nations is man-
of democracy, for every country and every year since datory because the significance of a nation's dem-
1900 until 2014, the most recent available data at the ocraticness for our entire species varies in direct
time of this writing (Coppedge, Gerring, and Lindberg proportion to its share in the world population:
et al. 2017). V-Dem data cover three aspects that we though we respect Icelanders, it is of greater signifi-
believe are essential for democracy's empowering pur- cance for humanity that more than thirty million
pose. The first is the 'electoral democracy component', Canadians live under democracy than that 300,000
which measures how regular, open, fair, and free the Icelanders do so.
elections in a country are and how large a proportion
of public offices is filled by contested elections. The
'participatory democracy component' measures how Re-Examining the Centennial
many legal channels of participation a country offers Democratic Trend: A Reversal?
its citizens, from the local to the national level, and
how easy it is for the citizens to use these channels. Looking at the entire world over the long time span
Finally, the 'liberal democracy component' measures from 1900 to 2014, Figure 1.1 shows a continuous
the extent of civil rights, including minority rights, as incremental increase in all three key components of
well as power separation and horizontal checks on the democracy, with a spike-especially in the electoral
executive. component-after World War II and a steepening
The distinctiveness of these three components slope since the mid-1970s, which persists until the
makes them equally important in generating 'compre- end point of our observation period in 2014. The pro-
hensive democracy', which exists when the electoral, nounced spike after World War II reflects the fact that
participatory, and liberal component are all present a few nations with rather large populations-namely
at a high level. To obtain a single comprehensive India,Japan, Germany, and Italy-became democratic
measure of democracy, one needs to combine the during this time. Apparently, there is no indication
measures of electoral, participatory, and liberal dem- of an overall recent reversal of the long-term demo-
ocracy. One obvious way to do so is to average the cratic trend, at least not with the data that were most
three measures. This assumes that strength in one up-to-date at the time of this writing. Combining the
component can compensate for weakness in another, electoral, participatory, and liberal components into a
which we think is mistaken because it seems clear that single index of comprehensive democracy replicates
the three components of democracy interact in mutu- these trend features on a lower base level and with a
ally conditional ways, such that what one component slightly smaller slope. Treating the three components
contributes to comprehensive democracy depends as mutually conditional, as our multiplicative index
on the level of the other two. The mathematical pro- does, provides a more rigid measurement standard
cedure to model this kind of mutual conditionality under which the democratic trend appears more mod-
is multiplication. Consequently, we calculate each est than if we were to simply average the three dem-
country's score in comprehensive democracy for each ocracy components.
year by multiplying the three scores for the electoral, Since our index of comprehensive democracy is
participatory, and liberal components. Doing so sets the product of fractions, it is exceedingly hard for all
a high bar for democracy because all three compo- but the most democratic of the democratic to achieve
nents must be pretty high in order to obtain a high scores approximating 1. Thus, we also employ a dif-
overall score. Since V-Dem provides scores for the ferent approach to see if we can replicate this picture
Introduction 3
Fig I. I The centennial democratic trend I (global democracy av~rages) '. ,

-· --·~· ... - - --·-'··- -- -·· - ----- - --- .. :.. ·- - -- - -- ,._. ·- -· ·---
0,65
0.60
0.55
0.50
0.45
~ 0.40
~
.
"i:I 0.35
~ 0.30 ,.....,
e 0.25
0
I
I
I
:z
0.20
It,V 1\...._____...___,I
0.15 II./ Electoral Democracy
1t'"-\
,---' y
0.10
,.I
0.05
~ ~~§~~~~~~~ia~11i~ffi~~iiiii~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~llilliiij
0
l""""ll""""ll""""lr-tl""""l..-4r-tr-f1""""11""""11""""11""""11""""11""""11""""1H.------,.-------,.-------,.-------,.-----,.------,.--,,------,.------,
Year of Measurement
Source: Data are from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (www.v-dem.net)
of the global state of democracy from another angle. Democracy's Persistent Culture-
To do so, we average the countries' scores over the
electoral, participatory, and liberal components and
Boundedness
divide up regimes into 'pure autocracies' in the lower Figure 1.3 displays the long-term democratic trend
third of the scale (0 to 0.32 points), 'hybrid regimes' with regional breakdowns, using Welzel's (2013) his-
in the middle third (0.33 to 0.66 points) and 'pure torically grounded culture zone scheme. This scheme
democracies' in the upper third (0.67 to 1.00 points). defines culture zones by distinct imperial and religious
Looking at the quantitative evolution of these three traditions, which overlap with language families as
regime types over time gives us a complementary well as ethnic lineages and-accordingly-tend to
picture of the long-term democratic trend. Figure 1.2 concentrate in certain geographic areas. Welzel dis-
depicts this evolution from two perspectives: the pro- tinguishes four Western culture zones, which are
portion of the world's population living under these defined by their imprint from three emancipatory
regime types at a given time (upper diagram), and the movements in history that shaped Western identity:
proportion of independent states falling into these Renaissance-Humanism, the Reformation, and the
regime categories in a given year (lower diagram). Enlightenment. The 'Old West' to begin with, com-
Interestingly, as the two diagrams in Figure 1.2 illus- prises the Romance-language nations of Southern
trate, the most striking feature in this perspective is Europe that were once part of the Roman Empire,
the steep, continuous, uninterrupted decrease of from which they inherited their Catholic tradition.
pure autocracies, which drop from about 85 per cent The 'New West' includes English-speaking nations
in 1900 to about 15 per cent in 2014, with periods of that were once British-ruled white settler colonies
accelerated decline after World War II and after the in North America and Australasia. The 'Reformed
end of the Cold War. 1 West' refers to those Germanic-language nations in
_!!~'?_ !h~ centenniaJ de~o.?r~tic?;.~~ II (regim_e_ t>.'?_:~!:_•..

90
85
80
75
70 Pure Autocracies
"' 65
~ 60
t§
0 ...
55
50
il'o'3 45
"' c:i. 40
5ie 35
~ 30 /"""\
~ 25 I
20
15
r---1
10
5
0 ffi'i'n"n'n;e;,;:i"rr;~TTTrrrTTTTT"TT1CTTTTTTrrrTTTTT"TT1rrrTTTTT"TT1TTTTTT1rrrrTTTT"TT1TTTTTTrrnTTTTTT1"TTTTTTrrnTTTT"TT1CT"TT1
Year of Measurement
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30 Hybrid Regimes /
25 ~---- _,,.-"'1
20 /
15
-~ ,.-..._--...:>''.,/-----~--.
10
5
0 +rrn-TTTTTT"rn-n""rTrM'TTTT"rn-n""rTrM'TTTT"rn-n""rTrM'TTTT"rn-n""rTrM'TTTT"rn-n""nTM'TTTT"rn"T'rnTM'TTTT"rn-n-nTM'TTTT"TT>TTTl
Year of Measurement
North-Western Europe in which the Protestant Ref- and North Africa that have been part of the Arab, Per-
ormation was most successful. The 'Returned West' sian, and Ottoman Islamic empires. Finally, the 'Ortho-
covers those (mostly) Slavic nations in Central-Eastern dox East' incorporates the nations of Eastern Europe
Europe with a West~rn-Christian tradition, which and Central Asia that were historically dominated by
joined the European Union after the dissolution of the Russia with its Christian-Orthodox roots. Besides this
Soviet Union. Juxtaposed to the West, history created eight-fold East-West scheme, Welzel distinguishes
four Eastern culture zones in the axial belt of Eurasian the culture zones of Latin America and Sub-Saharan
civilization. The 'Indic East' comprises those nations Africa, to which we add the Pacific islands ('Oceania').
in South Asia whose history was shaped by Indian cul- When we examine Figure 1.3, certain features are
ture. Similarly, the 'Sinic East' covers those nations in obvious. Starting from a relatively high base level, the
East Asia that were influenced by Chinese culture. The 'New West' has moved on a trajectory of continuing
'Islamic East' consists of the nations in the Middle East incremental gains in comprehensive democracy
Introduction 5
0.65
0.60
]' 0.55 ...... ,- .
,-..," ,•'.
0
u Reformed West
"'
"0 0.50 • ,../ ed \'JeSt
~ 0.45 . : • 1tet\lfl\
~
I
0.40 \'Jest
s 1-ie"'7
e- 0.35
s 0.30
0
.,e
Cl 0.25
.,
·i., 0.20 r .... ,- ............................ ,.
: '
i
Q,
0.15
e 0.10
..
'
_,
,. '
0 I ... , , ' \
u
0.05 -.:;~~:~~=~-
0.00
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00000000
rlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlrlNNNNNNNN
Year of Measurement
throughout the entire period from 1900 to 2014. The and its tendency to undermine key features of democ-
'Reformed West' joins this trajectory later, after Ger- racy; such as power separation, critical media, cultural
many's democratization at the end of World War I, pluralism, and minority protection.
but became derailed during Nazi rule, and only re- Nevertheless, the recent democratic stagnation of
joins the high base upward trajectory after World the West occurs at an exceptionally high base level
War II. Since then, the 'New' and 'Reformed' West of comprehensive democracy that no other culture
move along in unison. The 'Old West' starts from a zone in the world comes even close to. Despite con-
lower base level and drops further during fascism in secutive waves of democratization around the globe,
Italy. The 'Old West' then returns quickly to a higher high levels of comprehensive democracy still remain
base level after World War II but remains considerably a singularity of the West. In other words, the cen-
behind the 'New' and 'Reformed West', until Portu- tennial democratic trend has by no means produced
gal, Spain, and Greece democratize in the early/ mid global convergence on Western-typical democracy
1970s. Ever since then, the 'Old West' moves in unison levels. Partly; the lack of global convergence in
with the 'New' and 'Reformed West', joining their comprehensive democracy reflects the fact that the
high base upward trajectory. The last culture zone continuous rise of the global average was derived to a
to join this trajectory is the 'Returned West', which large extent from a rise among Western nations them-
skyrockets during the late 1980s/ early 1990s from the selves. Standard democracy measures by Polity and
bottom sharply upward to meet the West's high base Freedom House gloss over this important observa-
trajectory; albeit on a somewhat lower intercept and tion because their less nuanced views set the standard
slightly decreasing slope since 2000, reflecting demo- for democracy much lower, so that Western nations
cratic backsliding in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. are given the highest possible democracy scores from
More generally; since the turn of the millennium, the the beginning, and consequently show a flat trajec-
upward slope of the West's trajectory has leveled off, tory from then on-toward which various regional
which resonates with recent concerns about populism groups of non-Western countries have converged
Islamic East ~ 0Turkey

Sinic East ~ I
SS-Africa r-------1 I
Orthodox East ~ I ', I
CU
Oceania ~
=
0 I I
N Indic East I I I
i
u
Latin America I
I IC
I
I 0Uruguay
Returned West 1----<~~l,__1____,
Old West ~
New West ~
Reformed West r---0] 0
Switzerland
.00 .05 .10 .15 .20 .25 .30 .35 .40 .45 .50 .55 .60 .65 .70 .75 .80
Comprehensive Democracy 2012
through consecutive waves of democratization. The Figure 1.4 documents how the culture zone mem-
view provided here is markedly different on both ac- berships of 162 states across the world affects their
counts: continuous improvement among Western scores on the comprehensive democracy index. The
nations and a largely incomplete approximation by figure contains boxplots, which show the distribution
non-Western nations to the Western standard. of comprehensive democracy for each culture zone.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that-although The bar inside the box represents the median case,
Western nations reach the highest levels in compre- i.e. that case which splits the sample into two halves
hensive democracy-they are still considerably below if the countries within a culture zone were ordered
the possible maximum. On average, they score at from the least to the most democratic. The lower and
about 0.65 scale points in comprehensive democracy; upper hinges correspond to the first and third quar-
while the theoretical maximum is 1.0. There is still tiles (the 25th and 75th position, respectively; on that
substantial room for improvement, which highlights ordered list of countries) of the distribution. The
another difference from the Freedom House and space between these is the inter-quartile range (IQR).
Polity measures, on which dozens of nations receive The left whisker extends from the hinge to the small-
maximum scores. On our measure of comprehensive est value no further than 1.5 times the IQR from the
democracy; no nation in the world has yet reached the hinge; the right whisker extends from the hinge to the
maximum. 2 largest value at most 1.5 times the IQ R from the hinge.
I Introduction 7
Data beyond the end of the whiskers are outliers and democratic transitions in South Korea and Taiwan
plotted individually. For example, the median country in the late 1980s and in Mongolia in the early 1990s
in the Islamic East has a comprehensive democracy are hardly recognizable here because of these popu-
score of 0.07; Turkey is an upper outlier with a score lations' small size compared to China's 1.4 billion
of 0.22. people.
Outside the West, improvements in comprehen- The 'Islamic East', too, remains near the bottom
sive democracy are modest at best, with the excep- of the comprehensive democracy scale, with a barely
tion of Latin America, which began a steep rise in the recognizable improvement after the largely failed
late 1970s, ending up at two-thirds of the Western Arab Spring. Despite the democratic aspirations ex-
level today. Since the turn of the millennium, Latin pressed during this upheaval, the countries with the
America's ascension levels off and shows even a slight biggest populations in the 'Islamic East'-namely Iran
downward slope, reflecting democratic backsliding in and Egypt remain solidly authoritarian, while Turkey
countries like Brazil and Venezuela. under Erdogan is moving in this direction.
With more than a billion people, India's establish- In summary, there are no signs of a wholesale re-
ment as a constitutional democracy in 1947 has a sig- versal of the centennial democratic trend. Despite
nificant influence on the world population average in repeated temporary drops, the global state of democ-
comprehensive democracy. Our diagram, however, racy has continuously improved since the end of World
also reveals that India's score in comprehensive dem- War II, leading humanity as a whole on its highest
ocracy is at best half the Western level, which conflicts level of democracy in history at the turn of the mil-
with the standard democracy measures by Polity and lennium, which seems to be rather stable since then.
Freedom House where India scores much higher. On Thus, the centennial democratic trend is composed of
the other hand, India's modest democracy perform- two elements: (1) an incremental improvement of an
ance in the V-Dem data fully confirms Alexander, Wel- increasingly uniform Western standard, and (2) other
zel, and Inglehart (2012) who argue that India's state of regions' consecutive rise to two thirds (Latin America),
democracy is overestimated by standard measures and half ('Indic East') and a quarter (Oceania, Sub-Saharan
needs to take account of serious deficiencies in rule of Africa, 'Orthodox East') of the Western standard. As
law and human rights enforcement (cf. Inglehart and shown in Figure 1.1, humanity as a whole has never in
Welzel 2005; Welzel and Inglehart 2006; Alexander history experienced a higher level of democracy than
and Welzel 2011). 3 The recent considerable drop of since the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, one
the 'Indic East' mainly reflects India's democratic must recognize that very high levels of comprehensive
backsliding under the Hindu-nationalist administra- democracy remain a distinct feature of the West-and
tion of Modi. even there, it is still well below the theoretical max-
Other remarkable improvements occurred among imum. Furthermore, the centennial democratic trend
the Pacific island states of Oceania during the early has levelled off more recently, with signs of a partial
1970s, followed by a stable flat line until today. Sub- reversal in several regions. Whether this is just another
Saharan Africa experienced a similar rise during the temporary interruption of the long-term democratic
early 1990s. Its slope has gotten flatter since 2000 but trend, or the beginning of a more complete turn-
continues to move upward. Nevertheless, Oceania and around, remains to be seen.
Sub-Saharan Africa only achieve about a third of the
Western level in comprehensive democracy.
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's Democracy's Societal
dissolution during the early 1990s, the 'Orthodox Pre-Conditions
East' also moved to about a third of the Western level
through a very steep but short rise. Since the mid- Why does democracy continue to be so culture-bound?
1990s, the 'Orthodox East' is on a continuous down- One answer is that the societal pre-conditions of dem-
ward slope, reflecting Russia's re-autocratization ocracy continue to be so culture-bound as well. In-
under Putin. deed, advocates of modernization theory argue since
From the start, the 'Sinic East' has remained near long that democracy is a difficult achievement because
the bottom of the comprehensive democracy scale, it places special demands on the populations among
reflecting China's resilient authoritarianism. The which it is practised (Upset 1959; Inglehart and Welzel
2005). Democracy is basically an emancipatory pro- correlate with the spread of action resources among
ject because it is inspired by the idea to entitle people the people between R =0.65 and R =0.95, in any given
to practise freedoms-freedoms in guiding their per- year from 1900 to 2010. (The correlation coefficient
sonal lives and in participating in politics. To function R is a measure of the strength of the association be-
properly, democracy thus places two major demands tween two variables, which can vary between R =-1. O
on the populations among which it is practised: (1) for a perfectly negative association to R = + 1.0 for a
action resources-including material means, cognitive perfectly positive one. The closer R is to o, the
capacities, and connective opportunities-must be weaker is the association.) Democracy's linkage to
widely dispersed throughout large population seg- people's action resources was somewhat weaker in
ments because these resources shape people's capabil- the years preceding World War I and then, again,
ity to practise freedoms; (2) emancipative values must during World War II, which probably shows that
be firmly encultured among large population seg- rising nationalism in the context of wars can weaken
ments because only these values make people eager democracy even in countries with widespread action
to practise freedoms (Welzel 2013). Accordingly, com- resources. Since the early 1970s, the linkage of dem-
prehensive democracy should show a strong societal ocracy to people's action resources shows a slight
anchorage in that its presence correlates powerfully continuous decline, perhaps reflecting the fact that
with the spread of action resources and emancipative globalization, regional contagion, and international
values among national populations. advocacy all have helped transplanting democracy
Figure 1.5 uses the encompassing measure of into countries where people's action resources are
action resources described by Welzel and Inglehart in less widespread. But even in the most recent year
Chapter 9 of this volume. The diagram shows that of observation, democracy's link to people's action
the countries' levels of comprehensive democracy resources remains fairly strong.
1.00
0.95
0.90
~ Emancipative Values
0.85
·1
.i:::
0.80
~ 0.75
~ ~ 0.70
0 ~
u -"' 0.65 Action Resources
£ § 0.60
·a: ; 0.55
:8=e~>, o.5o
O!
ol ~ 0.45
I:: tl 0.40
O 0
u a
0.35
s~
§
0.30
0 0.25
u
~ 0.20
0
ll 0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~8~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Year of Observation
Source: Data for Comprehensive Democracy are from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (www.v-dem.net)
I Introduction 9
Fig 1·.6 The global co-evolution of action resour~~s. emancipative values,, and c~mprehensive D.emocracy : .
-----<•--------·----------- - ---~ -···--- -· --·- -- -~----· .· . ·---·--·- - ·····-·. --· - ·----- ---· ·---· -- ----· ·-·---- _, ···-•-.,,- ------·. -- -. - ····· ~---·----
0.55 ..-·
0.50
0.45
0.40
~ 0.35
8
~ 0.30
.,
]
j ::::
0.15
0.10
0.05
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~R~~~~~~~~~~~g~~8~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~00000000
MHMrlrlMrlMHMMHMrlrlMHMMMMMMMMHMMMMMMMHMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMNNNNNNNN
Year of Measurement
Source: Welzel and lnglehart (20 18)
Emancipative values measure people's emphasis temporal co-evolution of action resources, emancipa-
on universal freedoms, using a dozen items from the tive values, and comprehensive democracy is driven
World Values Surveys (Welzel 2013). When it comes by a dynamic in which spreading action resources give
to these values, our data cover a shorter time series, rise to emancipative values, which then together with
which only starts in 1960, using the estimates intro- action resources release mass pressures in favour of
duced by Welzel and Inglehart in Chapter 9 of this comprehensive democracy.
volume. We also cover a smaller number of states, 94 Figure 1. 7 shows that each of the three com-
in total. But since these states include the largest ponents of democracy is significantly and posi-
national populations in each region of the globe, they tively linked to people's action resources and their
represent more than 90 per cent of the world popu- emancipative values. When we combine the three
lation. Within these limits, the diagram shows that components into our comprehensive measure of
the link of comprehensive democracy with people's democracy, the societal anchorage of democracy
emancipative values has a high stability over time (the becomes even stronger-and more so when we
correlation coefficient R hovers pretty consistently combine the components multiplicatively than
around 0.8). 4 additively. Thus, in revealing the strength of de-
The persistence of democracy's link to action re- mocracy's societal anchorage, a multiplicative com-
sources and emancipative values suggests that, over bination is superior. This finding in turn illustrates
time, action resources, emancipative values and com- that the components of democracy are not just
prehensive democracy co-evolve in close association complements to each other but condition each other
with each other. This is indeed the case, as Figure 1.6 so that each component's contribution to the com-
demonstrates with striking clarity. As Welzel and In- prehensive measure depends on what the other two
glehart demonstrate in Chapter 9 of this volume, the contribute.
IO Christian Welzel, Ronald lnglehart, Patrick Bernhagen, and Christian W Haerpfer
Comprehensive Comprehensive
Democracy
(multiplicative) I Democracy
(multiplicative) I
Comprehensive Comprehensive
Democracy
(additive) ,I Democracy
(additive) I
.
Liberal - -, Electoral
Democracy Democracy I
Electoral Liberal
Democracy I Democracy I
.
Participatory
Democracy I
Participatory
Democracy l
7
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
Cross-country Correlation with People's Cross-country Correlation with People's
Action Resources 2012 (N = 154) Emancipative Values 2012 (N = 93)
Source: Note: Electoral, Participatory and Liberal Democracy are measured using the respective component indices from V-Dem. Action Resources and
Emancipative Values are measured as explained in Welzel and lnglehart (2018)
Global Support for Democracy- important determinant of a population's aspiration for

and appreciation of democracy. This premise further
A False Standard assumes that, when people say that they support dem-
The grassroots societal pre-conditions on which democracy; they have a roughly accurate understanding
ocracy grows-people's action resources and emanci- of what democracy means and, hence, all support the
pative values-show no sign of a general deterioration. same thing when saying to support democracy. Unfor·
On the contrary, overall these pre-conditions continue tunately; this assumption may not hold.
to progress and are doing so in most parts of the world, Indeed, recent evidence demonstrates that many
albeit on varying intercepts and slopes-which account people outside the Western world, as well as people
for democracy's continuing variability across cultures. in more traditional segments of Western populations,
Again, it is noteworthy that democracy's societal hold notions of democracy that contradict democ-
pre-conditions continue to evolve progressively for racy's electoral-participatory-liberal meaning (Welzel
the most part and that this is also true especially for and Kirsch 2017). Consequently; when these people say
democracy's cultural anchor: emancipative values. that they support democracy; they may mean some-
This finding contrasts starkly with Poa and Mounk's thing very different, even to the point of supporting
(2016; 2017) pessimistic conclusions about the eroding authoritarian misconceptions of democracy; which
cultural basis of democracy in even the most mature are surprisingly widespread. For this reason, ratings
democracies of the West. To assess the strength of of public support for democracy are not comparable
democracy's cultural basis, Poa and Mounk focus on unless qualified for the values that inspire this support.
public support for democracy. Doing so presumes that Related recent evidence shows that emancipa-
the scope of public support for democracy is the most tive values immunize people against the adoption of
Introduction II
Islamic Islamic
East East f----[0---l
Ex-Soviet +-------i Ex-Soviet
Islam '-'----'----'---' Islam ~
SS-Africa O ~ SS-Africa ~
S. Africa
Indic East H ·- " -
'-· __ __ ....__ ~
___,~ Indic East 0 ~
Pakistan
., Orthodox ... Orthodox
§ East ~ § East f-Q}l
N N
Sinic ... Sinic
OJ--i
I East
Latin
America
Returned
~
i
u America
East
Latin
Returned
f-----[[3----,
West ~ West
H._~__-...J-i- - - 1
Old West f---CI]-------- Old West 1----1! · I H
New West 0 1-CJ}----i New West 1-i==::]-l
U.S.A
Reformed Reformed
West ~ West ~
.66 .70 .74 .78 .82 .86 .90 .16 .20 .24 .28 .32 .36 .40 .44 .48 .52 .56 .60 .64
(Unqualified) Support for Democracy Emancipatory Support for Democracy
authoritarian misconceptions of democracy (Wel- democracy without any further qualification (left-hand
zel and Kirsch 2017). Because of this, emandpative diagram), looking at both variables' alignment with
values also immunize people against misperceiving culture zones. It is clear that unqualified support for
authoritarian regimes as democratic (Kruse, Ravlik, democracy is consistently high across the globe. And
and Welzel 2017). Hence, one needs to qualify support because unqualified support for democracy can mean
for democracy for how strongly it is tied to emancipa- anything from truly supporting democracy to sup-
tive values because only if this tie is reasonably strong porting authoritarianism, culture zone variation in
can one be confident that people support democracy unqualified support for democracy is for its most part
out of a genuine appreciation of its defining free- random, showing no clear alignment with culture
doms. Following this rationale, we use data from the zones.
World Values Surveys (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) to By contrast, emancipatory support for democ-
measure people's 'emancipatory support for democracy shows a clear pattern of alignment with cul-
racy', that is, support for democracy to the extent that ture zones, varying from a very strong presence
it is tied to emandpative values. Technically speaking, among Western cultures to the weakest presence
we multiply the strength of a person's support for in the 'Islamic East.' In fact, the countries' culture
democracy/ measured on a four-point scale from zone memberships account for fully 78 per cent of
minimum 0 to maximum 1, with the strength of her the total cross-national variation in emancipatory
or his emancipative values measured on a continuous support for democracy across some 110 countries
scale from minimum 0 to maximum 1. The resulting that represent more than 90 per cent of the world
index of emancipatory support for democracy, ac- population.
cordingly; remains in the scale range from minimum We have already seen in Figure 1.4 that cross-na-
0 to maximum 1. tional variation in comprehensive democracy maps
Figure 1.8 juxtaposes emancipatory support for closely on the world's culture zones. Now we have
democracy (right-hand diagram) with support for just seen that emancipatory support for democracy
.66 Reformed West

.64
.62
.60
New West .. -·· ------·-·
.58
.56
.54 Old West
.52 Returned West
§' .50
d, .48
g .46
t!, .44
.................···
>, .42
~ .40
~ .38
~ .36 Latin America
i::i .34
~ .32
..... 30
'E=
Ill .28
Sinic East
.26
A. .24
@ .22
U .20 Indic East
.18
.16
.14
.12
.10
.08 Islamic East
.06 R sq. (quadratic): 0.95
.04 /
.24 .26 .28 .30 .32 .34 .36 .38 .40 .42 .44 .46 .48 .50 .52 .54 .56
Emancipatory Support for Democracy (2000-15)
maps similarly-and even more strongly-on culture In the upper diagram of Figure 1.10, we see
zones. But unqualified support shows no such map- that in countries like Denmark, New Zealand, and
ping. This suggests that the cultural boundedness of Switzerland where people have more emancipatory
comprehensive democracy is explained by the cul- than unqualified support, there is more democracy.
tural boundedness of emancipatory support for dem- Conversely, in countries like Jordan, Uzbekistan, and
ocracy. Figure 1.9 demonstrates that this is indeed Yemen where people have less emancipatory than un-
the case: Cross-cultural variation in emancipatory sup- qualified support, there is less democracy. Thus, the
port for democracy accounts for 95 per cent of the general tendency is that-among countries at the
cross-cultural variation in comprehensive democracy. same level of unqualified support-more emancipa-
The evidence further suggests that the driving atti- tory support is strongly conducive to democracy. This
tude behind comprehensive democracy is not support tendency accounts for 67 per cent of the entire cross-
for democracy as such but, much more specifically, national variation in comprehensive democracy.
emancipatory support for democracy. Results from a The lower diagram of Figure 1.10 shows that in
multivariate regression analysis in Figure 1.10 support countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Zimbabwe in which
this conclusion. The two partial regression plots in this people have more unqualified than emancipatory sup-
figure show the simultaneous impact of emancipatory port, there is less democracy. Conversely; in countries
and unqualified support for democracy on compre- like Latvia, Slovenia, and South Korea where people
hensive democracy. have less unqualified than emancipatory support, there
Introduction 13
. .Fig i
'i: ci. The :y,,cirid's culture•zone's 'em~ncipatorysupport for dembcracy exphiin~ toeir lev~I ot:rnn:ipreh~nsiv~.
&mbcnicy ' . . • . . . ·· . . . . . ···'
.45 qwltz~;,•
Denmark ,,
.40 O ,,,,'
.35 Slovenia
0 8 guay France
NZ ,,' Sweden
U.S.A. QAus~ia
ii
!:1
.30
,25
PortugaI
QLlth~anla,
Estonia Iceland~
r-,,,
~~I
1 ' · ust,ja •
Ul"-:,J
•
. tJ.~Finland
Spain · ·
Norway
c9
,a .20 Hungary ,lfftland~~ Italy,• 0
!:1
6[ .15
uo~ 'OC~hR.Canada
Latvia TaiwOJn·.BraziiChiie, ·
NL
°'t: S. KQtea Greece
e, 8, .10 Peru • Siovjll<1a
e""
o ii .OS
Bulgaria
ColombiaI,'X
1erbla
O·
Argentlna
~-g
~~ .00
Q
Ghana Roma~la
MaUZambia •.
Q PhilippinesO'Cyprus
• '· .
•R> # ..' \ _ )
S. Afrlca
Trlnldad-T. Mexico
-~ 8, -.OS
(08
Ind I (J Albania
ones a Tu?itey )W'l,ced. QvenezueJa
°E § -.10 Burkina F. Oranzania ~ Moldova
r
U
-.15
-.20
Nlgerlaop::stan ~~v.
Tunisia
Rwanda Q
dnd
,,
lf:::jUkraJneGuatemala
Kyrgyzst. Qoomln. R.
Thailand Bosnia
Morocco , Ba I (:()Lebanon
-.25 Armenia ZlmfJ~ . eori,J~ Malaysia
ordan 1""""\, V'femam Russia
-.30 Q ,0 ~JU1:~~ Vietnam
Partial R sq.: 0.67
eme 'bekistan V- Azerb. Belarus
-.18 -.13 -.08 -.03 .02 .07 .12 .17 .22 .27
Emancipatory Support for Democracy (weaker/stronger than
unqualified support predicts)
.30 Latlva Hungary Portugal Partial R sq.: 0.28

Q Estonia Q
.25
Poland
Slovenia Q 00 0
0 r) Lithuania Taiwan Uruguay
sYorea
Braz!!
0 U.S.A. Q ,..r)
Ireland f...._)-"
Ghana
•••• SlovaklaoCopan oo Bei~uro . Mail
••• Q Colombia France ~ 0 0
PhillJ'll'IQ~ • 0
Crech R. Peru Switzerland
s. Africa
KazakhsL §
.
Q
Ser~kl. OaklstanQ
~~rla
•• •
EISaiv.ooFiniand U:k•
.
Romania Chile
Iraq
~,..(""')Australia
Italy
Indonesia
~
~Yemenlce.land::i:\_)Nlgerla
OJ Burkina F.
0
· Austna ~
Mexico . NL Trinida~-1'.' •~ID()'.) . zc,1a Tunisia
GuatemaiaS(o @Uganda Turitey • '9"'! Denmark
Ukraine Can~da Maced. Armenia "' ~ Q
Albania
Lebanon OMoldova
Q
Malaysia
Q rf
.iw,,and a Tanzania
U ~ru; ~Jnglad.
Russia 0 Azerb. Georgia ...-{) Q U ~"'"' -ar~ece
Q Q ()._ \..XgentlnavenezueiaThalland ()_ • • •.
Kyrgyzst. O ~ran QA!geria Egypt V •••
Belarus " BosnlaQ Vietnam A Morocco
-.25
0 QChina Q) Q - Vietnam ZimbabweV UzbekiS tan
Norway Sweden Q
Domin. R.
-.30
-.14 -.12 -.10 -.08 -.06 -.04 -.02 .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10 .12 .14 .16
Unqualified Support for Democracy (weaker/stronger than
emancipatory support predicts)
is more democracy. Thus, among countries at the same been rising steeply in Western democracies since the
level of emancipatory support, more unqualified sup- early 1980s, as a result of outsourcing industrial pro-
port is actually detrimental to democracy. This negative duction, welfare state retrenchment and a neo-liberal
association is more modest than the positive tendency move away from progressive taxation, especially of
of emancipatory support and accounts for 28 per cent capital, stocks, real estate, and other sources of eco-
of the entire cross-national variation in comprehensive nomic rents (Stiglitz 2012; Picketty 2015; Inglehart
democracy. The reason why unqualified support for 2018: Ch. 10). The resulting economic inequalities
democracy turns into a negative influence when we translate into political inequalities that become visible
control for emancipatory support is straightforward: in a manifest oligarchic tendency among modern democ-
where unqualified support is high relative to emancipa- racies: Although policies usually follow public prefer-
tory support, many people hold authoritarian miscon- ences, when lower and upper-class preferences diverge,
ceptions of democracy; in which case the meaning of policies almost invariably coincide with the preferences
support for democracy reverses into its exact opposite: of the upper class, even under leftist governments
namely, support for autocracy. It is of no surprise that (Gilens 2005). Needless to say; this oligarchic tendency
such a reversal in the meaning of democratic support increases in direct proportion to the magnitude of the
is negatively associated with democracy. economic inequalities between the social classes.
The inevitable result of the oligarchic tendency is
a rising disillusionment among lower-class segments
Economic Inequality as Democracy's whose members feel increasingly 'left behind.' These
Key Challenge feelings are also manifest in a growing class polariza-
tion over emancipative values. Over recent decades,
Foa and Mounk. (2016; 2017) document lower levels of all segments of the electorates of mature Western
unqualified support for democracy among younger democracies have become significantly more eman-
compared to older people. But this age pattern is very cipatory in their value orientations. But members of
modest and mostly reflects a life-cycle effect rather than the upper and middle class have progressed on these
a time trend. Even more importantly; the age pattern values much farther than members of the working
does not explain much because support for democracy and lower class. Consequently; class polarization over
can mean anything from truly supporting democracy to emancipative values has more than doubled over the
supporting its opposite. Unless further qualified for the past fifteen years (Alexander and Welzel 2017). 6 This
values that motivate it, support for democracy as such polarization has almost certainly deepened the alien-
is an altogether misleading indicator. What truly mat- ation of the more traditional voters in the face of an
ters is the specific form of support inspired by emanci- increasingly progressive policy agenda when it comes
pative values. Contrary to Foa and Mounk.'s scenario of to such issues as drug liberalization, same sex mar-
democratic decline, emancipatory support for democ- riage, immigration, and ethnic tolerance.
racy is neither in a temporal nor a generational decline, Lack of education among the more traditionalist
as the line graphs in Figure 1.11 demonstrate for ma- voter segments comes with diminished cognitive cap-
ture democracies. These graphs also suggest that rising acities and a low need for information, which makes
incomes, education, and growing middle classes fuel these voters feel detached from the academic jargon
emancipatory support for democracy; and all of these of the established parties (Fording and Schram 2018).
factors are on a global rise (Welzel 2013: 4). For all these reasons, lower-class voters tended to turn
This does not mean that everything is rosy. Large out in elections in continuously decreasing numbers,
segments of the population in many parts of the world the more political parties grounded their campaigns in
remain excluded from income growth, expanding edu- rational language (Dalton 2017). This is where right-
cation and other benefits of modernization. As a conse- wing populist parties have stepped in with growing
quence, emancipative values remain deficient in these success: Their vulgar and simplistic rhetoric appeals
places, which darkens the prospects for democracy. to the instinct of voters with modest cognitive needs
Advanced post-industrial democracies also face chal- and turns their distaste for rational argumentation
lenges, although these are of a different nature than from a depressor into a catalyst of participation. A
Foa and Mounk. suggest. The main challenge is the possibly healthy side-effect of this development is that
economic inequality between the social classes that has populism brings back in previously excluded voter
I Introduction 15
.
.8 0.60
• • • • • • 1995-98
.
.a
--2011-15
'[ 0.50 -.... ~ 0.60
-
....... -
0. >, 0.50
~ .
§' ~ 0.40 0. u
J:l ea 0.40
i:' 1S 0.30 g
i:' 0.30
~0.Q5 0.20 .S~o20
2-o .
·o 0.10 ·o 0.10
~
a 0.00 j 0.00
....N .,.,0
....0\
~
0 0
...."i'N ....'1'
<V')
....0\ ....0\
........I
0
.....,.,"i'
0
'I....
'l:>
0
"?
....
[',
0
...."i'00
0
0\
.......
0\
a...
"'
a ~
'O
~
~
'O
'O
~...
.... .... ....0\ ....0\ ....0\
s
bO
.E
0\ 0\
....«:
(I) (I)
]... 1i:: (I)

(I)
): 0.
<'l
~
0
~ .3
Birth Cohorts Subjective Social Class
... .
.a
~ 0.60
~
~
0.60
0.50 ••
..
8: tj' 0.50 ~ 0. >,
J:l S 0.40 ~--···. §' u
~ s
0.40
i:' 1S 0.30
~ 50.20
····· i:' g
.S
0.30
El 0.20
"'(I)
.e,o 0.10
-~Q
ea 0.10-+---.---.---.---.--r--r--r-~
0.00 ~ 0.00 -+--r-.----.---.----.--.----.-~---.---,
.... .,., .,.,
~
~
~ :a :a :a :a.... :a :a :a :a
N [',
.J
~
<V') 'l:> (I) N <V') 'l:> [', 00 0\
:8 ] 1 ] .J i .J >
~
(I) (I) (I) (I) (I) (I) (I)
~
~ ~
(I) (I)
""u
;:, ....i ....i ....i ~ ~
Q (I)
Cl Q
OJ (I) (I)
Q
OJ
Q
(I) (I)
Q
(I) Q
~ Cl Cl Cl ~
~
(I)
(I) (I)
:§, ): .i:::
~
(I) :i:: .3 -~
:i::
~
....i
Education Levels Income Levels (relative)
Source: Data are from the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), rounds 3 ( 1995-98) and 6 (20 I 1-15)
segments, which forces the established parties to pay productivity to technology to longevity, prosperity,
more attention to the legitimate concerns of these education, and information-all of which turn life,
'modernization losers'. But the price we pay for this for most people, from a source of threats into a
return is a change in political culture in which evi- source of opportunities. Likewise, comprehensive
dence, facts, and rationality become devalued in democracy's close tie to emancipative values reflects
favour of instinct, anger, and vulgarism. Coping with its rootedness in healthy psychological climates that
this challenge requires a reversal of the trend toward turn societies into more trusting, tolerant, empath-
economic inequality on which it feeds. etic, engaged, inspired, and happy places.
In keeping with this claim, Figure 1.12 shows that
comprehensive democracy is a strong positive cor-
The Value of Democracy relate of a variety of desirable social goods, including
social ·movement activity, women's engagement, life
Despite these challenges, it remains true that com- satisfaction, out-group trust, peace and security and
prehensive democracy is closely tied to a broad distri- environmental protection. At the same time, com-
bution of action resources among ordinary people. prehensive democracy is a negative correlate of some
Democracy's tie to action resources reflects its root- of the most serious social ills, above all corruption,
edness in favourable existential conditions, from terror, and belligerence.
Fig 1.12 Democracy's link with social goods and social ill;
People's Social Movement Activity (N = 89) ·1
Women's Voluntary Engagement (N = 1 58) I
Country's Environmental Performance (N = 149) ,''a• C

I
People's Out-group Trust (N = 66) I
Country's Peace and Security (N = 1 23) . .. I
People's Life Satisfaction (N = 94) I
People's Charity Proneness (N = 1 25) . I
People's War Proneness (N = 92) I
Country's Political Terror (N = 1 56) ...

I
Country's Public Corruption (N = 1 58) I
-1.00 -0.80-0.60 -0.40-0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00

Cross-country Correlation with Comprehensive Democracy 2012
Whether this means that democracy is merely a including reversals of democratization. One chapter,
symptom of all these social goods and evils or contrib- namely Chapter 17 on the role of the social media,
utes to them as a true cause cannot be inferred from is entirely new, while Eastern Europe and post-Soviet
mere correlations. Still, the positive link of democracy Eurasia are now dealt with in two separate chapters
to social goods, and its negative link to social ills, is a (Chs. 21 and 22).
fact so fundamental that it needs to be recognized as a Part One (Theoretical and Historical Perspectives)
quintessential aspect of reality. Regardless of whether of our volume starts out by tracing the historic origins
democracy is a symptom or cause, the way it is linked to of democracy as well as the social forces that drive and
desirable goods and undesirable ills makes it worthwhile block its emergence (Ch. 2). The subsequent chapters
to understand both its foundations and challenges. This discuss the difference between democratic and un-
book attempts to contribute to that task. democratic states (Ch. 3) and describe how to measure
the level of democracy in a given state (Ch. 4). Chapter
5 provides an historical overview of democratization
Plan of the Book since the late eighteenth century, discussing 'waves'
and 'conjunctures.' Chapter 6 focuses on the global
The sequence of the chapters in this book is based on wave of democratization from 1970 to the present and
four main aspects of democratization: (1) theoretical the signs of a recent reversal.
and historical perspectives on democratization, (2) the Part Two (Causes and Dimensions of Democra-
causes and dimensions of democratization, (3) actors tization) presents contemporary factors that facili-
and institutions in democratization, and (4) geograph- tate, inhibit and revert democratization and discusses
ical regions of democratization. The chapters are the role of democracy beyond the narrowly pol-
organized within these four sections. All chapters of itical sphere. Turning to the international context
this new edition have been thoroughly updated to of democratization, Chapter 7 examines the roles
reflect important events and developments that have that supra-national, intergovernmental, and inter-
occurred since the first edition was published in 2009, national non-governmental organizations play in
I Introduction 17
democratization, and illuminates the role of dem- which facilitates the consideration of international
ocratization in the foreign policies of major powers variables, cultural factors, contagion effects, and
such as the USA and the European Union. Chapter other regional dynamics. The regions are examined
8 explores how economic factors affect transitions to according to the sequence in which the long-term
democracy and highlights the problems involved in democratic trend spread around the world. Analysing
simultaneous transitions from communist systems the democratization processes in Southern Europe in
to democratic and capitalist systems, and the role of the 1970s, Chapter 19 examines the role of pre-transi-
business elites in democratization. Chapter 9 deals tional legitimacy crises of authoritarian regimes, elite
with political culture, public opinion, and questions pacts and mass mobilization, and international influ-
of legitimacy; examining the role of mass beliefs in ences as exerted by the European Union. Chapter
democratization, particularly the role played by rising 20 describes democratization in Latin America, em-
emancipative beliefs. Chapter 10 examines the extent phasizing the democratic transitions and democratic
to which women benefit from democratization, re- consolidation in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, as well
inforcing the view that democratization is not only as Venezuela's democratic backsliding. Chapter 21
about electoral enfranchisement but also about deals with democratization in post-communist Eu-
gender equality with respect to other aspects of so- rope, while Chapter 22 addresses these issues in the
cial, economic, and political life. Chapter 11 analyses post-Soviet space, with particular emphasis on Rus-
the importance of civil society and social capital for sia's reautocratization. Successful democratization is
successful democratization, reviewing the debates rare in North Africa and the Middle East, which is the
stimulated by Robert Putnam and examining prob- focus of Chapter 23. Political Islam, the Israel-Pales-
lems of 'weak' civil society and its impact on democ- tine conflict, civil war in Libya and Syria, the so called
ratization. Part Two closes with Chapter 12, which Islamic State, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Ara-
investigates the role of social movements, protest, bia, and the prevalence of rent-seeking economies
and transnational advocacy networks in transitions based on oil wealth all are uniquely important fac-
towards and away from democracy. tors of this region. In Chapter 24, democratization in
Part Three (Actors and Institutions) begins with an the poorest region in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa,
examination of elections and voter behaviour in dem- is analysed. Though still ridden by severe economic
ocratizing and newly democratized systems (Ch. 13). problems, the region has nevertheless experienced a
Chapter 14 focuses on the role of political parties, strong trend towards democracy; to the surprise of
while Chapter 15 scrutinizes the influence of elect- many observers. The chapter pays special attention to
oral systems and party systems, and the implications South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. Lastly;
of parliamentary and presidential systems. Chapter democratization in South-East Asia is the focus of
16 analyses the relationship between the mass media, Chapter 25. Here, we examine examples of successful
democracy; and democratization, while Chapter 17 mass-pressured democratization as in the Philippines
examines these questions in reference to the social and South Korea, and the contrasting example of
media and the Internet. The last chapter in this sec- elite-guided democratization in Taiwan. The chapter
tion (Ch. 18) analyses failed and incomplete democ- also deals with failed popular pressures to democra-
ratization processes and identifies key factors that tize, as in China; with democratization that was re-
account for reversed democratization and democratic versed by military rule, as in Thailand; and with the
backsliding. absence of serious attempts to democratize, as in Vi-
Part Pour (Regions of Democratizations) exam- etnam or Singapore.
ines how the global trend towards democracy and its The concluding chapter (Ch. 26) draws together the
reversals manifest themselves in various regions of themes of the book summarizing the lessons learned
the world. Most chapters in this part start with a brief for democratizers. On this basis, we attempt a cautious
historical overview and then examine how the fac- sketch of the future prospects of democracy around
tors identified in Parts Two and Three influence the the world. To do so, the chapter discusses the global
democratization processes as well as their reversals democratic trend of recent decades in a broader evolu-
and stagnation encountered in the given region. tionary perspective addressing the selective forces that
The focus is on regions rather than single countries, drive regime evolution.
(8··--Nb'r~s- ._-., __ ~-~ ·_-·___ -_-- ;/· __,:_. __ -___ · _- '.:-.-,-,"".'"''.":C:---:-:-:-:-7

, j
_The dip in the pe_rcentage of the world's population living .in pure democracies during the early 1970s in the upper
diagram of Figure· 1.2 reflects the periodic enactment of emergency law in India by Indira Gandhi. In the world popu-
lation average, this is visible because a billion people periodically drop out of democracy. In terms of the percentage
of states in the lower diagram, no such dip is visible because in this counting perspective it is just one state among
some 180 states dropping out of democracy,
2 Again, the only other democracy indicator replicating this feature is Alexander, lnglehart, and Welzel's (2012)
effective democracy index,
3 Indeed, with Alexander, lnglehart. and Welzel's (2012) effective democracy index, India scores at only a third of the
scale maximum (at 0,33) in 2012 as well as in other years, which is practically identical with its score in comprehensive
democracy (i.e, 0.32),
4 The correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) is a measure of the linear relationship between two variables. Values range
between 0 and I, and a score of .8 indicates a very close relationship,
5 This measure is based on a question, fielded since the third round of the World Values Surveys in 1995--98, asking
people how good an idea they think it is to 'have a democratic system'. People answer this question in a four-fold
response format, which we recode along increasing strength of support: 0 ('very bad idea'), 0,33 ('bad idea'), 0.66
('gooq idea'), I ,00 ('very good idea').
6 The distinction between 'lower', 'working', 'lower middle', 'upper middle', and 'upper class' does not derive from a
theoretical definition of objective indicators but reflects people's subjective self-attribution to the classes. in this pre-
set scheme. It can be taken as an indication of the validity of these self-attributions that they correlate strongly, and
in the expected direction, with the respondents' self-reported household income and formal education.
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decentration of the eye as if a prism were prescribed, nature
supplying its own decentration.
Treatment for Correcting Esophoria

in Children
In case of esophoria, regardless of amount, slightly increased
spherical power is frequently prescribed for children. This will
naturally blur or fog the patient’s vision, but in their effort to
overcome the blur, accommodation is relaxed, usually tending to
correct the muscular defect.
In such cases, as a rule, a quarter diopter increased spherical
strength may frequently be added for each degree of esophoria as
determined before the optical correction was made. In a case of 6
degrees of esophoria, the refractionist may prescribe +1.50 diopter
spherical added to the optical correction, which, let us assume, is
+1.00 sph. = -1.00 cyl. ax. 180°, so that the treatment glasses would
be +2.50 sph. = -1.00 ax. 180° (See Procedure on Page 74).
At the end of each three months’ period, the patient should be
requested to return, when the binocular and the duction test should
again be made, comparing results with the work previously
accomplished. An improvement tending to build up the left weak
externus will possibly permit of a decrease of the excessive spherical
power, so that excessive spherical power is reduced until completely
removed, in all probability overcoming the muscular defect.
Esophoria is almost invariably a false condition and frequently is
outgrown under this treatment as the child advances in years. On the
other hand, esophoria uncared for in the child may tend to produce
exophoria in the adult.
How Optical Correction Tends to

Decrease 6° Esophoria in a Child
Assume binocular muscle test made
before optical correction shows
6° Esophoria.
+1. Sph. = -1. Cyl. Ax. 180.
Next, locate faulty muscle by making a duction

test, which shows how abduction of left eye is
made to equal that of right eye, change being
made quarterly with treatment lenses in
accordance with following rule. Note as
abduction is increased, esophoria is reduced.
Rule—prescribe a quarter diopter increased
sphere for each degree of imbalance or 0.25
× 6 equals:
+1.50 added to optical correction.
1/1/19 (assumed date) prescribed treatment
lenses equal:
+2.50 = -1. × 180°.
4/1/19 (3 months later) assuming abduction has

increased from 2° to 3° showing difference of
5 Es. or 0.25 × 5. equals +1.25 added to
optical correction, prescribed treatment lenses
equal:
+2.25 = -1. × 180.
7/1/19 (3 months later), assuming abduction has

increased from 3° to 4° showing difference of
4° Es. or 0.25 × 4 equals +1.00 which added
to optical correction would make prescribed
treatment lenses equal:
+2.00 = -1. × 180.
And so on, every three months treatment lenses

are prescribed until both right and left eye
show 8° of abduction. In this way the
treatment lenses are reduced to original
correction of +1.00 = -100 × 180. This would
have required six changes of lenses, three
months apart—thus consuming 18 months
time.
Chapter X
SECOND METHOD OF TREATMENT—
MUSCULAR EXERCISE
Made With Two Rotary Prisms

and Red Maddox Rod
Exophoria
I f a case is one of exophoria of six degrees, where the second

method of treatment or muscular exercise is in line of routine, it is
essential to first determine through a duction test and the
preparation of the diagram exactly which one of the four muscles are
faulty (Fig. 24).
Having determined, with the aid of the diagram, first, the
existence of 6 degrees of exophoria; second, 18 degrees of
adduction; third, a weak left internus—the next procedure is to
determine what degree of prism will enable the patient to obtain
single binocular vision, with both eyes looking “straight.”
To determine this, place both of the Ski-optometer’s rotary prisms
in position with the handle of each pointing outward horizontally. The
red line or indicator of each prism should then be placed at 30° of the
outer scale (Fig. 26).
The red Maddox rod should be horizontally positioned before the
eye, the white line on indicator pointing to 180° of the scale (Fig. 27).
The strength of the rotary prism before the right eye should
thereupon be reduced by rotating the prism indicator or red line
toward the upper zero (0) to a point where the patient first sees the
red streak—assuming that the red line appears at 42 degrees, that is
30 degrees before the left eye and 12 degrees before the right.
Fig. 26 (A and B)—First position of rotary

prisms to determine amount of prism
exercise to be employed for building up
the weak muscle.
The prism should then be still further reduced until the vertical
streak produced by the Maddox rod directly bisects the muscle
testing spot of light. Assuming that this point be thirty-eight degrees,
which is four degrees less, single binocular vision is produced.
Fig. 27—Position of red Maddox rod used
in conjunction with Fig. 26 for prism
exercising.
For example, sixty degrees of prism power (the combined power
of the two rotary prisms) will usually cause complete distortion.
Therefore, as outlined in Figure 28, the patient, seeing only out of
the right eye, will detect nothing but a white light. By gradually
reducing the strength of the prism before the right, which is the good
eye, the patient will eventually see a red streak off to the left. A
continued and gradual reduction to a point where the red streak
bisects the white light, will determine how much prism power is
required for the patient to obtain single binocular vision, thus
establishing the same image at the same time on each fovea or
retina (Fig. 20).
This has taught the patient to do that which he has never before
accomplished. Therefore, after having been taught how to make the
two eyes work in relation to each other, the natural tendency
thereafter will be to strive for the same relationship of vision with
both eyes. The refractionist should then aim to reduce the excessive
amount of prism required to give binocular vision, which can be
accomplished by muscular exercise.
It must always be remembered before the refractionist is ready to
employ the muscular exercise or second method, that the degree of
prism required to give the patient single binocular vision must be
determined with the optical correction in place. The exercise must be
practised daily in routine, a daily record being essential.
An Assumed Case
We will assume a case where 42 degrees is required to enable
the patient to first see the red streak as produced by the Maddox rod
to the extreme left. Through a continued gradual reduction of 4
degrees (or to 38 degrees), we next learn that the streak was carried
over until it bisected the white spot of light, giving single binocular
vision and producing a position of rest.
Fig. 28—Simplified chart showing the
prism action employed in developing a
weak ocular muscle through alternating
prism exercise. Either side of 38° in
excess of 4° causing diplopia.
The patient has now established the limitation of the exercise,
which is four degrees, this limitation being determined by the
difference between the point where the streak was first seen to the
extreme side and where it bisected the spot. The same amount of
four degrees should then be used for the opposite side, thus
reducing the prism strength to 34 degrees.
This again produces diplopia, because of the lesser amount of
prism power employed to give single binocular vision. The
refractionist should then return to 38 degrees, where single binocular
vision had originally been determined (Fig. 28), alternating back to
42, returning to 38, over to 34, back to 38, and so on. This procedure
should be employed once a day just after meals for about five
minutes, and repeated ten times, constantly striving for a slight
reduction of prism power from day to day.
Effect of Muscular Exercise

This muscular treatment, or constructive exercising, should
enable the patient to overcome his amount of four degrees in either
direction in about a week. Hence in the case showing 38 degrees for
single binocular vision, results may be looked for in about nine
weeks—four degrees divided into 38 degrees. While the patient is
undergoing the treatment, which is nothing more than the
strengthening of the interni muscles or developing adduction, it is
natural to believe that the amount of imbalance is likewise being
conquered. This, however, is readily determined from time to time by
making the binocular muscle test with the phorometer and Maddox
rod, as well as the duction chart test (Fig. 24), as previously outlined.
To fully appreciate the effect of this muscular treatment, the
reader need only hold his head in a stationary position, casting his
eyes several times from the extreme right to the extreme left, not
failing to note the apparent muscular strain. On the other hand, with
the aid of the Ski-optometer’s rotating prisms, the refractionist not
only has complete control of the patient’s muscles at all times, but
scientifically accomplishes muscular exercise without any tiresome
strain, overcoming all possible exertion.
After the case in question has been reduced to 30 degrees,
having no further use for the rotary prism, it may be removed from
before the right eye and the same exercising procedure continued as
before with the remaining left side rotary prism by reducing its power,
until it is likewise down to zero.
Having reduced both prisms to zero, each prism should again be
placed in position with zero graduations vertical and the prism
indicator on upper zero. Both prisms should then be turned
simultaneously about four degrees toward the nasal side of the
patient, thus tending to jointly force corresponding muscles of both
eyes.
Home Treatment for Muscular Exercise—

Square Prism Set Used in Conjunction
With the Ski-Optometer
Where a patient is unable to call each day for this muscular
treatment or exercise, the work will be greatly facilitated by
employing a specially designed set of square prisms ranging in
strength from ½ to 20 degrees for home treatment. As in the case
previously cited, it is necessary to carefully instruct the patient that
the interni muscles must be developed, hence prism base out with
apex in must be employed. Attention should then be directed to a
candle light, serving as a muscle testing spot of light and stationed in
a semi-dark room at an approximate distance of twenty feet.
Having determined through the Ski-optometer the strength of the
prism required after each office treatment, its equivalent should then
be placed in a special square prism trial-frame which permits rotation
of the prism, although the patient is frequently taught to twirl the lens
before the eye. This exercise may be continued for about five
minutes each day.
The patient should also be instructed to call at the end of each
week, when the work may be checked by means of the Ski-
optometer’s rotary prisms, making the duction test as previously
explained and outlined in Fig. 24. It is then possible to determine
whether or not satisfactory results are being obtained. Otherwise the
exercise should be abandoned.
Should the second method employed in the work of muscular
imbalance not prove effective, the third method requiring the use of
prisms would be next in routine.
Chapter XI
THIRD METHOD OF TREATMENT—PRISM
LENSES
When and How Employed
A s stated in the preceding chapter, on ascertaining the failure of

the second muscular treatment or method, prisms are employed
for constant wear. When prism lenses are used, whether the
case is exophoria or esophoria, or right or left hyperphoria, it is
always safe to prescribe one-quarter degree prism for each degree
of prism imbalance for each eye. For example, in a case of 6
degrees of esophoria, a prism of 1½ degree base out should be
prescribed for each eye; or in 6 degrees of exophoria, employ the
same amount of prism, but base in. In right hyperphoria, place the
prism base down before the right eye and up before the left, and vice
versa for left hyperphoria.
It is not always advisable, however, to allow the patient to wear
the same degree of prism for any length of time. Many authorities
suggest a constant change with the idea that a prism is nothing more
than a crutch. Should the same degree be constantly worn, even
though it afforded temporary relief, the eye would become
accustomed to it and the purpose of the prism entirely lost. Prisms
should be prescribed with extreme care, their use being identical
with that of dumb-bells, where weight is first increased to maximum
and subsequently reduced, viz.:
Prism Reduction Method

Where prisms are prescribed, it is considered good practice to
make a binocular muscle test and the duction test (Fig. 24) at the
end of each three months’ period, employing the phorometer,
Maddox rod, and rotary prisms, as already explained.
If the condition shows any decrease, the prism degree should be
proportionately decreased. For example, in the case originally
showing 6 degrees of exophoria, one-quarter degree prism for each
degree of imbalance was prescribed, or 1½ degree for each eye. If
the same case subsequently indicated 4 degrees, only one degree
for each eye should be prescribed—and so on, a gradual reduction
of prism value being constantly sought.
Except in rare cases, prisms should not be prescribed with the
base or apex at oblique angles, as the eye is rarely at rest with such
a correction. An imbalance may be caused by a false condition in
one rectus and a true imbalance in the other, giving one the
impression that cyclophoria exists, as explained in a following
chapter.
Having now employed the three methods, the refractionist can
readily understand that a marked percentage of muscular imbalance
cases may be directly benefited through the aid of the Ski-optometer.
If these three methods of procedure fail, there is nothing left but the
fourth and last method—that of operative procedure.
Chapter XII
A CONDENSATION OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS
ON THE PROCEDURE FOR MUSCLE TESTING
WITH THE SKI-OPTOMETER
T he present chapter, intended for those desiring a synopsis or

condensed summary of muscular imbalance work, should prove
of the utmost assistance to the busy refractionist. Muscular
imbalance work can be successfully conducted if the following
routine is studied and memorized, with the Ski-optometer constantly
before the reader. The chapters containing the corresponding figures
and diagrams or illustrations will then be readily comprehended. It is
also important to carefully note the captions under each diagram.
1. Without any testing lenses before patient’s eyes, direct
attention to a 20-foot distant muscle testing spot of light (Fig. 9).
2. Place phorometer handle vertically (Fig. 16).
Place red Maddox rod vertically (Fig. 15). Patient should see a
white spot of light, and a red horizontal streak (Fig. 17).
Simply turn phorometer handle until horizontal streak bisects
white spot of light. Pointer then indicates amount of deviation on red
scale. Ignore cases less than 1° hyperphoria, whether right or left
designated by (R. H.—L. H.).
3. Place phorometer handle horizontally (Fig. 19).
Place red Maddox rod horizontally (Fig. 18). Patient should see a
white spot of light and a vertical red streak (Fig. 20).
Simply turn phorometer handle until red streak bisects spot of
light. Pointer indicates amount of deviation on white scale, whether
esophoria or exophoria designated by (Es—Ex).
4. Ignore all exophoria cases, less than 3°.
Ignore all esophoria cases, less than 5°—except in children,
ignore less than 3° of esophoria.
5. Always make the above or binocular muscle test—with
phorometer and red Maddox before optical correction or (test for
spheres and cylinders) and again after optical correction where case
shows more than 1-3-5 rule, to determine whether muscles are
aggravated or benefited.
6. In cases showing more than the 1-3-5 rule, shown in above
No. 4, make monocular duction test first with rotary prism before
patient’s right eye,—then with rotary prism before left eye to find
faulty muscle and determine which eye is affected.
7. To test adduction, prism base out is required. Rotary prism’s
red line or indicator should be rotated from zero outwardly. To test
abduction, base in is required. Indicator should be rotated inwardly
from zero (Fig. 22). Power of adduction as compared with abduction,
is normally 3 to 1—usually rated 24 to 8.
8. To test superduction, base down is required. Rotary prism’s
line or indicator should be rotated downward from zero. To test
subduction, base up is required. Indicator should be rotated upward
from zero. Power of superduction as compared with subduction, is
normally equal—usually rated 2 for each (Fig. 23).
9. Direct patient’s attention to largest letter on distant chart,
usually letter “E,” rotating red line indicator of rotary prism outlined in
above No. 7 and No. 8, until diplopia is first procured.
10. The use of a duction chart on a record card, quickly
designates pull for each of four muscles (Fig. 24), illustrating an
assumed case of—
1st—6D of Exophoria.
2nd—18° adduction (which must be developed to 24°).
3rd—Patient has a left weak internus.
11. Employ First Method—Optical Correction—to effect
treatment.
12. Assuming a case of a child with 6° of esophoria—8° of right
abduction and 2° left abduction indicating a left weak externus,
prescribe a quarter diopter increased plus spherical power for each
degree of imbalance, thus adding +1.50D spherical to optical
correction. This is the first method of treatment. This requires a
thorough reading of Chapter IX on Treatment for Correcting
Esophoria in Children and a careful study of the formula. For
synopsis see Page 74.
Four Methods of Treating an Imbalance Case

When the Preceding One Fails
1st—Optical correction;
2nd—Muscular exercise or treatment;
75% are Curable with First and Second Methods.
3rd—Prisms;
5% are Curable with Third Method.
4th—Operation;
20% are Curable with Fourth Method.
13. When first method of treatment fails, Employ Second
Method—Muscular Exercise—to effect treatment.
1st—Find degree of prism patient will accept to produce single
binocular vision with optical correction on, placing both rotary prisms
in position, handles horizontal, red line on 30° of temporal scale of
each, giving total value to 60° (Fig. 26a and b).
2nd—Also place red Maddox rod before patient’s eye (rods
horizontal) (Fig. 18), calling patient’s attention to usual muscle
testing spot of light.
3rd—Reduce prism before good eye until red streak appears,
noting degree (which we assume shows 42° the combined total
value of both prisms) slowly continue to decrease prism until streak
bisects spot. Assume this shows total of 38°. Either side of 38° in
excess of 4° (38 to 42) produces diplopia. Prisms must only be
rotated from 38° to 42° back to 38° over to 34°—back to 38° over to
42°—back again to 38° and so on—exercise to be continued daily
ten times for five minutes (Fig. 28).
4th—At end of each week, duction test should again be made.
Duction chart should show a tendency to reduce exophoria by a
gradual building up of adduction, approximately one week is usually
sufficient to teach patient to hold streak within the spot (between 38°
and 42°). Exercise to be continued until both prisms are worked
down to zero. Exercise tends to teach patient how to establish same
image on each fovea or retina at same time.
5th—If patient is unable to call daily for treatment, employ home
treatment. (Read “Home Treatment for Muscular Exercising,” Page
82).
Employ Third Method—Use of Prisms for Constant Wear to
effect treatment.
Prisms
1st. Where a case cannot be reduced through use of first two
methods, as for example in a case of 6° of exophoria, prescribe ¼ of
amount of imbalance (¼ × 6 = 1½°) for each eye—base in—or
esophoria base out, hyperphoria base up on eye affected.
2nd. Advise patient to call every three months and make duction
test (Fig. 24). If no improvement in condition, after wearing prisms
six months, operative means is suggested.
Assume a case is benefited, reduce prism power according to
rule; ¼D prism for each degree of imbalance.
Cyclophoria
This work being of a technical nature, it is deemed best for the
reader to study Chapter XIII and XIV.
Chapter XIII
CYCLOPHORIA
Made with Maddox Rods

and Rotary Prisms
C yclophoria, a condition affecting the oblique muscles of the

eye, is caused by its rotation. It is detected in the following
manner by the combined use of the red and white Maddox rods
and the rotary prism.
Fig. 29—Position of rotary prism for
producing diplopia in testing cyclophoria
with prism placed at 8° base up.
Darken the room and direct the patient’s attention to the usual
muscle-testing spot of light, located approximately twenty feet away
and on a direct plane with the patient’s eye. The optical correction, if
one is required, should always be left in place—just as in making
other previously described muscle tests.
The rotary prism should then be brought before the patient’s right
eye with the handle-pointing upward and with zero graduations
horizontal. The indicator or red line should then be rotated upward
from zero to eight upon the prism scale, creating the equivalent of a
prism of 8 diopters with base up (Fig. 29). This normally caused

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Democratization Christian W.

NEW TO THIS EDITION: :t\n important and brilliant book

significant changes and developments in these

This textbook is supported by a range of online resources

OXFORD ISBN 978- 0-19 -8 73228 -0

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

How to use this book xxii

PART ONE Theoretical and Historical Perspectives 19

3 Democratic and Undemocratic States 40

4 Measuring Democracy and Democratization 52

5 Long Waves and Conjunctures of Democratization 67

6 The Global Wave of Democratization 82

PART TWO Causes and Dimensions of Democratization IOI

8 The Political Economy of Democracy 119

9 Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change 134

I O Gender and Democratization 158

I I Social Capital and Civil Society 171

12 Social Movements and Contention in Democratization Processes 182

PART THREE Actors and Institutions 195

13 Conventional Citizen Participation 197

14 Political Parties 212

15 Institutional Design in New Democracies 228

16 The Media 239

17 Social Media 253

18 A Decade of Democratic Decline and Stagnation 267

PART FOUR Regions of Democratization 283

19 Southern Europe 285

20 Latin America 305

21 Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe 322

22 Post-Soviet Eurasia 341

23 The Middle East and North Africa 364

24 Sub-Saharan Africa 384

25 East Asia 401

PART FIVE Conclusions and Outlook 421

26 Conclusion: The Future of Democratization 423

How to use this book xxii

About the Contributors xxvi

The New Pessimism about Democracy

PART ONE Theoretical and Historical Perspectives 19

Detailed Contents xiii

Elite Concessions versus Pressures from Below 33

3 Democratic and Undemocratic States 40

4 Measuring Democracy and Democratization 52

5 Long Waves and Conjunctures of Democratization 67

6 The Global Wave of Democratization 82

PART TWO Causes and Dimensions of Democratization IOI

7 The International Context 103

8 The Political Economy of Democracy 119

9 Political Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value Change 134

IO Gender and Democratization 158

I I Social Capital and Civil Society 171

12 Social Movements and Contention in Democratization Processes 182

Elite transactional process approach: transitology 184

PART THREE Actors and Institutions 195

13 Conventional Citizen Participation 197

14 Political Parties 212

Introduction: Parties as an Essential Component of Democracy 213

15 Institutional Design in New Democracies 228

Institutions and Institutional Design 228

Duverger's and Sartori's Electoral Laws 231

16 The Media 239

17 Social Media 253

I8 A Decade of Democratic Decline and Stagnation 267

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