58rule 8 Clavecilla vs. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623

4/20/24, 8:12 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 407
623
INDEX
ACTIONS
1. The Court finds it iniquitous, under the circumstances of the

case, for the creditor to forfeit both the debtor’s land and hard-
earned money. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
2. A party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense. Silverio vs.
Court of Appeals, p. 240.
3. The alleged failure of a party to attach to the petition certified
copies of the impugned RTC orders did not merit the denial of
the petition. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, p. 240.
4. The pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the
property does not bar the filing or consideration of an
ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein.
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, p. 240.
5. An action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for
the consequent cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a
personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the
mortgage and the mortgagor is in possession of the premises
since neither the mortgagor’s title to nor possession of the
property is in question. Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Plaza,
p. 306.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
The act of an accused in forcibly placing his hand between the

legs of a girl over 12 years old, or without force if she were
under that age, constitutes the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
People vs. De Jesus, p. 265.
624
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant

has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the
allegations in his complaint. Aguilar vs. How, p. 482.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018efb74282054d9915c000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/34
ALIBI AND DENIALS
1. The defense of alibi is always looked upon with suspicion and

received with caution because not only is this kind of defense
inherently weak and unreliable, it is also easy to fabricate.
People vs. Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
2. Denials are self-serving negative evidence which cannot prevail
over the positive, straightforward and unequivocal testimony of
the victim. People vs. Madronio, p. 337.
3. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by other
convincing evidence of non-culpability. People vs. Baltazar, p.
542.
4. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent,
without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. People
vs. Baltazar, p. 542.
5. Denial being intrinsically weak as a defense, it must be
supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credence. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
6. For alibi to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense must be proven; and (b) the physical impossibility for
him to be at the scene of the crime. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p.
563.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
1. The elements of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, as

amended, are as follows: (1) The accused is a public officer or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) The
said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or
her public positions; (3) That he or she causes undue injury to
any party, whether the government or a private party; (4) Such
undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) That the
public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Suller vs.
Sandiganbayan, p. 201.
2. The fact that the money extorted by the accused was
immediately recovered as a consequence of the NBI agents’
timely entrapment will not in any way affect his criminal
liability—he gained actual possession of the money and it
matters not even if he had no occasion or opportunity to
dispose of the same because at the precise moment he received
the money and placed it inside his pocket with the evil motive
of appropriating it as his own, the offense was already

consummated. Suller vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 201.
625
APPEALS
1. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Rules of Civil Procedure serves to correct a reversible error and
not grave abuse of discretion. Kalayaan Arts and Crafts, Inc.
vs. Anglo, p. 146.
2. In the absence of any showing that it has overlooked or
misconstrued some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that can affect his conclusions in a case, the trial
judge’s findings on credibility will not be disturbed on appeal.
People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
3. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and
failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment or resolution final and executory. Manipor vs.
Ricafort, p. 298.
4. An automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial
court was deemed to include an appeal of the less serious
crimes not so punished by death but arising out of the same
occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion
as that giving rise to the more serious offense. People vs.
Ibañez, p. 406.
5. Jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought to it from the Court
of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law
allegedly committed by the appellate court. Tugade, Sr. vs.
6. Instances where the Court may review the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals. Tugade, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 497.
7. Findings of fact of trial courts are accorded by appellate courts
with great, if not conclusive effect. Tugade, Sr. vs. Court of
Appeals, p. 497.
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
1. The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and

corrupt practices of AFP personnel who have either (a)
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate
family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationships, or (b)
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG. Republic vs.
626
2. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically

make him a “subordinate” as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
3. The term “subordinate” as used in EO Nos. 1 and 2 refers to
one who enjoys a close association with former President
Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family
member, relative and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close
relative, business association, dummy, agent or nominee in EO
No. 2—there must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or
his wife. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. Position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make the
occupant a “subordinate” of former President Marcos for
purpose of EO No. 1 and its amendments. Republic vs.
ARSON
1. Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art.

320) and (2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). People vs. Soriano,
p. 367.
2. Classification is based on the kind, character and location of the
property burned regardless of the value of the damage caused.
People vs. Soriano, p. 367.
3. In the crime of arson, the prosecution may describe the theatre
of the crime and the conditions and circumstances surrounding
it. People vs. Soriano, p. 367.
4. The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these
elements concur in the case at bar. People vs. Soriano, p. 367.
5. Destructive arson distinguished from simple arson. People vs.
Soriano, p. 367.
ATTORNEYS
1. It is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy,

fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues. De la
Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., p. 213.
2. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer
shall be a person of good moral character. Grande vs. De Silva,
p. 310.
627
3. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in

serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice
of law. Grande vs. De Silva, p. 310.
4. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason
whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment.
Grande vs. De Silva, p. 310.
5. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt
validly incurred. Grande vs. De Silva, p. 310.
6. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Uy vs. Depasucat, p.
315.
7. A lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession. Uy vs. Depasucat, p. 315.
BILL OF RIGHTS
1. During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective

takeover of power by the revolutionary government up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the
Provisional Constitution)—a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then. Republic vs.
2. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void
all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution. Republic vs.
3. Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to
enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the
same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. View that though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a
republican constitution and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights,
with or without such mandate, the Constitution would have
nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were
satisfied with their experience of a republican government—a
Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also included
because the people had been accustomed to the role of a Bill of
Rights in the past organic acts. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
5. View that because of the wide-scaled violation of human rights
during the dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains of Bill
of Rights which more jealously safeguards the people’s
“fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional
democracy.” Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
6. View that from Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616, 625 (1885),
it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is an
almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect
rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in
one’s home and possessions. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
628
7. View that while there has been a shift in focus of the Fourth
Amendment in American jurisdiction, from protection of the
individual from arbitrary and oppressive conduct to protection
of privacy rather that property, the essence of his right in
Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as
respect for one’s personality, property, home privacy. Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
8. View that at bottom, the Bill of Rights (under the 1973
Constitution), during the interregnum from 26 February to 24
March 1986 remained in force and effect not only because it
was so recognized by the 1986 People Power but also because
the new government was bound by international law to respect
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Republic vs.
9. View that the Freedom Constitution made the Bill of Rights in
the 1973 Constitution operable from the incipiency of the
Aquino government. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
10. View that it was unmistakable thrust of the Freedom
Constitution to bestow uninterrupted operability to the Bill of
Rights in the 1973 Constitution. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
p. 10.
11. View that even if it is supposed that the Freedom Constitution
had no retroactive effect or it did not extend the effectivity of
the Bill of Rights in the 1973 Constitution, still there would be
no void in the municipal or domestic law at the time as far as
the observance of the fundamental right is concerned—the Bill
of Rights in the 1973 Constitution would still be in force,
independently of the Freedom Constitution, or at least the
provisions thereof proscribing unreasonable search and seizure
and excluding evidence in violation of the proscription.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
12. The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. People vs. Hipol, p. 179.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
1. Elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22. Cabrera

vs. People, p. 247.
2. Prosecution is burdened to prove all the elements of the crime

beyond reasonable doubt. Cabrera vs. People, p. 247.
3. To create the prima facie presumption, that the issuer knew of
the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she
received a notice of dishonor and within five banking days
thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or shall
arrange for its payment. Cabrera vs. People, p. 247.
629
4. Presumption is not conclusive, or one that forecloses or

precludes the presentation of evidence to the contrary. Cabrera
vs. People, p. 247.
5. The full payment of the amount of the check within five
banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor is a complete
defense. Cabrera vs. People, p. 247.
6. A mere oral notice or demand to pay is insufficient compliance
with the requirements of the law. Cabrera vs. People, p. 247.
7. That a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check
not enough for the prosecution. Cabrera vs. People, p. 247.
8. A check is an evidence of debt against the drawer, and although
may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an
ordinary check, and if passed upon to a third person, will be
valid in his hands like any other check. Cabrera vs. People, p.
247.
CERTIORARI
1. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in

a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the
exercise of his judgment as when the assailed order is bereft of
any factual and legal justification. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee vs. Majaducon, p. 356.
2. No basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in
Bengzon. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon, p.
356.
3. The 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is now revoked
from date of receipt of the notice of denial of a motion for
reconsideration or new trial if one was filed. Webb vs. Secretary
of Justice, p. 532.
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS
1. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every

compromise agreement, where each party approximates and
concedes in the hope of gaining balance by the danger of losing
—it is, in essence, a contract. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
2. In the event of breach or default by one party to a judicial
compromise in the performance of his obligations, the remedy
of the aggrieved party is to move for the execution of the

compromise judgment. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. The resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in

February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international
law. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
630
2. During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective

takeover of power by the revolutionary government up to 24
March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the
Provisional Constitution)—a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then. Republic vs.
3. Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to
enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the
same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution
on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives
and orders void. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
5. View that the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of
fundamental rights during the one month interregnum
between February 26 and March 24, 1986 is not as perplexing
as the question of whether the world was without a God in the
three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He
rose to life. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
6. With the establishment of civil government and a constitution,
there arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights
and civil rights, difficult though to define their scope and
delineation. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
7. “Natural Rights” and “Civil Rights,” Distinguished. Republic vs.
8. View that similar to natural rights and civil rights, human
rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s,
eludes definition—the usual definition that is the right which
inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly
begs the question. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
9. View that because of the wide-scaled violation of human rights
during the dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains of Bill
of Rights which more jealously safeguards the people’s

“fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional
democracy.” Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
10. View that considering the American model and origin of the
Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurist
and legal scholars define and explain the nature of the
Philippine constitution in similar terms that American
constitutional law scholars explain their constitution. Republic
631
11. View that the power to search in England was first used as an
instrument to oppress objectionable publications. Republic vs.
12. View that from Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616, 625
(1885), it may be derived that our own Constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, which
is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to
protect rights to security of person and property as well as
privacy in one’s home and possessions. Republic vs.
13. View that while there has been a shift in focus of the Fourth
Amendment in American jurisdiction, from protection of the
individual from arbitrary and oppressive conduct to protection
of privacy rather that property, the essence of his right in
Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as
respect for one’s personality, property, home privacy. Republic
14. View that invoking natural law because the history, tradition
and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is
an altogether different story, for ultimately, in our political and
legal tradition, the people are the source of all government
authority and the courts are their creation—while it may be
argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of
opinion. history is a fact against which one cannot argue.
15. View that it could confidently be asserted that the spirit and
letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of
government and the Bill of Rights were concerned, still
prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution. Republic vs.
16. Although Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino face,
it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are
American in origin. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
17. When government not only defaults in its duty but itself
violates the very rights it was established to protect, it forfeits
its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be
replaced with one to which the people consent, and this highest
of rights the Filipino people exercised in the EDSA Revolution

of February 1986. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
18. It is implicit from the pledge in Proclamation No. 1 dated
February 25, 1986 that the president and the vice president
pledged “to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights
violations” that the new government recognized and respected
human rights. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
19. A natural right to liberty indubitably includes the freedom to
determine when and how an individual will share the private
part of his beings and the extent of his sharing. Republic vs.
632
20. View that truly, the drapes of a man’s castle are but an
extension of the drapes on his body that cover the essentials—
in unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the
invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from
enjoying his freedom to keep himself and to act undisturbed
within his zone of privacy. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
21. View that a reflective grasp of what it means to be human and
how one should go about performing the functions proper to his
human nature can only be done by the rational person himself
in the confines of his private space—only he himself in his own
quiet time can examine his life knowing that an unexamined
life is not worth living. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
22. View that a revolution is staged only for the most
fundamental of reasons—such as the violation of fundamental
and natural rights—for prudence dictated that “governments
long established should not be changed for light and transient
reasons.” Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
23. View that cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during
the one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were
stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural rights
as human beings—with the extraordinary circumstances
before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos
simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly
not without fundamental rights. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
p. 10.
24. View that the 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one
that borders the miraculous—it was the first revolution of its
kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the history of
this planet—and fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of
its kind in this Court, where history and philosophy are
invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but
to recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in
man as man. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
CONTRACTS
1. When the true intention of the parties to a contract is not

expressed in the instrument purporting to embody their
agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or
accident, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to ask for
reformation of the instrument to the end that their true
agreement may be expressed therein. Cebu Contractors
Consortium Co. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 154.
2. In the interpretation of contracts, if the terms are clear and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control, but when
the words appear contrary to the evident intention of the
parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. Cebu
Contractors Consortium Co. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 154.
633
3. In order to judge the intention of the parties, their

contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall principally be
considered. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. vs. Court of
Appeals, p. 154.
4. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every
compromise agreement, where each party approximates and
concedes in the hope of gaining balance by the danger of losing
—it is, in essence, a contract. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
5. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is based on the ancient
principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
6. A contract undergoes three distinct stages—(1) preparation or
negotiation; (2) perfection and (3) consummation. Gateway
Electronics Corporation vs. Land Bank of the Philippines,
p.454.
7. The perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the
parties agree upon the essential elements of the contract.
Gateway Electronics Corporation vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, p. 454.
8. The real nature of a contract may be determined from the
express terms of the agreement, as well as from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties thereto.
Agag vs. Alpha Financing Corporation, p. 602.
CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE
1. Under a general pool partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing

airline is the principal in a contract of carriage while the
endorsee-airline is the agent. China Airlines vs. Chiok, p. 432.
2. The obligation of the ticket-issuing airline remained and did
not cease, regardless of the fact that another airline had
undertaken to carry the passengers to one of their destinations.
China Airlines vs. Chiok, p. 432.
3. The business of common carriers is imbued with public interest

and duty. China Airlines vs. Chiok, p. 432.
4. The law governing them imposes an exacting standard. China
Airlines vs. Chiok, p. 432.
5. Airline companies required to give cursory instructions to their
personnel to be more accommodating towards customers,
passengers and the general public. China Airlines vs. Chiok, p.
432.
634
COURT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
1. The conduct of court personnel not only in the performance of

their official duties but also in their personal life as well should
be free from impropriety. Kee vs. Calingin, p. 325.
2. Respondent has displayed a contemptuous behavior that falls
short of the moral standard required of everyone in the
judiciary. Kee vs. Calingin, p. 325.
3. Disgraceful or immoral conduct is a grave offense that cannot
be taken lightly and it cannot be countenanced even by the
withdrawal of the charge by private complainant. Kee vs.
Calingin, p. 325.
4. Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, morality and honesty. Layosa vs. Salamanca, p. 329.
5. Respondent’s act of encashing complainant’s check without her
knowledge and authority constitutes gross misconduct and
dishonesty. Layosa vs. Salamanca, p. 329.
6. A process server, like any other employee or officer in public
service, must perform his assigned duties with dedication,
efficiency and utmost responsibility. Aguilar vs. How, p. 482.
7. As custodian of judicial records, it is her duty to see to it that
court orders and other processes are sent to the litigants with
dispatch. Aguilar vs. How, p. 482.
COURTS
It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court, upon proper

application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult
questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant judges
of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day
period. Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Municipal Trial Court, Bocaue, Bulacan, p. 1.
CRIMINAL LAW
1. An offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries—

social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be
repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which is

sought to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in
nature; It is perfectly feasible to extinguish the civil liability
arising from the commission of a criminal offense before,
during or after the institution of the criminal case without,
however, affecting or impairing the offender’s criminal liability.
Suller vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 201.
635
2. Frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed with

disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but very difficult to
substantiate. Suller vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 201.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1. The illegality of a warrantless arrest is deemed cured when the

accused applied for bail, entered a plea of “not guilty” during
his arraignment, and actively participated in the trial of his
case. People vs. Hipol, p. 179.
2. An amendment of an Information for Malversation of Public
Funds to make it conform to what the evidence showed as the
total amount of money undeposited and unaccounted for by the
accused after the requisite audit examination was further
conducted is only a matter of form and not in substance, to
which no double jeopardy can be said to have attached. People
vs. Hipol, p. 179.
3. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to
the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative
Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over
said prosecutors. Webb vs. Secretary of Justice, p. 532.
4. Once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition
of the case—be it dismissal of the case, or conviction or
acquittal of the accused—rests on the sound discretion of the
court. Webb vs. Secretary of Justice, p. 532.
5. It is not sufficient to simply allege the qualifying circumstances
in the caption or the preamble but, more importantly, these
must be alleged in the body or the accusatory portion of the
information. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
DAMAGES
1. Imposition of exemplary damages justified in cases where

treachery is proved. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
2. Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary
evidence such as receipts in order to prove expenses incurred
as a result of the death of the victim. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
3. Employer may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent
acts of its driver, who at the time was acting within the scope
of his assigned task, only if it can show that it observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Tugade, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 497.
4. Actual damages to be recoverable, must actually be proved and
supported by receipts. Tugade, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 497.
636
DEATH PENALTY
An automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial

court was deemed to include an appeal of the less serious
crimes not so punished by death but arising out of the same
occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion
as that giving rise to the more serious offense. People vs.
Ibañez, p. 406.
DEEDS OF ASSIGNMENT
Where subsequent payments were made by the debtor following

the execution of a deed of assignment, it follows that the
execution of the deed of assignment did not extinguish the
obligation, and the fact that a chattel mortgage was executed
after the execution of the deed of assignment further confirms
the existence of the debtor’s obligation under the lease
agreement. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. vs. Court of
Appeals, p. 154.
EASEMENTS
1. An acknowledgement of the easement is an admission that the

property belongs to another. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs.
2. Easements are either continuous or discontinuous. Bogo-
Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 518.
EJECTMENT
1. In ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction

if the complaint fails to allege that a demand has been made.
2. The pendency of an action questioning the ownership of the
property does not bar the filing or consideration of an
ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein.
3. Requisites to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an
ejectment case while appeal is pending. Silverio vs. Court of
Appeals, p. 240.
4. In an action for ejectment, the only question involved is
possession de facto. Agag vs. Alpha Financing Corporation, p.
602.
EVIDENCE
1. The admission of carnal knowledge of the complainant by the

accused effectively placed upon him the burden of proving his
defense by convincing evidence, i.e., that the sexual congress
was an act of two consenting adults. People vs. Ramirez, Jr., p.
191.
637
2. It is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of the

Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Suller
3. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. People vs.
Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
4. In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to
adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.
People vs. Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
5. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that which
indirectly proves a fact in issue. People vs. Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
6. Requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for
conviction. People vs. Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
7. It is unnatural for an aggrieved relative, let alone the mother of
the victim, to falsely accuse someone other than the real
culprit. People vs. Navarro, Jr., p. 221.
8. In the absence of any showing of the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching either labia of the pudendum by
the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. People vs.
De Jesus, p. 265.
9. The failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the
very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to the
sexual intercourse. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
10. The moral character of the victim is immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape. People vs.
Sandig, p. 280.
11. Even a prostitute can be the victim of rape, for she can still
refuse a man’s lustful advances. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
12. The mere assertion of a love relationship does not necessarily
rule out the use of force to consummate the crime of rape.
13. Entries in a police or barangay blotter, although regularly
done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not
conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often
incomplete and inaccurate. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
14. When a victim is intimidated, she is gripped with fear for her
physical safety and is cowed into submission, which surely
cannot be equated with consent. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
15. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of
intimidation, offering none at all does not amount to consent to
the sexual assault so as to make the victim’s submission to the
sexual act voluntary. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
16. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits
herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for
life and personal safety. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
638
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
We have ruled that for courts to consider evident premeditation

as aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must prove (a)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of this act and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
1. View that it is said that the exclusionary rule has three

purposes—the major and the most often invoked is the
deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures, the second is
the “imperative of judicial integrity,” and the third is the more
recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United
States Supreme Court which is that “of assuring the people—
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.” Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
2. View that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that
can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution
guaranteeing such right. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
3. View that to be sure, though, the status of the exclusionary
right is a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is
firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in
history. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. View that without the strength of history and with philosophy
alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary right’s status as
a fundamental and natural right stands on unstable ground—
the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the absence of a
constitution also rests on shifting sands. Republic vs.

5. View that the exclusionary right is available to someone who
invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. Republic vs.
639
FINANCIAL LEASING OR FINANCING LEASE
1. “Financial leasing” or “financing lease” are not new to the

commercial world and have been recognized as genuine or
legitimate contracts, accorded with statutory and
administrative recognition. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co.
vs. Court of Appeals, p. 154.
2. Kinds of Financing Lease. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. vs.
3. “Financial Leasing,” Defined. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co.
4. In a true “financial leasing,” a finance company purchases on
behalf of or at the instance of the lessee the equipment which
the latter is interested to buy but has insufficient funds for the
purpose and the finance company leases the equipment to the
lessee in consideration of the periodic payment by the lessee of
a fixed amount of “rental.” Cebu Contractors Consortium Co.
5. Where the client already owns the equipment but needs
additional working capital and the finance company purchases
such equipment with the intention of leasing it back to him,
the lease agreement is simulated to disguise the true
transaction that is a loan with security. Cebu Contractors
Consortium Co. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 154.
FLIGHT
Flight certainly strongly indicates his guilt. People vs. Mendoza,

Jr., p. 563.
FORUM SHOPPING
1. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against

forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
2. The filing of a separate case based on a cause of action that
arises from the application or violation of a compromise
agreement is not barred by res judicata in the first action.
Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
640
INJUNCTIONS
A writ of mandatory injunction requires the performance of a

particular act and is granted only upon a showing of the
following requisites—(1) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; (2) the right of a complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Gateway
Electronics Corporation vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, p.
454.
INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
1. An innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent phrase shall

be deemed, under Section 39 of Act 496, to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee or any other encumbrancer for value. Agag
vs. Alpha Financing Corporation, p. 602.
2. When the purchaser or mortgagee is a financing institution, the
general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of land is not
required to look further that what appears on the face of the
title does not apply. Agag vs. Alpha Financing Corporation, p.
602.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in

February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure
government in the Philippines, assumed under international
law. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
2. The Declaration is part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules
of international law laid down in the Covenant. Republic vs.
3. View that it is no longer correct to state that the State could
only be the medium between international law and its own
nationals, for the law has often fractured this link as and when
it fails in its purpose. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. View that at bottom, the Bill of Rights (under the 1973
Constitution), during the interregnum from 26 February to 24
March 1986 remained in force and effect not only because it
was so recognized by the 1986 People Power but also because
the new government was bound by international law to respect
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Republic vs.
INTOXICATION
1. Intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or subsequent

to the plan to commit the felony. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
641
2. To be mitigating the accused’s state of intoxication must be

proved. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
JUDGES
1. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court, upon proper

application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult
questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant judges
of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day
period. Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
2. Cramming should not be the manner in which judges should
render decisions. Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
3. The amendment to rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which took effect on 1 October 2001, cannot apply retroactively
to an administrative complaint which arose in 2000. Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court,
Bocaue, Bulacan, p. 1.
4. A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust and baseless order
will prosper, only if it is shown that the issuance of the order
was indeed unjust and the respondents did not merely commit
an error of judgment or took the unpopular side of a
controversial point of law. De la Rosa vs. Sabio, Jr., p. 213.
5. To merit disciplinary action from the Court, there should be a
showing that the complained judicial acts of respondent Judge,
more so dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. De la Rosa vs.
Sabio, Jr., p. 213.
6. While a judge is a man subject to the frailties of other men, his
office is an exalted position in the administration of justice.
Santillan Vda. de Nepomuceno vs. Bartolome, p. 262.
7. Statement that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the

rules of law and procedures does not constitute improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
vs. Majaducon, p. 356.
8. Judges should do no less by strictly abiding by the rule when
they quote cases that support their judgments and decisions.
9. Court impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly
and expeditiously. Re: Request of Judge Sylvia G. Jurao for
Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 5812 Before the
RTC-Brs. 10 & 12, San Jose Antique, p. 464.
10. Failure of a judge to render a decision within the
reglementary period constitutes serious misconduct and gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanction on them. Re: Request of Judge Sylvia G. Jurao for
Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 5812 Before the
RTC-Brs. 10 & 12, San Jose Antique, p. 464.
642
11. The application for extension of time must be filed before the
expiration of the prescribed period. Re: Request of Judge Sylvia
G. Jurao for Extension of Time to Decide Criminal Case No.
5812 Before the RTC-Brs. 10 & 12, San Jose Antique, p. 464.
12. A judge who falsifies his certificates of service violates Rule
3.09 of the Code of Judicial conduct which requires of a judge
the observance of high standards of public service and fidelity
at all times. Re: Request of Judge Sylvia G. Jurao for Extension
of Time to Decide Criminal Case No. 5812 Before the RTC-Brs.
10 & 12, San Jose Antique, p. 464.
13. A judge is required to dispose of the court’s business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. Beltran, Jr. vs.
Paderanga, p. 475.
14. Incompetent court management does not help him explain and
gloss over a serious violation of the constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases which was brought about by his
failure to resolve incidents within the period fixed by law.
Beltran, Jr. vs. Paderanga, p. 475.
15. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of court personnel. Aguilar vs. How, p. 482.
16. As an administrative officer of the court, a judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business and require at all
times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity. Aguilar vs. How, p. 482.
17. For the present charge of gross misconduct to prosper it must
be shown that the judicial act complained of was corrupt, or
inspired by an intention to violate the law, or at least, in
persistent and intentional disregard of well-known legal rules.

Francisco vs. Corcuera, p. 489.
18. Once the permanent presiding judge has acted on a case or
has ruled on an incident which pertains to the case, the
acting/assisting judge loses such authority; worse, the latter
cannot issue an order contrary to that already issued by the
former. Francisco vs. Corcuera, p. 489.
19. Being the visible representation of law and justice, judges
should always conduct themselves within the confines of
proper judicial deportment and behave in a manner shorn of
reproach. Francisco vs. Corcuera, p. 489.
JUDGMENTS
1. The remedy of annulment of judgment may be availed of only

where the ordinary remedies of new trial, or appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. Manipor vs. Ricafort, p. 298.
643
2. A petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after
the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six months
after entry thereof. Manipor vs. Ricafort, p. 298.
3. There are three requisites for the execution of a judgment
pending appeal: a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party; b) there must be good
reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons
must be stated in a special order. City of Iligan vs. Principal
Management Group, Inc., p. 554.
4. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the
judgment has become final and executory; (b) the right of
appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal
has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) having
been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the
case have been returned to the court of ori-gin—in which case,
execution shall issue as a matter of right. City of Iligan vs.
Principal Management Group, Inc., p. 554.
5. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify
the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become illusory;
or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of
time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may
have no recourse but to delay. City of Iligan vs. Principal
Management Group, Inc., p. 554.
6. The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending
appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
the appellate court will not normally disturb such finding. City
of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, Inc., p. 554.
JURISDICTION
1. Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot

exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it, then the respondent could not be deemed to have waived
any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by filing an
answer with counterclaim. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
2. Parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the
proceeding. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
3. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against
the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter. Eviota vs. Court of Appeals, p. 394.
4. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action precedes from a different source of obligation is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Eviota vs. Court
of Appeals, p. 394.
644
LABOR LAW
1. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against

the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the labor arbiter. Eviota vs. Court of Appeals, p. 394.
2. Actions between employees and employer where the employer-
employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action precedes from a different source of obligation is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Eviota vs. Court
of Appeals, p. 394.
LACHES
1. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches.

Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 518.
2. There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. Bogo-
Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 518.
3. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court and each case must be decided according to its
particular circumstances. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs.
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
View that the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of

fundamental rights during the one month interregnum
between February 26 and March 24, 1986 is not as perplexing
as the question of whether the world was without a God in the
three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He
rose to life. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
1. Conviction for malversation of public funds or property under

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code requires proof that (a)
the offender is a public officer; (b) he has the custody or control
of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the
funds or property involved are public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and (d) he has appropriated, taken or
misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment
or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such
funds or property. People vs. Hipol, p. 179.
2. The fact that the obligation to deposit the collections of the City
Treasurer’s Office is not covered by appellant’s official job
description is of no legal consequence in a prosecution for
Malversation. People vs. Hipol, p. 179.
3. An accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in
the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there
is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to
explain. People vs. Hipol, p. 179.
645
4. The element of taking advantage of public office is inherent in

the crime of malversation of public funds or property under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and could not therefore
be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. People vs.
Hipol, p. 179.
5. The fact that the amount malversed may constitute a crime of
economic sabotage cannot be considered to aggravate the
penalty to reclusion perpetua, there being no such aggravating
circumstance in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. People
vs. Hipol, p. 179.
MORTGAGES
1. An action to compel the mortgagee to accept payment and for

the consequent cancellation of a real estate mortgage is a
personal action if the mortgagee has not foreclosed the
mortgage and the mortgagor is in possession of the premises
since neither the mortgagor’s title to nor possession of the
property is in question. Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Plaza,
p. 306.
2. The due diligence required of banks extended even to persons
regularly engaged in the business of lending money secured by
real estate mortgages. Agag vs. Alpha Financing Corporation,
p. 602.
OMBUDSMAN
The PCGG should have recommended the instant case to the

Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases.
PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE
1. Section 6 of Rule 43 does not require that all of the supporting

papers or annexes accompanying the petition should be
certified true copies or duplicate originals—what is mandatory
is the attachment of clearly legible duplicate originals or
certified true copies of the judgment or final orders of the lower
courts. Kalayaan Arts and Crafts, Inc. vs. Anglo, p. 146.
2. Petitioner is deemed to have complied with the requirement for
the submission of a certified true copy of the assailed decision
when it submitted a photocopy of the decision wherein the
office of the respondent office stamped the words “Certified
True Copy” on the transmittal letter—“notice of the decision
and [on] the last page of the decision,” but office refused to
stamp the words “Certified True Copy” and sign on all pages of
the decision. Kalayaan Arts and Crafts, Inc. vs. Anglo, p. 146.
646
3. An amendment of an Information for Malversation of Public

Funds to make it conform to what the evidence showed as the
total amount of money undeposited and unaccounted for by the
accused after the requisite audit examination was further
conducted is only a matter of form and not in substance, to
which no double jeopardy can be said to have attached. People
vs. Hipol, p. 179.
4. The alleged failure of a party to attach to the petition certified
copies of the impugned RTC orders did not merit the denial of
the petition. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, p. 240.
5. Lawyers and litigants are mandated to quote decisions of the
Court accurately. China Airlines vs. Chiok, p. 432.
6. Judges should do no less by strictly abiding by the rule when
they quote cases that support their judgments and decisions.
PLEAS OF GUILTY
1. It is mandatory for the trial court to accomplish three things to

avoid an improvident plea of guilty, namely: (1) conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the
accused’s full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2)
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3)
inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence
on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. People vs.

Ibañez, p. 406.
2. A “searching inquiry,” under the Rules, means more than
informing cursorily the accused that he faces jail term but so
also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the
certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or
a penal colony. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
3. It is not enough to inquire as to the voluntariness of the plea;
the court must explain fully to the accused that once convicted,
he could be meted the death penalty; that death is a single and
indivisible penalty and will be imposed regardless of any
mitigating circumstance that may have attended the
commission of the felony. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
4. Appellant had made an improvident plea of guilt as he was not
fully apprised of the consequences of his plea. People vs.
Ibañez, p. 406.
5. Court have set aside convictions based on plea of guilty in
capital offenses because of improvidence thereof and when such
plea if the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment. People vs.
Ibañez, p. 406.
647
6. A plea of guilty on arraignment is a mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
7. A plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had
begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered
as a mitigating circumstance. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
POLITICAL LAW
1. View that a revolution results in a complete overthrow of

established government and of existing legal order; A rebellion
or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and the
political institution, but not the social structure and prevailing
values; A coup d’etat in itself changes leadership and perhaps
policies but not necessarily more extensive and intensive than
that; A war of independence is a struggle of one community
against the rule by an alien community and does not have to
involve changes in the social structure of either community.
2. View that Proclamation No. 3 is an acknowledgment by the
Aquino government of the continued existence, subject to its
exclusions, of the 1973 Charter. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,
p. 10.
POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, without

any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. People
vs. Baltazar, p. 542.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT
1. The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and

corrupt practices of AFP personnel who have either (a)
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of
former President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate
family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationships, or (b)
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG. Republic vs.
2. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically
make him a “subordinate” as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
648

4. Position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make the
occupant a “subordinate” of former President Marcos for
purpose of EO No. 1 and its amendments. Republic vs.
5. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose,
and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such
specific and limited purpose. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
6. It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth
was accumulated by a “subordinate” of former Pres. Marcos
that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,

p. 10.
7. The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under
EO No. 1 and its amendments. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p.
10.
8. The PCGG should have recommend the instant case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases.
9. Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot
exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it, then the respondent could not be deemed to have waived
any defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by filing an
answer with counterclaim. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
10. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution
remained operative during the interregnum would render void
all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution. Republic vs.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
1. The doctrine of privileged communication that utterances made

in the course of judicial proceedings including all kinds of
pleadings, petitions and motions belong to the class of
communications that are absolutely privileged has been
enunciated in a long line of cases. Uy vs. Depasucat, p. 315.
649
2. Lawyers most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of

pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes
they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be
pardoned some infelicities of phrase. Uy vs. Depasucat, p. 315.
3. Such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the
bounds of relevancy and propriety. Uy vs. Depasucat, p. 315.
PROPERTY
1. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right,

must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be
adverse. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
p. 518.
2. An acknowledgement of the easement is an admission that the
property belongs to another. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. vs.
3. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as
against the owner and is insufficient to vest title, unless such
possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.

4. Acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of prescription. Bogo-Medellin Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, p. 518.
5. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches.
6. Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of title. Camara vs.
Malabao, p. 593.
7. At best they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
Camara vs. Malabao, p. 593.
8. A belated tax declaration has been held to be indicative of an
absence of a real claim of ownership over the subject land prior
to the declaration. Camara vs. Malabao, p. 593.
9. The survey and subdivision plan submitted in evidence by
petitioners are inferior proofs of ownership and cannot prevail
over the certificate of title in the name of respondents. Camara
vs. Malabao, p. 593.
10. The due diligence required of banks extended even to persons
regularly engaged in the business of lending money secured by
real estate mortgages. Agag vs. Alpha Financing Corporation,
p. 602.
RAPE
1. The admission of carnal knowledge of the complainant by the

accused effectively placed upon him the burden of proving his
defense by convincing evidence, i.e., that the sexual congress
was an act of two consenting adults. People vs. Ramirez, Jr., p.
191.
650
2. Physical resistance in establishing rape would be

inconsequential when intimidation was clearly exercised upon
the victim, submitting herself to the rapist’s lust, not because
she willed it, but because of fear for her life and safety. People
vs. Ramirez, Jr., p. 191.
3. It had long been settled that failure to promptly file a
complaint to the proper authorities would not necessarily
destroy the truth per se of the complaint nor would it impair
the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay
were satisfactorily explained. People vs. Ramirez, Jr., p. 191.
4. A married woman, with a husband and children, would not
publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless it be
founded. People vs. Ramirez, Jr., p. 191.
5. Guiding principles in reviewing rape cases. People vs. De Jesus,
p. 265; People vs. Madronio, p. 337; People vs. Pateño, p. 381.
6. In the absence of any showing of the slightest penetration of

the female organ, i.e., touching either labia of the pudendum
by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. People
vs. De Jesus, p. 265.
7. The failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the
very first opportunity cannot be construed consent to the
sexual intercourse. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
8. The moral character of the victim is immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of an accused for rape. People vs.
Sandig, p. 280.
9. Even a prostitute can be the victim of rape, for she can still
refuse a man’s lustful advances. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
10. The mere assertion of a love relationship does not necessarily
rule out the use of force to consummate the crime of rape.
11. Entries in a police or barangay blotter, although regularly
done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not
conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, for these are often
incomplete and inaccurate. People vs. Sandig, p. 280.
12. When a victim is intimidated, she is gripped with fear for her
physical safety and is cowed into submission, which surely
cannot be equated with consent. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
13. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of
intimidation, offering none at all does not amount to consent to
the sexual assault so as to make the victim’s submission to the
sexual act voluntary. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
651
14. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when

intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits
herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for
life and personal safety. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
15. It is settled jurisprudence that when a woman says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was indeed committed. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
16. Circumstances by which rape is committed. People vs.
Madronio, p. 337.
17. Rape is committed when the victim submits herself against
her will out of fear for her life or personal safety. People vs.
Madronio, p. 337.
18. The law does not even impose the burden of proving resistance
on the part of the victim of rape. People vs. Madronio, p. 337.
19. The failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate the
commission of rape. People vs. Madronio, p. 337.
20. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of the
crime. People vs. Madronio, p. 337.
21. It is settled that rape can be committed in places where people

congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within the school
premises, inside a house where there are occupants and even
in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. People vs. Pateño, p. 381.
22. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a story of
defloration against her putative father, unless she had really
been aggrieved. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
23. Lust does not respect either time or place, nor the presence of
people nearby. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
24. A young and immature girl usually conceals for a time the
rape committed on her because of the rapist’s threats on her
life, more so when the offender is living with her. People vs.
Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
25. The gravamen of the offense of rape as defined under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent. People vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
26. The bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of
the accused as to their relationship do not suffice for an
accused cannot be condemned to suffer the supreme penalty of
death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. People
vs. Mendoza, Jr., p. 563.
RES JUDICATA
1. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against

forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another. Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
652
2. The filing of a separate case based on a cause of action that

arises from the application or violation of a compromise
agreement is not barred by res judicata in the first action.
Genova vs. De Castro, p. 165.
SEARCH WARRANTS
A raiding team exceeds its authority when it seizes items not

included in the search warrant unless contraband per se.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
1. View that the power to search in England was first used as an

instrument to oppress objectionable publications. Republic vs.
2. View that it is said that the exclusionary rule has three

purposes—the major and the most often invoked is the
deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures, the second is
the “imperative of judicial integrity,” and the third is the more
recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United
States Supreme Court which is that “of assuring the people—
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct—that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.” Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
3. View that the rights against unreasonable search and seizure is
a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and
property. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
4. View that truly, the drapes of a man’s castle are but an
extension of the drapes on his body that cover the essentials—
in unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and the
invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from
enjoying his freedom to keep himself and to act undisturbed
within his zone of privacy. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
5. View that considering that the right against unreasonable
search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot
claim that a person was not entitled to the right for the reason
alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the
time the search was conducted—this right precedes the
constitution and does not depend on positive law since it is part
of natural rights; Even in the absence of the constitution,
individuals had a fundamental and natural right against
unreasonable search and seizure under natural law. Republic
653

7. It has been held that tipped information is sufficient to provide
probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
People vs. Tampis, p. 582.
8. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case. People vs. Tampis,
p. 582.
9. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect; Any

objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment. People
vs. Tampis, p. 582.
10. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no
search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
a probable cause. People vs. Tampis, p. 582.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Regional Trial Court of General Santos City or any court for
that matter had no authority to prohibit the Committee from
requiring respondent to appear and testify before it. The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee vs. Majaducon, p. 355.
STATUTE OF FRAUD
The Statute of Fraud applies only to executory and not completed,

executed or partially executed contracts. Camara vs. Malabao,
p. 593.
TREACHERY
1. There is treachery when the victim was killed while he was

asleep. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
2. Imposition of exemplary damages justified in cases where
treachery is proved. People vs. Ibañez, p. 406.
3. The essence of treachery lies in the attack which comes without
warning, and is swift, deliberate and unexpected, and affords
the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. People vs. Baltazar, p. 542.
654
4. Fact that a victim was able to stab one of his assailants was
held as not negating the presence of treachery. People vs.
Baltazar, p. 542.
5. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is unexpected
and made on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to
repel the attack or avoid it. People vs. Baltazar, p. 542.
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
For voluntary surrender to be a mitigating circumstance, the

following must concur: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. People vs.
Ibañez, p. 406.
WITNESSES
1. Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he or

she can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his or her
perception to others; Requirements of a child’s competence as a
witness. People vs. De Jesus, p. 265.
2. An errorless testimony cannot be expected when complainant is
recounting details of a harrowing experience. People vs.
Sandig, p. 280.
3. Findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court. People vs. Federico, p. 290.
4. When the credibility of the witnesses is in issue, the trial
court’s assessment is accorded great weight unless it is shown
that it has overlooked a certain fact or circumstance of weight
which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which if properly considered would alter
the results of the case. People vs. Madronio, p. 337.
5. The prosecution witnesses who are all law enforcers are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of proof to the contrary. People vs.Tampis, p. 582.
6. The assessment of the credibility of witness and their testimony
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court. People
vs.Tampis, p. 582.
WORDS AND PHRASES

655
2. View that the distinction between natural and civil rights is

“between that class of natural rights which man retains after
entering into society, and those which he throws into the
common stock as a member of society.” Republic vs.
3. “Natural Rights” and “Civil Rights,” Distinguished. Republic vs.
4. View that similar to natural rights and civil rights, human
rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s,
eludes definition—the usual definition that is the right which
inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly

begs the question. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
5. View that a revolution results in a complete overthrow of
established government and of the existing legal order; A
rebellion or insurrection may change policies, leadership, and
the political institution, but not the social structure and
prevailing values; A coup d’etat in itself changes leadership
and perhaps policies but not necessarily more extensive and
intensive than that; A war of independence is a struggle of one
community against the rule by an alien community and does
not have to involve changes in the social structure of either
community. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, p. 10.
6. Kinds of Financing Lease. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. vs.
7. “Financial Leasing,” Defined. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co.
8. Destructive arson distinguished from simple arson. People vs.
Soriano, p. 367.
——o0o——
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58rule 8 Clavecilla vs. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623

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58rule 8 Clavecilla vs. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623

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4/20/24, 8:12 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 407

1. The Court finds it iniquitous, under the circumstances of the

The act of an accused in forcibly placing his hand between the

It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant

ALIBI AND DENIALS

1. The defense of alibi is always looked upon with suspicion and

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES

1. The elements of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, as

of appropriating it as his own, the offense was already

1. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. The PCGG can only investigate the unexplained wealth and

2. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically

1. Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art.

1. It is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy,

3. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in

1. During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective

BOUNCING CHECKS LAW

1. Elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22. Cabrera

2. Prosecution is burdened to prove all the elements of the crime

4. Presumption is not conclusive, or one that forecloses or

1. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in

1. Reciprocal concessions are the very heart and life of every

of the aggrieved party is to move for the execution of the

1. The resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in

2. During the interregnum—i.e., after the actual and effective

of Rights which more jealously safeguards the people’s

of rights the Filipino people exercised in the EDSA Revolution

1. When the true intention of the parties to a contract is not

3. In order to judge the intention of the parties, their

1. Under a general pool partnership agreement, the ticket-issuing

3. The business of common carriers is imbued with public interest

COURT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

1. The conduct of court personnel not only in the performance of

It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court, upon proper

1. An offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries—

personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which is

2. Frame-up as a defense has been invariably viewed with

1. The illegality of a warrantless arrest is deemed cured when the

1. Imposition of exemplary damages justified in cases where

An automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial

Where subsequent payments were made by the debtor following

1. An acknowledgement of the easement is an admission that the

1. In ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction

1. The admission of carnal knowledge of the complainant by the

2. It is a well-entrenched rule that factual findings of the

We have ruled that for courts to consider evident premeditation

1. View that it is said that the exclusionary rule has three

constitution also rests on shifting sands. Republic vs.

FINANCIAL LEASING OR FINANCING LEASE

1. “Financial leasing” or “financing lease” are not new to the

Flight certainly strongly indicates his guilt. People vs. Mendoza,

1. The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against

A writ of mandatory injunction requires the performance of a

INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE

1. An innocent purchaser for value or any equivalent phrase shall

1. The resulting government following the EDSA Revolution in

1. Intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or subsequent

2. To be mitigating the accused’s state of intoxication must be

1. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court, upon proper

7. Statement that respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the

persistent and intentional disregard of well-known legal rules.

1. The remedy of annulment of judgment may be availed of only