Homar vs People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 182534

Case Doctrine:

● The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of these
rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, the exercise of this power and the implementation
of the law should not violate the constitutional rights of the citizens. To determine the admissibility
of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.

● The filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even
if there is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to
prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that
produced the corpus delicti of the crime.

● The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot save the prosecution’s lack
of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This presumption cannot overcome the
presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

● Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application
of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest,
is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.

● The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Facts:

PO1 Eric Tan and Tangcoy, while proceeding to Roxas Boulevard onboard a mobile hunter, saw the
petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and
told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the
recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner’s body and
found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he suspected as shabu.

Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.

Petitioner testified that on August 20, 2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling
imitation sunglasses and other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a
policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun at him, accused
him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them.

They also confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords.

He was likewise investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was
criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for the possession
of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted.

The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.

The RTC convicted the petitioner.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC’s findings.

Issues/Ruling:

1. Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the petitioner’s
body.

No.

Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present
case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was due to his
commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.

To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. 24

The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly
crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the
respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner
crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not charged of
jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that
indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to prove this in the present case.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary. 27

The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he
actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest.

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.32

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence
precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.

The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search conducted on the
petitioner’s body. the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the requirements for
a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. No arrest preceded the search on the person of
the petitioner.

When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted
him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy
"immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the designated area." Tan and Tangcoy did not
intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty.

This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was
filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area. The intent to arrest the petitioner only
came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his
constitutional rights and brought him to the police station.
 2. Whether or not Homar had waived the inadmissibility of the evidence seized when he
submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.

No. Despite having actively participated in all the proceedings, this waiver does not automatically carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized. The shabu as evidence is inadmissible and
precludes conviction.

Full text

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182534, September 02, 2015

ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ongcoma Hadji Homar
(petitioner) seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29364.
These assailed CA rulings affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 259 in Criminal Case No. 02-0986 which convicted the
petitioner for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The Factual Antecedents

The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II 2 of RA 9165. The
Information states that on or about August 20, 2002, the petitioner was found to
possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner pleaded
not guilty during arraignment.3

PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in the RTC
decision, he testified that on August 20, 2002, at around 8:50 in the evening, their
Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald
Tangcoy (Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the
area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking"
portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at
the pedestrian crossing area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him
resulting in the recovery of a knife. Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search
on the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing what he
suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the
incident.4

The petitioner was the sole witness for the defense. 5 He testified that on August 20,
2002, he was going home at around 6:30 p.m. after selling imitation sunglasses and
other accessories at the BERMA Shopping Center. After crossing the overpass, a
policeman and a civilian stopped and frisked him despite his refusal. They poked a gun
at him, accused him of being a holdupper, and forced him to go with them. They also
confiscated the kitchen knife, which he carried to cut cords. He was likewise
investigated for alleged possession of shabu and detained for one day. He was
criminally charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 77 for
the possession of the kitchen knife but he was eventually acquitted. 6

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC convicted the petitioner. It ruled that PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy were
presumed to have performed their duties regularly in arresting and conducting a search
on the petitioner. The RTC also noted that PO1 Eric Tan was straightforward in giving
his testimony and he did not show any ill motive in arresting the petitioner. 7

The RTC also did not believe the petitioner's defense of denial and ruled that it is a
common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions in dangerous drugs cases.
This defense is weak especially when it is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence as in this case.8

The petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.

The CA's ruling

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC's findings.

According to the CA, Section 5, paragraph (a) of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure enumerates the circumstances when a warrantless arrest is legal,
valid, and proper. One of these is when the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace
officer or a private person. In the present case, the petitioner committed jaywalking in
the presence of PO1 Tan and C/A Tangcoy; hence, his warrantless arrest for jaywalking
was lawful.9

Consequently, the subsequent frisking and search done on the petitioner's body which
produced the knife and the shabu were incident to a lawful arrest allowed under Section
13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 10

The CA likewise ruled that PO1 Tan11 clearly showed that the petitioner was caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of shabu.12
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. 13 Hence,
this appeal.

The Petitioner's Position

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming his conviction on the following
grounds: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

First, the shabu, which was allegedly recovered from the petitioner, is inadmissible as
evidence because it was obtained as a result of his unlawful arrest and in violation of
his right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioner has not committed,
was not committing and was not attempting to commit any crime at the time of his
arrest. In fact, no report or criminal charge was filed against him for the alleged
jaywalking.14

Second, assuming for the sake of argument that there was a valid arrest, Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a search that is directed
only upon dangerous weapons or "anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant." In the present case, the
offense, for which the petitioner was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto, is jaywalking.
The alleged confiscated drug has nothing to do with the offense of jaywalking. 15

Finally, the non-presentation of Tangcoy, who allegedly recovered the shabu from the
petitioner, renders the prosecution's evidence weak and uncorroborated. Consequently,
the sole testimony of Tan cannot sustain the petitioner's conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Respondent's Position

In his Comment, the respondent argues that the guilt of the petitioner was conclusively
established beyond reasonable doubt.16 He reiterates that the warrantless frisking and
search on the petitioner's body was an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for
jaywalking.17 The non-filing of a criminal charge of jaywalking against the petitioner
does not render his arrest invalid.18

The respondent also assails the petitioner's defense that the shabu is inadmissible as
evidence. According to the respondent, the petitioner can no longer question his arrest
after voluntarily submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered
his plea of not guilty and when he testified in court. 19

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

The prosecution failed to prove that a lawful warrantless arrest preceded the search
conducted on the petitioner's body.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence
obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, the exercise of this power and the implementation of the law should not
violate the constitutional rights of the citizens.20

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to

ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.21 There must be a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this purpose, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed.22

Section 5, Rule 11323 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the present
case, the respondent alleged that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was due to his
commission of jaywalking in flagrante delicto and in the presence of Tan and Tangcoy.

To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence of or within the view of the arresting officer. 24

The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from
which the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu - was obtained. For, without a valid
warrantless arrest, the alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless
search on the petitioner's body is surely a violation of his constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible
as evidence against him.

On this point, we find that aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in
its decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to establish that the
requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the
prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime.

The respondent failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner allegedly
crossed. Thus, Tan merely stated that the petitioner "crossed the street of Roxas
Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing." Aside from this conclusion, the
respondent failed to prove that the portion of Roxas Boulevard where the petitioner
crossed was indeed a "no jaywalking" area. The petitioner was also not charged of
jaywalking. These are pieces of evidence that could have supported the conclusion that
indeed the petitioner was committing a crime of jaywalking and therefore, the
subsequent arrest and search on his person was valid. Unfortunately, the prosecution
failed to prove this in the present case.

We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to
prove a valid warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused,
the prosecution is not relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest preceding the warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of
the crime.

Neither can the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty save the
prosecution's lack of evidence to prove the warrantless arrest and search. This
presumption cannot overcome the presumption of innocence or constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the
most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary
principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt; and the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
rests upon the prosecution.25 cralawred

It may not be amiss to point out also the contrary observation of the Court as regards
the findings of the RTC when it held, rather hastily, that in the process of accosting the
petitioner for jaywalking, Tangcoy recovered from his possession a knife and a small
plastic sachet containing shabu26 The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision,
and the findings of the RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and Tangcoy intended to
arrest the petitioner for jaywalking.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough
that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.27

The pertinent testimony28 of Tan, as quoted by the CA, is as follows:

Q: What happened after you obeyed the order of your immediate superior?
A: At 8:50 in the evening of August 20, 2002, we saw a male person crossed the street of
Roxas Boulevard, in a place not designated for crossing.
Q: What did you do when you saw this person crossed the street of Roxas Boulevard, in a place
not designated for crossing?
A: We accosted him.
Q: How did you accost that person?
A: We accosted him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. Pero napansin namin
siya na parang may kinukuha, so he was frisked by Ronald Tangcoy and a knife was
recovered from his possession.
Q: After a knife was recovered by your companions (sic) from that person who allegedly
crossed the wrong side of the street, what happened after that?
A: After recovering the knife, nakaalalay lang ako and he was frisked again by Tangcoy and
a plastic sachet was recovered from his possession.
Q: Did you know the contents of that plastic sachet which your companion recovered from that
person who crossed the wrong side of the street?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What about the contents?
A: Suspected shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
Q: After the drug was recovered from the possession of that man, what did you do?
A: We brought him to our precinct and informed him of his constitutional rights and
brought him to the Parañaque Community Hospital and the suspected shabu or
methylamphetamine was brought to the PNP Crime Lab at Fort Bonifacio.
Q: Did you come to know the name of that person whom you arrested in the morning of
August 20, 2002?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Ongcoma Hadji Omar, sir.
Q: Is he the same Ongcoma Hadji Omar y Para, the accused in this case?
A: Yes, sir.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and
Tangcoy allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted
him and pointed to him the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan
and Tangcoy "immediately accosted him and told him to cross [at] the
designated area."29

Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his
liberty. This lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no
criminal charge that was filed against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.

From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly
confiscated the shabu from the petitioner, for which they informed him of his
constitutional rights and brought him to the police station.

The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident

to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held
that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as evidence
when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to
arrest him. According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent
search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused, being
caught in flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been
therefore lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.

In the light of the discussion above, the respondent's argument that there was a lawful
search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest for jaywalking appears to be an
afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the
petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when
it was not recovered immediately after the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but
only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter, according
to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting in
the alleged confiscation of the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his
person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police officers. 31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he
actively participated in the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest.
However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.32

Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence
precludes conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 10, 2008, and its Resolution dated April 11, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29364. Petitioner ONGCOMA HADJI HOMAR is ACQUITTED and
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag and concurred in by Associate Justice
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, rollo, pp. 45-63.

2
Article II - Unlawful Acts and Penalties: Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. —
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in
the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof: (1) 10 grams or
more of opium; (2) 10 grams or more of morphine; (3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; (5) 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"; (6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin
or marijuana resin oil; (7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and (8) 10 grams or more
of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA),
lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value, or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements,
as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance with Section 93, Article XI
of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows: (1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00),
if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or
more but less than fifty (50) grams; (2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one
(1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin
oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but
not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed
or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value
or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred
(300) grams or more but less than five (hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and (3)
Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams
of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous
drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements;
or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

3
Rollo, p. 46.

4
Id. at 24, 49.

5
Id. at 50.

6
Id. at 50-51.

7
Id. at 52.

8
Id.

9
Id. at 59.

10
Id.

11
Based on the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) taken during the hearing on April
21, 2003. Id. at 56-57.

12
Id. at 58.

13
Id. at 73-74.

14
Id. at 17.

15
Id. at 122.

16
Id. at 96.

17
Id. at 99-100.

18
Id. at 101.

19
Id. at 103-104.
20
563 Phil. 934, 941 (2007).

21
Id.

22
People v. Delos Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 174774, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 417, 450.

23
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

24
Supra note 22, at 452.

25
Supra note 20, at 954.

26
Rollo, p. 43.

27
Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 421,
429.

28
Rollo, pp. 56-58.

29
Id. at 42.

30
Supra note 27, at 430.

31
Rollo, p. 56.

32
640 Phil. 669, 681 (2010).