Deciding When Hate Is A Crime - The First Amendment Police Detect
Deciding When Hate Is A Crime - The First Amendment Police Detect
2002
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bell, Jeannine, "Deciding When Hate Is a Crime: The First Amendment, Police Detectives, and the
Identification of Hate Crime" (2002). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 369.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/369
Jeannine Bell*
INTRODUCTION
A cartoon that appeared in a major United States newspa-
per several years ago aptly illustrates many of the fears that
have been expressed regarding the enforcement of hate crime
laws. The cartoon shows a man in a suit standing in front of a
judge.' The caption reads, "I had no idea I was violating his
civil rights, your honor. I only intended to punch him in the
nose."2 The man has been charged with some type of hate
crime. A hate crime is a crime motivated by prejudice toward
the "victim's race, color, ethnicity, religion, or national ori-
gin." 3 Hate crime laws typically require proof of the individ-
ual's motivation for the crime in order to convict the
defendant.4 In the cartoon, the judge appears to have been
saddled with the responsibility of determining the individual's
true motivation. The cartoon seems to cast aspersions on the
judge's ability to evaluate whether a hate crime has been com-
mitted. This is precisely what worries many who are con-
cerned about enforcement of hate crime laws.6
For example, critics see the task of proving and judging mo-
tivation in this context complex, if not impossible.7 They find
the task not only difficult, but one fraught with grave First
Amendment difficulties.8
Critics' concerns contribute to the impassioned decade-long
debate concerning hate crime legislation. 9 This debate has
only intensified and grown more polarized in the past few
years as legislatures around the country have considered pass-
ing hate crime legislation, frequently in response to dramatic
hate crimes like the dragging death of James Byrd in Texas,'"
the murder of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming,11 and the mur-
der of a Filipino-American letter carrier, Joseph Ileto, by Bur-
ford Furrow in Los Angeles.12 Critics do not believe that hate3
crime legislation is an appropriate response to such crimes.'
They assail hate crime legislation for a variety of reasons, 4
one of the most serious being the problem of controlling hate-
ful behavior without offending the First Amendment by silenc-
ing speech.5 Critics are concerned that people will be
convicted for hate crimes in cases in which the crime is not
motivated by bias and the only evidence of the defendant's
motivation is hate speech.
Unfortunately, the current debate over hate crime is predi-
cated mainly on doctrinal, historical, and emotional arguments
as neither supporters nor critics ground their arguments in em-
pirical evidence of how hate crime laws actually work in prac-
tice. Scholars have questioned whether hate crime legislation
can be enforced by those charged with enforcement, many of
17. In this Article, the terms "hate crime" and "bias crime" are used
interchangeably.
18. Troy A. Scotting, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal Leg-
islation, 34 AKRON. L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2001).
19. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES UNI-
FORM CRIME REP. 1999 59 (1999) (collecting hate crime statistics for murder,
non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple as-
sault, intimidation, robbery, burglary, etc.).
20. See MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (Rob-
ert W. Gordon & Margaret Jane Radin eds., Westview Press, Inc. 1993).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1407-1408, (7th ed. 1999).
22. MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 67.
23. Id. at 1.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
24. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (striking down
city ordinance which prohibited symbols which arouse alarm on the basis on
race, color, creed, religion or gender); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp.
852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989) and UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down campus speech
codes).
25. WANG, supra note 4, § 2.1 (discussing the federal legislation under
which hate crimes may be prosecuted).
26. Id. at app. B.
27. Id. (noting that only Wyoming had no legislation specially related to
bias crime).
28. Id. (delineating state cross burning statutes; most states also prohibit
the burning of any other religious symbol).
29. Id. (delineating state institutional vandalism statutes); see e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080(2)(b) (West 1998), § 9.61.160-.180 (West 1998)
("dealing with threats to bomb or injure property."); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 943.012 (West 1996) (criminalizing the destruction of religious or other
public institutional structures).
30. WANG, supra note 4, at App. B (delineating state anti-mask statutes);
id. at § 11:1 (generally statutes have exemptions for innocent activities such
as wearing a mask as part of a holiday costume, "by persons under sixteen
years of age," or safety reasons); see, e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.7 to 14-
12.10. (1999).
31. WANG, supra note 4, § 10:2.
38 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
32. Id. at § 10:3; see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (1981) (enhancing
fine and imprisonment penalties for bias-related crimes).
33. WANG, supra note 4, at §§ 10:2-10:3.
34. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 729A.1, 716.6A (1993). See generally WANG,
supra note 4, at app. B (delineating intimidation statutes which proscribe
disability as motivation).
35. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, § 1304(a)(2) (Supp. 2000); see gen-
erally WANG, supra note 4, at app. B (delineating state intimidation statutes
which proscribe anti-gay and lesbian bias as motivation).
36. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-702.C.14 (2001). See generally
WANG, supra note 4, app. B (delineating state intimidation statues which
include gender as a proscribed motivation).
37. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001(1) (1981). See generally WANG,
supra note 4, app. B (delineating state intimidation statutes which include
political affiliation as a proscribed motivation).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES:
CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 77 (1998).
20021 DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
Texas hate crime law and fear of having a conviction overturned on constitu-
tional grounds); Rhonda Smith & Larry Murphy, Protection from hate
crimes on gay agenda, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 18, 1995, at B3
(describing a year old hate crime law that does not mention specific racial or
minority groups and the difficulty in enforcing such an ambiguous law).
50. See generally LEVIN & McDEVITr, supra note 43 (describing crimes
motivated by resentment, mission crimes, thrill-seekers and reactive hate
crimes).
51. See Elizabeth A. Boyd, et al, "Motivated by Hatred or Prejudice":
Categorizationof Hate Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 L. & Soc'y. REV.
819, 822 (1996).
52. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishmentfor Prejudice:A Commentary
on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Prob-
lem of Hate Crimes, 39 S. D. L. REV. 1, 24-6 (1994); Susan Gellman, Tran-
script: Hate Crime Laws After Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 21 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
863, 865 (1995); Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved
Martin Luther King, Jr.? The Constitutional Flaws of Hate Crime Sentence
Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014, 1019-20 (1997) (argu-
ing that Mitchell was incorrectly decided); Robert R. Riggs, Punishing the
Politically Incorrect Offender Through "Bias Motive" Enhancements: Com-
pelling Necessity or First Amendment Folly?, 21 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 945, 950
(1995); Terrance Sandalow, Transcript: Opening Address Equality and Free-
dom of Speech, 21 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 831, 843 (1995).
53. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
54. Id. at 396.
55. See id. at 379.
42 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
65. Id.
66. Id. at 395.
67. Id. at 395-96.
68. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ohio 1992) (striking
down Ohio's ethnic intimidation statute); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558,
565-566 (Or. 1992) (upholding Oregon's criminal intimidation statute); State
v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817 (Wis. 1992) (striking down Wisconsin's hate
crime statute), rev'd, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). There is some evidence that there
was police confusion in this area as well. See Katia Hetter, Enforcers of
Hate-Crime Laws Wary After High Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1992,
at B1 (describing law enforcement officials as wary of enforcing hate crime
laws after Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V.).
69. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
70. Id. at 479-80.
71. Id. at 480 n.1.
72. Id. at 480.
73. Id. at 481 n.2.
44 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
91. See supra note 52. Though scholars criticize hate crime legislation on
several fronts, this Article only addresses critics' arguments regarding
enforcement.
92. See generally Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992): Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (noting that defendant's motive is an important
factor when sentencing for crimes).
93. See supra note 53.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
94. Gerstenfeld, supra note 6, at 270; see, e.g. Robert I. Corry, Jr., Burn
This Article: It is Evidence in Your Thought Crime Prosecution, 4 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 461 (2000).
95. See, e.g., Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of
Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 359 (1991); Martin H.
Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression:Hate Crime Sentenc-
ing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29,
30 (1992).
96. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 39, at 109-10.
97. Id. at 103.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.; Gellman, supra note 95, at 363.
101. See id.
48 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
108. See Richard Cordray, Free Speech and the Thought We Hate, 21 OHIo
N.U.L. REV. 871, 880 (1995); JACOBS & PortER, supra note 39, at 92-100
(expressing skepticism regarding police enforcement).
109. Cordray, supra note 108, at 880.
110. See Gellman, supra note 95, at 360.
111. Riggs, supra note 52 at 953.
112. Gerstenfeld, supra note 6, at 270.
50 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
113. Id.
114. See Boyd et al., supra note 51, at 827.
115. Id.
116. Id.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
117. Id.
118. Id. 827-28.
119. Id. at 827.
120. Id. at 839.
121. Id. at 832-40.
122. Id. at 845.
123. Id. at 840.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 845.
52 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
126. Garofalo & Martin, supra note 41, at 33-45 (comparing responses of
law enforcement officers to bias crimes).
127. Id. at 49-50.
128. Id. at 50.
129. See Leslie Berger, Police Seek Motive in Shop Fire, L.A. TIMES, April
21, 1992, at 3; Meg McSherry Breslin, Vandals Leave Trail of Racist Graffiti
Homes, Cars Damaged in Joliet Neighborhood, CHI. TRIB., September 6,
1999, at 1; David Birkland, Lake Forest Park Hit with Racist Graffiti, Police
Unsure Whether Vandalism Was Hate Crime or Prank, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
May 12, 2001 at B2.
130. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 39, at 91.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
"Center City,' ' 34 a large city in the United States. During this
time period, I was granted access to observe the detectives,
and was also allowed access to their case files spanning two
decades, and to most of their other records. 35 The Center
City "Anti-Bias Task Force" (ABTF), the unit I studied, was
formed in the late 1970's, two years before the state's hate
crime statute was passed. 36 The unit was created to address
the violence many minorities experienced after they moved
into all-White neighborhoods. 137 The unit was supposed to re-
spond to three types of situations: 1) crimes where there was
evidence that victim(s) were selected on account of race, or
incidents and situations occurred that were precipitated by ra-
cial motives; 2) incidents of group activity and demonstrations
where there was a potential for inciting group conflict and vio-
lence; and 3) incidents where there were concerted efforts by a
person or a group of persons to deprive minorities of free ac-
cess to any neighborhood or community within the city.' 38 Af-
ter the state civil rights law-which served as the jurisdiction's
hate crime statute-was passed, the unit became responsible
139
for investigating and preparing hate crime charges.
As a detective unit, the ABTF received case files after the
officers who reported to the scene of a crime determined that
an incident was possibly bias-motivated. Police department
policy required those on the scene to forward the cases to the
ABTF if they believed a case to be bias-motivated.
134. The city's actual name and some of its identifying details have been
changed to protect the identity of the respondents.
135. The study, its methodology, and its conclusions are described in much
greater detail in BELL, supra note 16.
136. Id. (manuscript at 29).
137. Id.
138. Special Order 78-28 from "Center City" to ABTF (unpublished doc-
ument on file with the author).
139. To preserve the confidentiality of respondents, the statute is not
cited.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
140. See generally Jeannine Bell, PolicingHatred: Police Bias Units and the
Construction of Hate Crime, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 421, 443 (1997) ("While
there may be no inherent difficulty in identifying bias crimes, as free speech
absolutists suggest, separating bias crimes from free speech may at the very
least require police officers to make extremely fine legal distinctions, a job
that may require a clear understanding of the vagaries of First Amendment
jurisprudence. In addition, police officers' jobs are often complicated by the
lack of public understanding about what bias crime laws prohibit.").
141. The following discussion of the routines that the detectives in Center
City use to identify hate crime is drawn from BELL, supra note 16 (manu-
script at 141-152).
56 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
1. Different Identities
The first and most important requirement was that the vic-
tim and perpetrator have different identities or backgrounds.
In the vast majority of cases if detectives accepted that the vic-
tim had been attacked because of his or her race, the victim
and perpetrator had to have different racial backgrounds.
Detectives did not believe that bias-motivated incidents hap-
pened within the same identity group; incidents in which the
victim and the perpetrator had the same race were routinely
dismissed as having other origins.
The heavy presumption against bias-motivation among indi-
viduals of the same race applied to cases involving anti-gay
bias as well. It was assumed that gays could not commit hate
crimes against other gays. In one case involving one Black gay
man who was attacked by another and called a "faggot," two
detectives called the man "a victim of no crime," since the
other man was also gay.
There were two important exceptions to the practice of dis-
missing same-group attacks. The first involved heterosexual
men who were attacked by other heterosexuals because their
attackers believed that they were gay. The unit had investi-
gated several cases that fit this scenario. For example, in one
case the victims, who were not gay, were in a taxicab and ap-
proached by a group of men who said, "Get out of the car,
faggots." After one man exited the car and ran, the perpetra-
tor gave chase. When he caught the victim, he began to kick
him, screaming, "Fucking homos." The unit sought hate crime
charges in this case because the victim had been attacked be-
cause he was presumed to be gay. In this case, the two defend-
ants pled guilty to both criminal charges and hate crime
43
charges.'
The second important exception to the practice of dis-
missing same-group attacks concerned attacks against one
member of an interracial couple. ABTF detectives accepted
that same race attacks against a member of an interracial
couple were frequently bias-motivated. The unit had seen par-
ticularly dramatic examples of this, especially involving Whites
attacked by other Whites for dating minorities.
The practice of dismissing cases when individuals had simi-
lar identities meant that detectives were often unable to appre-
ciate the fact that victims and perpetrators had multiple
identities and myriad perspectives on these identities. In the
case involving the gay victim who the detectives decided was
not a victim of a hate crime, the detective did not even explore
the possibility that the hate crime could be a race-based crime,
or that the perpetrator was a "self-hating gay" and the attack
occurred because of the victim's sexual orientation. 144
Automatic dismissal of all cases in which both the perpetra-
tor and the victim are gay means that detectives may miss
cases that should be treated as hate crimes. Center City had
cases involving so-called self-hating gays who targeted and
killed other gay men. Detectives told of several homicides that
occurred in a public area where many gay men had sex. The
killer selected sex partners and clubbed each to death while
the two were engaged in intercourse. The detectives said that
when they caught the man, he claimed that he committed the
145. Id.
146. Videotape: License to Kill (Arthur Dong 1997), available at http://
www.deepfocusproduction.com.
147. Bell, supra note 16 (manuscript at 143).
20021 DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
going to say it's racial and I'm going to get attention." Like
when people want someone to come 1 53 right away and they
report an OT, officer in trouble.
crime legislation. The unit had had several cases with repeat
offenders, individuals who had committed a number of similar
bias-motivated incidents, frequently against members of the
same victim group. For these individuals, their behavior in
similar cases sometimes served as an important contextual va-
riable. One detective explained:
We look to the totality of the circumstances, criminal action
and the words and also at the incident ... Language alerts
us to the possibility of bias, but it's just the possibility.
It's not clear-cut. It's easier for us when you have, as
we've . .. had, the same defendant for two crimes. It's hard
because of the totality of the circumstances. None of us are in
the minds of the perpetrators. They may have acted because
they're ticked off because someone is hitting on their girlfriend
or because the person is of a different race and is hitting on the
girlfriend." 7
The comments of the two detectives quoted above are rep-
resentative of the views of most ABTF detectives. In cases in
which slurs or epithets had been used detectives were very re-
ceptive to the possibility that bias had not motivated the inci-
dent. The typical non-hate crime and their use of context are
indicative of their desire to look beyond language for other
indications of bias motivation.
in the number of cases indicates that the community was not "chilled" by
hate crime legislation. I think that this explanation is far too simplistic.
First, as other scholars have recognized an increased number of hate crimes
can be attributed to a variety of factors, such as increased reporting. See,
e.g., JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 39, at 58-59. Second, chilling effects on
speech address the effect on speech not formally covered by the restriction.
EUGENE VOLOKH, TH-E FIRST AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POL-
ICY ARGUMENTS 337-40 (2001). In the case of hate crime, critics worry
about the chilling effect on protected speech. Unless one were to actually
conduct a survey of the community, one could not evaluate whether the
community felt chilled and neglected to speak or otherwise express them-
selves because of hate crime legislation.
157. Bell, supra note 16 (manuscript at 147).
64 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
158. See Martin, supra note 48, at 314. Martin's study of verified and un-
verified racial, religious, and ethnic incidents by police in Baltimore County,
Maryland found that unverified incidents more often than not had a history
of conflict between the parties.
159. Cf. FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS
CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 15 (1999). "Particularly in cases of
acquaintance rape and domestic violence, the prior personal relationship be-
tween victim and assailant makes it difficult to prove that gender animus,
and not some other component of the relationship, is the motivation for the
crime." Id.
160. BELL, supra note 16 (manuscript at 148).
161. Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing
Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31
LAW. & Soc'y REv. 531, 535-43 (1997) (discussing the impact of race and
class on prosecutor's decision to reject rape cases).
162. BELL, supra note 16 (manuscript at 148).
163. Id.
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME
164. Id.
165. Id. (manuscript at 148-49).
166. Id. (manuscript at 149).
66 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
169. Id.
170. Lisa M. Stozek, Wisconsin v. Mitchell: The End of Hate Crimes or Just
the End of the First Amendment?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 861, 887 (1994)
(concluding that hate crimes statutes impinge on the First Amendment "by
punishing motive, thought and speech. Even though bigotry and racism are
deplorable to most people, it is a strongly ingrained principle that the gov-
ernment may not regulate expression because of its message, ideas, subject
matter or content").
68 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
172. Id.
173. See Dana Moon Dorsett, Hate Speech Debate and Free Expression, 5
S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 259, 262-73. (1997).
174. See Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate
Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 222-30 (1991).
175. BELL, supra note 16 (manuscript at 151).
70 RUTGERS RACE AND THE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
the straight men. The unit refused and sought criminal charges
instead. As the detective on the case noted in his report, the
case did not merit charges, in part for First Amendment
reasons:
[M]y evaluation of the evidence to this point reveals neither
of these defendants was in violation of the civil rights stat-
utes. While both admit that they were telling anti-gay jokes
and making inflammatory comments, they state those com-
ments and jokes were directed to each other. This behavior
is verified by [two other defendants], as well as other wit-
nesses. While this behavior may be inflammatory in nature,
it is within
176
the First Amendment right to speak in this
manner.
Detectives did not view their actions as depriving defend-
ants of their rights to free speech. Consistently, the response
to the question about the difference between their actions and
behavior that infringed on a defendant's free speech rights was
that a hate crime involved violence and action. When asked
whether perpetrators were really being punished just for say-
ing something, one detective responded: "That's not really the
case. We normally had them for something else, not just for
saying something. The perp said something, then beat some-
177
one up with their fists."'
Another detective evinced an appreciation of the difference
between hate crime and hate speech. When asked about the
free speech implications of hate crime enforcement, he re-
sponded, "People can call you a name, as long as there's no
overt act, you're on firm constitutional ground. It's a very fine
line."' 78 One detective, who manifested deep dislike for hate
speech was clear about the protection that the Constitution
gives it:
If you call someone a nigger ... I don't think that language
should be used. But if it's used in a context where the
words aren't directed at anybody .... [Hesitating]. It's not
OK to use it at all. You can never call anybody a nigger.
You can't use it when directed at someone or in a park in a
crowd. Both are a problem. You say that, you might be
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (manuscript at 151-52).
2002] DECIDING WHEN HATE IS A CRIME