rise of the moors

RES JUDICATA
In general, a judgment is res judicata not only as to all matters litigated and decided by it, but
also as to all relevant issues which could have been, but were not, raised and litigated in the suit.
P. 327 U. S. 735. U.S. Supreme Court Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946) No. 496.
Argued March 5, 1946 Decided April 22, 1946
The fundamental doctrine of res judicata rests at the core of our judicial system… the
fundamental doctrine of res judicata is the constitutional mandate that all courts in the United
States must give full faith and credit to the decisions of other courts, be they territorial, state,
federal, or special tribunals. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. Again, the full faith and credit principle
furthers the goals of certainty, finality, and comity in legal dealings within our nation… Res
judicata is a "general and well-established doctrine . . . conceived in the light of the maxim that
the interest of the state requires that there be an end to litigation a maxim which comports with
common sense as well as public policy." Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 401, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2429, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1981) (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191,
198-99, 52 S. Ct. 532, 533, 76 L. Ed. 1054 (1932)). In the Matter of Adrian Bonilla
MONTALVO, Debtor. Adrian Bonilla MONTALVO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANCO
COMERCIAL DE MAYAGUEZ; Neftali Rosa; Eugenio Rivera; Dagoberto Montalvo
Ignacio; Neca Mortgage Corp.; Eddie Acaron, and Frank Ramirez Ramirez, Defendants-
Appellees. Civ. No. 92-2333 (JAF), Bankruptcy No. 87-00304 (SEK), Adv. No. 89-0029.
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico. July 8, 1993.

Res Judicata is a principle or maxim in law that deals with cases already adjudicated and said
cases, either quotes or the case itself is then used for substantiating the accuser or defendants
proof of claim; expression of pre-existing rights, constitutional enforcement, the adherence to
due process, or commanding the courts to act on a matter, make a decision or issue a judgment or
decree in your favor, et alia.
Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a
matter [already] judged", and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common law
legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject to appeal;
and the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) continued litigation of a case on same issues
 rise of the moors

between the same parties. In this latter usage, the term is synonymous with "issue preclusion". In
the case of res judicata, the matter cannot be raised again, either in the same court or in a
different court. A court will use res judicata to deny reconsideration of a matter.
The doctrine of res judicata is a method of preventing injustice to the parties of a case
supposedly finished, but perhaps also or mostly a way of avoiding unnecessary waste of
resources in the court system. Res judicata does not merely prevent future judgments from
contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents litigants from multiplying judgments, and confusion.
Res judicata includes two related concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion (also called
collateral estoppel or issue estoppel), though sometimes res judicata is used more narrowly to
mean only claim preclusion.
Claim preclusion bars a suit from being brought again on an event which was the subject of a
previous legal cause of action that has already been finally decided between the parties or those
in privity with a party. Issue preclusion bars the re-litigation of issues of fact or law that have
already been necessarily determined by a judge or jury as part of an earlier case. Res judicata is
intended to strike a balance between competing interests. Its primary purpose is to assure an
efficient judicial system. A related purpose is to create "repose" and finality.
Justice Stewart explained the need for this legal precept as follows:
Federal courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata (claim
preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Under RJ, a final judgment on the
merits of an action precludes the parties . . . from re-litigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an
issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude re-litigation of
the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first cause. As this
court and other courts have often recognized, res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve
parties of the costs and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.

Abbott Laboratories v Granite State INS. CO. 573 F Supp 193. Crosskey, politics and the
constitution in the history of the united states ch XXVI, and particularly at 916-19 ff (1953). As
professor Crosskey has also pointed out (id at ch XX - XXI) under a reading that the term
“Laws” include the “common law” as well as legislation… a federal decision on any substantive
 rise of the moors

common law question would then become binding on all state courts. Failure or refusal of a state
court to follow that decision would then pose the federal question.
United States Supreme Court – Durfee v Duke 375 U.S. 106. The constitutional command of
full faith and credit, as implemented by congress, generally requires every state to give to a
judgement at least the res judicata effect which the judgement would be accorded in the state
which rendered it… res judicata [is] part of national jurisprudence… The principles of res
judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues, as well to jurisdiction of the
subject-matter as of the parties.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court – Bagley v Moxley 407 Mass 633. "`Res judicata' is
the generic term for various doctrines by which a judgment in one action has a binding effect in
another." Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23 n. 2 (1988). This court has recognized that
"[t]he doctrine of res judicata . . . [is] most important in assuring that judgments are conclusive,
thus avoiding relitigation of issues that were or could have been raised in the original action."
Anderson v. Phoenix Inv. Counsel of Boston, Inc., 387 Mass. 444, 449 (1982). Application of
the doctrine may serve to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
adjudication." Id., quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court – Alicea v Commonwealth 466 Mass 228, 234 99
N.E. 2d 725. Whether federal court judgement or order has preclusive effect in state court
proceeding is governed by federal common law not by state law… whether a previous decision is
to be given preclusive effect presents a question of law appropriate for resolution on summary
judgement… The preclusive effect of a federal court judgement is governed by federal common
law. Under federal common law, the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion
(collectively res judicata) define the preclusive effect of a prior judgement… Together, claim
preclusion and issue preclusion promote judicial economy and comity between the state and
federal courts, prevent the cost and aggravation of additional litigation, and encourage reliance
on prior adjudications… under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgement forecloses
successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigating of the same claim raises
the same issue as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion, in contrast bars successive litigation of an
issue of fact of law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determined essential to the
 rise of the moors

prior judgement, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Together, claim
preclusion and issue preclusion relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourages reliance on
adjudication… federal courts participate in developing uniform federal rules of res judicata,
which the united states supreme court has ultimate authority to determine and declare.

Pacific States Tel. & Tel Co. v Oregon. United States Supreme Court.
February 19th, 1912
An oligarchy or a democracy is equally unrepublican, each was equally hateful to the founders of
our government, and each is equally subversive of the structure which they erected. Lexington v
Thompson (Ky), 68 S.W. Rep. 477; Downes v Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244. And see Wilkinson v
Leland, 2 Pet. 657; Terrett v Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Bradshaw v Rogers, 20 Johns 102;
Camp v Rogers, 44 Connecticut, 291; State v Williams College, 9 Gill & J. 365; People v
Humphrey 23 Michigan, 471.

… a pure democracy… is subversive of the principles upon which the republic is founded…

Apart from the guaranty clause, all citizens of the united states may demand government in
conformity with republican principles; No 84 of the Federalist Hamilton; XII Hamilton’s
Works, 327; Madison, “Federalist” No. 44; XI Hamilton’s Works, 370; 3 Elliott’s Debates,
451; Minor v Happersett, 21 Wall. 161; United States v Cruikshank, supra.
The framers of he constitution recognized the distinction between the republican and democratic
form of government and carefully avoided the latter. “Federalist” No. 48; XII Hamilton’s
Works, 28; 2 Elliott’s Debates, 253; 5 Elliott’s Debates, 136 et seq; and see 3 Elliott’s
Debates, 225, 233, for views of John Marshall afterwards Chief Judge.
 rise of the moors

MENTAL COMPETENCE
Competence (Status) concerns the mental capacity of an individual to participate in legal
proceedings or transactions, and the mental condition a person must have to be responsible for
his or her decisions or acts. Competence is an attribute that is decision specific. Depending on
various factors which typically revolve around mental function integrity, an individual may or
may not be competent to make a particular medical decision, a particular contractual agreement,
to execute an effective deed to real property, or to execute a will having certain terms.
Depending on the state, a guardian or conservator may be appointed by a court for a person who
satisfies the state's tests for general incompetence, and the guardian or conservator exercises the
incompetent's rights for the incompetent. Defendants who do not possess sufficient
"competence" are usually excluded from criminal prosecution, while witnesses found not to
possess requisite competence cannot testify.
COMPETENT. Duly qualified; answering all requirements; having sufficient ability or
authority; possessing the requisite natural or legal qualifications; able; adequate; suitable;
sufficient; capable; legally fit. Levee Dist. v. Jamison, 176 Mo. 557, 75 S.W. 679; In re
Fichter's Estate, 279 N.Y. S. 597, 600, 155 Misc. 399. See, also, Incompetency. A testator may
be said to be "competent," if he has mental capacity to understand the nature of his act, to
understand and recollect the nature and situation of his property and his relations to persons
having claims on his bounty and whose interests are affected by his will. In re Smith's Estate,
200 Cal. 152, 252 P. 325, 328. When generally applied to arbitrators, the term does not
mean "expert." Home Ins. Co. v. Walter, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 723, 724.
INCOMPETENCY. Lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required
duty. In re Leonard's Estate, 95 Mich. 295, 54 N.W. 1082. In New York, the word
"incompetency" is used to designate the condition or legal status of a person who is unable or
unfitted to manage his own affairs by reason of insanity, imbecility, or feeble-mindedness, and
for whom, therefore, a committee may be appointed; and such a person is designated and
"incompetent." In re Palestine's Estate, 270 N. Y.S. 844, 151 Misc. 100.
*Minority deals with the mental 'State' of a person, it's a legal status. Infants are minors, but only
until they grow not only physically but mentally, and that is when they reach the status of
majority.
 rise of the moors

MINOR. An infant or person who is under the age of legal [Mental] competence. Also, less; of less
consideration; lower; a person of inferior condition.

MINORITY.
The [Mental] state or condition of a minor; infancy.

WARD. Guarding; care; charge; as, the ward of a castle; so, in the phrase "watch and ward."
Wards of court. Infants and persons of unsound mind. Davis' Committee v. Loney, 290 Ky. 644, 162
S.W.2d 189, 190.
 rise of the moors

CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 88 TRIAL § § 1 TO 572 §39 – ISSUES OF

LAW AND FACT

Where there are issues of law and issues of fact raised by the pleadings, the issue of law should
be determined before proceeding to the determination of the issue of fact.
Where there are issues of law and issues of fact raised by the pleadings, the issues of law should
be determined before proceeding to the determination of the issues of fact, and this is so on a
new trial although the issues of fact have once been tried.
A separate trial of the issues of law and fact raised by an affirmative defense may be had prior to
the trial of the other issues in the action.
Annotation: An example of an “Issue of law,” taking precedence over the issue of fact, would
be, as an example, a person facing the charges of “Possession of a weapon without a license.”
When facing these “charges,” and asked to plead, I would personally never admit to either
carrying a weapon, I would never ‘Plead Guilty’ or ‘not Guilty,’ I would merely say “No Plea
under the grounds that it is my Constitutional right to keep and bear Arms. Thus, any and all
alleged charges must be dropped.”
That response is an Issue of law, why? you may ask. Considering the American Constitution of
1791, is something that the American people decided on, it states in the second amendment of
the bill of rights (stare decisis), that; “the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.”
It has also been decided in Chicago v Collins, 51 NE 907 and Freeburg v Dawson 274 F 240
case that; “A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license or tax.”
The reason for this is because the definition of the word “license” is, in part, “permission.” In
other words, you do not need permission to exercise a right that you already have, nor can you be
charged for that right (tax).
It has also been stated in, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 US 262, that; “If the state converts
a liberty into a privilege, the citizen can engage in the right with impunity.”
 rise of the moors

And; “There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of the exercise of a
constitutional right.” Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1973) Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511 (1967) GARRITY v. NEW JERSEY, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616
(1886) MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)

With the above constitutional amendment declaring that it is our right to bare arms, as well as the
Supreme Court cases stating that no penalty can be imposed on anyone for exercising our rights.
The issue of fact would pertain to whether or not you actually had a weapon without a license or
not.
Brumley v Commonwealth 413 S.W. 3d 280, ky “Knowledge of firearms... alone… does not
create reasonable suspicion…”

Commonwealth v Kelly 484 Mass 53. Carrying… a weapon is not, standing alone, an
indication that criminal conduct has occurred or is contemplated.

Every man is independent of all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any
institutions formed by his fellowmen without his consent. CRUDEN v. NEALE 2N.C. (1796) 2
SE 70

United States v. Utah Constr. Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394 [16 L. Ed. 2d 642, 86 S. Ct. 1545].
There, the United States Supreme Court stated: "Occasionally courts have used language to the
effect that res judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, but such language
is certainly too broad. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id., at pp. 421-422 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 660].) Collateral
estoppel may be applied to decisions made by administrative agencies "[w]hen an administrative
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it
which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate ...." (Id., at p. 422 [16 L.Ed.2d at p.
661], italics added.) fn. 7 This standard formulated by the Supreme Court is sound, and it
comports with the public policy underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine "of limiting litigation
by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into
controversy. [Citations.]" (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811 [122 P.2d
892].) People v. Sims [Crim. No. 22265. Supreme Court of California. September 27, 1982.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JUNE LEORA LOPES SIMS, Defendant and
Respondent (Opinion by Bird, C. J., with Mosk, [32 Cal. 3d 469]
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Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: The Hague and Montreal Conventions

Treaty law also may provide a basis for a State's action independent of the principles of
customary international law. A treaty creates obligations in States parties to it that may differ
from those of customary international law, and it generally is immaterial whether customary
international law points in the same or in a different direction than the treaty obligation. See,
e.g., The Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, (Great Britain v. France) 1923 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7) (Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor of the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), recognizing that a country's treaty obligations could
supersede the general norms of customary international law for the purpose of determining
which questions of nationality fall within the domaine réservé of a State); see also Clive Parry,
The Sources and Evidences of International Law 33 (1965) (“[I]f two or more States have
unequivocally agreed to something by treaty, in relation to the matter in hand nothing other than
the treaty has much relevance.”). https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1169653.html

The exercise of criminal jurisdiction by consuls over United States citizens was also provided
for, at one time or another, in treaties with Borneo, 10 Stat. 909, 910; Siam, 11 Stat. 683, 684;
Madagascar, 15 Stat. 491, 492; Samoan Islands, 20 Stat. 704; Korea, 23 Stat. 720, 721; Tonga
Islands, 25 Stat. 1440, 1442, and, by virtue of most-favored-nation clauses, in treaties with
Tripoli, 8 Stat. 154; Persia, 11 Stat. 709; the Congo, 27 Stat. 926; and Ethiopia, 33 Stat. 2254.
The exercise of criminal jurisdiction was also provided for in a treaty with Morocco, 8 Stat. 100,
by virtue of a most-favored-nation clause and by virtue of a clause granting jurisdiction if "any . .
. citizens of the United States . . . shall have any disputes with each other." The word "disputes"
has been interpreted by the International Court of Justice to comprehend criminal as well as civil
disputes. France v. United States, I. C. J. Reports 1952, pp. 176, 188-189. The treaties with
Algiers, 8 Stat. 133, 224, 244; Tunis, 8 Stat. [354 U.S. 1, 62] 157; and Muscat, 8 Stat. 458,
contained similar "disputes" clauses. 9. United States Supreme Court REID v. COVERT,
(1956) No. 701. Argued: May 3, 1956 Decided: June 11, 1956

Treaty is law of land as act of Congress is whenever its provisions prescribe rule by
which rights of private citizens or subjects may be determined. Head Money Cases,
112 US 580, 28 L Ed 798, 5 S Ct 247.
State statutory provisions must yield to any applicable provisions of any treaty of
the United States with a foreign country, constituting a part of the supreme law of
the land. De Tenorio V McGowan (CA5 Miss) 510 F2d 92, adhered to (CA5
 rise of the moors

Miss) 513 F2d 294, cert den 423 US 877, 46 L Ed 2d 110, 96 S Ct 150 and later
app (CA5 Miss) 589 F2d 911.
Treaty lawfully entered into stands on same footing of supremacy as do
Constitution and laws of United States, and it is generally self-operating in that it
requires no legislation by either congress or the state; treaty must be regarded as
part of law of state as much as are state’s own statutes, and it may override power
of state even in respect of great body of private relations. Amaya V Stanolind Oil
& Gas Co. (CA5 Tex) 158 F2d, cert den 331 US 808, 91 L Ed 1828, 67 S Ct
1191, reh den 331 US 867, 91 L Ed 1871, 67 S Ct 1530.
Courts cannot go behind treaty for purposes of annulling its effect and operation.
Fellows V Blacksmith, 60 US 366, 15 L Ed 684.

https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/treaties-and-international-agreements/
Treaties and other international agreements are written agreements between sovereign
states (or between states and international organizations) governed by international law.
The United States enters into more than 200 treaties and other international agreements
each year.
The subjects of treaties span the whole spectrum of international relations: peace, trade,
defense, territorial boundaries, human rights, law enforcement, environmental matters, and
many others. As times change, so do treaties. In 1796, the United States entered into the
Treaty with Tripoli to protect American citizens from kidnapping and ransom by pirates in
the Mediterranean Sea. In 2001, the United States agreed to a treaty on cybercrime.
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-2/16-treaties-as-law-of-the-land.html
Treaty commitments of the United States are of two kinds. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote
in 1829: “A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It
does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its
operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the
respective parties to the instrument. In the United States, a different principle is established.
 rise of the moors

Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.
To the same effect, but more accurate, is Justice Miller’s language for the Court a half
century later, in the Head Money Cases: “A treaty is primarily a compact between
independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the
honor of the governments which are parties of it. . . . But a treaty may also contain
provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations
residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law,
and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the
country.”
Treaties and the States.—As it so happened, the first case in which the Supreme Court
dealt with the question of the effect of treaties on state laws involved the same issue that
had prompted the drafting of Article VI, paragraph 2. During the Revolutionary War, the
Virginia legislature provided that the Commonwealth’s paper money, which was
depreciating rapidly, was to be legal currency for the payment of debts and to confound
creditors who would not accept the currency provided that Virginia citizens could pay into
the state treasury debts owed by them to subjects of Great Britain, which money was to be
used to prosecute the war, and that the auditor would give the debtor a certificate of
payment which would discharge the debtor of all future obligations to the creditor.322 The
Virginia scheme directly contradicted the assurances in the peace treaty that no bars to
collection by British creditors would be raised, and in Ware v. Hylton323 the Court struck
down the state law as violating the treaty that Article VI, paragraph 2, made superior.
Justice Chase wrote: “A treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is, of all the
United States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way. If the constitution of a
state . . . must give way to a treaty, and fall before it;
In Hopkirk v. Bell, the Court further held that this same treaty provision prevented the
operation of a Virginia statute of limitations to bar collection of antecedent debts. In
numerous subsequent cases, the Court invariably ruled that treaty provisions superseded
inconsistent state laws governing the right of aliens to inherit real estate. An example is
Hauenstein v. Lynham, in which the Court upheld the right of a citizen of the Swiss
 rise of the moors

Republic, under the treaty of 1850 with that country, to recover the estate of a relative
dying intestate in Virginia, to sell the same, and to export the proceeds of the sale.
Treaties and Congress.—In the Convention, a proposal to require the adoption of treaties
through enactment of a law before they should be binding was rejected. But the years since
have seen numerous controversies with regard to the duties and obligations of Congress,
the necessity for congressional action, and the effects of statutes, in connection with the
treaty power. For purposes of this section, the question is whether entry into and
ratification of a treaty is sufficient in all cases to make the treaty provisions the “law of the
land” or whether there are some types of treaty provisions that only a subsequent act of
Congress can put into effect. The language quoted above from Foster v. Neilson early
established that not all treaties are self-executing, for, as Marshall said in that decision, a
treaty is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.”
When Is a Treaty Self-Executing.—Several references have been made above to a
distinction between treaties as self-executing and as merely executory, in which case they
are enforceable only after the enactment of “legislation to carry them into effect.” But what
is it about a treaty that makes it the law of the land and gives a private litigant the right to
rely on it in a court of law? As early as 1801, the Supreme Court took notice of a treaty,
and, finding it applicable to the situation before it, gave judgment for the petitioner based
on it. In Foster v. Neilson, Chief Justice Marshall explained that a treaty is to be regarded
“as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of
any legislative provision.” A treaty will not be self-executing, however, “when the terms of
the [treaty] stipulation import a contract— when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act. . . .” When this is the case, “the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a
rule for the court.”
Sometimes the nature of a treaty will determine whether it requires legislative execution or
“conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.” One
authority states that whether a treaty is self-executing “depends upon whether the
obligation is imposed on private individuals or on public authorities. . . .”
 rise of the moors

“Treaty provisions which define the rights and obligations of private individuals and lay
down general principles for the guidance of military, naval or administrative officials in
relation thereto are usually considered self-executing. Thus treaty provisions assuring
aliens equal civil rights with citizens, defining the limits of national jurisdiction, and
prescribing rules of prize, war and neutrality, have been so considered . . . .”
112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (quoted with approval in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357,
1358–59 (2008)). For treaty provisions operative as “law of the land” (self-executing), see S.
Crandall, supra, at 36–42, 49–62, 151, 153–163, 179, 238– 239, 286, 321, 338, 345–346. For
treaty provisions of an “executory” character, see id. at 162–63, 232, 236, 238, 493, 497, 532,
570, 589. See also CRS Study, supra, at 41–68; Restatement, Foreign Relations, supra, §§ 111–
115.

Treaty with Morocco, [1–25 January 1787]

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0292

https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1786n.asp

https://www.loc.gov/manuscripts/?q=morocco&dates=1785-1803&st=gallery

To all Persons to whom these Presents shall come or be made known.

Whereas the United States of America in Congress assembled by their Commission bearing date
the twelvth day of May One thousand Seven hundred and Eighty four thought proper to
constitute John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson their Ministers Plenipotentiary,
giving to them or a Majority of them full Powers to confer, treat and negotiate with the
Ambassador, Minister or Commissioner of His Majesty, the Emperor of Morocco concerning a
Treaty of Amity and Commerce, to make and receive propositions for such Treaty and to
conclude and sign the same, transmitting it to the United States in Congress assembled for their
final Ratification, And by one other Commission bearing date the Eleventh day of March One
thousand Seven hundred and Eighty five did further empower the said Ministers Plenipotentiary
or a Majority of them, by writing under their hands and Seals to appoint such Agent in the said
Business as they might think proper with Authority under the directions and Instructions of the
said Ministers to commence and prosecute the said Negotiations and Conferences for the said
 rise of the moors

Treaty provided that the said Treaty should be signed by the said Ministers: And Whereas, We
the said John Adams and Thomas Jefferson two of the said Ministers Plenipotentiary (the said
Benjamin Franklin being absent) by writing under the Hand and Seal of the said John Adams at
London October the fifth, One thousand Seven hundred and Eighty five, and of the said Thomas
Jefferson at Paris October the Eleventh of the same Year, did appoint Thomas Barclay, Agent in
the Business aforesaid, giving him the Powers therein, which by the said second Commission we
were authorized to give, and the said Thomas Barclay in pursuance thereof, hath arranged
Articles for a Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and His
Majesty the Emperor of Morocco, which Articles written in the Arabic Language, confirmed by
His said Majesty the Emperor of Morocco and seal’d with His Royal Seal, being translated into
the Language of the said United States of America, together with the Attestations thereto
annexed are in the following Words, To Wit:1

In the Name of Almighty God,

This is a Treaty of Peace and Friendship established between us and the United States of
America, which is confirmed, and which we have ordered to be written in this Book and sealed
with our Royal Seal at our Court of Morocco on the twenty fifth day of the blessed Month of
Shaban, in the Year One thousand two hundred, trusting in God it will remain permanent.

.20. If any of the Citizens of the United States, or any Persons under their Protection, shall have
any disputes with each other, the Consul shall decide between the Parties and whenever the
Consul shall require any Aid or Assistance from our Government to enforce his decisions it shall
be immediately granted to him.

.21. If a Citizen of the United States should kill or wound a Moor, or on the contrary if a Moor
shall kill or wound a Citizen of the United States, the Law of the Country shall take place and
equal Justice shall be rendered, the Consul assisting at the Tryal, and if any Delinquent shall
make his escape, the Consul shall not be answerable for him in any manner whatever.

.25.This Treaty shall continue in full Force, with the help of God for Fifty Years.

We have delivered this Book into the Hands of the before-mentioned Thomas Barclay on the
first day of the blessed Month of Ramadan, in the Year One thousand two hundred.
 rise of the moors

I Certify that the annex’d is a true Copy of the Translation made by Isaac Cardoza Nuñez,
Interpreter at Morocco, of the treaty between the Emperor of Morocco and the United States of
America.4

Thos Barclay

Per Article 1 and Article III of the American Constitution. Whereby, Federal Courts have been
given the lawful authority to adjudicate in matters of diversity of citizenship. Per United States
Codes Title 28 Part IV Chapter 85 § 1332 Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs.
Only United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy is between (1) citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign State, et cetera.

Diversity of citizenship exists if at least one party adverse to any other party in a civil or criminal
action does not share the same citizenship with the other adverse party.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/28/50.5#:~:text=%C2%A7%2050.5%20Notification%20of
%20Consular%20Officers%20upon%20the,of%20this%20Department%20on%20charges%20of
%20criminal%20violations.

28 CFR § 50.5 - Notification of Consular Officers upon the arrest of foreign nationals.

§ 50.5 Notification of Consular Officers upon the arrest of foreign nationals.

(a) This statement is designed to establish a uniform procedure for consular notification where
nationals of foreign countries are arrested by officers of this Department on charges of criminal
violations. It conforms to practice under international law and in particular implements
obligations undertaken by the United States pursuant to treaties with respect to the arrest and
detention of foreign nationals. Some of the treaties obligate the United States to notify the
consular officer only upon the demand or request of the arrested foreign national. On the other
hand, some of the treaties require notifying the consul of the arrest of a foreign national whether
or not the arrested person requests such notification.

(1) In every case in which a foreign national is arrested the arresting officer shall inform the
foreign national that his consul will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such
notification to be given. If the foreign national does not wish to have his consul notified, the
arresting officer shall also inform him that in the event there is a treaty in force between the
 rise of the moors

United States and his country which requires such notification, his consul must be notified
regardless of his wishes and, if such is the case, he will be advised of such notification by the
U.S. Attorney.

(2) In all cases (including those where the foreign national has stated that he does not wish his
consul to be notified) the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the local
Marshal's office, as the case may be, shall inform the nearest U.S. Attorney of the arrest and of
the arrested person's wishes regarding consular notification.

(3) The U.S. Attorney shall then notify the appropriate consul except where he has been
informed that the foreign national does not desire such notification to be made. However, if there
is a treaty provision in effect which requires notification of consul, without reference to a
demand or request of the arrested national, the consul shall be notified even if the arrested person
has asked that he not be notified. In such case, the U.S. Attorney shall advise the foreign national
that his consul has been notified and inform him that notification was necessary because of the
treaty obligation.

(b) The procedure prescribed by this statement shall not apply to cases involving arrests made by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service in administrative expulsion or exclusion
proceedings, since that Service has heretofore established procedures for the direct notification
of the appropriate consular officer upon such arrest. With respect to arrests made by the Service
for violations of the criminal provisions of the immigration laws, the U.S. Marshal, upon
delivery of the foreign national into his custody, shall be responsible for informing the U.S.
Attorney of the arrest in accordance with numbered paragraph 2 of this statement.

[Order No. 375-67, 32 FR 1040, Jan. 28, 1967]

United States Supreme Court

WEEMS v. U.S. (1910)

No. 20
Argued: Decided: May 2, 1910
 rise of the moors

Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve years and one day, a chain at
the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative,
no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even in the family
council. These parts of his penalty endure for the term of imprisonment. From other parts there is
no intermission. His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but he goes
from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever kept under the shadow of his
crime, forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his
domicil without giving notice to the 'authority immediately in charge of his surveillance,' and
without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes and among other people,
to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope is taken from him, and he is subject to
tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by
their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. No circumstance of degradation is omitted. It
may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. He must bear a chain night and day… What
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that
ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous,-torture and the like. McDonald v.
Com. 173 Mass. 322, 73 Am. St. Rep. 293, 53 N. E. 874. The court, however, in that case,
conceded the possibility 'that punishment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.' Other cases have
selected certain tyrannical acts of the English monarchs as illustrating the meaning of the clause
and the extent of its prohibition.

The provision received very little debate in Congress. We find from the Congressional Register,
p. 225, that Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, 'objected to the words 'nor cruel and [217 U.S. 349,
369] unusual punishment,' the import of them being too indefinite.' Mr. Livermore opposed the
adoption of the clause saying:

'The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to
it; but, as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the
terms 'excessive bail?' Who are to be the judges? What is understood by 'excessive fines?' It lays
with the court to determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off;
but are we, in future, to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? If
a more lenient mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be
invented, it would be very prudent in the legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security
 rise of the moors

that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any
declaration of this kind.'…

Mr. Justice Field, construing the clause of the Constitution prohibiting the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment, said, the other two justices concurring, that the inhibition was directed not
only against punishments which inflict torture, 'but against all punishments which, by their
execssive length or severity, are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged.' He said further:
'The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive in the bail required or fine imposed or
punishment inflicted.'…

We cannot think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms of
punishment was overlooked. We say 'coercive cruelty,' because there was more to be considered
than the ordinary criminal laws. Cruelty might become an instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a
purpose, either honest or sinister…

Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils
but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had
theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
'designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.' The future is
their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be
made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of
application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little
value, and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in
words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognized. The meaning and vitality of the
Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.

To sustain its judgment, the court said that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
was not 'intended to warn against merely erratic [217 U.S. 349, 376] modes of punishment or
torture, but applied expressly to 'bail,' 'fines' and 'punishments."

The Philippine law made criminal the entry in a public record by a public official of a knowingly
false statement. The [217 U.S. 349, 383] punishment prescribed for violating this law was fine
 rise of the moors

and imprisonment in a penal institution at hard and painful labor for a period ranging from
twelve years and a day to twenty years, the prisoner being subjected, as accessories to the main
punishment, to carrying during his imprisonment a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist,
deprivation during the term of imprisonment of civil rights, and subjection, besides, to perpetual
disqualification to enjoy political rights, hold office, etc., and, after discharge, to the surveillance
of the authorities. The plaintiff in error, having been convicted of a violation of this law, was
sentenced to pay a small fine and to undergo imprisonment for fifteen years, with the resulting
accessory punishments above referred to. Neither at the trial in the court of first instance nor in
the supreme court of the Philippine Islands was any question raised concerning the repugnancy
of the statute defining the crime and fixing its punishment to the provision of the Philippine Bill
of Rights, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, no question on that subject was
even indirectly referred to in the assignments of error filed in the court below for the purpose of
this writ of error. In the brief of counsel, however, in this court, the contention was made that the
sentence was void, because the term of imprisonment was a cruel and unusual one, and therefore
repugnant to the Bill of Rights. Deeming this contention to be of such supreme importance as to
require it to be passed upon, although not raised below, the court now holds that the statute,
because of the punishment which it prescribes, was repugnant to the Bill of Rights, and therefore
void, and for this reason alone reverses and remands with directions to discharge.

-------

The United States has, from the very beginning, recognized that it does not have the power to
control private land titles within the states. United States v. Fox, 1876, 94 U.S. 315, 320, 24
L.Ed. 192
Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an
inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading… we cannot condone this shocking
behavior … This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be
corrected immediately. U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299. See also U.S. v. Prudden, 424, F.2d
1021, 1032; Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932
A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a “consumer good”… it is not a type of vehicle
required to be registered… Bank of Boston v. Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484,
UCC PP 9-109.14
 rise of the moors

“As a general rule men have natural rights to do anything which their inclinations suggest, if it be
no evil in itself, and in no way impairs the rights of others. In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502
An instrument is deemed in law filed at the time it is delivered to the clerk, regardless of
whatever the instrument is “file-marked”. Biffle v. Morton Rubber., Inc., 785 S.W. 2d 143,
144 (tex.1990)
Uncontested allegations in an affidavit must be accepted as true. Morris v National Cash
Register, 44S.W. 2d 433
Allegations in affidavit in support of motion must be considered as true in absence of counter-
affidavit. Group v. Finletter, 108 F. Supp. 327 (D. C.D.C., 1952).
Once challenged, jurisdiction cannot be “assumed” it must be proven to exist. Stuck v Medical
Examiners, 94 Ca.2d 751, 211 P. 2d 389

The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on the record of the administrative agency and
all administrative proceedings. Hagans v Lavine, 415 U.S. 533

If any tribunal finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the case
must be dismissed. Louisville Rail Road v. Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S Ct. 42

A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid.
It is clear and well-established law that a void order can be challenged in any court. OLD
WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v. McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).
Subject matter jurisdiction is the "power to hear or determine the case." (See Abelleira v. District
Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal. 2d 280, 288 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].) Without subject
matter jurisdiction, the court has no power to determine the case. Lack of subject matter
jurisdiction therefore is such a basic defect that it can be raised at any time by any available
procedure. (Cal. Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, 3:189-190, pp. 3-64.) "[L]ack of
jurisdiction is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings ...."
(Jacobs v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222 (1975) 49 Cal. App. 3d 959, 963 [123 Cal. Rptr.
309].) The fundamental nature of subject matter jurisdiction also is recognized by statute, which
provides the issue will not be waived if it is not raised in the pleadings. Barnick v. Longs Drug
Stores, Inc. (1988) [No. D006125. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District,
 rise of the moors

Division One. July 29, 1988.] WILLIAM BARNICK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LONGS DRUG
STORES, INC., Defendant and Respondent
Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If
they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgements and orders
are regarded as nullities; they are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.
WILLIAMSON v. BERRY, 8 HOW. 945, 540 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850).
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. 495 F 2d 906,
910.
An individual unquestionably has the right to litigate his own claims in federal court… The right
to litigate for oneself, however, does not create a coordinate right to litigate for others. Myers v.
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2005)
Moreover, when Traficant decided to represent himself, the district court warned him that doing
so was risky, but Traficant told the court that “I understand the Rules of Criminal Procedure ․
[a]nd if I make a mistake, it's my fault.” United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit. UNITED
STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James A. TRAFICANT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. No.
02-3864. Decided: May 19, 2004
The Constitution requires that every effort be made to see to it that a defendant in a criminal case
has not unknowingly relinquished the basic protections that the Framers thought indispensable to
a fair trial, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973), and among these “basic protections” is the right to a trial by jury. Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). And of course,
the basic protection of a right to trial by jury includes the right to a jury representing a fair-cross
section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-31, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d
690 (1975). [See UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James A.
TRAFICANT, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. No. 02-3864. Decided: May 19, 2004]
The Right to Park or Travel is part of the Liberty of which the Natural Person, citizen cannot be
deprived without “due process of law” under the 5th Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Kent v. Dulles 357 US 116, 125
 rise of the moors

State Police Power extends only to immediate threats to public safety, health, welfare, etc.,
Michigan v. Duke 266 US, 476 Led. At 449: which driving and speeding are not. California v.
Farley Ced. Rpt. 89, 20 CA3rd 1032 (1971)
Traffic infractions are not a crime. People v. Battle, 50 Cal. App. 3, step 1, 123 Cal. Rptr.
636,639

Under the United States Republic’s Constitutional system of Government and upon the
individuality and intelligence of the citizen, the State does not claim to control one’s conduct to
others, leaving one the sole judge as to all that affects oneself. Mugler v. Kansas 1213 US 623,
659—60

As stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case involving this same sect and an ordinance
similar to the present one, a person cannot be compelled "to purchase, through a license fee or a
license tax, the privilege freely granted by the constitution. Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill. 511,
519, 41 N.E.2d 515.

The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the
power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444; Schneider v. State, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306; Largent v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 418; Jamison v. Texas, supra.

“When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public have an interest
[commerce], he in effect grants the public an interest in that use and must submit to be controlled
by the public for the common good [i.e. submits to commercial regulation(s)], to the extent of the
interest he has thus created.” Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)
Speeding, driving without a license, wrong plates or no plates, no registration, no tags, etc.,
have been held to be “nonarrestable” offenses.
Cal. V. Farley, 98 Cal. Rep. 89., 20 CA 3d 1032

No state government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor
waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for wither recreation or business,
but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc.
Traveling is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurance.
Chicago Coach Co. V. City of Chicago, 227 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22.
 rise of the moors

A "person" "driving" an automobile cannot be stopped to see if he or she is licensed to "drive"

unless there is reasonable suspicion the "person" has engaged in criminal conduct. Delaware v
Prouse, (1979) 440 US 648, 59 Led2d 660

The United States Supreme Court ruled that a police officer could not arrest a citizen merely for
refusing to present identification. Kolender v. Lawson (461 U.S. 352, 1983)

A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license or tax. Chicago v Collins, 51
NE 907; Freeburg v Dawson 274 F 240

Traveling in an automobile on the public roads was not a threat to the public safety or health and
constituted no hazard to the public, and such a traveler owed nothing more than “due care” (as
regards to tort for negligence) to the public and the owner owed no other duty to the public (eg.
State), he / she and his / her auto, having equal rights to and on the roadways / highways as
horses and wagons, etc.; this same right is still substantive rule, in that speeding, running stop
signs, traveling without license plates, or registration are not threats to the public safety, and
thus, are not arrestable offenses. Christy v. Elliot, 216 I 131, 74 HE 1035, LRA NS 1905 –
1910:
California v. Farley 98 CED Rpt. 89, 20 CA 3d 1032 (1971)

The Ohio Supreme Court, the authoritative voice on Ohio law, has never established a physical
injury requirement under the Ohio survivorship statute. And the language of the statute, “injury
to the person,” does not suggest such a requirement. This language normally requires the
invasion only of a personal, not a physical, right and thus permits claims premised on
psychological harm. See Injury, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “personal
injury” among other things as “[a]ny invasion of a personal right, including mental suffering”);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 (defining “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected
interest of another”). United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. Keith CRABBS, Plaintiff-
Appellant, v. Zach SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee. No. 17-3854
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation
which would abrogate them.” Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 at 1636, 384 U.S.
436 at 491 (U.S.Ariz.1966)
 rise of the moors

Persons are not the subjects of commerce, and not being imported goods, they do not fall within
the meaning founded upon the constitution, of a power given to congress, to regulate commerce,
and the prohibition of the states for imposing a duty on imported goods. Ibid; Gibbons v. Ogen
9 Wheat 1; 5 Cond. Rep. 562.
The Right of a citizen to Travel upon the public highways and to transport one’s property
thereon, either by carriage or automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or
permit at will but a common right which he / she has under the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Thompson v. Smith 154SE 579

A right which is free and open to all is not the subject of a license or tax. Chicago v Collins, 51
NE 907; Freeburg v Dawson 274 F 240
No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it, and attach a fee to it. Murdock v.
Penn., 319 US 105
If the state converts a liberty into a privilege, the citizen can engage in the right with impunity.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 US 262

The Right to Travel; The Right to Mode of Conveyance; The Right to Locomotion are all
absolute rights, and the police cannot make void the exercise of rights. State v. Armstead, 60 s.
778, 779, and 781

"In as much as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the
mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having
neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the
tangible. The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency,
aspect, court, etc. Can concern itself with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the
contracts between them. S.C.R. 1795, Penhallow v. Doane's Administraters (3 U.S. 54; 1
L.Ed. 57; 3 Dall. 54).
The State is prohibited from violating substantive rights. Owens v. City, 445 US 662 (1980);
and it cannot do by one power (eg. Police power) that which is, for example, prohibited
expressly to any other such power (eg. Taxation / Eminent Domain) as a matter of law. US and
UT v. Daniels, 22 p 159, nor indirectly that which is prohibited to it directly. Fairbanks v. US
181, US 283, 294, 300
 rise of the moors

Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or
legislation, which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 125
It is not the duty of the police to protect you. Their job is to protect the corporation and arrest
code breakers. SAPP vs Tallahassee, 348 So. 2nd. 363, Reiff vs City of Phila.
If this is a Criminal Matter, there must exist an injured party, of which I would be obligated to
make remedy to. If this is a Civil Matter, there must be an injured party, or property, even unto a
preponderance of evidence. If this is an Administrative Court (Traffic Court) as well, there must
be an injured party as defined in the established Rule of Law, submitted in Exhibit A: Board of
Trade v. Olson, 262 US 1; 29 ALR 2d 105.

Waiver of rights

law requires that the corpus delicti be established independently of any confession
before the confession is admitted into evidence. Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803
(Fla.1984); Frazier v. State, 107 So.2d 16 (Fla.1958).

Stated another way, “no criminal conviction may be based upon an extra-judicial
confession by the defendant himself unless there is prima facie evidence of the corpus
delicti of the crime independent of the statement.” McQueen v. State, 304 So. 2d 501,
502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

Waiver of rights
Poindexter v. Greenhow: Waiver of constitutional rights, not only must be voluntary, they must
be knowingly intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness.
Carnley v. Cochran: Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must
show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show that an accused… intelligently
and understandingly rejected [ or waived their rights]. Anything less is not a waiver.
 rise of the moors

Miranda v. Arazona: Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no
rule or legislation which would abrogate them.
Hoffsomer v. Hayes: The courts are not bound by an officer’s interpretation of the law under
which he presumes to act.
Elmore v. McCammon: the right to file lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under
the constitution and laws.
Jenkins v. McKeithen; Picking v. Pennslyvania R. Co.; Pucket v. Cox: Pro se pleadings are
to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to
the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.
Owens v. City of Independence; Hafer v. Melo: Officials and judges are deemed to know the
law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful
deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the citizen cannot
plead ignorance of the law.
Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture; Foundation v Barr: it is the duty of all
officials whether legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, or ministerial to so preform
every official act as to not violate constitutional provisions.

ILLEGAL ARREST
An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained of his liberty
has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in repelling any other assault
and battery. State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL. 260
Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person attempting the
arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by the use of force, as in self-
defense. State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2d 100
One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may where one is being
assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus, it is not an offense to liberate one from the
unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may have submitted to such custody, without
resistance. Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 910
 rise of the moors

what the Stuarts had tried to do to their political enemies, George III had tried to do to the
colonists. In the tumultuous decades of the 1760's and 1770's, the Crown began to disarm the
inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans
invoking their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New York article of April 1769 said that
"[i]t is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Bill of
Rights, to keep arms for their own defence." A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, New York
Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Boston Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickerson ed. 1936); see
also, e.g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Writings of Samuel Adams 299 (H.
Cushing ed. 1968). They understood the right to enable individuals to defend themselves. As the
most important early American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries (by the law professor and
former Antifederalist St. George Tucker) made clear in the notes to the description of the arms
right, Americans understood the "right of self-preservation" as permitting a citizen to "repe[l]
force by force" when "the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury." 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 145-146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker's Blackstone).
See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31-32
(1833). United States Supreme Court DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ET AL. v. HELLER
(2008) No. 07-290 Argued: March 18, 2008 Decided: June 26, 2008
Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. ___, this Court held that the Second
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and struck
down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home. United
States Supreme Court MCDONALD ET AL. v. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, ET AL.
(2010) No. 08-1521 Argued: March 2, 2010 Decided: June 28, 2010
The term "certificate of indebtedness" has a similar administrative background. Since 1920 the
Treasury has considered certificates of indebtedness as akin to bonds and debentures, including
"only instruments having the general character of investment securities, as distinguished from
instruments evidencing debts arising in ordinary transaction between individuals..." Sales Tax
Rulings, L. O. 909, December 1920, ST. 1-20-85; Regs. 55 (Art. 14), October 26, 1920, 22 T. D.
Int. Rev. 502 (1920) … The Treasury itself has acknowledged that promissory notes lacking this
quality have never been taxed as "certificates of indebtedness," [350 U.S. 383, 395] Cum. Bull.
1948-2, M. T. 32, p. 160 (supra, p. 393) ... "ART. 48. `Promissory note' defined. - A promissory
note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one person to another signed by the maker
 rise of the moors

engaging to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to
such other person or to order or to bearer, free from restrictions as to registration or transfer and
usually without coupons." Treasury Regulations 55, June 11, 1919. United States Supreme
Court UNITED STATES v. LESLIE SALT CO. (1956) No. 74 Argued: December 7,
1955 Decided: March 5, 1956.
…and in no case shall the legislature have the power to issue 'treasury warrants,' 'treasury notes,' or
paper of any description intended to circulate as money.' The same provision is found in the
Constitution of Texas adopted in 1861… The provision in the state is substantially the same as that in
the Federal Constitution, in that the legislature is prohibited from issuing treasury warrants, treasury
notes, or paper of any description intended to circulate as money, while in the Federal Constitution
the prohibition is against a state's emitting bills of credit; and the necessity exists in both that the
paper shall be issued to circulate as money, in order to be in violation of either instrument. It has
been held that the bills of credit prohibited by the Federal Constitution are those which were intended
to circulate as money, and hence the authorities as to the meaning of that expression, when so used,
are applicable here. In Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410, 7 L. ed. 903, Chief Justice Marshall, in referring
to the meaning of the clause in the Constitution prohibiting a state from emitting bills of credit, said
(page 432, L. ed. p. 911): 'The word 'emit' is never employed in describing those contracts by which
a state binds itself to pay money at a future day for services actually received, or for money borrowed
for present use; nor are instruments executed for such purposes, in common language, denominated
'bills of credit.' To 'emit bills of credit' conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to
circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a
future day. This is the sense in which the terms have been always understood.' It is true the court in
the Craig Case held that the certificates authorized by the state of Missouri were void because they
were in effect bills of credit. United States Supreme Court HOUSTON & T C R CO v.
STATE OF TEXAS (1900) No. 81 Argued: Decided: March 26, 1900

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS

“The standard of review for a court's decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. A motion to
dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ․
When a ․ court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must
consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court
must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied
from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader ․ The motion to
dismiss admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided
 rise of the moors

upon that alone.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v.
American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516 (2007).

“When the jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits of the case, the court may in its
discretion choose to postpone resolution of the jurisdictional question until the parties complete
further discovery or, if necessary, a full trial on the merits has occurred.” Conboy v. State, 292
Conn. 642, 653 n.16 (2009). “Because the defendants' claim implicates the trial court's subject
mailer jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time during the proceedings.” Gerardi v. City of
Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 462 (2010).

The United States Supreme Court has rejected foreign citizenship as a legitimate basis for state
restrictions on non-citizens' right to own property or to otherwise engage in the social and
commercial community. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131
(1915); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed.
1478 (1948).

PAYMENT
MONEY. In usual and ordinary acceptation, it means gold, silver, or paper money used as
circulating medium of exchange, and does not embrace notes, bonds, evidences of debt, or other
personal or real estate. Lane v. Railey, 280 Ky. 319, 133 S.W.2d 74, 79, 81.
NOTE, n. A unilateral instrument containing an express and absolute promise of signer to pay to
a specified person or order, or bearer, a definite sum of money at a specified time. Shawano
Finance Corporation v. Julius, 214 Wis. 637, 254 N.W. 355. An abstract, a memorandum; an
informal statement in writing. Road Improvement Dist. No. 4 of Cleveland County v.
Southern Trust Co., 152 Ark. 422, 239 S.W. 8, 11; American Nat. Bank v. Marshall, 122
Kan. 793, 253 P. 214, 215.
TREASURY NOTE. A note or bill issued by the treasury department by the authority of the
United States government, and circulating as money. See Brown v. State, 120 Ala. 342, 25 So.
182.
PROMISSORY NOTE. A promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a specified sum at a time
therein limited, or on demand, or at sight, to a person therein named, or to his order, or bearer.
Byles, Bills, 1, 4; Hall v. Farmer, 5 Denio, N.Y., 484. A written promise made by one or more
to pay another, or order, or bearer, at a specified time, a specific amount of money, or other
 rise of the moors

articles of value. Pryor v. American Trust & Banking Co., 15 Ga.App. 822, 84 S.E. 312, 314.
An unconditional written promise, signed by the maker, to pay absolutely and at all events a sum
certain in money, either to the bearer or to a person therein designated or his order, Benj.
Chalm. Bills & N. art. 271; Harrison v. Beals, 111 Or. 563, 222 P. 728, 730; at a time
specified therein, or at a time which must certainly arrive. Iowa State Savings Bank v. Wignall,
53 Okl. 641, 157 P. 725; Lanum v. Harrington, 267 Ill. 57, 107 N.E. 826, 828.
CONTRACT. A promissory agreement between two or more persons that creates, modifies, or
destroys a legal relation. Buffalo Pressed Steel Co. v. Kirwan, 138 Md. 60, 113 A. 628, 630;
Mexican Petroleum Corporation of Louisiana v. North German Lloyd, D.C.La., 17 F.2d
113, 114. An agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing. 2
Bl.Comm. 442; 2 Kent, Comm. 449. Justice v. Lang, 42 N.Y. 496, 1 Am.Rep. 576; Rabon v.
State Finance Corporation, 203 S.C. 183, 26 S.E.2d 501, 502. A deliberate engagement
between competent parties, upon a legal consideration, to do, or abstain from doing, some act.
Wharton; Smith v. Thornhill, Tex. Com. App. 25 S.W.2d 597, 599.
CONSIDERATION. Consideration is not to be confounded with motive. Consideration means
something which is of value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff, either of benefit
to the plaintiff or of detriment to the defendant. Patteson, J., in Langd. Sel. Cas. Contr. 168; s.
c. 2 Q.B. 851; Miller v. Bank of Holly Springs, 131 Miss. 55, 95 So. 129, 130, 31 A.L.R. 698.
"Nothing is consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties." Schlecht v. Schlecht,
168 Minn. 168, 209 N.W. 883, 887. And "price" and "consideration," though sometimes the
same, are not always identical. Oregon Home Builders v. Crowley, 87 Or. 517, 170 P. 718,
721. Illegal Consideration. An act which if done, or a promise which if enforced, would be
prejudicial to the public interest. Harriman, Cont. 101.
LEGAL CONSIDERATION. One recognized or permitted by the law as valid and lawful; as
distinguished from such as are illegal or immoral. The term is also sometimes used as equivalent
to "good" or "sufficient" consideration. See Sampson v. Swift, 11 Vt. 315; Albert Lea College
v. Brown, 88 Minn. 524, 93 N.W. 672, 60 L.R.A. 870.
PAY, V. To discharge a debt; to deliver to a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in
goods, for his acceptance. Beals v. Home Ins. Co., 36 N.Y. 522. Carpenter v. Dummit, 221
Ky. 67, 297 S.W. 695, 700; Vollmer v. Automobile Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 207
App.Div. 67, 202 N.Y.S. 374, 375.
 rise of the moors

That no power has been expressly conferred upon Congress [79 U.S. 457, 464] by the
Constitution to make the Treasury notes of the government a legal tender between private
individuals in discharge of pre-existing debts, must be admitted.; Money is used in the
Constitution in two senses. In the second subdivision of the section relating to the powers of
Congress, the Constitution speaks of the power 'to borrow money;' and there the word must be
used in the larger sense of strict money, or of anything received instead. But in the fifth
subdivision of that section, which gives Congress power 'to coin money and regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coins,' it must be evident that Congress referred only to metallic money.
From time immemorial, in all countries, in all ages of the world, the precious metals have been
the medium of exchanges, and the strict mo[n]eys. The value of these metals has been designated
by a stamp upon them indicating their fineness and weight; that is, indicating the value at which
the coins were rated. When the coins have possessed the value indicated, they have passed from
hand to hand as of that value. When they have been found not to possess that value, they have,
except within very narrow limits, failed to so pass.; Not only has 'money' meant metallic money,
but, upon looking at the public history of the times (which this court has established as a proper
guide to the construction of the Constitution),8 we find that in the history of the country there
was no period in which 'money' was more distinctly understood and meant to be hard money
than at the period when the Constitution was framed and adopted. 'Its framers had just passed
through all the horrors of an unredeemed paper currency.' 'The history of that currency had been,
within the view of those who staked their property on the public faith, always freely given and
grossly violated.' 9 'The mischiefs of the various experiments that had been made were fresh in
the [p]ublic mind, and had excited general disgust.' 10 With the bills of the government
unredeemed-indeed, become at last so hopelessly beyond redemption as to be entirely given up
as worthless,11-the country had returned for circulation to a specie currency, to absolute money
having an intrinsic value; and neither had nor wished any other currency.; But the context as well
as the word itself shows that the power is confined to metals. This grant is not a grant to create
money, but simply 'to coin money'-a power that can be exercised only on money that admits of
being coined; that is, a bare power to 'strike coin,' which was the phrase used in the Articles of
Confederation as the equivalent of 'to coin money.' It was from those Articles that the power to
coin money and regulate the value thereof was transferred to the existing Constitution. And that
this provision only [79 U.S. 457, 466] gave Congress power to strike coin and regulate its alloy
and value, was declared at the time, and undisputed. The Federalist, No. 43, tells us: 'The right of
 rise of the moors

coining money, which is here taken from the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation,
as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the exclusive right of
Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an
improvement on the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general authority, a right of
coinage in the particular States could have no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and
diversify the forms and weights of the circulating pieces.'; Treasury notes have, as substance, no
appreciable value. They are not declared to be, and do not purport to be, of any value as
substance. They are not stamped with any intrinsic value. They are not, so far as they possess
value, things at all, but only things in action. The material holds the evidence of the promise; but
it is the promise, and the promise alone, which is, and which purports to be, of value. One dash
of the pen across the signature of the Treasurer of the United States at their foot, and the note is
not a Treasury note; not a thing in action; not a matter which bears the government stamp of
value; not ten dollars at all, but a worthless rag of paper, once used to hold a promise, [79 U.S.
457, 467] now cancelled. If, therefore, 'money,' in the phrase 'to coin money,' could be
considered as embracing other substances beside those precious metals, alone in use throughout
all the world as coin, none the less would it remain that to utter promises to pay money would
not be 'coining,' or 'to coin money.'; United States Supreme Court LEGAL TENDER
CASES(1870) No. 43 Argued: Decided: December 1, 1870
U.S vs. Long (No. CR-193-91) an informed jury found Mr. Long NOT GUILTY of willful
failure to file a tax return. In Don E. William vs. commissioner or the Revenue Services, the
Supreme Court” … a note even when and payable on demand and fully secured, is still only a
promise to pay…” Since Federal Reserve Notes are not secured and payable on demand,
according to the law, they are only a promise to pay and not payment. (429 US 569, L, ED2d 48,
97 S Ct 850).
Congress had no express authority to issue treasury notes… What is a bill of credit? What did the
constitution mean to forbid? In its enlarged, and perhaps its literal sense, the term 'bill of credit'
may comprehend any instrument by which a state engages to pay money at a future day; thus,
including a certificate given for money borrowed [or promissory note] … To 'emit bills of credit,'
conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community for its
ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day. This is the sense in
which the terms have been always understood… Such a medium has been always liable to
considerable fluctuation. Its value is continually changing; and these changes, often great and
 rise of the moors

sudden, expose individuals to immense loss, are the sources of ruinous speculations, and destroy
all confidence between man and man. To cut up this mischief by the roots, a mischief which was
felt through the United States, and which deeply affected the interest and prosperity of all; the
people declared in their constitution, that no state should emit bills of credit. If the prohibition
means anything, if the words are not empty sounds, it must comprehend the emission of any
paper medium… The history of paper money has been referred to, for the purpose of showing
that its great mischief consists in being made a tender; and that therefore the general words of the
constitution may be restrained to a particular intent… It has been long settled, that a promise
made in consideration of an act which is forbidden by law is void. It will not be questioned, that
an act forbidden by the constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law, is against
law… [In reference to paper money as a circulating medium] that which it is not permitted to do
directly, cannot be legalized by any change of names or forms. Acts done 'in fraudem legis,' are
acts in violation of law. CRAIG v. STATE OF MISSOURI No. 44

A debt is not paid by the giving of a note. (Nolan Co. vs. Maryland Causality, 38F. Supp. 479)
A note is only a promise to pay and not payment. (Fidelity Saving Bank vs. Grimes, 131 P 2d
894)
A check payable in notes is an altered instrument and void. (M.R, S, 1954 C.188, Section 124
and 125)
Section 411 of 12 USC reads as follows: “Federal Reserve notes, to be issued at the direction of
the Federal Reserve Board for purpose of making advances to the Federal Reserve Banks…” The
said notes shall be the obligation of the United States….”
115TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 5404

To define the dollar as a fixed weight of gold.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 22, 2018

 rise of the moors

Mr. MOONEY of West Virginia introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Financial Services

A BILL

To define the dollar as a fixed weight of gold.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The United States dollar has lost 30 percent of its purchasing power since 2000, and 96
percent of its purchasing power since the end of the gold standard in 1913.

(2) Under the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent inflation objective, the dollar loses half of its
purchasing power every generation, or 35 years.

(3) American families need long-term price stability to meet their household spending needs,
save money, and plan for retirement.

(4) The Federal Reserve policy of long-term inflation has made American manufacturing
uncompetitive, raising the cost of United States manufactured goods by more than 40 percent
since 2000, compared to less than 20 percent in Germany and France.

(5) Between 2000 and 2010, United States manufacturing employment shrunk by one-third after
holding steady for 30 years at nearly 20,000,000 jobs.

(6) The American economy needs a stable dollar, fixed exchange rates, and money supply
controlled by the market not the government.

(7) The gold standard puts control of the money supply with the market instead of the Federal
Reserve.
 rise of the moors

(8) The gold standard means legal tender defined by and convertible into a certain quantity of
gold.

(9) Under the gold standard through 1913 the United States economy grew at an annual average
of four percent, one-third larger than the growth rate since then and twice the level since 2000.

(10) The international gold exchange standard from 1914 to 1971 did not provide for a United
States dollar convertible into gold, and therefore helped cause the Great Depression and
stagflation.

(11) The Federal Reserve’s trickle down policy of expanding the money supply with no demand
for it has enriched the owners of financial assets but endangered the jobs, wages, and savings of
blue collar workers.

(12) Restoring American middle-class prosperity requires change in monetary policy authorized
to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 5 of the Constitution.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5404/text

FRAUD
A dispute is “genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the non-moving party.” Ford v. Gen. Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986) ). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine
issues of material facts, which it may accomplish “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party
lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In response, the nonmoving
party must present “significant probative evidence” that will reveal that there is more than “some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335,
340 (6th Cir. 1993). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's
position will not suffice to avoid summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct.
2505.
 rise of the moors

The federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1341, prohibits the use of the mails to execute "any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false of fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises." United States Supreme Court, McNALLY v.
UNITED STATES, (1987) No. 86-234. (Argued: April 22, 1987 Decided: June 24, 1987)
“The words "to defraud" commonly refer to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods…” United States Supreme Court, McNALLY v. UNITED STATES, (1987) No. 86-
234. (Argued: April 22, 1987 Decided: June 24, 1987)
18 U.S. Code § 1341 - Frauds and swindles
18 U.S. Code Chapter 47 - FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS:18 U.S. Code § 1001 -
Statements or entries generally
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896), the first case in which this Court construed the
meaning of the phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud," held that the phrase is to be
interpreted broadly insofar as property rights are concerned, but did not indicate that the statute
had a more extensive reach. The Court rejected the argument that "the statute reaches only such
cases as, at common law, would [483 U.S. 350, 357] come within the definition of `false
pretences,' in order to make out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact
and not a mere promise as to the future." Id., at 312. Instead, it construed the statute to "includ[e]
everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and
promises as to the future." Id., at 313. Accordingly, the defendant's use of the mails to sell bonds
which he did not intend to honor was within the statute. The Court explained that "[i]t was with
the purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent
the post office from being used to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed..." United
States Supreme Court, McNALLY v. UNITED STATES, (1987) No. 86-234. (Argued: April
22, 1987 Decided: June 24, 1987)
“…the mail fraud statute criminalized schemes or artifices "to defraud" or "for obtaining money
or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representation, or promises..." United
States Supreme Court, McNALLY v. UNITED STATES, (1987) No. 86-234. (Argued: April
22, 1987 Decided: June 24, 1987)
The limitation the Court adopts today shows no fidelity to Congress' words or purpose. The
Court recognizes that the "money or property" limitation of the second clause may not actually
 rise of the moors

apply to prosecutions under the first clause. See ante, at 358. But where else can such a limitation
be derived from? A few examples of the types of frauds that have been prosecuted under the
"intangible right" theory reveal that these schemes constitute "fraud" in every sense of the word,
and that the "intangible right" theory plays an indispensable role in effectuating Congress' goal of
preserving the integrity of the Postal Service. United States Supreme Court, McNALLY v.
UNITED STATES, (1987) No. 86-234. (Argued: April 22, 1987 Decided: June 24, 1987)
In Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910), the Court, dealing with the predecessor to 371, rejected
the argument that there could be no conspiracy to defraud in the absence of contemplated
monetary or property loss.

RACISM IS NOT A CRIME

See - United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Erick PEEPLES; Perry Anderson; Vincent Fields; Arnold Freeman; Ralph Glenn, Jr.;
Jamal Jennings; Lee Jones; Anthony Mccloud; Exander Poe; David Rivera; Samuel Shack,
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. CITY OF DETROIT, Michigan, Law
Department; International Association of Firefighters Local 344,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Nos. 17-1222
Decided: June 01, 2018
Here, Plaintiffs allege that they were all laid off at the same time because of either race or
national origin discrimination. But as is clear, Plaintiffs do not allege the exact same claims—
Plaintiff Rivera alleges national origin discrimination, and the remaining Plaintiffs allege race
discrimination. Therefore, the question is whether national origin and race discrimination are
“substantially related.” If so, Plaintiffs should be able to piggyback on Plaintiff Rivera's timely
filed EEOC charge under the single filing rule, which allows both untimely or never filed claims
to be joined.
Plaintiffs cite no case law, nor do they argue, that discrimination claims for national origin are
“substantially similar” to those of racial discrimination claims of a different group. While there
may be overlap between the concepts of race and national origin themselves, see, e.g., Village of
 rise of the moors

Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016), there is no case law to support the
application of the single filing rule between the two distinct groups.
Therefore, we find that the remaining Plaintiffs are unable to piggyback on Plaintiff Rivera's
charge. The City was placed on notice that Rivera, and others similarly situated, were alleging
discrimination in the layoff process, but only of claims involving national origin. This finding
comports with the goals of the notice requirement—to put the employer on notice and allow the
EEOC to conciliate claims that are shared by more than one plaintiff.
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1898763.html

Sheriff. In American Law; The chief executive and administrative officer of a county, being
chosen by popular election. His principal duties are in aid of the criminal courts and civil courts
of record; such as serving process, summoning juries, executing judgments, holding judicial
sales and the like. He is also the chief conservator of the peace within his territorial jurisdiction.
Harston v. Langston, Tex.Civ. App., 292 S.W. 648, 650. – Blacks Law 4th ed.

Articles of Confederation Article IV (4).

The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds,
and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free
citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively,
provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property
imported into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also
that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on the property of the United
States, or either of them.
 rise of the moors

Constitution for the united States of America Article VI (Article 6 - Prior

Debts, National Supremacy, Oaths of Office)
1: All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

3: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State
Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Amendment V (5) (Bill of rights)

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
The judicial power exercised by consuls was defined by statute and was sweeping:
"Jurisdiction in both criminal and civil matters shall, in all cases, be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, which are hereby, so far as is necessary to execute
such treaties, respectively, and so far as they are suitable to carry the same into effect, extended
over all citizens of the United States in those countries, and over all others to the extent that the
terms of the treaties, respectively, justify or require. But in all cases where such laws are not
 rise of the moors

adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies, the
common law and the law of equity and admiralty shall be extended in like manner over such
citizens and others in those countries; and if neither the common law, nor the law of equity or
admiralty, nor the statutes of the United States, furnish appropriate and sufficient remedies, the
ministers in those countries, respectively, shall, by decrees and regulations which shall have the
force of law, supply such defects and deficiencies." Rev. Stat. 4086.
The consuls, then, exercised not only executive and judicial power, but legislative power as well.
The number of people subject to the jurisdiction of these courts during their most active periods
appears to [354 U.S. 1, 63] have been fairly small. In the Chronicle & Directory for China,
Japan, & the Philippines, for the year 1870, there is a listing of the total number of foreign, not
just United States, residents in these three places. The list is 81 pages long, with a total of some
4,500 persons. (Pp. 54-134.) This same publication gives the following information about Japan:
"The number of foreigners settled in Japan is as yet very small. At the end of the year 1862, the
foreign community at Kanagawa, the principal of the three ports of Japan open to aliens,
consisted of... thirty-eight Americans... and in the latter part of 1864 the permanent foreign
residents at Kanagawa had increased to 300, not counting soldiers, of which number... about 80
[were] Americans... At Nagasaki, the second port of Japan thrown open to foreign trade by the
government, the number of alien settlers was as follows on the 1st of January, 1866: -...
American citizens 32... A third port opened to European and American traders, that of Hakodadi,
in the north of Japan, was deserted, after a lengthened trial, by nearly all the foreign merchants
settled there..." (Appendix, p. 353.) The Statesman's Yearbook of 1890 shows: China at the end
of 1888: 1,020 Americans (p. 411); Japan in 1887: 711 Americans (p. 709); Morocco, 1889
estimate: "The number of Christians is very small, not exceeding 1,500." (P. 739.) The
Statesman's Yearbook of 1901 shows: China at the end of 1899: 2,335 Americans (p. 484);
Japan, December 31, 1898, just before the termination of our extraterritorial rights: 1,165
Americans (p. 809); Morocco: "The number of Christians does not exceed 6,000; the Christian
population of Tangier alone probably amounts to 5,000." (P. 851.) These figures of course do not
include those civilians temporarily in the country coming within consular jurisdiction. [354 U.S.
1, 64]
The consular court jurisdiction, then, was exercised in countries whose legal systems at the time
were considered so inferior that justice could not be obtained in them by our citizens. The
 rise of the moors

existence of these courts was based on long-established custom and they were justified as the
best possible means for securing justice for the few Americans present in those countries. The
Ross case, therefore, arose out of, and rests on, very special, confined circumstances, and cannot
be applied automatically to the present situation, involving hundreds of thousands of American
citizens in countries with civilized systems of justice. If Congress had established consular courts
or some other non-military procedure for trial that did not contain all the protections afforded by
Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for the trial of civilian dependents of military
personnel abroad, we would be forced to a detailed analysis of the situation of the civilian
dependent population abroad in deciding whether the Ross case should be extended to cover such
a case. It is not necessary to do this in the present cases in view of our decision that the form of
trial here provided cannot constitutionally be justified.
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/354/1.html

That moment you lie and claim to be Indian for tax breaks and the United States de facto
government still taxed you because you agreed to be their Indian property (ward) instead of
honoring your foremothers and forefathers by claiming their name, not some Indian brand for a
colonial benefit.
United States Supreme Court

SUPERINTENDENT v. COMMISSIONER, (1935)

No. 817
Argued: Decided: May 20, 1935
Messrs. Thomas J. Reilly and Arthur F. Mullen, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
The Attorney General and Frank J. Wideman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Sandy Fox, for whom this suit was instituted, is a full-blood Creek Indian. Certain funds, said to
have been [295 U.S. 418, 419] derived from his restricted allotment, in excess of his needs were
invested. The proceeds therefrom were collected and held in trust under direction of the
 rise of the moors

Secretary of Interior. The question now presented is whether this income was subject to the
federal tax laid by the 1928 Revenue Act (chapter 852, 11, 12, 45 Stat. 791, 26 USCA 2011,
2012). The Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the court below answered in the
affirmative.
Petitioner maintains that the court should have followed the rule which it applied in Blackbird v.
Commissioner (C.C.A.) 38 F.(2d) 976, 977; also that it erroneously held Congress intended to
tax income derived from investment of funds arising from restricted lands belonging to a full-
blood Creek Indian.
Blackbird, restricted full-blood Osage, maintained that she was not subject to the federal income
tax statute. The court sustained that view and declared:
'Her property is under the supervising control of the United States. She is its ward, and we cannot
agree that because the income statute, Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1057), and Act of 1921 (42 Stat.
227), subjects 'the net income of every individual' to the tax, this is alone sufficient to make the
Acts applicable to her. Such holding would be contrary to the almost unbroken policy of
Congress in dealing with its Indian wards and their affairs. Whenever they and their interests
have been the subject affected by legislation they have been named and their interests
specifically dealt with.'
This does not harmonize with what we said in Choteau v. Burnet (1931) 283 U.S. 691, 693 ,
696 S., 51 S.Ct. 598, 600:
...
Nor can we conclude that taxation of income from trust funds of an Indian ward is so
inconsistent with that relationship that exemption is a necessary implication. Non-taxability and
restriction upon alienation are distinct things. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 673 , 32 S.Ct.
565. The taxpayer here is a citizen of the United States, and wardship with limited power over
his property does not, without more, render him immune from the common burden.
Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., supra, held that restricted land purchased for a full-blood
Creek-ward of the United States-with trust funds was not free from state taxation, and declared
that such exemption could not be implied merely because of the restrictions upon the Indian's
power to alienate.
 rise of the moors

Our inquiry is whether Congress intended to include within the meaning of the word 'allottees' as
used in the latter act, Indian wards of the United States holding homestead lands by virtue of the
act of 1884. It is argued that Congress did so intend, but that the legislators used only the term
'allottee' and did not add 'or Indian homesteader' because, while such addition would have
prevented the question here involved from arising, it would have added further confusion for the
reason that [280 U.S. 183, 193] the language is too broad and would include as well as tribal
Indians claiming as wards of the United States under the act of 1884, Indians claiming as
citizens-not as Indian wards-under the general homestead laws.
United States Supreme Court

UNITED STATES v. JACKSON, (1930)

No. 57
Argued: December 5, 1929 Decided: January 6, 1930
Indians be like "We're sovereign and have our nation and tribal trust."
There masters be like: There is nothing in the act of 1884 which indicates any disposition on the
part of the United States to dispossess itself of its powers and duties as guardian, or so to change
the status of its wards as to leave them no longer subject to manifestations of its protection. On
the contrary, the provisions of the act leave no doubt that it is an act done by the United States in
its capacity as guardian, and that the rights conferred by the act upon the Indians were so
conferred principally because they were wards of the government.
United States Supreme Court
UNITED STATES v. JACKSON, (1930)
No. 57
We have had frequent occasion to point out the duty of the United States to protect its wards, the
Indians, and the consequent broad extent of its power over them and their affairs. United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 , 6 S. Ct. 1109; United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 , 36 S.
Ct. 696.
 rise of the moors

...endorsement by President Roosevelt of "a new standard of dealing between the Federal
Government and its Indian wards." S. Rep., supra, at 3. Article 10 of the 1852 Treaty with the
Apaches described the role of the guardian as respects these wards: "For and in consideration of
the faithful performance of all the stipulations herein contained, by the said Apache's Indians, the
government of the United States will grant to said Indians such donations, presents, and
implements, and adopt such other liberal and humane measures as said government may deem
meet and proper." 10 Stat. 980.
United States Supreme Court

MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE v. JONES, (1973)

No. 71-738
Argued: December 12, 1972 Decided: March 27, 1973
The power gained breadth by reason of historic experiences that induced Congress to treat
Indians as wards of the Nation. See Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640, 642 -643; United States v.
Thomas, 151 U.S. 577, 585; United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 538.
Indians, federally recognized or not are Wards of the United States and not a sovereign nation,
regardless of what they say or what alleged 'Tribal Trust' they claim to have.
The trust period has not expired, the tribal relation has not been dissolved, and the wardship of
the Indians has not been terminated. See Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co. 221 U.S. 286,
315, 55 S. L. ed. 738, 749, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; act May 8, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 182, chap.
2348; United States v. Pelican (decided this day [ 232 U.S. 442, 58 L. ed. --, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
396]).
Indians and their status as wards of the government... United States Supreme Court. PERRIN v.
U S, (1914). No. 707. February 24, 1914
We are not Indians. The word 'Indian' is a label placed on people with 'unsound minds', i.e.
mental incompetence, i.e. chattel property, i.e. slaves. Read the Christian Black Codes of 1724
article 22. Lets stop clinging to names and principles that delude to slavery.
 rise of the moors

Indian tribes are the wards of the Nation. They are communities dependent on the United
States. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of
the Federal government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and
by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.' United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 383, 30 S. L. ed. 228, 231, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1109. [232 U.S. 478, 483]