Origin Development

The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory
Author(s): Robert J. Antonio

Source: The Sociological Quarterly , Summer, 1983, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer, 1983), pp.
325-351
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Sociological Quarterly 24 (Summer 1983):325-351
The Origin, Development, and Contemporary

Status of Critical Theory*
Robert J. Antonio, University of Kansas
This paper describes the nature of critical theory, its historical development, its con-
nections to sociology and Marxism, and the central debates over its core ideas.
Though the "Frankfurt School" was founded in 1923 and many of its leading
scholars lived in American exile during the Nazi takeover of their native Ger-
many, their approach-critical theory-was not widely known in the United
States until the 1970s. It was made accessible to American readers through recent
translations and, above all, the efforts of two new English-language journals, Telos
and New German Critique. The American antiwar movement and Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia contributed to the appeal of an approach that was criti-
cal of both late capitalism and state socialism. Furthermore, since critical theory
constituted a cultural as well as economic critique and stressed alienation as
strongly as exploitation, it addressed some of the challenges to traditional values
and lifesyles posed by the New Left and the youth movement of the late 1960s
and early 1970s. Herbert Marcuse, a prominent critical theorist who remained in
the United States after World War II, ascended to intellectual leadership of the
New Left and was projected by the media as the guru of youth rebellion. Though
his public role diminished in the quiescent post-Vietnam era, Marcuse's impact on
young, radical intellectuals contributed significantly to the revival of critical the-
ory in the 1970s. Ironically, while the approach made gains in the United States,
its popularity had already waned in much of Europe (including Germany), where
more orthodox and economistic forms of Marxism dominated leftist thought.
During the 1970s, graduate seminars in critical theory were established, and
sessions on the topic were held at regional and national sociological meetings, in-
dicating that it might have been emerging as a subarea of academic sociology.
This was stimulated not only by the political climate, but also by increasing dis-
ciplinary pluralism generated by the partial disintegration of the functionalist and
empiricist consensus of postwar American sociology. Critical theory's "conflict
orientation" (I apply this term reluctantly because it often combines contradictory
approaches, e.g., Georg Simmel's and Karl Marx's) and antipositivist thrust were
timely in an era of paradigmatic debate centering on these issues. Despite its
growing legitimacy, however, critical theory remained on the margins of the socio-
logical enterprise. The most prestigious American sociology journals continued to
ignore it almost completely, except for a few book reviews and an occasional un-
sympathetic gloss (e.g., van den Berg, 1980).
01983 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/83/1400-0325$00.75

* Thanks to John Harms for assisting in the research and to Sharon Cox for typing and editorial assis-
tance. Doug Kellner, Herman Lantz, Scott McNall, and Alan Sica have provided good criticism, but deserve
none of the blame for any errors or distortions. This investigation was supported by the University of Kan-
sas General Research allocation #3204-0038. Robert Antonio's address is Department of Sociology, Univer-
sity of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66056.

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326 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
Though most American sociologists are aware that critical theory exists and
many know that it is connected in some way to Marxism, few have accurate
knowledge of its nature and content. The Frankfurt School is portrayed aptly as
"the tendency in contemporary social thought which everyone 'knows' and nobody
reads" (Pearson, 1974:111). The goal of this essay is to present, for sociologists,
a brief, clear portrayal of this intellectual tradition.
Critical Theory: Definition and Origin

Critical theory has been attacked by both the Right (e.g., Feuer, 1974, 1980) and
the Left (e.g., Therborn, 1970, 1971), as well as by positivists (e.g., Adorno, et
al., 1976), but this fact is not sufficient to support a conspiratorial explanation of
its marginal status within sociology. Its location derives in part from its abstract
vocabulary, which at times seems deliberately obscure. Critical theory's mode of
discourse has been shaped by intellectual traditions foreign to both conventional
sociology and western empiricism (Piccone, 1977:29-30; Held, 1978:553-54).
In short, translation into English is not sufficient to make the approach easily ac-
cessible to the average American sociologist. However, the issue of style and dis-
course has been overwrought by critics. Critical theory is not uniform in its ab-
struseness and dependence on philosophical concepts; much work in the area is
not unduly complex. On the other hand, many interpreters point correctly to its
heterogeneity and lack of a clearly defined, widely shared, and easily summarized
set of core techniques and propositions (Lowenthal, 1981:145; Kellner and Rod-
erick, 1981:166-67; Jay, 1973:41; Leiss, 1974a:347; Buck-Morss, 1977:65).
Even a casual glance at general portrayals (Jay, 1973; Held, 1980) or at collec-
tions of essays on the topic (Arato and Gebhardt, 1978), reveals a stunning range
of methods, theories, and substantive analyses. Critical theory is immune to brief
summary, and even basic familiarity requires effort that few nonspecialists are
willing to expend.
"Critical theory" was adopted as a code word for Marxism during the Ameri-
can exile of the Frankfurt School (Piccone, 1980:21; Kellner and Roderick,
1981:143-44). In a recent interview, Leo Lowenthal (1981:145), a member of
the school's original inner circle, asserted that "critical theory" was nothing more
than a "collective denominator" and joked that he had to rely on Martin Jay (a
recent historian of the school) to enumerate "the main characteristics of the so-
called critical theory." However, Lowenthal (1981:145) did mention a unifying
attribute: the issues "critical theory" investigates are "determined by the given
historical situation." Its goal is to criticize and refashion Marxian theory in light
of "changed historical situations" (Lowenthal, 1981:147). Paul Piccone (1980:
21), after explaining that critical theory is constituted of a variety of differing
positions and is not a "single critical theory," stated:
Yet, all of the works of the major figures of the Frankfurt School share one funda-
mental objective: to come to terms with the new emerging forms of organized capi-
talism and to radically reconstitute the project of human emancipation that in tradi-
tional Marxist theory had been projected as the proletarian revolution.
Since it is not a fixed body of conceptual knowledge, adequate description of criti-

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Critical Theory 327
cal theory must present its long-term development and connections to its changing
historical context.
Marxist scholarship has been marked by almost constant internecine disputes
and the development of numerous conflicting interpretations, but within this po-
lemical, intellectual terrain is a central polarity referred to by Alvin Gouldner
(1980) as "the two Marxisms." This reflects a basic tension within Marx's texts
between science and humanism. "Scientific Marxism" suggests that Marx's later
work, particularly Capital, constitutes a fundamental (and desirable) turn away
from his earlier Hegelian "idealism" and toward a materialistic analysis of modes
of production. According to this perspective, "true" Marxism is determinist, evo-
lutionary, structuralist, and economistic. On the other hand, "critical Marxism,"
though it stresses Marx's early writings (particularly The Economic and Philo-
sophical Manuscripts of 1844 [1964]), claims that the Hegelian dialectic and cri-
tique of alienation are persistent threads that unify his thought. (Hegelian aspects
of The Grundrisse [1973] and the analysis of "commodity fetishism" in Capital
[1967:71-83] are considered evidence of this thematic coherence.) Critical Marx-
ism is voluntarist, cataclysmic, historicist, and cultural (Gouldner, 1980:32-63).
Both Marxisms express a commitment to socialist political transformation, but
each approaches it differently. Scientific Marxism stresses the need for party or-
ganization to guide a proletarian revolution made historically necessary by inevi-
table structural ruptures, unfolding from a social formation's materialist "laws of
motion." In contrast, critical Marxism abandons concepts of bureaucratic party
organization and historical inevitability for themes of emancipatory consciousness,
mass action, and revolutionary spontaneity (Gouldner, 1980:45-51). The two
poles of this dichotomy are ideal types, not empirical categories. Marxist works,
though they may tend toward one pole or the other, combine aspects of both
types. Furthermore, individual Marxists may tap elements from each at different
times, depending upon whether it is an era of upheaval or stability (Kellner,
1981a:272). Despite these qualifications, a comparison of "structuralism" with
"critical theory" (Althusser with Marcuse and New Left Review with Telos),
demonstrates that the clash between the scientific and critical perspectives is an
axial issue within contemporary Marxist thought.
The schismatic relation between critical Marxism (also western Marxism, He-
gelian Marxism, or cultural Marxism) and scientific Marxism (also orthodox
Marxism, automatic Marxism, or mechanical Marxism) must be placed in histori-
cal perspective. In the early 20th century, during the interface between market
and corporate capitalism, scientific Marxists (e.g., Georgi Plekhanov, Eduard
Bernstein, Karl Kautsky) of the Second International, argued that capitalism was
close to collapse and that socialism would emerge rapidly from the consequent
shift of property relations (Agger, 1979:75-115; Piccone, 1976:93; Colletti,
1971). However, after the onset of World War I, these hopes were dimmed by
the conservative and sometimes nationalist positions of Marxist political parties.
During the postwar period, doubts were intensified further by the failure of the
workers' councils, the survival of capitalism, and the "Bolshevization" of the in-
ternational communist movement (Arato, 1978a:4).
By 1923, the chance for imminent revolution had evaporated and, with it, the
guarantees of scientific socialism. This stimulated a reformulation of revolution-
ary theory; the work of Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch, and Antonio Gramsci chal-

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lenged prevailing Marxist orthodoxy. Their theories retained the goal of socialist
transformation, but in an increasingly voluntaristic framework, stressing "collec-
tive subjectivity" and cultural factors (Piccone, 1976:95-96; Arato, 1978a:4-8;
Jacoby, 1971:119-37). It must suffice to say that they reestablished Marxism's
Hegelian roots (stressing an active subject who makes history, rather than a pas-
sive object of inevitable laws) and, in the process, provided the foundation for
critical Marxism. For contemporary critical theorists, the work of these thinkers
remains an important conceptual backdrop, a major source of critical reflection,
and the subject of frequent commentaries (e.g., Arato and Breines, 1979; Kell-
ner, 1977; Piccone, 1983).
Though Lukacs and Korsch aimed to defend the Third International, their
work was condemned by the Soviet-dominated party apparatus (Jacoby, 1971:
120). Korsch was expelled, and Lukacs recanted his views to maintain party
membership. Gramsci was jailed by the Fascists and isolated from the commu-
nist movement. At the same time, the possibility of democratic socialism faded
because of the nascent reintegration of capitalism (in its new corporate form),
the development of fascism, and the emergence of Stalinism. All three power cen-
ters tended toward increasingly broad state regulation (or absorption) of the mar-
ket, extensive bureaucratic organization, and "scientific management" of the
workplace. The collapse of capitalism (and mechanical transformation to social-
ism), predicted by scientific Marxists, and hopes for proletarian revolution, re-
vived by Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci, appeared to be indefinitely postponed.
The Early Frankfurt School and Critical Theory
Lukacs argued that subjectivity is "annihilated" by "commodity production"

(Lukacs, 1971 [1923]:62) (original publication dates are in brackets). Its exten-
sion and rationalization generates "phantom objectivity" (social relations appear
as unalterable relations between things) that undermines class consciousness
(1971) [1923]:83-222). In his view, emancipatory change does not automati-
cally follow material evolution. Material conditions make revolution possible, but
its realization depends upon the "free-action of the proletariat itself" (Lukacs,
1971 [1923]:209). Lukacs' analyses of alienation, commodity fetishism, subjec-
tivity, consciousness, and spontaneous action constitute the theoretical bridge to
critical theory; but on the way over, the Frankfurt school discarded other key ele-
ments of his approach.
Lukacs' (1971 [1923]:73, 46-82) "objective theory" defines proletarian class
consciousness as a theoretical understanding of the "historical role of the class,"
rather than empirical consciousness. Furthermore, "[t]he Communist Party is an
autonomous form of proletarian class consciousness . . ." that interprets this "his-
torical" role and leads the class struggle (Lukacs, 1971 [1923]:330). These ele-
ments in Lukacs' theory, which uphold the orthodox view of party-led, proletarian
revolution, constitute the dividing line between early western Marxism and critical
theory.
The Frankfurt School began at the Institut fur Sozialforschung, which was es-
tablished in 1924 as a center for Marxist research. The early years, under the
leadership of Carl Grunberg, were characterized by a rather orthodox, scientific
Marxism (Jay, 1973:3-20), but this was abandoned after Max Horkheimer as-

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Critical Theory 329
sumed the directorship in 1930. The Institute's journal, Zeitschrift fur Sozialfor-
schung, became "the mouthpiece of critical theory" (Lowenthal, 1981:149).
Horkheimer and his inner circle of scholars, which included Friedrich Pollock,
Leo Lowenthal, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm, adopted
a more philosophical, less dogmatic Marxism that was open to diverse intellec-
tual currents (Jay, 1973:31). More importantly, the focus of their work, despite
the continued adherence to a general Marxist perspective, began to shift from the
economy to a critique of culture (Jay, 1973:21).
Lowenthal (1981:141) explained that the Institute's decision to prepare for
emigration from Germany was made already in 1930 (after the election of 107
National Socialists to the Reichstag). The political situation, which was extremely
dangerous for a predominantly Jewish group of Marxist intellectuals, became im-
possible after the Nazis assumed total power. In 1933, Horkheimer was dismissed
from his faculty position at Frankfurt and the Institute premises were occupied by
the Nazi SA (Lowenthal, 1981:143; Jay, 1973:29). Fortunately, the Institute
endowment was transferred to Holland in 1931 (Jay, 1973:37), and most Insti-
tute scholars were able to emigrate. In 1934, an arrangement was made to re-
establish the "Institute of Social Research"at Columbia University in New York.
Frankfurt School thought was influenced by the extraordinarily pessimistic po-
litical environment of the time. The social democratic parties had lost touch with
their radical roots and their proletariat political base was eroded. Fascism was
gaining momentum throughout Europe, and Stalinist bureaucracy and terror de-
stroyed lingering hopes that the USSR would provide an authentic socialist alter-
native. Finally, New Deal legislation demonstrated capitalism's flexible approach
to its contradictions and foreshadowed heretofore unimagined integrative powers.
This was the final blow to scientific Marxism's promise of a sudden capitalist col-
lapse, also dampening western Marxism's revolutionary aspirations. Despite its
continental origins, the thought of the Frankfurt School was shaped decisively by
the American experience, especially by the success of corporate capitalist re-
integration.
During the 1930s and early 1940s, the Frankfurt scholars engaged in a broad,
multidisciplinary set of research projects on topics such as authority and the family,
the origins and structure of Nazi society, aesthetic theory, and the critique of mass
culture. The development of a radical social psychology based upon a synthesis of
Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx was a major theoretical achievement. Marxian the-
ory had previously lacked sufficient elaboration on the microscopic level to analyze
the psychological dynamics in the generation and maintenance of false conscious-
ness. (This microscopic emphasis is being revived by certain contemporary criti-
cal theorists; see Wexler, 1983, and the new journal Psychology and Social The-
ory.) Also during this period, the Soviet Union's Stalinist course became a topic
of increasing concern, a cause of some divisiveness (Lowenthal, 1981:148), and
the source of new theories of state socialism. There was some support for the So-
viet Union at the Institute, but the purge trials, the Nazi-Soviet pact, and con-
tinued movement toward authoritarian bureaucracy led other Frankfurt scholars
to question whether the Soviet system was a totalitarian social formation, and not
a transitional stage to socialism. Horkheimer's (1973 [1940]:6) essay on "the
totalitarian state" stressed that authoritarian means of revolution (dictatorship of
the party) reproduce self-perpetuating hierarchical power, rather than "dissolving

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in the end into the democracy of the councils ..." Lowenthal (1981:148) argued
that "disappointment over what took place in the Soviet Union ... is a key to [the
Frankfurt School's] political development." Indeed, the transition to socialism,
the role of the party vanguard, and the entire issue of organization had to be re-
formulated. Ultimately, this line of questioning led to a separation of Frankfurt
Marxism from "actually existing socialism" and the international communist
movement.
Rather than attempting a radically condensed summary of the diverse

sophical, historical, and empirical studies of the Frankfurt school (which
ready been the topic of several comprehensive works, e.g., Jay, 1973;
1978; Held, 1980), I will concentrate on the development of the theoretic
tion-critical theory-that guided these studies. Though it has been desc
"resistant to summary" (Connerton, 1976:22), critical theory is a definab
tion, reflecting a coherent configuration of theoretical interests. The approa
the Frankfurt School is "rooted in the Marxist critique of political econo
... is an hisorical dialectic aiming at revolutionary change" (Kellner, 19
By the late 1920s, Soviet Marxism was transformed into dialectical materia
(Marxism-Leninism), which increasingly contained ideological elements c
dictory to Marx's original historical materialism (Ulmen, 1978:130-3
approach purged Marxism of much of its historical content and hitched
firmly to the party apparatus (Jacoby, 1971:133-37). An incisive Marxist
sis of Soviet society, revealing the system's material and ideological cont
tions, would likely have won its author a place in a prison or labor camp
than in the Academy of Science. Though it retained scientistic slogans ab
versal laws, dialectical materialism depended increasingly upon the party
ship, rather than scientific knowledge, as the arbiter of truth. Under
regime, the autonomy of the sciences was destroyed, permitting compliant f
such as Lysenko to rise, while disagreeing scholars were silenced (Kolak
1978:77-105). Marxism became a pseudoscientific means of legitimiz
party and state with little regard for facts or systematic ideas.
Critical theory was a response to the liquidation of history by a def
Marxism. The Frankfurt scholars believed that mechanical application of
ist categories in changed historical situations" was contradictory to their "pr
sive form of Marxism" (Lowenthal, 1981:147). However, despite their a
on one-sided economism, early critical theorists continued to accept Mar
tique of political economy. Though Marx's early ideas were stressed (e.g.
tion), many of his later ideas about commodity production, contradictio
tween productive forces and social relations of production, and capitalis
tendencies were retained. Furthermore, Frankfurt School thought upheld
predictions about increased concentration of capital and greater pervasiv
the commodity form (Held, 1980:40-65; Jacoby, 1974; Kellner, 1975). O
other hand, Frankfurt School "materialism" abandoned claims about soci
emphasizing instead the historically grounded critique of reification. Ac
to Horkheimer (1972 [1933]:23), "the materialist tries to replace the jus
tion of action with an explanation of it through an historical understan
the agent." This historical thrust was necessary because the underlying eman
tory end, which animates critical Marxism and distinguishes it from pos

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Critical Theory 331
and pseudo-scientific Marxism, depends upon an understanding of the changing

conditions of human suffering (Horkheimer, 1972 [1933]:32).
Horkheimer's (1972) [1937]:188-243) essay, "Traditional and Critical The-
ory," outlined the Frankfurt School position when the term "critical theory" was
coined. Its Marxist roots are clear: Horkheimer (1972 [1937]:227) referred to
critical theory as "the unfolding of a single existential judgment" about progres-
sive developments, contradictions, and ultimately the "new barbarism" generated
by "the historically given commodity economy [capitalism]." History was con-
strued as the "necessary product of an economic mechanism" that contained "a
protest against this order . . ." (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]:229). Critical theory
"constructs a developing picture of society" (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]:239)
that exposes the prevailing system of domination, expresses its contradictions,
assesses its potential for emancipatory change, and criticizes the system to pro-
mote that change.
Horkheimer (1972 [1937]:229) considered critical theory "part of the devel-
opment of society" and argued that its critical standpoint ("the goals of human
activity, especially the idea of a reasonable organization of society that will meet
the needs of the whole community") were "immanent in human work" (1972
[1937]:213). He believed that critiques based upon supposed absolute values or
alleged universal scientific laws were reifications that ultimately serve domina-
tion. Horkheimer attempted to avoid this error by operating according to the
method of immanent critique, which is based on Hegel's dialectics and Marx's
early writings (Antonio, 1981). This method restores "actuality to be a false ap-
pearance" by "expressing what a social totality holds itself to be, and then con-
fronting it with what it is in fact becoming" (Schroyer, 1975:30-31). Horkheim-
er (1974 [1947]:178) explained:
Again and again in history, ideas have cast off their swaddling clothes and struck
out against the social systems that bore them. The cause, in large degree, is that spirit,
language, and all realms of the mind necessarily stake universal claims. Even ruling
groups, intent above all upon defending their particular interests, must stress universal
motifs in religion, morality, and science. Thus originates the contradiction between the
existent and ideology, a contradiction that spurs all historical progress. While conform-
ism presupposes the basic harmony of the two and includes minor discrepancies in the
ideology itself, philosophy makes men conscious of the contradiction between them.
On the one hand it appraises society by the light of the very ideas that it recognizes
as its highest values; on the other, it is aware that these ideas reflect the taints of
reality.
Critical theory is concerned with contradictions between ideology and reality.

Ideology portrays a false unity of the ideal and real, but the greater this distortion,
the deeper its contradictions, and the more vulnerable the system is to criticism.
Immanent critique attacks social structure from the perspective of its own legiti-
mations by criticizing ideology from the perspective of history and then contrast-
ing emancipatory aspects of ideological claims with social reality. The intent is to
turn legitimations against their contexts, transforming them into weapons against
false consciousness (Antonio, 1981:338). Critical theory is supposed to con-
tribute to the necessary subjective dimension of emancipation by clarifying imma-

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nent (historically based) emancipatory ends and demystifying reifications that

prevent "free action."
Though Horkheimer's "Traditional and Critical Theory" called for emancipa-
tory social criticism, it also pointed to trends that were likely to blunt its effects.
Unlike Marx and Lukacs, Horkheimer (1972 [1937]:213) believed that the posi-
tion of the proletariat is "no guarantee of correct knowledge." Furthermore, he
(1972 [1937]:238) claimed that "the general intellectual level of the great masses
is rapidly declining." This worsening situation derived from the growth of mass
culture, reflecting the increasing concentration of capital, rationalization, and bu-
reaucratization. Though cultural mediation makes the process more indirect and
increasingly incomprehensible to the masses, economic determinism in social life
increases (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]:234-38). Moreover, Horkheimer consid-
ered "bourgeois culture," with its values of autonomy and freedom, to be on the
decline. These values provided an immanent basis for attacking the direct and
comprehensible exploitation of market capitalism, despite their capitalist origins
(in the relative independence of the early entrepreneur). Corporate capitalism,
however, destroys entrepreneurial independence and vitiates the values that were
formerly generated by it. Increasingly liberal ideology is replaced by "mass belief,
in which no one really believes [and which] is an immediate product of the ruling
economic and political bureaucracies" (Horkheimer, 1972 [1937]:237). Overall,
modern capitalism heightens class unconsciousness and weakens the means for
overcoming it. Horkheimer's (1972 [1937]:241) position suggests that attenu-
ated emancipatory hopes are kept alive by "prevailing injustice" and the belief
that the small minority that is conscious of these desires "may at the decisive mo-
ment become the leaders because of their deeper insight."
Horkheimer's critical theory is not "a set of statements or hypotheses," but is a
style of understanding the social world that seeks to promote emancipatory action
(Howard, 1977:104). The Marxist ideas that guide it are left largely unelabo-
rated, except at the points where Horkheimer applied or criticized them. Early
critical theory was not a substitute for Marxism, but was a voice within Marxist
theory aimed at preventing it from degenerating into a stale set of ahistoric as-
sumptions and claims. The early Frankfurt theorists believed that the vitality of
Marxism depended upon its ability to address correctly the historical situation of
modern capitalism and to counter the transformation of Soviet Marxism into an
ideology of state socialist bureaucracy.
Capitalist Integration: The Rise of One-Dimensional Society

Though the Frankfurt scholars stressed the increasing penetration of the commod-
ity form into all sectors of life, they believed that political economy could not, by
itself, provide an adequate understanding of modern capitalism (Held, 1980:77-
79). During the 1930s and 1940s, the rise in the United States of centrally ad-
ministered consumption, orchestrated by radio and printed advertising (Ewen,
1976; Ewen and Ewen, 1982), and the emergence in totalitarian societies of mass
indoctrination, delivered through newly developed media, caused critical theorists
to focus increasingly on the relation of "mass culture" to domination. In their
opinion, art-which is the source of "otherness" and "negation" since it portrays
ideal conceptions that contradict existing society (Horkheimer, 1972 [1941]:

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Critical Theory 333
277-78; Marcuse, 1972, 1978)-was being displaced by conformist mass cul-

ture. This trend was part of a broader encroachment of mass production and mass
distribution on the private sphere. "Leisure" consists increasingly of manipulated
pleasures" (e.g., ball park, movie, best seller, and radio) that bring the commod-
ity form, administrated activities, and mass produced tastes into the private house-
hold (Horkheimer, 1972 [1941]:277). The result of that "opposition of individ-
ual and society, and of private and social existence, which gave seriousness to the
pastime of art, has become obsolete" (Horkheimer, 1972 [1941]:289).
In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno (1972 [1947]:93)
argued that Enlightenment thought, formerly the basis of an antiauthoritarian
critique of traditionalism, "abrogates itself" once it is harnessed to corporate capi-
talism. Its offspring, "instrumental reason" (also formalized reason, the ratio, tech-
nological reason, and subjective reason), promotes exclusively the exact calcula-
tion of exchange value and the technological domination of nature. The Frankfurt
analysis of the culture industry is related to a broader critique, arguing that the
spread of instrumental rationality erodes criticism and opposition. Under market
capitalism, Enlightenment reason stimulated social criticism based upon the values
of autonomy and freedom, but under corporate capitalism, it is silent about ends
and is reduced to a tool for measuring and calculating means. Instrumental reason,
though it claims to avoid direct judgments of value, tends to consecrate techno-
logical advance as the highest human activity and the cure-all for human prob-
lems. Moreover, since it is neutral toward other substantive values, instrumental
reason serves uncritically the institutions that can best afford to objectify it in rou-
tines, processes, and products. Horkheimer (1974 [1947]) refered to this situa-
tion as the "eclipse of reason," meaning that the emergence of instrumental ra-
tionality undermined the capacity for rational discourse and critical debate about
ultimate values and the degree to which institutions reflected these values. The
understanding of institutions was increasingly based upon a single, cognitive di-
mension that reflected institutional requisites and routines, rather than broader
concepts of needs and justice.
The postwar (WW II) capitalist recovery, explosive development of mass
media (e.g., television), and vast extension of commodity consumption, height-
ened the fears of the Frankfurt School-capitalist society appeared headed toward
"total integration" and "total administration." Furthermore, liberals expressed an
optimistic flipside of "the dialectic of Enlightenment" position; they praised rap-
idly expanding technical rationality, technocratic administration, and capitalist
integration as movement toward the development of a rational society lacking the
contradictions of classical capitalism and increasingly characterized by abundance
and social justice. In the 1950s and early 1960s Daniel Bell, Irving Kristol, John
Kenneth Galbraith, W. W. Rostow, Seymour Martin Lipset and numerous others
declared: American society "works," ideology is dead, affluence and the welfare
state averts class conflict, rapidly advancing technology mitigates major social
problems, and modern capitalism has begun permanent growth based on "human
capital." This "ideology of the liberal consensus" declared that Marxism had ab-
solutely no relevance to modern capitalism, except as a seductive ideology of a
a hostile and dangerous external power (Hodgson, 1978:67-98). From the
Frankfurt School perspective, postwar liberalism had lost its critical edge, verify-
ing the alleged eclipse of reason. This period was also characterized by the right-

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ward movement of labor unions, hysterical anticommunism, and a general si-

lencing and/or co-optation of the Left. Finally, despite Nikita Khrushchev's
denunciation of Stalinism, the Soviet Union continued to degenerate into the ineffi-
cient, bureaucratic tyranny.
Adorno (1978 [1960]:105) considered modern capitalism to be a totally ad-
ministered society where "autonomy, spontaneity, and criticism" are eliminated
and people "subjugate" themselves to the "preordained." Though the Frankfurt
School attacked (somewhat unfairly) Max Weber for uncritically accepting "in-
strumental reason" (Horkheimer, 1974 [1947]:6; Marcuse, 1969:201-69), they
adopted many elements of his analysis of bureaucratization and rationalization.
Their work (unlike Weber's) aimed at emancipatory possibilities, but during the
postwar era, they offered little to rebut Weberian pessimism. Moreover, they sug-
gested deeper pessimism by arguing that the ruling bureaucracy mobilized even
apparently contradictory cultural elements ("tolerated negativity" and "negatively
useful") to serve capital (Adorno, 1978 [1960]:101).
The members of the Frankfurt School dispersed to different locations in the
1950s and lost the little institutional coherence they had. By the early 1960s,
Marcuse emerged as the most important of the original Frankfurt scholars and
was the intellectual bridge to the second generation of critical theorists. Marcuse's
One Dimensional Man (1964) is the culmination of the pessimistic phase of criti-
cal theory. (This widely read book promoted his later ascendancy in the New
Left.)
Marcuse (1964:1) described the "comfortable, smooth, reasonable, demo-
cratic unfreedom" of "advanced industrial civilization," and argued that the
immanent contradiction between ideology and society had been deflected by "tech-
nological rationality." The missing second dimension (critical reason and Eros),
which had evaluated ends and conceived of alternative modes of action and or-
ganization, was definitely in eclipse. Private social space and even mental space
were determined by the logic of exchange value and the system of administration:
"[m]ass production and mass distribution claim the entire individual" (Marcuse,
1964:10). Early critical Marxism was influenced deeply by Hegel's concepts of
"immanent contradiction" and "determinate negation," which together generated
transcendence of the existing state of affairs. Marcuse's "one-dimensionality" the-
sis implied that this creative, negative dimension had been stunted by the over-
powering force of technological reason and its domination of nature. The modern
system no longer generated ideologies containing claims that could be transformed
into counterideologies. Marcuse's position, like that of the liberals, pointed to an
"end of ideology" where legitimation derives, not from transcendental claims that
idealize reality, but directly from the structure of production and its successful de-
livery of goods. Unlike the liberals, however, Marcuse considered this condition
to be a state of euphoric alienation, not the beginning of a technologically based,
democratic, rational society.
Initially, the Frankfurt School desired to elaborate emancipatory possibilities
by performing an immanent critique of the cultural impediments to proletarian
revolution. However, the rise of fascism and Stalinism, and postwar capitalist in-
tegration foreclosed the emergence of a collective, revolutionary subject. More-
over, though critical theorists stressed the extension of capitalist domination,
they located its origins in deep-rooted, cultural conditions (the decline of bour-

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Critical Theory 335
geois culture and the rise of instrumental rationality) for which there were no
determinate solutions. The Freudian assumption of a biologically based opposi-
tion between individual and society and the claim that art expresses an alternative
reality were critical theory's small refuge for emancipatory ends. However, the de-
cline of the patriarchal family (which allegedly nurtures a strong and potentially
rebellious ego) and the displacement of art by mass culture vitiated even these
faint hopes (Schoolman, 1980:131-356). The historical search for emancipatory
possibilities was futile, yielding the abstractions of negative dialectics (Adorno,
1973 [1966]) and vague discussions of "a reconciliation with nature" (Hork-
heimer, 1974 [1947]:92-127; Marcuse, 1964:225-46); Leiss, 1974b). Jack
Mendelson (1979:47) argued that:
. . Horkheimer and Adorno had reached a theoretical and political cul de sac; they
were not only isolated from both practice and the prevailing scientific universe of dis-
course, but had also developed a philosophy of history which was unable to locate non-
esoteric ruptures and addressees due to the supposed sway of virtually universal pro-
cesses of reification.
Contemporary Critical Theory: Habermas
Jurgen Habermas is probably the most well known and prolific second generation
critical theorist. His work is of broad scope and has incorporated parts of several
intellectual traditions (e.g., linguistic philosophy, systems theory, developmental
psychology) that would have been unacceptable to earlier critical theorists. It is
impossible to even outline his complex system of ideas in this paper (McCarthy,
1978; Held, 1980:249-378; Giddens, 1977; Dickens, 1983), so the discussion
will merely situate him in the tradition of critical theory.
Habermas (1979a:33, 41-42; 1982) disagreed with the Frankfurt School's
analysis of instrumental reason and opposed a concept of communicative rational-
ity to Adorno and Horkheimer's dialectic of Enlightenment (and Marcuse's "one-
dimensionality"). Their depiction of "total social reification" can be interpreted
as a renunciation of political praxis and the reduction of critical theory to "a pes-
simistic self-clarification" (Honneth, 1979:46-47). Habermas (1981a:7-8)
traced the problems of critical theory to its "historical concept of reason," Hegel-
ian concept of truth, and failure to take "bourgeois democracy" seriously. He be-
lieves that a rejuvenated critical theory must be more open to "cultural modern-
ism" (Habermas, 1981a:15, 1981b), reject portrayals of total reification, and
avoid utopianism (Whitebook, 1979:66).
Habermas constructed a new normative foundation for critical theory that sub-
stitutes a " 'transcendental argument' about language-use and its preconditions"
for the historical concept of reason and immanent criticism (Geuss, 1981:64-65;
Habermas, 1970, 1979b:1-68; McCarthy, 1978:272-357). In a nutshell, he
argued that linguistic communities are predicated upon an understanding that
communication should be based upon a free flow of information undistorted by
coercion. He believes that the "ideal speech situation"-uncoerced communica-
tion among free and equal people-is implicit because interaction depends upon
tacit validity claims that presuppose it. ("This means . . . that agents are commit-
ted to accepting as valid any criticism of their action which shows that action to be

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based on norms which would not be freely agreed on in the ideal speech situation"
[Geuss, 1981:66].) This argument is an attempt to rescue reason from both posi-
tivism and the pessimistic critique of the Frankfurt School. Instead of an eclipse
of reason, Habermas pointed to an ontological basis for apprehending truth, free-
dom, and justice.
Harbermas' ideas about communication are linked to his theory of social evolu-
tion, which is proposed as a "reconstruction of historical materialism" (Haber-
mas, 1979b: 130-77; Arnason, 1979:201-18). Habermas began by differentiat-
ing spheres of labor (instrumental action) and social interaction (communicative
action), and argued that the latter evolves, with relative autonomy, from instru-
mental action (Habermas, 1979b:130-77; Honneth, 1979:59). His analysis of
the role of language in social evolution rejected views that assign knowledge, val-
ues, and ideology a pure epiphenomenal status. Thus, Habermas abandoned the
base/superstructure relation and its strict concept of material determinism. He
suggested that evolutionary, structural differentiation (rationalization) of produc-
tive forces interacts with, establishes limits for, and creates possibilities for the
development of communicative action, but does not strictly determine this action.
The evolution of both productive forces and communicative norms together con-
tribute to the gradual emergence of a communicative ethic stressing increasing
autonomy, freedom, flexibility, and reflexivity (Benhabib, 1981:50). Habermas
(1979b:69-94) adopted Lawrence Kolberg's stages of individual moral develop-
ment (and used elements of Jean Piaget's developmental theory) to formulate an
evolutionary theory of communicative norms. In his view, the maturation of both
individual and society is characterized by the development of competencies that
make possible increasingly free and open communication.
Habermas disagreed with the Frankfurt School's position about the level of in-
tegration of late capitalism. He suggested that the growth of the welfare state bu-
reaucracy extends instrumental rationality into areas formerly controlled by the
family and local community. However, as domination becomes more visible in
these areas, the state's legitimacy suffers increased strains (Habermas, 1975:33-
94; Benhabib, 1981:50). The late capitalist state has an intensifying problem
meeting the increasingly diverse demands made upon it. It is also threatened by
the erosion of traditional normative structures that motivate people to act in ac-
cordance with system needs. The evolutionary trend toward "communicative eth-
ics" produces needs for freedom, autonomy, and rationality that cannot be met
in a system "based on a pattern of distribution and dominance which is still class
dependent" (Habermas, 1974a:52; 1975:33-94).
Habermas implied (though not directly) that the developmental trend, given
the structural differentiation of the spheres of labor and interaction, and the
emergence of late capitalist crisis tendencies, is toward democratic socialism (Ha-
bermas, 1979:167-72). However, he was not at all clear how and through whose
agency this transformation will occur. Habermas' (1962, 1974b [1964]; Hohen-
dahl, 1979) early work focused on "the public sphere," where free public discus-
sion among equals shapes public opinion and, in turn, influences the structure and
functioning of social life. His later argument, concerning communicative ethics,
implied that evolution points in the direction of a reconstituted public sphere (a
point he did not make in his earlier work). It can be deduced that emancipatory
social organization, in Habermas' system, arises from determinate possibilities

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Critical Theory 337
generated by social evolution and mediated by collective actions that originate in

the developing free sphere of communication. Though he did not describe a col-
lective agent of emancipation, Habermas (1981c:33-34) did point to certain
"subinstitutional, extraparliamentary forms of protest" (e.g., women's anti-
nuclear, environmental, and peace movements) that imply crises of legitimation
and motivation, and suggest emergent, emancipatory, normative structures.
Habermas countered the pessimistic phase of critical theory with an approach
that elaborates progressive features of rationalization and points to strains and
contradictions in late capitalism. However, since his theory is inexplicit about de-
terminate, emancipatory possibilities and political practices, it does not resolve the
dilemma of the missing historical subject of emancipation. Moreover, it does not
directly address early western Marxism's central problem of class consciousness
and reification. Habermas' substitution of the ideal speech situation and evolu-
tionary systems theory for immanent critique constitutes a turn away from the
Hegelian-Marxist tradition. The locus of emancipatory tendencies in an undiffer-
entiated, collective subject and vaguely periodized, evolutionary stages moves
away from the determinate, historical grounding of Hegelian-Marxism toward
Hegelianism and perhaps even Parsonsian evolutionary functionalism. (For some
varying critical analyses of Habermas see Benhabib, 1981; Cohen, 1979; Disco,
1979; Held, 1980:389-400; Howard, 1974; Schmidt, 1979; Therborn, 1971.)
Contemporary Critical Theory: The Continuing Debate

over Capitalist Integration
After the dissolution of the Frankfurt School, the meaning of critical theory was
more elusive than ever. Here, it will refer to western Marxists who are informed
by the Frankfurt School approach and who are continuing the critical dialogue
with scientific Marxism, critically confronting state socialism and corporate capi-
talism, and maintaining the search for determinate, emancipatory possibilities.
Marcuse was not only a bridge between the first generation of critical theory and
the modern version, but also had important input into both sides of the debate
over capitalist integration. His important work on one dimensionality and his later
rejection of the dialectic of Enlightenment argument (as well as his later empha-
sis on system contradictions and his active role in Left politics) placed him in
the middle of the most important rift in contemporary critical theory. Despite his
earlier pessimism, Marcuse became one of the most politically active critical theo-
rists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. His activism, contact with radicals both
inside and outside the United States, and deepening interest in world capitalist in-
stabilities caused him to revise substantially his views on the integration of Amer-
ican capitalism. (Douglas Kellner has suggested this point to me in conversation.)
Even after the demise of the student movement, Marcuse (1979:7) argued that
the New Left did not fail and that capitalist stability had been upset. He believed
that New Left goals, which were "ahead of objective conditions" (1979:4), had
been simply postponed by suppression and co-optation. In his view, the New Left
put "radical social change on the agenda" (1979:8), and despite the Nixon-
Reagan "counterrevolution," local and regional struggles (beginning in bourgeois
form) pointed to a mobilization of depoliticized groups that could eventually
stimulate cultural revolution (Marcuse, 1979:9).

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In an interview the year before he died, Marcuse explicitly rejected the dialec-
tic of Enlightenment position that critical theory had lost its historical subject and
that such theory must be bequeathed to an "imaginary witness" (Marcuse, et al.,
1978-79:149-50). (This interview was ignored by Morton Schoolman, who
claims, in The Imag nary Witness, that Marcuse gave in to pessimism.) Marcuse
(Marcuse et al., 1978-79:150) argued that the working class "remains a poten-
tial agent or subject of revolution ... ," but is not the industrial proletariat that
Marx stressed. However, the modern working class, which in his estimation con-
stitutes over 90 percent of the American population and includes white-collar as
well as industrial workers, is still consistent with Marxian theory because mem-
bers of this enlarged class must work for a wage (and submit themselves to the
consequent insecurities and forms of domination), rather than be supported by
capital ownership. Because the American working class is now generally well fed,
the source of revolution will not be merely material deprivation, but rather will be
a reaction to a more general oppression, insecurity, and control that characterizes
a consumer society. He argued that "marginal groups" (e.g., women, students,
and minorities) are "catalysts" for an eventual, broader cultural revolution, Mar-
cuse no longer portrayed the total alienation that he had described in One Dimen-
sional Man. In an interesting exchange with Habermas, Marcuse (Marcuse, et al.,
1978-79:138) rejected this idea completely, arguing that people know "what is
necessary."
Telos, the most important contemporary English-language journal in critical
theory, has provided translations, exegeses, and reviews and has fostered inter-
action between American and European critical theorists. The journal's editor
and founder, Paul Piccone, is important not only for his role on Telos, but also
because he has been at the turbulent center of the continuing debate over late
capitalist integration. Piccone (1976, 1977, 1978, 1980; Kansas Telos Group,
1977:190-92; Luke, 1978) argued that contemporary American society is so
well integrated and "homogenized" by bureaucratic administration that "bureau-
cratization becomes counterproductive" (Piccone, 1978:46). Because "the full
domination of monopoly capital" has meant the destruction of "otherness"
("spontaneous" resistance) (Piccone, 1978:48), the system is threatened by suf-
focation through overadministration. However, capitalism responds with even
higher levels of integration, adjusting to the new danger by producing, within its
own structures, critical (reformist) elements that prevent total bureaucratic petri-
faction. Piccone (1978:45) argued that the "transition period beween entrepre-
neurial capialism and the full domination of capital" was characterized by "one-
dimensionality," while contemporary monopoly capitalism is an age of "artificial
negativity." Once the system is able to generate controls to limit the counterpro-
ductive effects of its own domination, it becomes practically impervious to quali-
tative change. It not only enriches its administrative structure through reform, it
develops powers of co-optation that deflect resistance groups by integrating them
into the system. According to this perspective, the social movements of the 1960s
and 1970s (consumers', women's, civil rights, etc.) served to prop up the bureau-
cracy, rather than alter it substantially. Tim Luke (1978:65-66),a former Pic-
cone student, claimed that "the stimulation of the New Left" (e.g., black power
groups, militant feminism, the peace movement) "prevented the completed derail-

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Critical Theory 339
ment of advanced capitalist growth" and strengthened bureaucracy "with its inno-
vative notions."
The "artificial negativity thesis" drew sharp reactions, especially from those
who believed that monopoly capitalism was undergoing intensified contradictions
and even possible decline (DeBrizzi, 1978; Piccone, 1978). Most of the Telos cir-
cle was highly critical of the approach or dismissed it completely (Kansas Telos
Group, 1977; Fekete, 1981-82). On the other hand, artificial negativity could be
viewed as an extrapolation of the total integration emphasis that has characterized
Telos articles about the United States (e.g., Alt, 1976; Jacoby, 1977-78; Ewen
and Ewen, 1978; Reed, 1979; Roelofs, 1979; Kansas Telos Group, 1980-81).
The journal's coverage of American society has not been as strong as its offerings
on European society and continental thought. (This problem has been recognized
by some of the Telos editors.) Telos has presented many varations on the integra-
tion theme and lamented the terrible condition of American society, but its new
critical horizons and articulation of emancipatory possibilities have been expressed
in its analyses of Europe, not the United States (e.g., Piccone [1978:51] argues
that the "system's Achilles heel" is cultural, but argues that the only challenges on
this level come from southern Europe). Furthermore, Telos analyses of Left ori-
ented political and social movements (both American and western European)
have tended to stress their contributions to social integration, rather than change.
Breines (1982:172) has argued that Telos' "solidarity with opposition move-
ments seems to be snapping and giving way to a kind of homogenous hostility to
activism in the West.. ."
Piccone's artificial negativity concept has generated considerable debate about
integration, resistance, and the adequacy of the Telos interpretation of American
society. His central point is that Marxism was an acceptable explanation of entre-
preneural capitalism and that critical theory accurately portrayed the transitional
stage to monopoly capitalism, but that the "critical perspective" appropriate for
the present era does not yet exist (Piccone, 1977:34-35)! He argued that a new
approach was needed to elaborate authentic, emancipatory possibilities-"organic
negativity"-that would reconstitute the society through "spontaneous" action
from outside, rather than from within, the bureaucratic structure of domination.
Piccone believed that such an approach would reject traditional Marxism and
would have a phenomenological foundation (Piccone, 1980:27; 1971). Though
his prescription for a new perspective is not clearly delineated, his (1977:37)
major point is well taken: the renewal of emancipatory theory must be based on
"an historically accurate reconstruction of critical theory's own trajectory . . ." It
is ironic that Telos has published an impressive variety of rich articles on the
structure, functioning, and contradictions of Eastern European systems (e.g.,
Carlo, 1974; Arato, 1978b; Feher, 1978; Zaslavsky, 1979), some of which even
point to potentially emancipatory conditions (e.g., Arato, 1981-82), but has been
weak in analyzing the society where critical theory has enjoyed its revival.
The theme of total integration implies nearly complete domination by capital.
For example, Jacoby spoke of an "increasing decomposition of human subjectiv-
ity" ("a falling rate of intelligence") that is expressed in the petrifaction of social
relations (Jacoby, 1976:142), and the liquidation of use value by exchange value
(Jacoby, 1976:143). Both conditions follow from the spread of the "commodity

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form" into almost all relations and activities. Even the Left suffers from "com-
modification" (Jacoby, 1977-78:75). This grim portrait can be interpreted to
imply that "capital alone . . . answers the casting call for the True Subject" (Ogil-
vy, 1978:214; see Breuer, 1977). But, despite their depressing portrayals of the
present, critical theorists who stress total capitalist integration call for a rejuve-
nated critical theory based upon a deeper understanding of human subjectivity
and a "cultural revolution" that would restore it historically. Even though they
imply an eclipse of the subject under monopoly capitalism, they preserve the goal
of its eventual restoration in an emancipated society. This possibility, however, is
retained in hope, rather than in depictions of determinate, historical possibilities.
Though creation of a complete blueprint for progressive change is an impossible
and undesirable goal, it is possible and desirable to provide some substantive me-
diation between the extremes of the empirical claims about total capitalist integra-
tion and the theoretical end of emancipation. This task awaits the new critical per-
spective that Piccone has spoken of programmatically.
There are critical theorists, mostly outside the Telos circle, who portray a less
complete integration of monopoly capitalism and one characterized by contradic-
tions that open at least limited emancipatory possibilities. These scholars usually
preserve more of the original Marxian foundation and do not call for a completely
reconstructed approach. (Those who suggest broader changes usually mean that
it is necessary to trim off more of the Marxian elements.) For example, Douglas
Kellner, a young American critical theorist (who is presently completing a book
that counters Schoolman's overstatement of Marcuse's pessimism [Kellner, 1984,
1983] and who has also criticized Jay for underemphasizing the Marxist thrust of
the Frankfurt School [1975]), considers critical theory to be based upon the
Hegelian-Marxist dialectic and historical materialism (Kellner, 1975:138-41).
Though he (1975:142) reaffirmed the critique of scientific Marxism, he retained
much of the Marxist framework. Kellner's (1979; 1981b) analysis of television
and the media countered the Frankfurt School's portrayal of "the culture indus-
try," criticized more recent arguments that view the media simply as instruments
of cultural homogenization, and attacked orthodox Marxist views that the capi-
alist media are "a monolithic tool of a unified ruling class" (1981b:45). Kellner
(1981b:45) held that television reflects "divisions and conflicts" within the ruling
segments of society. He also implied that the media portray social conflict and dis-
integration (Kellner, 1981b:50-51; 1979:31-41) and even contains some eman-
cipatory themes (Kellner, 1979:26-31).
Kellner (1981b:46) called for a "critical theory of television" that attends "to
contradictory images, messages, and social effects, while also rejecting monolithic
theories of advanced capitalism." Though Kellner (1981b:40-41) suggested that,
overall, television contributes to social integration, he pointed to contradictions
(e.g., the interest in short-term ratings and profits cause networks to present de-
tailed news of scandals and crises) that prevent the media from consistently serv-
ing a single, homogeneous interest. Kellner implied that a democratized media
could be the basis for a revitalized public sphere and that the contemporary tech-
nical, organizational, and legal conditions of the media provide some democratic
possibilities (Kellner, 1981b:51-55). He (1979:26) also criticized the Left for
ignoring the broadcast media as a possible vehicle for change and calls (1979:

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Critical Theory 341
47-48) upon them to forge "radical media politics," aimed at democratic con-
trol of the media and ultimately, at "the project of cultural revolution." Kellner's
(1979:43-46) activity is not confined to scholarship: he is pursuing media poli-
tics through his successful public television show, "Alternative Views" (Austin,
Texas). Despite the theoretical differences with Telos, Kellner's project is quite
consistent with the idea of "partial struggles," stressed by members of the Telos
circle (e.g., Jacoby: 1980-81:110).
Oskar Negt (Negt and Kluge, 1972; Negt, 1973, 1976) is a major second gen-
eration (German) critical theorist who has retained a strong Marxist perspective.
Negt (Negt and Kluge, 1972; Hohendahl, 1979:104-9; Knodler-Bunte, 1975)
criticized Habermas for failing to provide a clear outline of a democratically re-
constituted public sphere and developed the concept of "proletarian public
sphere" to fill this gap. Negt and Kluge argued that the penetration of capital far
into cultural life generates a "block of real life" that contradicts the interests of
capital (Knodler-Bunte, 1975:65-66). This is constituted of needs and desires
that are stimulated by the development of capital, but which cannot be met by it.
The proletarian public sphere develops in reaction to these unmet needs and be-
comes a basis for articulating opposition, expressing alternative possibilties, and
representing general needs and interests. This is the foundation for the emergence
of new forms of "spontaneous self-organization" based on common experiences
and interests. Negt (1973) preserved the concept of proletarian class struggle,
but stressed organization from "below" rather than from "above" by a party van-
guard. This approach emphasizes the progressive possibilities deriving from the
experiences of the masses, rather than stressing mass alienation and blindness
(Hohendahl, 1979:107). Negt (1978) like Kellner, expressed the need for a crit-
ical theory of the media that would have an important role in the process of eman-
cipation. The media must be transformed from a source of mystification to a
means of communication. In the latter form, it would be a valuable tool in the
creation of the emergent proletarian public sphere. The major point is that this
(and Kellner's) version of critical theory puts stronger emphasis on contradic-
tions and emancipatory possibilities than on capitalist integration.
The central debate over capitalist integration is important because the position
taken on this topic determines whether a thorough reconstruction of critical the-
ory, entailing a possible abandonment of its original foundation, is necessary, or if
only minor adjustments of theoretical and historical focus are required. This issue
goes to the heart of Marxist theory and particularly points to problems concern-
ing the fundamental conceptions of revolution and the transition to socialism.
Also, it shapes views about whether progressive change can be built on the foun-
dation of existing movements or requires entirely new strategies. The debate over
capitalist integration is significant because it raises important questions about criti-
cal theory's connection to Marxism and because its resoluion is likely to yield the
next creative synthesis in the history of the approach.
Neither Marxist Science nor Sociology: Critical Theory's Place

in the Marxist Tradition
Habermas: "The integration of the proletariat into the capitalist system. That is an
empirical process . ."

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Marcuse: "... but not the fault of critical theory."

(Marcuse, et al., 1978-79:149)
Therborn (1970:94) argued that critical theory "takes the form of a double re-
duction of science and politics to philosophy." By "reduction of science" he meant
that critical theory rejects Althusserian Marxism (Althusser, 1970; Poster,
1974). This "structuralist" position claims that the mature Marx abandoned the
humanist concept of man actively making his/her history. Structuralist Marxism
is a "science" of objective structures and laws. It excludes critical Marxism's goal
of making people conscious of history so they can become active subjects, rather
than mere objects of structural change (Maravall, 1976:24-25). Though struc-
turalism abandons narrow economic determinism, allows for the relative auton-
omy of the state, and allegedly revises orthodox Marxism, it retains and even am-
plifies those elements of traditional scientific Marxism that uphold orthodox
concepts of party organization and proletarian revolution.
Extreme scientific Marxism is an ahistorical mode of discourse that permits it
to liquidate inconvenient facts (Jacoby, 1980) and ignore unintentional conse-
quences, both of which are vital to an approach with professed political, as well as
"scientific," ends. Critical theory's alleged reduction of politics means that it re-
jects the traditional Marxist organizational model for revolution. It does so, not
simply for theoretical reasons, but because of the history of both "actually exist-
ing socialism" and late capitalism. (For broad treatment of this topic see Jacoby,
1981.) Marcuse's (Marcuse et al., 1978-79:149) strange statement that critical
theory cannot be blamed for the integration of the proletariat must be understood
in the context of a politically charged, intellectual climate in which the recognition
of history sometimes brings condemnations. This suggests a betrayal of political
goals. The point is that critical theory's emphasis on integration and pessimism
about traditional revolutionary models is not an abandonment of politics, but a rec-
ognition of empirical conditions that require new concepts and tactics to realize
the goal of emancipation.
The primary significance of critical theory is its critical role within Marxism. It
is a mode of discourse that tends to uphold history over theory in a broader tradi-
tion that sometimes promotes the obverse. This does not mean that critical theo-
rists are always correct historically, but only that their approach serves notice to
Marxists whose theories pay inadequate attention to changing cultural, social, po-
litical, and economic conditions. As Leiss (1974a:341) pointed out, the tendency
of orthodox Marxism is "to simply assume [my emphasis] the existence (actual
or potential) of a class with a general interest in emancipation." Critical theory
transforms this a priori into the most important empirical/historical issue within
Marxism. Historically informed understanding of this topic becomes the basis for
reflection about the shape of Marxist theory and the political ends implied by the
theory. The goal of critical theory is to preserve Marxism's founding emancipatory
cognitive interest (Habermas, 1971:301-17) by rethinking the project of eman-
cipation within the historical contexts where it must be achieved.
Critical theory is neither purely academic, nor contemplative. Despite its grow-
ing popularity among some sociologists, it should not be considered a sociological
subarea. Critical theory's primary thinkers, and the outlets in which their work
appears, are generally outside or on the margins of sociology. If critical theory

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Critical Theory 343
achieves full status as a subdiscipline and is absorbed into sociology, it will be

imperiled by intellectual compartmentalization. Of course, today, this is an ab-
stract scenario since most sociologists continue to have little knowledge of critical
theory, few "straight" journals publish papers on the topic, and several of the
brightest and most prolific critical theorists (e.g., Piccone and Jacoby) have been
unable to acquire steady academic employment, despite strong scholarly creden-
tials. Critical theory contributes to sociology by addressing critically the ahistori-
cal elements of academic Marxism and by raising epistemological questions that
encourage greater reflection on the limits of empirical methodology. Ultimately,
however, the approach's vitality does not derive primarily from its status within
sociology. Instead, critical theory's eventual success or bankruptcy depends upon
its ability to sensitize Marxism to what is and is not historically possible and de-
sirable.
At present, critical theory is still in transition from its "dialectic of Enlighten-
ment" stage. The Telos circle calls for a reconstituted perspective that will ground
more adequately the project of "cultural revolution," while other critical theorists
(e.g., Negt and Kellner) imply that such a project requires more openness to
some components of orthodox Marxist thought (historical materialism and po-
litical economy) that are too handily rejected by those who stress total integration.
Though the debate over theory and capitalist integration is not likely to be re-
solved in the immediate future, emergent conditions (e.g., the consequences of
supply-side economics, Reaganism, and the New Federalism for the welfare state
and the late capitalist economy and culture) related to the disrupted economic
and political situation of the present historical conjuncture, require adjustments in
theoretical viewpoint and revised emancipatory tactics. Critical theory's ability to
meet these challenges should be aided by its sensitivity to history.
Conclusion: Critical Theory as a Distinctive Enterprise
Critical theory cannot be characterized by a particular set of methodological tech-

niques and theoretical propositions; however, it is still a coherent approach to the
social world that is separate from other types of sociology and Marxism. This fact
is obscured by the great diversity of studies in critical theory and by the loose
application of this term by some sociologists. Critical theory is sometimes used to
denote any radical position that rejects economism and scientism. Hence, some
sociologists claim to be "into critical theory" having read neither the works of the
Frankfurt school nor those by more recent critical theorists. But even knowledge
of a reasonable number of these works is an insufficient basis for such a claim.
The ability to "do critical theory" is not gained from a cookbook of techniques
and concepts. Instead, it emerges from an understanding of a network of methodo-
logical assumptions and a concern for certain substantive problems that are dis-
tinctive to Hegelian-Marxism.
Critical theory is based on meta-assumptions that derive from Hegel's dialec-
tics, modified by Marx's materialist critique (Hegel, 1967; Marx, 1964:170-93;
Schroyer, 1975:15-168; Antonio, 1981). Hegel's philosophy, which stresses im-
manent principles of contradiction, change, and movement, constitutes an alter-
native to the formal and static nature of Kantianism (the other pole of German
idealism that contributed strongly to the development of social science, e.g., We-

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berian thought). For Hegel, the nature of being is characterized by the subject
continuously creating, negating, and recreating itself and its object world. Through
labor, the subject not only makes history, but also produces a movement in his-
tory away from "self-estrangement" toward "freedom." In Hegel's thought, eman-
cipatory values are given an historical, rather than a transcendental, foundation.
The complexities of Hegelian dialectics cannot be expressed in a short summary,
but it should suffice to indicate that Marx's creative, historical, laboring subject
and his method of immanent critique were both shaped by his reading of Hegel,
particularly Hegel's (1967:229-40) analysis of "Lordship and Bondage." Marx-
ian dialectics is Hegelian thought stripped of its phenomenological idiom and re-
formulated in a materialist framework.
The dialectical method, which is based on the Hegelian-Marxian view of a crea-
tive, history-making subject, stresses historical factors, but is neither history nor
historical sociology. Though it focuses on historical facts and processes, its ulti-
mate aim is not historical description; but the location of contradictions and con-
ditions that contain emancipatory possibilities. In a dialectical analysis, "what
was" and "what is" are moments in an analysis of "what is coming to be" and,
most importantly, "what can be." The emphasis on future possibilities distin-
guishes it from positivism's tendency to reify existing social arrangements. On the
other hand, the values that define possible social structures belong to an immanent
contradiction between ideology and social reality, and any consideration of "what
can be" is mediated by a detailed analysis of existing material, cultural, social, and
political constraints. Thus, the historically determinate nature of dialectics distin-
guishes it from the arbitrariness, abstractness, and idealism of ahistorical utopian-
ism. A contemporary critical theory of society should be a dialectical rendering of
conditions favoring and constraining the achievement, in objective social relations,
of Enlightenment values of freedom, justice, and plenty (Wellmer, 1974:46-47).
This central thrust differentiates the approach from both scientific (orthodox)
Marxism and sociology.
Another defining attribute of critical theory is its location in the critical dia-
logue on Marxist theory. It differs from orthodox Marxist sociology and from the
official Marxism of state socialist regimes because it is based upon the idea that
emancipatory theory must be reevaluated in reaction to two obdurate historical/
empirical realities: (1) the absence of an emancipatory proletariat in capitalist
nations, and (2) the development of a totalitarian bureaucracy in state socialist
societies. According to critical theory, a Marxism that ignores these conditions
and maintains the guarantees of proletarian revolution in the West and democratic
socialism in the East constitutes a new metaphysics in materialist garb. The sub-
stance of critical theory reflects the need to make Marxist theory increasingly re-
sponsive to existing capitalism and existing state socialism. This broad task re-
quires not only elaboration of material and social conditions that foster or block
the development of a democratic and emancipated society (Leiss, 1974a:346),
but also necessitates the analysis of theories and other aspects of ideology and cul-
ture that contribute to the shaping of such possibilities. Thus, epistemological dis-
cussions of theoretical concepts that are carried out at a high level of abstraction
and culural analyses that focus on literature and art are important parts of the
historical readjustment and critique of Marxism. In fact, much of critical theory's
analysis of the "crisis of Marxism" is an epistemological and cultural critique.

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Critical Theory 345
Though it has been successful in demonstrating certain weaknesses of Marxism,

this approach could be strengthened by increasing the number of complementary
inquiries that focus more directly on the empirical constraints of material and
social life.
The combination of the dialectical meta-assumptions with a substantive focus
that confronts Marxist theory with contemporary historical realities, and on that
basis recasts the approach, constitutes the foundation of critical theory. This does
not provide a simple means for identifying an uncontested theoretical and empiri-
cal terrain that belongs exclusively to critical theory. Arguments to define such a
territory would have to be based upon a presumed unity of techniques and propo-
sitions and other professional boundary markers that characterize well established
sociological subareas, but not critical theory. Though its domain cannot be de-
marcated with pristine clarity, the core attributes mentioned above provide stud-
ies in critical theory with an identifiable texture and analytic style. Critical theory's
formulation of theoretical problems reflects its central, emancipatory value orien-
tation, and its substantive focus stresses possible forms of social organization and
possible types of social relations. Whereas critical theory is based on a common
value orientation and aims at the elaboration of emancipatory possibilities, sociol-
ogy is characterized by a plurality of value orientations and an emphasis on em-
pirical description and theoretical explanation of past and present forms of social
life. Despite the fact that emancipation serves as its valuative compass, critical
theory cannot be distinguished from sociology on the basis of standards of value
bias and value freedom. As Weber (1949:60-63, 76-79) points out, all social re-
search is guided ultimately by value orientations. Correct practice of critical the-
ory, just as for sociology, requires a phase of analysis, aiming at accurate empiri-
cal understanding. The success of this phase requires an attempt to minimize the
conflation of fact with value. The fundamental difference between the approaches
is on the level of value orientations that define research problems. Sociology leaves
this choice to the individual researcher, and, as a result, the discipline is character-
ized by a diversity of underlying value orientations. To the degree that some so-
ciologists treat the choice of a research problem as ethically neutral, they ignore
careful reflection about the value orientations of their work and adopt uncritically
those values that are implicit in their theories, their research traditions, and/or
those subscribed to by their granting agencies. The invocation of Weber's value
freedom by these sociologists is erroneous and ignores his point that critical, valu-
tive reflection ("value analysis") should precede the choice of research problem.
Critical theory differs from sociology in that critical theory is based upon a con-
scious commitment to emancipation: a value orientation that establishes a com-
mon set of problems, delineating the scope of research. Domination pervades
modern industrial society, so it follows that the need for emancipation is equally
broad. Thus, the substantive limits set by the common value orientation are
broad, permitting a variety of empirical foci, theoretical concepts, and analytic
techniques.
Critical theory is different from scientific Marxism because the latter does not
admit a "crisis of Marxism" (orthodox Marxists often consider this phrase to re-
flect an error in bourgeois thought, rather than their own inability to deal wtih
recent history), nor does it recast Marxist theory. Instead of focusing on issues
concerning the integration of the proletarian, state socialist domination, and other

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problems related to the missing transition to democratic socialism, scientific Marx-

ism retains most of the Marxist framework, and uses it to interpret contemporary
conditions. The application often results in a crudely revised, extremely material-
ist version of Marxism. In state socialist societies, Marxism often becomes pure
theory or is transformed into a systems approach which serves the administrative
structure. In these societies, critical, political economy is a dangerous enterprise
that threatens to expose the fact that the reigning bureaucracy is not leading a tran-
sition to socialism, but is the locus of stasis, waste, and domination (Konrad and
Szelenyi, 1979:245). Marxism in the service of the state apparatus differs from
critical theory because it abandons the value orientation of emancipation; official
Marxism is an ideology that serves bureaucratic domination directly. At the same
time, it conflates Marxist values and concepts with the empirical reality of state
socialist society. (Marxist theory is treated as an empirical description of the soci-
ety, without the support of empirical inquiry.) Unofficial forms of orthodox Marx-
ism, which lack direct connection to state socialist bureaucracy, are usually less
crude in their approaches, but often share some of the flaws of official Marxism
(though in milder form) and for that reason deserve criticism.
Though critical theory's impact has been primarily theoretical, the approach
includes a rich research tradition (e.g., Jay, 1973:113-172, 219-52). Contempo-
rary research will now be discussed to demonstrate that the core elements of criti-
cal theory can be applied in innovative studies. These may adopt sociological tech-
niques but, as a whole, remain distinct from conventional sociology. Comstock
and Fox (1982) portray "participatory research" as a type of critical theory prac-
tice that applies the method of immanent critique to local and regional domina-
tion. According to this approach, members of the communities under investiga-
tion should participate in the entire research process. The aim is self-clarification
of community values, needs, and projects. The researchers and subjects work to-
gether in the conceptualization, design, collection of data, data analysis, and pos-
ing of solutions to problems. Most importantly, the goal is not merely the produc-
tion of information, but the generation of a free public sphere of discussion and
debate that intensifies a community's consciousness of its problems and ultimately
generates self-mobilization to deal with them.
Comstock and Fox (1982) discussed the application of the participatory re-
search approach in a small Washington state town that was threatened by a U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers' water project. Though the townspeople were to be
moved, there was no plan to relocate the community. Fox and a team of student
researchers, working with the citizenry, carried out a multifaceted study of the
community and of the issue of relocation. The research made use of some conven-
tional sociological techniques (e.g., survey, participant observation, secondary
analysis of documents), but within the general framework of a critical theoretic
analysis. First, the approach was dialectical, stressing an active, creative subject
capable of rational intervention in a problematic social situation. Moreover, the
intervention was guided by an immanent critique that helped the community elab-
orate collectively its values and needs and determine the contradictions between
these ends and the plan that was being imposed on them by a powerful bureau-
cratic organization. The Army Corps was interested almost exclusively in the tech-
nical rationality of construction, not the substantively rational considerations re-

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Critical Theory 347
lated to community welfare. In short, the Army Corps' plan was designed to move
people and property, not to preserve the culture and social networks of the com-
munity. The participatory research caused the people to recognize that they val-
ued and desired to protect their community, increased their understanding of the
community's social structure, sensitized them to the threats to it, and stimulated
an awareness of the ways that it could be preserved.
Though this study did not address directly the global crisis of Marxism, it re-
flects the Hegelian-Marxist focus, stressing emancipation through the creation of
a public sphere that promotes social change through free communication and
democratic participation. As mentioned above, community members participated
in all phases of the research, and this collective work stimulated communication
in the context of local institutions, which became the basis for a democratic mo-
bilization. Because this approach engaged virtually the entire citizenry and insured
that they were well informed about the relocation issue, they were not outmaneu-
vered by the Army Corps' professionals. Citizen involvement in the relocation
issue raised Army Corps' fears about the erosion of their planning power and
cause them to offer their own design for relocating the community. However, the
local people chose to retain this power and were successful at organizing socially
and politically to overcome some of the most threatening conditions of the dis-
placement. Ultimately they instituted their own plan with favorable terms for re-
location. Comstock and Fox (1982:30) explained that the participatory research
helped the community discover and create "the possibilities for a shift in power."
In short, it was a catalyst for an indigenous community project; it did not institute
a bureaucratic plan from "above." For this reason, the research succeeded in the
creation and preservation of social structures in a manner that was consistent with
critical theory, rather than in the centralized fashion of bureaucratic capitalism or
orthodox Marxism.
The study mentioned above is only one possible type of research based on a
critical theory framework. Though many of the techniques used in the study have
been employed frequently in sociology, the study bears the imprint of meta-as-
sumptions and a concern for substantive problems that distinguish it from con-
ventional empirical studies. Research of a more traditional and less action-ori-
ented nature has also been carried out by critical theorists. For example, the
Ewens (1976, 1978, 1982) have studied advertising, fashion, and the develop-
ment of consumer culture in the 20th century United States. Their theoretical
framework argues that these cultural elements contribute to capitalist integration
by deflecting progressive social change. The Ewens' work employs historical
methods of analysis, but in a dialectical framework that focuses substantively on
cultural forces that block the development of a more democratic society. Though
the work stresses the issue of integration in a concrete, empirical fashion and
does not offer a plan for change, its critical approach implies the need for nega-
tions in the cultural sphere (the transformation of consumer culture) that would
permit the development of the collective subjectivity necessary for progressive
change. The Ewens' work demonstrates that such a transformation requires an
overcoming of the illusion of change created by corporate-administered con-
sumer lifestyles, where freedom is conflated mistakenly with centrally planned
and proffered types of consumption. Most importantly, these theoretic issues

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are communicated through analyses of documents and historical descriptions

that are similar to conventional historical studies, but in a framework of assump-
tions and in the context of substantive problems that make the outcome quite
unconventional.
Critical theory, despite its marginality, should not be considered foreign or con-
tradictory to the sociological enterprise. Its empirical phase is a necessary element
that distinguishes it from the types of Marxism it rejects. Critical theory requires
adequate empirical grounding that can be assured only by the maintenance of a
continuous conversation between theoretical concepts and historical processes.
The issue of emancipation must be rethought in the context of objective ideologi-
cal, material, and social constraints. It is unfortunate that the extreme antiposi-
tivism of certain critical theorists sometimes causes them to ignore techniques and
ideas from sociology (and historical materialism) that could contribute to the
empirical dimension of their project. Though critical theory should neither em-
brace positivist methods uncritically nor fuse with sociology, it should be open to
those techniques that can be harmonized with the dialectical method as well as be
useful for collecting and analyzing data necessary for the empirical moment of im-
manent critique (Kilminster, 1979:240-69). The first generation of critical theo-
rists (most of whom were trained in philosophy, not sociology), though they
stressed the importance of history, did not go far enough in incorporating concrete
historical and empirical work into their analyses. Their philosophical training and
overly broad definition of positivism caused some of their theoretical work to rely
upon less than adequate empirical/historical grounding. Perhaps some of the ex-
cesses of the "dialectic of Enlightenment" argument could have been avoided had
its empirical moment been enlarged. (Contradictory cultural elements might have
been discovered if this phase of critical theory had looked more closely at history,
especially in the long term.) The younger generation of critical theorists frequent-
ly has formal training in sociology and is sometimes more open to empirical and
historical research methods. The injection of some sociology into critical theory,
and vice versa, should be beneficial and enriching to both enterprises. Adequate
emphasis on the empirical phase is one means of preventing the normative thrust
in Marxism from degenerating into dogmatic ideology. Richard Kilminster (1979:
269) argued, in a playful reversal of Marx' famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach,
that: "The Leninists have only imposed change on the world; the point, however,
is to understand it."
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The Origin, Development, and Contemporary Status of Critical Theory

Author(s): Robert J. Antonio

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106182

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The Origin, Development, and Contemporary

Robert J. Antonio, University of Kansas

01983 by The Sociological Quarterly. All rights reserved. 0038-0253/83/1400-0325$00.75

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Critical Theory: Definition and Origin

Since it is not a fixed body of conceptual knowledge, adequate description of criti-

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The Early Frankfurt School and Critical Theory

Lukacs argued that subjectivity is "annihilated" by "commodity production"

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Rather than attempting a radically condensed summary of the diverse

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and pseudo-scientific Marxism, depends upon an understanding of the changing

Critical theory is concerned with contradictions between ideology and reality.

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nent (historically based) emancipatory ends and demystifying reifications that

Capitalist Integration: The Rise of One-Dimensional Society

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277-78; Marcuse, 1972, 1978)-was being displaced by conformist mass cul-

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ward movement of labor unions, hysterical anticommunism, and a general si-

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Contemporary Critical Theory: Habermas

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generated by social evolution and mediated by collective actions that originate in

Contemporary Critical Theory: The Continuing Debate

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Neither Marxist Science nor Sociology: Critical Theory's Place

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Marcuse: "... but not the fault of critical theory."

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achieves full status as a subdiscipline and is absorbed into sociology, it will be

Conclusion: Critical Theory as a Distinctive Enterprise

Critical theory cannot be characterized by a particular set of methodological tech-

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Though it has been successful in demonstrating certain weaknesses of Marxism,

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problems related to the missing transition to democratic socialism, scientific Marx-

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are communicated through analyses of documents and historical descriptions

Adorno, Theodor W. 1973. Negative Dialectics. New York: Seabury Press.

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- . 1981-82. "Empire vs. civil society: Poland 1981-82." Telos 50:19-48.

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1974. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Seabury Press.

- . 1981. Dialectic of Defeat. New York: Cambridge University Press.

1. 1967. Capital. Vol. 1. New York: International Publishers.

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- . 1973. Grundrisse. New York: Vintage Books.

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