ML14100A493

GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy
26A6641AB
Revision 10
April 2014
ESBWR Design Control Document

Tier 1
Copyright 2005, 2014, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC
All Rights Reserved
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
NOTICE
The design, engineering, and other information contained in this document is furnished by GE-
Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC (GEH) for the purpose of supporting the GEH
application to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certification of the
ESBWR nuclear plant design pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52.
No use of or right to copy any of the information contained in this document, other than by the
NRC and its contractors in support of GEH application, is authorized except by contract with
GEH. The information provided in this document is part of and dependent upon a larger set of
knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights pertaining to standardized, nuclear
powered, electric generating facilities that utilize the design certification, as designed and
certified to U.S. Codes, Standards, and Regulations by GEH, and referred to as the ESBWR
nuclear power plant design. Without access and a GEH grant of rights to that larger set of
knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights, this document is not practically or
rightfully usable by others, except by the NRC or through contractual agreements with
Combined License Applicants and Licensees or customers and participating utilities.
This document contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI) related to the
physical protection of an ESBWR Nuclear Plant pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d).
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
Contents
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1.1-1

1.1 Definitions and General Provisions ............................................................................................ 1.1-1
1.1.1 Definitions ........................................................................................................................ 1.1-1
1.1.2 General Provisions ............................................................................................................ 1.1-6
1.1.2.1 Treatment of Individual Items ................................................................................. 1.1-6
1.1.2.2 Implementation of ITAAC ...................................................................................... 1.1-6
1.1.2.3 Discussion of Matters Related to Operations .......................................................... 1.1-7
1.1.2.4 Interpretation of Figures .......................................................................................... 1.1-7
1.1.2.5 Rated Reactor Core Thermal Power ........................................................................ 1.1-7
1.2 Figure Legend............................................................................................................................. 1.2-1
1.3 Table Legend .............................................................................................................................. 1.3-1
1.4 Design Acceptance Criteria ........................................................................................................ 1.4-1
2. Design Descriptions And ITAAC ......................................................................................... 1.4-1
2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply ................................................................................................................ 2.1-1
2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals .............................................................................. 2.1-1
2.1.2 Nuclear Boiler System .................................................................................................... 2.1-14
2.2 Instrumentation and Control Systems ........................................................................................ 2.2-1
2.2.1 Rod Control and Information System ............................................................................... 2.2-1
2.2.2 Control Rod Drive System .............................................................................................. 2.2-15
2.2.3 Feedwater Control System .............................................................................................. 2.2-39
2.2.4 Standby Liquid Control System ...................................................................................... 2.2-46
2.2.5 Neutron Monitoring System ........................................................................................... 2.2-72
2.2.6 Remote Shutdown System .............................................................................................. 2.2-78
2.2.7 Reactor Protection System .............................................................................................. 2.2-82
2.2.8 Plant Automation System ............................................................................................... 2.2-89
2.2.9 Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System ................................................................... 2.2-90
2.2.10 Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System ....................................... 2.2-94
2.2.11 Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Information System ................................. 2.2-96
2.2.12 Leak Detection and Isolation System............................................................................ 2.2-98
2.2.13 Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control .................................. 2.2-110
2.2.14 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls ........................................................................ 2.2-116
2.2.15 Instrumentation & Control Compliance With IEEE Std. 603 ..................................... 2.2-125
2.2.16 High Pressure Control Rod Drive Isolation Bypass Function Independent Control
Platform .............................................................................................................. 2.2-187
2.3 Radiation Monitoring Systems ................................................................................................... 2.3-1
2.3.1 Process Radiation Monitoring System .............................................................................. 2.3-1
2.3.2 Area Radiation Monitoring System ................................................................................ 2.3-12
2.4 Core Cooling Systems Used For Abnormal Events ................................................................... 2.4-1
2.4.1 Isolation Condenser System .............................................................................................. 2.4-1
2.4.2 Emergency Core Cooling System - Gravity-Driven Cooling System ............................ 2.4-29
2.5 Reactor Servicing Equipment ..................................................................................................... 2.5-1
2.5.1 Fuel Service Equipment .................................................................................................... 2.5-2
2.5.2 Miscellaneous Service Equipment .................................................................................... 2.5-3
2.5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel Servicing Equipment ................................................................. 2.5-4
2.5.4 RPV Internals Servicing Equipment ................................................................................. 2.5-5
2.5.5 Refueling Equipment ........................................................................................................ 2.5-6
2.5.6 Fuel Storage Facility ....................................................................................................... 2.5-12
2.5.7 Under-Vessel Servicing Equipment ................................................................................ 2.5-16
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2.5.8 FMCRD Maintenance Area ............................................................................................ 2.5-17

2.5.9 Fuel Cask Cleaning ......................................................................................................... 2.5-18
2.5.10 Fuel Transfer System .................................................................................................... 2.5-19
2.5.11 (Deleted) ....................................................................................................................... 2.5-23
2.5.12 (Deleted) ....................................................................................................................... 2.5-24
2.6 Reactor And Containment Auxiliary Systems............................................................................ 2.6-1
2.6.1 Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System ......................................................... 2.6-1
2.6.2 Fuel And Auxiliary Pools Cooling System ..................................................................... 2.6-17
2.7 (Deleted) ..................................................................................................................................... 2.7-1
2.7.1 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................................... 2.7-1
2.7.2 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................................... 2.7-1
2.7.3 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................................... 2.7-1
2.8 (Deleted) ..................................................................................................................................... 2.8-1
2.8.1 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................................... 2.8-1
2.8.2 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................................... 2.8-2
2.9 (Deleted) ..................................................................................................................................... 2.9-1
2.10 Radioactive Waste Management System ............................................................................... 2.10-1
2.10.1 Liquid Waste Management System .............................................................................. 2.10-1
2.10.2 Solid Waste Management System................................................................................. 2.10-5
2.10.3 Gaseous Waste Management System ........................................................................... 2.10-8
2.11 Power Cycle ........................................................................................................................... 2.11-1
2.11.1 Turbine Main Steam System ......................................................................................... 2.11-1
2.11.2 Condensate and Feedwater System ............................................................................. 2.11-12
2.11.3 Condensate Purification System ................................................................................. 2.11-16
2.11.4 Main Turbine .............................................................................................................. 2.11-17
2.11.5 Turbine Gland Seal System ........................................................................................ 2.11-22
2.11.6 Turbine Bypass System............................................................................................... 2.11-25
2.11.7 Main Condenser .......................................................................................................... 2.11-28
2.11.8 Circulating Water System ........................................................................................... 2.11-30
2.11.9 Power Cycle Auxiliary Systems ................................................................................. 2.11-31
2.12 Auxiliary Systems .................................................................................................................. 2.12-1
2.12.1 Makeup Water System .................................................................................................. 2.12-1
2.12.2 Condensate Storage and Transfer System ..................................................................... 2.12-3
2.12.3 Reactor Component Cooling Water System ................................................................. 2.12-4
2.12.4 Turbine Component Cooling Water System ................................................................. 2.12-7
2.12.5 Chilled Water System ................................................................................................... 2.12-8
2.12.6 Oxygen Injection System ............................................................................................ 2.12-11
2.12.7 Plant Service Water System ........................................................................................ 2.12-12
2.12.8 Service Air System ..................................................................................................... 2.12-15
2.12.9 Instrument Air System ................................................................................................ 2.12-17
2.12.10 High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System .................................................................... 2.12-18
2.12.11 Auxiliary Boiler System ........................................................................................... 2.12-20
2.12.12 Potable Water and Sanitary Waste ............................................................................ 2.12-21
2.12.13 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System ......................................................................... 2.12-22
2.12.14 Process Sampling System ......................................................................................... 2.12-23
2.12.15 Zinc Injection System ............................................................................................... 2.12-24
2.12.16 Freeze Protection ...................................................................................................... 2.12-25
2.12.17 Station Water System ................................................................................................ 2.12-26
2.13 Electrical Systems .................................................................................................................. 2.13-1
2.13.1 Electric Power Distribution System .............................................................................. 2.13-1
2.13.2 (Deleted) ..................................................................................................................... 2.13-18
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2.13.3 Direct Current Power Supply ...................................................................................... 2.13-19

2.13.4 Standby Onsite AC Power Supply .............................................................................. 2.13-34
2.13.5 Uninterruptible AC Power Supply .............................................................................. 2.13-42
2.13.6 (Deleted) ..................................................................................................................... 2.13-52
2.13.7 Communications System ............................................................................................ 2.13-53
2.13.8 Lighting Power Supply ............................................................................................... 2.13-55
2.13.9 Grounding and Lightning Protection System.............................................................. 2.13-59
2.14 Power Transmission ............................................................................................................... 2.14-1
2.15 Containment, Cooling and Environmental Control Systems.................................................. 2.15-1
2.15.1 Containment System ..................................................................................................... 2.15-1
2.15.2 Containment Vessel .................................................................................................... 2.15-37
2.15.3 Containment Internal Structures ................................................................................. 2.15-38
2.15.4 Passive Containment Cooling System ........................................................................ 2.15-43
2.15.5 Containment Inerting System ..................................................................................... 2.15-54
2.15.6 Drywell Cooling System ............................................................................................. 2.15-57
2.15.7 Containment Monitoring System ................................................................................ 2.15-59
2.15.8 Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner.............................................................................. 2.15-68
2.16 Structures and Servicing Systems/Equipment ........................................................................ 2.16-1
2.16.1 Cranes, Hoists and Elevators ........................................................................................ 2.16-1
2.16.2 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning ................................................................... 2.16-6
2.16.2.1 Reactor Building HVAC ..................................................................................... 2.16-6
2.16.2.2 Control Building HVAC System ......................................................................... 2.16-7
2.16.2.3 Emergency Filter Units ....................................................................................... 2.16-9
2.16.2.4 Turbine Building HVAC System ...................................................................... 2.16-10
2.16.2.5 Fuel Building HVAC System ............................................................................ 2.16-10
2.16.2.6 Radwaste Building HVAC System ................................................................... 2.16-11
2.16.2.7 Electrical Building HVAC System .................................................................... 2.16-11
2.16.2.8 Other Building HVAC Systems ........................................................................ 2.16-12
2.16.3 Fire Protection System ................................................................................................ 2.16-45
2.16.3.1 Fire Barriers ....................................................................................................... 2.16-53
2.16.4 Equipment and Floor Drain System ............................................................................ 2.16-57
2.16.5 Reactor Building ......................................................................................................... 2.16-59
2.16.6 Control Building ......................................................................................................... 2.16-89
2.16.7 Fuel Building ............................................................................................................ 2.16-104
2.16.8 Turbine Building ....................................................................................................... 2.16-121
2.16.9 Radwaste Building .................................................................................................... 2.16-124
2.16.10 Service Building...................................................................................................... 2.16-127
2.16.11 Ancillary Diesel Building ....................................................................................... 2.16-129
2.16.12 Fire Water Service Complex ................................................................................... 2.16-132
2.16.13 Electrical Building .................................................................................................. 2.16-135
2.16.14 Service Water Building ........................................................................................... 2.16-138
2.17 Intake Structure and Servicing Equipment ............................................................................. 2.17-1
2.17.1 Intake and Discharge Structure ..................................................................................... 2.17-1
2.18 Yard Structures and Equipment.............................................................................................. 2.18-1
2.18.1 Oil Storage and Transfer Systems ................................................................................. 2.18-1
2.18.2 Site Security .................................................................................................................. 2.18-2
2.19 Plant Security System ............................................................................................................. 2.19-1
3. Non-System Based Material ............................................................................................... 2.19-1
3.1 Design of piping systems and components ................................................................................ 3.1-1
3.2 Software Development ............................................................................................................... 3.2-1
3.3 Human Factors Engineering ....................................................................................................... 3.3-1
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.4 Radiation Protection ................................................................................................................... 3.4-1

3.5 Initial Test Program .................................................................................................................... 3.5-1
3.6 Design Reliability Assurance Program ...................................................................................... 3.6-1
3.7 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ................................................................................ 3.7-1
3.8 Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment ................ 3.8-1
4. Interface Material .................................................................................................................. 3.8-1
4.1 Plant Service Water System ....................................................................................................... 4.1-1
4.2 Offsite Power .............................................................................................................................. 4.2-2
5. Site Parameters...................................................................................................................... 4.2-1
5.1 Scope and Purpose...................................................................................................................... 5.1-1
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
List of Tables
Table 2.1.1-1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Mechanical Equipment ........................ 2.1-3
Table 2.1.1-2 Key Dimensions of RPV Components and Acceptable Variations................... 2.1-4
Table 2.1.1-3 ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals .................................... 2.1-5
Table 2.1.2-1 Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment .............................................. 2.1-18
Table 2.1.2-2 Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment .................................................. 2.1-22
Table 2.1.2-3 ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System .......................................................... 2.1-24
Table 2.2.1-1 RC&IS Functional Arrangement ....................................................................... 2.2-2
Table 2.2.1-2 RC&IS Major Functional Groups ..................................................................... 2.2-3
Table 2.2.1-3 RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems . 2.2-7
Table 2.2.1-4 RC&IS Rod Block Functions ............................................................................ 2.2-9
Table 2.2.1-5 RC&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ..................................................... 2.2-11
Table 2.2.1-6 ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System................................... 2.2-12
Table 2.2.2-1 CRD System Functional Arrangement ............................................................ 2.2-18
Table 2.2.2-2 CRD Maximum Allowable Scram Times for Vessel Bottom Pressures Below
7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) ............................................................................... 2.2-19
Table 2.2.2-3 CRD System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
....................................................................................................................... 2.2-20
Table 2.2.2-4 CRD System Controls and Interlocks.............................................................. 2.2-21
Table 2.2.2-5 Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment ........................................ 2.2-24
Table 2.2.2-6 Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment ........................................... 2.2-26
Table 2.2.2-7 ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System ................................................... 2.2-28
Table 2.2.3-1 FWCS Functional Arrangement ...................................................................... 2.2-40
Table 2.2.3-2 FWCS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems 2.2-41
Table 2.2.3-3 FWCS Controls ............................................................................................... 2.2-42
Table 2.2.3-4 ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System ................................................... 2.2-43
Table 2.2.4-1 (Deleted) .......................................................................................................... 2.2-49
Table 2.2.4-2 SLC System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
....................................................................................................................... 2.2-50
Table 2.2.4-3 SLC System Controls and Interlocks .............................................................. 2.2-51
Table 2.2.4-4 SLC System Mechanical Equipment ............................................................... 2.2-52
Table 2.2.4-5 SLC System Electrical Equipment .................................................................. 2.2-57
Table 2.2.4-6 ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System ........................................... 2.2-60
Table 2.2.5-1 NMS Functional Arrangement ........................................................................ 2.2-73
Table 2.2.5-2 NMS Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems .................... 2.2-74
Table 2.2.5-3 NMS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ........................................................ 2.2-75
Table 2.2.5-4 ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System ................................................. 2.2-76
Table 2.2.6-1 RSS Functional Arrangement .......................................................................... 2.2-79
Table 2.2.6-2 RSS Controls ................................................................................................... 2.2-80
Table 2.2.6-3 ITAAC For The Remote Shutdown System .................................................... 2.2-81
Table 2.2.7-1 RPS Functional Arrangement .......................................................................... 2.2-83
Table 2.2.7-2 RPS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems .... 2.2-84
Table 2.2.7-3 RPS Controls, Interlocks (System Interfaces), and Bypasses ......................... 2.2-85
Table 2.2.7-4 ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System ................................................... 2.2-86
Table 2.2.9-1 SB&PC System Functional Arrangement ....................................................... 2.2-91
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Table 2.2.9-2 SB&PC System Functions and Initiating Conditions ...................................... 2.2-91
Table 2.2.9-3 ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System ........................ 2.2-92
Table 2.2.10-1 Q-DCIS Platforms ......................................................................................... 2.2-95
Table 2.2.11-1 N-DCIS Network Segments .......................................................................... 2.2-97
Table 2.2.12-1 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.2-100
Table 2.2.12-2 LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables ......................................... 2.2-101
Table 2.2.12-3 LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables ............................................ 2.2-104
Table 2.2.12-4 LD&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ................................................. 2.2-107
Table 2.2.12-5 ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System ............................... 2.2-108
Table 2.2.13-1 SSLC/ESF Functional Arrangement ........................................................... 2.2-111
Table 2.2.13-2 SSLC/ESF Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing
Systems ........................................................................................................ 2.2-112
Table 2.2.13-3 SSLC/ESF Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ........................................... 2.2-113
Table 2.2.13-4 ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control
(SSLC/ESF) ................................................................................................. 2.2-114
Table 2.2.14-1 Diverse Instrumentation and Control Systems Functional Arrangement .... 2.2-118
Table 2.2.14-2 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing
Systems 1 ..................................................................................................... 2.2-119
Table 2.2.14-3 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls Controls, Interlocks and Bypasses1 2.2-121
Table 2.2.14-4 ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls .............................. 2.2-122
Table 2.2.15-1 IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2) ......................... 2.2-139
Table 2.2.15-2 ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation ............................... 2.2-142
Table 2.2.16-1 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Functional Arrangement............. 2.2-188
Table 2.2.16-2 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Automatic Functions, Initiators,
and Associated Interfacing Systems ............................................................ 2.2-189
Table 2.2.16-3 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Controls, Interlocks, and
Bypasses ...................................................................................................... 2.2-190
Table 2.2.16-4 ITAAC For The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP .......................... 2.2-191
Table 2.3.1-1 Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1) .................................. 2.3-3
Table 2.3.1-2 ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System ................................... 2.3-7
Table 2.3.2-1 ARM Locations ............................................................................................... 2.3-13
Table 2.3.2-2 ITAAC For Area Radiation Monitoring System .............................................. 2.3-16
Table 2.4.1-1 ICS Mechanical Equipment ............................................................................... 2.4-5
Table 2.4.1-2 ICS Electrical Equipment ................................................................................ 2.4-11
Table 2.4.1-3 ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System ................................................. 2.4-15
Table 2.4.2-1 GDCS Mechanical Equipment ......................................................................... 2.4-32
Table 2.4.2-2 GDCS Electrical Equipment............................................................................ 2.4-40
Table 2.4.2-3 ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven
Cooling System ............................................................................................. 2.4-46
Table 2.5.5-1 ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment .............................................................. 2.5-7
Table 2.5.6-1 ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility............................................................. 2.5-13
Table 2.5.10-1 ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System .......................................................... 2.5-20
Table 2.6.1-1 Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System.......................................... 2.6-3
Table 2.6.1-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System............. 2.6-10
Table 2.6.2-1 FAPCS Mechanical Equipment ....................................................................... 2.6-19
Table 2.6.2-2 ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System ........................... 2.6-24
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Table 2.10.1-1 Major Equipment in LWMS .......................................................................... 2.10-2

Table 2.10.1-2 ITAAC For The Liquid Waste Management System .................................... 2.10-4
Table 2.10.2-1 SWMS Tanks Nominal Capacity (Volume) ................................................... 2.10-6
Table 2.10.2-2 ITAAC For Solid Waste Management System .............................................. 2.10-7
Table 2.10.3-1 ITAAC For The Gaseous Waste Management System ................................. 2.10-9
Table 2.11.1-1 ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System .............................................. 2.11-3
Table 2.11.2-1 ITAAC For The Condensate and Feedwater System .................................. 2.11-13
Table 2.11.4-1 Additional Equipment Protected from Turbine Missiles............................. 2.11-18
Table 2.11.4-2 ITAAC For The Main Turbine .................................................................... 2.11-19
Table 2.11.5-1 ITAAC For The Turbine Gland Seal System .............................................. 2.11-23
Table 2.11.6-1 ITAAC For The Turbine Bypass System .................................................... 2.11-26
Table 2.11.7-1 ITAAC For The Main Condenser................................................................ 2.11-29
Table 2.12.1-1 (Deleted) ........................................................................................................ 2.12-2
Table 2.12.3-1 ITAAC For The Reactor Component Cooling Water System....................... 2.12-5
Table 2.12.5-1 ITAAC For The Chilled Water System ......................................................... 2.12-9
Table 2.12.7-1 ITAAC For The Plant Service Water System ............................................. 2.12-13
Table 2.12.8-1 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.12-16
Table 2.12.10-1 (Deleted) .................................................................................................... 2.12-19
Table 2.13.1-1 Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment ......................................... 2.13-4
Table 2.13.1-2 ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System ................................... 2.13-8
Table 2.13.3-1 Direct Current Power Supply System Equipment ....................................... 2.13-21
Table 2.13.3-2 Direct Current Power Supply Equipment Displays/Status Indication ......... 2.13-24
Table 2.13.3-3 ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply ........................................... 2.13-26
Table 2.13.4-1 Equipment Location .................................................................................... 2.13-36
Table 2.13.4-2 ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply .................................. 2.13-37
Table 2.13.5-1 Uninterruptible AC Power Soppy System Equipment ................................ 2.13-44
Table 2.13.5-2 ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply ................................... 2.13-45
Table 2.13.7-1 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.13-54
Table 2.13.8-1 ITAAC For The Lighting Power Supply ..................................................... 2.13-56
Table 2.13.9-1 ITAAC For The Grounding and Lightning Protection System ................... 2.13-60
Table 2.15.1-1a Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment ..................................... 2.15-4
Table 2.15.1-1b Containment Mechanical Equipment ......................................................... 2.15-15
Table 2.15.1-1c Electrical Equipment ................................................................................. 2.15-16
Table 2.15.1-1d Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times ............. 2.15-17
Table 2.15.1-2 ITAAC For The Containment System ......................................................... 2.15-22
Table 2.15.3-1 Containment Internal Structures Locations ................................................. 2.15-39
Table 2.15.3-2 ITAAC For The Containment Internal Structures ....................................... 2.15-40
Table 2.15.4-1 Passive Containment Cooling System Mechanical Equipment................... 2.15-45
Table 2.15.4-2 ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System .............................. 2.15-46
Table 2.15.5-1 Containment Inerting System Electrical Equipment .................................... 2.15-55
Table 2.15.5-2 ITAAC For The Containment Inerting System ........................................... 2.15-56
Table 2.15.6-1 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.15-58
Table 2.15.6-2 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.15-58
Table 2.15.7-1 Containment Monitoring System Electrical Equipment.............................. 2.15-61
Table 2.15.7-2 ITAAC For The Containment Monitoring System ...................................... 2.15-64
Table 2.15.8-1 ITAAC For The Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner .................................... 2.15-69
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Table 2.16.1-1 ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators ..................................................... 2.16-2
Table 2.16.2-1 Reactor Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment ..................... 2.16-13
Table 2.16.2-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC .................................................. 2.16-14
Table 2.16.2-3 Control Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment ..................... 2.16-19
Table 2.16.2-4 ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem ............ 2.16-20
Table 2.16.2-5 Emergency Filter Units................................................................................ 2.16-25
Table 2.16.2-6 ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units..................................................... 2.16-26
Table 2.16.2-7 ITAAC For The Turbine Building Ventilation System ............................... 2.16-30
Table 2.16.2-8 Fuel Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment........................... 2.16-31
Table 2.16.2-9 ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC ........................................................ 2.16-32
Table 2.16.2-10 ITAAC For The Electrical Building Ventilation System .......................... 2.16-34
Table 2.16.3-1 Fire Protection System Equipment .............................................................. 2.16-46
Table 2.16.3-2 ITAAC For The Fire Protection System ..................................................... 2.16-47
Table 2.16.3.1-1 ITAAC For Fire Barriers .......................................................................... 2.16-54
Table 2.16.4-1 ITAAC For The Equipment and Floor Drain System ................................. 2.16-58
Table 2.16.5-1 Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1 ....................................... 2.16-62
Table 2.16.5-1 Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 2 ....................................... 2.16-71
Table 2.16.5-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building ............................................................... 2.16-72
Table 2.16.5-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building ............................................................... 2.16-77
Table 2.16.6-1 Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 1 ....................................... 2.16-91
Table 2.16.6-1 Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 2 ....................................... 2.16-93
Table 2.16.6-2 ITAAC For Control Building ...................................................................... 2.16-94
Table 2.16.7-1 Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1 .......................................... 2.16-106
Table 2.16.7-1 Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 2 .......................................... 2.16-109
Table 2.16.7-2 ITAAC For The Fuel Building .................................................................. 2.16-110
Table 2.16.8-1 ITAAC For The Turbine Building ............................................................. 2.16-122
Table 2.16.9-1 ITAAC For The Radwaste Building........................................................... 2.16-125
Table 2.16.10-1 ITAAC For The Service Building ............................................................ 2.16-128
Table 2.16.11-1 ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building .............................................. 2.16-130
Table 2.16.12-1 ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex ........................................... 2.16-133
Table 2.16.13-1 ITAAC For The Electrical Building ......................................................... 2.16-136
Table 2.16.14-1 ITAAC For The Service Water Building ................................................. 2.16-139
Table 2.19-1 ITAAC For The Plant Security......................................................................... 2.19-3
Table 3.1-1 ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components.............................. 3.1-2
Table 3.3-1a Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls ........................... 3.3-4
Table 3.3-1b Minimum Inventory of RSS Alarms, Displays, and Controls ............................. 3.3-6
Table 3.3-2 ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering ............................................................. 3.3-7
Table 3.4-1 ITAAC For Radiation Protection ......................................................................... 3.4-2
Table 3.6-1 ITAAC For The Design Reliability Assurance Program ..................................... 3.6-2
Table 3.7-1 ITAAC For Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ...................................... 3.7-4
Table 3.8-1 Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification .............. 3.8-2
Table 3.8-2 ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and
Electrical Equipment ..................................................................................... 3.8-15
Table 5.1-1 Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (1) ..................................... 5.1-2
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
List of Illustrations
Figure 1.1.1-1 RPV Water Level Range Definition ................................................................ 1.1-8

Figure 1.2-2. Legend for Tier 1 Electrical System Diagrams .................................................. 1.2-3
Figure 2.1.1-1. Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Key Features Layout ........................ 2.1-12
Figure 2.1.1-2. Fuel Bundle, Neutron Sources, Neutron Detectors and Control Rod Functional
Arrangement .................................................................................................. 2.1-13
Figure 2.1.2-1. Safety Relief Valves, Depressurization Valves and Steamline Diagram ...... 2.1-37
Figure 2.1.2-2. NBS Steamlines and Feedwater Lines .......................................................... 2.1-38
Figure 2.1.2-3. Safety Relief Valve Discharge Line Quencher Arrangement ....................... 2.1-39
Figure 2.2.1-1. (Deleted) ........................................................................................................ 2.2-14
Figure 2.2.2-1. Control Rod Drive System ............................................................................ 2.2-38
Figure 2.2.3-1. (Deleted) ........................................................................................................ 2.2-45
Figure 2.2.4-1. Standby Liquid Control System Simplified Diagram ................................... 2.2-71
Figure 2.2.7-1. RPS Functional Arrangement ........................................................................ 2.2-88
Figure 2.3.1-1. Process Radiation Monitoring System Diagram ........................................ 2.3-11
Figure 2.4.1-1. Isolation Condenser System Schematic ........................................................ 2.4-28
Figure 2.4.2-1. Gravity-Driven Cooling System ................................................................... 2.4-56
Figure 2.6.1-1. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System ..................................... 2.6-16
Figure 2.6.2-1. Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System .................................................... 2.6-33
Figure 2.11.1-1. TMSS Functional Arrangement .................................................................. 2.11-9
Figure 2.11.1-2. High Pressure Turbine Exhaust Functional Arrangement ........................ 2.11-10
Figure 2.11.1-3. Extraction Steam Functional Arrangement ............................................... 2.11-11
Figure 2.11.5-1. Turbine Gland Seal System Arrangement................................................. 2.11-24
Figure 2.12.3-1. Reactor Component Cooling Water System Functional Arrangement ....... 2.12-6
Figure 2.12.5-1. NICWS Functional Arrangement .............................................................. 2.12-10
Figure 2.12.7-1. Plant Service Water System Functional Arrangement .............................. 2.12-14
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 1. Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement........... 2.13-16
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 2. Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement........... 2.13-17
Figure 2.13.3-1. Safety-Related 250 VDC System Functional Arrangement...................... 2.13-31
Figure 2.13.3-2 Sh 1. Nonsafety-Related 250 VDC System Functional Arrangement ....... 2.13-32
Figure 2.13.3-2 Sh 2. Nonsafety-Related 125 VDC System Functional Arrangement ....... 2.13-33
Figure 2.13.5-1. Safety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement .............................. 2.13-49
Figure 2.13.5-2 Sh 2 Nonsafety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement ................. 2.13-51
Figure 2.15.1-1. Containment System ................................................................................. 2.15-36
Figure 2.15.3-1. Containment Internal Structures ............................................................... 2.15-42
Figure 2.15.4-1. Passive Containment Cooling System Schematic ..................................... 2.15-53
Figure 2.15.7-1. Containment Monitoring System Functional Arrangement ...................... 2.15-67
Figure 2.16.2-1. CLAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram (Typical Train A/B) ............. 2.16-35
Figure 2.16.2-2. CONAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram (Typical Train A/B) .......... 2.16-36
Figure 2.16.2-3. REPAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................................ 2.16-37
Figure 2.16.2-4. CRHAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ........................................... 2.16-38
Figure 2.16.2-5a. CBGAVS (Set A) Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................. 2.16-39
Figure 2.16.2-5b. CBGAVS (Set B) Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................. 2.16-40
Figure 2.16.2-6. TBVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ................................................. 2.16-41
Figure 2.16.2-7. FBGAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................................ 2.16-42
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-8. FBFPVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................................. 2.16-43

Figure 2.16.2-9. EBVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ................................................. 2.16-44
Figure 2.16.3-1. Fire Protection System .............................................................................. 2.16-52
Figure 2.16.5-1. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –11500 .................................................. 2.16-78
Figure 2.16.5-2. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –6400 .................................................... 2.16-79
Figure 2.16.5-3. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –1000 .................................................... 2.16-80
Figure 2.16.5-4. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650 ...................................................... 2.16-81
Figure 2.16.5-5. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 9060 ...................................................... 2.16-82
Figure 2.16.5-6. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 13570 .................................................... 2.16-83
Figure 2.16.5-10. RB Concrete Outline N-S Section........................................................... 2.16-87
Figure 2.16.5-11. RB Concrete Outline E-W Section ......................................................... 2.16-88
Figure 2.16.6-1. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –7400 .................................................... 2.16-99
Figure 2.16.6-2. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –2000 .................................................. 2.16-100
Figure 2.16.6-3. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650 .................................................... 2.16-101
Figure 2.16.6-4. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 9060 .................................................... 2.16-102
Figure 2.16.6-5. CB Concrete Outline E-W Section ......................................................... 2.16-103
Figure 2.16.7-1. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –11500................................................. 2.16-115
Figure 2.16.7-2. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –6400................................................... 2.16-116
Figure 2.16.7-3. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –1000................................................... 2.16-117
Figure 2.16.7-4. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650..................................................... 2.16-118
Figure 2.16.7-5. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 22500................................................... 2.16-119
Figure 2.16.7-6. FB Concrete Outline N-S Section ........................................................... 2.16-120
Figure 5.1-1. ESBWR Horizontal SSE Design Ground Spectra at Foundation Level ............ 5.1-8
Figure 5.1-2. ESBWR Vertical SSE Design Ground Response Spectra at Foundation Level 5.1-9
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1. INTRODUCTION
This document provides the Tier 1 material of the ESBWR Design Control Document (DCD).
1.1 DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.1.1 Definitions
The definitions below apply to terms which may be used in the Design Descriptions and
associated Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC).
Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis results for a
structure, system, or component that demonstrates a Design Commitment is met.
Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation.
Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with
operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components.
As-built means the physical properties of the structure, system, or component, following the
completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site.
Determination of physical properties of the as-built structure, system, or component may be
based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation provided that
subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing do not alter the properties. Many
ITAAC require verification of “as-built” structures, systems, or components (SSCs). However,
some of these ITAAC will involve measurements and/or testing that can only be conducted at the
vendor site due to the configuration of equipment or modules or the nature of the test (e.g.,
measurements of reactor vessel internals). For these specific items where access to the
component for inspection or test is impractical after installation in the plant, the ITAAC closure
documentation (e.g., test or inspection record) will be generated at the vendor site and provided
to the licensee.
ASME Code means Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Some Tier 1 ITAAC design commitments in the ESBWR DCD
specify that structures, systems, and components be designed and constructed in accordance with
ASME Code Section III requirements. When this language is used, it indicates that the ITAAC
for that design commitment will be met by satisfying the edition and addenda of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III as specified in the DCD and as incorporated by
reference in 10 CFR 50.55a subject to the conditions listed in 10 CFR 50.55a(b), or in
accordance with alternatives to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), or (e) of 10 CFR 50.55a as authorized by
the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3).
ASME Code Report means a report required by the ASME Code and whose content
requirements are stipulated by the ASME Code. Each such ASME Code report is final, and
when required is certified in accordance with the Code.
Cold shutdown means a Safe Shutdown with the average reactor coolant temperature ≤ 93.3°C
(200°F).
Component as used in Tier 1 for reference to ASME components means that subset of
equipment that does not include piping.
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Containment means the Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV) and the Passive
Containment Cooling System (PCCS) Heat Exchangers, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Design Commitment means that portion of the Design Description that is verified by ITAAC.
Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified.
Division is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components that
enables the establishment and maintenance of physical, electrical, and functional independence
from other redundant sets of components.
Equipment as used in Tier 1 as related to ASME Code and Seismic Category I requirements
means both components and piping.
Equipment Identification Number or Equipment Identifier as used in Tier 1 means the
designation on a Tier 1 figure and is not representative of an actual equipment number or tag
number.
Equipment Qualification
For purposes of ITAAC:
Environmental Qualification: Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the safety-related
electrical equipment demonstrate qualification to applicable normal, abnormal and design
basis accident conditions without loss of the safety-related function for the time needed
during and following the conditions to perform the safety-related function. These harsh
environmental conditions, as applicable to the bounding design basis accident(s), are as
follows: expected time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical
effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant
effect on equipment performance.
As used in the associated ITAAC, the term “safety-related electrical equipment” constitutes
the equipment itself, connected instrumentation and controls, connected electrical
components (such as cabling, wiring, and terminations), and the lubricants necessary to
support performance of the safety-related functions of the safety-related electrical
components identified as being subject to the environmental qualification requirements.
Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the safety-related mechanical equipment
demonstrate qualification to applicable normal, abnormal and design basis accident
conditions without loss of the safety-related function for the time needed during and
following the conditions to perform the safety-related function considering the applicable
harsh environmental conditions. As used in this paragraph, “safety-related mechanical
components” refers to mechanical parts, subassemblies or assemblies that are categorized as
Quality Group A, B, or C. Mechanical components qualification also may be by type tests,
type tests and analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of individual parts or
subassemblies or of complete assemblies rather than by type testing the individual parts or
subassemblies separately. ITAAC address analyses of material data for safety-related
mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.
Safety-related equipment located in a mild environment will be qualified for its
environmental conditions through specifications and certifications to the environments;
however, for a mild environment, only safety-related digital instrumentation and control
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equipment will be addressed by ITAAC. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Radio

Frequency Interference (RFI) susceptibility and emissions qualification is performed by type
testing for the safety-related digital instrumentation and control equipment.
ITAAC are located in Section 3.8. to cover environmental qualification for digital
instrumentation and control equipment (including digital components in the safety-related
electrical distribution system) located in a mild environment. Environmental qualification of
safety-related electrical (including I&C equipment) and mechanical equipment in a harsh
environment is covered in Section 3.8 ITAAC. Equipment inside containment that supports
RTNSS functions is covered in Section 3.8 ITAAC. The scope of equipment located in a
harsh environment subject to environmental qualification is identified in a table in Section
3.8. The scope of digital I&C equipment located in a mild environment subject to
environmental qualification is determined through the completion of Design Acceptance
Criteria ITAAC in Section 3.8.
Seismic Qualification: Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of
the Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment (including connected
instrumentation and controls) may be used to demonstrate that the as-built equipment,
including associated anchorage, is qualified to withstand design basis dynamic loads without
loss of its safety function. Seismic qualification for digital instrumentation and controls
equipment is addressed in Section 3.8 ITAAC, with the determination of the scope of
equipment being designated as Design Acceptance Criteria. Seismic qualification for
mechanical and electrical equipment is addressed in system ITAAC throughout Tier 1.
Seismic qualification results are documented in DQDs for both system-based ITAAC and
the Section 3.8 ITAAC for digital instrumentation and controls equipment. System-based
ITAAC address performance of inspections and analyses to verify equipment seismic
qualification is bounded by the testing or analyzed conditions. The “inspections and
analyses” include verification that the associated DQD exists and concludes that the as-
built equipment is seismically qualified.
Exists, when used in Acceptance Criteria, means that the item is present and meets the design
description.
Functional Arrangement/Physical Arrangement (for a Building) means the arrangement of
the building features (e.g., floors, ceilings, walls, basemat and doorways) and of the structures,
systems, or components within, as specified in the building Design Descriptions.
Functional Arrangement (for a System) means the physical arrangement of systems and
components to provide the service for which the system in intended, and which is described in
the system Design Description.
Hot shutdown means a Safe Shutdown with the average reactor coolant temperature > 215.6°C
(420°F).
Inspect or Inspection means visual observations, physical examinations, or review of records
based on visual observation or physical examination that compare the structure, system, or
component condition to one or more Design Commitments. Examples include, but are not limited to,
walk-downs, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, and non-destructive
examinations. Inspections also may include review of design and construction documents
including drawings, calculations, analyses, test procedures and results, certificates of
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compliance, purchase records, and other documents that may verify that the acceptance criteria
of a particular ITAAC are met.
Inspect for Retrievability of a display means to visually observe that the specified information
appears on a monitor when summoned by the operator.
Operate means the actuation, control, running, or shutting down (e.g., closing, turning off) of
equipment.
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level means the various levels used as reference points
for instrumentation ranges. Figure 1.1.1-1 shows the relative location of the defined water levels
and the overlap in the level measurement ranges.
Report means, as used in the Acceptance Criteria, a document created by or for the licensee that
verifies that the acceptance criteria of the subject ITAAC have been met and references the
supporting documentation. Reports typically include but are not limited to: results of
walkdowns, results of visual inspections, field measurements, and reviews of design and
construction documents. The Functional Arrangement verification report, for ASME Code
Section III components or systems, may be or may include an ASME Code report.
Safe Shutdown (generic definition) is a shutdown with:
(1) The reactivity of the reactor kept to a margin below criticality consistent with Technical
Specifications;
(2) The core decay heat being removed at a controlled rate sufficient to prevent core or reactor
coolant system thermal design limits from being exceeded;
(3) Components and systems necessary to maintain these conditions operating within their
design limits; and
(4) Components and systems, necessary to keep doses within prescribed limits, operating
properly.
Safe Shutdown for Station Blackout means bringing the plant to those shutdown conditions
specified in plant Technical Specifications as Hot Shutdown or Stable Shutdown.
Stable Shutdown means a Safe Shutdown with the average reactor coolant temperature ≤
215.6°C (420°F) and > 93ºC (200ºF) (see “safe stable condition” in SECY-94-084 and stable
shutdown in ESBWR Generic Technical Specifications).
Test or Testing means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions, to
evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
Train means a redundant, identical mechanical function within a system. For nonsafety-
related systems, redundant trains may share passive components (e.g., piping, supports, manual
shutoff valves).
Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer
to qualify other components of that same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a
test of the as-built structures, systems, or components.
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Verification of the Functional Arrangement of a system, as used in an ITAAC, means

verifying that the system is constructed as depicted in the Tier 1 Design Description and figures,
including equipment and instrument locations, if applicable.
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1.1.2 General Provisions

The following general provisions are applicable to the design descriptions and associated
ITAAC.
1.1.2.1 Treatment of Individual Items

The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the Design Description or
accompanying figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an
item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions, or impairing the
performance of those safety functions, as discussed or depicted in the Design Description or
accompanying figures.
If an inspection, test, or analyses requirement does not specify the temperature or other conditions
under which a test must be run, then the test conditions are not constrained.
When the term “operate,” “operates” or “operation” is used with respect to an item discussed in
the Acceptance Criteria, it refers to the actuation, control, running or shutting down of the item.
When the term “exist,” “exists” or “existence” is used with respect to an item discussed in the
Acceptance Criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the Design Description.
1.1.2.2 Implementation of ITAAC

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) are provided in tables with the
following three-column format:
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
Each Design Commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated
requirement for Inspections, Tests or Analyses (ITA) specified in the middle column of the tables.
The identification of a separate ITA entry for each Design Commitment shall not be construed to
require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each Design
Commitment. Instead, the activities associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined,
and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement more than one ITA entry.
An ITA may be performed by the licensee of the plant or by its authorized vendors, contractors,
or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group,
may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and may be performed at any
time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the Combined License for those ITAAC that do
not require as-built equipment). Additionally, ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are
required to be performed under 10 CFR 50 (including, for example, the Quality Assurance (QA)
program required under Appendix B to Part 50). Therefore, an ITA need not be performed as a
separate or discrete activity.
For the Acceptance Criteria, appropriate documentation may be a single document or a collection of
documents that show that the stated Acceptance Criteria are met. Examples of appropriate
documentation include design reports, test reports, inspection reports, analysis reports, evaluation
reports, design and manufacturing procedures, certified data sheets, commercial dedication procedures
and records, quality assurance records, calculation notes, and equipment qualification data packages.
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An entry in the ITA column of the ITAAC tables include the words “Inspection will be
performed for the existence of a report verifying…” When these words are used it indicates that
the ITA is tests, type tests, analyses, or a combination of tests, type tests, and analyses and a
report will be produced documenting the results. This report will be available for inspection.
For those nonsystem-based ITAAC, which address piping and equipment qualification, the ITA
and Acceptance Criteria may be satisfied on a system-by-system basis so as not to delay
completion of ITAAC for a particular system. In this manner, a system may be turned over for
operation following verification of the information needed to satisfy the nonsystem-based
ITAAC. Documentation of completion of the ITAAC for a particular system will be retained in
a manner that will allow verification of completion of the ITAAC for the nonsystem-based
ITAAC. Notification to the NRC of completion of the nonsystem-based ITAAC may be on a
system basis throughout construction and should be discussed with the NRC whether notification
should be provided. Notification to the NRC will be made upon final completion of the
nonsystem-based ITAAC for purposes of ensuring that the Acceptance Criteria have been met.
The Acceptance Criteria are generally stated in terms of a value with and acceptable range, or
with a values that is either a minimum or maximum. For these ITAAC, the acceptance criteria
for performing the ITAAC will be as stated in the Acceptance Criteria. In some cases, the
Acceptance Criteria are stated in terms of nominal values without an acceptable range. For these
ITAAC, the acceptable range will be determined at the time of performing the ITAAC.
1.1.2.3 Discussion of Matters Related to Operations

In some cases, the Design Descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to operation,
such as normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are
provided solely to place the Design Description provisions in context (e.g., to explain
automatic features for opening or closing valves or breakers upon off-normal conditions). Such
discussions shall not be construed as requiring operators during operation to take any particular
action (e.g., to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position during normal operation).
1.1.2.4 Interpretation of Figures

In many but not all cases, the Design Descriptions in Section 2 include one or more figures,
which may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or another
general illustration. For instrumentation and control systems, the figures also represent aspects
of the relevant logic of the system or part of the system. Unless specified explicitly, these figures
are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built
structures, systems, or components. In particular, the as-built attributes of structures, systems, or
components may vary from the attributes depicted on these figures, provided that those safety
functions discussed in the Design Description pertaining to the figure are not adversely affected.
1.1.2.5 Rated Reactor Core Thermal Power

The initial rated reactor core thermal power for the standard ESBWR is 4500 megawatts thermal
(MWt).
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Figure 1.1.1-1 RPV Water Level Range Definition
1.1-8
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1.2 FIGURE LEGEND

Certain Tier 1 sections include figures described in the design description. Figure legends are
provided in Figures 1.2-1 and 1.2-2 for certain symbols used in system functional arrangement
diagrams. The figure legend is provided for information and is not part of the Tier 1 Material.
Many of the Tier 1 figures identify specific equipment and may include figure specific legends.
Electrical and building drawings contain figure-specific legends and equipment nomenclature.
Other figures may be labeled as necessary to explain the content of the figure.
1.2-1
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Figure 1.2-1. Legend for Tier 1 System Diagrams
1.2-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
TRANSFORMER
RECTIFIER
GENERATOR
REGULATING
TRANSFORMER
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
BREAKER
FUSED BATTERY
DISCONNECT
SWITCH
SXS STATIC TRANSFER

INVERTER SWITCH
MAINTENANCE
MTS TRANSFER
SWITCH
Figure 1.2-2. Legend for Tier 1 Electrical System Diagrams
1.2-3
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1.3 TABLE LEGEND

A dash (-) in a table column means “not applicable”.
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1.4 DESIGN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

Design Acceptance Criteria are a special type of ITAAC that set forth the processes and
acceptance criteria for completing portions of design. These are designated as “{{Design
Acceptance Criteria}}” in the two right columns of the ITAAC tables where appropriate.
1.4-1
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2. DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND ITAAC

This section provides the certified design material for each of the ESBWR systems that is either
fully or partially within the scope of the Certified Design.
2.1 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY

The following subsections describe the major Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS)
components of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and the Nuclear Boiler System. This section
also describes the natural circulation process for the ESBWR.
2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals

Design Description
The RPV and Internals generate heat and boil water to steam in a direct cycle. The functional
arrangement of the RPV and Internals includes the reactor core and reactor internals (see
Figure 2.1.1-1). The chimney provides an additional elevation head (or driving head) necessary
to sustain natural circulation flow through the RPV. The chimney also forms an annulus
separating the subcooled recirculation flow returning downward from the steam separators and
feedwater from the upward steam-water mixture flow exiting the core. The steam is separated
from the steam-water mixture by passing the mixture sequentially through an array of steam
separators attached to a removable cover on the top of the chimney assembly, and through the
steam dryer, resulting in outlet dry steam. The water mixes with the feedwater as it comes into
the RPV through the feedwater nozzle. RPV internals consist of core support structures and
other equipment.
The RPV is located in the containment. Internal component locations are shown on
Figure 2.1.1-1.
The reactor core contains a matrix of fuel rods assembled into fuel assemblies using structural
elements. Control rods in the reactor perform the functions of power distribution shaping,
reactivity control, and scram reactivity insertion for safety shutdown response. The core is
designed for 1132 fuel bundles and 269 control rods arranged as shown in Figure 2.1.1-2.
(1) The functional arrangement of the RPV and Internals is as described in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.1.1, Table 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-1.
(2) The key dimensions (and acceptable variations) of the as-built RPV are as described in
Table 2.1.1-2.
(3) a1. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top
guide, core plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code Section III
are designed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
a2. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top
shall be reconciled with the design requirements.
a3. The RPV and its components identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support, top
2.1-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III
requirements.
(4) Pressure boundary welds in the RPV meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive
examination requirements.
(5) The RPV retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(6) The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic
Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(7) RPV surveillance specimens are provided from the forging material of the beltline region
and the weld and heat affected zone of a weld typical of those adjacent to the beltline
region. Brackets welded to the vessel cladding at the location of the calculated peak
fluence are provided to hold the removable specimen holders and a neutron dosimeter in
place.
(8) a. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney
head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) must meet the limited
provisions of ASME Code Section III regarding certification that these components
maintain structural integrity so as not to adversely affect RPV core support structure.
b. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney
head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) meet the requirements
of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000, except for the weld quality and fatigue
factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.
(9) The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will withstand flow-induced vibration and
maintain fuel cladding integrity during operation.
(10) The fuel bundles and control rods intended for initial core load have been fabricated in
accordance with the approved fuel and control rod design.
(11) The reactor internals arrangement conforms to the fuel bundle, instrumentation, neutron
sources, and control rod locations shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.
(12) The number and locations of pressure sensors installed on the steam dryer for startup
testing ensure accurate pressure predictions at critical locations.
(13) The number and locations of strain gages and accelerometers installed on the steam dryer
for startup testing are capable of monitoring the most highly stressed components,
considering accessibility and avoiding discontinuities in the components.
(14) The number and locations of accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing
are capable of identifying potential rocking and of measuring the accelerations resulting
from support and vessel movements.
(15) The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will be able to withstand fuel lift and seismic and
dynamic loads under normal operation and design basis conditions.
(16) The as-built steam dryer predicted peak stress is below the fatigue limitation.
2.1-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

Table 2.1.1-3 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals.
2.1-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-1
Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Mechanical Equipment
ASME Loss of
Containment Remotely
Code Seismic RCPB(2) Motive MCR(3)
Equipment Name Isolation Operated
Section Cat. I Component Power Alarms
Valve Valve
III Position
RPV Yes Yes Yes - - - -
Core support structures (shroud,
shroud support, top guide, core
plate, control rod guide tubes Yes Yes - - - - -
and fuel supports) which have a
support function
Chimney and partitions Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
Chimney head and steam
Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
separators assembly
Steam dryer assembly Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
(1) The chimney and partitions, the chimney head and steam separators assembly, and the steam dryer assembly are subject only to the ASME III certification requirements specified in ASME
Code Section III, Subsection NG-1122 (c).
(2) RCPB = Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary
(3) MCR = Main Control Room
(4) The chimney and partitions, the chimney head and steam separators assembly, and the steam dryer assembly are not ASME B&PV Code components, but their design complies with the
requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000 except for the weld quality and fatigue factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.
2.1-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-2
Key Dimensions of RPV Components and Acceptable Variations
Nominal Acceptable
Dimension/
Value Variation
Description Elevation
mm mm
(Figure 2.1.1-1)
(in) (in)
Reference
RPV bottom head inside invert elevation A 0
elevation zero
Bottom of active fuel location from 4405 ±16
B
elevation zero1 (173.4) (0.63)
Top of active fuel location from elevation 7453 ±16
C
zero1 (293.4) (0.63)
27560 ±100
RPV top head inside invert elevation D
(1085) (3.94)
7112 ±51
RPV inside diameter (inside cladding) E
(280.0) (2.01)
RPV wall thickness in beltline (including 182 177.2 min
F
cladding) (7.17) (6.976 min)
1
Dimension is verified by calculations based on as-built interfacing components.
2.1-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built RPV and The RPV and Internals and core
RPV and Internals is as described in Internals will be conducted. arrangement conforms to the functional
the Design Description of arrangement described in the Design
Subsection 2.1.1, Table 2.1.1-1 and Description of this Subsection 2.1.1,
Figure 2.1.1-1. Table 2.1.1-1 and Figure 2.1.1-1.
2. The key dimensions (and acceptable Inspection of the as-built RPV key The RPV conforms to the key
variations) of the as-built RPV are as dimensions (and acceptable variations dimensions (and acceptable variations)
described in Table 2.1.1-2. thereof) will be conducted. described in Table 2.1.1-2.
3a1 The RPV and its components Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by
shroud support, top guide, core plate, documents will be conducted. ASME Code) exist and conclude that the
control rod guide tubes and fuel design of the RPV and its components
supports) as ASME Code Section III identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud,
are designed in accordance with shroud support, top guide, core plate,
ASME Code Section III requirements. control rod guide tubes and fuel
supports) as ASME Code Section III
complies with the requirements of the
ASME Code, Section III, including those
stresses applicable to loads related to
fatigue (including environmental effects),
thermal expansion, seismic, and
combined.
2.1-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

3a2. The RPV and its components A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified,
identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, components using as-designed and as- when required by ASME Code) exist and
shroud support, top guide, core plate, built information and ASME Code conclude that design reconciliation has
control rod guide tubes and fuel Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be been completed in accordance with the
supports) as ASME Code Section III performed. ASME Code for as-built reconciliation of
shall be reconciled with the design the RPV and its components identified in
requirements. Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, shroud support,
top guide, core plate, control rod guide
tubes and fuel supports) as ASME Code
Section III. The report documents the
results of the reconciliation analysis.
3a3. The RPV and its components Inspection of the RPV and its ASME Code Data Report(s) (including
identified in Table 2.1.1-1 (shroud, components identified in Table 2.1-1 as N-1/N-1A Data reports, where
shroud support, top guide, core plate, ASME Code Section III will be applicable) (certified, when required by
control rod guide tubes and fuel conducted. ASME Code) and inspection reports exist
supports) as ASME Code Section III and conclude that the RPV and its
are fabricated, installed, and inspected components identified in Table 2.1.1-1
in accordance with ASME Code (shroud, shroud support, top guide, core
Section III requirements. plate, control rod guide tubes and fuel
supports) as ASME Code Section III are
fabricated, installed, and inspected in
accordance with ASME Code Section III
requirements.
2.1-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

4. Pressure boundary welds in the RPV Inspection of as-built pressure boundary ASME Code Report(s) exist and
meet ASME Code Section III non- welds in the RPV will be performed in conclude that the ASME Code Section
destructive examination requirements. accordance with the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-
III. destructive examination of pressure
boundary welds in the RPV.
5. The RPV retains its pressure A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Report(s) exist and
boundary integrity at its design the RPV as it is required to be conclude that the results of the
pressure. hydrostatically tested by the ASME hydrostatic test of the RPV comply with
Code. the requirements of the ASME Code
Section III.
6. The equipment identified in i. Inspection will be performed to verify i. The equipment identified in Table
Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I that the Seismic Category I equipment 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I is
can withstand Seismic Category I identified in Table 2.1.1-1 is located located in a Seismic Category I
loads without loss of safety function. in a Seismic Category I structure. structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The equipment identified in Table
of type tests and analyses of 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can
equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 withstand Seismic Category I loads
as Seismic Category I will be without loss of safety function.
performed using analytical
assumptions, or will be performed
under conditions which bound the
Seismic Category I design
requirements.
2.1-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

iii. Inspection and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment, identified in
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I,
equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 including anchorage, can withstand
as Seismic Category I, including Seismic Category I loads without loss
anchorage, is bounded by the tested or of safety function.
analyzed conditions.
7. RPV surveillance specimens are Inspections of the as-built RPV and The RPV surveillance specimens and
provided from the forging material of Internals will be conducted for neutron dosimeters are provided and
the beltline region and the weld and implementation of the RPV surveillance brackets are installed at the location(s) of
heat affected zone of a weld typical of specimens, neutron dosimeter, and calculated peak fluence determined by
those adjacent to the beltline region. brackets. An analysis is performed to an analysis of the as-built configuration.
Brackets welded to the vessel determine the location of the peak
cladding at the location of the fluence.
calculated peak fluence are provided
to hold the removable specimen
holders and a neutron dosimeter in
place.
8a. The RPV internal structures listed in Inspections will be conducted of the as- The RPV internal structures listed in
Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, built internal structures as documented in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions,
chimney head and steam separators the ASME Code design reports. chimney head and steam separators
assembly, and steam dryer assembly) assembly, and steam dryer assembly)
must meet the limited provisions of meet the limited provisions of ASME
ASME Code Section III regarding Code Section III, NG-1122 (c),
certification that these components regarding certification that these
maintain structural integrity so as not components maintain structural integrity
to adversely affect RPV core support so as not to adversely affect RPV core
structure. support structure.
2.1-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

8b. The RPV internal structures listed in Inspections will be conducted of the as- The RPV internal structures listed in
Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, built internal structures as documented in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions,
chimney head and steam separators the ASME Code design reports. chimney head and steam separators
assembly, and steam dryer assembly) assembly, and steam dryer assembly)
meet the requirements of ASME meet the requirements of ASME B&PV
B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000, Code, Subsection NG-3000, except for
except for the weld quality and the weld quality and fatigue factors for
fatigue factors for secondary secondary structural non-load bearing
structural non-load bearing welds. welds.
9. The initial fuel to be loaded into the Flow-Induced Vibration (FIV) testing The initial fuel to be loaded into the core
core will withstand flow-induced will be performed on the fuel bundle will withstand flow-induced vibration
vibration and maintain fuel cladding design that will be loaded into the and maintain fuel cladding integrity
integrity during operation. ESBWR initial core and on the reference during operation.
fuel design in reactor use during the time
of the tests. Bundle and rod responses at
various elevations between the ESBWR
design and the fuel design with the most
similar design features will be compared.
10. The fuel bundles and control rods An inspection of the fuel bundles and The fuel bundles and control rods
intended for initial core load have control rods will be performed. intended for the initial core load have
been fabricated in accordance with been inspected upon receipt to verify that
the approved fuel and control rod they have been fabricated in accordance
design. with the approved fuel and control rod
design.
2.1-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

11. The reactor internals arrangement An inspection of the as-built system will The as-built reactor system fuel bundle,
conforms to the fuel bundle, be performed. control rod, instrumentation, and neutron
instrumentation, neutron sources, and source locations conform to the locations
control rod locations shown on Figure shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.
2.1.1-2.
12. The number and locations of pressure An analysis of the number and locations The number and locations of pressure
sensors installed on the steam dryer of pressure sensors installed on the steam sensors installed on the steam dryer for
for startup testing ensure accurate dryer for startup testing will be startup testing ensure accurate pressure
pressure predictions at critical performed. predictions at critical locations.
locations.
13. The number and locations of strain An analysis of the number and locations The number and locations of strain gages
gages and accelerometers installed on of strain gages and accelerometers and accelerometers installed on the
the steam dryer for startup testing are installed on the steam dryer for startup steam dryer for startup testing are
capable of monitoring the most highly testing will be performed. capable of monitoring the most highly
stressed components, considering stressed components, considering
accessibility and avoiding accessibility and avoiding discontinuities
discontinuities in the components. in the components.
14. The number and locations of An analysis of the number and locations The number and locations of
accelerometers installed on the steam of accelerometers installed on the steam accelerometers installed on the steam
dryer for startup testing are capable of dryer for startup testing will be dryer for startup testing are capable of
identifying potential rocking and of performed. identifying potential rocking of and
measuring the accelerations resulting measuring the accelerations resulting
from support and vessel movements. from support and vessel movements.
2.1-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.1-3

15. The initial fuel to be loaded into the An analysis of the fuel lift and seismic The initial fuel to be loaded into the core
core will be able to withstand fuel lift and dynamic loads will be performed on will have primary stresses and maximum
and seismic and dynamic loads under the fuel bundle design that will be loaded fuel bundle lift out of the fuel support
normal operation and design basis into the ESBWR initial core. piece that do not exceed the allowable
conditions. values provided in the approved Fuel
Assembly Mechanical Design Report.
16. The as-built steam dryer predicted Analyses using NRC-approved A report of the fatigue analyses of the as-
peak stress is below the fatigue methodologies are performed. built steam dryer exists and demonstrates
limitation. that the maximum calculated alternating
stress intensity provides at least a
Minimum Alternating Stress Ratio of 2.0
to the allowable alternating stress
intensity of 93.7 MPa (13,600 psi).
2.1-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.1.1-1. Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Key Features Layout
2.1-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.1.1-2. Fuel Bundle, Neutron Sources, Neutron Detectors and Control Rod
Functional Arrangement
2.1-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.1.2 Nuclear Boiler System

Design Description
The Nuclear Boiler System (NBS) generates steam from feedwater and transports steam from
the RPV to the main turbine.
The combined steamline volume from the RPV to the main steam turbine stop valves and steam
bypass valves is sufficient to validate the assumptions in Anticipated analyses (see Table 2.11.1-
1, Item 8).
The environmental qualification of the NBS components is addressed in Section 3.8; and the
environmental and seismic qualification of digital instrumentation and controls equipment is
addressed in Section 3.8.
The containment isolation requirements for the NBS are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
NBS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2.
NBS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
Conformance with IEEE Standard 603 requirements by the safety-related control system,
structures, systems, or components is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
(1) The functional arrangement of the NBS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.1.2, Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2, and as shown on Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and
2.1.2-3.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
a2. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be
reconciled with the design requirements.
a3. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
b1. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in
accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III shall be
reconciled with the piping design requirements.
b3. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
(3) a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code
Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section
III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
(4) a. The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their
pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
2.1-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
b. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure
boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(5) The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can
withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) a. (Deleted)
b. (Deleted)
(7) a. Each NBS mechanical train located outside the containment is physically separated
from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
b. Each NBS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated
related function.
(8) a. The MSIVs close upon command.
b. The Feedwater Isolation Valves (FWIVs) close upon command.
(9) (Deleted)
(10) MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon loss of electrical power to the actuating solenoid.
(11) Check valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and
temperature conditions.
(12) The throat diameter of each Main Steamline (MSL) flow restrictor is sized for design choke
flow requirements.
(13) Each MSL flow restrictor has taps for two instrument connections to be used for
monitoring the flow through its associated MSL.
(14) (Deleted)
(15) a. The MSIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow,
and temperature conditions.
b. The FWIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow
and temperature conditions.
(16) a. When all four inboard or outboard MSIVs are stroked from a full-open to full-closed
position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the MSIVs for all four MSLs
will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
b. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their
actuators, the combined liquid inflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater
lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
c. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their
actuators, the combined gas outflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater
lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
(17) The opening pressure for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) setpoint in mechanical lift mode
validates the overpressure protection analysis by lifting at its nominal setpoint pressure.
2.1-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(18) The opening time for the SRVs in the overpressure operation of self-actuated or mechanical lift
mode, which is measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the
valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.
(19) The steam discharge capacity of each SRV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in)
the overpressure protection analysis.
(20) The opening pressure for the Safety Valves (SVs) validates (i.e., is less than or equal to
that used in) the overpressure protection analysis.
(21) The opening time for the SVs, measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure
to when the valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.
(22) The steam discharge capacity of each SV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in) the
overpressure protection analysis.
(23) The relief-mode actuator (and safety-related appurtenances) can open each SRV with the drywell
(DW) pressure at design pressure.
(24) The booster assembly opens each Depressurization Valve (DPV) in less than or equal to the
design opening time (opening time to full rated capacity).
(25) Each DPV minimum flow capacity is sufficient to support rapid depressurization of the
RPV (i.e., has a flow capacity that is greater than or equal to the design flow capacity
under design basis conditions).
(26) (Deleted)
(27) (Deleted)
(28) Vacuum breakers are provided on SRV discharge lines to reduce the post-discharge reflood
height of water in the discharge lines.
(29) The SRV discharge line vacuum breakers close to prevent steam bypass to the DW during
SRV discharge, and open following a discharge completion to permit pressure equalization
with the DW and prevent ingestion of a water slug into the SRV discharge lines.
(30) The pressure loss coefficient of each of the following components is within the uncertainty
band of the pressure loss coefficient used in the natural circulation flow analysis:
• Steam separator
• Fuel bundle
• Fuel support piece orifice
• Control rod guide tubes
• Shroud support
(31) The free volume for each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the
free volume used in the natural circulation flow analysis:
• RPV
• Downcomer
2.1-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• Core
• Chimney
• Separator/dryer
(32) The hydraulic diameter, geometry of the heated surfaces, and flow area in fuel assemblies
are within the uncertainty band of the geometry used in the natural circulation flow
analysis.
(33) (Deleted)
(34) (Deleted)
(35) (Deleted)
(36) The main steam line and SRV/SV branch piping geometry precludes first and second shear
layer wave acoustic resonance conditions from occurring and avoids pressure loads on the
steam dryer at plant normal operating conditions.
Table 2.1.2-3 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the NBS.
2.1-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-1
Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment
ASME
Equipment
Code Seismic RCPB Containment Isolation Remotely Loss of Motive
Equipment Name ID on Figure
Section Cat. I Component Valve Operated Power Position
2.1.2-2
III
Main steam lines to the
seismic restraint in the - Yes Yes Yes - - -
steam tunnel
Inboard main steam V8

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Closed
isolation valves (Typ. of 4)
Outboard main steam V9

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Closed
isolation valves (Typ. of 4)
Portions
For valves V8, may be
MSIV actuator and support Portions may be
V9 connected
hardware and associated Yes connected to - - -
to ASME
structural supports (Typ. of 8) RCPB
Code
systems
Main steam flow restrictors - Yes Yes Yes - - -
Inboard and outboard
Steam line drain/bypass upstream drain isolation
- Yes Yes Portions - -
subsystem valves (see Table 2.15.1-
1a)
Feedwater piping from
RPV to seismic restraint
- Yes Yes Yes - - -
upstream of isolation
shutoff valve
2.1-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-1
ASME
Equipment
2.1.2-2
III
V7
Safety valves (SV) Yes Yes Yes No No -
(Typ. of 8)
Yes (in Closed for relief
V6
Safety relief valves (SRV) Yes Yes Yes No relief mode
(Typ. of 10) mode)
Depressurization valves V5 (Typ. of 8) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Fail as is
Yes
V1, V2, and (no active
RPV head vent subsystem Yes Yes Yes No Fail as is
V3 safety
function)
2.1-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-1
ASME
Equipment
2.1.2-2
III
System instrumentation –
detection and monitoring
(indication in Main
Control Room):
• Position of
MSIVs
• Position of DPVs Safety-
• Position of SRVs related Safety-related Safety-related fluid
• Differential - fluid Yes fluid portions portions only (see - -
pressure between portions only Subsection 2.15.1)
two feedwater only
lines
• Continuity circuit
for each DPV
squib device
• Continuity circuit
for each SRV
SRV discharge lines - Yes Yes - - - -
SRV discharge line V18, V19
Yes Yes No No - -
vacuum relief valves (Typ. of 10)
SRV discharge line Q1
Yes Yes No - - -
quencher (Typ. of 10)
2.1-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-1
ASME
Equipment
2.1.2-2
III
Closed
Feedwater outboard V14, V17, (gravity close on
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
isolation valves V20, V21 loss of system
pressure)
Yes
Feedwater inboard No
V12, V15 Yes Yes Yes (will close on reverse -
isolation check valves
flow)
Feedwater branch line Yes Closed
outboard isolation check (active function to close Yes (gravity close on
V13, V16 Yes Yes Yes
valves (RWCU/SDC on LOCA and will close loss of system
system connections) on reverse flow) pressure)
2.1-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-2
Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment
Safety- Containment
Control Safety- Seismic
Equipment ID Related Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Related
on Figure 2.1.2-2 Electrical Category I Operated Valve
DPS Display
Equipment Actuator
V8
Inboard MSIV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Typ. of 4)
V9
Outboard MSIV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Typ. of 4)
Yes
V6 (ADS – See
SRV Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(Typ. of 10) Section
2.2.13)
V5
DPV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(Typ. of 8)
Feedwater outboard V14, V17, V20,
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
isolation valves V21
Feedwater branch line
outboard isolation V13, V16 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
check valves
Reactor pressure
transmitters (1 or more
- Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
in each of the 4
divisions)
Reactor water level
transmitters (1 or more
in each of the 4
divisions)
MSIV isolation logic - Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
2.1-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-2
Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment
Safety- Containment
Control Safety- Seismic
Equipment ID Related Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Related
on Figure 2.1.2-2 Electrical Category I Operated Valve
DPS Display
Equipment Actuator
Leak Detection and
Isolation System Logic
2.1-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built NBS conforms to the
NBS is as described in the Design performed. functional arrangement described in the
Description of this Subsection 2.1.2, Design Description of this
Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 and as Subsection 2.1.2, Tables 2.1.2-1 and
shown in Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and 2.1.2-2 and Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and
2.1.2-3. 2.1.2-3.
2a1. (Deleted)
2.1-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
2a2. The components identified in A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the design ASME Code Section III using as-designed Code) exist and conclude that design
requirements. and as-built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed, in
Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
performed. reconciliation of the components identified
in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section
III, and that the design of as-built
components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
ASME Code Section III complies with the
requirements of ASME Code Section III.
The report documents the results of the
reconciliation analysis.
2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
accordance with ASME Code Section and inspection reports exist and conclude
III requirements. that the components identified in Table
2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are
requirements.
2.1-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
as ASME Code Section III is (NCA-3550) and required documents will 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
designed in accordance with ASME be conducted. Code) exist and conclude that the design
Code Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1
as ASME Code Section III complies with
the requirements of ASME Code Section
III, including those stresses applicable to
loads related to fatigue (including
environmental effects), thermal
expansion, seismic, and combined.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b2. The as-built piping identified in A reconciliation analysis of the piping ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the piping Section III using as-designed and as-built Code) exist and conclude that design
design requirements. information and ASME Code Design reconciliation has been completed, in
Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
reconciliation of the piping identified in
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
2.1-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Inspections of the piping identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified,
as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III when required by ASME Code) and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. inspection reports (including N-5 Data
accordance with ASME Code Section Reports where applicable) exist and
III requirements. conclude that the piping identified in
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III
is fabricated, installed, and inspected in
requirements.
3a. Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude
components identified in boundary welds in components identified that ASME Code Section III requirements
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section are met for non-destructive examination
III meet ASME Code Section III non- III will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in
destructive examination requirements. ASME Code Section III. components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
ASME Code Section III.
3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude
identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME boundary welds in piping identified in that ASME Code Section III requirements
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are met for non-destructive examination
Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in piping
examination requirements. ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code
Section III
4a. The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section those code components identified in Table conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
III retain their pressure boundary 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are test of components identified in Table
integrity at their design pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply
ASME Code Section III. with the requirements of ASME Code
Section III.
2.1-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
4b. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
as ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at its as ASME Code Section III that is required test of piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
design pressure. to be hydrostatically tested by ASME ASME Code Section III comply with the
Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
5. The equipment identified in i. Inspection will be performed to verify i. The equipment identified as Seismic
Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as that the Seismic Category I equipment Category I in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table
Seismic Category I can withstand identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 is located in a Seismic
Seismic Category I loads without loss 2.1.2-2 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.
of safety function. Category I structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The equipment identified in
of type tests and analyses, of Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as
equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Seismic Category I can withstand
and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category Seismic Category I loads without loss
I, will be performed using analytical of safety function.
Seismic Category I equipment design
requirements
iii. Inspection and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment identified in
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as
equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Seismic Category I, including
and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category anchorage, can withstand Seismic
I, including anchorage, is bounded by Category I loads without loss of safety
the testing or analyzed conditions. function.
6a. (Deleted)
6b. (Deleted)
2.1-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
7a. Each NBS mechanical train located Inspections and analysis will be conducted Each NBS mechanical train located
outside the containment is physically for each of the NBS mechanical trains outside containment is protected against
separated from the other train(s) so as located outside the containment. design basis events and their direct
not to preclude accomplishment of the consequences by spatial separation,
intended safety-related function. barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not
to preclude accomplishment of the
intended safety-related function.
7b. Each NBS mechanical train located Inspections and analysis will be conducted Each NBS mechanical train located inside
inside the containment is physically for each of the NBS mechanical trains containment is protected against design
separated from the other train(s) so as located inside the containment. basis events and their direct consequences
not to preclude accomplishment of the by spatial separation, barriers, restraints,
intended safety-related function. or enclosures so as not to preclude
accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
8a. The MSIVs close upon command. Valve closure tests will be performed on The MSIVs close upon command.
the as-built MSIVs using a manual closure
command to simulate an isolation signal.
8b. The Feedwater Isolation Valves Valve closure tests will be performed on The FWIVs close upon command
(FWIVs) close upon command. the as-built FWIVs using a manual closure
command to simulate an isolation signal.
9. (Deleted)
10. MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon Tests will be conducted on the as-built The MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon
loss of electrical power to the valve valve under preoperational conditions loss of electrical power to the valve
actuating solenoid. actuating solenoid.
2.1-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
11. Check valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 Tests of installed valves for opening and Based on the direction of the differential
open and close under system pressure, closing, will be conducted under system pressure across the valve, each check
fluid flow, and temperature preoperational pressure, fluid flow, and valve listed in Table 2.1.2-1 opens and
conditions. temperature conditions. closes.
12. The throat diameter of each Main Inspections of each as-built MSL flow The throat diameter of each MSL flow
Steamline (MSL) flow restrictor is sized restrictor throat diameter will be performed restrictor is less than or equal to 355 mm
for design choke flow requirements. (14.0 in).
13. Each MSL flow restrictor has taps for Inspections of the as-built installation of Each as-built MSL flow restrictor provides
two instrument connections to be used each MSL flow restrictor will be conducted for two instrument connections.
for monitoring the flow through its to verify that it provides for two instrument
associated MSL. connections.
14. (Deleted)
15a. The MSIVs are capable of fast closing Type tests of the MSIV will be conducted The MSIVs are capable of fast closure in
under design differential pressure, fluid in accordance with the design and not less than 3 seconds and not more than 5
flow and temperature conditions. purchase specifications to demonstrate seconds under design conditions.
that the MSIVs will fast close under
design conditions.
15b. The FWIVs are capable of fast Type tests of the FWIVs will be conducted The FWIVs are capable of fast closure in
closing under design differential in accordance with the design and not less than 10 seconds and not more than
pressure, fluid flow and temperature purchase specifications to demonstrate 15 seconds under design conditions.
conditions. that the FWIVs will fast close under
design conditions.
2.1-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
16a. When all four inboard or outboard Tests at preoperational conditions along When all MSIVs are stroked from the
MSIVs are stroked from full-open to with analysis will be performed on the as- full-open to full-closed position by their
full-closed position by their actuators, built MSIVs to determine the leakage as actuators, the combined leakage through
the combined leakage through the adjusted to the specified design the MSIVs for all four MSLs is less than
MSIVs for all four MSLs will be less conditions. or equal to a total combined leakage
than or equal to the design bases (corrected to standard conditions) of less
assumption value. than or equal to 94.4 liters/minute (3.33
ft3/minute) for post-LOCA leakage.
16b. When all four FWIVs are stroked Tests using demineralized water and When all FWIVs are stroked from the
from full-open to full-closed position analysis will be performed on the as-built full-open to full-closed position by their
by their actuators, the combined FWIVs to determine the liquid inflow actuators, the combined leakage through
liquid inflow leakage through the leakage as adjusted to the specified design the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less
FWIVs for both feedwater lines will conditions. than or equal to a total combined liquid
be less than or equal to the design inflow leakage (corrected to standard
bases assumption value. conditions) of less than or equal to 900
cc/minute (0.238 gpm) for post-LOCA
leakage.
16c. When all four FWIVs are stroked Tests and analysis will be performed on the When all FWIVs are stroked from the
from full-open to full-closed position as-built FWIVs to determine the gas outflow full-open to full-closed position by their
by their actuators, the combined gas leakage as adjusted to the specified design actuators, the combined leakage through
outflow leakage through the FWIVs conditions. the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less
for both feedwater lines will be less than or equal to a total combined gas
than or equal to the design bases outflow leakage (corrected to standard
assumption value. conditions) of less than or equal to 700
cc/minute (1.483 ft3/hour) for post-LOCA
leakage.
2.1-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
17. The opening pressure for the Safety Type tests or setpoint tests will be The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure
Relief Valves (SRVs) setpoint in conducted in accordance with the ASME of 8.366 + 0.251 MPaG (1213 + 36 psig).
mechanical lift mode validates the Code to certify the valves.
overpressure protection analysis by
lifting at its nominal setpoint pressure.
18. The opening time for the SRVs in the Analysis and type tests will be conducted The opening time (as measured from
overpressure operation of self-actuated in accordance with the ASME Code to when the pressure exceeds the valve set
or mechanical lift mode, which is ensure that the valves open within the pressure to when the valve is fully open)
measured from when the pressure design opening time. for the SRVs in the overpressure operation
exceeds the valve set pressure to when of self-actuated or mechanical lift mode is
the valve is fully open, shall be less than less than or equal to 0.5 seconds.
or equal to the design opening time.
19. The steam discharge capacity of each Type tests will be conducted in accordance Valve capacity stamping on each SRV
SRV validates (i.e., is greater than or with the ASME Code Section III for relief records the certified capacity at rated
equal to that used in) the overpressure valve certification. setpoint of 138 kg/s (304 lbm/s)
protection analysis. minimum.
20. The opening pressure for the Safety Type tests or setpoint tests will be The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure
Valves (SVs) validates (i.e. is less than conducted in accordance with the ASME of 8.503 + 0.255 MPaG (1233 + 37 psig).
or equal to that used in) the Code Section III to certify the valve.
overpressure protection analysis.
21. The opening time for the SVs, Analysis and type tests will be conducted The opening time (measured from when
measured from when the pressure in accordance with the ASME Code the pressure exceeds the valve set
exceeds the valve set pressure to when Section III to ensure that the valves open pressure to when the valve is fully open)
the valve is fully open, shall be less than within the design opening time. for the SVs is less than or equal to 0.5
or equal to the design opening time. seconds.
2.1-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
22. The steam discharge capacity of each Type tests will be conducted in accordance Valve capacity stamping on each SV
SV validates (i.e., is greater than or with the ASME Code Section III for relief records the certified capacity at rated
equal to that used in) the overpressure valve certification. setpoint of 140.2 kg/s (309 lbm/s)
protection analysis. minimum.
23. The relief-mode actuator (and safety- An analysis and type test will be performed The relief-mode actuation has the capacity to
related appurtenances) can open each to demonstrate the capacity Section III of lift the SRVs to the full open position one
SRV with the DW pressure at design the relief-mode actuation for each SRV. time with the DW pressure at the DW design
pressure. pressure when the accumulator is isolated
from its pneumatic pressure source.
24. The booster assembly opens each Type testing will be performed on the Each DPV opens when actuated by the
Depressurization Valve DPV in less booster assemblies to confirm that they are booster assembly in less than or equal to
than or equal to the design opening time capable of opening the valve at design basis 0.45 seconds with an inlet pressure of 7,584
(opening time to full rated capacity). conditions. Type testing, along with kPa ± 685 kPaG (1100 psig ± 99 psi).
analyses to adjust for design basis conditions
will be performed to demonstrate that the
booster opens each DPV within the design
opening time (opening time to full rated
capacity) and design conditions.
25. Each DPV minimum flow capacity is Analyses and type tests will be performed. The DPV flow capacity is greater than or
sufficient to support rapid equal to 239 kg/s (527 lbm/s) at an inlet
depressurization of the RPV (i.e., has a pressure of 7.480 MPaG (1085 psig).
flow capacity that is greater than or
equal to the design flow capacity under
design basis conditions).
26. (Deleted)
27. (Deleted)
2.1-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
28. Vacuum breakers are provided on An inspection and analysis will be The vacuum breakers are installed on the
SRV discharge lines to reduce the performed to confirm that the vacuum SRV discharge lines and the vacuum
post-discharge reflood height of water breakers are installed and to demonstrate breaker capacity and setpoint limit the
in the discharge lines. that the vacuum breaker capacity and water column in the discharge line.
setpoint limit the water column in the
discharge line.
29. The SRV discharge line vacuum Type test will be performed on the The following test criteria are met:
breakers close to prevent steam vacuum breaker for disk-closed leakage at • At SRV discharge line pressure
bypass to the DW during SRV line pressure during SRV discharge, disk during SRV discharges, the vacuum
discharge, and open following cracking (unseating) pressure, and full- breaker leak rate is less than or equal
discharge completion to permit open flow capacity. to design leak rate;
pressure equalization with the DW
• The disk unseat begins at design
and prevent ingestion of a water slug
cracking pressure; and,
into the SRV discharge lines.
• At disk full lift, the vacuum breaker
achieves equal to or greater than
design flow capacity.
2.1-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
30. The pressure loss coefficient of each As-built component records will be The pressure loss coefficient of each of
of the following components is within inspected and compared against inputs to the following components is within the
the uncertainty band of the pressure the natural circulation analysis, uncertainty band of the pressure loss
loss coefficient used in the natural considering uncertainty, performed to coefficient used in the natural circulation
circulation flow analysis: calculate pressure loss coefficients. flow analysis:
• Steam separator • Steam separator
• Fuel bundle • Fuel bundle
• Control rod guide
• Control rod guide tubes • Shroud support
• Shroud support
31. The free volume for each of the Inspection of as-built component records The free volume of each of the following
following components is within the will be performed to determine the components is within the uncertainty band
uncertainty band of the free volume component free volume for each of the of the free volume used in the natural
used in natural circulation flow listed components. circulation flow analysis:
analysis: • RPV
•RPV • Downcomer
•Downcomer • Core
•Core • Chimney
•Chimney • Separator/dryer
•Separator/dryer
2.1-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.1.2-3
32. The hydraulic diameter, geometry of As-built dimension inspection and The hydraulic diameter, geometry of
heated surfaces, and flow area in fuel analyses will be performed to determine heated surfaces, and flow area in the fuel
assemblies are within the uncertainty the geometry of the fuel assemblies to be assemblies are within the uncertainty band
band of the geometry used in the loaded. of the geometry used in the natural
natural circulation flow analysis. circulation flow analysis.
33. (Deleted)
34. (Deleted)
35. (Deleted)
36. The main steam line and SRV/SV Analysis of the as-built piping system and The main steam line and SRV/SV branch
branch piping geometry precludes equipment analysis, for acoustic resonance piping geometry precludes first and
first and second shear layer wave at plant normal operating conditions, will second shear layer wave acoustic
acoustic resonance conditions from be performed. resonance conditions from occurring and
occurring and avoids pressure loads results in no significant pressure loads on
on the steam dryer at plant normal the steam dryer at plant normal operating
operating conditions. conditions.
2.1-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.1.2-1. Safety Relief Valves, Depressurization Valves and Steamline Diagram
2.1-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.1.2-2. NBS Steamlines and Feedwater Lines
2.1-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.1.2-3. Safety Relief Valve Discharge Line Quencher Arrangement
2.1-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The following subsections describe the major instrumentation and control (I&C) systems for
the ESBWR.
2.2.1 Rod Control and Information System

Design Description
The Rod Control and Information System (RC&IS) automatically controls and monitors, and
provides manual control capability for, positioning of the control rods in the reactor by the
Control Rod Drive (CRD) System.
RC&IS alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed in Section 3.3.
(1) RC&IS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.1 and Table 2.2.1-1.
(2) RC&IS is divided into major functional groups as defined in Table 2.2.1-2.
(3) RC&IS provides automatic functions and initiators as defined in Table 2.2.1-3.
(4) RC&IS provides rod block functions as defined in Table 2.2.1-4.
(5) RC&IS provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as defined in Table 2.2.1-5.
(6) (Deleted)
(7) RC&IS has a dual redundant architecture.
(8) RC&IS equipment is powered by separate, non-divisional AC power sources.
(9) RC&IS has at least one power source being a nonsafety-related uninterruptible power
supply.
Table 2.2.1-6 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the RC&IS.
2.2-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-1
RC&IS Functional Arrangement
RC&IS Dedicated Operator Interface is located in the MCR.

RC&IS equipment is located in mild environment rooms within the Reactor Building (RB) and
Control Building (CB).
2.2-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-2
RC&IS Major Functional Groups
Major Functional Group Functions

Rod Control and Information Provides control rod position, Fine Motion Control Rod Drive
System Dedicated Operator (FMCRD status, RC&IS status, and Hydraulic Control Unit
Interface (HCU) status information to the plant operator in MCR.
Provides controls for performing normal rod movement
functions, bypassing major RC&IS subsystems, performing
CRD surveillance tests, and resetting RC&IS trips and
abnormal status conditions.
Rod Action Control System Comprises the following subsystems:
(RACS)
• Rod Action and Position Information (RAPI)
• RAPI DOI that displays the same information that is
available on the RC&IS Dedicated Operator Interface
• RAPI Signal Interface Unit (SIU)
• Rod Worth Minimizers (RWM)
• Automated Thermal Limited Monitor (ATLM)
Rod Action and Position Performs manual, semi-automatic, and automatic rod
Information (RAPI) movement commands.
Performs rod blocks, as defined in Table 2.2.1-4, based upon
internal RC&IS signals from either channel:
• ATLM
• RWM
• RAPI SIU
Performs rod blocks, as defined in Table 2.2.1-4, based upon
external input signals:
• Safety-related RPS Reactor Mode Switch position.
• Safety-related NMS SRNM.
• Safety-related NMS APRM.
2.2-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-2

RAPI (Continued) • Nonsafety-related NMS Multi-Channel Rod Block
Monitor (MRBM).
• Safety-related FMCRD control rod separation
switches.
• Nonsafety-related refueling platform position.
• Nonsafety-related refueling hoist load condition.
Maintains a mirror copy of the N-DCIS reference rod pull
sequence in memory.
Enforces adherence to reference rod pull sequence; deviation
from the RRPS causes RAPI logic to issue the following:
• Issue rod block as defined in Tables 2.2.1-3 and
2.2.1-4.
• Switch to RC&IS manual mode; disable automatic and
semi-automatic modes of operation.
• Send alarm signal to MCR that RC&IS is in manual
mode.
Provides control rod position and FMCRD status information
to the N-DCIS, the NMS, the RWM, and the ATLM.
Performs the scram-follow function.
Performs the Selected Control Rod Run-in (SCRRI) function.
Sends a SCRRI signal to the Diverse Protection System (DPS)
to initiate the SRI function.
Performs Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) motor run-in
function.
Sends/receives rod movement commands, rod position,
FMCRD status information, and RC&IS-related status
information.
Sends HCU purge water valve control signals
Sends and receives HCU status signals.
2.2-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-2

Provides capability to perform the following CRD System
surveillance tests:
• Scram Time Test,
• Coupling Check Test, and
• Double-Notch Test.
Rod Action and Position Handles RAPI inter-channel communication between ATLM,
Information Signal Interface RWM, and RAPI A and B channels and external
Unit (RAPI SIU) communication with the nonsafety-related NMS MRBM.
Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) Enforces absolute rod pattern restrictions, called the Ganged
Withdrawal Sequence Restrictions (GWSR) when reactor
power is below the low power setpoint (LPSP) and the RPS
reactor mode switch in either the STARTUP or RUN position.
Supports shutdown margin testing
Auto Thermal Limit Monitor Microprocessor-based subsystem of the RC&IS
(ATLM) Enforces Operating Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio
(OLMCPR)
Enforces the Operating Limit Maximum Linear Heat
Generation Rate (OLMLHGR)
Issues rod withdrawal block signals
Issues high-pressure FW heater bypass valves one-way block
signal.
Issues seventh FW heater steam heating valves one-way block
signal.
Initiates SCRRI/SRI functions on Loss of FW Heating
Remote Communication Houses the redundant microprocessor-based communication
Cabinets (RCCs) system that interfaces with the RAPI, MCC, and RBCC.
Motor Control Center (MCCs) Houses the FMCRD motor controllers.
Interfaces with RCC, RBCC and Emergency Rod Insertion
Panel (ERIP)
Rod Brake Controller Cabinets Operates the FMCRD holding brakes
(RBCCs) Interfaces with RCC.
2.2-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-2

Emergency Rod Insertion Located in CB. Relay-hardware based, nonsafety-related
Control Panel (ERICP) control system that alternatively commands scram follow,
ARI, and SCRRI.
Emergency Rod Insertion Panel Interface with the MCC FMCRD motor controllers.
(ERIP)
Scram Time Recording Panels Monitors the FMCRD position switch status
Automatically records and time tags FMCRD scram timing
position switch status changes
Transmits recorded scram timing data to the scram time
recording and analysis panel (STRAP)
Communicates with the RAPI
Scram Time Recording and Performs scram timing performance analysis
Analysis Panel (STRAP)
RAPI Auxiliary Panels Open HCU purge water valve.
Monitor scram valve position.
Monitor scram accumulator water pressure.
Monitor scram accumulator water level.
Send data to RAPI subsystem.
2.2-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-3
RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
Function Initiator Interfacing System

Initiate Rod Block and ATLM Operating Limit Minimum NMS
Terminate Rod Withdrawal Critical Power Ratio (OLMCPR)
(See Table 2.2.1-4 for a parameter greater than or equal to
complete list of rod blocks.) setpoint.
ATLM Operating Limit Maximum NMS
Linear Heat Generation Rate
(OLMLHGR) parameter greater than
or equal to setpoint.
SRNM period greater than or equal to NMS
setpoint.
RWM function sequence error. NMS
Refueling platform over core and fuel The RB refueling
on hoist. machine
Reactor Mode Switch (RMS) in RPS
SHUTDOWN position
Scram accumulator charging water CRD System
header pressure - low
Scram accumulator charging water CRD System
header pressure - low-low trip bypass
RWM function parameter greater than NMS
or equal to setpoint.
Large deviation of control rod -
positions from RRPS in selected gang.
Any attempt to withdraw an additional -
rod beyond the original control rod
pair.
RAPI trouble -
RAPI Signal Interface Unit trouble -
SCRRI Generator load rejection signal. TGCS
FW temperature low. DPS
Turbine trip signal. TGCS
2.2-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-3
RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

SCRRI initiation signal DPS
Rod separation detection rod Safety-related rod separation switches. CRD System
block
Scram follow / ARI FMCRD See Table 2.2.7-2 for RPS scram RPS, DPS
motor run-in initiating conditions and Table 2.2.14-
2 for DPS scram initiating conditions.
One-way block high-pressure ATLM issues high-pressure FW heater Feedwater Control
seventh FW heater bypass bypass valves one-way block System (FWCS)
valves
One-way block high-pressure ATLM issues high-pressure seventh FWCS
seventh FW heater steam FW heater steam heating valves one-
heating valves one-way block way block
2.2-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-4
RC&IS Rod Block Functions
Permissive
Rod Block Condition Description
Rod separation RMS: STARTUP or Rod withdrawal block only for those selected
detection RUN rod(s) for which the separation condition is
detected and are not in the Inoperable Bypass
condition.
RMS in SHUTDOWN RMS: SHUTDOWN Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
position
SRNM withdrawal RMS: SHUTDOWN, Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block REFUEL, or STARTUP
APRM withdrawal None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block
CRD charging water None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
low pressure
CRD charging water None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
low-pressure trip
bypass
RWM withdrawal Reactor power less Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
RWM insert block Reactor power less Rod insertion block for all control rods.
than setpoint
ATLM withdrawal Reactor power greater Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
MRBM withdrawal Reactor power greater Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
Gang large deviation RC&IS Mode Switch: Rod withdrawal block for all operable control
GANG: rods of the selected gang upon detection of:
− Large deviation of control rod
positions from RRPS in selected gang.
− Any attempt to withdraw an additional
rod beyond the original control rod
pair.
Refuel mode RMS: REFUEL, Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
2.2-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-4
RC&IS Rod Block Functions
Permissive
Rod Block Condition Description
withdrawal block refueling platform
over RPV, and fuel
bundle on crane
Startup mode RMS: STARTUP and Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
withdrawal block refueling platform
over RPV
RAPI trouble RRPS active Rod withdrawal block and rod insertion block
for all control rods.
RAPI Signal None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods
Interface Unit trouble when difference detected between any pair of
input or output A and B channels.
Electrical group None Rod withdrawal block and rod insertion block
power abnormal for all control rods.
2.2-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-5
RC&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Function Description
Control Single / Ganged mode selection.
Automatic / semi-automatic / manual mode selection.
Normal / notch / continuous control rod movement mode
Insert / Withdraw.
SCRRI/SRI manual initiation.
ARI manual initiation (DPS)
Interlock Single / Dual Rod Sequence Restriction Override
(S/DRSRO) allows an operator to place up to two control
rod associated with the same HCU in S/DRSRO for scram
time surveillance testing.
Rod Inoperable Bypass condition allows up to 8 control rod
to be selected with the Reactor Mode Switch (RMS) in RUN
position (RPS).
Rod Inoperable Bypass condition allows up to 54 control rod
to be selected with the RMS in REFUEL position (RPS).
Bypass RC&IS is capable of continued operation when different
subsystems of RC&IS are bypassed using the following bypass
functions:
Rod position detector channel bypass.
S/DRSRO.
Rod Inoperable Bypass selection.
Communication channel bypasses.
ATLM channel bypass.
RWM channel bypass.
RAPI channel bypass.
2.2-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-6
ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System

1. RC&IS functional arrangement is as Inspection(s) of the as-built system will The as-built system conforms with the
described in Subsection 2.2.1 and be performed. functional arrangement defined in
Table 2.2.1-1. Subsection 2.2.1 and Table 2.2.1-1.
2. RC&IS is divided into major Inspection(s) of the as-built system will Test and inspection report(s) document
functional groups as defined in Table be performed. that the as-built system is divided into
2.2.1-2. major functional groups as defined in
Table 2.2.1-2.
3. RC&IS provides automatic functions Test(s) will be performed for the Test and type test report(s) document that
and initiators, as defined in initiators on the as-built RC&IS using the RC&IS is capable of performing the
Table 2.2.1-3. simulated signals and actuators for the automatic functions as defined in Table
automatic functions defined in Table 2.2.1-3.
2.2.1-3.
4. RC&IS provides rod block functions Test(s) will be performed using The rod block functions defined in Table
as defined in Table 2.2.1-4. simulated signals and manual actions to 2.2.1-4 are performed in response to
confirm that the rod withdrawal and simulated signals and manual actions.
insertion commands are blocked as
defined in Table 2.2.1-4.
5. RC&IS provides controls, interlocks, Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system controls, interlocks, and
and bypasses as defined in Table system using simulated signals and bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
2.2.1-5. manual actions. main control room, or are performed in
response to simulated signals and manual
actions as defined in Table 2.2.1-5.
6. (Deleted)
2.2-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.1-6
ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System

7. RC&IS has a dual redundant Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The surviving channel continues to
architecture. system that simulate failure of each execute system functions with one failed
redundant channel. channel.
8. RC&IS equipment is powered by Test(s) will be performed on the as-built A test signal exists only in the channel
separate, non-divisional AC power system by simulating a failure of AC under test.
sources. power.
9. RC&IS has at least one power source Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The test signal exists from at least one
being a nonsafety-related system by providing a test signal in only nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC
uninterruptible power supply. one channel at a time. power supply only in the channel under
test.
2.2-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.2.1-1. (Deleted)
2.2-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.2 Control Rod Drive System

Design Description
The control rod drive (CRD) system, manually and automatically upon signal from the RPS,
DPS, and RC&IS, provides rapid control rod insertion (scram), performs fine control rod
positioning (reactivity control), detects control rod separation (prevent rod drop accident), limits
the rate of control rod ejection due to a break in the control rod pressure boundary (prevent fuel
damage), and supplies high pressure makeup water to the reactor during events in which the
feedwater system is unable to maintain reactor water level.
CRD system alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by
Section 3.3.
Conformance with IEEE Std. 603 requirements by the safety-related control system structures,
systems, or components defined in Table 2.2.2-6 is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
The environmental qualification of CRD system components defined in Tables 2.2.2-5 and
2.2.2-6 is addressed in Section 3.8; and the environmental and seismic qualification of digital
instrumentation and controls equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
CRD system software is developed in accordance with the software development program
described in Section 3.2 as part of the Plant Investment Protection (PIP) software projects.
(1) The functional arrangement of the CRD System comprises three major functional groups:
fine motion control rod drive (FMCRD), hydraulic control unit (HCU), and CRD hydraulic
subsystem, as described in Subsection 2.2.2 and Table 2.2.2-1 and shown in Figure 2.2.2-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
2.2-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(6) The FMCRD is capable of positioning control rod incrementally and continuously over its
entire range.
(7) Valves defined in Table 2.2.2-5 and 2.2.2-6 open and close under differential pressure,
fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(8) a. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a high-pressure makeup mode of operation that
injects water to the RPV via the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
RWCU/SDC return path.
b. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a safety-related isolation capability terminating
injection into the RPV.
c. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has an isolation bypass capability allowing injection to
the RPV.
(9) The PIP software project for the CRD system provides automatic functions, initiators, and
associated interfacing systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3.
(10) The PIP software project for the CRD system provides controls and interlocks as defined in
Table 2.2.2-4.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) The CRD system provides rapid control rod insertion in response to a scram signal.
(13) (Deleted)
(14) (Deleted)
(15) The FMCRD has an electro-mechanical brake with a minimum required holding torque on
the motor drive shaft.
(16) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance have
maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the CRD system that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(17) High Pressure (HP) CRD makeup water isolation valves are normally open and close on a
signal to close and on loss of air.
(18) HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass valves are normally closed and open on a signal to
open.
(19) FMCRDs have continuous control rod position indication sensors that detect control rod
position based on motor rotation.
2.2-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(20) FMCRDs have scram position indication switches that detect intermediate and scram
completion control rod positions.
(21) FMCRDs have a bayonet control rod coupling mechanism that requires a minimum
rotation to decouple.
(22) FMCRDs have spring-loaded latches in the hollow piston that engage slots in the guide
tube to prevent rotation of the bayonet coupling except at predefined positions.
(23) FMCRDs have redundant safety-related rod separation switches that detect separation of
the FMCRD from the control rod.
(24) Each FMCRD has a magnetic coupling that connects the associated drive motor to the
drive shaft through the associated CRD housing.
(25) FMCRDs have safety-related scram inlet port check valves that are installed to close under
reverse flow.
(26) HCU scram pilot solenoid valves transfer open to vent on loss of power to both solenoids.
(27) Backup scram solenoid valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when
energized.
(28) ARI valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when energized.
(29) Each HCU contains a nitrogen-water scram accumulator that can be charged to a
sufficiently high pressure and with the necessary valves and components to fully insert two
CRs.
(30) Scram accumulators are continuously monitored for water leakage by level instruments.
(31) Divisional safety-related power supplies power safety-related FMCRD and HCU equipment.
criteria for the CRD system.
2.2-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-1
CRD System Functional Arrangement
HCUs are located in four dedicated rooms in the Reactor Building (RB).
HCUs provide a flow path for purge water to the associated FMCRDs during normal
operation.
HCUs have a test port to allow connection of temporary test equipment for the conduct of
FMCRD ball check valve testing and drive friction testing.
FMCRDs are mounted to the reactor vessel bottom head inside containment.
2.2-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-2
CRD Maximum Allowable Scram Times for
Vessel Bottom Pressures Below 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig)
Percent Insertion Time (sec)

10 0.34
40 0.80
60 1.15
100 2.23
2.2-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-3
CRD System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

Hydraulic scram RPS scram signal RPS and DPS
Scram follow/ARI motor run- RPS scram signal / DPS RPS and DPS
in scram signal
Provide makeup water to RPV water level low (L2) NBS
RPV
SCRRI (electric) SCRRI signals RC&IS and DPS
ARI (hydraulic) DPS ARI signal DPS
SRI (hydraulic) DPS SRI signals DPS
Isolate makeup water to RPV GDCS Pool level low LD&IS
Drywell pressure high and
Drywell level high
Isolation Bypass GDCS initiation logic and GDCS
time delay and GDCS Pool
level not low
2.2-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-4
CRD System Controls and Interlocks
Parameter Description
Control Manual start (CRD pumps)
Interlock High pressure makeup mode
(RPV water level low (Level 2))
• The standby CRD pump is started. Both pumps
operate in parallel to deliver the required makeup
flow capacity to the reactor.
• The two pump suction filter bypass valves are
opened.
• The scram accumulator charging water header
isolation valve and purge water header isolation
valve are closed.
• Each pump minimum flow line isolation valve
closes.
• The flow control valves in the high pressure makeup
lines open to regulate the makeup water flow rate to
the reactor.
• The test valve in the high pressure makeup line to
the RWCU/SDC system opens if it is closed at the
start of the event and the test valve in the return line
to the CST closes if it is open at the start of the
event.
• The high pressure makeup flow control valves close
to stop flow to the reactor at high reactor water
Level 8.
• Each pump minimum flow line isolation valve
opens and both pumps continue to operate in a low
flow condition by directing their flow back to the
CST through the pump minimum flow lines.
2.2-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-4 (Continued)

• The control valves reopen and the pump minimum

flow isolation valve closes to restart high pressure
makeup flow if a subsequent Level 2 signal should
occur.
Normal operation mode (CRD common pump discharge
line pressure low)
• Start standby CRD pump.
Normal operation mode (CRD pump inlet pressure low)
• Trip running CRD pump after expiration of an
adjustable time delay.
Normal operation mode (pump lube oil pressure low)
• Trip running CRD pumps and remove CRD pump
start permissive condition.
Normal operation mode (rod separation detection)
• Send individual rod block initiate signal to RC&IS.
Normal operation mode (scram accumulator charging water
header pressure - low)
• Send all rods block initiate signal to RC&IS.
Normal operation mode (rod gang misalignment)
• Send all rods in gang block initiate signal to RC&IS.
High pressure makeup mode (inboard FW maintenance
valve closed)
• Inhibit opening (makeup water) injection valves.
High pressure makeup mode (at least two GDCS pool levels
low or Drywell pressure high and Drywell level high)
• Isolate CRD pumps to allow both pumps to operate
in a low flow condition by directing their flow back
to the CST through the pump minimum flow lines.
2.2-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-4 (Continued)

High pressure makeup mode Isolation Bypass (GDCS
initiation logic and time delay and at least two GDCS pools
not low)
 The HP CRD Isolation Bypass valves open to allow
normal high pressure makeup mode.
CRD common pump discharge line pressure low
 Starts the standby pump.
CRD common pump discharge line flow
 Modulates purge water control valves.
Injection flow
 Modulates injection valves.
2.2-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-5
Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment
Equipment Name Identifier ASME
Seismic RCPB
Code (Deleted) MCR Alarms
(Description) See Figure Cat. I Component
Section III
2.2.2-1
FMCRD components required FMCRD No Yes No
for scram –
FMCRD reactor coolant FMCRD Yes Yes Yes

primary pressure boundary –
components
HCU components required for HCU No Yes No 1. Scram accumulator
scram gas pressure low
2. Scram accumulator
leakage high
Scram inlet piping – Yes Yes No –
Internal drive housing supports – – Yes No –
FMCRD magnetic coupling FMCRD – Yes No –
FMCRD ball check valves FMCRD – Yes No –
HCU charging water supply HCU Yes Yes No
line check valve –
HCU purge water supply line HCU Yes Yes No

check valve –
High pressure makeup isolation HP CRD Yes Yes No –

valves Isolation
valves
2.2-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-5
Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment
Equipment Name Identifier ASME
Seismic RCPB
Code (Deleted) MCR Alarms
(Description) See Figure Cat. I Component
Section III
2.2.2-1
High pressure makeup isolation HP CRD Yes Yes No –
bypass valves (not including Isolation
valve operator) Bypass valves
2.2-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-6
Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- (Deleted) Loss of Remotely
Identifier Q-DCIS/DPS Category I Related Related Motive Operated
(Description) Power Valve
See Figure Display
See Note 1 Position
2.2.2-1
HCU scram solenoid SSPV Yes Yes Yes Associated Vent By RPS
pilot valves scram HCU system
valve scram logic
position valve
status
FMCRD passive FMCRD No Yes Yes Yes Apply -
holding brakes brake
Scram accumulator Div 1-4 Yes Yes Yes MCR - -

charging water header alarm
pressure transmitters
FMCRD separation FMCRD Yes Yes Yes MCR - -
switches alarm
High pressure makeup HP CRD Yes Yes Yes MCR valve Close Yes
isolation valves Isolation position
valves
High pressure makeup HP CRD Yes Yes Yes MCR valve As-Is Yes
isolation bypass Isolation position
valves (not including Bypass
valve operator) valves
2.2-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-6
Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- (Deleted) Loss of Remotely
Identifier Q-DCIS/DPS Category I Related Related Motive Operated
(Description) Power Valve
See Figure Display
See Note 1 Position
2.2.2-1
Backup scram valve Backup Yes Yes Yes Associated As-Is By RPS
solenoids scram valves scram system
valve logic
position
status
NOTE 1: See Tables 2.2.2-3, 2.2.2-4, and 2.2.2-5 for control functions and initiating conditions.
2.2-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System

1. The functional arrangement of the CRD Inspection(s) of the as-built CRD system The CRD system conforms to the
System comprises three major functional will be conducted. functional arrangement as described in
groups: fine motion control rod drive Subsection 2.2.2 and Table 2.2.2-1 and
(FMCRD), hydraulic control unit (HCU), as shown in Figure 2.2.2-1.
and CRD hydraulic subsystem, as
described in Subsection 2.2.2 and Table
2.2.2-1 and as shown in Figure 2.2.2-1.
2a1. (Deleted)
Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as 3550) (certified, when required by
shall be reconciled with the design ASME Code Section III using as- ASME Code) exist and conclude that
requirements. designed and as-built information and design reconciliation has been
ASME Code Design Reports (NCA- completed, in accordance with ASME
3550) will be performed. Code, for as-built reconciliation of the
components identified in Table 2.2.2-5
as ASME Code Section III, and that the
design of as-built components
identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME
Code Section III complies with the
requirements of ASME Code Section
III. The report documents the results of
the reconciliation analysis.
2.2-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified ASME Code Data Report(s) (including
2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III are in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section N-5 Data Reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME
accordance with ASME Code Section III Code) and inspection reports exist and
requirements. conclude that the components identified
in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code
Section III are fabricated, installed, and
inspected in accordance with ASME
Code Section III requirements.
2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-5 as Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
ASME Code Section III is designed in Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by
accordance with ASME Code Section III documents will be conducted. ASME Code) exist and conclude that
requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} the design of the piping identified in
Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section
III complies with the requirements of
ASME Code Section III, including
those stresses applicable to loads
related to fatigue (including
2.2-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME 3550) (certified, when required by
shall be reconciled with the piping Code Section III using as-designed and ASME Code) exist and conclude that
design requirements. as-built information and ASME Code design reconciliation has been
Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be completed, in accordance with ASME
performed. Code, for as-built reconciliation of the
piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as
ASME Code Section III. The report
documents the results of the
2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as A reconciliation analysis of the piping ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
ASME Code Section III is fabricated, identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME 3550) (certified, when required by
installed, and inspected in accordance Code Section III using as-designed and ASME Code) exist and conclude that
with ASME Code Section III as-built information and ASME Code design reconciliation has been
requirements. Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be completed, in accordance with ASME
performed. Code, for as-built reconciliation of the
piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as
documents the results of the
3a. Pressure boundary welds in components Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and
identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME boundary welds in components identified conclude that ASME Code Section III
Code Section III meet ASME Code in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section requirements are met for non-
Section III non-destructive examination III will be performed in accordance with destructive examination of pressure
requirements. ASME Code Section III. boundary welds in components
Code Section III.
2.2-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and
identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME boundary welds in piping identified in conclude that ASME Code Section III
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-
Section III non-destructive examination will be performed in accordance with destructive examination of pressure
requirements. ASME Code Section III. boundary welds in piping identified in
Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section
III.
Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III those code components identified in conclude that the results of the
retain their pressure boundary integrity at Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III hydrostatic test of components
their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME
tested by ASME Code Section III. Code Section III comply with the
requirements of ASME Code Section
III.
4b. The piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table 2.2.2- conclude that the results of the
pressure boundary integrity at its design 5 as ASME Code Section III that is hydrostatic test of piping identified in
pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section
ASME Code Section III. III comply with the requirements in
5. The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2- i. Inspection will be performed to i. The equipment identified as
5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category verify that the Seismic Category I Seismic Category I in Table 2.2.2-5
I can withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 is located in a
without loss of safety function. and Table 2.2.2-6 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.
Seismic Category I structure.
2.2-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

ii. Type tests, analyses, or a ii. The equipment identified in
combination of type tests and Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as
analyses, of equipment identified in Seismic Category I can withstand
Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I loads without
Seismic Category I, will be loss of safety function.
requirements.
iii. Inspections and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment identified in
equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 Seismic Category I, including
and Table 2.2.2-6, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic
anchorage, is bounded by the testing Category I loads without loss of
or analyzed conditions. safety function.
6. The FMCRD is capable of positioning Type test(s) will be performed of the The FMCRD is capable of positioning
control rod incrementally and motor run-in and withdrawal function on control rod incrementally and
continuously over its entire range. the FMCRD using a simulated control continuously over its entire range.
rod.
7. Valves defined in Table 2.2.2-5 and Tests of installed valves will be Upon receipt of the actuating signal,
2.2.2-6 open and close under differential performed for opening and closing under each valve changes position under
pressure, fluid flow, and temperature system preoperational differential differential pressure, fluid flow, and
conditions. pressure, fluid flow, and temperature temperature conditions.
conditions.
2.2-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

8a. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a high Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem The CRD hydraulic subsystem high
pressure makeup mode of operation that high pressure makeup mode of operation pressure makeup mode of operation
injects water to the RPV via the will be conducted on the as-built system injects water to the RPV via the
RWCU/SDC return path. verifying that water is injected to the RWCU/SDC return path.
RPV via the RWCU/SDC return path.
8b. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem The CRD hydraulic subsystem high
safety-related isolation capability high pressure makeup mode of operation pressure makeup mode of operation
terminating water injection into the RPV. will be conducted on the as-built system terminates water injection to the RPV
verifying that water injection is via the safety-related isolation.
terminated to the RPV via the safety-
related isolation.
8c. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has an Test(s) of the CRD hydraulic subsystem The CRD hydraulic subsystem high
isolation bypass capability allowing high pressure makeup mode of operation pressure makeup mode of operation
water injection to the RPV. will be conducted on the as-built system injects water to the RPV via the
verifying that water is injected to the isolation bypass.
RPV via the isolation bypass.
9. The PIP software project for the CRD Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The PIP network segments for the CRD
system provides automatic functions, system using simulated signals initiated system are capable of performing the
initiators, and associated interfacing from all of the associated interfacing as- automatic functions defined in Table
systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3. built systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3. 2.2.2-3 using simulated signals initiated
from all of the associated interfacing
as-built systems as defined in Table
2.2.2-3.
2.2-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

10. The PIP software project for the CRD Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The PIP network segments for the CRD
system provides controls and interlocks system using simulated signals. system controls and interlocks exist,
as defined in Table 2.2.2-4. can be retrieved in the main control
room, and perform in response to
simulated signals and manual actions as
11. (Deleted)
12. The CRD system provides rapid control Test(s) will be performed of each CRD The scram insertion time for each
rod insertion in response to a scram control rod pair scram function using control rod pair is less than or equal to
signal. simulated signals. the maximum allowable scram times as
13. (Deleted)
14. (Deleted)
15. The FMCRD has an electro-mechanical Tests of each FMCRD brake will be The FMCRD electro-mechanical brake
brake with a minimum required holding conducted in a test facility has a minimum required holding torque
torque on the motor drive shaft. of 49 N-m (36 ft-lbf) on the motor drive
shaft.
16a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that Inspections of piping design isometric A review piping design isometric
require maintenance have maintenance drawings will be conducted. drawings, confirms that maintenance
valves such that freeze seals will not be {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} valves are included such that freeze
required. seals will not be required.
2.2-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

16b. The as-built location of valves on lines A reconciliation analysis of valves on Design reconciliation has been
attached to the CRD system that require lines attached to the RPV system that completed for the as-built location of
maintenance shall be reconciled to require maintenance using as-designed valves relative to the design
design requirements. and as-built information will be requirements. A report documents the
performed. results of the reconciliation analysis.
17. HP CRD makeup water isolation valves Tests of the as-built HP CRD makeup The as-built HP CRD makeup water
are normally open and close on a signal to water isolation valves will be performed isolation valves are normally open and
close and on loss of air. close on a signal to close and on loss of
air.
18. HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass Tests of the as-built HP CRD makeup The as-built HP CRD makeup water
valves are normally closed and open on a water isolation bypass valves will be isolation bypass valves are normally
signal to open. performed. closed and open on a signal to open.
19. FMCRDs have continuous control rod Test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD FMCRDs have continuous control rod
position indication sensors that detect continuous control rod position position indication in the MCR based
control rod position based on motor indication sensors by simulating motor on motor rotation.
rotation. run-in of each control rod.
20. FMCRDs have scram position indication Test(s) will be performed on the FMCRD FMCRDs have scram position
switches that detect intermediate and scram position indication switches by indication in the MCR for intermediate
scram completion control rod positions. simulating motor run-in of each control and scram completion control rod
rod. positions.
21. FMCRDs have a bayonet control rod Test(s) will be performed on each After being rotated at least one-eighth
coupling mechanism that requires a FMCRD control rod coupling turn the control rod coupling
minimum rotation to decouple. mechanism. mechanism uncouples the FMCRD
from the control rod.
2.2-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

22. FMCRDs have spring-loaded latches in Type test(s) will be performed on the The FMCRD bayonet coupling rotates
the hollow piston that engage slots in the FMCRD latches by rotating the bayonet less than one-eighth turn when the
guide tube to prevent rotation of the coupling. spring-loaded latches in the hollow
bayonet coupling except at predefined piston are engaged in slots in the guide
positions. tube.
23. FMCRDs have safety-related redundant Test(s) will be performed on each Each redundant safety-related rod
rod separation switches that detect FMCRD safety-related rod separation separation switch detects separation of
separation of the FMCRD from the switch. the FMCRD from the control rod and
control rod. indicates the separation status in the
MCR.
24. Each FMCRD has a magnetic coupling Type test(s) will be performed on the For each FMCRD, the associated drive
that connects the associated drive motor FMCRD magnetic coupling. motor that is outside the CRD housing
to the drive shaft through the associated rotates the associated drive shaft that is
CRD housing. inside the associated CRD housing up
to the torque rating required for the
FMCRD operation.
25. FMCRDs have safety-related scram inlet Inspection(s) will be performed of the as- Safety-related scram inlet port check
port check valves that are installed to built inlet port check valve installation. valves are installed with normal flow
close under reverse flow. direction going into the reactor.
26. HCU scram pilot solenoid valves transfer Test(s) will be performed on each HCU Each HCU scram pilot solenoid valve
open to vent on loss of power to both scram pilot solenoid valve. transfers open to vent on loss of power
solenoids. to both solenoids.
27. Backup scram solenoid valves are closed Test(s) will be performed on each backup Each backup scram solenoid valve
on loss of power and transfer open to scram solenoid valve. closes on loss of power and transfers
vent when energized. open to vent when energized.
2.2-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.2-7

28. ARI valves are closed on loss of power Test(s) will be performed on each ARI Each ARI valve closes on loss of power
and transfer open to vent when valve. and transfers open to vent when
energized. energized.
29. Each HCU contains a nitrogen-water Test(s) will be performed on each HCU With each accumulator fully charged,
scram accumulator that can be charged to and control rod pair, as applicable, with each HCU fully inserts both control rod
a sufficiently high pressure and with the the reactor unpressurized, using in the pair as applicable.
necessary valves and components to fully simulated scram signals.
insert two CRs.
30. Scram accumulators are continuously Test(s) will be performed on the level Low scram accumulator water level is
monitored for water leakage by level instruments in each scram accumulator. detected by each level instrument and is
instruments. indicated in the MCR.
31. Divisional safety-related power supplies Test(s) will be performed on the as-built A test signal exists only in the FMCRD
power safety-related FMCRD and HCU system by providing a test signal in only and HCU equipment powered by the
equipment. one divisional safety-related power divisional power supply under test.
supply at a time.
2.2-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.2.2-1. Control Rod Drive System
2.2-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.3 Feedwater Control System

Design Description
The Feedwater Control System (FWCS), automatically or manually, controls RPV water level by
modulating the supply of feedwater flow to the RPV, the low flow control valve (LFCV),
individual reactor feed pump Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD), or the RWCU/SDC system
overboard control valve (OBCV).
The FWCS changes reactor power by automatically or manually controlling FW temperature by
modulating the seventh FW heater steam heating valves or the high-pressure FW heater bypass
valves.
FWCS alarms, displays, controls and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section
3.3.
(1) FWCS functional arrangement is described in Subsection 2.2.3 and Table 2.2.3-1.
(2) FWCS provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.3-2.
(3) FWCS provides controls as described in Table 2.2.3-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) FWCS controllers are triple redundant fault tolerant.
criteria for the FWCS.
2.2-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.3-1
FWCS Functional Arrangement
FWCS is located in the Control Building, Reactor Building, and Turbine Building.
2.2-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.3-2
FWCS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
Functions Initiators Interfacing System

Perform FW runback RPV water level high NBS
(Level 8)
Reduce speed of other FW FW flow high on one FW -
pumps pump run-out
Start standby reactor feed Reactor feed pump trip -
pump
Open the steamline Steam flow less than -
condensate drain valves predefined value of rated
flow
Perform FW runback and ATWS trip signal DPS
close the LFCV and the
RWCU/SDC overboard flow
control valve
One-way block high-pressure ATLM issues high-pressure RC&IS
FW heater bypass valves FW heater bypass valves one-
way block signal
One-way block seventh FW ATLM issues seventh FW RC&IS
heater steam heating valves heater steam heating valves
one-way block signal
2.2-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.3-3
FWCS Controls
RPV Level Control Manual speed control (reactor feed pump)
Manual start/stop (reactor feed pump)
Automatic / manual mode (reactor feed pump control)
Manual control (high pressure FW heater string bypass
valves and isolation valves)
Automatic Control Modes:

• Single element control: (enable at predefined value
below rated reactor power) RPV water level:
- Modulate either the low flow control valve
(LFCV) or individual reactor feed pump ASD.
- Modulate RWCU/SDC system overboard
control valve (OBCV)
• Three element control: (enable during normal power
operation) Three process variables generate master
feedwater flow demand signal (for output to
individual reactor feed pump loop trim controller):
- Total steam flow
- Total FW flow
- RPV water level
Reactor feed pump loop trim controller output plus master
feedwater flow controller output modulates individual
reactor feed pump ASD:
• Master FW flow demand signal
• Individual reactor feed pump flow signals
FW Temperature Control Manual mode: FW temperature setpoint set by operator
Automatic mode: FW temperature setpoint is provided by
PAS
• Modulate FW heater No. 7 steam inlet valves
• Modulate HP FW Heaters bypass valves
2.2-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.3-4
ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System

1. The FWCS functional arrangement is Inspections of the as-built system will be The FWCS functional arrangement is as
as described in Subsection 2.2.3 and performed. defined in Subsection 2.2.3 and Table
Table 2.2.3-1. 2.2.3-1.
2. FWCS provides automatic functions Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system performs the functions
and initiators as described in Table system using simulated signals. defined in Table 2.2.3-2.
2.2.3-2.
3. FWCS provides controls as defined in Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The FWCS controls and interlocks exist,
Table 2.2.3-3. system using simulated signals and can be retrieved in the main control room,
manual actions. and are performed in response to
simulated signals and manual actions as
4. (Deleted)
2.2-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.3-4
ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System

5. FWCS controllers are triple redundant i. Test(s) will be performed simulating i. Failure of any one FWCS temperature
and fault tolerant. failure of each FWCS temperature controller does not affect FWCS
controller. output.
ii. Test(s) will be performed simulating ii. Failure of any one FWCS level
failure of each FWCS level controller does not affect FWCS
controller. output.
iii. Test(s) will be performed simulating iii. “Lock-up” signal is sent to feed pump
discrepancy between field voter ASDs following discrepancy between
output and the control signal actually field voter output and control signal
sent to the ASDs. actually sent.
iv. Test(s) will be performed simulating iv. “Lock-Up” signal is sent to the
discrepancy between field voter modulating steam admission valves of
output and the control signal actually the seventh stage feedwater heater
sent to the modulating steam and the modulating heater bypass
admission valves. valves, following discrepancy
between field voter output and control
signal actually sent.
2.2-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.2.3-1. (Deleted)
2.2-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.4 Standby Liquid Control System

Design Description
The Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System is an alternative means to reduce core reactivity to
ensure complete shutdown of the reactor core from the most reactive conditions at any time in
core life, and provides makeup water to the RPV to mitigate the consequences of a Loss-of-
Coolant-Accident (LOCA).
The SLC alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
systems, or components defined in Tables 2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-5 is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
The environmental qualification of SLC System components defined in Tables 2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-
5 are addressed in Section 3.8; and the environmental and seismic qualification of digital
instrumentation and controls equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
SLC software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2 as part of the ATWS/SLC software projects and SSLC/ESF software projects.
(1) The functional arrangement of the SLC System is as described in Subsection 2.2.4 and
shown in Figure 2.2.4-1.
(2) The SLC System provides automatic functions and initiators are as defined in Table
2.2.4-2.
(3) The SLC System provides controls and interlocks as defined in Table 2.2.4-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) During an ATWS, the SLC System shall be capable of injecting borated water into the RPV at
flow rates that assure rapid power reduction.
(8) The SLC System shall be capable of injecting borated water for use as makeup water to the
RPV in response to a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA).
(9) The redundant injection shut-off valves shown in Figure 2.2.4-1 as V1, V2, V3, and V4 are
automatically closed by low accumulator level signals from the respective accumulator
level monitors.
(10) a1. (Deleted)
2.2-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(14) (Deleted).
(15) Each of the SLC System divisions and safety-related loads/components identified in Tables
2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-5 is powered from its respective safety-related division.
(16) In the SLC System, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and
between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
(17) a. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located outside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.
b. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located inside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.
(18) Re-positionable (not squib) valves listed in Table 2.2.4-4 open, close, or both open and
close under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(19) The pneumatically operated valve(s) designated in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the mode listed if
either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the
valve(s) is lost.
(20) Check valves designated in Table 2.2.4-4 as having a safety-related function open and
close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(21) The SLC System injection squib valve will open as designed.
(22) The equivalent natural boron concentration at cold shutdown conditions for the total
solution injection volume is based on the liquid inventory in the RPV at the main steam
line nozzle elevation plus the liquid inventory in the reactor shutdown cooling piping and
equipment of the RWCU/SDC system.
(23) (Deleted)
(24) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves
such that freeze seals will not be required.
2.2-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the SLC System that
require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(25) Each accumulator tank has an injectable liquid volume of at least 7.80 m3 (2060 gal).
(26) Each accumulator tank has a cover gas volume above the liquid of at least 14.8 m3
(523 ft3).
(27) Each accumulator tank is capable of maintaining an initial nitrogen cover gas absolute
pressure of least 14.82 MPa (2150 psia).
criteria for the SLC system.
2.2-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-1
(Deleted)
2.2-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-2
SLC System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

Open SLC injection valves DPV Group 1 timer expired. SSLC/ESF, NBS and DPS
RPV pressure high and Startup NBS, NMS, and ATWS/SLC
Range Neutron Monitor
(SRNM), i.e., the SRNM
ATWS permissive, exist for
specified time delay period.
SRNM ATWS permissive and NBS, NMS, and ATWS/SLC
RPV water level low (L2)
exist for specified time delay
period.
SRNM ATWS permissive and NBS, NMS, ATWS/SLC, and
Manual ARI/FMCRD run-in DPS
signals exist for specified time
delay period.
Close SLC accumulator SLC accumulator level low -
shut-off valves following injection.
2.2-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-3
SLC System Controls and Interlocks
Control Manual initiation of SLC injection valves
Interlock ATWS trip signal (from ATWS/SLC trip signal to open
SLC injection squib valves )
ECCS initiation signal (from SSLC/ESF to open SLC
injection squib valves)
RWCU/SDC isolation signal to LD&IS on SLC injection
(from ATWS/SLC)
ECCS initiation signal (from DPS to open SLC injection
squib valves)
2.2-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment ASME Loss of

Equipment Containment
Identifier Code Seismic RCPB Remotely Motive MCR
Name Isolation
See Figure Section Cat. I Component Operated Power Alarms
(Description) III Valve Position
2.2.4-1
Train A Nitrogen
Supply Line V-20 Yes Yes No No No – No
Check Valve
Train B Nitrogen
Supply Line V-19 Yes Yes No No No – No
Check Valve
Train A Nitrogen
Supply Isolation V-18 Yes Yes No No Yes Closed Note 1
Valve
Train A
– Yes Yes No No No – No
Accumulator
Train A
Accumulator V-22 Yes Yes No No No – No
Relief Valve
Train B Nitrogen
Supply Isolation V-15 Yes Yes No No Yes Closed Note 1
Valve
Train B
Accumulator
Train B
Accumulator V-21 Yes Yes No No No – No
Relief Valve
Train A
Accumulator V-17 Yes Yes No No Yes Closed Note 1
Vent Valve
2.2-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-4

Name Isolation
2.2.4-1
Train A
Vent Valve
Train A
Accumulator
Vent Line Flow – Yes Yes No No – – No
Restricting
Orifice
Train B
Vent Valve
Train B
Vent Valve
Train B
Accumulator
Vent Line Flow – Yes Yes No No – – No
Restricting
Orifice
Train A
Fail-as-
Accumulator V-3 Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
is
Shut-off Valve
Train A
Fail-as-
is
Shut-off Valve
2.2-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-4

Name Isolation
2.2.4-1
Train B
Fail-as-
is
Shut-off Valve
Train B
Fail-as-
is
Shut-off Valve
Train A Injection Fail-as-
V-7 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Squib Valve is
Train A Injection Fail-as-
Squib Valve is
Train B Injection Fail-as-
Squib Valve is
Train B Injection Fail-as-
Squib Valve is
Train A
Accumulator
V-24 Yes Yes Yes No No – No
Injection
Test/Vent Valve
Train B
Accumulator
Injection
Test/Vent Valve
Train A Injection
V-11 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – No
Check Valve
2.2-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-4

Name Isolation
2.2.4-1
Train A Injection
Check Valve
Train B Injection
Check Valve
Train B Injection
Check Valve
Train A Vessel
Isolation Valve
Train B Vessel
Isolation Valve
Main Mixing
Pump Suction V-27 Yes Yes No No No – No
Isolation Valve
Main Mixing
Pump Discharge V-28 Yes Yes No No No – No
Isolation Valve
Poison Solution
Batch Mixing V-29 Yes Yes No No No – No
Isolation Valve
2.2-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-4

Name Isolation
2.2.4-1
Train A piping
from the locked
open valve
closest to the
reactor vessel
through the first
non-seismic
class break
Train B piping
from the locked
open valve
closest to the
reactor vessel
through the first
non-seismic
class break
NOTE 1: Final determination of MCR Alarms will be based on Section 3.3.
2.2-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-5
SLC System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Control Containment

Equipment Name Identifier Q-DCIS Safety-
Seismic Safety- Remotely Isolation
/ DPS Related
Cat. I Related
(Description) See Figure Display Operated Valve
2.2.4-1 Actuator
Train A
Accumulator PT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Pressure Sensor
Train B
Accumulator PT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Pressure Sensor
Train A
Accumulator Level LT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Sensor
Train B
Accumulator Level LT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Sensor
Train A Injection
Yes
Squib Valve – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note 1
Initiator(s)
Train B Injection
Yes
Squib Valve – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note 1
Initiator(s)
SLC Train A and
Train B Logic – Yes Yes Yes – – No
Controllers
Train A Nitrogen
Supply Isolation V-18 No Yes No Note 2 Yes No
Valve
2.2-57
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-5

/ DPS Related
Cat. I Related
2.2.4-1 Actuator
Train B Nitrogen
Supply Isolation V-15 No Yes No Note 2 Yes No
Valve
Train A
Accumulator Vent V-17 No Yes No Note 2 Yes No
Valve
Train A
Valve
Train B
Valve
Train B
Valve
Train A
Accumulator V-3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Shutoff Valve
Train A
Shutoff Valve
Train B
Shutoff Valve
2.2-58
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-5

/ DPS Related
Cat. I Related
2.2.4-1 Actuator
Train B
Shutoff Valve
Train A
Accumulator
TI No Yes No Note 2 – No
Temperature
Indicator
Train B
Accumulator
TI No Yes No Note 2 – No
Temperature
Indicator
NOTE 1: Squib valve initiators allow independent SLC injection from different safety-related divisions or DPS
NOTE 2: Final determination of safety-related display will be based on Section 3.3.
2.2-59
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System

1. The functional arrangement of the SLC Inspection(s) of the as-built system will The as-built system conforms to the
system is as described in Subsection be performed. functional arrangement described in
2.2.4 and shown in Figure 2.2.4-1. Subsection 2.2.4 and shown in Figure
2.2.4-1.
2. The SLC System provides automatic Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The SLC system Train A and Train B
functions and initiators are as defined SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Logic Controllers are capable of
in Table 2.2.4-2. Controllers using simulated signals and performing the automatic functions
actuators for the automatic functions described in Table 2.2.4-2.
3. The SLC system provides controls and Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The SLC system Train A and Train B
interlocks as described in Table 2.2.4- SLC system Train A and Train B Logic Logic Controllers controls and interlocks
3. Controllers using simulated signals and exist, can be retrieved in the main control
actuators for the controls and interlocks room, and perform in response to
defined in Table 2.2.4-3. simulated signals and manual actions as
described in Table 2.2.4-3.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
2.2-60
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

7. During an ATWS, the SLC system Tests are conducted to measure injection During an ATWS the as-built SLC system
shall be capable of injecting borated time of the as-built SLC system by (both accumulators) injects borated water
water into the RPV at flow rates that injecting demineralized water from both into the RPV within the following time
assure rapid power reduction. accumulators into the open RPV. The frames:
initial differential pressure (6.21 MPa) 3 3
• The first 5.4 m (190 ft )of solution
between the accumulators and the RPV injects in ≤ 196 seconds.
are set to that expected at the beginning • The first and second 5.4 m3 (190
of an ATWS by adjusting the ft3)of solution injects in ≤ 519
accumulator pressures. Analyses are seconds.
performed to correlate test results to as-
built SLC system performance during
postulated ATWS conditions.
8. The SLC system shall be capable of Tests are conducted with the as-built The as-built SLC system (both accumulators)
injecting borated water for use as SLC system to measure the total volume injects a total volume of ≥15.6 m3 (551 ft3)
makeup water to the RPV in response of demineralized water injected from of borated water in response to a postulated
to a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident both accumulators into the open RPV. LOCA.
(LOCA). These tests utilize the continuation of
the tests conducted in ITAAC #7.
Analyses are performed to correlate test
results to as-built SLC system
performance during postulated actual
LOCA conditions.
9. The redundant injection shut-off valves Test(s) will be performed using a The as-built injection shut-off valves
shown in Figure 2.2.4-1 as V1, V2, V3, simulated low accumulator level signal identified in Figure 2.2.4-1 as V1, V2,
and V4 are automatically closed by low to close the injection shut-off valves V1, V3, and V4 close upon receipt of a
accumulator level signals from their V2, V3, and V4. simulated low accumulator level signal
respective accumulator level monitors.
2.2-61
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

10a1. (Deleted)
Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Section III shall be reconciled with as ASME Code Section III using as- Code) exist and conclude that design
the design requirements. designed and as-built information and reconciliation has been completed, in
ASME Code Design Reports (NCA- accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
3550) will be performed. reconciliation of the components
identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code
Section III, and that the design of as-built
10a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
are fabricated, installed, and III will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
inspected in accordance with ASME and inspection reports exist and conclude
Code Section III requirements. that the components identified in Table
requirements.
2.2-62
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

10b1. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4- Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
4 as ASME Code Section III is Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
designed in accordance with ASME documents will be conducted. Code) exist and conclude that the design
Code Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as
requirements of the ASME Code, Section
Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code identified in Table 2.2.4- as ASME 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Section III shall be reconciled with Code Section III using as-designed and Code) exist and conclude that design
the piping design requirements. as-built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed, in
performed. reconciliation of the piping identified in
Table 2.2.4 -4 as ASME Code Section III.
2.2-63
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

10b3. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4- Inspections of the piping identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified,
4 as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III when required by ASME Code) and
accordance with ASME Code Reports where applicable) exist and
Section III requirements. conclude that the piping identified in
requirements.
components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 boundary welds in components that ASME Code Section III requirements
as ASME Code Section III meet ASME identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME are met for non-destructive examination
Code Section III non-destructive Code Section III will be performed in of pressure boundary welds in
examination requirements. accordance with ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as
III. ASME Code Section III.
Section III non-destructive examination will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in piping
requirements. ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code
Section III.
Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section those code components identified in conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
III retain their pressure boundary Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III test of components identified in Table
integrity at their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III
tested by ASME Code Section III. comply with the requirements of ASME
Code Section III.
2.2-64
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

as ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at its 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III that test of piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4
design pressure. is required to be hydrostatically tested as ASME Code Section III comply with
by ASME Code Section III. the requirements in ASME Code Section
III.
13. The equipment identified in i. Inspection will be performed to i. The equipment identified as Seismic
Tables 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.2.4-4 and Table
Seismic Category I can withstand equipment identified in 2.2.4-5 is located in a Seismic
Seismic Category I loads without loss Table 2.2.4-54and Table 2.2.4-5 are Category I structure.
of safety function. located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
Table 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as Seismic Category I loads without loss
Seismic Category I, will be of safety function.
Seismic Category I equipment
design requirements.
2.2-65
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

equipment identified in Table 2.2.4- Seismic Category I, including
4 and Table 2.2.4-5, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic
anchorage, is bounded by the testing Category I loads without loss of
or analyzed conditions. safety function
14. (Deleted)
15. Each of the SLC System divisions and Testing will be performed on the SLC A test signal exists in the safety-related
safety-related loads/components System by providing a test signal in only division and at the equipment identified in
identified in Tables 2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-5 one safety-related division at a time. Table 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 powered
is powered from its respective safety- from the safety-related division under test
related division. in the SLC System.
16. In the SLC System, independence is i. Tests will be performed on the SLC i. The test signal exists only in the
provided between safety-related System by providing a test signal in safety-related division under test in
divisions, and between safety-related only one safety-related division at a the System.
divisions and nonsafety-related time.
equipment.
2.2-66
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

ii. Inspection of the as-built safety- ii. For the as-built safety-related
related divisions in the SLC System divisions in the SLC System:
will be performed. • Physical separation or electrical
isolation exists between these
safety-related divisions in
accordance with RG 1.75.
• Physical separation or electrical
isolation exists between safety-
related Divisions and nonsafety-
related equipment in accordance
with RG 1.75.
17a. Each mechanical train of the SLC System Inspections and analysis will be Each mechanical train of SLC System
located outside the containment is conducted for each of the SLC System located outside containment is protected
physically separated from the other mechanical trains located outside the against design basis events and their
train(s) so as to preclude damage to both containment. direct consequences by spatial separation,
trains. barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as to
preclude damage to both trains.
17b. Each mechanical train of the SLC System Inspections and analysis will be Each mechanical train of SLC System
located inside the containment is conducted for each of the SLC System located inside containment is protected
physically separated from the other mechanical trains located inside the against design basis events and their
train(s) so as to preclude damage to both containment. direct consequences by spatial separation,
trains. barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as to
preclude damage to both trains.
2.2-67
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

18. Re-positionable (not squib) valves Tests of installed valves will be Upon receipt of the actuating signal, each
listed in Table 2.2.4-4 open, close, or performed for opening, closing, or both valve opens, closes, or both opens and
both open and close under differential opening and closing under system closes, depending upon the valve’s safety
pressure, fluid flow, and temperature preoperational differential pressure, function.
conditions. fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
19. The pneumatically operated valve(s) Tests will be conducted on the as-built The pneumatically operated valve(s)
listed in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the mode valve(s). identified in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the listed
listed if either electric power to the mode when either electric power to the
valve actuating solenoid is lost, or valve actuating solenoid is lost, or
pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.
lost.
20. Check valves listed in Table 2.2.4-4 Tests of installed valves for opening and Based on the direction of the differential
open and close under system pressure, closing will be conducted under system pressure across the valve, each check
fluid flow, and temperature conditions preoperational pressure, fluid flow, and valve opens and closes.
21. The SLC System injection squib valve A vendor type test will be performed on Records of vendor type test conclude SLC
opens as designed. a squib valve to open as designed. injection squib valves used in the
injection and equalization will open as
designed.
2.2-68
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.4-6

22. The equivalent natural boron An analysis of the as-built system will The equivalent natural boron
concentration at cold shutdown be performed to determine the concentration at cold shutdown conditions
conditions for the total solution equivalent natural boron concentration for the total solution injection volume is
injection volume is based on the liquid at cold shutdown conditions for the total > 1100 ppm.
inventory in the RPV at the main steam solution injection volume.
line nozzle elevation plus the liquid
inventory in the reactor shutdown
cooling piping and equipment of the
RWCU/SDC system.
23. (Deleted)
24a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV Inspections of piping design isometric A review of piping design isometric
that require maintenance have drawings will be conducted. drawings confirms that maintenance
maintenance valves such that freeze {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} valves are included such that freeze seals
seals will not be required. will not be required.
24b. The as-built location of valves on lines A reconciliation evaluation of valves on Design reconciliation has been completed
attached to the RPV in the SLC System lines attached to the RPV that require for the as-built location of valves relative
that require maintenance shall be maintenance using as-designed and as- to the design requirements.
reconciled to design requirements. built information will be performed.
25. Each accumulator tank has an Analysis of each as-built accumulator Each accumulator tank has an injectable
injectable liquid volume of at least tank will be performed. volume of at least 7.80 m3 (2060 gal).
7.80 m3 (2060 gal).
26. Each accumulator tank has a cover gas Analysis of each as-built accumulator Each accumulator tank has a cover gas
volume above the liquid of at least 14.8 tank will be performed. volume above the liquid of at least 14.8
m3 (523 ft3). m3 (523 ft3).
2.2-69
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Table 2.2.4-6

27. Each accumulator tank is capable of Analysis of each as-built accumulator Each accumulator tank is capable of
maintaining an initial nitrogen cover tank will be performed. maintaining an initial nitrogen cover gas
gas absolute pressure of least 14.82 absolute pressure of least 14.82 MPa
MPa (2150 psia). (2150 psia).
2.2-70
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.2.4-1. Standby Liquid Control System Simplified Diagram
2.2-71
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.5 Neutron Monitoring System

Design Description
The Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) monitors thermal neutron flux and supports the Reactor
Protection System (RPS).
NMS alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
The environmental and seismic qualification of NMS components defined in Table 2.2.5-1 is
NMS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2 as part of the NMS software projects.
(1) NMS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.5 and Table 2.2.5-1.
(2) NMS provides automatic functions and initiators as defined in Table 2.2.5-2.
(3) NMS provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as defined in Table 2.2.5-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip condition on critical hardware failure, power failure, or
loss of communication.
(9) The Startup Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) subsystem monitors neutron flux from the
source range to 15% of the reactor rated power.
(10) The Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) subsystems monitor neutron flux from 1 % to
125 % of reactor rated power.
(11) Each NMS division is powered by its divisional safety-related uninterruptible power
supply.
(12) LPRM provides signals that are proportional to the local neutron flux.
(13) The LPRM detector assemblies have a design pressure of 8.62 MPaG (1250 psig).
Table 2.2.5-4 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the NMS.
2.2-72
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.5-1
NMS Functional Arrangement
NMS comprises the safety-related SRNM subsystem and the power range neutron monitor
(PRNM) subsystem; and the nonsafety-related automatic fixed in-core probe (AFIP)
subsystem and multi-channel rod block monitor (MRBM) subsystem.
NMS is a four division, redundant, logic based system.
NMS controllers and their preamplifiers are located in divisionally separate rooms in the
Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building (RB).
The PRNM subsystem comprises the local power range monitors (LPRM), the average power
range monitors (APRM), and the oscillation power range monitors (OPRM).
The SRNM subsystem has 12 SRNM channels, each channel having one fixed in-core
regenerative fission chamber sensor.
The LPRM detector assemblies, SRNM detector assemblies, wiring, cables, and connector are
located in the lower DW in the RB.
LPRM subsystem comprises 64 assemblies, divided into four divisions, distributed uniformly
throughout the core, each assembly having four uniformly spaced fixed in-core fission
chamber detectors and seven AFIP sensors .
2.2-73
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.5-2
NMS Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

SRNM Trip SRNM short period RPS
SRNM upscale RPS
SRNM inoperable RPS
SRNM non-coincident RPS

upscale. A non-coincident
SRNM trip with Reactor
Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN,
REFUEL, or STARTUP,
position, the NMS
Coincident/Non-coincident
switch is in the NON-
COINCIDENT position, and a
single SRNM exceeds count
setpoint.
PRNM Trip APRM upscale flux RPS
APRM inoperative RPS
APRM upscale simulated RPS

reactor thermal power
OPRM oscillation detection DPS, RPS
2.2-74
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.5-3
NMS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
MCR Parameter Description

Control APRM Channel Bypass Control (one for each division)
(hardware).
SRNM Channel Bypass Controls (one for each bypass
group) (hardware).
MRBM Main Channel Bypass
Coincident/Non-coincident switch
Interlock APRM ATWS Permissive (for ATWS ADS inhibit
(ATWS/SLC))
APRM Rod Block (RC&IS)
Reactor Mode Switch (RPS)
SRNM ATWS Permissive (ATWS/SLC)
SRNM Rod Block (RC&IS)
APRM Signal (RPS, RC&IS, DPS)
SRNM Signal (RC&IS, DPS)
Bypass MRBM Main Channel Bypass (one for each MRBM)
APRM Channel Bypass Control (one for each division)
SRNM Channel Bypass Controls (one for each bypass
group)
2.2-75
26A6641AB Rev.10
Table 2.2.5-4
ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System

1. NMS functional arrangement is as Inspection(s) of the as-built system will The system conforms to the functional
described in Subsection 2.2.5 and be performed arrangement as described in Subsection
Table 2.2.5-1. 2.2.5 and Table 2.2.5-1.
2. NMS provides automatic functions Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The NMS performs the automatic
and initiators as described in Table NMS using simulated signals and functions defined in Table 2.2.5-2.
2.2.5-2. actuators for the automatic functions
3. NMS provides controls, interlocks, Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The NMS controls, interlocks and
and bypasses as described in Table NMS and MCRP SSLC/ESF VDUs bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
2.2.5-3. using simulated signals and actuators for main control room, and are performed in
the controls, interlocks, and bypasses response to simulated signals and manual
defined in Table 2.2.5-3. actions as defined in Table 2.2.5-3.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8. NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip Test(s) will be performed using The NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip
condition on critical hardware failure, simulated signals. condition on critical hardware failure,
power failure, or loss of power failure, or loss of communication
communication. failure.
2.2-76
26A6641AB Rev.10
Table 2.2.5-4
ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System

9. The Startup Range Neutron Monitor Test(s) will be performed using The SRNM subsystem monitors neutron
(SRNM) subsystem monitors neutron simulated signals. flux from the source range to 15% of the
flux from the source range to 15% of reactor rated power.
the reactor rated power.
10. The Local Power Range Monitor Test(s) will be performed using The LPRM subsystems monitor neutron
(LPRM) subsystems monitor neutron simulated signals. flux from 1 % to 125 % of reactor rated
flux from 1 % to 125 % of reactor power.
rated power.
11. Each NMS division is powered by its Test(s) will be performed on the NMS The test signal exists only in the safety-
divisional safety-related by providing a test signal in only one related division under test in the NMS.
uninterruptible power supply. safety-related division at a time.
12. LPRM provides signals that are Test(s) will be performed on the NMS The test signal exists and can be retrieved
proportional to the local neutron flux. by providing test signals to each LPRM. in the MCR.
13. The LPRM detector assemblies have a Test(s) will be performed on each LPRM The LPRM detector assembly withstands a
design pressure of 8.62 MPaG (1250 detector assembly. pressure greater than 8.62 MPaG (1250
psig). psig).
2.2-77
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.6 Remote Shutdown System

Design Description
The Remote Shutdown System (RSS) provides remote manual control of the systems necessary
to: (a) perform a prompt shutdown (scram) of the reactor, (b) perform safe (hot) shutdown of the
reactor after a scram, (c) perform subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor, and (d) monitor the
reactor to ensure safe conditions are maintained during and following a reactor shutdown.
RSS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications are addressed by Section 3.3.
The environmental and seismic qualification of RSS components defined in Table 2.2.6-1 is
RSS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2 as part of the reactor trip isolation function (RTIF) software projects and SSLC/ESF
software projects.
(1) RSS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.6 and Table 2.2.6-1.
(2) RSS provides dedicated controls as described in Table 2.2.6-2.
(3) (Deleted)
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) Safety-related systems in each RSS panel receive power from divisionally separate safety-
related uninterruptible power supplies.
(8) Nonsafety-related systems in each RSS panel receive power from nonsafety-related power
supplies.
associated acceptance criteria for the RSS.
2.2-78
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.6-1
RSS Functional Arrangement
RSS is safety-related
RSS has two redundant, independent, panels located in two separate rooms in different
divisional quadrants of the Reactor Building
RSS panels have a safety-related Division 1 Visual Display Unit (VDU), a safety-related
Division 2 VDU, and nonsafety-related VDUs associated with the PIP A and PIP B network
segments.
2.2-79
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.6-2
RSS Controls
Division 1 Manual Scram Control

Division 2 Manual Scram Control
Division 1 Manual MSIV Isolation Control
Division 2 Manual MSIV Isolation Control
Safety-related Division 1 VDU
Safety-related Division 2 VDU
Nonsafety-related VDUs
Nonsafety-related Communications Equipment
2.2-80
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.6-3
ITAAC For The Remote Shutdown System

1. RSS functional arrangement is as Inspection(s) will be performed to confirm The as-built RSS is configured as described
described in Subsection 2.2.6 and that the as-built RSS is configured as in Subsection 2.2.6 and Table 2.2.6-1.
Table 2.2.6-1. described in Subsection 2.2.6 and
Table 2.2.6-1.
2. RSS provides dedicated controls as Test(s) will be performed on the dedicated The RSS panels are capable of issuing
described in Table 2.2.6-2. controls as described in Table 2.2.6-2. control signals from the dedicated
controls described in Table 2.2.6-2.
3. (Deleted)
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. Safety-related systems in each RSS Test(s) will be performed on the RSS by The test signal exists only in the safety-
panel receive power from divisionally providing a test signal in only one safety- related division under test in the RSS.
separate safety-related uninterruptible related division at a time.
power supplies.
8. Nonsafety-related systems in each Test(s) will be performed on the RSS by Test signal exists from an uninterruptible
RSS panel receive power from providing a test signal in only one AC power supply only in the channel
nonsafety-related power supplies. channel at a time. under test.
2.2-81
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.7 Reactor Protection System

Design Description
The Reactor Protection System (RPS) initiates a reactor trip (scram) automatically whenever
selected plant variables exceed preset limits or by manual operator action.
systems, or components is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
RPS alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
The environmental and seismic qualification of RPS components is addressed in Section 3.8.
RPS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2 as part of the RTIF software projects.
(1) RPS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.7 and Table 2.2.7-1 and as
shown on Figure 2.2.7-1.
(2) RPS provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.7-2.
(3) RPS provides controls, interlocks (system interfaces), and bypasses as described in
Table 2.2.7-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) The RPS logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring a coincident trip of like,
unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.
(9) The RPS is fail-safe such that on loss of redundant divisional electrical power supplies the
load drivers of that division change to the tripped state.
(10) Redundant safety-related power supplies are provided for each division of the RPS.
(11) Automatic and manual scram initiation logic systems are independent of each other.
(12) The RPS initiates a backup scram whenever an automatic scram is initiated in two-out-of
four divisions or whenever a manual scram is initiated.
(13) The backup scram is not implemented through software.
associated acceptance criteria, which will be performed for the RPS.
2.2-82
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.7-1
RPS Functional Arrangement
The RPS comprises four redundant safety-related divisions of sensor channels, trip logics and
trip actuators.
The RPS comprises two divisions of manual scram controls and scram logic circuitry.
2.2-83
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.7-2
RPS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

Reactor scram NMS PRNM trip condition NMS
NMS SRNM trip condition NMS
Scram accumulator charging water header CRD
pressure – low-low
Turbine stop valve closed position -
Turbine control valve control oil pressure low -
Condenser pressure high -
Power Generation Bus Loss (Loss of all -
feedwater flow event)
MSIV closed position NBS
Reactor Pressure high NBS
RPV reactor level low (Level 3) NBS
RPV reactor level high (Level 8) NBS
DW pressure high CMS
Suppression pool average temperature high CMS
High simulated thermal power (feedwater NBS, NMS
temperature biased)
Feedwater temperature exceeding allowable NBS, NMS
simulated thermal power vs. FW temperature
domain.
2.2-84
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.7-3
RPS Controls, Interlocks (System Interfaces), and Bypasses
Control Manual divisional trip switches
Manual scram trip switches
Reactor Mode Switch
Divisional actuator trip manual switches
RPS trip reset manual switches
RPS scram test switch (to RC&IS)
Interlock (System RPS full scram condition (to RC&IS, CRD)
Interface)
Turbine bypass valves open position indication
APRM Simulated Thermal Power (to NMS)
Reactor Mode Switch positions:
- RUN (to NMS, ICS, PAS, LD&IS)
- STARTUP (to PAS, NMS)
- SHUTDOWN (to CRDS)
- REFUEL (to CRDS, PAS, NMS)
Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position automatic
bypass after a time delay
Scram accumulator charging water header pressure signal (to
RC&IS)
MSIV closure bypass (to LD&IS)
Bypass Special MSIV operational bypass switches
Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown scram manual bypass
switches
Scram accumulator charging water header pressure trip manual
bypass switches (to RC&IS)
MSIV closure trip signals manual bypass switches (to LD&IS)
RPS division of logic (TLU output) manual divisional bypass
switches
RPS Division of sensors (DTM output) manual divisional
bypass switches
2.2-85
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.7-4
ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System

1. RPS functional arrangement is as Inspection(s), will be performed on the as- The RPS conforms to the functional
described in Subsection 2.2.7 and built RPS. arrangement as described in Subsection
Table 2.2.7-1 and as shown on Figure 2.2.7 and Table 2.2.7-1 and as shown in
2.2.7-1. Figure 2.2.7-1.
2. RPS provides automatic functions and Test(s) will be performed on the as-built RPS provides automatic functions,
initiators as described in Table RPS using simulated signals and actuators initiators and associated interfacing
2.2.7-2. for the automatic functions defined in systems as described in Table 2.2.7-2.
Table 2.2.7-2.
3. RPS provides controls, interlocks Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The RPS controls and interlocks (system
(system interfaces), and bypasses as RPS and SSLC/ESF VDUs using interfaces), and bypasses exist, can be
described in Table 2.2.7-3. simulated signals and actuators for the retrieved in the main control room
controls, interlocks (system interfaces), SSLC/ESF VDUs, and are performed in
and bypasses described in Table 2.2.7-3. response to simulated signals and manual
actions as described in Table 2.2.7-3.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8. The RPS logic is designed to provide Test(s) of the RPS functions will be The RTIF platform performs the RPS
a trip initiation by requiring a performed on the as-built RTIF platform function trip outputs when a coincident
coincident trip of like, unbypassed of the RPS functions. trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at
parameters in at least two divisions to least two divisions occurs.
cause the trip output.
2.2-86
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.7-4
ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System

9. The RPS is fail-safe such that on loss Test(s) of the RPS functions will be The RTIF platform de-energizes the RPS
of redundant divisional electrical performed on the as-built RTIF platform trip outputs when a coincident de-
power supplies the load drivers of that of the RPS functions by de-energizing the energization of at least two divisions
division change to the tripped state. RTIF platform by division. occurs.
10. Redundant safety-related power Test(s) will be performed on the RPS by The test signal exists only in the safety-
supplies are provided for each providing a test signal in only one safety- related division under test in the RPS.
division of the RPS. related division at a time.
11. Automatic and manual scram Analysis(es) will be performed on the Single failures in an automatic scram
initiation logic systems are automatic and manual scram initiation initiation logic system do not propagate
independent of each other. logic systems. to the manual scram initiation logic
system and single failures in a manual
scram initiation logic system do not
propagate to the automatic scram
initiation logic system.
12. The RPS initiates a backup scram Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The RTIF platform performs the backup
whenever an automatic scram is RTIF platform of the backup scram scram outputs when either a coincident
initiated in two-out-of four divisions function. scram in at least two divisions or a
or whenever a manual scram is manual scram occurs.
initiated.
13. The backup scram is not implemented Analysis(es) and inspections will be No software is used to implement the
through software. performed on the backup scram circuitry. backup scram function.
2.2-87
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.2.7-1. RPS Functional Arrangement
2.2-88
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.8 Plant Automation System

No ITAAC are required for this system.
2.2-89
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.2.9 Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System

Design Description
The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control (SB&PC) System, is a non-safety related system that
controls the reactor pressure during reactor startup, power generation, and reactor shutdown by
control of the turbine bypass valves and signals to the Turbine Generator Control System (TGCS),
which controls the turbine control valves.
The SB&PC System alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by
Section 3.3.
(1) The SB&PC System functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.9 and Table
2.2.9-1.
(2) The SB&PC System provides functions and initiating conditions as described in Table
2.2.9-2.
(3) (Deleted)
(4) SB&PC controllers are triple redundant fault tolerant.
(5) SB&PC System has three redundant nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC power supplies.
criteria for the SB&PC system.
2.2-90
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.9-1
SB&PC System Functional Arrangement
SB&PC System fault-tolerant digital controllers are located in the Control Building.
SB&PC System interfaces with Nuclear Boiler System (NBS) reactor steam dome pressure
signals.
SB&PC System interfaces with the TGCS turbine power load unbalance signal, turbine trip
signal, and turbine steam flow demand signal.
SB&PC System interfaces with the main condenser pressure signal.
Table 2.2.9-2
SB&PC System Functions and Initiating Conditions
Function Initiating Condition

Close TBV Main condenser pressure high
Modulate TBV Normal pressure control function during normal operation
2.2-91
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.9-3
ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System

1. The SB&PC System functional Inspections of the as-built SB&PC The as-built SB&PC System conforms to
arrangement is as described in System will be conducted. the functional arrangement as described
Subsection 2.2.9 and Table 2.2.9-1. in Subsection 2.2.9 and Table 2.2.9-1.
2. SB&PC System provides functions and Tests will be performed on the SB&PC The SB&PC system performs the
initiating conditions as defined in System using simulated signals. functions as described in Table 2.2.9-2.
Table 2.2.9-2.
3. (Deleted)
4. SB&PC controllers are triple i. Test(s) will be performed simulating i. Failure of any one SB&PC controller
redundant fault tolerant. failure of any one SB&PC controller. has no effect on SB&PC valve
position demand signal.
ii. Test(s) will be performed simulating ii. Failure of any two SB&PC
failure of any two SB&PC controllers generates a turbine trip
controllers. signal.
2.2-92
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.9-3
ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System

5. SB&PC System has three redundant i. Test(s) will be performed on the i. The test signal exists only in the
nonsafety-related uninterruptible AC SB&PC system by providing a test power channel under test.
power supplies. signal in only one power supply
channel at a time.
ii. Test(s) will be performed on the ii. Loss of any one power supply at a
SB&PC system power supply time has no effect on SB&PC valve
configuration simulating failure of position demand signal.
any one power supply.
iii. Test(s) will be performed on the iii. Loss of any two power supplies at a
SB&PC system power supply time has no effect on SB&PC valve
configuration simulating failure of position demand signal.
any two power supplies.
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2.2.10 Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System

Design Description
The Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (Q-DCIS) comprises the
platforms that are defined in Table 2.2.10-1. These platforms comprise systems of integrated
software and hardware elements. Q-DCIS platform software is developed in accordance with the
software development program described in Section 3.2. Conformance with IEEE Standard 603
requirements by the Q-DCIS platforms is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
Subsection 2.2.15 and Section 3.2 provide the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Q-DCIS platforms.
2.2-94
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Table 2.2.10-1
Q-DCIS Platforms
Platform Software projects

Reactor Trip & Isolation System RTIF
Function Neutron Monitoring
System (RTIF/NMS) NMS
Safety System Logic & Control / SSLC/ESF

Engineered Safety Features
(SSLC/ESF) Platform
Independent Control Platform Vacuum Breaker
(ICP) Isolation Function
(VBIF)
ATWS/SLC
HP CRD Isolation
Bypass Function
ICS DPV Isolation
Function
2.2-95
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2.2.11 Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Information System

Design Description
The Nonsafety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (N-DCIS) is the designation
given to the collection of hardware and software that comprise the nonsafety-related
instrumentation, controls and monitoring systems or functions. A subset of the N-DCIS comprise
the network segments that are described in Table 2.2.11-1. These network segments comprise
systems of integrated software and hardware elements. N-DCIS network segment software is
developed in accordance with the software development program described in Section 3.2.
Section 3.2 provides the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the N-DCIS network segments.
2.2-96
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Table 2.2.11-1
N-DCIS Network Segments
GENE (DPS) Supported Functions

PIP A and PIP B FAPCS and Supporting Systems
RCWU Suction Backup Isolation
2.2-97
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2.2.12 Leak Detection and Isolation System

Design Description
The Leak Detection and Isolation System (LD&IS) detects and monitors leakage from the
containment, and initiates closure of inboard and outboard main steamline isolation valves
(MSIVs), containment isolation valves (CIVs), and Reactor Building (RB) isolation dampers by
the safety-related reactor trip and isolation function (RTIF) and SSLC/ESF programmable logic
controller software projects.
LD&IS MSIV isolation function is implemented by the RTIF platform.
The environmental and seismic qualification of LD&IS components is addressed by Section 3.8.
The LD&IS alarms, displays, and status indications in the main control room are addressed in
Section 3.3.
The containment isolation components that correspond to the isolation functions defined in
Tables 2.2.12-2 and 2.2.12-3 are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
LD&IS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described
in Section 3.2 as part of the RTIF software projects and SSLC/ESF software projects.
(1) (Deleted)
(2) a. RTIF LD&IS software monitors MSIV isolation function variables are as described in
Table 2.2.12-2.
b. SSLC/ESF LD&IS software monitors isolation function variables as described in Table
2.2.12-2.
(3) RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS software monitor leakage source variables as described in
Table 2.2.12-3.
(4) RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS software provide controls, interlocks, and bypasses as
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) (Deleted)
(10) LD&IS isolation functions logic is designed to provide an actuation by requiring
coincident trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip
output.
(11) MSIV LD&IS logic is de-energized to initiate the isolation function (i.e., fail-safe).
2.2-98
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(12) DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump instrumentation is designed with the
sensitivity to detect a leakage step-change (increase) within one hour and to alarm at
excess sump flow rates.
Table 2.2.12-5 specifies the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the LD&IS.
2.2-99
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Table 2.2.12-1
(Deleted)
2.2-100
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Table 2.2.12-2
LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables
LD&IS Isolation Platforms and Functions (1)

RTIF SSLC/ESF
DW HCW Sump Drain

DW LCW Sump Drain
CWS Lines to DW Air
FAPCS Process Lines

Containment Purge &
Main Steam & Drain
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
RWCU/SDC Differential
– X – – – – – – – – – –
Mass Flow High
SLC Initiation Signal – X – – – – – – – – – –

Refueling Area Air
– – – – – – X – – X – –
Exhaust Radiation High
Reactor Building Air
– – – – – – X – – X – –
Isolation Condenser
– – X – – – – – – – – –
Condensate Flow High
Isolation Condenser Steam
– – X – – – – – – – – –
Flow High
Drywell Pressure High – – – X X X X X X X X(3) X(2)(3)
Drywell Pressure High-High – – – – – – – – – – – X(4)
2.2-101
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Table 2.2.12-2

RTIF SSLC/ESF
DW HCW Sump Drain

DW LCW Sump Drain
CWS Lines to DW Air
FAPCS Process Lines

Containment Purge &
Main Steam & Drain
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
Main Condenser Vacuum
X – – – – – – – – – – –
Low
Turbine Area Ambient
X – – – – – – – – – – –
Temperature High
MSL Tunnel Ambient
X X – – – – – – – – – –
Temperature High
Isolation Condenser Vent
– – X – – – – – – – – –
MSL Flow Rate High X – – – – – – – – – – –
MSL Pressure Low X – – – – – – – – – – –
Reactor Water Level Low

X X – X X X X X X X – –
(Level 1, Level 2)
Reactor Water Level High
– – – – – – – – – – – X
(Level 8)
2.2-102
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Table 2.2.12-2

RTIF SSLC/ESF
DW HCW Sump Drain

DW LCW Sump Drain
CWS Lines to DW Air
FAPCS Process Lines

Containment Purge &
Main Steam & Drain
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
Feedwater Lines
– – – – – – – – – – – X(2)
Differential Pressure
Drywell Water Level High – – – – – – – – – – X(3) X(3)
Reactor Water Level Low –

– – – – – – – – – – – X
Low L0.5
GDCS Pool Level Low – – – – – – – – – – X –

(1) “X” indicates that isolation signal is provided to perform the designated isolation function(s) for the listed monitored variable.
(2) Feedwater lines isolation signal is a high FW lines differential pressure coincident with high drywell pressure.
(3) Feedwater lines isolation signal and HP CRD makeup water injection isolation signal is Drywell Water Level High coincident with Drywell Pressure High.
(4) These lines have a third diverse, nonsafety-related valve for line isolation controlled by nonsafety-related DCIS, closing on the same signals as they safety-
related isolation valves.
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Table 2.2.12-3
LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables
Leakage Source (2)
Monitored Variables(3) IC Reactor

Main IC RWCU/ Feed-
Conden CWS FAPCS GDCS Vessel Misc.
Steam- Steam- SDC water
-sate Lines Lines Water Head Leaks
lines lines Lines Lines
Lines Seal
Location (1) I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O
Intersystem Leakage
– – – – – – – – – – – X – – – – – – – –
Radiation High
RWCU/SDC Differential
– – – – – – – – – – – X4 – – – – – – – –
Mass Flow High
Equip. Areas Differential
– X – – – – – – – – – X – – – – – – – –
Temperature High
MSL Tunnel or Turbine
Building Area Ambient – X – – – – – – – – – X – X – – – – – X
Temperature High
MSL Flow High X X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Isolation Condenser
– – X X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Steamline Flow High
Isolation Condenser
Condensate Return Flow – – – – X X – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
High
DW Air Cooler Cond.
X – X – – – X – X – X – X – X – – – X –
Flow High
2.2-104
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Table 2.2.12-3
Leakage Source (2)

Main IC RWCU/ Feed-
Lines Seal
Vessel Head Flange Seal
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X – – –
Pressure High
RB Equip. / Floor Drain
– X – X – – – X – X – X – X – – – – – X
Sump Pump Activity
SRV and SV Discharge
X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Line Temperature High
DW Temperature High X – X – – – – – – – X – X – X – – – X –
DW Fission Product
X – X – X – – – – – X – X – – – – – – –
Radiation High
DW Equip. Drain Sump
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X – X –
Level Change High
DW Floor Drain Sump
X – X – X – X – X – X – X – X – – – X –
Level Change High
DW Pressure High X – X – – – – – – – X – X – – – – – – –
RPV Water Level Low X X X X X X – – – – X X – – – – – – –
2.2-105
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Table 2.2.12-3
Leakage Source (2)

Main IC RWCU/ Feed-
Lines Seal
Feedwater Lines –
– – – – – – – – – – – – X X – – – – –
Main Steamline Pressure
– X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
Low
Main Condenser Vacuum
– X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X
Low
Drywell Water Level – – – – X – X – X – X – X – X – – – X –

(1)
“I” means inside DW leakage; “O” means outside DW leakage.
(2)
“X” means control/alarm is associated with the monitored variable; “–“ means not applicable.
(3)
Monitored Variables are listed with qualitative modifiers for the parameter trend of significance to leak detection only, and are no to be confused
with variable setpoints that may use similar descriptive labeling.
(4)
Non-safety related RWCU valve insolate using PIP logic.
2.2-106
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Table 2.2.12-4
LD&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Control Manual isolation (individually transfer open/close each
CIV and MSIV)
Manual reset (individually reset CIV and MSIV isolation
logic to enable CIV and MSIV manual open function)
MSIV test switches
Isolation logic reset switches
Interlock Reactor Mode Switch
RPV water level low (Level 2) time delay (RTIF)
RPV water level low (Level 2) time delay (SSLC/ESF)
Turbine stop valve closed position
RPV pressure
DW pressure
ADS Inhibit (ATWS/SLC)
Bypass RTIF Division of sensors channel inputs to each division
manual bypass switches
RTIF Divisional actuator trip manual switches
SSLC/ESF Division of sensors channel inputs to each
manual bypass switch
SSLC/ESF manual control bypasses (disables) the load
driver/discrete output
Feedwater Isolation Bypass (ADS Inhibit)
2.2-107
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Table 2.2.12-5
ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System

1. (Deleted)
2a. RTIF LD&IS software monitors Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The RTIF performs the MSIV isolation
isolation MSIV function variables are RTIF using simulated signals and functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.
as described in Table 2.2.12-2. actuators for the MSIV isolation functions
as described in Table 2.2.12-2.
2b. SSLC/ESF LD&IS software Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The SSLC/ESF performs the non-MSIV
monitors non-MSIV isolation SSLC/ESF using simulated signals and isolation functions as described in Table
function variables as described in actuators for the non-MSIV isolation 2.2.12-2.
Table 2.2.12-2. functions as described in Table 2.2.12-2.
3. RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The monitored variables exist and can be
software monitor leakage source RTIF software projects, SSLC/ESF retrieved in the main control room in
variables as described in Table software projects, and SSLC/ESF VDUs response to simulated signals as described
2.2.12-3. using simulated signals and actuators for in Table 2.2.12-3.
the monitored variables as described in
Table 2.2.12-3.
4. RTIF and SSLC/ESF LD&IS Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The RTIF and SSLC/ESF controls,
software provide controls, interlocks, RTIF software projects, and SSLC/ESF interlocks, and bypasses exist, can be
and bypasses as described in Table software projects, (including the retrieved in the main control room, and
2.2.12-4. SSLC/VDUs) using simulated signals and are performed in response to simulated
actuators for the controls, interlocks, and signals and manual actions as described in
bypasses as described in Table 2.2.12-4. Table 2.2.12-4.
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
2.2-108
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Table 2.2.12-5
ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System

8. (Deleted)
9. (Deleted)
10. LD&IS isolation functions logic is Test(s) of the LD&IS functions will be The SSLC/ESF performs the LD&IS
designed to provide an actuation by performed on the as-built SSLC/ESF. function trip outputs when a coincident
requiring coincident trip of like, trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at
unbypassed parameters in at least least two divisions occurs.
two divisions to cause the trip output.
11. MSIV LD&IS logic is de-energized Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The RTIF de-energizes the MSIV LD&IS
to initiate the isolation function (i.e., RTIF MSIV of the LD&IS functions by trip outputs when a coincident de-
fail-safe). de-energizing the RTIF by division. energization of at least two divisions
occurs.
12. DW floor drain high conductivity Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The DW floor drain high conductivity
waste (HCW) sump instrumentation DW floor drain high conductivity waste waste (HCW) sump instrumentation
is designed with the sensitivity to (HCW) sump instrumentation. detects leakage step-changes (increases)
detect a leakage step-change of 3.8 liters/min (1.0 gpm) within one
(increase) within one hour and to hour and alarms at sump flow rates in
alarm at excess sump flow rates. excess of 19 liters/min (5 gpm).
2.2-109
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2.2.13 Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control

Design Description
The Safety System Logic and Control for the Engineered Safety Features systems (SSLC/ESF)
addressed in this subsection performs the safety-related Emergency Core Cooling System
(ECCS) control logic, the isolation logic for the Control Room Habitability System (CRHS), and
controls the safety-related video display units (VDUs) for the Q-DCIS.
The SSLC/ESF alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
The environmental and seismic qualification of SSLC/ESF components described in Table
2.2.13-1 is addressed in Section 3.8.
The SSLC/ESF software is developed in accordance with the software development program
described in Section 3.2 as part of the SSLC/ESF software projects.
(1) The SSLC/ESF functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.2.13 and Table
2.2.13-1.
(2) The SSLC/ESF provides automatic functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.13-2.
(3) The SSLC/ESF provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses in the MCR as described in
Table 2.2.13-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) SSLC/ESF logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring a coincident trip of
like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.
(9) SSLC/ESF uses “energized-to-trip” and “fail-as-is” logic.
(10) Redundant safety-related power supplies are provided for each division.
criteria for the SSLC/ESF system.
2.2-110
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Table 2.2.13-1
SSLC/ESF Functional Arrangement
SSLC/ESF comprises four redundant, safety-related divisions of trip logics and trip actuators,
located in divisionally separate rooms in the Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building
(RB).
SSLC/ESF video display units (VDUs) comprise two redundant sets of four divisions of
safety-related, VDUs, housed in two separate main control room panels.
2.2-111
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Table 2.2.13-2
SSLC/ESF Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

ADS RPV reactor water level low (Level 1) NBS
Drywell pressure high CMS
GDCS Injection RPV reactor water level low (Level 1) NBS, GDCS
Drywell pressure high CMS
GDCS Equalizing RPV reactor water level low (Level 1) NBS, GDCS
Lines
ICS RPV reactor water level low (Level 1) NBS, ICS
Steam Supply Line and Drain Line Isolation NBS, ICS
(Any 2 DPVs Open)
SLC RPV reactor water level low (Level 1) NBS, SLC,
ATWS/SLC
CRHAVS CRHA inlet air supply radiation high from PRMS, CRHAVS
emergency filtration Process Radiation Monitoring System
mode (PRMS)
CRHAVS CRHA high room temperature Nonsafety-related
temperature control MCR N-DCIS Load
Groups A, B and C
2.2-112
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Table 2.2.13-3
SSLC/ESF Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Control ADS sequence actuation from VDUs in the MCR (one arm/fire switch per
division)
GDCS sequence actuation from VDUs in the MCR (one arm/fire switch
per division)
Interlock ECCS-LOCA confirmation time delay for ADS
Group 1 SRV open
Group 2 SRV open time delay
Group 1 DPV open and SLC initiation time delay
Group 2 DPV open time delay
GDCS manual initiation interlock on low reactor pressure signal
GDCS injection squib valve open time delay
GDCS equalization line squib valve open time delay
GDCS equalization line squib valve open interlock (RPV water level low
(Level 0.5)
CRHAVS CRHA high room temperature signal to trip major N-DCIS
power supplies within CRHA
Bypass SSLC/ESF Division of sensors division manual bypass switch
SSLC/ESF manual control bypasses (disables) the load driver/discrete
output
2.2-113
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Table 2.2.13-4
ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC/ESF)

1. The SSLC/ESF functional arrangement Inspections will be conducted of the as- The system conforms to the functional
is as described in Subsection 2.2.13 and built configuration. arrangement as described in Subsection
Table 2.2.13-1. 2.2.13 and Table 2.2.13-1.
2. The SSLC/ESF provides automatic Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system is capable of performing the
functions and initiators as described in system using simulated signals. functions as described in Table 2.2.13-2.
Table 2.2.13-2.
3. The SSLC/ESF provides controls, Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system controls, interlocks and
interlocks, and bypasses in the MCR as system using simulated signals. bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
described in Table 2.2.13-3. main control room, and are performed in
response to simulated signals and manual
actions as described in Table 2.2.13-3.
4. (Deleted).
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted).
7. (Deleted)
8. SSLC/ESF logic is designed to provide Test(s) of the as-built SSLC/ESF system The as-built SSLC/ESF system performs
a trip initiation by requiring a will be performed using simulated signals trip initiation when a coincident trip of
coincident trip of like, unbypassed and actuators. like, unbypassed parameters occurs in at
parameters in at least two divisions to least two divisions.
cause the trip output.
9. SSLC/ESF uses “energized-to-trip” and Test(s) of the as-built SSLC/ESF system The as-built SSLC/ESF system uses
“fail-as-is” logic. will be performed using simulated signals “energized-to-trip” and “fail-as-is” logic.
and actuators.
2.2-114
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Table 2.2.13-4
ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC/ESF)

10. Redundant safety-related power Test(s) will be performed on the The test signal exists only in the safety-
supplies are provided for each division SSLC/ESF System by providing a test related division under test in the
of the SSLC/ESF System. signal in only one safety-related division SSLC/ESF System.
at a time.
2.2-115
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2.2.14 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls

Design Description
The diverse instrumentation and control systems comprise the safety-related Anticipated
Transients Without Scram Standby Liquid Control (ATWS/SLC) system and the nonsafety-
related Diverse Protection System (DPS).
The ATWS/SLC and DPS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are
addressed by Section 3.3.
The environmental and seismic qualification of ATWS/SLC and DPS components described in
Table 2.2.14-1 is addressed in Section 3.8.
The containment isolation components that correspond to the DPS isolation functions are
addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
systems, or components defined in Table 2.2.14-1 are addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
ATWS/SLC hardware and software is developed in accordance with the software development
program described in Section 3.2 as part of the ATWS/SLC software projects.
DPS hardware and software is developed in accordance with the software development program
described in Section 3.2 as part of the DPS software projects.
(1) The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems functional
arrangement as described in Subsection 2.2.14 and Table 2.2.14-1.
(2) The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems provide automatic
functions and initiators as described in Table 2.2.14-2.
(3) The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse instrumentation and control systems provide controls,
interlocks and bypasses in the MCR as described in Table 2.2.14-3.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) Confirmatory analyses support and validate the DPS design scope and the fire separation
criteria.
(9) (Deleted)
(10) (Deleted)
(11) DPS controller cabinets are in fire areas separate from the other N-DCIS, Remote
Multiplier Unit (RMU), and Q-DCIS cabinets.
(12) ATWS/SLC system logic is designed to provide a trip initiation by requiring coincident
trip of like, unbypassed parameters in at least two divisions to cause the trip output.
2.2-116
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(13) Each ATWS/SLC System division is powered from its respective safety-related power
supply.
(14) DPS is powered from nonsafety-related load group power supplies.
(15) DPS triple redundant digital controllers require agreement in at least two channels out of
three channels for a coincident trip actuation.
(16) DPS logic is “energize-to-actuate”.
(17) DPS process variable sensors are diverse from those used by the RPS and SSLC/ESF.
(18) The DPS network segment uses diverse hardware and software from that used by the RPS
and SSLC/ESF.
criteria for the ATWS/SLC and DPS.
2.2-117
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Table 2.2.14-1
Diverse Instrumentation and Control Systems Functional Arrangement
ATWS/SLC system is housed within each of the divisional safety-related reactor trip and
isolation function (RTIF) cabinets on a separate chassis from the other equipment within the
cabinet.
RTIF cabinets housing the ATWS/SLC system are located within the divisional electrical
rooms in the control building (CB).
ATWS/SLC has RPV dome pressure sensors and RPV water level sensors that are hardwired
to their respective divisional controller in the CB.
DPS controllers are housed in a cabinet located in the CB.
2.2-118
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Table 2.2.14-2
Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing Systems 1

SLC system RPV dome pressure high and Startup NMS, NBS, SLC
initiation Range Neutron Monitor (SRNM) signal
(ATWS/SLC) greater than ATWS setpoint (SRNM
ATWS permissive) with time delay
RPV water level low (Level 2) and SRNM NBS, NMS, SLC
ATWS permissive with time delay
Feedwater Runback RPV dome pressure high and SRNM NBS, NMS, FWCS
(ATWS/SLC) ATWS permissive
ADS inhibit RPV water level low (Level 2) and APRM NBS, NMS, SSLC/ESF
(ATWS/SLC) ATWS permissive
RPV dome pressure high and APRM NBS, NMS, SSLC/ESF
ATWS permissive with time delay
ATWS ARI and
FMCRD motor run- RPV dome pressure high NBS, CRD, RC&IS
in (DPS)
RPV water level low (Level 2) NBS, CRD, RC&IS
Diverse scram command CRD, RC&IS
SCRRI/SRI (DPS) RC&IS SCRRI signal RC&IS, RPS
ATLM SCRRI/SRI signal RPS, RC&IS
Generator load rejection signal TGCS, RPS, RC&IS
Loss of feedwater heating C&FS, NMS, RPS,
RC&IS
Turbine trip signal TGCS, RPS, RC&IS
OPRM thermal neutron flux oscillation NMS, RPS, RC&IS
2.2-119
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Table 2.2.14-2
Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing Systems 1

Delayed Feedwater SCRRI/SRI signal and power levels remain NMS, RC&IS, FWCS
Runback (DPS) elevated
RPS scram command and power levels RPS, NMS, FWCS
remain elevated
1
Implementing system is shown in parentheses.
2.2-120
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Table 2.2.14-3
Controls, Interlocks and Bypasses1
Control Manual initiation of ATWS SLC (ATWS/SLC)

Manual initiation of ATWS ARI (ATWS/SLC)
Manual initiation of ATWS Feedwater Runback (ATWS/SLC)
Manual initiation of FMCRD Run-in (DPS)
Manual inhibit of SSLC/ESF ECCS functions under ATWS
conditions2 (ATWS/SLC)
Interlock SRNM ATWS Permissive (ATWS/SLC)
APRM ATWS Permissive (ATWS/SLC)
Time Delays
Bypass Division of sensor bypass (ATWS/SLC)
Sensor channel bypass (DPS)
1
Implementing system is shown in parentheses.
2
For applicable ATWS conditions, refer to Initiator column, Table 2.2.14-2, for the Function “ADS inhibit
(ATWS/SLC).”
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Table 2.2.14-4
ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls

1. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse Inspection(s) will be conducted on the The system’s conformance to the
instrumentation and control systems as-built system configuration. functional arrangement as described in
functional arrangement is as described Subsection 2.2.14 and Table 2.2.14-1.
in Subsection 2.2.14 and Table 2.2.14-
1.
2. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse Tests will be conducted on the The ATWS/SLC and DPS are capable of
instrumentation and control systems ATWS/SLC and DPS safety-related and performing the functions as described in
provide automatic functions and nonsafety-related components on the as- Table 2.2.14-2.
initiators as described in Table 2.2.14- built system configuration using
2. simulated signals.
3. The ATWS/SLC and DPS diverse Test(s) will be performed on the The ATWS/SLC and DPS logic controls,
instrumentation and control systems ATWS/SLC and DPS safety-related and interlocks and bypasses exist, can be
provide controls, interlocks and nonsafety-related logic using simulated retrieved in the main control room, and
bypasses in the MCR as described in signals and actuators for controls, are performed in response to simulated
Table 2.2.14-3. interlocks, and bypasses, as described in signals and manual actions as described
Table 2.2.14-3. in Table 2.2.14-3.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8. Confirmatory analyses support and i. Complete Failure Modes and Effects i. The FMEA completed per
validate the DPS design scope and the Analysis (FMEA) per NUREG/CR- NUREG/CR-6303 of the Q-DCIS has
fire separation criteria. 6303 of the Q-DCIS to validate the been addressed in the DPS design
DPS protection functions. scope.
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Table 2.2.14-4

ii. Inspection of the DPS platform ii. The platform requirements phase
requirements phase summary summary baseline review report
baseline review report will be contains the validated DPS design
performed. scope.
iii. Inspection(s) of the DPS platform iii. The DPS platform(s) test phase
test phase summary baseline review summary baseline review report(s)
report(s) will be performed. • Identify and reconcile changes,
deletions, and additions to the
applicable DPS design scope.
• Confirm that tests show that the
DPS performs in accordance with
the applicable DPS design scope.
iv. Inspections will be performed to iv. The as-built location of the control
confirm the control logic cabinets logic cabinets for the containment
for each of the containment vacuum vacuum breaker isolation valves are
breaker isolation valves meet their separated according to fire protection
fire protection separation criteria. separation criteria for the various
locations.
9. (Deleted)
10. (Deleted)
11. DPS controller cabinets are in fire areas Inspections will be performed to confirm The as-built physical location of the DPS
separate from the other N-DCIS, RMU, as-built location of the DPS cabinets. cabinets are in fire areas separate from the
and Q-DCIS cabinets. other N-DCIS, RMU, and Q-DCIS
cabinets.
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Table 2.2.14-4

12. ATWS/SLC System logic is designed Test(s) will be performed on the The as-built ATWS/SLC system logic
to provide a trip initiation by requiring ATWS/SLC system logic. provides trip initiation signals when a
coincident trip of like, unbypassed coincident trip signal exists in like,
parameters in at least two divisions to unbypassed parameters in at least two
cause the trip output. unbypassed divisions.
13. Each ATWS/SLC System division is Test(s) will be performed on the A test signal exists in the safety-related
powered from its respective safety- ATWS/SLC System by providing a test division under test in the ATWS/SLC
related power supply. signal in only one safety-related division System.
at a time.
14. DPS is powered from nonsafety-related Test(s) will be performed on the DPS by A test signal exists in the load group
load group power supplies. providing a test signal in only one DPS under test in the DPS.
load group at a time.
15. DPS triple redundant digital controllers Test(s) will be performed on the DPS by Trip actuation signals exist only when at
require agreement in at least two providing simulated signals to each DPS least two channels are in coincident
channels out of three channels for a channel. agreement.
coincident trip actuation.
16. DPS logic is “energize-to-actuate”. Test(s) will be performed on the DPS Trip actuation signals are “energize-to-
system logic. actuate”.
17. DPS process variable sensors are Analysis(es) will be performed on the The DPS sensors are diverse from the
diverse from those used by the RPS and DPS sensor failure modes and effects. RPS and SSLC/ESF sensors.
SSLC/ESF.
18. The DPS network segment uses diverse Analysis(es) will be performed on the The DPS network segment is diverse
hardware and software from that used DPS network segment failure modes and from the RPS and SSLC/ESF hardware
by the RPS and SSLC/ESF. effects. and software.
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2.2.15 Instrumentation & Control Compliance With IEEE Std. 603

Design Description
IEEE Std. 603 establishes the minimum functional and design requirements for the power,
instrumentation, and control portions of safety systems. ESBWR divides safety systems into two
parts:
• Safety-related distributed control and information system (Q-DCIS) platforms, and
• Associated functional systems that contain the sensors and actuators used by the Q-DCIS
platforms.
In accordance with the software development process described in Section 3.2 and the defense-
in-depth and diversity strategy described in Subsection 2.2.14, the safety-related protection
systems are executed as software projects on particular Q-DCIS platforms. The software
projects are named RTIF, NMS, SSLC/ESF, Vacuum Breaker Isolation Function (VBIF),
ATWS/SLC, HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function, and ICS DPV Isolation Function.
Table 2.2.10-1 shows the relationship between the Q-DCIS platforms and their corresponding
software projects. As shown, the RTIF-NMS platform has two software projects: RTIF and
NMS. The SSLC/ESF platform has one software project: SSLC/ESF. The Independent Control
Platform has four software projects: VBIF, ATWS/SLC, HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function and
ICS DPV Isolation Function.
Demonstration of compliance with IEEE Std. 603 means the Q-DCIS documentation includes
design bases that make appropriate reference to IEEE Std. 603 design criteria and that the
resulting as-built equipment has been inspected, tested, or analyzed to show that the Q-DCIS will
be capable of performing in accordance with the design bases. The choice of whether an
inspection, test, or analysis is required to close a particular ITAAC is defined in the
documentation associated with the {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} ITAAC closure report for the
software projects in response to ITAAC defined in Section 3.2.
IEEE Std. 603 divides the Q-DCIS into three features: sense, command, and execute features.
Sense features comprise sensors. Command features comprise the Q-DCIS platforms. Execute
features comprise actuators. Each of these features is treated differently within Tier 1 because of
influences outside of the scope of IEEE Std. 603.
As a result of these differences, Table 2.2.15-1 was developed to group the software projects
with their associated functional system(s), if any, and to define how the various IEEE Std. 603
criteria will be demonstrated by an ITAAC for each software project.
Table entries marked with an R means the IEEE Std. 603 criterion compliance report(s) for the
indicated software projects (i.e., RTIF, NMS, SSLC/ESF, VBIF, ATWS/SLC, HP CRD Isolation
Bypass Function, and ICS DPV Isolation Function) include(s) the associated parts of the
functional systems marked with a C or string of Cs, if any, immediately to the right of the R.
Table entries marked with a C means compliance with the IEEE Std. 603 criterion is documented
by one or more reports written against the first software projects marked with an R, to the left of
the C(s). For example, the report(s) for the RTIF software projects will demonstrate compliance
to IEEE Std. 603 criterion 5.1 for RPS, LD&IS MSIV, Containment Monitoring System (CMS)-
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Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring (SPTM), NBS, and CRD. The report(s) may be
referenced or attached to a software project lifecycle phase summary baseline review record
(BRR) reference described in Subsection 3.2 to close the Table 2.2.15-2 ITAAC.
Table headings contain the software projects or the functional system identifier and a
parenthetical reference to the section or subsection where additional information about the
software projects or functional system can be found. These parenthetical references are reverse
references that point back to the originating system. The IEEE Std. 603 criteria apply only to
those structures, systems, or components (SSCs) directly associated with the performance of the
safety-related function of the software projects. Complete lists of applicable SSCs and functions
are defined in the documentation associated with the {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} ITAAC
closure report for each software project in response to ITAAC defined in Section 3.2. These lists
along with the information in the tables associated with a software project or functional system
in each column define the scope of the IEEE Std. 603 ITAAC.
Refer to Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, as described, for ITAAC associated with the IEEE
Std. 603 criteria that do not appear in Table 2.2.15-1.
When the IEEE Std. 603 design criteria are applied to platforms relying on the use of software to
perform their safety-related functions, additional criteria from IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2, which
augments the IEEE Std. 603 criteria, also apply to the software projects as described under the
applicable IEEE Std. 603 criterion. The evaluation of Q-DCIS platforms for compliance with
IEEE Std. 603 and IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2 criteria includes consideration of the effects that the
associated sensors and actuators have on the performance of the safety-related function.
IEEE Std. 603, Criteria 4.2, 4.3, 4.11, and 4.12, are not included as ITAAC because NUREG
0800, Section 14.3.5, and RG 1.206, Section C.II.1, do not include these criteria as ITAAC.
IEEE Std. 603 Criteria 4.10 is included as ITAAC even though it is not included in NUREG
0800, Section 14.3.5, and RG 1.206, Section C.II.1. This criterion for an overall plant process
control timing budget ensures the completion of protective action in less time than the maximum
time allowable. The timing budget is inclusive of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute
(actuate) loop. The timing budget includes the associated DCIS components of digital signal
conditioning, control data processing, and communications response times. A plant process
control timing budget is required for each function within a functional system and software
project.
IEEE Std. 603, Criterion 5.3, Quality, requires that the Q-DCIS be of a quality that is consistent
with minimum maintenance requirements and low failure rates and be designed, manufactured,
inspected, installed, tested, operated, and maintained in accordance with a prescribed quality
assurance (QA) program. The QA program for Q-DCIS is not addressed in Tier 1.
The following paragraphs provide references to the tables associated with the software projects
and their associated functional systems. For example, RPS refers to Subsection 2.2.7, which
associates Tables 2.2.7-1, 2.2.7-2, and 2.2.7-3 with RPS.
Process sensors and actuators that provide sense and execute functions associated with the
software projects in Table 2.2.15-1 are found in Tables 2.1.2-2, 2.2.2-6, 2.2.4-5, 2.4.1-2, 2.4.2-2,
2.15.1-1c, and 2.15.7-1, and marked “Yes” in the Control Q-DCIS/DPS column.
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Functional arrangement of the software projects platforms (except VBIF and ICS DPV Isolation
Function) are found in Tables 2.2.5-1, 2.2.7-1, 2.2.13-1, 2.2.14-1, and 2.2.16-1.
The independent control platforms associated with the VBIF and ICS DPV Isolation Function
software projects are found in Table 2.15.1-1c and Table 2.4.1-2 respectively.
Functions, initiators, and interfacing systems associated with the software projects (except for the
functional system LD&IS) are found in Tables 2.2.5-2, 2.2.7-2, 2.2.13-2, 2.2.14-2, and 2.2.16-2.
The isolation functions and monitored variables associated with the functional system LD&IS
are found in Table 2.2.12-2.
Isolation valves associated with the functional system LD&IS are found in Table 2.15.1-1a, and
marked “Yes” in the Safety-Related column.
Isolation dampers associated with the functional system LD&IS are found in Tables 2.16.2-1,
2.16.2-3, 2.16.2-5, and 2.16.2-8.
Controls, interlocks, and bypasses associated with the software projects are found in Tables
2.2.5-3, 2.2.7-3, 2.2.12-4, 2.2.13-3, 2.2.14-3, and 2.2.16-3.
The process radiation monitors associated with the functional system PRMS are found in Table
2.3.1-1, marked “Yes” in the Safety-Related column.
Refer to Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, and 3.8, as described, for ITAAC associated with the IEEE Std.
603 criteria that do not appear in Table 2.2.15-1.
The design descriptions that demonstrate compliance with the IEEE Std. 603 standard are shown
below:
1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project’s design bases
list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial
conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each
such event.
1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of
operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant
conditions for each such event.
2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project’s design bases
list:
• The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to
manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action;
• The analytical limit associated with each variable;
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable;
and
• The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of
the protective action is ensured.
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2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the list of:
• The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to
manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action;
• The analytical limit associated with each variable;
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable;
and
• The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of
the protective action is ensured.
3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions
subsequent to initiation: The software project’s design bases list:
• The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed;
• The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by
manual means;
• The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal,
abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be
performed; and
• The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.
3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions
subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project’s design bases, with changes
reconciled, list:
• The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed;
• The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by
manual means;
• The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal,
abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be
performed; and
• The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.
4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software
project’s design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those
variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial
dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).
4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built
software project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number
and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related
function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of
position in a particular region).
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5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project’s
design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control
power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity,
pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout
which the safety-related system is to perform.
5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software
project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steady-
state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage,
frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal,
abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to
perform.
6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional
degradation of safety-related system’s performance: The software project’s design bases
list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related
system performance.
6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional
degradation of safety-related system’s performance: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause
functional degradation of safety-related system performance.
7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety
system design: The software project’s design bases list the methods and any qualitative
and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system
design.
7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety
system design: The as-built software project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the
list: of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the
reliability of the safety-related system design.
8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design
basis event: The software project’s design bases ensures that;
• A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop
including the associated DCIS digital components response times) exists; and
• The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the
specified maximum time allowable.
8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design
basis event: The as-built software project ensures that;
• The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the
specified maximum time allowable.
9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project’s design bases show
compliance with the single-failure criterion.
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9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the
results of the FMEA.
10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project’s design
bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of
safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.
10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project’s design
bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the
safety-related systems to normal.
10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project’s
ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-
related functions of the execute features continue until completion.
10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project’s
ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-
related systems to normal.
11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant
divisions.
Features and Other Systems: The software project’s inter-divisional communication
systems have;
• Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DIS (e.g., RMU,
controller) cabinets.
11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features
and Other Systems: The software project’s safety-related functions are performed
independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and
communication channel.
Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project’s design bases for intra-
divisional input/output data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data
links;
• Data links use optical fibers; and
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared
reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.
Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project’s design bases for inter-
divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features;
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• Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-

point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and
trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and
• Data links use optical fibers.
and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project’s design bases for N-DCIS data
communications between safety-related and non-safety-related systems have the following
features;
• Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components;
• Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared
reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module,
trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components;
• Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-
related components) at the receiving end; and
Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project’s design bases for intra-
divisional input/output data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy;
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply
redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application
processors;
• Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers;
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply
redundant controller application processors; and
• Actuator commands are sent via triply redundant optical fibers.
11a8.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features
and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project’s design bases for intra-divisional
VDU data communications have the following features;
• Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform;
• Data inputs are only from RTIF-NMS platform;
• Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs via dual, redundant networks;
• Data links have dedicated communication interface modules
• Data links use optical fibers;
• Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and
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• Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver identification, sequence

number, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.
and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project’s design bases for inter-divisional
data communications within safety-related systems have the following features;
• Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks;
• Data links have dedicated communication interface modules;
11a10.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The SSLC/ESF software project’s design bases for N-DCIS
data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the
following features;
• Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant networks;
• SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division
only; and
11a11.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project’s design bases for intra-divisional
data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and
• Data links use hard copper wires.
Features and Other Systems: The ICP software project’s design bases for inter-divisional
• Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point;
• Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers;
• Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic;
• Monitoring data links are point-to-point;
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• Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules;

• Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and
• Monitoring data links use optical fibers.
11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project has four independent,
redundant divisions.
Features and Other Systems: The as-built software project’s interdivisional
communication systems have;
• Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU,
controller) cabinets.
11b3.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features
and Other Systems: The as-built software project’s safety-related functions are performed
independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and
11b4.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features
and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project’s intra-divisional
input/output data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data
links;
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared
reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.
11b5.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project’s inter-divisional
• Communication interface modules and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-
point data communications between the various divisions of digital trip modules and
trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and
Features and Other Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS software project’s N-DCIS data
communications between safety-related and non-safety-related systems have the following
features;
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• Data communications use dedicated communication interface modules and shared

reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module,
trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related components;
• Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-
related components) at the receiving end; and
Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project’s intra-divisional
input/output data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy;
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply
redundant communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller application
processors;
• Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via data links using triply redundant optical
fibers;
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands from the triply
redundant controller application processors; and
• Actuator commands are sent via data links using triply redundant optical fibers.
11.b8.Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project’s intra-divisional
VDU data communications have the following features;
• Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform
• Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant
networks;
Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project’s inter-divisional
• Data links supporting two-out-of-four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks;
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Features and Other Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF software project’s N-DCIS data
communications between safety-related and nonsafety-related systems have the following
features;
• SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division
only; and
Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project’s intra-divisional data
communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links; and
Features and Other Systems: The as-built ICP software project’s inter-divisional data
communications within safety-related systems have the following features;
• Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic are point-to-point;
• Data links used for two-out-of-four voting logic use optical fibers;
• Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic;
• Monitoring data links are point-to-point;
• Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication interface modules;
• Monitoring data links use dedicated communication interface modules; and
• Monitoring data links use optical fibers.
12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The software project has
maintenance bypasses that allow testing its calibration of one out of four divisions while
retaining capability to accomplish their safety-related functions.
12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project’s
maintenance bypasses show that the divisions not in bypass status will accomplish their
safety-related functions.
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12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project’s
maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass
mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a
two-out-of-three voting scheme.
13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key
lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative
control of access to safety-related system equipment.
13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets
with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit
administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.
14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the
timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning
equipment.
14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that
facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of
malfunctioning equipment.
15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly
identified.
15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are
distinctly identified.
16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software
project’s performance below an acceptable level.
16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built
software project’s performance below an acceptable level.
17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to
automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.
17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project’s design bases show that in
normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control
loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data
processing and communications) the following features are not used;
• Non-deterministic data communications;
• Non-deterministic computation;
• Interrupts;
• Multi-tasking;
• Dynamic scheduling; and;
• Event-driven actions.
17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means
to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.
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17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project’s normal operation
end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the
associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and
communications) do not use the following features;
• Non-deterministic data communications;
• Non-deterministic computation;
• Interrupts;
• Multi-tasking;
• Dynamic scheduling; and
18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control
room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at
the division level.
18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the
main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-
related functions at the division level.
19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the
software project’s design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the
desired variables specified in the plants design bases.
19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-
built software project’s design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the
desired variables specified in the plant’s design bases.
20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project’s design bases provides for
automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable
permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project’s design bases provides for
automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that
an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.
20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically
prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive
conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it
automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that
an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.
21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project’s design bases
provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in
maintenance bypass.
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21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures
that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in
maintenance bypass.
21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures
that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply
division is in maintenance bypass.
22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project’s setpoints for safety-related functions are
determined by a defined setpoint methodology.
22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built
software project.
23a. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project’s design bases
ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-
related power supplies.
23b. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project’s as-
built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related
power supplies.
24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project’s design
bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.
24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project’s
actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.
Table 2.2.15-2 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with acceptance criteria for
the software projects.
Subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.7, 2.2.10, 2.2.12, 2.2.13, 2.2.14, 2.2.16, 2.3.1, 2.4.1,
2.4.2, 2.15.1, and 2.15.7, 2.16.2.2, 2.16.2.3 define the inspections, tests, and analyses, together
with associated acceptance criteria for the sensors, actuators, functional arrangement, functional
performance, controls, interlocks, and bypasses associated with the software projects.
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Table 2.2.15-1
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2)
Software Project RTIF-NMS Platform ICP Platform
Functional
SSLC/ESF
Systems
Platform
ICS DPV
HP CRD
(Para. Ref.)
ATWS/
NMS
RTIF
VBIF
SLC
IBF
IF
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
LD&IS non-MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (3)]
CBVS (2.16.2.2, 2.16.2.3) [Note (5)]
ICS DPV Isolation Function (2.4.1)

CMS non-SPTM (2.15.7) [Note (4)]
LD&IS MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (4)]
VB Isolation Function (2.15.1)

Table 2.2.15-2, Item No.
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion
NBS (2.1.2)/ADS (N/A)

CMS-SPTM (2.15.7)
ATWS/SLC (2.2.14)
SSLC/ESF (2.2.13)
GDCS (2.4.2)
PRMS (2.3.1)
RTIF (2.2.10)
NMS (2.2.5)
CRD (2.2.2)
CRD (2.2.2)
NBS (2.1.2)
RPS (2.2.7)
SLC (2.2.4)
ICS (2.4.1)
(2.2.16)
1 4.1 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
5.2
10 and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
7.3
11 5.6
Note and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
(7) 6.3
5.7
6.5
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Table 2.2.15-1
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2)
Software Project RTIF-NMS Platform ICP Platform
Functional
SSLC/ESF
Systems
Platform
ICS DPV
HP CRD
(Para. Ref.)
ATWS/
NMS
RTIF
VBIF
SLC
IBF
IF
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
LD&IS non-MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (3)]
CBVS (2.16.2.2, 2.16.2.3) [Note (5)]
ICS DPV Isolation Function (2.4.1)

CMS non-SPTM (2.15.7) [Note (4)]
LD&IS MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (4)]
VB Isolation Function (2.15.1)

Table 2.2.15-2, Item No.
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion
NBS (2.1.2)/ADS (N/A)

CMS-SPTM (2.15.7)
ATWS/SLC (2.2.14)
SSLC/ESF (2.2.13)
GDCS (2.4.2)
PRMS (2.3.1)
RTIF (2.2.10)
NMS (2.2.5)
CRD (2.2.2)
CRD (2.2.2)
NBS (2.1.2)
RPS (2.2.7)
SLC (2.2.4)
ICS (2.4.1)
(2.2.16)
6.1
and
7.1 C C
17 R C C C C R R C C C C C C C C R R R R
[Not
e
(6)]
6.2
C C
18 and R C C C C R R C C C C C C C C R R R R
7.2
6.6
7.4
6.7,
7.5,
21 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
and
8.3
Notes:
(1) R means the IEEE Std. 603 criterion compliance report(s) for the indicated software projects (i.e., RTIF, NMS, SSLC/ESF, VB Isolation Function,
ATWS/SLC, and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function) include(s) the associated parts of the functional systems marked with a C or string of Cs, if
any, immediately to the right of the R. C means compliance with the IEEE Std. 603 criterion is documented by one or more reports written against
the first software projects marked with an R, to the left of the C(s). For example, the report(s) for the RTIF software projects will demonstrate
compliance to IEEE Std. 603 criterion 5.1 for RPS, LD&IS MSIV, CMS-SPTM, NBS, and CRD.
(2) IEEE Std. 603 criteria apply only to the safety-related portions of the functional systems that perform sense, command, or execute functions.
(3) LD&IS non-MSIV functions control the safety-related actuators (isolation valves and isolation dampers) in the following nonsafety-related
systems: RWCU/SDC, FAPCS, EFDS, CIS, CWS, HPNSS, SAS, RBVS, CBVS, FBVS, CRD.
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(4) CMS (non-SPTM) provides sensor inputs for both LD&IS MSIV and LD&IS non-MSIV functions.
(5) CBVS includes the safety-related CB isolation dampers (see Note 3), EFU and CRHAVS. SSLC/ESF platform executes the CRHS function logic
for the safety-related CBVS subsystems, CRHAVS and EFU.
(6) Includes BTP HICB-21 on Design Commitments related to avoiding the use of design practices that lead to non-deterministic timing behaviors.
(7) Data communications between the diverse Q-DCIS platforms is itself diverse. To provide adequate granularity and specificity to the ITAAC
descriptions there are ITAACs that are not common across the software projects. ITAACs 11a4, 11a5, 11a6, 11b4, 11b5, and 11b6 are specific to
the RTIF-NMS platform. ITAACs 11a7, 11a8, 11a9, 11b7, 11b8, and 11b9 are specific to the SSLC/ESF platform. ITAACs 11a10, 11a1, 11b10,
and 11b11 are specific to the ICP platform.
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation

1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
basis events: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR include a list of design
design bases list the applicable design performed for the identification of the basis events, the applicable reactor modes
basis events, the applicable reactor design basis events. of operation, the initial conditions
modes of operation, the initial {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} requiring protective action, and the
conditions requiring protective action, allowable limits of plant conditions for
and the allowable limits of plant each such event.
conditions for each such event. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s
basis events: The as-built software project’s installation phase summary installation phase summary BRR include
project’s design bases reconcile any BRR will be performed for the a list of design basis events, the
changes to the design bases events, identification of the design basis events applicable reactor modes of operation,
applicable reactor modes of operation, and to ensure that changes have been the initial conditions requiring protective
initial conditions requiring protective reconciled. action, and the allowable limits of plant
action, and allowable limits of plant conditions for each such event and
conditions for each such event. changes have been reconciled.
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Table 2.2.15-2

2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
variables monitored: The software design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify:
project’s design bases list: performed for identification of monitored • The variables or combinations of
variables. variables, or both, that are to be
• The variables or combinations of
variables, or both, that are to be {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} monitored to manually or
monitored to manually or automatically, or both, control
automatically, or both, control each each protective action;
protective action; • The analytical limit associated
• The analytical limit associated with with each variable;
each variable; • The ranges (normal, abnormal,
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and and accident conditions)
accident conditions) associated with associated with each variable; and
each variable; and • The rates of change of these
• The rates of change of these variables variables to be accommodated
to be accommodated until proper until proper completion of the
completion of the protective action is protective action is ensured.
ensured. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2

2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s installation phase
variables monitored: The as-built installation phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify and comply with
software project’s design bases performed for identification of monitored changes, deletions, and additions to, and
reconcile any changes to the list of: variables and to ensure that changes have changes thereto are reconciled for:
been reconciled. • The variables or combinations of
• The variables or combinations of
variables, or both, that are to be variables, or both, that are to be
monitored to manually or monitored to manually or
automatically, or both, control each automatically, or both, control
protective action; each protective action;
• The analytical limit associated with • The analytical limit associated
each variable; with each variable;
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and • The ranges (normal, abnormal,
accident conditions) associated with and accident conditions)
each variable; and associated with each variable; and
• The rates of change of these variables • The rates of change of these
to be accommodated until proper variables to be accommodated
completion of the protective action is until proper completion of the
ensured. protective action is ensured.
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Table 2.2.15-2

3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
manual initiation and control of design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify:
protective actions subsequent to performed for identification of the • The points in time and the plant
initiation: The software project’s minimum criteria for manual initiation conditions during which manual
design bases list: and control. {{Design Acceptance control is allowed;
Criteria}} • The justification for permitting
• The points in time and the plant
conditions during which manual initiation or control subsequent to
control is allowed; initiation solely by manual means;
• The justification for permitting • The range of environmental
initiation or control subsequent to conditions imposed upon the
initiation solely by manual means. operator during normal, abnormal,
• The range of environmental; and accident conditions
conditions imposed upon the operator throughout which the manual
during normal, abnormal, and operations will be performed; and
accident conditions throughout which • The variables that will be
the manual operations will be displayed for the operator to use
performed; and in taking manual action.
• The variables that will be displayed {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
for the operator to use in taking
manual action.
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Table 2.2.15-2

3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s
manual initiation and control of project’s installation phase summary installation phase summary BRR identify
protective actions subsequent to BRR will be performed for identification and comply with applicable changes,
initiation: The as-built software of the minimum criteria for manual deletions, and additions to, and changes
project’s design bases, with changes initiation and control of protective actions thereto are reconciled for:
reconciled, list: subsequent to initiation and to ensure • The points in time and the plant
changes have been reconciled. conditions during which manual
• The points in time and the plant
conditions during which manual control is allowed;
control is allowed; • The justification for permitting
• The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to
initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by manual means;
initiation solely by manual means. • The range of environmental
• The range of environmental; conditions imposed upon the
conditions imposed upon the operator operator during normal, abnormal,
during normal, abnormal, and and accident conditions
accident conditions throughout which throughout which the manual
the manual operations will be operations will be performed; and
performed; and • The variables that will be
• The variables that will be displayed displayed for the operator to use
for the operator to use in taking in taking manual action.
manual action.
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Table 2.2.15-2

4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
minimum number and location of design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify the minimum
sensors: The software project’s design performed for the identification of the number and locations of sensors for those
bases list the minimum number and minimum number of sensors and variables that are required to perform a
locations of sensors for those variables locations of sensors for those variables safety-related function and have a spatial
that are required to perform a safety- that have a spatial dependence. dependence (i.e., where the variable
related function and have a spatial {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} varies as a function of position in a
dependence (i.e., where the variable particular region).
varies as a function of position in a {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
particular region).
4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s
minimum number and location of project’s installation phase summary installation phase summary BRR identify
sensors: The as-built software BRR will be performed for the and comply with changes, deletions, and
project’s design bases reconcile any identification of the minimum number of additions to the applicable minimum
changes to the list of the minimum sensors and locations of sensors for those number and locations of sensors for those
number and locations of sensors for variables that have a spatial dependence variables that are required to perform a
those variables that are required to and to ensure that changes have been safety-related function and have a spatial
perform a safety-related function and reconciled. dependence (i.e., where the variable
have a spatial dependence (i.e., where varies as a function of position in a
the variable varies as a function of particular region) and changes have been
position in a particular region). reconciled.
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Table 2.2.15-2

5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
steady-state conditions: The software design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify the range of
project’s design bases list the range of performed for the identification of the transient and steady state conditions of
transient and steady state conditions of range of transient and steady-state motive and control power and the
motive and control power and the conditions of motive and control power environment (e.g., voltage, frequency,
environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, and the environment. radiation, temperature, humidity,
radiation, temperature, humidity, {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} pressure, and vibration) during normal,
pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances
abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related
throughout which the safety-related system will perform.
system is to perform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s
steady-state conditions: The as-built project’s installation phase summary installation phase summary BRR identify
software project’s design bases BRR will be performed for the and comply with changes, deletions, and
reconcile any changes to the list of the identification of the range of transient additions to the applicable range of
range of transient and steady state and steady state conditions of motive and transient and steady state conditions of
conditions of motive and control power control power and the environment, and motive and control power and the
and the environment (e.g., voltage, to ensure that changes have been environment (e.g., voltage, frequency,
frequency, radiation, temperature, reconciled. radiation, temperature, humidity,
humidity, pressure, and vibration) pressure, and vibration) during normal,
during normal, abnormal, and accident abnormal, and accident circumstances
circumstances throughout which the throughout which the safety-related
safety-related system is to perform. system will perform and changes have
been reconciled.
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Table 2.2.15-2

6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
conditions having the potential for design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify the conditions
causing functional degradation of performed for identification of the having the potential to cause functional
safety-related system’s performance: conditions having the potential for degradation of safety-related system’s
The software project’s design bases list causing functional degradation of the performance.
the conditions having the potential to safety-related system’s performance. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
cause functional degradation of safety- {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
related system performance.
6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s accounts
conditions having the potential for project’s installation phase summary for the applicable conditions having the
causing functional degradation of BRR will be performed for the conditions potential to cause functional degradation
safety-related system’s performance: having the potential for causing of safety-related system performance and
The as-built software project’s design functional degradation of the safety- changes have been reconciled.
bases reconcile any changes to the list related system performance and to ensure
of the conditions having the potential that changes have been reconciled.
to cause functional degradation of
safety-related system performance.
7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
methods used to determine reliability design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identify that appropriate
of the safety system design: The performed for identification of the methods and qualitative and quantitative
software project’s design bases list the applicable qualitative and quantitative reliability goals were used to assess the
methods and any qualitative and reliability goals. reliability of the safety-related system
quantitative reliability goals used to {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design.
assess the reliability of the safety- {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
related system design.
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Table 2.2.15-2

7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the Inspection of the as-built software The as-built software project’s design
methods used to determine reliability project’s design bases will be performed bases identifies applicable qualitative and
of the safety system design: The as- for identification of the applicable quantitative reliability goals used to
built software project’s design bases qualitative and quantitative reliability assess the reliability of the safety-related
reconcile any changes to the list of the goals, and to ensure that changes have system design and changes have been
methods and any qualitative and been reconciled. reconciled.
quantitative reliability goals used to
assess the reliability of the safety-
related system design.
8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
time or the plant conditions, after the design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR identifies that;
onset of a design basis event: The performed to verify that; • A plant process control timing
software project’s design bases ensures • A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense,
that; budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop
• A plant process control timing budget command, and execute loop including the associated DCIS
(end-to-end sense, command, and including the associated DCIS components’ response times)
execute loop including the associated components’ response times) exists; and
DCIS components’ response times) exists; and
• The plant process control timing
exists; and • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective
• The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the specified
budget completes its protective action action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.
in less than the specified maximum maximum time allowable.
time allowable. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2

8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in Tests will be performed to show that the Test shows that;
time or the plant conditions, after the as-built software project complies with;
• The plant process control timing
onset of a design basis event: The as- • The plant process control timing budget completes its protective
built software project ensures that; budget completes its protective action in less than the specified
• The plant process control timing action in less than the specified maximum time allowable.
budget completes its protective action maximum time allowable.
in less than the specified maximum
time allowable.
9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
The software project’s design bases design phase summary BRR show that a summary BRR show that a FMEA has
show compliance with the single- Failures Mode and Effects Analysis been completed and show the software
failure criterion. (FMEA) have been completed. project’s safety-related functions required
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} for design basis events can be performed
in the presence of:
• Single detectable failures within
safety-related systems concurrent
with identifiable but non-
detectable failures;
• Failures caused by the single
failure; and
• Failures and spurious system
actions that cause or are caused
by the Design Basis Event (DBE)
requiring the safety-related
functions.
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Table 2.2.15-2

9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: Inspection will be performed to show that The as-built software project complies
The as-built software project complies the as-built software project complies with the results of the FMEA.
with the results of the FMEA. with the results of the FMEA.
10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Protective Actions: The software design phase summary BRR verifies that summary BRR show “seal-in” features.
project’s design bases ensures the design bases show “seal-in” features {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
designed so that once initiated are provided to enable system-level
(automatically or manually), the safety-related functions to go to
intended sequences of safety-related completion.
functions of the execute features {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
continue until completion.
10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Protective Actions: The software design phase summary BRR verifies that summary BRR show “manual reset”
project’s design bases ensures that the design bases show “manual reset” features that are provided to require
after completion, deliberate operator features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the
action is required to return the safety- deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal.
related systems to normal. safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Tests will be performed to show that once Once initiated (automatically and
Protective Actions: The as-built initiated (automatically and manually), manually), the intended sequences of
software project ensures that once the intended sequences of safety-related safety-related functions of the “execute
initiated (automatically or manually), functions of the “execute features” features” continue until completion.
the intended sequences of safety- continue until completion.
related functions of the execute
features continue until completion.
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Table 2.2.15-2

10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Tests of the “manual reset” features will Tests show that after completion of
Protective Actions: The as-built be performed. protective actions, deliberate operator
software project ensures that after action to operate the “manual reset”
completion, deliberate operator action features is required to, return the safety-
is required to return the safety-related related systems to normal.
systems to normal.
11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
Interactions Between the Sense and phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR show that the software
Command Features and Other to verify that the design of the software project has four independent, redundant
Systems: The software project has project has four independent, redundant divisions.
four independent, redundant divisions. divisions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
Command Features and Other to verify that the design of the software project’s interdivisional communication
Systems: The software project’s project’s interdivisional communication systems have;
interdivisional communication systems systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic
have; • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and
• Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit
communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable
and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller)
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and
DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.
terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g.,
cabinets. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
RMU, controller) cabinets.
2.2-153
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Table 2.2.15-2

Command Features and Other to verify that the software project’s project’s safety-related functions are
Systems: The software project’s safety-related functions are performed performed independently of the existence
safety-related functions are performed independently of the existence and and function of any nonsafety-related
independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication
function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and communication channel.
component, data, and communication channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
channel. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-154
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Table 2.2.15-2

11a4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that the design
and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for intra-divisional input/output
Systems: The RTIF-NMS software for intra-divisional input/output data data communications have the following
project’s design bases for intra- communications have the following features;
divisional input/output data features; • Sensor inputs sent from
communications have the following • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via
features; instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires;
• Sensor inputs sent from instruments dedicated hard copper wires;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU
to the RMUs via dedicated hard • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via
copper wires; to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data links;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to dedicated, redundant data links;
controller cabinets via dedicated, • Data links use optical fibers; and
redundant data links; • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF- NMS communication interface
• Data links use optical fibers; and NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in
communication interface modules to memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.
shared reflective memory (scramnet) downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria
in downstream chassis. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-155
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Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for inter-divisional data
Systems: The RTIF-NMS software for inter-divisional data communications communications within safety-related
project’s design bases for inter- within safety-related systems have the systems have the following features;
divisional data communications within following features; • Communication interface modules
safety-related systems have the • Communication interface modules and shared memory provides
following features; and shared memory provides dedicated point-to-point data
• Communication interface modules dedicated point-to-point data communications between the
and shared memory provides communications between the various divisions of digital trip
dedicated point-to-point data various divisions of digital trip modules and trip logic units for
communications between the various modules and trip logic units for two-out-of-four voting logic; and
divisions of digital trip modules and two-out-of-four voting logic; and
trip logic units for two-out-of-four • Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
voting logic; and {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-156
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Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for N-DCIS data communications
Systems: The RTIF-NMS software for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-
project’s design bases for N-DCIS data between safety-related and non-safety- related systems have the following
communications between safety- related systems have the following features;
related and non-safety-related systems features; • Data communications are one way
have the following features; • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related
• Data communications are one way out out to nonsafety-related components;
to nonsafety-related components; components;
• Data communications use
• Data communications use dedicated • Data communications use dedicated communication
communication interface modules and dedicated communication interface modules and shared
shared reflective memory (scramnet) interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to
to communicate between the RMU, reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU,
digital trip module, trip logic unit, and communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit,
nonsafety-related components; digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related
and nonsafety-related components;
• Data links use dedicated nonsafety- components;
related communication interface • Data links use dedicated
modules (safety-related components) • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication
at the receiving end; and nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related
interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end;
• Data links use optical fibers components) at the receiving end; and
and
• Data links use optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-157
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Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design for bases for intra-divisional input/output
Systems: The SSLC/ESF software intra-divisional input/output data data communications have the following
divisional input/output data features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are
communications have the following • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy;
features; measured with triple redundancy;
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to
• Sensor inputs at the RMUs are • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a
measured with triple redundancy; and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to
from the RMUs are on a dedicated communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller
triply redundant communication triply redundant controller application processors;
backplane bus to triply redundant application processors;
• Data links for sensor inputs from
controller application processors; • Data links for sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via triply
• Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent the RMUs are sent via triply redundant optical fibers
via triply redundant optical fibers redundant optical fibers
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs are • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands
determined using commands from the are determined using commands from the triply redundant
triply redundant controller application from the triply redundant controller application processors;
processors; and controller application processors; and
and
• Actuator commands are sent via triply • Data links actuator commands are
redundant optical fibers. • Data links for actuator commands sent via triply redundant optical
are sent via triply redundant fibers.
optical fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-158
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for intra-divisional VDU data
Systems: The SSLC/ESF software for intra-divisional VDU data communications have the following
divisional VDU data communications features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and
have the following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform;
• Data inputs/outputs are to and from from the SSLC/ESF platform;
• Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS
the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform;
• Data inputs/outputs to and from
platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via
• Data inputs/outputs to and from the the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks;
safety-related VDUs are via dual, dual, redundant networks;
• Data links have dedicated
redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface
communication interface modules; modules;
• Data links use optical fibers; • Data links use optical fibers;
• Message authentication resides in
• Message authentication resides in the • Message authentication resides in the receiving division only; and
receiving division only; and the receiving division only; and
• Message authentication includes
• Message authentication includes • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver
transmitter and receiver identification, transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number,
sequence number, hash functions, and identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic
cyclic redundancy checks. hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.
redundancy checks. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-159
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for inter-divisional data
Systems: The SSLC/ESF software for inter-divisional data communications communications within safety-related
project’s design bases for inter- within safety-related systems have the systems have the following features;
divisional data communications within following features; • Data links supporting two-out-of-
safety-related systems have the • Data links supporting two-out-of- four voting logic are via dual,
following features; four voting logic are via dual, redundant networks;
• Data links supporting two-out-of-four redundant networks;
voting logic are via dual, redundant • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules;
networks; communication interface
• Data links have dedicated modules;
communication interface modules; • Message authentication resides in
the receiving division only; and
• Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication resides in
• Message authentication resides in the the receiving division only; and
transmitter and receiver
receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes identification, sequence number,
• Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver hash functions, and cyclic
transmitter and receiver identification, identification, sequence number, redundancy checks.
sequence number, hash functions, and hash functions, and cyclic {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
cyclic redundancy checks. redundancy checks.
2.2-160
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases bases for N-DCIS data communications
Systems: The SSLC/ESF software for N-DCIS data communications between safety-related and nonsafety-
project’s design bases for N-DCIS data between safety-related and nonsafety- related systems have the following
communications between safety- related systems have the following features;
related and nonsafety-related systems features; • Communications are one way out
have the following features; • Communications are one way out to nonsafety-related components;
• Data links are via a separate,
to nonsafety-related components; • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant
dedicated, dual, redundant networks; networks;
• Data links have dedicated • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules
communication interface modules communication interface modules
• Data links use optical fibers; • Data links use optical fibers;
• SSLC/ESF message authentication
• SSLC/ESF message authentication • SSLC/ESF message (for absolute time) resides in the
(for absolute time) resides in the authentication (for absolute time) receiving division only; and
receiving division only; and resides in the receiving division
only; and
• Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver
transmitter and receiver identification, • Message authentication includes identification, sequence number,
sequence number, hash functions, and transmitter and receiver hash functions, and cyclic
cyclic redundancy checks. identification, sequence number, redundancy checks.
hash functions, and cyclic {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
redundancy checks.
2.2-161
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

6.3, Interactions Between the Sense design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that design bases for
and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the design bases intra-divisional data communications
Systems: The ICP software project’s for intra-divisional data communications have the following features;
design bases for intra-divisional data have the following features; • Sensor inputs are point-to-point
communications have the following • Sensor inputs are point-to-point data links
features; data links
• Sensor inputs are point-to-point data • Data links use hard copper wires. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
links {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-162
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

and Command Features and Other performed to verify that the software bases for inter-divisional data
Systems: The ICP software project’s project’s design for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related
design bases for inter-divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features;
communications within safety-related systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of-
systems have the following features; • Data links used for two-out-of- four voting logic are point-to-
• Data links used for two-out-of-four four voting logic are point-to- point;
voting logic are point-to-point; point;
• Data links used for two-out-of-
• Data links used for two-out-of-four • Data links used for two-out-of- four voting logic use optical
voting logic use optical fibers; four voting logic use optical fibers;
fibers;
• Data links used for monitoring are • Data links used for monitoring are
separate from voting logic; • Data links used for monitoring are separate from voting logic;
separate from voting logic;
• Monitoring data links are point-to- • Monitoring data links are point-
point; • Monitoring data links are point- to-point;
to-point;
• Monitoring data links connect to the • Monitoring data links connect to
RTIF communication interface • Monitoring data links connect to the RTIF communication
modules; the RTIF communication interface modules;
interface modules;
• Monitoring data links use dedicated • Monitoring data links use
communication interface modules; • Monitoring data links use dedicated communication
and dedicated communication interface modules; and
interface modules; and
• Monitoring data links use optical • Monitoring data links use optical
fibers. • Monitoring data links use optical fibers.
fibers. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-163
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Tests will be performed to show that the The as-built software project has four
Interactions Between the Sense and software project has four independent, independent, redundant divisions.
Command Features and Other redundant divisions.
Systems: The as-built software project
has four independent, redundant
divisions.
11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Inspection of the as-built software project The as-built software project’s inter-
Interactions Between the Sense and will verify that the inter-divisional divisional communication systems have;
command Features and Other Systems: communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic
The as-built software project’s inter- • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and
divisional communication systems communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit
have;
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable
• Optically isolated fiber optic and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller)
communication pathways; and DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.
cabinets.
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and
terminate in the applicable DCIS
(e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.
2.2-164
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Tests will be performed to show that the The as-built software project’s safety-
Interactions Between the Sense and as-built software project’s safety-related related functions are performed
Command Features and Other functions are performed independently of independently of the existence and
Systems: The as-built software the existence and function of any function of any nonsafety-related
project’s safety-related functions are nonsafety-related component, data, and component, data, and communication
performed independently of the communication channel. channel.
existence and function of any
nonsafety-related component, data, and
2.2-165
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The intra-divisional input/out data
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the intra-divisional communications have the following
and Command Features and Other input/output data communications have features;
Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS the following features; • Sensor inputs sent from
software project’s intra-divisional • Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via
input/output data communications have instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires;
the following features; dedicated hard copper wires.
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU
• Sensor inputs sent from instruments • Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to to controller cabinets via
to the RMUs via dedicated hard controller cabinets via dedicated, dedicated, redundant data links;
copper wires; redundant data links;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to • Data links use optical fibers; and
controller cabinets via dedicated, • Data sent using dedicated RTIF-
redundant data links; • Data sent using dedicated RTIF- NMS communication interface
NMS communication interface modules to shared reflective
• Data links use optical fibers; and modules to shared reflective memory (scramnet) in
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS memory (scrammnet) in downstream chasis.
communication interface modules to downstream chassis.
shared reflective memory (scramnet)
in downstream chassis.
2.2-166
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The inter-divisional data communications
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the inter-divisional data within safety-related systems have the
and Command Features and Other communications design within safety- following features;
Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS related systems have the following • Communication interface modules
software project’s inter-divisional data features; and shared memory provides
communications within safety-related • Communication interface modules dedicated point-to-point data
systems have the following features; and shared memory provides communications between the
• Communication interface modules dedicated point-to-point data various divisions of digital trip
and shared memory provides communications between the modules and trip logic units for
dedicated point-to-point data various divisions of digital trip two-out-of-four voting logic; and
communications between the various modules and trip logic units for
• Data links use optical fibers
divisions of digital trip modules and two-out-of-four voting logic; and
trip logic units for two-out-of-four • Data links use optical fibers.
voting logic; and
2.2-167
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b6. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The N-DCIS data communications design
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the N-DCIS data between safety-related and nonsafety-
and Command Features and Other communications design between safety- related systems have the following
Systems: The as-built RTIF-NMS related and nonsafety-related systems features;
software project’s N-DCIS data have the following features; • Data communications are one way
communications between safety- • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related
related and nonsafety-related systems out to nonsafety-related components;
have the following features; components;
• Data communications use
• Data communications are one way out • Data communications use dedicated communication
to nonsafety-related components; dedicated communication interface modules and shared
• Data communications use dedicated interface modules and shared reflective memory (scramnet) to
communication interface modules and reflective memory (scramnet) to communicate between the RMU,
shared reflective memory (scramnet) communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit,
to communicate between the RMU, digital trip module, trip logic unit, and nonsafety-related
digital trip module, trip logic unit, and and nonsafety-related components;
nonsafety-related components; components;
• Data links use dedicated
• Data links use dedicated nonsafety- • Data links use dedicated nonsafety-related communication
related communication interface nonsafety-related communication interface modules (safety-related
modules (safety-related components) interface modules (safety-related components) at the receiving end;
at the receiving end; and components) at the receiving end; and
and
• Data links use optical fibers. • Data links use optical fibers.
2.2-168
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b7. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The intra-divisional input/output data
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the intra-divisional communications have the following
and Command Features and Other input/output data communications design features;
Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF have the following features; • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are
software project’s intra-divisional • Sensor inputs at the RMUs are measured with triple redundancy;
input/output data communications have measured with triple redundancy;
the following features; • Sensor inputs and outputs sent to
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and from the RMUs are on a
• Sensor inputs at the RMUs are and from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant
measured with triple redundancy; dedicated triply redundant communication backplane bus to
• Sensor inputs and outputs sent to and communication backplane bus to triply redundant controller
from the RMUs are on a dedicated triply redundant controller application processors;
triply redundant communication application processors;
• Sensor inputs from the RMUs are
backplane bus to triply redundant • Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent via data links using triply
controller application processors; sent via data links using triply redundant optical fibers
• Sensor inputs from the RMUs are sent redundant optical fibers
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs
via data links using triply redundant • Actuator outputs from the RMUs are determined using commands
optical fibers; are determined using commands from the triply redundant
• Actuator outputs from the RMUs are from the triply redundant controller application processors;
determined using commands from the controller application processors; and
triply redundant controller application and
• Actuator commands are sent via
processors; and • Actuator commands are sent via data links using triply redundant
• Actuator commands are sent via data data links using triply redundant optical fibers.
links using triply redundant optical optical fibers.
fibers.
2.2-169
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b8. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The intra-divisional VDU data
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the intra-divisional VDU communications have the following
and Command Features and Other data communications design have the features;
Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF following features; • Data inputs/outputs are to and
software project’s intra-divisional • Data inputs/outputs are to and from the SSLC/ESF platform;
VDU data communications have the from the SSLC/ESF platform;
following features; • Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS
• Data inputs are from RTIF-NMS platform;
• Data inputs/outputs are to and from platform;
the SSLC/ESF platform; • Data inputs/outputs to and from
• Data inputs/outputs to and from the safety-related VDUs are via
• Data inputs are only from RTIF-NMS the safety-related VDUs are via dual, redundant networks;
platform; dual, redundant networks;
• Data inputs/outputs to and from the • Data links have dedicated communication interface
safety-related VDUs are via dual, communication interface modules;
redundant networks; modules;
• Data links have dedicated • Data links use optical fibers;
communication interface modules; • Message authentication resides in
• Data links use optical fibers; the receiving division only; and
• Message authentication resides in the • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver
receiving division only; and transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number,
• Message authentication includes identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic
transmitter and receiver identification, hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.
sequence number, hash functions, and redundancy checks.
cyclic redundancy checks.
2.2-170
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF related systems have the following • Data links supporting two-out-of-
software project’s inter-divisional data features; four voting logic are via dual,
communications within safety-related • Data links supporting two-out-of- redundant networks;
systems have the following features; four voting logic are via dual,
• Data links supporting two-out-of-four redundant networks;
communication interface modules;
voting logic are via dual, redundant • Data links have dedicated
networks; • Data links use optical fibers;
communication interface
• Data links have dedicated modules; • Message authentication resides in
communication interface modules; the receiving division only; and
• Data links use optical fibers; • Message authentication includes
• Message authentication resides in
transmitter and receiver
• Message authentication resides in the the receiving division only; and
identification, sequence number,
receiving division only; and • Message authentication includes hash functions, and cyclic
• Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver redundancy checks.
transmitter and receiver identification, identification, sequence number,
sequence number, hash functions, and has functions, and cyclic
cyclic redundancy checks. redundancy checks.
2.2-171
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b10. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The N-DCIS data communications design
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the N-DCIS data between safety-related and nonsafety-
and Command Features and Other communications design between safety- related systems have the following
Systems: The as-built SSLC/ESF related and nonsafety-related systems features;
software project’s N-DCIS data have the following features; • Data communications are one way
communications between safety- • Data communications are one way out to nonsafety-related
related and nonsafety-related systems out to nonsafety-related components;
have the following features; components;
• Data links are via a separate,
• Data communications are one way out • Data links are via a separate, dedicated, dual, redundant
to nonsafety-related components; dedicated, dual, redundant networks;
• Data links are via a separate, networks;
dedicated, dual, redundant networks; • Data links have dedicated communication interface modules
• Data links have dedicated communication interface modules
communication interface modules • Data links use optical fibers;
• SSLC/ESF message
• Data links use optical fibers; • SSLC/ESF message authentication (for absolute time)
• SSLC/ESF message authentication authentication (for absolute time) resides in the receiving division
(for absolute time) resides in the resides in the receiving division only; and
receiving division only; and only; and
• Message authentication includes • Message authentication includes transmitter and receiver
transmitter and receiver identification, transmitter and receiver identification, sequence number,
sequence number, hash functions, and identification, sequence number, hash functions, and cyclic
cyclic redundancy checks. hash functions, and cyclic redundancy checks.
redundancy checks.
2.2-172
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.2.15-2

11b11. Criteria 5.6, Independence and Inspection of the as-built software project The intra-divisional data communications
6.3, Interactions Between the Sense will verify that the intra-divisional data have the following features;
and Command Features and Other communications design have the • Sensor inputs are point-to-point
Systems: The as-built ICP software following features; data links; and
project’s intra-divisional data • Sensor inputs are point-to-point
communications have the following • Data links use hard copper wires.
data links; and
features;
• Sensor inputs are point-to-point data
links; and
2.2-173
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Table 2.2.15-2

Systems: The as-built ICP software related systems have the following • Data links used for two-out-of-
project’s inter-divisional data features; four voting logic are point-to-
communications within safety-related • Data links used for two-out-of- point;
systems have the following features; four voting logic are point-to-
• Data links used for two-out-of-
• Data links used for two-out-of-four point;
four voting logic use optical
voting logic are point-to-point; • Data links used for two-out-of- fibers;
• Data links used for two-out-of-four four voting logic use optical
• Data links used for monitoring are
voting logic use optical fibers; fibers;
separate from voting logic;
• Data links used for monitoring are • Data links used for monitoring are
• Monitoring data links are point-
separate from voting logic; separate from voting logic;
to-point;
• Monitoring data links are point-to- • Monitoring data links are point-
• Monitoring data links connect to
point; to-point;
the RTIF communication
• Monitoring data links connect to the • Monitoring data links connect to interface modules;
RTIF communication interface the RTIF communication
• Monitoring data links use
modules; interface modules;
dedicated communication
• Monitoring data links use dedicated • Monitoring data links use interface modules; and
communication interface modules; dedicated communication
• Monitoring data links use optical
and interface modules; and
fibers.
• Monitoring data links use optical • Monitoring data links use optical
fibers. fibers.
2.2-174
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Table 2.2.15-2

12a. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
and Calibration: The software project phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR show that the
has maintenance bypasses that allow to verify that tests of the maintenance maintenance bypasses allow test and
test and calibration of one out of four bypasses allows test and calibration of calibration of one out of four divisions
divisions while retaining their one out of four divisions while retaining while retaining their capability to
capability to accomplish their safety- their capability to accomplish their accomplish their safety-related functions.
related functions. safety-related functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
12b1. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test Tests will be performed to show that the Individual functions in each safety-
& Calibration: The as-built software design allows for trip and bypass of related system division can be tripped
project’s maintenance bypasses show individual functions in each safety- and bypassed and those not in bypass
that the divisions not in bypass status related system division to demonstrate remain functional.
will accomplish their safety-related that individual functions can be tripped
functions. and bypassed and those functions not in
bypass remain functional.
12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test Tests will be performed to show that When one division is placed into
& Calibration: The as-built software when one division is placed into maintenance bypass mode, the condition
project’s maintenance bypasses show maintenance bypass mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division
that when one division is placed into is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a two-out-
maintenance bypass mode, the logic automatically becomes a two-out- of-three voting scheme.
condition is alarmed in the MCR and of-three voting scheme.
the division logic automatically
becomes a two-out-of-three voting
scheme.
2.2-175
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Table 2.2.15-2

13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
software project is housed within phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR show that the software
cabinets with keylock doors, has to confirm that software project is housed project is housed within cabinets with
keylock switches, and utilizes within cabinets with keylock doors, has keylock doors, has keylock switches, and
passwords that permit administrative keylock switches, and utilizes passwords utilizes passwords that permit
control of access to safety-related that permit administrative control of administrative control of access to safety-
system equipment. access to safety-related system related system equipment.
equipment. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The Tests will be performed to show the Keylock doors, keylock switches, and
as-built software project is housed operation of the keylock doors, keylock passwords allow for administrative
within cabinets with keylock doors, switches, and passwords. control of access to safety-related system
has keylock switches, and utilizes equipment.
passwords that permit administrative
control of access to safety-related
system equipment.
14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
project has self-diagnostic features that phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR confirm that the software
facilitate the timely recognition, of the self-diagnostic features. project’s self-diagnostic functions locate
location, replacement, repair, and {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}. failure to the component level.
adjustment of malfunctioning {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
equipment.
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Table 2.2.15-2

14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built Tests of the as-built software projects Self-diagnostic functions locate failure to
software project has self-diagnostic will be performed of the self-diagnostic the component level by facilitating the
features that facilitate the timely features. timely recognition, location, replacement,
recognition, location, replacement, repair, or adjustment of malfunctioning
repair, and adjustment of equipment.
malfunctioning equipment.
15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
redundant portions of the software phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR confirm that the software
project is distinctly identified. to ensure that the software project’s project’s divisions are distinctly
divisions are distinctly identified. identified.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The Inspection will be performed to confirm The redundant portions of the as-built
redundant portions of the as-built that the redundant portions of the as-built software project is distinctly identified.
software project is distinctly identified. software project is distinctly identified.
16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
Other auxiliary features cannot phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR show that the design of
degrade the software project’s to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA other auxiliary features of the software
performance below an acceptable verifies that the design of other auxiliary project do not have failure modes that can
level. features of the software project do not degrade the software project’s
have failure modes that can degrade the performance below an acceptable level.
software project’s performance below an {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
acceptable level.
2.2-177
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Table 2.2.15-2

16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Tests will be performed to show that the The as-built software project
Other auxiliary features cannot as-built software project confirm the performance confirms the results of the
degrade the as-built software project’s results of the FMEA that other auxiliary FMEA that other auxiliary features of the
performance below an acceptable features of the software project do not software project do not result in
level. result in degradation below an acceptable degradation below an acceptable level.
level.
17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Inspection of the software project’s The software project design phase
Control: The software project provides design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that the design has
the means to automatically initiate and performed to verify that the design has the capability to automatically initiate
control the required safety-related the capability to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related
functions. and control the required safety-related functions.
functions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-178
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Table 2.2.15-2

17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Control: The software project’s design design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR shows that the design
bases show that in normal operation of performed to verify that the design bases bases show that in normal operation of
the end-to-end sense, command, and show that in normal operation of the end- the end-to-end sense, command, and
execute plant process control loops to-end sense, command, and execute execute plant process control loops
(including the associated DCIS plant process control loops (including the (including the associated DCIS
components involved with determinant associated DCIS components involved components involved with determinant
data processing and communications) with determinant data processing and data processing and communications) the
the following features are not used; communications) the following features following features are not used;
are not used; • Non-deterministic data
• Non-deterministic data
communications; • Non-deterministic data communications;
communications; • Non-deterministic computation;
• Non-deterministic computation; • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts;
• Interrupts; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking;
• Multi-tasking; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and
• Dynamic scheduling; and • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.
• Event-driven actions. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2

17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Tests will be performed using simulated The as-built software project provides the
Control: The as-built software project signals and actuators, to demonstrate means to automatically initiate and
provides the means to automatically automatic initiation and control for the control the required safety-related
initiate and control the required safety- required safety-related functions. functions.
related functions.
17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Inspection of the as-built software project The as-built software project, in normal
Control: The as-built software will verify that in normal plant process plant process control loops (including the
project’s normal operation end-to-end control loops (including the associated associated DCIS components involved
sense, command, and execute plant DCIS components involved with with determinant data processing and
process control loops (including the determinant data processing and communications), does not use the
associated DCIS components involved communications) the following features following features;
with determinant data processing and are not used; • Non-deterministic data
communications) do not use the • Non-deterministic data communications;
following features; communications; • Non-deterministic computation;
• Non-deterministic data • Non-deterministic computation; • Interrupts;
communications; • Interrupts; • Multi-tasking;
• Non-deterministic computation; • Multi-tasking; • Dynamic scheduling; and
• Interrupts; • Dynamic scheduling; and • Event-driven actions.
• Multi-tasking;
• Dynamic scheduling; and
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Table 2.2.15-2

18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
The software project’s design bases design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show main control room
has features in the main control room performed to verify that they show main features that are capable of manually
to manually initiate and control the control room features that are capable of initiating and controlling automatically
automatically initiated safety-related manually initiating and controlling initiated safety-related functions at the
functions at the division level. automatically initiated safety-related division level.
functions at the division level. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Tests will be performed using simulated The as-built software project, using
Control: The as-built software project signals and actuators, to demonstrate that simulated signals and actuators, show
has features in the main control room the as-built software project has main that the main control room features
to manually initiate and control the control room features that manually manually initiate and control the
automatically initiated safety-related initiate and control the automatically automatically initiated safety-related
functions at the division level. initiated safety-related functions at the functions at the division level.
division level.
19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Inputs: Sense and command feature design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that the sense and
inputs for the software project’s design performed to ensure that the sense and command feature inputs for the software
bases is derived from signals that are command feature inputs for the software project are derived from signals that are
direct measures of the desired variables project are derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables
specified in the plant’s design bases. direct measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.
specified in the design bases. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-181
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Table 2.2.15-2

19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inspection will be performed to confirm The sense and command feature inputs
Inputs: Sense and command feature that the sense and command feature for the as-built software project are
inputs for the as-built software project inputs for the as-built software project are derived from signals that are direct
is derived from signals that are direct derived from signals that are direct measures of the desired variables
measures of the desired variables measures of the desired variables specified in the design bases.
specified in the design bases. specified in the design bases.
20.a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Inspections of the software project’s The software project design’s phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR confirm that the systems
design bases provides for performed to verify that the systems are are capable of automatically preventing
automatically preventing the activation capable of automatically preventing the the activation of an operating bypass,
of an operating bypass, whenever the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive
applicable permissive conditions for an whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not
operating bypass are not met. conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
20.a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR confirm that the systems
design bases provides for performed to verify that they show are removing activated operating
automatically removing activated removal of activated operating bypasses, bypasses, if the plant conditions change
operating bypasses, if the plant if the plant conditions change so that an so that an activated operating bypass is
conditions change so that an activated activated operating bypass is no longer no longer permissible.
operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2

20.b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Tests will be performed to demonstrate The software project automatically
Bypasses: The as-built software that the software project automatically prevents the activation of an operating
project automatically prevents the prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable
activation of an operating bypass, bypass, whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating
whenever the applicable permissive permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
conditions for an operating bypass are bypass are not met.
not met.
20.b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Tests will be performed to demonstrate The as-built software project
Bypasses: The as-built software that the as-built software project automatically removes activated
project shows that it automatically automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant
removes activated operating bypasses, operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated
if the plant conditions change so that conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer
an activated operating bypass is no operating bypass is no longer permissible.
longer permissible. permissible.
21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3 Maintenance Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that it is capable of
design bases provides the capability of performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions,
performing their safety-related performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance
functions, when one division is in when one division is in maintenance bypass.
maintenance bypass. bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-183
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Table 2.2.15-2

21.b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Tests will be performed to demonstrate The as-built software project performs its
Bypasses: The as-built software that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one
project ensures that it is capable of safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance bypass.
performing its safety-related functions, division is in maintenance bypass.
when one division is in maintenance
bypass.
21.b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Tests will be performed to demonstrate The as-built software project performs its
Bypasses: The as-built software that the software project performs its safety-related functions, when one power
project ensure that it is capable of safety-related functions, when one power supply division is in maintenance bypass.
performing its safety-related functions, supply division is in maintenance bypass.
when one power supply division is in
maintenance bypass.
22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
project’s design bases setpoints for design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that a defined
safety-related functions are defined, performed to verify that a defined setpoint methodology exists.
determined and implemented based on setpoint methodology exists. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
a defined setpoint methodology. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to Inspection of the installation phase The installation phase setpoints for
the setpoints have been reconciled for setpoint analyses for the as-built software safety-related functions for the as-built
the as-built software project. project will be performed to verify that software project are defined, determined
the setpoints for safety-related functions and implemented using a defined setpoint
are defined, determined and implemented methodology and changes have been
based on a defined setpoint methodology reconciled.
and to ensure that changes have been
reconciled.
2.2-184
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Table 2.2.15-2

23a. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Requirements: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR reference design
design bases ensures that electrical performed to ensure that the software documents that show that the software
components receive power from their project’s electrical components receive project’s electrical components receive
respective, divisional, safety-related power from their respective, divisional, power from their respective, divisional,
power supplies. safety-related power supplies. safety-related power supplies.
23b. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Tests will be performed to show that the Tests show that electrical components
Requirements: The as-built software as-built software project’s electrical received test signals from a safety-related
project’s as-built electrical components components receive power from their source in the same division, which
receive power from their respective, respective, divisional, safety-related verifies that the components receive
divisional, safety-related power power supplies. The test signal will be power from their respective, divisional,
supplies. injected in only one safety related safety-related power supplies.
division at a time.
24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Source Requirements: The software design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that safety-related
project’s design bases ensure that performed to ensure that safety-related systems and components that require
actuators receive non-electric power systems and components that require non-electric power receive it from safety-
from safety-related sources. non-electric power receive it from safety- related sources.
related sources. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2.2-185
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Table 2.2.15-2

24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Tests will be performed on the as-built Tests show that actuators receive non-
Source Requirements: The as-built software project’s as-built mechanical electric power from safety-related
software project’s actuators receive installation of the as-built software sources.
non-electric power from safety-related project’s actuators to show that non-
sources. electric power is received from safety-
related sources.
2.2-186
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2.2.16 High Pressure Control Rod Drive Isolation Bypass Function

Independent Control Platform
Design Description
The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Independent Control Platform (ICP) automatically
bypasses the CRD hydraulic subsystem high pressure makeup water injection isolation function
by using isolation bypass valves.
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are
The environmental and seismic qualification of HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP
components defined in Table 2.2.16-1 are addressed in Section 3.8.
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP software is developed in accordance with the software
development program described in Section 3.2 as part of the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software projects.
(1) HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP functional arrangement is as described in
Subsection 2.2.16 and Table 2.2.16-1.
(2) HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP provides automatic functions and initiators as
(3) HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP provides controls, interlocks, and bypasses as
(4) Divisional HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP safety-related power supplies power
the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP divisional loads.
(5) PIP power supplies power their respective HP CRD isolation bypass valves.
criteria for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP.
2.2-187
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Table 2.2.16-1
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Functional Arrangement
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP is a four division, redundant, logic controller.
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICPs are located in divisionally separate rooms in the
Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building (RB).
2.2-188
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Table 2.2.16-2
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP
Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems

ADS Initiation Detection RPV Water Level Low NBS
(Level 1)
Drywell Pressure High and CMS
Time Delay
Permissive to open HP ADS Initiation Detection CMS, GDCS, NBS
CRD isolation bypass valve and Time Delay and
GDCS Pool level not low
2.2-189
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Table 2.2.16-3
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
MCR Parameter Description

Control Manual close (one for each HP CRD isolation bypass
valve) (permissive only)
Manual open (one for each HP CRD isolation bypass
valve) (permissive only)
Interlock None
Bypass HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP division of
sensors bypass (one for each division)
2.2-190
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Table 2.2.16-4
ITAAC For The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP

1. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Inspection(s) will be performed on the as- The system conforms to the functional
ICP functional arrangement is as built configuration. arrangement as described in Subsection
described in Subsection 2.2.16 and 2.2.16 and Table 2.2.16-1.
Table 2.2.16-1.
2. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
ICP provides automatic functions and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP ICP performs the automatic functions
initiators as described in Table using simulated signals and actuators for defined in Table 2.2.16-2.
2.2.16-2. the automatic functions defined in Table
2.2.16-2.
3. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system controls, interlocks and
ICP provides controls, interlocks, and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
bypasses as described in Table 2.2.16- using simulated signals and actuators for main control room, and are performed in
3. the controls, interlocks, and bypasses response to simulated signals.
4. Divisional HP CRD Isolation Bypass Test(s) will be performed on each as-built The test signal exists only at the
Function ICP safety-related power HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP terminals of the respective divisional HP
supplies power the HP CRD Isolation division by providing a test signal in only CRD Isolation Bypass Function loads.
Bypass Function ICP divisional loads. one safety-related division at a time
5. PIP power supplies power their Test(s) will be performed on the power The test signal exists only at the
respective HP CRD isolation bypass supply to each as-built HP CRD isolation respective PIP power supply.
valves. bypass valve by introducing a test signal.
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2.3 RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS

The following subsections describe the major radiation monitoring systems for the ESBWR.
2.3.1 Process Radiation Monitoring System

Design Description
The Process Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS) monitors and provides for indication of
radioactivity levels in process and effluent gaseous and liquid streams, initiates protective
actions, and activates alarms in the MCR on high radiation signals. Alarms are also activated
when a monitor becomes inoperative or goes upscale/downscale. The PRMS safety-related
channel trip signals are provided as inputs to the Safety System Logic and Control/Engineered
Safety Features (SSLC/ESF) for generation of protective action signals.
PRMS subsystem software is developed in accordance with the software development program
described in Section 3.2.
The environmental qualification of PRMS equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
Refer to Subsection 2.2.15 for “Instrumentation and Controls Compliance with IEEE Standard
603.”
(1) The PRMS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.3.1, Figure 2.3.1-1, and Table 2.3.1-1.
(2) a. The safety-related PRMS subsystems as identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are powered from
uninterruptible safety-related power sources.
b. The safety-related divisions of electric power for the PRMS subsystems identified in
Table 2.3.1-1 are physically separated.
(3) The safety-related process radiation monitors listed in Table 2.3.1-1 can withstand Seismic
(4) Safety-related PRMS subsystems provide the following:
• Indications in MCR for radiation levels
• Indications on SCUs for radiation levels
• Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint
• Indications on Signal Conditioning Units (SCUs) on radiation level exceeding
setpoint
• Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions
• Initiation of protective actions as noted in Table 2.3.1-1
(5) The nonsafety-related process monitors listed in Table 2.3.1-1 are provided.
(6) Safety-related PRMS subsystems initiate preventive actions to isolate or terminate plant
processes or effluent releases as described in Table 2.3.1-1.
2.3-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(7) The nonsafety-related PRMS subsystem monitors which perform active/automatic control
functions in order to control offsite doses below 10 CFR 20 limits provide the following:
• Indications in MCR for radiation levels
• Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint
• Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions.
(8) (Deleted)
Table 2.3.1-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with the
associated acceptance criteria for the PRMS. As appropriate, each of the ITAAC in Section
2.3.1 may be closed on a system-by-system basis throughout construction, in order that the
PRMS subsystems may be placed in service. ITAAC for the liquid radwaste discharge radiation
monitor and offgas post-treatment radiation monitor also are located in Table 2.10.1-2 and Table
2.10.3-1, respectively.
2.3-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-1
Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1)
ID on Figure Safety-Related
and Seismic Description Safety Function
2.3.1-1 Category I
1 No MSL
2 Yes Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Continuously monitors gross gamma
quantity of radioactivity being exhausted
from the contaminated area served by
Reactor Building Contaminated Area
(HVAC) Subsystem. The discharge point
from duct is monitored with four physically
and electrically independent and redundant
divisions. In the event of radioactive
releases due to system failures in the Reactor
Building, or due to a fuel handling accident,
RBVS dampers are closed, and exhaust fans
are stopped.
3 Yes Refuel Handling Area HVAC Exhaust Continuously monitors gamma radiation
levels in exhaust plenum of HVAC exhaust
ducts in Refuel Handling Area of Reactor
Building with four divisions of Radiation
Detection Assemblies and channels. In the
event of a radioactive release due to an
accident while handling spent fuel, Reactor
Building HVAC (RBVS) dampers are closed
and exhaust fans are stopped.
2.3-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-1
2.3.1-1 Category I
4A Yes Control Room Habitability Area HVAC The Radiation Detection Assembly
Subsystem (CRHAVS) continuously monitors the gamma radiation
levels from air intake plenum for the building
or area containing the MCR and auxiliary
rooms. The Control Room outside air intake
is secured and the emergency air filtration
units are started in the event of a high
radiation level.
4B, 4C Yes CRHAVS Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Instrument interfaces with safety-related
control and logic system.
5 No TB Normal Ventilation Air HVAC
6 No TB Compartment Area Air HVAC
7 No Offgas Pre-treatment
8 No Charcoal Vault Ventilation
9A, 9B No Offgas Post-treatment
10 No TB Combined Ventilation Exhaust
11 No Liquid Radwaste Discharge
12 No LCW DW Sump Discharge
HCW DW Sump Discharge

13A No RB/FB Stack
2.3-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-1
2.3.1-1 Category I
13B No TB Stack
13C No RW Stack NA
14 No Main Turbine Gland Seal Steam Condenser NA
Exhaust
15A, 15B No Reactor Component Cooling Water Intersystem NA
Leakage
16 No DW Fission Product NA
17 No Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust NA
18 No FB Combined Ventilation Exhaust NA
19 Yes Isolation Condenser Vent Exhaust Continuously monitors the four Isolation
Condenser Discharge Vents for gross gamma
radiation by sixteen local detectors (four per
isolation condenser vent). High radiation in
the exhaust of a vent results in isolation of
the affected Isolation Condenser loop.
20 No TSC HVAC Air Intake NA
21 Yes FB General Area HVAC Monitors the gross gamma radiation level in
Fuel Building HVAC exhaust duct for the
general area. In the event of an abnormal
radioactivity release, Fuel Building HVAC
exhaust dampers are closed and fans are
stopped.
2.3-5
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Table 2.3.1-1
2.3.1-1 Category I
22 Yes FB Fuel Pool HVAC Monitors the gamma radiation level of air
exiting spent fuel pool and equipment areas.
In the event of radioactive releases due to an
accident while handling spent fuel, Fuel
Building HVAC exhaust dampers are closed
and fans are stopped.
23 Yes Containment Purge Exhaust Monitors gross radiation level in exhaust
duct leading from the containment. In the
event of radioactive releases, monitors
initiate closure of ventilation isolation
dampers prior to exceeding radioactive
effluent limits. In addition to closure of the
RBVS isolation dampers, the RB HVAC
exhaust fans are stopped.
2.3-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-2
ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System

1. The PRMS functional arrangement is as Inspections shall be conducted on each The as-built PRMS subsystems conform
described in the Design Description of as-built PRMS subsystem. to the functional arrangement as
this Subsection 2.3.1, Figure 2.3.1-1, described in the Design Description of
and Table 2.3.1-1. this Subsection 2.3.1 and shown in
Figure 2.3.1-1 in conjunction with
Table 2.3.1-1.
2a. The safety-related PRMS subsystems as Testing will be conducted to confirm The safety-related PRMS subsystems
identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are powered that the PRMS safety-related subsystems identified in Table 2.3.1-1 receive
from uninterruptible safety-related identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are powered electrical power from uninterruptible
power sources. from uninterruptible safety-related safety-related buses.
power sources.
2b. The safety-related divisions of electric Inspections of the as-built divisions will Each subsystem division is physically
power for the PRMS subsystems be conducted. separated from the other division in
identified in Table 2.3.1-1 are physically accordance with RG 1.75.
separated.
3. The equipment identified in Table i. Inspection will be performed to i. The equipment identified as Seismic
2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I can verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.3.1-1 is located
withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in in a Seismic Category I structure.
without loss of safety function. Table 2.3.1-1 are located in a
2.3-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-2

combination of type tests and Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I
analyses, of equipment identified in can withstand Seismic Category I
Table 2.3.1-1 as Seismic Category I, loads without loss of safety function.
will be performed using analytical
performed to verify that the as-built Tables 2.3.1-1 including anchorage,
equipment identified in Table can withstand Seismic Category II
2.3.1-1, including anchorage, is loads without loss of safety function.
bounded by the testing or analyzed
conditions.
2.3-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-2

4. Safety-related PRMS subsystems provide Tests will be conducted by using a The as-built indications, alarms, and
the following: standard radiation source or portable automatic initiation functions are met as
• Indications in MCR for radiation calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint described in Table 2.3.1-1, considering the
levels value that is preset for the testing to following:
• Indications on SCUs for radiation confirm that the as-built indications, • Indications in MCR for radiation
levels alarms, and automatic initiation levels
• Alarms in MCR on radiation level functions are met as described in Table • Indications on SCUs for radiation
exceeding setpoint 2.3.1-1. levels
• Indications on SCUs on radiation • Alarms in MCR on radiation level
level exceeding setpoint exceeding setpoint
• Alarms in MCR on • Indications on SCUs on radiation
upscale/downscale or inoperative level exceeding setpoint
conditions • Alarms in MCR on
• Initiation of actions described in upscale/downscale or inoperative
Table 2.3.1-1 conditions
• Initiation of actions described in
Table 2.3.1-1
5. The nonsafety-related process monitors Inspection for the existence of the The nonsafety-related monitors exist.
listed in Table 2.3.1-1 are provided. monitors will be performed.
6. Safety-related PRMS subsystems initiate Tests will be conducted to confirm that The preventive actions requirements are
preventive actions to isolate or terminate the preventive actions are initiated and met as described in Table 2.3.1-1.
plant processes or effluent releases as proper isolation or termination are
described in Table 2.3.1-1. secured on simulated high radiation
levels. These tests will be performed in
conjunction with each subsystem that
contains the isolation boundaries.
2.3-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.1-2

7. The nonsafety-related PRMS subsystem Tests will be conducted by using a The as-built indication, alarm, and
monitors which perform active/automatic standard radiation source or portable automatic initiation functions are met.
control functions in order to control offsite calibration unit that exceeds a setpoint
doses below 10 CFR 20 limits provide the value that is preset for the testing to
following: confirm that the as-built indication,
• Indications in MCR for radiation alarm, and automatic initiation functions
levels are met.
• Alarms in MCR on radiation level
exceeding setpoint
• Alarms in MCR on
upscale/downscale or inoperative
conditions
8. (Deleted)
2.3-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Note: See Table 2.3.1-1 for radiation detector numbers.

Figure 2.3.1-1. Process Radiation Monitoring System Diagram
2.3-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.3.2 Area Radiation Monitoring System

Design Description
The Area Radiation Monitoring System (ARMS) continuously monitors the gamma radiation
levels within the various areas of the plant and provides an early warning to operating personnel
when high radiation levels are detected so the appropriate action can be taken to minimize
occupational exposure.
(1) The functional arrangement (location) of the ARMS equipment is described in Subsection
2.3.2 and as listed on Table 2.3.2-1.
(2) Each ARM channel listed in Table 2.3.2-1 initiates a MCR alarm and a local audible alarm
(if provided) when the radiation level exceeds a preset limit.
(3) Each ARM channel listed in Table 2.3.2-1 is provided with indication of radiation level.
associated acceptance criteria for the Area Radiation Monitoring System.
2.3-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
Area Description & Location
Reactor Building RB Refueling Floor Area #1

Reactor Building RB Refueling Floor Area #2
Reactor Building RB New Fuel Buffer Pool
Reactor Building RB New Fuel Buffer Pool
Reactor Building RB RWCU/SDC Pump
Reactor Building RB Sump Pumps
Reactor Building* RB RWCU/SDC Train A Heat Exchanger
Reactor Building* RB RWCU/SDC Train B Heat Exchanger
Reactor Building RB Lower Equipment Hatch
Reactor Building RB Lower Personnel Hatch
Reactor Building FMCRD HCU Room B
Reactor Building FMCRD HCU Room D
Reactor Building RB RWCU/SDC Filter Demineralizer Area
Reactor Building RB Radiological Control Area Entrance
Reactor Building RB H2/O2 Monitoring (CMS) Skid
Reactor Building RB H2/O2 Monitoring (CMS) Skid Panel
Reactor Building Instrument Rack Area #1
Reactor Building RB IFTS Maintenance Room (Multiple)
Reactor Building Fuel Handling Machine
Reactor Building RB Remote Shutdown Panel A Area
Reactor Building RB Remote Shutdown Panel B Area
Fuel Building FB Spent Fuel Floor
Fuel Building Fuel Handling Machine
Fuel Building FB Fuel Transfer Cask Area
2.3-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
Fuel Building FB FAPCS Heat Exchangers

Fuel Building FB FAPCS Heat Exchangers
Fuel Building* FB FAPCS Backwash Transfer Pumps
Fuel Building FB Sump Pumps
Fuel Building RB Ground Grade Access Pathway
Fuel Building FB Wash Down Bay Entry Door
Fuel Building FB IFTS Fuel Bldg Isolation Valve Room (Inside)
Fuel Building Fuel Prep Machine
Radwaste Building RW Electrical Panel Area
Radwaste Building RW Control Room
Radwaste Building RW Resin Pump
Radwaste Building RW Resin Transfer Pump Room
Radwaste Building RW Trailer Access Area
Radwaste Building* RW Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment Area
Radwaste Building* RW Wet Solid Radioactive Waste Treatment Area
Radwaste Building* RW Dry Solid Waste Treatment Area
Radwaste Building* RW Packaged Waste Staging Area
Turbine Building* Main Condenser Vault Area
Turbine Building* Feedwater Heater Drain Cooler 1 A/B/C Room
Turbine Building H2 and O2 Analyzer Room B
Turbine Building Condensate Pumps Room
Turbine Building* Low Pressure Heater Area
Turbine Building* Feedwater Heater 4 and Feedwater Storage Tank Room
Turbine Building* Turbine Bldg Steam Tunnel
Turbine Building* Condensate Drain Tank and Steam Jet Air Ejector/H2 Recombiner and
Cooler Room B
Turbine Building* Steam Jet Air Ejector/H2 Recombiner and Cooler Room A
Turbine Building* Feedwater Heater 5B and 6B Room
Turbine Building Condensate Filter Access Hatch Room
Turbine Building Corridor/Turbine Building Operating Floor
Turbine Building Corridor/Turbine Operating Floor
2.3-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
Turbine Building Crane Travel Area

Turbine Building Equipment Main Access Area
Turbine Building RCCWS Pump/Exchanger Room A
Turbine Building* Offgas Charcoal Adsorber Vessel Vault
Turbine Building Condensate Pleated Filter Valve/Condensate Filter Transfer
Pumps/condensate Flow Control Valve Station Room
Turbine Building Condensate Pleated Filter Valve/Condensate Filter Transfer
Pumps/Condensate Flow Control Valve Station Room
Turbine Building Condenser Sampling Pump Room A
Turbine building Condenser Sampling Pump Room B
Turbine Building Condensate Deep Bed Demineralizer Valve Room
Turbine Building H2 and O2 Analyzer Room A
Turbine Building* Feedwater Heater 5A and 6A Room
Turbine Building* Feedwater heater 7B Room
Turbine Building* Feedwater Heater 7A Room
Turbine Building Turbine Bldg Sampling/Drain Sump C Room
Turbine Building Corridor/Exhaust Duct Area
Turbine Building RCCWS Pump/Exchanger Room B
Turbine Building* Main Condenser Vault Area
Control Building Main Control Room
* ARMs located in accessible areas where abnormal plant evolutions or anticipated operational
occurrences can potentially result in dose rate increases of 1mSv/hr (100mRem/hr) or more.
2.3-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.3.2-2
ITAAC For Area Radiation Monitoring System

1. The functional arrangement (location) Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built ARM system locations
of the ARMS equipment is as conducted. conform to Subsection 2.3.2 and
described in Subsection 2.3.2 and as Table 2.3.2-1.
listed on Table 2.3.2-1.
2. Each ARM channel listed in Tests will be conducted using a simulated The MCR alarm and local audible alarm
Table 2.3.2-1 initiates a MCR alarm high radiation level signal to verify that (if provided) are initiated when the
and a local audible alarm (if provided) the MCR alarm and local alarm (if simulated radiation level exceeds a preset
when the radiation level exceeds a provided) are on when the simulated limit.
preset limit. signal exceeds a preset setpoint.
3. Each ARM channel listed in Tests will be conducted using a simulated The indications for each ARM channel
Table 2.3.2-1 is provided with high radiation signal to verify that the responds to the simulated high radiation
indication of radiation level. indications for each ARM channel signal.
responds to the simulated high radiation
signal.
2.3-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.4 CORE COOLING SYSTEMS USED FOR ABNORMAL EVENTS

The following subsections describe the core cooling systems in response to Abnormal Operating
Occurrences (AOOs) and accidents.
2.4.1 Isolation Condenser System

Design Description
The Isolation Condenser System (ICS) removes decay heat from the RPV when the reactor is
isolated. Decay heat removal keeps the RPV pressure below the SRV pressure setpoint. ICS
consists of four independent trains, each containing a heat exchanger that condenses steam on
the tube side and transfers heat by heating and boiling water in the Isolation Condenser/Passive
Containment Cooling System (IC/PCCS) pools, which is then vented to the atmosphere. The
ICS is as shown in Figure 2.4.1-1.
The environmental qualification of ICS components is addressed in Section 3.8; and the
The containment isolation portions of the ICS are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
ICS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2.
Conformance with IEEE Standard 603 requirements by the safety-related control system
structures, systems, or components is addressed in Subsection 2.2.15.
The ICS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the main control room are addressed
in Section 3.3.
(1) The functional arrangement of the ICS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.4.1, Table 2.4.1-1, Table 2.4.1-2, and as shown in Figure 2.4.1-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
2.4-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(6) a. Each of the ICS divisions (or safety-related loads/components) identified in Table
2.4.1-2 is powered from its respective safety-related division.
b. In the ICS, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between
safety-related divisions and non-safety related equipment.
(7) a. Each mechanical train of the ICS located outside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended
safety-related function.
b. Each mechanical train of the ICS located inside the containment is physically separated
related function.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Re-positionable (NOT squib) valves designated in Table 2.4.1-1 open, close, or both open
and close, under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(10) The pneumatically operated valve(s) designated in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the mode listed if
either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the
valve(s) is lost.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) (Deleted)
(13) Each condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens to initiate the ICS.
(14) The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in
Table 2.4.1-1, close automatically on receipt of high vent line radiation from the Process
Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS).
(15) The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in
Table 2.4.1-1, close upon receipt of the following automatic actuation signals:
• LD&IS
• Open position on two or more DPVs
(16) Each ICS train normally closed condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens upon
receipt of the following automatic actuation signals:
• RPV high pressure following a time delay
2.4-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• RPV water level below level 2 following a time delay

• RPV water level below level 1
• Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed pumps with the reactor mode switch in RUN
• MSIVs in 2 of 4 steam lines less than fully open with the reactor mode switch in RUN
(17) Each ICS train normally closed condensate return bypass valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens
upon receipt of the following automatic actuation signals:
• RPV high pressure following a time delay
• RPV water level below level 2 following a time delay
• Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed pumps with the reactor mode switch in RUN
• MSIVs in 2 of 4 steamlines less than fully open with the reactor mode switch in RUN.
(18) a. The lower IC header vent valve (V-9) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the
SSLC/ESF platform followed by a time delay.
b. The lower IC header vent valve (V-10) opens upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the DPS
platform followed by a time delay.
(19) (Deleted)
(20) The accumulators for the pneumatic isolation valves, shown in Table 2.4.1-1, in the ICS steam
supply and condensate return valves have the capacity to close the valves three times with the
DW at the DW design pressure.
(21) Upon loss of pneumatic pressure to the condensate bypass valve (V-6), the valve strokes to the
fully open position.
(22) Each ICS train has at least the minimum heat removal capacity assumed in analysis of
Abnormal Events with reactor at or above normal operating pressure.
(23) Each ICS train provides at least the minimum drainable liquid volume available for return
to the RPV assumed in analysis of Abnormal Events.
(24) The Equipment Pool and Reactor Well provide sufficient makeup water volume to the
IC/PCCS expansion pool to support operation of the ICS and PCCS for the first 72 hours.
(25) The IC/PCCS pools are safety-related and Seismic Category I.
(26) Each ICS flow path is constrained to a maximum flow area at transitions between Class 1
piping from containment to Class 2 piping outside containment in order to limit flow in the
event of a break.
(27) (Deleted)
(28) (Deleted)
2.4-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance
shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(30) The Lower IC Header Vent Line restricting orifices shown in Table 2.4.1-1 are sized so
that the water level in the RPV during station blackout events does not reach the Level 1
setpoint within 72 hours of the blackout event.
Table 2.4.1-3 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Isolation Condenser System.
2.4-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
– – – – – – –
Train A Isolation
Condenser
IC (A) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (A) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (A) Steam Supply Line P-1(A) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (A) Steam Supply Line V–1(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (A) Steam Supply Line V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate Return P-2(A) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (A) Condensate Return V-3(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate Return V-4(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (A) Condensate Return V-5(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
V-6(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
IC (A) Condensate Return
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (A) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (A) Header Vent V-7(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (A) Header Vent V-8(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
2.4-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-9(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-10(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-11(A) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-12(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent RO(A) Yes Yes No – – –
Line Restricting Orifice
Train B Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (B) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (B) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (B) Steam Supply Line P-1(B) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (B) Steam Supply Line V-1(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (B) Steam Supply Line V-2(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return P-2(B) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (B) Condensate Return V-3(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (B) Condensate Return V-4(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (B) Condensate Return V-5(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return V-6(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
2.4-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Upper IC (B) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (B) Header Vent V-7(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (B) Header Vent V-8(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-9(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-10(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-11(B) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-12(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent RO(B) Yes Yes No – – –
Train C Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (C) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (C) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (C) Steam Supply Line P-1(C) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (C) Steam Supply Line V-1(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (C) Steam Supply Line V-2(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return P-2(C) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
2.4-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
IC (C) Condensate Return V-3(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (C) Condensate Return V-4(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (C) Condensate Return V-5(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return V-6(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (C) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (C) Header Vent V-7(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (C) Header Vent V-8(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-9(C) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-10(C) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-11(C) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-12(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent RO(C) Yes Yes No – – –
Train D Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (D) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No No –
Inline Vessel (D) – Yes Yes Yes No –
2.4-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
IC (D) Steam Supply Line P-1(D) Yes Yes Yes No – –
IC (D) Steam Supply Line V-1(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (D) Steam Supply Line V-2(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return P-2(D) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (D) Condensate Return V-3(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (D) Condensate Return V-4(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
IC (D) Condensate Return V-5(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return V-6(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (D) Header Vent – Yes Yes No No – –
Line
Upper IC (D) Header Vent V-7(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (D) Header Vent V-8(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent – Yes Yes No No – –
Line
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-9(D) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-10(D) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-11(D) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
2.4-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-12(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent RO(D) Yes Yes No – – –
V-13(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
Pool Cross-Connect Valve
(Squib)
V-14(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
(Pneumatic)
V-13(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
(Squib)
V-14(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
(Pneumatic)
2.4-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-2
ICS Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Containment
(Description) Identifier Q-DCIS / Category Related Related Operated Isolation Valve
See Figure DPS I Display Valve Actuator
2.4.1-1
IC (A) Steam Supply V-1(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (A) Steam Supply V-2(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (A) Condensate V-3(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-4(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-5(A) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-6(A) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (A) Header V-7(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (A) Header V-8(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-9(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-10(A) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-12(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Pool Cross Connect V-13(A) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Squib)
Pool Cross Connect V-14(A) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Pneumatic)
IC (B) Steam Supply V-1(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
2.4-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-2
2.4.1-1
IC (B) Steam Supply V-2(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (B) Condensate V-3(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-4(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-5(B) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-6(B) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (B) Header V-7(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (B) Header V-8(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-9(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-10(B) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-12(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Pool Cross Connect V-13(B) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Squib)
Pool Cross Connect V-14(B) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Pneumatic)
IC (C) Steam Supply V-1(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (C) Steam Supply V-2(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
2.4-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-2
2.4.1-1
IC (C) Condensate V-3(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-4(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-5(C) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-6(C) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (C) Header V-7(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (C) Header V-8(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-9(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-10(C) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-12(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
IC (D) Steam Supply V-1(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (D) Steam Supply V-2(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
IC (D) Condensate V-3(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
IC (D) Condensate V-4(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Valve
2.4-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-2
2.4.1-1
IC (D) Condensate V-5(D) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (D) Condensate V-6(D) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (D) Header V-7(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (D) Header V-8(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-9(D) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-10(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-12(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
ICS DPV Isolation – Yes/No Yes Yes No Yes No
Function Independent
Control Platform
Note 1: Valve pair V-5 and V-6 must have a total of four control inputs to the pair. The minimum control inputs for this pair must include two
different Q-DCIS divisions to one of the valves and a third different Q-DCIS division and DPS to the other valve. The design is such that any
combination of two of four divisions or DPS can initiate ICS flow in all four ICS trains.
2.4-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System

1. The functional arrangement of the ICS Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built ICS conforms with the
is as described in the Design performed. functional arrangement described in the
Description of this Subsection 2.4.1, Design Description of this Subsection
Table 2.4.1-1, Table 2.4.1-2, and as 2.4.1, Table 2.4.1-1, Table 2.4.1-2, and as
shown in Figure 2.4.1-1. shown in Figure 2.4.1-1.
2a1. (Deleted)
Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the design as ASME Code Section III using as- Code) exist and conclude that design
requirements. designed and as-built information and reconciliation has been completed, in
3550) will be performed. reconciliation of the components
Section III, and that the design of as-built
2.4-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
requirements.
2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
as ASME Code Section III is designed Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
in accordance with ASME Code documents will be conducted. Code) exist and conclude that the design of
Section III requirements. the piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as
environmental effects), thermal expansion,
seismic, hydrogen combustion and
combined.
2.4-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the piping Code Section III using as-designed and Code) exist and conclude that design
design requirements. as-built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed, in
as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.4. 1-1 as ASME Code Section when required by ASME Code) and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. inspection reports (including N-5 Data
requirements.
components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 boundary welds in components that ASME Code Section III requirements
as ASME Code Section III meet identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME are met for non-destructive examination
ASME Code Section III non- Code Section III will be performed in of pressure boundary welds in
destructive examination requirements. accordance with ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as
III. ASME Code Section III.
2.4-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in piping
Section III.
integrity at their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply
tested by ASME Code Section III. with the requirements of ASME Code
Section III.
pressure boundary integrity at its 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that test of piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as
design pressure. is required to be hydrostatically tested ASME Code Section III comply with the
by ASME Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 as verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table
Seismic Category I can withstand equipment identified in 2.4.1-2 is located in a Seismic
Seismic Category I loads without loss Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 are Category I structure.
structure.
2.4-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

equipment identified in Table Seismic Category I, including
2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic
anchorage, is bounded by the testing Category I loads including the
or analyzed conditions, including the hydrodynamic effects of surrounding
hydrodynamic effects of water for submerged components
surrounding water for submerged without loss of safety function.
components.
6a. Each of the ICS divisions (or safety- Testing will be performed on the ICS by A simulated test signal exists in the
related loads/components) identified in providing a simulated test signal in only safety-related division (or at the
Table 2.4.1-2 is powered from its one safety-related division at a time. equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-2
respective safety-related division. powered from the safety-related division)
under test in the ICS.
2.4-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

6b. In the ICS, independence is provided i. Tests will be performed on the ICS i. The test signal exists only in the
between safety-related divisions, and by providing a test signal in only safety-related Division under test in
between safety-related divisions and one safety-related division at a time. the ICS.
non-safety related equipment.
ii. Inspection of the as-built safety- ii. The as-built safety-related divisions in
related divisions in the ICS will be the ICS are separated:
performed. • Physical separation or electrical
isolation exists between these
safety-related divisions in
accordance with RG 1.75.
• Physical separation or electrical
isolation exists between safety-
related divisions and non-safety
related equipment in accordance
with RG 1.75.
7a. Each mechanical train of the ICS located Inspections and analysis will be Each mechanical train of ICS located
outside the containment is physically conducted for each of the ICS outside containment is protected against
separated from the other train(s) so as not mechanical trains located outside the design basis events and their direct
to preclude accomplishment of the containment. consequences by spatial separation,
2.4-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

7b. Each mechanical train of the ICS located Inspections or analysis will be Each mechanical train of ICS located
inside the containment is physically conducted for each of the ICS inside containment is protected against
separated from the other train(s) so as not mechanical trains located inside the design basis events and their direct
to preclude accomplishment of the containment. consequences by spatial separation,
8. (Deleted)
9. Re-positionable (NOT squib) valves Tests of installed valves will be Upon receipt of the actuating signal, each
designated in Table 2.4.1-1 open, performed for opening, closing, or both valve opens, closes, or both opens and
close, or both open and close, under opening and also closing under system closes, depending upon the valve's safety
differential pressure, fluid flow, and preoperational differential pressure, fluid function.
temperature conditions. flow, and temperature conditions.
10. The pneumatically operated valve(s) Tests will be conducted on the as-built The pneumatically operated valve(s)
designated in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the valve(s). identified in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the
mode listed if either electric power to listed mode when either electric power to
the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or
pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is pneumatic pressure to the valve(s) is lost.
lost.
11. (Deleted)
12. (Deleted)
13. Each condensate return valve, listed in Opening test of valves will be conducted Each condensate return valve opening
Table 2.4.1-1, opens to initiate the ICS. under pre-operational differential pressure, time is no less than 7.5 seconds and no
fluid flow and temperature conditions. greater than 31 seconds under pre-
operational differential pressure, fluid
flow, and temperature conditions.
2.4-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

14. The normally open ICS isolation valves An isolation valve closure test will be The ICS isolation valves close upon
in the steam supply and condensate performed using simulated signals. receipt of signals from the PRMS.
return lines, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, close
automatically on receipt of high vent
line radiation from the Process
Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS).
15. The normally open ICS isolation valves Valve closing tests will be performed The ICS isolation valves close upon
in the steam supply and condensate using simulated automatic actuation receipt of automatic actuation signals.
return lines, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, close signals.
upon receipt of the following automatic
actuation signals:
• LD&IS.
• Open position on two or more
DPVs.
2.4-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

16. Each ICS train normally closed Valve opening tests will be performed The condensate return valves open upon
condensate return valve, listed in Table using simulated automatic actuation receipt of automatic actuation signals.
2.4.1-1, opens upon receipt of the signals.
following automatic actuation signals:
• RPV high pressure following a time
delay
following a time delay
• Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed
pumps with the reactor mode switch
in RUN
• MSIVs in 2 of 4 steam lines less
than fully open with the reactor
mode switch in RUN
2.4-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

17. Each ICS train normally closed Valve opening tests will be performed using The condensate return valves open upon
condensate return bypass valve, listed in simulated automatic actuation signals. receipt of automatic actuation signals.
Table 2.4.1-1, opens upon receipt of the
following automatic actuation signals:
• RPV high pressure following a time
delay
following a time delay
• Loss of power to 2 of 4 reactor feed
pumps with the reactor mode switch
in RUN
• MSIVs in 2 of 4 steamlines less than
fully open with the reactor mode
switch in RUN.
18a. The lower IC header vent valve (V-9) A valve-opening test will be performed on The lower IC header vent valve (V-9) opens
opens upon an ICS initiation signal the lower IC header vent valve (V-9) using upon an ICS initiation signal generated by
generated by the SSLC/ESF platform a simulated SSLC/ESF platform ICS the SSLC/ESF platform followed by a time
followed by a time delay. initiation signal. delay.
18b. The lower IC header vent valve (V-10) A valve-opening test will be performed on The lower IC header vent valve (V-10) opens
opens upon an ICS initiation signal the lower IC header vent valve (V-10) upon an ICS initiation signal generated by the
generated by the DPS platform using a simulated DPS platform ICS DPS platform followed by a time delay.
followed by a time delay. initiation signal.
19. (Deleted)
2.4-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

20. The accumulators for the pneumatic A test and analysis or test will be Isolation valve accumulators have the
isolation valves, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, in performed to demonstrate the capacity of capacity to close the valves three times with
the ICS steam supply and condensate the isolation valve accumulators. the DW pressure at the design pressure.
return valves have the capacity to close
the valves three times with the DW at
the DW design pressure.
21. Upon loss of pneumatic pressure to the Tests will be performed to demonstrate The condensate bypass valve fully opens
condensate bypass valve (V-6), the valve that the condensate bypass valve will when pneumatic pressure is removed from
strokes to the fully open position. stroke to the full open position upon the the condensate bypass valve.
loss of pneumatic pressure to the
condensate bypass valve accumulator.
22. Each ICS train has at least the Using prototype test data and as-built IC The ICS train unit heat removal capacity
minimum heat removal capacity unit information, an analysis will be is greater than or equal to 33.75 MWt
assumed in analysis of Abnormal Events performed to establish the heat removal (assumed in the analysis of Abnormal
with reactor at or above normal operating capacity of the IC unit with IC pool at Events) with the reactor at or above normal
pressure. atmospheric saturated conditions. operating pressure.
23. Each ICS train provides at least the An analysis will be performed for the as- The as-built ICS train provides at least
minimum drainable liquid volume built isolation condenser system. 13.88m3 (490.1 ft3) (assumed in the
available for return to the RPV analysis of Abnormal Events) of the
assumed in analysis of Abnormal liquid volume available for return to the
Events. RPV.
24. The Equipment Pool and Reactor Well i. A valve-opening test will be i. The pneumatic valves open on a
provide sufficient makeup water performed on the pneumatic valves simulated low-level water signal from
volume to the IC/PCCS expansion pool using simulated low-level water signal the IC/PCCS expansion pool.
to support operation of the ICS and from the IC/PCCS expansion pool.
2.4-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

PCCS for the first 72 hours. ii. A physical measurement will be ii. Measurements show that the
performed on the dimensions and combined water volume of the
water level in the IC/PCCS pools, IC/PCCS pools, Equipment Pool, and
Equipment Pool, and Reactor Well to Reactor Well is no less than 6,290 m3
demonstrate that the required water (222,000 ft3).
volume is achieved.
iii. A type test will be performed on the iii. The squib valves open on a simulated
squib valve. open signal.
25. The IC/PCCS pools are safety-related Inspections, tests, type tests, and The IC/PCCS pools are safety-related
and Seismic Category I. analyses for the IC/PCCS pools confirm and Seismic Category I.
that they are safety-related and Seismic
Category I.
26. Each ICS flow path is constrained to a Inspection will be performed to confirm Each steam supply branch line contains a
maximum flow area at transitions that the flow area at these transition flow limiter which is no greater than 76.2
between Class 1 piping from locations is limited. mm (3 in) in diameter, and that the
containment to Class 2 piping outside condensate branch lines are no greater
containment in order to limit flow in than 101.6 mm (4 in) in diameter.
the event of a break.
27. (Deleted)
28. (Deleted)
that require maintenance have drawings will be conducted. drawings confirms that maintenance
2.4-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.1-3

29b. The as-built location of valves on lines A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been
attached to the RPV that require lines attached to the RPV using as- completed for the as-built location of
maintenance shall be reconciled to designed and as-built information will be valves relative to the design
design requirements. performed. requirements.
30. The Lower IC Header Vent Line Inspections of the as-built Lower IC The diameter of the Lower IC Header
restricting orifices shown in Table Header Vent Line restricting orifice will Vent Line restricting orifices shown in
2.4.1-1 are sized so that the water level be conducted. table 2.1.4-1 is 4.60 mm (0.181 in)
in the RPV during station blackout ±0.025 mm (0.001 in).
events does not reach the Level 1
setpoint within 72 hours of the
blackout event.
2.4-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR
Design Control Document/Tier 1
Figure 2.4.1-1. Isolation Condenser System Schematic
2.4-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.4.2 Emergency Core Cooling System - Gravity-Driven Cooling System

Design Description
Emergency core cooling is provided by the Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) located
within containment in conjunction with the ADS in case of a LOCA.
The GDCS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the main control room are
The environmental qualification of GDCS components is addressed in Section 3.8; and the
The GDCS software is developed in accordance with the software development program
described in Section 3.2.
Refer to Subsection 2.2.15 for “Instrumentation and Control Compliance with IEEE Standard
603.”
(1) The functional arrangement of the GDCS is as described in Subsection 2.4.2 and as listed
in Table 2.4.2-1 and as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
2.4-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(7) (Deleted)
(8) a. The GDCS injection lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above
(Top of Active Fuel) TAF for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.
b. The GDCS equalizing lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above
TAF for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.
(9) The GDCS squib valves used in the injection and equalization lines open as designed.
(10) a. Check valves designated on Figure 2.4.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid
flow, and temperature conditions.
b. The GDCS injection line check valves meet the criterion for maximum fully open flow
coefficient in the reverse flow direction.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) GDCS squib valves maintain RPV backflow leak tightness and maintain reactor coolant
pressure boundary integrity during normal plant operation.
(13) Each GDCS injection line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.
(14) Each GDCS equalizing line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.
(15) Each of the GDCS divisions is powered from its respective safety-related power division.
(16) Each GDCS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated from
the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related
function.
(17) The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a minimum drainable water volume.
(18) The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a specified minimum water level.
(19) The elevation change between low water level of GDCS pools and the centerline of GDCS
injection line nozzles is sufficient to provide gravity-driven flow.
(20) The minimum drainable volume from the suppression pool to the RPV is sufficient to meet
long-term post-LOCA core cooling requirements.
(21) The long-term GDCS minimum equalizing driving head is based on RPV Level 0.5.
(22) The GDCS Deluge squib valves open as designed.
(23) (Deleted)
(24) The GDCS injection piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases to
GDCS pools and to RPV, to prevent collection in the GDCS injection pipes.
(25) Deluge system has redundant nonsafety-related Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
that are connected to thermocouples in each cell of the lower drywell Basemat-Internal
Melt Arrest Coolability (BiMAC) system.
(26) When temperatures exceed the setpoint at one set of thermocouples coincident with
setpoints being exceeded at a second set of thermocouples in adjacent cells, each PLC
starts a deluge squib valve timer.
2.4-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(27) The GDCS deluge valve squib initiation signals are inhibited when either of the safety-
related deluge system lower drywell temperature switches sense temperatures lower than a
preset value coincident with the presence of both deluge squib valve timer signals.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the GDCS that require
(29) a. (Deleted)
b. The BiMAC has a material located on top of the BiMAC pipes to protect against melt
impingement during the initial corium relocation event.
c. The BiMAC is designed with a cover so that debris will penetrate it in a short period of
time while providing protection for the BiMAC from CRD housings falling from the
vessel.
d. The BiMAC piping is inclined from horizontal to permit natural circulation flow.
e. The material located on top of the BiMAC pipes does not generate non-condensable
gases in quantities that would result in exceeding the containment ultimate pressure.

acceptance criteria for the Gravity-Driven Cooling System.
2.4-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment

Equipment Name Identifier Containment
Code Seismic RCPB Remotely Motive MCR
See Figure Section Cat. I Component Isolation
(Description) Operated Power Alarms
III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Pool Supply P-1(A)

Line to V-2 Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
2.4-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Pool Supply
P-1(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line to V-2
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
2.4-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Deluge Line

V-7(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Pool Supply
P-1(C) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line to V-2
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(C) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(C) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
2.4-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(C) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(C) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(C) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(C) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(C) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(C) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
2.4-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Pool Supply

P-1(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line to V-2
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(D) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(D) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(D) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
Suppression Pool
Equalization Line N/A
Intake Screen in Yes Yes No No No – –
each train
2.4-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Suppression
Pool Injection Line V-6(D) Yes Yes No No No – –
Check Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Injection Line V-5(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(D) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
Squib Valve
GDCS Pool
–
Perforated Plate Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-1

III Valve
2.4.2-1 Position
GDCS Pool
–
Stainless Steel Liner Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment

Identifier Seismic Safety- Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q- Safety-
Category Related Operated Valve
(Description) See Figure DCIS/ Related
I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
GDCS Injection Line Check V-1(A) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
GDCS Injection Line Squib Yes /
V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Valve Yes
Valve Yes
GDCS Injection Line Check
V-4(A) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
GDCS Suppression Pool Yes /
Injection Line Squib Valve Yes
GDCS Suppression Pool
V-6(A) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Injection Line Check Valve
GDCS Deluge Line Squib
V-7(A) – Yes No Yes Yes No
Valve
Valve
Valve
V-1(B) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
V-2(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Valve Yes
2.4-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2

I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
Valve Yes
Valve
V-7(B) – Yes No Yes Yes No
Valve
Valve
Valve
V-1(C) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
V-2(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Valve Yes
Valve Yes
V-4(C) - Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
2.4-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2

I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
V-6(C) – Yes Yes Yes No No
V-7(C) – Yes No Yes Yes No
Valve
Valve
Valve
V-1(D) – Yes Yes Yes No No
Valve
V-2(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Valve Yes
Valve Yes
Valve
2.4-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2

I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
V-7(D) – Yes No Yes Yes No
Valve
Valve
Valve
Programmable Logic
– – No No No – –
Controller Channel A Train 1
Programmable Logic
– – No No No – –
Controller Channel B Train 1
Programmable Logic
– – No No No – –
Controller Channel A Train 2
Programmable Logic
– – No No No – –
Controller Channel B Train 2
Deluge System PLC DC
power supply battery and – – No No No – –
charger Channel A Train1
charger Channel B Train 1
Deluge System squib valve
initiator DC power supply – – No No No – –
battery and charger Train 1
2.4-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2

I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
charger Channel A Train 2
charger Channel B Train 2
Deluge System squib valve
initiator DC power supply – – No No No – –
battery and charger Train 2
GDCS lower drywell
temperature switch high – – Yes Yes No – –
Switch A Train 1
GDCS lower drywell
Switch B Train 1
GDCS BiMAC
thermocouples Channel A – – No No No – –
Train 1
GDCS BiMAC
thermocouples Channel B – – No No No – –
Train 1
GDCS lower drywell
Switch A Train 2
2.4-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-2

I Display Actuator
2.4.2-1 DPS
GDCS lower drywell
Switch B Train 2
GDCS BiMAC
thermocouples Channel A – – No No No – –
Train 2
GDCS BiMAC
thermocouples Channel B – – No No No – –
Train 2
2.4-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built GDCS conforms to the
GDCS is as described in Subsection be conducted. functional arrangement as described in
2.4.2 and as listed in Table 2.4.2-1 and Subsection 2.4.2 and as listed in Table 2.4.2-
as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. 1 and as shown in Figure 2.4.2-1
2a1. (Deleted)
Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.4.2-1 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the design as ASME Code Section III using as- Code) exist and conclude that design
3550) will be performed. reconciliation of the components identified
2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5
2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section Data Reports, where applicable) (certified,
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. when required by ASME Code) and
accordance with ASME Code Section inspection reports exist and conclude that
III requirements. the components identified in Table 2.4.2-1
as ASME Code Section III are fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with
ASME Code Section III requirements.
2.4-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

as ASME Code Section III is designed Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
in accordance with ASME Code documents will be conducted. Code) exist and conclude that the design of
Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} the piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as
seismic, and combined.
2.4-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section when required by ASME Code) and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. inspection reports (including N-5 Data
III requirements. conclude that the piping identified in Table
2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III is
requirements.
components identified in Table 2.4.2- boundary welds in components that ASME Code Section III requirements
1 as ASME Code Section III meet identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME are met for non-destructive examination of
ASME Code Section III non- Code Section III will be performed in pressure boundary welds in components
destructive examination requirements. accordance with ASME Code Section identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code
III. Section III.
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section are met for non-destructive examination of
Section III non-destructive III will be performed in accordance with pressure boundary welds in piping
Section III.
III retain their pressure boundary Table 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section test of components identified in Table
integrity at their design pressure. III that are required to be hydrostatically 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply
Section III.
2.4-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

pressure boundary integrity at its 2.4.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that test of piping identified in Table 2.4.2-1 as
design pressure. is required to be hydrostatically tested ASME Code Section III comply with the
by ASME Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 as verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.4.2-1 and Table
Seismic Category I can withstand equipment identified in 2.4.2-2 is located in a Seismic Category
Seismic Category I loads without loss Table 2.4.2-1 and Table 2.4.2-2 are I structure.
structure.
equipment identified in Table 2.4.2- Seismic Category I, including
1 and Table 2.4.2-2, including anchorage, can withstand Seismic
anchorage, is bounded by the testing Category I loads without loss of safety
or analyzed conditions. function.
2.4-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8a. The GDCS injection lines provide For each loop of the GDCS, an open Based on analysis and test data, the flow
sufficient flow to maintain water reactor vessel test will be performed rate, in conjunction with vessel
coverage above Top of Active Fuel utilizing two test valves in place of the depressurization and other modes of GDCS
(TAF) for 72 hours following a design parallel squib valves in the GDCS operation, maintains water coverage above
basis LOCA. injection line and connected to the TAF for 72 hours following the design
GDCS actuation logic. Flow basis LOCA.
measurements will be taken on flow
into the RPV. An analysis of the test
configuration will be performed.
8b. The GDCS equalizing lines provide For each loop of the GDCS, open Based on analysis and test data, that the
sufficient flow to maintain water reactor vessel testing will be performed flow rate, in conjunction with vessel
coverage above TAF for 72 hours utilizing one test valve in place of the depressurization and other modes of GDCS
following a design basis LOCA. squib valve in the GDCS equalizing line operation, will maintain water coverage
and connected to the GDCS actuation above TAF for 72 hours following the
logic. Flow measurements will be taken design basis LOCA.
on flow into the RPV. An analysis of
the test configuration will be performed.
9. The GDCS squib valves used in the A vendor type test will be performed on GDCS squib valves used in the injection
injection and equalization lines open a squib valve. and equalization lines open as designed.
as designed.
10a. Check valves designated on Type tests of valves for opening and Based on the direction of the differential
Figure 2.4.2-1 open and close under closing will be conducted. pressure across the valve, each check valve
system pressure, fluid flow, and opens and closes.
2.4-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

10b. The GDCS injection line check valves Type tests of the GDCS check valves to The fully open flow coefficient for the
meet the criterion for maximum fully determine the fully open flow GDCS injection line check valves in the
open flow coefficient in the reverse coefficient in the reverse flow direction reverse flow direction is less than the value
flow direction. will be conducted. assumed in the LOCA analysis.
11. (Deleted)
12. GDCS squib valves maintain RPV A test will be performed to demonstrate Testing concludes GDCS squib valves have
backflow leak tightness and maintain the squib valves are leak tight during zero leakage at normal plant operating
reactor coolant pressure boundary normal plant conditions. pressure.
integrity during normal plant
operation.
13. Each GDCS injection line includes a Inspections of the as-built GDCS Each GDCS injection nozzle flow limiter is
nozzle flow limiter to limit break size. injection flow limiters will be less than or equal to 4.562E-3 m2 (0.0491
performed. ft2) and a nominal reactor-side outlet length
to diameter ratio of 4.41.
14. Each GDCS equalizing line includes a Inspections of the as-built GDCS Each GDCS equalizing line nozzle flow
nozzle flow limiter to limit break size. equalizing flow limiters will be taken. limiter is less than or equal to 2.027E-3 m2
(0.0218 ft2) and a nominal reactor-side
outlet length to diameter ratio of 6.59.
15. Each of the GDCS divisions is Tests will be performed on the GDCS Testing confirms the signal exists only in
powered from its respective safety- by providing a test signal in only one the safety-related power division under test
related power division. safety-related power division at a time. in the GDCS.
2.4-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

16. Each GDCS mechanical train located Inspections and analysis will be Each GDCS mechanical train located inside
inside the containment is physically conducted for each of the GDCS containment is protected against design
separated from the other train(s) so as mechanical trains located inside the basis events and their direct consequences
not to preclude accomplishment of the containment. by spatial separation, barriers, restraints, or
intended safety-related function. enclosures so as not to preclude
accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
17. The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are An analysis of combined minimum Analysis confirms the combined minimum
sized to hold a minimum drainable drainable volume for GDCS pools A, drainable water volume for GDCS pools A,
water volume. B/C, and D will be performed. B/C, and D is 1636 m3 (57770 ft3).
18. The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are An analysis of minimum water level in Analysis confirms the minimum water level
sized to hold a specified minimum GDCS pools A, B/C, and D will be in GDCS pools A, B/C, and D can be at
water level. performed. least 6.5 m (21.3 ft).
19. The elevation change between low An analysis of elevation change Analysis confirms the elevation change
water level of GDCS pools and the between low water level of GDCS pools between low water level of GDCS pools
centerline of GDCS injection line and the centerline of GDCS injection and the centerline of GDCS injection line
nozzles is sufficient to provide line nozzles will be performed. nozzles is 13.5 m (44.3 ft).
gravity-driven flow.
20. The minimum drainable volume from An analysis of minimum drainable Analysis confirms the minimum drainable
the suppression pool to the RPV is volume from the suppression pool to the volume from the suppression pool to the
sufficient to meet long-term post- RPV will be performed. RPV is 799 m3 (28,200 ft3).
LOCA core cooling requirements.
21. The long-term GDCS minimum An analysis of the minimum equalizing Analysis confirms the minimum equalizing
equalizing driving head is based on driving head will be performed. driving head is 1.0 m (3.28 ft).
RPV Level 0.5.
2.4-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

22. The GDCS Deluge squib valves open A vendor type test will be performed on GDCS Deluge squib valves used open as
as designed. a squib valve. designed.
23. (Deleted)
24. The GDCS injection piping is Inspection(s) will be conducted of as- Based on inspection(s) of as-built GDCS
installed to allow venting of non- built GDCS injection piping installation injection piping, the as-built piping
condensable gases to GDCS pools and to ensure there are no elevated piping conforms to design that allows venting of
to RPV, to prevent collection in the loops or high-point traps in piping run non-condensable gases to GDCS pools and
GDCS injection pipes. from squib valves to GDCS pools and to RPV.
to RPV inlet nozzles.
25. Deluge system has redundant Inspections and tests will be performed One thermocouple from each cell is
nonsafety-related Programmable to confirm the connection of the monitored in one PLC, while the other
Logic Controllers (PLCs) that are thermocouples to the PLCs. thermocouple from each cell is monitored
connected to thermocouples in each in a second PLC.
cell of the lower drywell Basemat-
Internal Melt Arrest Coolability
(BiMAC) system.
26. When temperatures exceed the i. Tests will be performed to confirm i. The timers are initiated when the
setpoint at one set of thermocouples timer initiation using simulated temperature setpoint is exceeded.
coincident with setpoints being signals.
exceeded at a second set of
thermocouples in adjacent cells, each
PLC starts a deluge squib valve timer.
ii. Type tests will be performed of the ii. The thermocouples are capable of
thermocouples to confirm detection detecting simulated core melt debris in
of simulated core melt debris in the the BiMAC cells.
BiMAC cells.
2.4-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

27. The GDCS deluge valve squib Tests will be performed using simulated The GDCS deluge valve squib initiation
initiation signals are inhibited when signals to confirm that the GDCS signals are inhibited when either of the
either of the safety-related deluge deluge valve squib initiation signals are safety-related deluge system lower drywell
system lower drywell temperature inhibited when either of the safety- temperature switches sense temperatures
switches sense temperatures lower related deluge system lower drywell lower than a preset value coincident with
than a preset value coincident with the temperature switches sense the presence of both deluge squib valve
presence of both deluge squib valve temperatures lower than a preset value timer signals.
timer signals. coincident with the presence of both
deluge squib valve timer signals.
that require maintenance have drawings will be conducted. drawings confirms that maintenance valves
maintenance valves such that freeze {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} included such that freeze seals will not be
seals will not be required. required.
28b. The as-built location of valves on A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been completed
lines attached to the RPV in the lines attached to the RPV using as- for the as-built location of valves relative to
GDCS that require maintenance shall designed and as-built information will the design requirements.
be reconciled to design requirements. be performed.
29a. (Deleted)
29b. The BiMAC has a material located on Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built BiMAC contains a material
top of the BiMAC pipes to protect be conducted. located on top of the BiMAC pipes to
against melt impingement during the protect against melt impingement during
initial corium relocation event. the initial corium relocation event.
2.4-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.4.2-3

29c. The BiMAC is designed with a cover Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built BiMAC includes a cover plate
so that debris will penetrate it in a be conducted. providing protection for the BiMAC from
short period of time while providing CRD housings falling from the vessel while
protection for the BiMAC from CRD allowing debris to penetrate it in a short
housings falling from the vessel. period of time.
29d. The BiMAC piping is inclined from Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built BiMAC includes piping
horizontal to permit natural circulation be conducted. inclined from horizontal, according to the
flow. analyzed value, to permit natural
circulation flow.
29e. The material located on top of the Analyses of the as-built system will be The as-built BiMAC contains a material
BiMAC pipes does not generate conducted. located on top of the BiMAC pipes that
non-condensable gases in quantities does not generate non-condensable gases in
that would result in exceeding the quantities that would result in exceeding
containment ultimate pressure. the containment ultimate pressure.
2.4-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR
Design Control Document/Tier 1
Figure 2.4.2-1. Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5 REACTOR SERVICING EQUIPMENT

The following subsections describe the major reactor servicing equipment for the ESBWR.
2.5-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.1 Fuel Service Equipment

2.5-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.2 Miscellaneous Service Equipment

2.5-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel Servicing Equipment

2.5-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.4 RPV Internals Servicing Equipment

2.5-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.5 Refueling Equipment

The ESBWR is supplied with a refueling machine for fuel movement in the Reactor Building (RB)
and a fuel handling machine used for fuel servicing and transporting tasks in the Fuel Building
(FB).
Design Description
The functional arrangement of the RB refueling machine is that it is a gantry-type crane that
spans the reactor vessel cavity and fuel and storage pools to handle fuel and perform other
ancillary tasks. It is equipped with a traversing trolley on which is mounted a telescoping mast
and integral fuel grapple. The machine is a rigid structure built to ensure accurate and repeatable
positioning during the refueling process.
The functional arrangement of the FB fuel handling machine is that it is equipped with a
traversing trolley on which is mounted a telescoping mast and integral fuel grapple. The
machine is a rigid structure built to ensure accurate and repeatable positioning while handling
fuel.
(1) The functional arrangement of the RB refueling machine is as described in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.5.5.
(2) The RB refueling machine is classified as nonsafety-related, but is designed as Seismic
Category I.
(3) The RB refueling machine has an auxiliary hoist with sufficient load capability.
(4) The RB refueling machine is provided with controls interlocks.
(5) The functional arrangement of the FB fuel handling machine is as described in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.5.5.
(6) The FB fuel handling machine is classified as nonsafety-related, but is designed as Seismic
Category I.
(7) The FB fuel handling machine has an auxiliary hoist with sufficient load capability.
(8) The FB fuel handling machine is provided with controls and interlocks.
(9) The RB refueling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a single
failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.
(10) The FB fuel handling machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is designed such that a
single failure will not result in the loss of the capability to safely retain the load.
(11) The FB fuel handling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in
the certified design that are to be lifted.
(12) The RB refueling machine passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the
certified design that are to be lifted.
Table 2.5.5-1 provides a definition of the inspection, test, and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the refueling equipment.
2.5-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built RB refueling The as-built RB refueling machine
RB refueling machine is as machine will be performed. conforms to the functional arrangement as
described in the Design described in the Design Description of
Description of this Subsection Subsection 2.5.5.
2.5.5.
2. The RB refueling machine is Inspections and analyses of the as-built RB The as-built RB refueling machine can
classified as nonsafety-related, but refueling machine will be performed. withstand seismic dynamic loads without
is designed as Seismic Category I. loss of load carrying or structural integrity
functions.
3. The RB refueling machine has an Load tests on the as-built auxiliary hoists A successful load test of each as-built
auxiliary hoist with sufficient load will be conducted in accordance with ANSI auxiliary hoist has been performed in
capability. N14.6, 1993. accordance with ANSI N14.6, 1993.
4. The RB refueling machine is Testing will be performed with actual or The as-built interlocks function as follows:
provided with controls interlocks. simulated signals to demonstrate that the • Prevent hoisting a fuel assembly over
as-built interlocks function as required. the vessel with a control rod
removed;
• Prevent collision with fuel pool walls
or other structures;
• Limit travel of the fuel grapple;
• Interlock grapple hook engagement
with hoist load and hoist up power;
and
• Ensure correct sequencing of the
transfer operation in the automatic or
manual mode.
2.5-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.5-1

5. The functional arrangement of the Inspections and analyses of the as-built FB The as-built FB fuel handling machine
FB fuel handling machine is as fuel handling machine system will be conforms to the functional arrangement as
described in the Design performed. described in the Design Description of the
Description of this Subsection Subsection 2.5.5.
2.5.5.
6. The FB fuel handling machine is Inspections and analyses of the as-built FB The as-built FB fuel handling machine can
classified as nonsafety-related, but fuel handling machine system will be withstand seismic dynamic loads without
is designed as Seismic Category I. performed. loss of load carrying or structural integrity
functions.
7. The FB fuel handling machine has Load tests on the as-built auxiliary hoists A successful load test of the as-built
an auxiliary hoist with sufficient will be conducted. auxiliary hoist has been performed at 125%
load capability. of rated load capacity.
8. The FB fuel handling machine is Test will be performed with actual or The required interlocks function as follows:
provided with controls and simulated signals to demonstrate that the • Prevent collision with fuel pool walls
interlocks. as-built interlocks function as required. or other structures;
• Limit travel of the fuel grapple;
• Interlock grapple hook engagement
with hoist load and hoist up power;
and
• Ensure correct sequencing of the
transfer operation in the automatic or
manual mode.
2.5-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.5-1

9. The RB refueling machine hoist The following tests, type tests, and The following tests have been successfully
(the mast and fuel grapple) is inspections will be performed: completed for the as-built RB refueling
designed such that a single failure machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple)
will not result in the loss of the so that a single failure will not result in the
capability to safely retain the load. loss of the capability to safely retain the
load:
i. Nondestructive Examination on the i. Nondestructive Examination on the
welded structural connections of the welded structural connections of the RB
RB refueling machine will be refueling machine performed in
performed in accordance with ASME accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004,
NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4. Paragraph 4251.4.
ii. The RB refueling machine hoist will be ii. The RB refueling machine hoist has
static load-tested to 125% of the been static load-tested to 125% of the
manufacturer’s rated load. manufacturer’s rated load.
iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB refueling iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB refueling
machine hoist will be performed in machine hoist performed in accordance
accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph
Paragraph 7422. 7422.
iv. A No-Load Test on the RB refueling iv. A No-Load Test on the RB refueling
machine hoist will be performed in machine hoist performed in accordance
accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs
Paragraphs 7421 and 7421.1. 7421 and 7421.1.
v. Inspection of the rope drum, sheeve v. Inspection records show the rope drum,
blocks, and hook component sheeve blocks, and hook component
dimensions and material composition dimensions and material compositions
has been completed. match design specifications.
2.5-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.5-1

vi. Inspection of the wire rope(s) for vi. Inspection records show the wire rope
proper reeving has been completed. (s) are correctly reeved.
10. The FB fuel handling machine The following tests, type test, and The following tests have been successfully
hoist (the mast and fuel grapple) is inspections will be performed: completed for the as-built FB fuel handling
designed such that a single failure machine hoist (the mast and fuel grapple)
will not result in the loss of the so that a single failure will not result in the
capability to safely retain the load. loss of the capability to safely retain the
load:
welded structural connections of the FB welded structural connections of the FB
fuel handling machine will be fuel handling machine performed in
NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 4251.4. Paragraph 4251.4.
ii. The FB fuel handling machine hoist ii. The FB fuel handling machine hoist has
will be static load-tested to 125% of the been static load-tested to 125% of the
manufacturer’s rated load. manufacturer’s rated load.
iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB fuel iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB fuel
handling machine hoist will be handling machine hoist performed in
NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422. Paragraph 7422.
iv. A No-Load Test on the FB fuel iv. A No-Load Test on the FB fuel handling
handling machine hoist will be machine hoist performed in accordance
performed in accordance with ASME with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs
NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and 7421 and 7421.1.
7421.1.
2.5-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.5-1

blocks, and hook component sheeve blocks, and hook component
dimensions and material composition dimensions and material composition
has been completed. match design specifications.
vi. Inspection of the wire rope(s) for vi. Inspection records show the wire rope
proper reeving has been completed. (s) are correctly reeved.
11. The FB fuel handling machine Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB The FB fuel handling machine passes over
passes over the centers of gravity fuel handling machine. the centers of gravity of heavy loads
of heavy loads included in the included in the certified design that are to
certified design that are to be be lifted.
lifted.
12. The RB refueling machine passes Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB The RB refueling machine passes over the
over the centers of gravity of refueling machine. centers of gravity of heavy loads included
heavy loads included in the in the certified design that are to be lifted.
certified design that are to be
lifted.
2.5-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.6 Fuel Storage Facility

New and spent fuel storage facilities are provided for fuel and associated equipment.
Design Description
(1) New fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a design bases seismic event.
(2) Spent fuel storage racks are designed to withstand a design bases seismic event.
(3) Deleted.
(4) Deleted.
(5) The maximum spent fuel rack water coolant flow temperature at the rack exit shall be
≤ 121°C (250°F).
(6) The maximum stresses in the spent fuel racks do not exceed ASME Code, Section III,
design allowable during accident conditions.
(7) The Spent Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.
(8) New Fuel Racks are capable of maintaining fuel subcritical.
associated acceptance criteria for the new and spent fuel storage racks.
2.5-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.6-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility

1. New fuel storage racks are An inspection and analysis of the new The new fuel racks can withstand seismic
designed to withstand a design fuel storage racks configuration will be design basis dynamic loads, and that the as-
bases seismic event. performed to ensure the design built configuration conforms to the analyses.
conforms to the seismic analyses.
2. Spent fuel storage racks are An inspection and analysis of the spent The spent fuel racks can withstand seismic
designed to withstand a design fuel storage racks configuration will be design basis dynamic loads and the as-built
bases seismic event. performed to ensure the design configuration conforms to the analyses.
conforms to the seismic analyses.
3. (Deleted)
4. (Deleted)
5. The maximum spent fuel rack Analyses will be performed to Analyses confirm the maximum temperature
water coolant flow temperature at determine the maximum temperature of in the spent fuel racks is ≤ 121°C (250°F) at
the rack exit shall be ≤ 121°C the spent fuel racks. rack exit under normal operating conditions.
(250°F).
6. The maximum stresses in the spent Analyses will be performed to confirm Analysis records confirm that the maximum
fuel racks do not exceed ASME that maximum stresses in the spent fuel stresses in the spent fuel racks will not exceed
Code, Section III, design allowable racks do not exceed ASME Code, ASME Code, Section III, design allowable
during accident conditions. Section III, design allowables during during accident conditions.
accident conditions.
2.5-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.6-1

7. The Spent Fuel Racks are capable i. Inspections will be performed on the i. The as-built Spent Fuel Racks dimensions
of maintaining fuel subcritical. as-built Spent Fuel Racks and are within the tolerances used in the Fuel
arrays. Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the
following features:
• Borated stainless steel rack pitch
• Borated stainless steel rack wall
thickness
• Exterior stainless steel wall thickness
• Inner fuel box width
• Edge fuel box width
• Rack array spacing
ii. Inspections will be performed on the ii. The as-built interlocking panels in the
as-built Spent Fuel Racks and active fuel region that form the Spent Fuel
arrays. Racks interior matrix conform to the
design in the Fuel Storage Racks
Criticality Analysis for the following
features:
• Panels are made of borated stainless
steel
• Borated stainless steel type
• Boron content
• Minimum density
• Maximum gap between panels
2.5-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.6-1

iii. Inspections will be performed on the iii. The as-built interlocking panels that form
as-built Spent Fuel Racks and the Spent Fuel Racks exterior walls
arrays. conform to the design in the Fuel Storage
Racks Criticality Analysis for the
following features:
• Stainless steel type
• Minimum density
8. New Fuel Racks are capable of i. Inspections will be performed on the i. The as-built New Fuel Racks dimensions
maintaining fuel subcritical. as-built New Fuel Racks. are within the tolerances used in the Fuel
Storage Racks Criticality Analysis for the
following features:
• Between rack pitch
• In-rack pitch
• Rack array spacing
• Rack inner fuel box width
• Rack wall thickness
• Four-sided bottom enclosure
ii. Inspections will be performed on the ii. The as-built New Fuel Rack walls
as-built New Fuel Racks. conform to the design in the Fuel Storage
Racks Criticality Analysis for the
following design features:
• Stainless steel type
• Minimum density
2.5-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.7 Under-Vessel Servicing Equipment

2.5-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.8 FMCRD Maintenance Area

2.5-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.9 Fuel Cask Cleaning

2.5-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.10 Fuel Transfer System

Design Description
The ESBWR is equipped with an Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS). The functional
arrangement of the IFTS consists of a terminus at the upper end in the Reactor Building refueling
pool that allows the fuel to be tilted from a vertical position to an inclined position prior to
transport to the spent fuel pool in the Fuel Building. There is means to lower the transport
device (i.e., a carriage), means to seal off the top end of the transfer tube, and a control system to
effect transfer. The IFTS has lower terminus in the fuel building storage pool, and a means to
tilt the fuel to be removed from the transport cart. There are controls contained in local control
panels to control fuel transfer. There is a means to seal off the upper and lower end of the tube
while allowing filling and venting of the tube.
The IFTS is anchored to the bottom of the refueling pool floor in the Reactor Building. The
IFTS penetrates the Reactor Building at an angle down to the fuel storage pool in the Fuel
Building. To ensure that there are no modes of normal or abnormal operation that will trap fuel
assemblies without the ability to add water or prevent unconditional venting of pressure that may
develop due to boiling, the IFTS is vented to the building through the hoist cable piping that
originates at the top of the transfer tube which extends above the level of the water in the RB
with no valves or obstructions.
(1) The functional arrangement of the IFTS is as described in this Subsection 2.5.10.
(2) The IFTS tubes and supporting structure can withstand an SSE without failure of the basic
structure or compromising the integrity of adjacent equipment and structures. Therefore,
the portion of the IFTS transfer tube assembly from where it interfaces with the upper fuel
pool, the portion of the tube assembly extending through the building, the drain line
connection, and the lower tube equipment (valve, support structure, and bellows) are
designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category I. The winch, upper upender, and
lower terminus are designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category II. The
remaining equipment is designated as nonsafety-related and Seismic Category NS.
(3) The IFTS is functionally capable of moving fuel.
(4) No single active failure can cause the draining of water from the upper pool in an
uncontrolled manner into the spent fuel pool or other areas. There is sufficient redundancy
and diversity in equipment and controls to prevent loss of load (carriage with fuel is
released in an uncontrolled manner) and there are no modes of operation that allow
simultaneous opening of valves that could cause draining of water from the upper pool in
an uncontrolled manner.
(5) The IFTS can be maintained filled with water for cooling in the event the fuel transport
cart with fuel loaded within the IFTS cannot be moved.
(6) For personnel radiation protection, access (ingress and egress) to areas adjacent to the
transfer tube is controlled through a system of physical barriers, interlocks and alarms.
associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Transfer System.
2.5-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.10-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built IFTS system The as-built IFTS conforms to the
IFTS is as described in this will be performed. functional arrangement as described in
Subsection 2.5.10. this Subsection 2.5.10.
2. The IFTS tubes and supporting i. Inspection will be performed to verify i. Inspection results verify that the
structure can withstand an SSE that the Seismic Category I and II Seismic Category I and II equipment
without failure of the basic structure equipment is located in a Seismic is located in a Seismic Category I
or compromising the integrity of Category I structure. structure.
adjacent equipment and structures.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The Seismic Category I and II
Therefore, the portion of the IFTS
of type tests and analyses of Seismic equipment can withstand seismic
transfer tube assembly from where it
Category I and II equipment will be design basis loads without loss of
interfaces with the upper fuel pool,
performed. safety function.
the portion of the tube assembly
extending through the building, the
drain line connection, and the lower
tube equipment (valve, support
structure, and bellows) are designated
as nonsafety-related and Seismic
Category I. The winch, upper
upender, and lower terminus are
designated as nonsafety-related and
Seismic Category II. The remaining
equipment is designated as nonsafety-
related and Seismic Category NS.
2.5-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.10-1

3. The IFTS is functionality capable of Tests will be performed using installed The as-built IFTS passes functional
moving fuel. controls and power supplies utilizing testing.
dummy fuel bundles for successful
demonstration of fuel movement from the
refuel pool to the spent fuel pool and
return.
4. No single active failure can cause the Tests and inspections will be performed on The as-built IFTS prevents loss of load
draining of water from the upper pool the as-built IFTS to confirm it prevents and draining water from the upper pool in
in an uncontrolled manner into the loss of load and draining water from the an uncontrolled manner.
spent fuel pool or other areas. There upper pool in an uncontrolled manner.
is sufficient redundancy and diversity
in equipment and controls to prevent
loss of load (carriage with fuel is
released in an uncontrolled manner)
and there are no modes of operation
that allow simultaneous opening of
valves that could cause draining of
water from the upper pool in an
uncontrolled manner.
5. The IFTS can be maintained filled Tests and inspection will be performed on The as-built IFTS can be maintained
with water for cooling in the event the the as-built IFTS that confirm the as-built filled with water in the event the fuel
fuel transport cart with fuel loaded IFTS can be maintained filled with water transport cart with fuel loaded within the
within the IFTS cannot be moved. in the event the fuel transport cart with IFTS cannot be moved.
fuel loaded within the IFTS cannot be
moved.
2.5-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.5.10-1

6. For personnel radiation protection, i. Inspections will be performed to i. Physical barriers exist between the
access (ingress and egress) to areas verify that physical barriers exist transfer tube and adjacent areas.
adjacent to the transfer tube is between the transfer tube and adjacent
controlled through a system of areas.
physical barriers, interlocks and
alarms.
ii. Tests and inspections will confirm that ii. The as-built interlocks and alarms
the as-built interlocks and alarms exist exist for controlling access to the
for controlling access to the transfer transfer tube area and indicating
tube area and indicating operation of operation of the IFTS.
the IFTS.
2.5-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.11 (Deleted)
2.5-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.5.12 (Deleted)
2.5-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.6 REACTOR AND CONTAINMENT AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

The following subsections describe the auxiliary systems for the ESBWR.
2.6.1 Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System

Design Description
The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling (RWCU/SDC) system purifies reactor coolant
during normal operation and shutdown, provides shutdown cooling to bring the reactor to cold
shutdown, and removes core decay heat to maintain cold shutdown. The RWCU/SDC system
also provides long term post-LOCA shutdown cooling in the unlikely event there has been fuel
failure. The RWCU/SDC system is as shown in Figure 2.6.1-1.
The containment isolation portions of the RWCU/SDC System are addressed in Subsection
2.15.1.
The environmental qualification of RWCU/SDC equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
MCR alarms and remote operation features of mechanical equipment provided for the
RWCU/SDC System are defined in Table 2.6.1-1.
(1) The functional arrangement of the RWCU/SDC system is as described in the Design
Description of Subsection 2.6.1, Table 2.6.1-1, and as shown in Figure 2.6.1-1.
(2) (Deleted)
(4) (Deleted)
(5) Manual closure of the RPV bottom head isolation valve can be accomplished remotely.
(6) Each of the RWCU/SDC system containment isolation valves identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is
powered from its respective safety-related division.
(8) a1. (Deleted)
2.6-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV system of the RWCU/SDC
system that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
Table 2.6.1-2 provides the inspections, tests, and analyses that will be undertaken for the
RWCU/SDC system.
2.6-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System

Equipment Name Identifier Code Seismic RCPB Containment
Remotely Motive MCR Alarms
Section Cat. I Component Isolation
(Description) See Figure Operated Power
III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
Demineralizers – Yes Yes No No No – Yes
Higher Capacity Pumps – Yes Yes No No Yes Off Yes
Lower Capacity Pumps – Yes Yes No No Yes Off Yes

Adjustable Speed Motor – Yes Yes No No Yes Off Yes
Drives
Regenerative Heat – Yes Yes No No No – No
Exchangers (RHXs)
Non-Regenerative Heat – Yes Yes No No No – No
Exchangers (NRHXs)
Midvessel Suction V-1(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Containment Inboard
Isolation Valve
RPV Bottom Suction V-4(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Containment Inboard
Isolation Valve
Midvessel Suction V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Containment Outboard
Isolation Valve
Midvessel Suction Flow V-3(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Close Yes
Control Valve
Isolation Valve
2.6-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
RPV Bottom Suction V-6(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve – Motor Operated
Sample Inboard
Containment Isolation
Valve
Sample Outboard
Valve
Higher Capacity Pump V-9(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Suction Valve
Return Line Isolation V-15(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Valve
Lower Capacity Pump V-10(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Suction Valve
Demineralizer Inlet V-11(A) Yes Yes No No No As-Is Yes
Valve
Demineralizer Outlet V-12(A) Yes Yes No No No As-Is Yes
Valve
Demineralizer Bypass V-13(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Open Yes
Flow Control Valve
Overboard Flow Control V-14(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Closed Yes
Valve
2.6-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
Suction Lines from RPV P-1(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Nozzles to the Outboard
Containment Quality
Group Break
Midvessel Suction V-1(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Containment Inboard
Isolation Valve
RPV Bottom Suction V-4(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Containment Inboard
Isolation Valve
Midvessel Suction V-2 (B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Midvessel Suction Flow V-3(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Close Yes
Control Valve
Isolation Valve
RPV Bottom Suction V-6(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve – Motor Operated
Sample Inboard
Valve
2.6-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
Sample Outboard
Valve
Higher Capacity Pump V-9(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Suction Valve
Return Line Isolation V-15(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Valve
Lower Capacity Pump V-10(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is No
Suction Valve
Demineralizer Inlet V-11(B) Yes Yes No No No As-Is Yes
Valve
Demineralizer Outlet V-12(B) Yes Yes No No No As-Is Yes
Valve
Demineralizer Bypass V-13(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Open Yes
Flow Control Valve
Overboard Flow Control V-14(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Closed Yes
Valve
Suction Lines from RPV P-1(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Nozzles to the Outboard
Containment Quality
Group Break
FAPC Suppression Pool V-16 Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
to RWCU Pump Suction
Isolation Valve
2.6-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
RWCU Pump Discharge V-17 Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
to FAPCS Containment
Cooling Line Isolation
Valve
RWCU Pump Discharge V-18 Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
to RWCU Mid-vessel
Suction Line Isolation
Valve
Reactor Bottom Flow P-2(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Sample Line to the
Outboard Containment
Isolation Valve
RWCU/SDC Return P-4(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line from the Return
Line Isolation Valve up
to and including the
connection to the
Feedwater Line
RWCU/SDC P-5(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
Overboarding Line
RWCU/SDC Lines from P-3(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
the Outboard
Valve Up to the Return
2.6-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
Suction Cross- P-6 Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line from
FAPCS Suppression
Pool Suction
Discharge Cross- P-7(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line to
FAPCS Containment
Cooling Line
Discharge Cross- P-8(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line to
RWCU Mid-vessel
Suction
Reactor Bottom Flow P-2(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Sample Line to the
Outboard Containment
Isolation Valve
RWCU/SDC Return P-4(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line from the Return
Line Isolation Valve up
to and including the
connection to the
Feedwater Line
RWCU/SDC P-5(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
Overboarding Line
2.6-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-1

III Valve Position
2.6.1-1
RWCU/SDC Lines from P-3(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
the Outboard
Valve Up to the Return
Suction Cross- P-6 Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line from
FAPCS Suppression
Pool Suction
Discharge Cross- P-7(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line to
FAPCS Containment
Cooling Line
Discharge Cross- P-8(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
connection Line to
RWCU Mid-vessel
Suction
2.6-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built RWCU/SDC system
RWCU/SDC system is as described in performed. conforms to the functional arrangement
the Design Description of Subsection described in the Design Description of
2.6.1, Table 2.6.1-1, and as shown in Section 2.6.1, Table 2.6.1-1, and as shown
Figure 2.6.1-1. in Figure 2.6.1-1.
2. (Deleted)
integrity at their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III comply
Section III.
pressure boundary integrity at its 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III that is test of piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as
design pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III comply with the
ASME Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
4. (Deleted)
5. Manual closure of the RPV bottom Remote manual closure testing of the The RPV bottom head isolation valve can
head isolation valve can be RPV bottom head isolation valve will be be manually closed remotely.
accomplished remotely. performed by closing the inboard
containment isolation valve in the
RWCU/SDC system suction line from the
RPV bottom head.
2.6-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2

6. Each of the RWCU/SDC System Testing will be performed on the A test signal exists in the safety-related
containment isolation valves identified RWCU/SDC system containment division for the containment isolation
in Table 2.6.1-1 is powered from its isolation valves by providing a test signal valves identified in Table 2.6.1-1 powered
respective safety-related division. in only one safety-related division at a from the safety-related division under test
time. in the RWCU/SDC System.
7. The equipment identified in Table i. Inspection will be performed to i. The equipment identified as Seismic
2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.6.1-1 is located
withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 in a Seismic Category I structure.
without loss of safety function. are located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I, loads without loss of safety function.
requirements.
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I,
equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1, including anchorage, can withstand
including anchorage, is bounded by Seismic Category I loads without loss
the testing or analyzed conditions. of safety function.
8a1. (Deleted)
2.6-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2

Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the design ASME Code Section III using as- Code) exist and conclude that design
2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in III will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
requirements.
2.6-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2

as ASME Code Section III is Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Code Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} of the piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as
seismic, and combined.
2.6-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2

as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III when required by ASME Code) and
Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is
requirements.
components identified in Table 2.6.1- boundary welds in components identified that ASME Code Section III requirements
1 as ASME Code Section III meet in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section are met for non-destructive examination of
ASME Code Section III non- III will be performed in accordance with pressure boundary welds in components
destructive examination ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code
requirements. Section III.
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are met for non-destructive examination of
Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with pressure boundary welds in piping
Section III.
system that require maintenance have drawings will be conducted. drawing confirms that maintenance valves
maintenance valves such that freeze {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} are included such that freeze seals will not
seals will not be required. be required.
2.6-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.1-2

10b.The as-built location of valves on A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been
lines attached to the RPV system of lines attached to the RPV requiring completed for the as-built location of
the RWCU/SDC system that require maintenance using as-designed and as- valves relative to the design requirements.
maintenance shall be reconciled to built information will be performed. The report documents the results of the
design requirements. reconciliation evaluation.
2.6-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.6.1-1. Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.6.2 Fuel And Auxiliary Pools Cooling System

Design Description
The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System (FAPCS) provides cooling and cleaning of pools
located in the containment, reactor building and fuel building during normal plant operation.
The FAPCS provides flow paths for filling and makeup of these pools during normal plant
operation and under post-accident conditions. The FAPCS provides suppression pool cooling
and Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) as active backup of the passive containment heat
removal systems.
The FAPCS is as shown in Figure 2.6.2-1.
The containment isolation portions of the FAPCS are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
The FAPCS alarms, displays, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
Environmental qualification for the FAPCS equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
(1) The functional arrangement of the FAPCS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.6.2 and as shown in Figure 2.6.2-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
(6) (Deleted)
2.6-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(7) a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related suppression pool cooling functions.
b. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related low-pressure coolant injection function.
c. The FAPCS provides the nonsafety-related external connection for emergency water to
IC/PCCS pool and Spent Fuel Pool functions.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Safety-related level instruments with adequate operating ranges are provided for the Spent
Fuel Pool, buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pools.
(10) (Deleted)
(11) Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water
level in the Spent Fuel Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies .
(12) Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water
level in the Buffer Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the FAPCS that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements
(14) Lines that are submerged in the spent fuel pool or buffer pool enter the pools above the
normal water level and are equipped with redundant anti-siphon holes that will preserve a
water inventory above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the event of a break at a
lower elevation.
(15) For all low-pressure coolant injection piping and components between the RWCU/SDC
System and the FAPCS, including the check valves and motor operated valves, the ultimate
rupture strength can withstand the full reactor pressure.
(16) The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in
the FAPCS trains A and B are electrically independent.
(17) The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in
the FAPCS trains A and B are physically separated.
(18) a. The electrical equipment supporting the two FAPCS trains is routed to the Reactor
Building and Fuel Building through separate areas that do not contain installed
equipment for lifting heavy loads.
b. Heavy loads that are being transported in the Reactor Building or the Fuel Building
(where the majority of FAPCS equipment is located) that have the potential to
simultaneously compromise both FAPCS trains would be handled by single failure-
proof cranes.
Table 2.6.2-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the FAPCS.
2.6-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
Suppression Pool Suction

V-1 Yes Yes No Yes Yes As-Is
Outboard Isolation Valve



Suppression Pool Return



V-7 Yes Yes No Yes – –
Inboard Isolation Valve

Drywell Spray Outboard

V-9 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Isolation Valve
2.6-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
Drywell Spray Inboard

Isolation Valve
GDCS Pool Return

GDCS Pool Return

GDCS Pool Suction

GDCS Pool Suction

Reactor Well Drain

Reactor Well Drain

FPS Water Makeup Valve

V-17 Yes Yes No No – –
to Spent Fuel Pool
FPS Water Makeup Check

Valve to Spent Fuel Pool
2.6-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1

to Spent Fuel Pool

External Water Makeup


Check Valve to Spent Fuel V-22 Yes Yes No No – –
Pool

to IC/PCCS Pool

Valve to IC/PCCS Pool

to IC/PCCS Pool


2.6-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1

Check Valve to IC/PCCS V-28 Yes Yes No No – –
Pool
LPCI Testable Check

Valve
LPCI Testable Check

Valve
Piping required for

emergency refill of SFP – Yes Yes No – – –
and IC/PCCS Pool
Piping associated with

– Yes Yes No – – –
containment penetrations
Piping to interconnect
– Yes Yes No – – –
GDCS pools
Piping associated with low

pressure injection interface – Yes Yes No – – –
with RWCU/SDC System
FAPCS Pump P-1 Yes No No – Yes Off
FAPCS Pump P-2 Yes No No – Yes Off
2.6-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-1
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
FAPCS Heat Exchanger HX-1 Yes No No – – –
FAPCS Heat Exchanger HX-2 Yes No No – – –
FAPCS Suppression Pool

S-1 Yes* Yes No – – –
Suction Strainer
* ASME Section III materials only.
2.6-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built FAPCS conforms to the
FAPCS is as described in the Design be conducted. functional arrangement described in
Description of Subsection 2.6.2 and Subsection 2.6.2 and as shown on
as shown in Figure 2.6.2-1. Figure 2.6.2-1.
2a1. (Deleted).
2a2. The components identified in A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550)
Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 (certified, when required by ASME Code)
III shall be reconciled with the design as ASME Code Section III using as- exist and conclude that design
in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III,
and that the design of as-built components
Section III complies with the requirements
of ASME Code Section III. The report
documents the results of the reconciliation
analysis.
2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5
2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III Data Reports, where applicable) (certified,
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. when required by ASME Code) and
accordance with ASME Code Section inspection reports exist and conclude that the
III requirements. components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as
ASME Code Section III are fabricated,
2.6-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550)
as ASME Code Section III is designed Reports (NCA-3550) and required (certified, when required by ASME Code)
in accordance with ASME Code documents will be conducted. exist and conclude that the design of the
Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME
requirements of the ASME Code, Section III,
including those stresses applicable to loads
related to fatigue (including environmental
effects), thermal expansion, seismic, and
combined.
2b2. The as-built piping identified in A reconciliation analysis of the piping ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550)
Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code (certified, when required by ASME Code)
III shall be reconciled with the piping Section III using as-designed and as-built exist and conclude that design reconciliation
design requirements. information and ASME Code Design has been completed, in accordance with
Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed. ASME Code, for as-built reconciliation of the
piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME
Code Section III. The report documents the
results of the reconciliation analysis.
2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 Inspections of the piping identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-5
as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III Data Reports, where applicable) (certified,
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. when required by ASME Code) and
accordance with ASME Code Section inspection reports exist and conclude that the
III requirements. piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME
Code Section III are fabricated, installed, and
inspected in accordance with ASME Code
Section III requirements.
2.6-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

3a. Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that
components identified in Table 2.6.2-1 boundary welds in components identified ASME Code Section III requirements are met
as ASME Code Section III meet ASME in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section for non-destructive examination of pressure
Code Section III non-destructive III will be performed in accordance with boundary welds in components identified in
requirements. ASME Code Section III. Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude that
identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME boundary welds in piping identified in ASME Code Section III requirements are met
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III for non-destructive examination of pressure
Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with boundary welds in piping identified in Table
requirements. ASME Code Section III. 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
4a. The components identified in Table A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section those code components identified in conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
IIIretain their pressure boundary Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III test of components identified in Table 2.6.2-1
integrity at their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically as ASME Code Section III comply with the
tested by ASME Code Section III. requirements of ASME Code Section III.
as ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at its as ASME Code Section III that is test of piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as
design pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III comply with the
ASME Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
2.6-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

Table 2.6.2-1 as Seismic Category I that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.6.2-1 is located in a
can withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 Seismic Category I structure.
without loss of safety function. are located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1
of type tests and analyses, of as Seismic Category I can withstand
equipment identified in Table 2.6.2-1 Seismic Category I loads without loss of
as Seismic Category I, will be safety function.
requirements.
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.6.2-1 including anchorage, can
equipment identified in Table 2.6.2- withstand Seismic Category I loads
1, including anchorage, is bounded without loss of safety function.
by the testing or analyzed
conditions.
6. (Deleted)
7a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety- i. Perform a test to confirm the flow i. The cooling flow path is demonstrated
related suppression pool cooling path and minimum flow rate and confirmed by operation of the
functions. between the FAPCS and the function. The flow rate is ≥ 567.8
suppression pools. m3/hr (2500 gal/min).
2.6-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

ii. Perform a type test to confirm the ii. The design heat removal capacity of a
heat transfer capacity of the FAPCS single FAPCS train is ≥ 8.3 MW under
heat exchanger. the following conditions:
• Primary and secondary side flow
rate ≤ 567.8 m3/hr (2500 gpm)
• Process inlet temperature ≤ 48.9ºC
(120ºF)
• Cooling water inlet temperature of
≥ 35ºC (95ºF)
iii. Inspection of as-built FAPCS iii. A suction strainer with perforated plate
suppression pool suction intake will hole sizes of < 2.508 mm (0.0988
be performed to confirm the inches) is present on FAPCS
presence of a suction strainer with suppression pool suction intake.
perforated plate hole sizes of <
2.508 mm (0.0988 inches).
7b. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety- Perform a test to confirm the flow path The injection flow path is demonstrated and
related low-pressure coolant injection and minimum flow rate from the confirmed by operation of the function.
functions. FAPCS to the RWCU/SDC system. The flow rate is ≥ 340 m3/hr (1500 gal/min)
at a differential pressure > 1.03 MPa
(150 psi) and < 1.05 MPa (152 psi).
7c. The FAPCS provides the nonsafety- Perform a test to confirm flow path The makeup water flow path is
related external connection for from the Fire Protection System and demonstrated and confirmed by operation
emergency water to IC/PCCS pool offsite water sources to the pools. of the function.
and Spent Fuel Pool functions.
8. (Deleted)
2.6-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

9. Safety-related level instruments with Inspections and tests of the FAPCS will The as-built FAPCS provides Spent Fuel
adequate operating ranges are be conducted to verify that level Pool, buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pool level
provided for the Spent Fuel Pool, instruments with adequate operating instrumentation with adequate operating
buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pools. ranges are provided for the Spent Fuel ranges.
Pool and IC/PCCS pools. • Instruments for the SFP and buffer
pool accurately indicate pool level
over the range from normal water
level to the top of the active fuel
within ± 300 mm (1 ft).
• Instruments for the IC/PCCS pools
accurately indicated pool level over
the range normal water level to the
midpoint of the IC heat exchanger
tube within ± 300 mm (1 ft).
10. (Deleted)
11. Following a loss of active cooling Inspection of the Spent Fuel Pool as- The elevation of the Spent Fuel Pool weir
without makeup that persists for 72 built dimensions will be performed to relative to the bottom of the pool is at least
hours, the water level in the Spent determine the elevation of the pool weir 14.35 m (47 ft) and that there is at least
Fuel Pool remains above the top of relative to the bottom of the pool and 1962 m3 (69300 ft3) of free volume above
the irradiated fuel assemblies. the free volume between the top of the the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies that
irradiated fuel assemblies and the weir can be filled with water.
elevation.
2.6-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

12. Following a loss of active cooling Inspection of the Buffer Pool as-built The elevation of the Buffer Pool weir
without makeup that persists for 72 dimensions will be performed to relative to the bottom of the pool is at least
hours, the water level in the Buffer determine the elevation of the pool weir 6.7 m (22 ft) and that there is at least 288
Pool remains above the top of the relative to the bottom of the pool and m3 (10,200 ft3) of free volume above the top
irradiated fuel assemblies. the free volume between the top of the of the irradiated fuel assemblies (stored in
irradiated fuel assemblies and the weir the deep pit) that can be filled with water.
elevation.
maintenance valves such that freeze {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} are included such that freeze seals will not
seals will not be required. be required.
13b. The as-built location of valves on A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been completed
lines attached to the RPV in the lines attached to the RPV that require for the as-built location of valves relative to
FAPCS that require maintenance maintenance using as-designed and as- the design requirements. The report
shall be reconciled to design built information will be performed documents the results of the reconciliation
requirements. evaluation.
14. Lines that are submerged in the spent Inspection of as-built submerged piping Redundant anti-siphon holes are present on
fuel pool or buffer pool enter the in the Spent Fuel Pool and Buffer Pool all submerged piping in the Spent Fuel Pool
pools above the normal water level will be performed. and Buffer Pool and the piping enters the
are equipped with redundant anti- pools above the normal water level to
siphon holes that will preserve a preserve the water inventory to a minimum
water inventory above the top of the of 10.26 m (33.7 ft) above the top of the
irradiated fuel assemblies in the event irradiated fuel assemblies in the event of a
of a break at a lower elevation. break at a lower elevation.
2.6-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

15. For all low-pressure coolant injection Inspection and analysis to verify the For the as-built low-pressure coolant
piping and components between the ultimate rupture strength of the as-built injection piping and components between
RWCU/SDC System and the FAPCS, low-pressure coolant injection piping the RWCU/SDC System and the FAPCS,
including the check valves and motor between the RWCU/SDC System and including the check valves and motor
operated valves, the ultimate rupture the nonsafety-related motor operated operated valves, the ultimate rupture
strength can withstand the full reactor valves will be performed. strength can withstand the full reactor
pressure. pressure.
16. The nonsafety-related control cables, Tests of the nonsafety-related control The nonsafety-related control cables,
instrument cables and power cables cables, instrument cables and power instrument cables and power cables for
for equipment in the FAPCS trains A cables for equipment in the FAPCS equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are
and B are electrically independent. trains A and B will be performed to electrically independent.
show electrical independence.
17. The nonsafety-related control cables, Inspections of the nonsafety-related The nonsafety-related control cables,
instrument cables and power cables control cables, instrument cables and instrument cables and power cables for
for equipment in the FAPCS trains A power cables for equipment in the equipment in the FAPCS trains A and B are
and B are physically separated FAPCS trains A and B will be physically separated as defined by IEEE-
performed to show physical separation. 384.
18a. The electrical equipment supporting Inspection of the electrical equipment The electrical equipment supporting the two
the two FAPCS trains is routed to the supporting FAPCS will be conducted. FAPCS trains is routed to the Reactor Building
Reactor Building and Fuel Building and Fuel Building through separate areas that
through separate areas that do not do not contain installed equipment for lifting
contain installed equipment for lifting heavy loads.
heavy loads.
2.6-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.6.2-2

18b. Heavy loads that are being Inspection of the Reactor Building and The Reactor Building and the Fuel Building
transported in the Reactor Building or Fuel Building cranes will be conducted. cranes are single failure-proof cranes (see
the Fuel Building (where the majority Table 2.16.1-1, ITAAC 10 and ITAAC 11).
of FAPCS equipment is located) that
have the potential to simultaneously
compromise both FAPCS trains will
be handled by single failure-proof
cranes.
2.6-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.6.2-1. Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.7 (DELETED)
2.7.1 (Deleted)
2.7.2 (Deleted)
2.7.3 (Deleted)
2.7-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.8 (DELETED)
2.8.1 (Deleted)
2.8-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.8.2 (Deleted)
2.8-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.9 (DELETED)
2.9-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.10 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
2.10.1 Liquid Waste Management System

Design Description
The ESBWR Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS) is designed to control, collect,
process, handle, store, monitor and dispose of liquid radioactive waste generated as the result of
normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences. The LWMS is designed to
process liquid prior to release and ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Part B effluent
concentration and dose limits, and Part 50, Appendix I dose objectives for liquid effluents when
the plant is operational.
The LWMS does not perform any safety-related function, and is not required to achieve or
maintain safe shutdown.
The functional arrangement of the LWMS is that it has components in four subsystems that
receive and store radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid waste. The four LWMS
subsystems are as follows:
• Equipment (low conductivity) drain subsystem;
• Floor (high conductivity) drain subsystem;
• Chemical drain subsystem; and
• Detergent drain subsystem.
Table 2.10.1-1 describes the major components in each of these four subsystems. Other
components include piping, pumps, and valves for transferring the process flow. The LWMS
processing equipment is located in the Radwaste Building. The LWMS is operated and
monitored from the Radwaste Building Control Room. Main control room alarms are provided
for key parameters of the LWMS. The LWMS either returns processed water to the condensate
system or discharges to the environment via the circulating water system.
(1) The LWMS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.10.1 and Table 2.10.1-
1.
(2) The LWMS piping systems retain their pressure boundary integrity under internal
pressures that will be experienced during service.
(3) LWMS discharge flow is monitored for high radiation. A radiation monitor provides an
automatic closure signal to the discharge line isolation valve. Discharge flow is terminated
on receipt of a high radiation signal from this monitor.
(4) LWMS demineralizers have the filter efficiency and sufficient demineralizer media as
specified in design specifications.
associated acceptance criteria for the Liquid Waste Management System. ITAAC, for the liquid
radwaste discharge radiation monitor, and for part of the process radiation monitoring system,
are also located in Table 2.3.1-2.
2.10-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.10.1-1
Major Equipment in LWMS
Equipment Number of Equipment Items
Equipment (Low Conductivity) Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 3
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 3 (one per cubicle)
Collection pumps 3
Process Subsystem: 1
• Filtration system
• Reverse osmosis
• Mixed-bed ion exchanger
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electrical System
Sample tanks 2
Sample tank cubicle steel liner 1 (one per cubicle)
Sample pumps 2
Floor (High Conductivity) Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 2
Collection pumps 2
Process Subsystem 1
• Reverse osmosis
• Mixed-bed ion exchanger
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electrical System
Sample tanks 2
Sample pumps 2
Chemical Drain Subsystem
Collection tank 1
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 1
Collection pump 2
Detergent Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 2
Collection pumps 2
2.10-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.10.1-1
Major Equipment in LWMS
Equipment Number of Equipment Items
Process Subsystem: 1
• Organic pre-treatment equipment
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electric system
Sample tanks 2
Sample pumps 2
2.10-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.10.1-2
ITAAC For The Liquid Waste Management System

1. The LWMS functional arrangement Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built LWMS conforms to the
is as described in Subsection 2.10.1 performed. functional arrangement as described in
and Table 2.10.1-1. the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.10.1 and Table 2.10.1-1.
2. The LWMS piping systems retain A hydrostatic test in accordance with The results of the hydrostatic test of the
their pressure boundary integrity ASME/ANSI B31.3 will be conducted on LWMS piping systems in accordance with
under internal pressures that will be the LWMS piping systems, except (1) at ASME/ANSI B31.3 comply with the
experienced during service. atmospheric tanks where no isolation requirements in the ASME Code per
valves exist, (2) when such testing would Regulatory Guide 1.143, Revision 2 and
damage equipment, and (3) when such indicate no unacceptable pressure
testing could seriously interfere with boundary leakage.
other systems or components required to
be hydrostatically tested by the API or
ASME Code per Regulatory guide 1.143,
Revision 2.
3. LWMS discharge flow is monitored Tests will be conducted using a standard The LWMS discharge flow terminates
for high radiation. A radiation radiation source or portable calibration upon receipt of a simulated high radiation
monitor provides an automatic unit that exceeds a setpoint value that is signal and associated indication and alarm
closure signal to the discharge line preset for the testing. functions are met.
isolation valve. Discharge flow is Inspections will be conducted to confirm
terminated on receipt of a high that the as-built indication, alarm, and
radiation signal from this monitor. automatic initiation functions are met.
4. LWMS demineralizers have the filter Inspections will be conducted to verify The vendor specified filter efficiency and
efficiency and sufficient the amount of filtration and amount of demineralization media is
demineralizer media as specified in demineralization media is loaded in loaded in the demineralizer vessels.
design specifications. demineralizer vessels.
2.10-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.10.2 Solid Waste Management System

Design Description
The Solid Waste Management System (SWMS) has no safety-related functions. It is designed to
control, collect, handle, process, package, and temporarily store wet and dry solid radioactive
waste prior to shipment. This waste is generated as a result of normal operation and anticipated
operational occurrences.
The functional arrangement of the SWMS is that the SWMS is located in the Radwaste Building.
It consists of the following four subsystems:
• SWMS collection subsystem,
• SWMS processing subsystem,
• Dry solid waste accumulation and conditioning subsystem, and
• Container storage subsystem.
The SWMS also contains the tanks listed in Table 2.10.2-1.
(1) The SWMS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.10.2.
(2) The SWMS provides the nonsafety-related function of storing radioactive solids prior to
processing for shipment.
Inspection, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria
associated acceptance criteria for the Solid Waste Management System.
2.10-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.10.2-1
SWMS Tanks Nominal Capacity (Volume)
Nominal Capacity (Volume)

Equipment Description Quantity
Liter (Gal)
High Activity Resin Holdup Tank 1 70,000 (18,494)
Low Activity Resin Holdup Tank 1 70,000 (18,494)
Condensate Resin Holdup Tank 1 70,000 (18,494)
Low Activity Phase Separator Tank 1 55,000 (14,531)
High Activity Phase Separator Tank 1 12,000 (3,170)
Concentrated Waste Tank 1 60,000 (15,852)
2.10-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.10.2-2
ITAAC For Solid Waste Management System

1. The SWMS functional arrangement is Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built SWMS conforms to the
as described in the Design Description performed. functional arrangement as described in the
of this Subsection 2.10.2. Design Description of this
Subsection 2.10.2.
2. The SWMS provides the nonsafety- Inspection will be performed to verify The nominal volume of each of the SWMS
related function of storing radioactive the nominal volumes of each of the tanks is the nominal value indicated on
solids prior to processing for SWMS tanks. Table 2.10.2-1.
shipment.
2.10-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.10.3 Gaseous Waste Management System

Design Description
The gaseous waste management system processes and controls the release of gaseous radioactive
effluents to the environs. The Offgas System (OGS) is designed to process gaseous wastes and
ensuring compliance with 10 CFR Part 20, Part B effluent concentration and dose limits, and
Part 50, Appendix I dose objectives for gaseous effluents when the plant is operational. The
OGS is the principal gaseous waste management subsystem. The various building HVAC
systems perform other gaseous waste functions.
The functional arrangement of the OGS is that the process equipment is housed in a reinforced-
concrete structure to provide adequate shielding. Charcoal absorbers are installed in a
temperature monitored and controlled vault. The facility is located in the Turbine Building. The
OGS provides for holdup, and thereby, decay of radioactive gases in the offgas from the main
condenser air removal system and consists of process equipment along with monitoring
instrumentation and control components. The OGS includes redundant hydrogen/oxygen
catalytic recombiners and ambient temperature charcoal beds to provide for process gas volume
reduction and radionuclide retention/decay. The OGS processes the main condenser air removal
system discharge during plant startup and normal operation before discharging the air flow to the
turbine building stack.
Control and monitoring of the OGS process equipment is performed both locally and remotely
from the main control room.
(1) The OGS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.10.3.
(2) The OGS is designed to withstand internal hydrogen explosions.
(3) Leakage from the process through purge or tap lines to external atmospheric pressure is
sufficiently low so it is undetectable by “soap bubble” test.
(4) The OGS automatically controls the OGS flow bypassing or through the charcoal adsorber
beds depending on the radioactivity levels in the OGS process gas downstream of the
charcoal beds. Normal operation of the OGS shall take place in the treat mode. The treat
mode provides for an alignment to send process flow through one guard bed and all the
remaining charcoal adsorbers.
(5) The OGS minimizes and controls the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere by
delaying release of the offgas process stream initially containing radioactive isotopes of
krypton, xenon, iodine, nitrogen, and oxygen. This delay, using activated charcoal
adsorber beds, is sufficient to achieve adequate decay before the process offgas stream is
discharged from the plant.
associated acceptance criteria for the Gaseous Waste Management System. ITAAC for the off-
gas post-treatment radiation monitor, and for part of the process radiation monitoring system, are
also located in Table 2.3.1-2.
2.10-8
26A6641AB Rev.10
Table 2.10.3-1
ITAAC For The Gaseous Waste Management System

1. The OGS functional arrangement is as Inspections of the as-built OGS will be The as-built OGS conforms to the
described in Subsection 2.10.3. performed. functional arrangement as described the
Design Description of this Section 2.10.3.
2. The OGS is designed to withstand A pressure test of the as-built OGS will The OGS pressure testing results conform
internal hydrogen explosions. be conducted in the plant in accordance to the requirements in ASME/ANSI
ASME/ANSI B31.3 requirements. B31.3.
3. Leakage from the process through “Soap bubble” tests will be performed on The OGS “soap bubble” test results show
purge or tap lines to external the OGS mechanical joints on purge or tap no detectable leakage.
atmospheric pressure is sufficiently lines at normal system operating pressure.
low so it is undetectable by “soap
bubble” test.
4. The OGS automatically controls the OGS i. A standard radiation source or i. The Main Control Room alarm
flow bypassing or through the charcoal portable calibration unit that exceeds activates on a high OGS discharge
adsorber beds depending on the a setpoint value that is preset for the radiation signal.
radioactivity levels in the OGS process testing will provide a simulated high
gas downstream of the charcoal beds. charcoal gas discharge radioactivity
Normal operation of the OGS shall signal that will give a MCR alarm.
take place in the treat mode. The treat
mode provides for an alignment to send
process flow through one guard bed
and all the remaining charcoal
adsorbers.
2.10-9
26A6641AB Rev.10
Table 2.10.3-1

ii. A standard radiation source or ii. The OGS charcoal bed valves operate
portable calibration unit that exceeds to automatically align to process offgas
a setpoint value that is preset for the flow through both the guard beds and
testing will provide a simulated high- all of the charcoal beds.
high charcoal gas discharge
radioactivity signal when the OGS
process gas flow is bypassing the
main charcoal beds and will give a
MCR alarm and direct the gas flow
through the charcoal beds.
iii. A standard radiation source or iii. The OGS discharge valve closes on a
portable calibration unit that exceeds high-high-high OGS discharge
a setpoint value that is preset for the radioactivity signal.
testing will provide a simulated OGS
gas discharge radioactivity signal that
closes the off-gas system discharge
valve when the signal reaches a high-
high-high level.
2.10-10
26A6641AB Rev.10
Table 2.10.3-1

5. The OGS minimizes and controls the Inspections will be performed to verify The Charcoal Guard Bed has a minimum
release of radioactive material into the the mass of charcoal loaded in the of 15,000 kg (33,000 lb) of charcoal. The
atmosphere by delaying release of the Charcoal Guard Bed and Charcoal Decay Charcoal Decay Bed has a minimum of
offgas process stream initially Bed. 223,000 kg (490,000 lb) of charcoal.
containing radioactive isotopes of
krypton, xenon, iodine, nitrogen, and
oxygen. This delay, using activated
charcoal adsorber beds, is sufficient to
achieve adequate decay before the
process offgas stream is discharged
from the plant.
2.10-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11 POWER CYCLE

The following subsections describe the major power cycle (i.e., generation) systems for the
ESBWR.
2.11.1 Turbine Main Steam System

Design Description
The Turbine Main Steam System (TMSS) supplies steam generated in the reactor to the Turbine
Generator, moisture separator reheaters, steam auxiliaries and turbine bypass system. The TMSS
does not include the seismic interface restraint, main turbine stop valves or bypass valves.
The TMSS consists of four lines from the seismic interface restraint to the main turbine stop
valves. The TMSS is nonsafety-related. Regulatory Guide 1.26 Quality Group B portions of the
TMSS are designed in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III,
Class 2 requirements. The TMSS is located in the Reactor Building steam tunnel and Turbine
Building.
The Regulatory Guide 1.26 Quality Group B portions of the TMSS are those portions of the
Main Steam Lines that extend from the seismic interface restraint (or seismic guide) to the
turbine stop valves (non-inclusive), turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting
branch lines (nominal 6.35 cm. (2.5 in) and larger) up to and including the first isolation valve
which is either normally closed or capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal
reactor operation. This defines the portions of the TMSS subject to ASME Code Section III
Class 2 requirements. Figures 2.11.1-1 through 2.11.1-3 show the functional arrangement and
class changes to identify the scope equipment within the TMSS.
(1) The TMSS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.11.1 and as shown on
Figures 2.11.1-1 through 2.11.1-3.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
a2. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS shall be reconciled with the
a3. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS are fabricated, installed, and
inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
b1. The ASME Code Section III components of the TMSS retain their pressure boundary
integrity at their design pressure.
b2. The ASME Code Section III piping of the TMSS retains its pressure boundary
integrity at its design pressure.
(3) Upon receipt of an MSIV closure signal, the Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) close(s)
and required MSIV fission product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) open(s).
(4) The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) fail(s) closed and required MSIV fission product
leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) fail(s) open on loss of electrical power to the valve
actuating solenoid or on loss of pneumatic pressure.
(5) TMSS piping, which consists of the piping (including supports) for the MSL from the
seismic interface restraint (or seismic guide) to the turbine stop valves (non-inclusive),
2.11-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting branch lines (nominal 6.35 cm.
(2.5 in.) and larger up to and including the first isolation valve which is either normally
closed or capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal reactor operation, is
classified as Seismic Category II.
(6) The integrity of the as-built MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping,
bypass piping, required drain piping, and main condenser as shown on Figure 2.11.1-1) is
not compromised by non-seismic systems, structures and components.
(7) The non-seismic portion of the MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping
from the stop valve (inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass piping, required drain piping, and
main condenser) maintains structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.
(8) The TMSS piping is sized to ensure that reactor pressure vessel (RPV) dome to turbine
stop valve pressure drop, total main steam system volume, and steamline length are
consistent with assumptions in Abnormal Event analyses.
(9) a. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is designed in
accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements and Seismic Category II
requirements.
b. The as-built TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III shall be
c. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements..
(10) a. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III components of TMSS meet
ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III piping of the TMSS meet the
ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
installed such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the TMSS that require
(12) The non-return valves shown on functional arrangement Figure 2.11.1-2 and 2.11.1-3 are
spring assisted to close.
associated acceptance criteria for the TMSS.
2.11-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System

1. The TMSS functional arrangement is Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built TMSS conforms to the
as described in Subsection 2.11.1 and conducted. functional arrangement description in
as shown on Figures 2.11.1-1 through Subsection 2.11.1 and as shown on Figures
2.11.1-3. 2.11.1-1 through 2.11.1-3.
2a1.(Deleted)
2a2. The ASME Code Section III A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified,
components of the TMSS shall be components using as-designed and as- when required by ASME Code) exist and
reconciled with the design built information and ASME Code conclude that design reconciliation has
requirements. Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be been completed in accordance with the
performed. ASME Code for as-built reconciliation of
the ASME Code Section III components of
the TMSS, and that the design of as-built
ASME Code Section III components of the
TMSS complies with the requirements of
analysis.
2a3. The ASME code components of the Inspection of the components will be ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
TMSS are fabricated, installed, and conducted. 5 Data reports, where applicable)
inspected in accordance with ASME (certified, when required by ASME code)
Code Section III requirements. and inspection reports exist and conclude
that the ASME Code Section III
components of the TMSS are fabricated,
2.11-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1

2b1. The ASME Code Section III A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
components of the TMSS retain their those Code components of the TMSS conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at their required to be hydrostatically tested by test of the ASME Code components of the
design pressure. the ASME Code. TMSS comply with the requirements of the
2b2. The ASME Code Section III piping of A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
the TMSS retains its pressure the code piping of the TMSS required to conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
boundary integrity at its design be hydrostatically tested by the ASME test of the ASME Code piping of the
pressure. Code. TMSS comply with the requirements of the
3. Upon receipt of an MSIV closure Tests will be performed on the Steam The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s)
signal, the Steam Auxiliary Isolation Auxiliary Isolation Valves(s) and close(s) and required MSIV fission product
Valve(s) close(s) and required MSIV required MSIV fission product leakage leakage path TMSS drain valve(s) open(s)
fission product leakage path TMSS path TMSS drain valve(s) using following receipt of a simulated MSIV
drain valve(s) open(s). simulated MSIV closure signals. closure signal.
4. The Steam Auxiliary Isolation A functional test will be performed on The Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s)
Valve(s) fail(s) closed and required Steam Auxiliary Isolation Valve(s) and fail(s) closed and required MSIV fission
MSIV fission product leakage path required MSIV fission product leakage product leakage path TMSS drain valve(s)
TMSS drain valve(s) fail(s) open on path TMSS drain valve(s). fail(s) open on loss of electrical power to
loss of electrical power to the valve the valve actuating solenoid or on loss of
actuating solenoid or on loss of pneumatic pressure.
pneumatic pressure.
2.11-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1

5. TMSS piping, which consists of the An inspection will be performed to The as-built TMSS piping, which consists
piping (including supports) for the verify that a seismic analysis has been of the piping (including supports) for the
MSL from the seismic interface completed for the as-built TMSS piping. MSL from the seismic interface restraint
restraint (or seismic guide) to the (or seismic guide) to the turbine stop
turbine stop valves (non-inclusive), valves (non-inclusive), turbine bypass
turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting
and the connecting branch lines branch lines 6.35 cm. (2.5 in.) and larger
(nominal 6.35 cm. (2.5 in) and larger) up to and including the first isolation valve
up to and including the first isolation which is either normally closed or capable
valve which is either normally closed of automatic closure during all modes of
or capable of automatic closure during normal reactor operation, meets Seismic
all modes of normal reactor operation, Category II requirements.
is classified as Seismic Category II.
6. The integrity of the as-built MSIV Inspections and analysis of non-seismic The as-built non-seismic systems,
leakage path to the condenser (main systems, structures and components structures and components overhead,
steam piping, bypass piping, required overhead, adjacent to, and attached to adjacent to, and attached to the MSIV
drain piping, and main condensers as the MSIV leakage path (i.e., the main leakage path to the condenser will not
shown on Figure 2.11.1-1) is not steam piping, bypass piping, required compromise the integrity of the main
compromised by non-seismic systems, drain piping and main condenser) will be steam piping, bypass piping, required
structures and components. performed. The as-built non-seismic drain piping and main condenser.
systems, structures, and components will
be reconciled through inspection and
analysis with the results of the initial
inspection and analysis.
2.11-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1

7. The non-seismic portion of the MSIV An analysis of the as-built non-seismic The as-built non-seismic portion of the
leakage path to the condenser (main portion of the MSIV leakage path to the MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main
steam piping from the stop valve condenser will be performed to verify steam piping from the stop valve
(inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass that it maintains structural integrity (inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass
piping, required drain piping, and main under SSE loading conditions. piping, required drain piping, and main
condenser) maintains structural condenser) maintains structural integrity
integrity under SSE loading under SSE loading conditions.
conditions.
8. The TMSS piping is sized to ensure Inspection and analysis of the as-built The TMSS piping is sized to be consistent
that RPV dome to turbine stop valve TMSS piping will be performed to with these Abnormal Events analyses
pressure drop, total main steam system confirm RPV to turbine calculated inputs:
volume, and steamline length are pressure drop, total main steam system • Minimum Steamline Pressure Drop
consistent with assumptions in volume, and steamline length are from RPV Dome to Turbine
Abnormal Event analyses. consistent with assumptions in Throttle at rated conditions: 0.179
Abnormal Events analyses. MPa (26 psi)
• Minimum Main Steam System
Volume: 103.3 m3 (3648 ft3)
• Minimum Steamline Length: 65.26
m (214.1 ft)
2.11-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1

9a. The TMSS piping portion designated Inspection of ASME code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550)
as ASME Code Section III is designed Reports (NCA-3550) and required (certified, when required by ASME Code)
in accordance with ASME Code documents will be conducted. exist and conclude that the design of the
Section III requirements and Seismic {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} TMSS piping portion designated as ASME
Category II requirements. Code Section III complies with the
III, and meets Seismic Category II
requirements.
9b. The as-built TMSS piping portion A reconciliation analysis of the piping ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified,
designated as ASME Code Section III using the as-designed and as-built when required by ASME Code) exist and
shall be reconciled with the piping information and ASME code Design conclude that design reconciliation has
design requirements. Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed. been completed in accordance with the
ASME code for as-built reconciliation of
the TMSS piping portion designated as
analysis.
9c. The TMSS piping portion designated Inspections of the piping will be ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified,
as ASME Code Section III is conducted. when required by ASME code) and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in inspection reports (including N-5 Data
III requirements. conclude that the TMSS piping portion
designated as ASME Code Section III is
requirements.
2.11-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.1-1

10a. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude
Code Section III components of TMSS boundary welds will be performed in that the ASME Code Section III
meet ASME Code Section III non- accordance with the ASME Code requirements are met for non-destructive
destructive examinations requirements. Section III. examination of pressure boundary welds in
the TMSS components.
10b. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude
Code Section III piping of the TMSS boundary welds will be performed in that the ASME Code Section III
meet the ASME Code Section III non- accordance with the ASME Code requirements are met for non-destructive
destructive examinations requirements. Section III. examination of pressure boundary welds in
the TMSS piping.
maintenance valves installed such that {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} are included such that freeze seals will not
freeze seals will not be required. be required.
11b. The as-built location of valves on lines A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been completed
attached to the RPV in the TMSS that lines attached to the RPV that require for the as-built location of valves relative to
require maintenance shall be maintenance using as-designed and as- the design requirements. The report
reconciled to design requirements. built information will be performed. documents the results of the reconciliation
evaluation.
12. The non-return valves shown on Inspections of the as-built system will be The non-return valves shown on functional
functional arrangement Figure 2.11.1- conducted. arrangement Figure 2.11.1-2 and 2.11.1-3
2 and 2.11.1-3 are spring assisted to are spring assisted to close.
close.
2.11-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.11.1-1. TMSS Functional Arrangement
2.11-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.11.1-2. High Pressure Turbine Exhaust Functional Arrangement
2.11-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.11.1-3. Extraction Steam Functional Arrangement
2.11-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.2 Condensate and Feedwater System

Design Description
The function of the Condensate and Feedwater System (C&FS) is to receive condensate from the
condenser hotwell(s), supply condensate to the Condensate Purification System (CPS), and deliver
feedwater to the reactor. The C&FS is classified as nonsafety-related.
Condensate is pumped from the main condenser hotwell(s) by the condensate pumps, passes
through the CPS, auxiliary condenser/coolers, low-pressure feedwater heaters and into the feedwater
tank. The feedwater booster pumps take suction from the open feedwater tank and provide adequate
suction head for the reactor FW pumps, which pump feedwater through the high-pressure feedwater
heaters to the reactor. The C&FS boundaries extend from the main condenser outlet to (but not
including) the seismic interface restraint outside containment. The C&FS is located in the
Reactor Building steam tunnel and Turbine Building.
(1) The functional arrangement for the C&FS is as described in Subsection 2.11.2.
(2) The C&FS provides sufficient feedwater flow and volume to mitigate AOOs.
(3) The C&FS limits maximum feedwater flow to mitigate AOOs.
(4) The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, provides sufficient feedwater
flow after MSIV isolation to mitigate AOOs.
(5) The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, limits the maximum
feedwater flow for a single pump following a single active component failure or operator
error to mitigate AOOs.
(6) The C&FS, in conjunction with the feedwater control system, is designed so that the loss of
feedwater heating is limited in the event of a single operator error or equipment failure.
(7) The C&FS, in conjunction with other Power Cycle Systems, provides a nominal full load
final feedwater temperature that is consistent with assumptions in AOOs analyses.
(8) The C&FS has a nominal feedwater flow rate at rated conditions that is consistent with
inputs and assumptions in AOOs analyses.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV system in the C&FS that
require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
Table 2.11.2-1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Condensate and Feedwater System.
2.11-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.2-1
ITAAC For The Condensate and Feedwater System

1. The functional arrangement for the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built C&FS conforms to the
C&FS is as described in conducted to confirm the functional functional arrangement described in
Subsection 2.11.2. arrangement. Subsection 2.11.2.
2. The C&FS provides sufficient An analysis of the as-built C&FS and Three operating feedwater pumps are
feedwater flow and volume to mitigate feedwater pumps will be performed to capable of supplying 135% of the rated
AOOs. confirm the minimum capacity of three feedwater flow at 7.34 MPaG (1065
feedwater pumps. The analysis may be psig) for mitigating AOOs.
supported by type testing.
3. The C&FS limits maximum feedwater Analysis or type testing of the as-built The maximum capacity of three
flow to mitigate AOOs. C&FS and feedwater pumps will be feedwater pumps at 7.34 MPaG (1065
performed to confirm that the C&FS psig) is less than or equal to 155% of
limits maximum feedwater flow. The rated feedwater flow for mitigating
analysis may be supported by type AOOs.
testing.
4. The C&FS, in conjunction with the Inspection or analysis of the as-built The C&FS, in conjunction with the
feedwater control system, provides feedwater system will be performed to feedwater control system, provides
sufficient feedwater flow after MSIV confirm that the C&FS provides feedwater flow greater than or equal to
isolation to mitigate AOOs. sufficient feedwater flow after MSIV 240 seconds of rated feedwater flow after
isolation. MSIV isolation for mitigating AOOs.
5. The C&FS, in conjunction with the Testing or analysis of the as-built C&FS The C&FS, in conjunction with the
feedwater control system, limits the and feedwater pumps or type testing of a feedwater control system, limits the
maximum feedwater flow for a single single feedwater pump will be performed maximum feedwater flow for a single
pump following a single active to confirm that the C&FS limits the pump to 75% of rated flow following a
component failure or operator error to maximum feedwater flow from a single single active component failure or
mitigate AOOs. pump. operator error for mitigating AOOs.
2.11-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.2-1

6. The C&FS, in conjunction with the Inspection or analysis of the as-built The C&FS, in conjunction with the
feedwater control system, is designed feedwater system will be performed to feedwater control system, is designed so
so that the loss of feedwater heating is confirm that the C&FS, in conjunction that the loss of feedwater heating is
limited in the event of a single operator with the feedwater control system, limits limited to a final feedwater temperature
error or equipment failure. the loss of feedwater heating in the event reduction less than or equal to 55.6°C
of a single operator error or equipment (100°F) in the event of a single operator
failure. error or equipment failure.
7. The C&FS, in conjunction with other Inspection or analysis of the as-built The C&FS, in conjunction with other
Power Cycle Systems, provides a C&FS and other Power Cycle Systems Power Cycle Systems, provides a
nominal full load final feedwater will be performed to confirm the nominal nominal full load final feedwater
temperature that is consistent with full load final feedwater temperature. temperature of 216°C (420°F) as
assumptions in AOOs analyses. assumed in AOOs.
8. The C&FS has a nominal feedwater Testing or analysis of the as-built C&FS The C&FS has a nominal feedwater flow
flow rate at rated conditions that is and feedwater pumps and type testing of rate at rated conditions of 2.43 x 103 kg/s
consistent with inputs and assumptions a single feedwater pump will be (19.3 x 106 lbm/hr) as assumed in AOOs.
in AOOs analyses. performed to confirm the nominal
feedwater flow rate at rated conditions.
system that require maintenance have drawings will be conducted. drawings confirms that maintenance
2.11-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.2-1

9b. The as-built location of valves on lines A reconciliation evaluation of valves on A design reconciliation has been
attached to the RPV system in the lines attached to the RPV system that completed for the as-built location of
C&FS that require maintenance shall be require maintenance using as-designed valves relative to the design
reconciled to design requirements. and as-built information will be requirements. The report documents the
performed. results of the reconciliation evaluation.
2.11-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.3 Condensate Purification System

2.11-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.4 Main Turbine

Design Description
The Main Turbine is nonsafety-related. The ESBWR standard plant design has a favorably
oriented turbine to minimize any potential impact on safety-related structures and equipment.
(1) The physical layout of the Main Turbine system assures that protection is provided to
essential systems and components, as required, from the effects of high and moderate
energy Main Turbine system piping failures or failure of the connection(s) from the low
pressure turbine exhaust hood(s) to the condenser. Essential systems and components are
defined in BTP SPLB 3-1 as systems and components required to shut down the reactor
and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power. The
physical layout also includes protection for the structures, systems, or components (SSCs)
listed in Table 2.11.4-1.
(2) The Main Turbine has a favorable orientation to minimize the potential effects of turbine
missiles on safety-related structures, systems, or components and the structures, systems,
or components listed in Table 2.11.4-1. The safety-related SSCs that are located within the
low-trajectory turbine missile strike zone are failsafe or protected by barriers.
(3) The Main Turbine control valve closing times are limited to mitigate Abnormal Events.
(4) The Main Turbine stop valve closing times are limited to mitigate Abnormal Events.
(5) The Main Turbine can accommodate sufficient steam flow through three control valves to
mitigate Abnormal Events.
(6) The probability of a strike by a turbine missile is sufficiently low to prevent equipment
damage to essential systems.
(7) The as-built turbine material properties, turbine rotor and blade designs, pre-service
inspection and testing results and in-service testing and inspection requirements meet the
requirements defined in the Turbine Missile Probability Analysis.
associated acceptance criteria for the Main Turbine.
2.11-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.4-1
Additional Equipment Protected from Turbine Missiles
FPS Diesel Driven Pump
FPS Motor Driven Pump
FPS to FAPCS Connection
PARs
PCCS Vent Fans
CRHAVS Air Handling Units
Emergency Lighting
FPS Water Tank
FPS Diesel Fuel Oil Tank
Ancillary Diesel Generators
Ancillary AC Power Buses
Ancillary DG Fuel Oil Tank
Ancillary DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
Ancillary Diesel Building HVAC
CRHAVS Air Handling Unit auxiliary heaters and coolers
2.11-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.4-2
ITAAC For The Main Turbine

1. The physical layout of the Main Inspections of the as-built Turbine The physical layout of the Main Turbine
Turbine system assures that Building and plant arrangements will be system protects essential systems and
protection is provided to essential conducted. components from the effects of high and
systems and components, as moderate energy Main Turbine system
required, from the effects of high and piping failures or failure of the
moderate energy Main Turbine connection(s) from the low pressure
system piping failures or failure of turbine exhaust hood to the condenser.
the connection(s) from the low Essential systems and components are
pressure turbine exhaust hood(s) to defined in BTP SPLB 3-1 and equipment,
the condenser. Essential systems and structures, systems, or components
components are defined in BTP (SSCs) listed in Table 2.11.4-1 as
SPLB 3-1 as systems and systems and components required to shut
components required to shut down down the reactor and mitigate the
the reactor and mitigate the consequences of a postulated piping
consequences of a postulated piping failure, without offsite power.
failure, without offsite power. The
physical layout also includes
protection for the structures, systems,
or components (SSCs) listed in Table
2.11.4-1.
2.11-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.4-2

2. The Main Turbine has a favorable Inspections of turbine orientation with An analysis exists that confirms that any
orientation to minimize the potential respect to safety-related SSCs and the safety-related SSCs and SSCs listed
effects of turbine missiles on safety- SSCs listed in Table 2.11.4-1 will be in Table 2.11.4-1 that are located inside
related structures, systems, or conducted. The consequences of turbine the low trajectory turbine missile
components and the structures, missile impact on those SSCs that are strike zone are failsafe or are protected by
systems, or components listed in located within the low-trajectory turbine physical barriers.
Table 2.11-4-1. The safety-related missile strike zone defined by Figure 1 of
SSCs that are located within the low- Regulatory Guide 1.115 will be analyzed.
trajectory turbine missile strike zone
are failsafe or protected by physical
barriers.
3. The Main Turbine control valve Testing or analysis of the as-built Main The Main Turbine control valve fast
closing times are limited to mitigate Turbine and type testing of a single turbine closing time characteristic is limited to a
Abnormal Events. control valve will be performed to confirm minimum greater than or equal to the
control valve closing times. equivalent of 0.08 seconds at 100% NBR.
The servo closing time is limited to a
minimum greater than or equal to 2.5
seconds for mitigating Abnormal Events.
4. The Main Turbine stop valve closing Testing or analysis of the as-built Main The Main Turbine stop valve closing time
times are limited to mitigate Turbine and type testing of a single turbine is limited to a minimum greater than or
Abnormal Events. stop valve will be performed to confirm equal to 0.100 seconds for mitigating
stop valve closing time. Abnormal Events.
5. The Main Turbine can accommodate An inspection of the analysis of the as-built The Main Turbine can accommodate a
sufficient steam flow through three Main Turbine will be performed to confirm flow greater than or equal to 85% of rated
control valves to mitigate Abnormal that the Main Turbine can accommodate steam flow through three control valves
Events. sufficient steam flow through three control for mitigating Abnormal Events.
valves.
2.11-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.4-2

6. The probability of a strike by a A turbine missile probability analysis will Turbine Missile Probability Analysis
turbine missile is sufficiently low to be performed to demonstrate the Report(s) exist and conclude that the
prevent equipment damage to probability of turbine failure resulting in probability of turbine failure resulting in
essential systems. the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal the ejection of turbine rotor (or internal
structure) fragments through the turbine structure) fragments through the turbine
casing is less than the regulatory limiting casing is less than 1x10-4 per year.
value.
7. The as-built turbine material An inspection of the as-built turbine The as-built turbine material properties,
properties, turbine rotor and blade material properties, turbine rotor and blade turbine rotor and blade designs, pre-
designs, pre-service inspection and designs, pre-service inspection and testing service inspection and testing results and
testing results and in-service testing results, and in-service testing and in-service inspection and testing
and inspection requirements meet the inspection requirements will be conducted. requirements meet the requirements of
requirements defined in the Turbine the Turbine Missile Probability Analysis.
Missile Probability Analysis.
2.11-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.5 Turbine Gland Seal System

Design Description
The Turbine Gland Seal System (TGSS) minimizes the escape of radioactive steam from the
turbine shaft/casing penetrations and valve stems.
(1) The TGSS functional arrangement is described in Subsection 2.11.5 and shown in Figure
2.11.5-1.
associated acceptance criteria for the TGSS.
2.11-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.5-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Gland Seal System

1. The TGSS functional arrangement is Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built TGSS conforms to the
described in Subsection 2.11.5 and be performed. functional arrangement as described in
shown in Figure 2.11.5-1. Subsection 2.11.5 and as shown on Figure
2.11.5-1.
2.11-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.11.5-1. Turbine Gland Seal System Arrangement
2.11-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.6 Turbine Bypass System

Design Description
The Turbine Bypass System (TBS) consists of hydraulically operated Turbine Bypass Valves
(TBVs) that are connected to the main steam header via Turbine Main Stream System (TMSS)
piping. The TBS also includes the piping down stream of the TBVs to the main condenser. The
TBS passes steam to the main condenser in conjunction with the TMSS under the control of the
Steam Bypass and Pressure Control (SB&PC) system. The TBS is classified as nonsafety-
related. The TBS is used to mitigate Abnormal Events. The TBS is located in the Turbine
Building.
(1) The TBS functional arrangement is as described in Subsection 2.11.6.
(2) The TBVs are controlled by the SB&PC System.
(3) The TBS steam pressure retaining and structural components are analyzed to demonstrate
structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.
(4) The TBS accommodates steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.
(5) The TBS maintains sufficient capacity to mitigate Abnormal Events with a single active
failure.
(6) The TBS design limits the capacity of individual TBVs.
(7) The TBS design allows the TBVs to open rapidly to support Abnormal Event mitigation.
associated acceptance criteria for the TBS.
2.11-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.6-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Bypass System

1. The TBS functional arrangement is as Inspections of the as-built TBS will be The as-built TBS conforms to the
described in Subsection 2.11.6. conducted. functional arrangement described in
Subsection 2.11.6.
2. The TBVs are controlled by the Tests will be conducted using a The TBVs operate upon receipt of a
SB&PC System. simulated signal. simulated signal from the SB&PC System.
3. The TBS steam pressure retaining and An inspection of the as-built TBS will The as-built TBS can withstand a SSE
structural components are analyzed to be performed to verify that it conforms without loss of structural integrity.
demonstrate structural integrity under with the seismic analysis.
SSE loading conditions.
4. The TBS accommodates steam flow to An inspection will be performed to The TBS accommodates at least 110% of
mitigate Abnormal Events. confirm that the as-built TBS rated main steam flow for mitigating
accommodates steam flow to mitigate AOOs.
Abnormal Events.
5. The TBS maintains sufficient capacity An inspection will be performed to The TBS maintains capacity greater than or
to mitigate Abnormal Events with a confirm that the as-built TBS maintains equal to 50% of the maximum capacity for
single active failure. sufficient capacity to mitigate Abnormal a period greater than or equal to 6 seconds
Events with a single active failure. with a single active failure for mitigating
AOOs.
6. The TBS design limits the capacity of A type test and analysis of the TBS will Analysis and test data exist and conclude
individual TBVs. be performed to confirm that the TBS that no single TBV has a capacity greater
design limits the capacity of individual than 15% of rated steam flow.
TBVs.
2.11-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.6-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Bypass System

7. The TBS design allows the TBVs to Testing or analyses of the TBS will be The TBS can achieve a flow greater than or
open rapidly to support Abnormal performed to confirm that the as-built equal to 80% of total bypass capacity in a
Event mitigation. TBS design allows the TBVs to open time period less than or equal to 0.17
rapidly to support Abnormal Event seconds after initiation of TBV fast
mitigation. opening function for AOO mitigation.
2.11-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.7 Main Condenser

Design Description
The Main Condenser is classified as nonsafety-related. The MC shell provides a hold-up
volume for Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) fission product leakage and accommodates
the TBS steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.
(1) The main condenser structural members, supports, and anchors are designed to maintain
condenser integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
(2) The main condenser can accommodate TBS steam flow to mitigate Abnormal Events.
(3) The actual volume and plate out areas is greater than that assumed in Design Basis dose
calculations.
Safety-related condenser pressure instruments are described in Subsection 2.2.7. Main
Condenser Evacuation System (MCES) effluent radiation monitoring is described in Subsection
2.3.1.
associated acceptance criteria for the Main Condenser.
2.11-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.11.7-1
ITAAC For The Main Condenser

1. The main condenser structural An inspection and analyses will be The as-built main condenser structural
members, supports, and anchors are performed to verify the ability of the as- members, supports, and anchors are able to
designed to maintain condenser built main condenser structural maintain condenser integrity following a safe
integrity following a safe shutdown members, supports, and anchors to shutdown earthquake.
earthquake (SSE). maintain condenser integrity following a
safe shutdown earthquake.
2. The main condenser can An inspection and analyses of the as- The as-built main condenser has the
accommodate TBS steam flow to built condenser will be performed to capability to accommodate TBS steam flow
mitigate Abnormal Events. confirm the capability of the as-built for at least 6 seconds following a loss of
condenser to accommodate TBS steam preferred power without the main condenser
flow to mitigate Abnormal Events. pressure exceeding the TBV isolation setpoint
to mitigate AOOs.
3. The actual volume and plate out The volume and plate out areas in the The as-built condenser exceeds the following
areas is greater than that assumed in condenser final design shall be verified parameters used to calculate the plate out
Design Basis dose calculations. by inspection and analysis. factors for the dose analysis:
3
• Condenser volume of ≥ 5.93E+3 m
(2.09E+5 ft3)
• Condenser horizontal plate area of
≥ 418 m2 (4500 ft2); and
• Condenser horizontal cylinder area ≥
2793 m2 (30060 ft2)
2.11-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.8 Circulating Water System

2.11-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.11.9 Power Cycle Auxiliary Systems

Design Description
The Power Cycle includes a number of auxiliary systems. The Power Cycle Auxiliary Systems
include the Heater Drain and Vent System, Turbine Generator Control System, Turbine
Lubricating Oil System, Moisture Separator Reheater System, Extraction System, Turbine
Hydraulics System, Turbine Auxiliary Steam System, Generator System, Hydrogen Gas Control
System, Stator Cooling Water System, Generator Lubricating and Seal Oil System, Hydrogen
and Carbon Dioxide Bulk Storage System, and Generator Excitation System.
2.11-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

The following subsections describe the auxiliary systems for the ESBWR.
2.12.1 Makeup Water System

Design Description
The Makeup Water System (MWS) is a nonsafety-related system, and has no safety design basis
other than provision for safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves.
The MWS has safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves that are addressed in
Subsection 2.15.1.
(1) (Deleted)
Subsection 2.15.1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the MWS.
2.12-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.1-1
(Deleted)

1. (Deleted)
2.12-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.2 Condensate Storage and Transfer System

2.12-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.3 Reactor Component Cooling Water System

Design Description
The Reactor Component Cooling Water System (RCCWS) does not perform any safety-related
function. Therefore, the RCCWS has no safety design basis. The RCCWS is subject to
additional regulatory oversight for its nonsafety-related functions to provide post 72-hour
cooling to the nuclear island chillers and standby diesel generators and to provide cooling
support to FAPCS.
The functional arrangement of the RCCWS is shown on Figure 2.12.3-1.
(1) The RCCWS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of
Subsection 2.12.3 and is shown on Figure 2.12.3-1.
(2) The RCCWS provides the nonsafety-related function to support post-72 hour cooling for
nuclear island chillers and standby diesel generators and provides cooling support for
FAPCS.
(3) RCCWS flow can be established and controlled from the MCR.
(4) RCCWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.
Table 2.12.3-1 provides definitions of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the RCCWS.
2.12-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.3-1
ITAAC For The Reactor Component Cooling Water System

1. The RCCWS functional arrangement Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built RCCWS System conforms to
is as described in the Design performed. the functional arrangement described in
Description of Subsection 2.12.3 and the Design Description of this Subsection
as shown on Figure 2.12.3-1. 2.12.3 and as shown on Figure 2.12.3-1.
2. The RCCWS provides the nonsafety- Testing of the RCCWS will be A flow path exists from the RCCWS to the
related function to support post-72 performed to verify flow to the nuclear nuclear island chillers, standby diesel
hour cooling for nuclear island island chillers, standby diesel generators generators, and to support operation of
chillers and standby diesel generators and FAPCS. FAPCS.
and provides cooling support for
FAPCS.
3. RCCWS flow can be established and Testing to demonstrate RCCWS flow RCCWS pumps can be operated and flow
controlled from the MCR. will be performed on the RCCWS controlled from the MCR.
components using controls in the MCR.
4. RCCWS flow indication is provided Inspection will verify that RCCWS flow The RCCWS flow indication exists and
in the MCR. indication exists and can be retrieved in can be retrieved in the MCR.
the MCR.
2.12-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.12.3-1. Reactor Component Cooling Water System Functional Arrangement
2.12-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.4 Turbine Component Cooling Water System

2.12-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.5 Chilled Water System

The Chilled Water System (CWS) does not perform or ensure any active safety-related function,
and is not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown. The CWS has safety-related
containment penetrations and isolation valves, which are required to maintain containment
integrity. In addition, the NICWS is subject to additional regulatory oversight for its nonsafety-
related functions to provide post 72-hour cooling support for RCCWS and HVAC systems.
The CWS has safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves and is addressed in
Subsection 2.15.1.
The functional arrangement of the NICWS is shown on Figure 2.12.5-1.
(1) The NICWS functional arrangement is described in the Design Description of Subsection
2.12.5 and as shown on Figure 2.12.5-1.
(2) The NICWS provides the nonsafety-related function to support post-72 hour cooling for
RCCWS and HVAC systems.
(3) NICWS flow can be established and controlled from the MCR.
(4) NICWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.
(5) (Deleted)
associated acceptance criteria for the CWS.
2.12-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.5-1
ITAAC For The Chilled Water System

1. The NICWS functional arrangement is Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built NICWS System conforms to
described in the Design Description of performed. the functional arrangement as described
Subsection 2.12.5 and as shown on in the Design Description of this
Figure 2.12.5-1. Subsection 2.12.5 and as shown on Figure
2.12.5-1.
2. The NICWS provides the nonsafety- Testing of the NICWS will be performed A flow path exists from the NICWS to the
related function to support post-72 to verify flow to the RCCWS and HVAC RCCWS and HVAC systems.
hour cooling for RCCWS and HVAC systems.
systems.
3. NICWS flow can be established and Testing will be performed to demonstrate NICWS pumps and chillers can be
controlled from the MCR. NICWS flow will be performed on the operated and flow controlled from the
NICWS components using controls in the MCR.
MCR.
4. NICWS flow indication is provided in Inspection will verify that NICWS flow The NICWS flow indication exists and
the MCR. indication exists and can be retrieved in can be retrieved in the MCR.
the MCR.
5. (Deleted)
2.12-9
226A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.12.5-1. NICWS Functional Arrangement
2.12-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.6 Oxygen Injection System

2.12-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.7 Plant Service Water System

Design Description
The Plant Service Water System (PSWS) does not perform or ensure any safety-related function,
is not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown, and has no interface with any safety-related
component.
The functional arrangement of the PSWS is shown on Figure 2.12.7-1.
(1) The PSWS functional arrangement is as described in the Design Description of Subsection
2.12.7 and as shown on Figure 2.12.7-1.
(2) The PSWS provides the nonsafety-related functions to support post-72 hour cooling for
RCCWS.
(3) PSWS flow can be established and controlled from the MCR.
(4) PSWS flow indication is provided in the MCR.
associated acceptance criteria for the PSWS.
2.12-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.7-1
ITAAC For The Plant Service Water System

1. The PSWS functional arrangement is Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built PSWS System conforms to
as described in the Design performed. the functional arrangement as described
Description of Subsection 2.12.7 and in the Design Description of Subsection
as shown on Figure 2.12.7-1. 2.12.7 and as shown on Figure
2.12.7-1.
2. The PSWS provides the nonsafety- Testing of the PSWS will be performed A flow path exists from the PSWS to
related functions to support post-72 to verify flow to the RCCWS. the RCCWS.
hour cooling for RCCWS.
3. PSWS flow can be established and Testing will be performed to PSWS pumps can be operated and flow
controlled from the MCR. demonstrate flow on the PSWS controlled from the MCR.
components using controls in the MCR.
4. PSWS flow indication is provided in Inspection will verify that PSWS flow The PSWS flow indication exists and
the MCR. indication exists and can be retrieved in can be retrieved in the MCR.
the MCR.
2.12-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.12.7-1. Plant Service Water System Functional Arrangement
2.12-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.8 Service Air System

Design Description
The Service Air System (SAS) is a nonsafety-related system, and has no safety design basis other
than provisions for safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves.
The SAS has safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves and are addressed in
Subsection 2.15.1.
(1) (Deleted)
associated acceptance criteria for the SAS.
2.12-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.8-1
(Deleted)

1. (Deleted)
2.12-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.9 Instrument Air System

2.12-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.10 High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System

Design Description
The High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System (HPNSS) is a nonsafety-related system, and has no
safety design basis other than provision for safety-related containment penetrations and isolation
valves.
The HPNSS has safety-related containment penetrations and isolation valves and is addressed in
Subsection 2.15.1.
(1) (Deleted)
associated acceptance criteria for the High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System.
2.12-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.12.10-1
(Deleted)

1. (Deleted)
2.12-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.11 Auxiliary Boiler System

2.12-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.12 Potable Water and Sanitary Waste

No ITTAC are required for this system.
2.12-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.13 Hydrogen Water Chemistry System

This system is optional. If the optional system is implemented in a specific plant, no ITAAC are
required for this system.
2.12-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.14 Process Sampling System

No ITTAC are required for this system.
2.12-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.15 Zinc Injection System

2.12-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.16 Freeze Protection

2.12-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.12.17 Station Water System

2.12-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
2.13.1 Electric Power Distribution System

Design Description
The purpose of the Electric Power Distribution System is to provide power to the power
generation nonsafety-related loads and the plant’s investment protection (PIP) nonsafety-related
loads. The PIP buses also supply power to the four (4) safety-related, 480VAC, Isolation Power
Center buses and the two (2) ancillary diesel generator buses. The nonsafety-related PIP buses
and ancillary diesel generator buses have a function to supply power to RTNSS credited loads.
The Electric Power Distribution System alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the
Main Control Room are addressed by Section 3.3.
Environmental qualification of safety-related 480 VAC Isolation Power Center equipment is
(1) The functional arrangement of Electric Power Distribution System is as described in the
Design Description of Subsection 2.13.1 and Table 2.13.1-1, and as shown on Figure
2.13.1-1.
(2) The 480 VAC Isolation Power Center equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table
2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(3) a. Independence is provided between safety-related divisions as defined in Regulatory
Guide 1.75.
b. Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between safety-related
divisions, and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as
defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75.
(4) Each safety-related Isolation Power Center supplies power to safety-related loads in its
respective division.
(5) Isolation Power Centers and their associated loads are protected against under voltage,
degraded voltage and under-frequency conditions.
(6) a. The Electric Power Distribution System provides the capability for distributing
nonsafety-related AC power from onsite sources to nonsafety-related RTNSS loads.
b. The Electric Power Distribution System provides a PIP bus under voltage signal to trip
the PIP bus normal and alternate preferred power supply breakers.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Equipment within the onsite portion of the Preferred Power Supply (PPS) is rated to supply
necessary load requirements, including power, voltage, and frequency, during design basis
operating modes.
(10) Equipment within the onsite portion of the PPS is rated to interrupt analyzed fault currents,
including the fault current contribution from the offsite portion of the PPS.
2.13-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(11) a. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are physically
separate from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits from
the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) to
the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
b. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are electrically
independent from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits
from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
c. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are electrically independent from the alternate
preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
d. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate
preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
e. The UAT and RAT are physically separated to minimize the likelihood of their
simultaneous failure under design basis conditions to the extent practical.
(12) a. The normal power supply circuits are physically separate from the alternate power
supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line
breakers.
b. The normal power supply circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power
supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line
breakers.
c. The normal power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power supply circuit breaker
control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation
Power Center bus incoming line breakers.
d. The onsite portions of the normal power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate power
supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP
buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.
(13) Interrupting devices for the Electric Power Distribution Preferred Power System are
coordinated so as to isolate faulted equipment or circuits of the Plant Investment Protection
Buses from the Preferred Power System, prevent damage to equipment, protect personnel,
minimize system disturbances, and maintain continuity of the Preferred Power Supply
System from the PIP buses to all safety-related loads and designated RTNSS B and C
loads.
(14) a. Monitoring of the normal and alternate power feeds on the high voltage side of the
UAT and RAT using the potential and current transformers of the digital protective
relaying used for transformer protection is provided to detect open phase conditions,
whether one, two, or three phases, with or without accompanying ground faults.
2.13-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
b. All three phases of all the UAT or RAT shall be monitored for undervoltage, open phase,
and ground faults by the specific transformer protective relay. When an undervoltage,
open phase or ground fault is detected in any combination of one, two or three phases by
the designated UAT or RAT protective relay, the protective relay shall send an alarm via
the DCIS alarm system to the Main Control Room.
associated acceptance criteria for the Electric Power Distribution System.
2.13-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-1
Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment
Safety
Equipment Description Location Seismic Cat. I
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 250 VDC Bus 11 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Breaker to Division 1 250 VDC Standby Building
Battery Charger
Breaker to Division 1 UPS Rectifier 1-1 Building
2.13-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-1
Safety
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
2.13-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-1
Safety
Related
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus A Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus B Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
2.13-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-1
Safety
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
2.13-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System

1. The functional arrangement of Inspections of the as-built Electric Power The as-built Electric Power Distribution
Electric Power Distribution System is Distribution System will be performed. System conforms to the functional
as described in the Design Description arrangement as described in the design
of Subsection 2.13.1 and Table description of Subsection 2.13.1 and shown in
2.13.1-1, and as shown on Figure Table 2.13.1-1 and, as shown on Figure
2.13.1-1. 2.13.1-1.
2. The 480 VAC Isolation Power Center i. Inspections will be performed to verify i. The Seismic Category I 480 VAC
equipment identified as Seismic that the 480 VAC Isolation Power Isolation Power Center equipment
Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 can Center equipment identified as Seismic identified in Table 2.13.1-1 is housed in a
withstand Seismic Category I loads Category I in Table 2.13.1-1 is located Seismic Category I structure.
without loss of safety function. in a Seismic Category I structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The Seismic Category I 480 VAC
of type test and analyses of the Seismic Isolation Power Center equipment
Category I 480 VAC Isolation Power identified in Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand
Center equipment identified in Table Seismic Category I loads without loss of
2.13.1-1, will be performed using safety function.
analytical assumptions, or under
conditions which bound the Seismic
Category I equipment design
requirements.
iii. Inspection and analyses will be iii. The as-built 480 VAC Isolation Power
performed to verify that the equipment Center equipment identified in Table
identified as Seismic Category I in 2.13.1-2 including associated anchorage
Table 2.13.1-2, including associated can withstand Seismic Category I loads
anchorage, is bound by the test or without loss of safety function.
analyzed conditions.
2.13-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

3a. Independence is provided between Tests will be performed on the as-built A test signal exists only in the as-built safety-
safety-related divisions as defined in safety-related 480 VAC Isolation Power related division under test in the 480 VAC
Regulatory Guide 1.75. Centers by providing a test signal in only Isolation Power Center.
one safety-related division at a time.
3b. Physical separation and electrical Inspection and analysis of the as-built For the as-built safety-related 480 VAC
isolation are provided between safety- safety-related 480 VAC Isolation Power Isolation Power Centers, physical separation
related divisions, and between safety- Centers will be performed. and electrical isolation as defined in
related divisions and nonsafety- Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between safety-
related equipment as defined in related divisions. Physical separation and
Regulatory Guide 1.75. electrical isolation as defined in Regulatory
Guide 1.75 exists between safety-related
divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
4. Each safety-related Isolation Power Tests will be performed using a test signal A test signal originating from the as-built
Center supplies power to safety- to confirm that an electrical path exists divisional Isolation Power Center exists at the
related loads in its respective division. from the as-built safety-related Isolation terminals of its divisional safety-related loads.
Power Center to its divisional safety-
related loads. Each test may be a single
test or a series of over-lapping tests.
5. Isolation Power Centers and their Testing will be performed using real or The Isolation Power Centers are protected
associated loads are protected against simulated signals. against under voltage, degraded voltage and
under voltage, degraded voltage and under-frequency conditions by applying a real
under-frequency conditions. or simulated signal and verifying that the as-
built Isolation Power Center bus isolates from
the nonsafety-related system.
2.13-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

6a. The Electric Power Distribution Tests will be performed using a test signal A test signal originating from the as-built bus
System provides the capability for to confirm that an electrical path exists for exists at the terminals of each associated
distributing nonsafety-related AC each RTNSS load from its associated as- RTNSS load.
power from onsite sources to their built bus. Each test may be a single test or
designated RTNSS loads. a series of over-lapping tests.
6b. The Electric Power Distribution Testing will be performed using real or The as-built PIP bus normal and alternate
System provides a PIP bus under simulated PIP bus under voltage signals. preferred power supply breakers trip after
voltage signal to trip the PIP bus receiving a real or simulated PIP bus under
normal and alternate preferred power voltage signal.
supply breakers.
7. (Deleted)
8. (Deleted)
9. Equipment within the onsite portion Analysis of the as-built onsite portion of The as-built equipment within the onsite
of the Preferred Power Supply (PPS) the PPS will be performed to determine portion of the PPS, as determined by its
is rated to supply necessary load load requirements during design basis ratings, exceeds the analyzed load
requirements, including power, operating modes. This analysis will, in requirements, including power, voltage, and
voltage, and frequency, during design part, specify required power, voltage, and frequency, during design basis operating
basis operating modes. frequency at the interface between the modes.
onsite and offsite portions of the PPS in
order to provide adequate power, voltage,
and frequency to the safety-related
Isolation Power Center buses to support
safety-related load operation.
2.13-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

10. Equipment within the onsite portion Analysis of the as-built onsite portion of The as-built equipment within the onsite
of the PPS is rated to interrupt the PPS will be performed to determine the portion of the PPS, as determined by its
analyzed fault currents, including the fault current interrupting requirements ratings, exceeds the analyzed fault currents,
fault current contribution from the during design basis operating modes including the fault current contribution from
offsite portion of the PPS. including the fault current contribution the offsite portion of the PPS.
from the offsite portion of the PPS.
11a. The onsite portions of the normal Inspections of the as-built onsite normal For the as-built onsite portion of the PPS:
preferred power supply circuits are preferred power supply circuits and •
physically separate from the onsite alternate preferred power supply circuits • The non-segregated phase bus ducts
portions of the alternate preferred will be performed. provided for the electrical
power supply circuits from the Unit interconnection between the RAT and
Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) and 6.9 kV switchgear buses are physically
Reserve Auxiliary Transformer separated from the bus ducts provided
(RAT) to the PIP bus incoming line for the interconnection of the UAT and
breakers. the switchgear by distance or physical
barriers so as to minimize, to the extent
practical, the likelihood of their
simultaneous failure under design basis
conditions in accordance with
IEEE-384.
11b. The onsite portions of the normal Tests of the as-built onsite portions of the A test signal exists in only the circuit under
preferred power supply circuits are PPS normal preferred and alternate test.
electrically independent from the preferred power supply circuits will be
onsite portions of the alternate conducted by providing a test signal in only
preferred power supply circuits from one preferred power circuit at a time.
the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus
incoming line breakers.
2.13-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

11c. The onsite portions of the normal Tests of the as-built onsite portions of the A test signal exists in only the circuit under
preferred power supply circuit breaker normal preferred and alternate preferred test.
control power, instrumentation, and power supply circuit breaker control power,
control circuits are electrically instrumentation, and control circuits will be
independent from the alternate conducted by providing a test signal in only
preferred power supply circuit breaker one circuit at a time.
control power, instrumentation, and
control circuits from the UAT and
RAT to the PIP bus incoming line
breakers.
11d. The onsite portions of the normal Inspections of the as-built onsite portions The as-built onsite portions of the normal
preferred power supply circuit breaker of the normal preferred and alternate preferred power supply circuit breaker control
control power, instrumentation, and preferred power supply circuit breaker power, instrumentation, and control circuits
control circuits are physically control power, instrumentation, and control are physically separated from the alternate
separated from the alternate preferred circuits will be performed. preferred power supply circuit breaker control
power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits
power, instrumentation, and control by distance or physical barriers so as to
circuits from the UAT and RAT to the minimize to the extent practical the likelihood
PIP bus incoming line breakers. of their simultaneous failure under design
basis conditions as defined in IEEE-384.
11e. The UAT and RAT are physically Inspection and analysis of the as-built UAT The UAT and RAT are physically separated
separated to minimize the likelihood and RAT physical separation will be by physical barriers, or are separated by
of their simultaneous failure under performed. distance, to minimize the likelihood of their
design basis conditions to the extent simultaneous failure under design basis
practical. conditions to the extent practical, according to
RG 1.189 separation criteria.
2.13-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

12a. The normal power supply circuits are Inspections of the as-built normal power The normal power supply circuits are
physically separate from the alternate supply circuits and alternate power supply physically separate from the alternate power
power supply circuits from the PIP circuits will be performed. supply circuits by distance or physical
buses to the Isolation Power Center barriers so as to minimize to the extent
bus incoming line breakers. practical the likelihood of their simultaneous
failure under design basis conditions as
defined in IEEE-384.
12b. The normal power supply circuits are Tests of the as-built normal and alternate A test signal exists in only the circuit under
electrically independent from the power supply circuits will be conducted by test.
alternate power supply circuits from providing a test signal in only one power
the PIP buses to the Isolation Power circuit at a time.
Center bus incoming line breakers.
12c. The normal power supply circuit Tests of the as-built normal and alternate A test signal exists in only the circuit under
breaker control power, power supply circuit breaker control power, test.
instrumentation, and control circuits instrumentation, and control circuits will be
are electrically independent from the conducted by providing a test signal in only
alternate power supply circuit breaker one circuit at a time.
control power, instrumentation, and
control circuits from the PIP buses to
the Isolation Power Center bus
incoming line breakers.
2.13-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

12d. The onsite portions of the normal Inspections of the as-built normal and The as-built normal power supply circuit
power supply circuit breaker control alternate power supply circuit breaker breaker control power, instrumentation, and
power, instrumentation, and control control power, instrumentation, and control control circuits are physically separated from
circuits are physically separated from circuits will be performed. the alternate power supply circuit breaker
the alternate power supply circuit control power, instrumentation, and control
breaker control power, circuits by distance or physical barriers so as
instrumentation, and control circuits to minimize to the extent practical the
from the PIP buses to the Isolation likelihood of their simultaneous failure under
Power Center bus incoming line design basis conditions as defined in
breakers. IEEE-384.
13. Interrupting devices for the Electric Analysis will be performed for all voltage Interrupting devices at all voltage levels are
Power Distribution Preferred Power levels to ensure that interrupting devices properly coordinated and the interrupter
System are coordinated so as to are properly coordinated. closest to a fault opens before other devices
isolate faulted equipment or circuits and isolate only the faulted equipment and or
of the Plant Investment Protection circuit.
Buses from the Preferred Power
System, prevent damage to
equipment, protect personnel,
minimize system disturbances, and
maintain continuity of the Preferred
Power Supply System from the PIP
buses to all safety-related loads and
designated RTNSS B and C loads.
2.13-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.1-2

14a. Monitoring of the normal and An analysis of the transformer protection An analysis demonstrates:
alternate power feeds on the high scheme will be performed to verify the a. The correct location of the current and
voltage side of the UAT and RAT following: potential transformers for the UAT and
using the potential and current RAT transformer protection relays.
a. Digital protective relay current and
transformers of the digital protective potential transformers have been b. Digital protective relay set points
relaying used for transformer correctly located. ensure that the monitoring systems can
protection is provided to detect open adequately detect open phase
phase conditions, whether one, two, or b. Relay set points can provide
conditions in any combination of the
three phases, with or without adequate detection.
three phases, with or without
accompanying ground fault. accompanying ground faults, on the
high-voltage side of the UAT and RAT
transformers.
14b. All three phases of all the UAT or A test will be performed of the as-built Using simulated signals, at the designated
RAT shall be monitored for monitoring system, using simulated protective relay set points in any combination
undervoltage, open phase, and ground signals, to demonstrate that, at the of the three phases, the as-built UAT and
faults by the specific transformer designated protective relay set points, RAT DCIS monitoring systems initiate an
protective relay. When an the UAT and RAT DCIS monitoring alarm in the Main Control Room.
undervoltage, open phase or ground systems alarm in the Main Control
fault is detected in any combination of Room.
one, two or three phases by the
designated UAT or RAT protective
relay, the protective relay shall send
an alarm via the DCIS alarm system
to the Main Control Room.
2.13-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
NORMAL PREFERRED ALTERNATE PREFERRED

POWER SUPPLY POWER SUPPLY
SWITCHYARD
MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD TURBINE ISLAND/

MAIN GENERATOR CIRCUIT CIRCUIT TRANSFORMER YARD
CIRCUIT BREAKER BREAKER BREAKER LINK LINK
MOD MOD MOD
MAIN XFMRS UNIT AUX. XFMR-A UNIT AUX. XFMR-B RESERVE RESERVE
27kV AUX. XFMR-A AUX. XFMR-B
13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV
LINK LINK LINK LINK LINK LINK LINK LINK LINK
MAIN GENERATOR
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
POWER POWER POWER POWER
GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG)
13.8kV BUS A1 13.8kV BUS B1 13.8kV BUS A2 13.8kV BUS B2
13.8KV 13.8KV 13.8KV 13.8KV

LOADS LOADS LOADS LOADS
PIP BUS-A3 PIP BUS-B3 PIP BUS-A3 PIP BUS-B3

NORMAL NORMAL ALTERNATE ALTERNATE
FEED FEED FEED FEED
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 1.
Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement
2.13-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
UNIT AUX. RESERVE AUX.

XFMR.-A XFMR.-A
ALTERNATE
NORMAL
PLANT INVESTMENT PROTECTION (PIP) BUS A3 6.9kV
TO PIP BUS B3 TO PIP BUS B3

4 6
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9KV 5 7
LOADS ISOL. PWR. ISOL. PWR.
NORM ALT NORM ALT
CENTER CENTER
BUS B31 BUS D31
ALT. FEED ALT. FEED BUS A31 480V 480V ANCILLARY DIESEL BUS A BUS C31 480V
STANDBY DIESEL
GENERATOR-A
6.9 KV
DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 480 V LOADS ANCILLARY DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3
UPS UPS NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY DIESEL BUS B NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY UPS UPS
RECTIFIER 1-1 RECTIFIER 1-2 BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY ANCILLARY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY RECTIFIER 3-1 RECTIFIER 3-2
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER DIESEL CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
250VDC 250VDC 250VDC GENERATOR A 250VDC 250VDC 250VDC
BUS 12 BUS 11 BUS 32 BUS 31
UNIT AUX. RESERVE AUX.

XFMR.-B XFMR.-B
ALTERNATE
NORMAL
PLANT INVESTMENT PROTECTION (PIP) BUS B3 6.9kV
TO PIP BUS A3 TO PIP BUS A3

5 7
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9KV 4 6
LOADS ISOL. PWR. ISOL. PWR.
NORM ALT NORM ALT
CENTER CENTER
BUS A31 BUS C31
ALT. FEED ALT. FEED BUS B31 480V 480V ANCILLARY DIESEL BUS B BUS D31 480V
STANDBY DIESEL
GENERATOR-B
6.9 KV
DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 480 V LOADS ANCILALRY DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4
UPS UPS NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY DIESEL BUS A NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY UPS UPS
RECTIFIER 2-1 RECTIFIER 2-2 BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY ANCILLARY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY RECTIFIER 4-1 RECTIFIER 4-2
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER DIESEL CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
250VDC 250VDC 250VDC GENERATOR B 250VDC 250VDC 250VDC
BUS 22 BUS 21 BUS 42 BUS 41
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 2.
Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement
2.13-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.2 (Deleted)
2.13-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.3 Direct Current Power Supply

Design Description
Completely independent safety-related and nonsafety-related DC power systems are provided.
Nonsafety-related DC power systems are not part of the plant safety-related design basis, and are
independent and separate from the safety-related DC power supplies.
The 250 V Safety-Related DC systems provide four divisions of power to operate safety-related
loads for at least 72 hours following a design basis accident. The 250V safety-related DC
systems are also adequately sized for the station blackout conditions.
The Direct Current Power Supply alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the main
control room are addressed in Section 3.3.
Environmental qualification of the 250 V safety-related DC systems is addressed in Section 3.8.
(1) The functional arrangement of the 250 V safety-related DC systems is as described in
Subsection 2.13.3 Design Description and Table 2.13.3-1 and as shown on Figure 2.13.3-1.
(2) The functional arrangement of the 125 V and 250V nonsafety-related DC systems is as
shown on Figure 2.13.3-2 and as described in Subsection 2.13.3.
(3) Two 250 V safety-related batteries in each division are together sized to supply their
design loads, at the end of installed life, for a minimum of 72 hours without recharging.
(4) The 250 V safety-related DC systems equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table
2.13.3-1 can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(5) The 250 V safety-related DC systems provide four independent and redundant safety-
related divisions.
(6) Physical separation is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-
related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75.
(7) Each battery charger associated with each 250 VDC safety-related battery is capable of
restoring its battery after a bounding design basis event discharge to a state that the battery
can perform its design basis function for subsequent postulated operational and design
basis functions, while at the same time supplying the largest combined demands associated
with the battery, within the time stated in the design basis, consistent with the requirement
given in IEEE 308.
(8) The 250 V safety-related DC battery and battery charger circuit breakers, and DC
distribution panels and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load
requirements.
(9) The battery chargers are designed to prevent their AC source from becoming a load on the
250 VDC safety-related batteries when the AC power source is de-energized or has
degraded voltage.
(10) (Deleted)
(11) (Deleted)
2.13-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(12) Electrical cables for the safety-related 250 VDC system are rated to withstand fault current
for the time required to clear the fault from their power source.
(13) Protective devices for the safety-related 250 VDC system are rated to interrupt analyzed
fault currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.
(14) Raceway for safety-related 250 VDC system circuits are sized in accordance with design
requirements.
associated acceptance criteria for the Direct Current Power Supply.
2.13-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-1
Direct Current Power Supply System Equipment
Seismic Safety
Equipment Description Location
Cat. I Related
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Charger Building
Division 1 250 VDC Standby Battery Charger Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Charger Building
Charger Building
Building
2.13-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-1
Seismic Safety
Cat. I Related
Charger Building
Charger Building
Building
Charger Building
Charger Building
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
2.13-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-1
Seismic Safety
Cat. I Related
Box Building
Box Building
Box Building
Box Building
Box Building
Box Building
Box Building
2.13-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-2
Direct Current Power Supply Equipment Displays/Status Indication
Equipment Description Display/Status Indication
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Battery Yes
Division 4 bus 42 250 VDC Battery Yes

Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Normal
Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
Division 1 250 VDC Standby Battery
Yes
Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Charger
Yes
Battery Charger
2.13-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-2
Direct Current Power Supply Equipment Displays/Status Indication
Equipment Description Display/Status Indication

Yes
Battery Charger
Yes
Charger
2.13-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built 250 V safety- The as-built 250 V safety-related DC
250 V safety-related DC systems is related DC systems will be performed. systems conform with the functional
as described in Subsection 2.13.3 arrangement as shown in Figure 2.13.3-1
Design Description and Table 2.13.3- and as described in Subsection 2.13.3 and
1 and as shown on Figure 2.13.3-1. component locations are as shown in
Table 2.13.3-1.
2. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built 125 V and The as-built 125 V and 250 V nonsafety-
125 V and 250V nonsafety-related 250 V nonsafety-related DC systems related DC systems conform with the
DC systems is as shown on Figure will be performed. functional arrangement as shown in Figure
2.13.3-2 and as described in 2.13.3-2 and as described in Subsection
Subsection 2.13.3. 2.13.3
3. Two 250V safety-related batteries in i. Analyses for the as-built safety- i. The as-built batteries in each division
each division are together sized to related batteries to determine battery together have the capacity, as
supply their design loads, at the end capacities will be performed based on determined by the vendor
of installed life, for a minimum of 72 the design duty cycle for each battery. performance specification, to supply
hours without recharging. their rated constant current for a
minimum of 72 hours without
recharging.
ii. Tests of each as-built safety-related ii. The capacity of each as-built safety-
battery will be conducted by related battery equals or exceeds the
simulating loads which envelope the analyzed battery design duty cycle
analyzed battery design duty cycle. capacity.
2.13-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-3

4. The 250 V safety-related DC systems i. Inspections will be performed to i. The Seismic Category I 250V DC
equipment identified as Seismic verify that the 250V DC system system equipment is located in a
Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 can equipment identified in Table 2.13.3-1 Seismic Category I structure.
withstand Seismic Category I loads is located in a Seismic Category I
without loss of safety function. structure.
ii. Type test, analyses, or a combination ii. The Seismic Category I 250V DC
of type test and analyses of the 250V system equipment can withstand
DC systems equipment identified in Seismic Category I loads without loss
Table 2.13.3-1 as Seismic Category I of safety function.
assumption, or under conditions
which bound the Seismic Category I
iii. Inspections and analyses will be iii. The as-built 250V DC system
performed to verify that the as-built equipment, including anchorage,
250V DC systems equipment, identified as Seismic Category I in
including anchorage, identified as Table 2.13.1-1 can withstand Seismic
Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.3-1 Category I loads without loss of safety
are seismically bounded by the tested function.
or analyzed conditions.
5. The 250 V safety-related DC systems Tests will be performed on the as-built A test signal exists only in the as-built
provide four independent and 250 V safety-related DC systems by safety-related division under test in the
redundant safety-related divisions. providing a test signal in only one safety- 250 V safety-related DC systems; and a
related division at a time. test signal originating from the as-built
divisional safety-related 250 VDC
distribution panel exists at the terminals of
its divisional safety-related loads.
2.13-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-3

6. Physical Separation is provided Inspection and analysis of the as-built 250 In the as-built 250 V safety-related DC
between safety-related divisions, and V safety-related DC systems will be systems, physical separation as defined in
between safety-related divisions and performed. Regulatory Guide 1.75 exists between
nonsafety-related equipment as safety–related divisions. Physical
defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75. separation as defined in Regulatory
Guide 1.75 exists between safety-related
divisions and nonsafety-related
equipment.
7. Each battery charger associated with Testing of each 250 VDC safety-related Following a bounding design basis event
each 250 VDC safety-related battery battery charger will be performed. discharge, the battery charger is capable of
is capable of restoring its battery after restoring its associated battery to a state
a bounding design basis event that the battery can perform its design
discharge to a state that the battery basis function for subsequent postulated
can perform its design basis function operational and design basis functions
for subsequent postulated operational while at the same time supplying the
and design basis functions, while at largest combined demands associated with
the same time supplying the largest the battery, within the time stated in the
combined demands associated with design basis, consistent with the
the battery, within the time stated in requirement given in IEEE 308.
the design basis, consistent with the
requirement given in IEEE 308.
2.13-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-3

8. The 250 V safety-related DC battery Analyses of the as-built 250V safety- The capacities of safety-related battery
and battery charger circuit breakers, related DC electrical distribution system and battery charger circuit breakers, and
and DC distribution panels and their will be performed to determine the DC distribution panels and their circuit
circuit breakers and fuses, are sized capacities of the battery and battery breakers and fuses, as determined by their
to supply their load requirements. charger circuit breakers, and DC nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed
distribution panels and their circuit load and DC interrupting current
breakers and fuses. requirements.
9. The battery chargers are designed to Testing of each 250 VDC safety-related The 250 VDC safety-related battery
prevent their AC source from battery charger will be performed to chargers prevent the AC input source from
becoming a load on the 250 VDC demonstrate that there is no power becoming a load on the 250 VDC safety-
safety-related batteries when the AC feedback from a loss of AC input power. related batteries during a loss of AC
power source is de-energized or has power condition.
degraded voltage.
10. (Deleted)
11. (Deleted)
2.13-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.3-3

12. Electrical cables for the safety-related Analyses of the as-built safety-related For the as-built safety-related 250 VDC
250 VDC system are rated to 250 VDC system will be performed to system, electrical cables will withstand the
withstand fault current for the time determine possible fault currents. analyzed fault currents, as determined by
required to clear the fault from their manufacturer’s ratings, for the time
power source. required to clear the fault from its power
source.
13. Protective devices for the safety- Analyses of the as-built safety-related 250 For the as-built safety-related 250 VDC
related 250 VDC system are rated to VDC system will be performed to system, that the protective devices for the
interrupt analyzed fault currents and determine possible fault currents and the safety-related 250 VDC system loads are
are coordinated to only trip the required size of protective devices to sized to only trip the protective device
protective device closest to the fault. ensure that they are coordinated to only closest to the fault.
trip the protective device closest to the
fault.
14. Raceway for safety-related 250 VDC Analyses of the as-built safety-related For the as-built safety-related 250 VDC
system circuits are sized in 250 VDC system will be performed to system, raceway sizing is in accordance
accordance with design requirements. determine required raceway sizing. with design requirements and raceway
loading is within that assumed in the
electrical analyses.
2.13-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A 31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS B 31
NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL
BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY
CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER
TRANSFER TRANSFER TRANSFER TRANSFER

SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX
TEST
TEST
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM. NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONNECTION CONNECTION
250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER 250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER
250VDC BUS 12 250VDC BUS 11 250VDC BUS 22 250VDC BUS 21
TO INVERTER TO INVERTER TO INVERTER TO INVERTER

72h UPS 72h UPS 72h UPS 72h UPS
SAFETY-RELATED 250VDC DIVISION 1 SAFETY-RELATED 250VDC DIVISION 2
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS C 31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS D 31
CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER

SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX SWITCH BOX
TEST
TEST
TEST
TEST
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONNECTION CONNECTION
250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER 250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER
250VDC BUS 32 250VDC BUS 31 250VDC BUS 42 250VDC BUS 41
TO INVERTER TO INVERTER TO INVERTER TO INVERTER

72h UPS 72h UPS 72h UPS 72h UPS
SAFETY-RELATED 250VDC DIVISION 3 SAFETY-RELATED 250VDC DIVISION 4
Figure 2.13.3-1. Safety-Related 250 VDC System Functional Arrangement
2.13-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
FROM 480VAC FROM 480VAC

DCIS SWING BUS DCIS SWING BUS
(SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS A3 & B3) (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS A3 & B3)
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER

SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH SWITCH
BOX BOX BOX BOX
TEST
TEST
TEST
TEST
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONN. CONN.
(TYP.) (TYP.)
250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS
INVERTER 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS INVERTER INVERTER 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS INVERTER
LOAD GROUP-A LOAD GROUP-A LOAD GROUP-B LOAD GROUP-B
NONSAFETY-RELATED 250VDC POWER SYSTEM NONSAFETY-RELATED 250VDC POWER SYSTEM
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS POWER CENTER DCIS SWING BUS

(SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS A3 & B3)
STANDBY NORMAL
BATTERY BATTERY
CHARGER CHARGER
BATTERY
250VDC
TRANSFER
SWITCH
BOX
TEST
NORM.
OFF
250VDC BUS
INVERTER
250VDC TYPICAL LOADS LOAD GROUP C
NONSAFETY-RELATED 250VDC POWER SYSTEM
Figure 2.13.3-2 Sh 1. Nonsafety-Related 250 VDC System Functional Arrangement
2.13-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
STANDBY NORMAL STANDBY NORMAL

BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
BATTERY BATTERY
125VDC 125VDC
TRANSFER TRANSFER
SWITCH SWITCH
BOX BOX
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF
125VDC BUS A3 125VDC BUS B3
TSC INVERTER TSC INVERTER
125VDC TYPICAL LOADS 125VDC TYPICAL LOADS

NONSAFETY-RELATED 125VDC SYSTEM
Figure 2.13.3-2 Sh 2. Nonsafety-Related 125 VDC System Functional Arrangement
2.13-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.4 Standby Onsite AC Power Supply

Design Description
There are two systems capable of supplying onsite AC power. They are the standby diesel
generators (SDG) and the ancillary diesel generators (ADG).
Two independent nonsafety-related SDG, including their support systems, provide separate
sources of onsite power for the nonsafety-related Plant Investment Protection (PIP) load groups
when the normal and alternate preferred 6.9kV power supplies are not available. The nonsafety-
related standby diesel generators have a Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS)
function to provide power to the PIP buses that supply RTNSS loads.
Two nonsafety-related, seismic category II ADG, including their support systems, provide
480 VAC power for post accident support loads when the normal and alternate preferred 6.9 kV
power supplies and the SDG are not available. The nonsafety-related ancillary diesel generators
have a RTNSS function to provide power to the ancillary diesel buses that supply RTNSS loads.
The Standby Onsite Power Supply System alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in
the main control room are addressed by Section 3.3.
The Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System alarms, displays, controls, and status
indications are addressed by Section 3.3.
(1) The functional arrangement of Standby Onsite Power System is as described in Subsection
2.13.4 and in Table 2.13.4-1.
(2) a. Upon receipt of an under voltage signal from the Electric Power Distribution System,
the standby diesel generator starts and achieves rated speed and voltage and sequences
its designed loads while maintaining voltage and frequency within design limits.
b. Each standby diesel generator is capable of operating at its nameplate rated load and is
sized to accommodate its expected loads.
c. Each standby diesel generator fuel oil storage tank contains adequate fuel oil capacity
for seven days of standby diesel generator operation based on expected SDG load.
d. Each of the standby diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps (two pumps per engine)
starts automatically and transfer fuel oil from the standby fuel oil storage tank to the
standby diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the
standby diesel generator.
e. Each of the standby diesel generator starting air receivers (two receivers per engine) is
capable of starting the engine at its low pressure alarm setpoint.
f. Each of the standby diesel generator jacket cooling water systems controls the flow of
water to maintain required water temperature.
g. Each standby diesel generator has instrumentation provided to monitor lube oil
temperature, pressure and sump level, ensuring proper operation of the system.
h. Each standby diesel generator is provided with a separate intake and exhaust system.
i. Each standby diesel generator can be remotely operated from the MCR.
2.13-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(3) (Deleted)
(4) The functional arrangement of the Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System is as
described in the Subsection 2.13.4 and in Table 2.13.4-1.
(5) a. Upon receipt of an under voltage signal from the ancillary diesel 480 VAC bus, the
ancillary diesel generator starts, achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power
to the ancillary diesel bus.
b. Upon receipt of a low ancillary diesel room temperature signal, the ancillary diesel
generator starts and achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power to the
ancillary diesel bus.
c. Each ancillary diesel generator is capable of operating at its nameplate rated load and
is sized to accommodate its expected loads.
d. Each ancillary diesel generator fuel oil storage tank contains adequate fuel oil capacity
for seven days of ancillary diesel generator operation based on expected ADG load.
e. Each of the ancillary diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps start automatically and
transfer fuel oil from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the ancillary diesel generator
day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel
generator.
(6) (Deleted)
(7) Each ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil
transfer pumps conform to Seismic Category II requirements.
associated acceptance criteria for the Standby Onsite Power Supply System and the Ancillary
Diesel Onsite Power Supply System.
2.13-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-1
Equipment Location

Standby Diesel Generator A Electrical Building
Standby Diesel Generator B Electrical Building
Ancillary Diesel Generator A Ancillary Diesel Building
Ancillary Diesel Generator B Ancillary Diesel Building
2.13-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built Standby Onsite Power Supply
Standby Onsite Power Supply is as conducted. system conform with the functional
described in Subsection 2.13.4 and in arrangement as described in the Design
Table 2.13.4-1. Description of Subsection 2.13.4 and
Table 2.13.4-1.
2a. Upon receipt of an under voltage Tests of the as-built Standby Onsite The as-built standby diesel generator
signal from the Electric Power Power Supply system will be conducted starts upon receipt of a real or simulated
Distribution System, the standby by providing a real or simulated under under voltage signal on its associated PIP
diesel generator starts and achieves voltage signal to start the standby diesel bus, achieves rated speed and voltage, and
rated speed and voltage and generators. Subsequently generated sequences its designed loads while
sequences its designed loads while signals will start load sequencing. maintaining voltage and frequency within
maintaining voltage and frequency design limits.
within design limits.
2b. Each standby diesel generator is Testing will be performed to demonstrate Each as-built standby diesel generator
capable of operating at its nameplate that each as-built standby diesel generator provides power at generator terminal rated
rated load and is sized to will operate between rated and maximum voltage and frequency when operated at
accommodate its expected loads. nameplate load, and nameplate power rated load, and expected loads are within
factor for a time period required to reach the rated nameplate load.
engine temperature equilibrium. Analysis
will be performed to demonstrate that the
expected loads are within the nameplate
rated load.
2c. Each standby diesel generator fuel oil The as-built standby fuel oil storage tank The as-built standby fuel oil storage tank
storage tank contains adequate fuel capacity will be calculated based on capacity is adequate to supply seven days
oil capacity for seven days of standby expected SDG load. of fuel oil to the standby diesel generator
diesel generator operation based on under continuous operation based on
expected SDG load. expected SDG load.
2.13-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-2

2d. Each of the standby diesel generator Testing will be performed to demonstrate Each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts
fuel oil transfer pumps (two pumps that each as-built fuel oil transfer pump automatically and transfers fuel oil from
per engine) starts automatically and starts automatically and transfers fuel oil the standby fuel oil storage tank to the
transfers fuel oil from the standby from the standby fuel oil storage tank to standby diesel generator day tank at a rate
fuel oil storage tank to the standby the standby diesel generator day tank at a greater than or equal to the usage rate of
diesel generator day tank at a rate rate greater than or equal to the usage rate the standby diesel generator when running
greater than or equal to the usage rate of the standby diesel generator when operating between rated and maximum
of the standby diesel generator. operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.
nameplate load.
2e. Each of the standby diesel generator Testing will be performed for each as- Each as-built starting air receiver is
starting air receivers (two receivers built starting air receiver. capable of starting the engine at its low
per engine) is capable of starting the pressure alarm setpoint.
engine at its low pressure alarm
setpoint.
2f. Each of the standby diesel generator Testing of standby diesel generator jacket The standby diesel generator jacket
jacket cooling water systems controls cooling water system will be performed to cooling water system demonstrates flow
the flow of water to maintain demonstrate flow of water to maintain of water to maintain required water
required water temperature. required water temperature. temperature.
2g. Each standby diesel generator has Inspection and testing will be performed Each standby diesel generator has
instrumentation provided to monitor to demonstrate that lube oil temperature, instrumentation provided to monitor lube
lube oil temperature, pressure and pressure and sump level instrumentation is oil temperature, pressure and sump level,
sump level, ensuring proper provided and monitors operation of the ensuring proper operation of the system.
operation of the system. system.
2h. Each standby diesel generator is Inspection of the as-built intake and Each as-built DG is provided with a
provided with a separate intake and exhaust system will be conducted. separate intake and exhaust system.
exhaust system.
2.13-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-2

2i. Each standby diesel generator can be Each standby diesel generator will be Each standby diesel generator starts and
remotely operated from the MCR. started and stopped using manually stops when manually initiated signals are
initiated signals from the MCR. sent from the MCR.
3. (Deleted)
4. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built Ancillary Diesel Onsite
Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power conducted. Power Supply System conforms to the
Supply System is as described in functional arrangement as described in
Subsection 2.13.4 and in Table Subsection 2.13.4 and Table 2.13.4-1
2.13.4-1
5a. Upon receipt of an under voltage Tests of the as-built Ancillary Diesel The as-built ancillary diesel generator
signal from the ancillary diesel 480 Onsite Power Supply System will be starts upon receipt of a real or simulated
VAC bus, the ancillary diesel conducted by providing a real or under voltage signal on its associated bus,
generator starts, achieves rated speed simulated under voltage signal to start the achieves rated speed and voltage, and
and voltage, and supplies power to ancillary diesel generators. supplies power to the ancillary diesel bus.
the ancillary diesel bus.
5b. Upon receipt of a low ancillary diesel Tests of the as-built Ancillary Diesel The as-built ancillary diesel generator
room temperature signal, the Onsite Power Supply System will be starts upon receipt of a real or simulated
ancillary diesel generator starts and conducted by providing a real or low ancillary diesel room temperature
achieves rated speed and voltage and simulated low ancillary diesel room signal, achieves rated speed and voltage,
supplies power to the ancillary diesel temperature signal to start the ancillary and supplies power to the ancillary diesel
bus. diesel generators. bus.
2.13-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-2

5c. Each ancillary diesel generator is Each as-built ancillary diesel generator Each as-built ancillary diesel generator
capable of operating at its nameplate will be operated between rated and provides power at generator terminal rated
rated load and is sized to maximum nameplate load, and nameplate voltage and frequency when operated at
accommodate its expected loads. power factor for a time period required to rated load, and expected loads are within
reach engine temperature equilibrium. the rated nameplate load.
Analysis will be performed to demonstrate
that the expected loads are within the
nameplate rated load.
5d. Each ancillary diesel generator fuel The as-built fuel oil storage tank capacity The as-built fuel oil storage tank capacity
oil storage tank contains adequate will be calculated based on expected ADG is adequate to supply seven days of fuel
fuel oil capacity for seven days of load. oil to the ancillary diesel generator under
ancillary diesel generator operation continuous operation based on expected
based on expected ADG load. ADG load.
5e. Each of the ancillary diesel generator Testing will be performed to demonstrate Each as-built fuel oil transfer pump starts
fuel oil transfer pumps start that each as-built fuel oil transfer pump automatically and transfers fuel oil from
automatically and transfer fuel oil starts automatically and transfers fuel oil the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the
from the ancillary fuel oil storage from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to ancillary diesel generator day tank at a
tank to the ancillary diesel generator the ancillary diesel generator day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate
day tank at a rate greater than or rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel generator when
equal to the usage rate of the of the ancillary diesel generator when operating between rated and maximum
ancillary diesel generator. operating between rated and maximum nameplate load.
nameplate load.
6. (Deleted)
2.13-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.4-2

7. Each ancillary diesel generator and i. Type tests and analyses of the i. Each as-built ancillary diesel
its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel ancillary diesel generators, their generator and its associated
tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel
conform to Seismic Category II tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps will oil transfer pumps conform to Seismic
requirements. be performed. Category II requirements.
ii. Inspections of the as-built ancillary ii. Each ancillary diesel generator and its
diesel generators, their associated associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel
auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel tanks, and fuel oil transfer pumps are
oil transfer pumps will be performed installed in accordance with the
to verify that the equipment is configurations specified by the type
installed in accordance with the tests and analyses.
configurations specified in the type
tests and analyses.
2.13-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.5 Uninterruptible AC Power Supply

Design Description
The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply (UPS) is divided into two subsystems, the safety-related
UPS and the nonsafety-related UPS.
The nonsafety-related UPS system and the nonsafety-related Technical Support Center UPS
system are not part of the plant safety design basis, and are independent and separated from the
safety-related UPS system.
The safety-related UPS system provides four divisions of 120 VAC power to safety-related loads
during normal, upset and accident conditions.
The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the
main control room are addressed by Section 3.3.
Environmental qualification of the safety-related UPS system is addressed in Section 3.8.
(1) The functional arrangement of the safety-related UPS system is as described in Subsection
2.13.5 and Table 2.13.5-1 and is as shown on Figure 2.13.5-1.
(2) The functional arrangement of the nonsafety-related UPS system is as described in
Subsection 2.13.5 and as shown on Figure 2.13.5-2.
(3) The UPS system equipment identified as Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 can
(4) The safety-related UPS system provides four independent and redundant safety-related
divisions.
(5) Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between safety-related divisions,
and between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment, as defined in
Regulatory Guide 1.75.
(6) Each safety-related UPS inverter is capable of supplying its AC load at both minimum and
maximum battery terminal voltages.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) The safety-related UPS rectifiers are designed to prevent their AC source from becoming a
load on the 250 VDC safety-related batteries when the AC power source is de-energized or
has degraded voltage.
(10) The safety-related UPS inverter high DC input voltage trip setpoint and time delay are
greater than the associated battery charger and UPS rectifier high DC output voltage trip
setpoint and time delay.
(11) The safety-related UPS system supplies a voltage at the terminals of the safety-related
utilization equipment that is within the equipment voltage tolerance limits.
(12) Electrical cables for the safety-related UPS system are rated to withstand fault current for
the time required to clear the fault from their power source.
2.13-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(13) Protective devices for the safety-related UPS system are rated to interrupt analyzed fault
currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.
(14) Raceway for safety-related UPS system circuits are sized in accordance with design
requirements.
associated acceptance criteria for the Uninterruptible AC Power Supply.
2.13-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.5-1
Uninterruptible AC Power Soppy System Equipment
Equipment Description Location Seismic Safety Related
Cat. I
Division 1 UPS 1-1 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Building
Division 1 UPS Bus 11 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
2.13-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.5-2
ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built safety-related The as-built safety-related UPS system
safety-related UPS system is as UPS system will be performed. conforms with the functional arrangement as
described in Subsection 2.13.5 and described in Subsection 2.13.5 and Table
Table 2.13.5-1 and is as shown on 2.13.5-1 and as shown in Figure 2.13.5-1.
Figure 2.13.5-1.
2. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built nonsafety- The as-built nonsafety-related UPS system
nonsafety-related UPS system is as related UPS system will be performed. conforms with the functional arrangement as
described in Subsection 2.13.5 and described in Subsection 2.13.5 and as shown
as shown on Figure 2.13.5-2. in Figure 2.13.5-2.
3. The UPS system equipment i. Inspections will be performed to i. The Seismic Category I equipment
identified as Seismic Category I in verify that the UPS system identified in Table 2.13.5-1 is located in
Table 2.13.5-1 can withstand equipment identified as Seismic a Seismic Category I structure.
Seismic Category I loads without Category I in Table 2.13.5-1 is
loss of safety function. located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a ii. The as-built UPS system can withstand
combination of type tests and Seismic Category I loads without loss of
analyses of the UPS system safety- safety function.
related Seismic Category I equipment
assumptions, or under conditions
2.13-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.5-2

iii Inspections and analyses of the iii. The as-built UPS system equipment,
as-built UPS system equipment, including anchorage, identified as
including anchorage, identified in Seismic Category I in Table 2.13.5-1
Table 2.13.5-1 are seismically can withstand Seismic Category I loads
bounded by the tested or analyzed without loss of safety function.
conditions.
4. The safety-related UPS system Tests will be performed on the as-built A test signal exists only in the safety-related
provides four independent and safety-related UPS system by providing a division under test in the as-built safety-
redundant safety-related divisions. test signal in only one safety-related related UPS system; and a test signal
division at a time. originating from the as-built divisional
safety-related UPS distribution panel exists
at the terminals of its divisional safety-
related loads.
5. Physical separation and electrical Inspection of the as-built safety-related The as-built safety-related UPS system,
isolation are provided between UPS system will be performed. physical separation and electrical isolation
safety-related divisions, and exist between safety-related divisions, as
between safety-related divisions defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75. Physical
and nonsafety-related equipment, as separation and electrical isolation exists
defined in Regulatory Guide 1.75. between safety-related divisions and
nonsafety-related equipment, as defined in
Regulatory Guide 1.75.
6. Each safety-related UPS inverter is Testing of each as-built safety-related The as-built safety-related UPS inverter
capable of supplying its AC load at UPS inverter will be performed by supplies its rated load while maintaining its
both minimum and maximum applying a combination of simulated or rated voltage at its rated frequency, within
battery terminal voltages. real loads with DC input at both tolerances acceptable for its AC loads.
minimum and maximum battery terminal
voltages.
2.13-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.5-2

7. (Deleted)
8. (Deleted)
9. The safety-related UPS rectifiers Testing of the each safety-related rectifier The safety-related rectifiers prevent the AC
are designed to prevent their AC will be performed to demonstrate that input source from becoming a load on the
source from becoming a load on the there is no power feedback from a loss of 250 VDC safety-related batteries during a
250 VDC safety-related batteries AC input power. loss of AC power condition.
when the AC power source is de-
energized or has degraded voltage.
10. The safety-related UPS inverter Tests will be performed using simulated The safety-related UPS inverter high DC
high DC input voltage trip setpoint signals of the UPS trips. input voltage trip setpoint and time delay are
and time delay are greater than the greater than the associated battery charger
associated battery charger and UPS and UPS rectifier high DC output voltage
rectifier high DC output voltage trip trip setpoint and time delay as demonstrated
setpoint and time delay. by applying test signals and verifying that:
• The inverter high DC input voltage
trip setpoint is greater than the battery
charger and UPS input rectifier high
DC output voltage trip, and;
• The inverter high DC input voltage
trip time delay is greater than the
associated battery charger and UPS
input rectifier high DC output voltage
trip time delay.
2.13-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.5-2

11. The safety-related UPS system i. Analyses of the as-built safety-related i. The as-built safety-related UPS system
supplies a voltage at the terminals UPS 120 volt distribution system are supplies a voltage at the terminals of the
of the safety-related utilization performed to determine the voltage at safety-related utilization equipment that
equipment that is within the the safety-related utilization is within the utilization equipment
equipment voltage tolerance limits. equipment terminals. voltage tolerance limits.
ii. Type tests will be performed to ii. The safety-related utilization equipment
confirm the safety-related utilization functions properly at the established
equipment functions properly at the maximum and minimum terminal
established maximum and minimum voltage tolerance limits.
terminal voltage tolerance limits.
12. Electrical cables for the safety- Analyses of the as-built safety-related For the as-built safety-related UPS system,
related UPS system are rated to UPS system will be performed to electrical cables can withstand the analyzed
withstand fault current for the time determine possible fault currents. fault currents, as determined by
required to clear the fault from their manufacturer’s ratings, for the time
power source. required to clear the fault from its power
source.
13. Protective devices for the safety- Analyses of the as-built safety-related For the as-built safety-related UPS system,
related UPS system are rated to UPS system will be performed to the protective devices for the safety-related
interrupt analyzed fault currents and determine possible fault currents and the UPS system loads are sized to only trip the
are coordinated to only trip the required size of protective devices to protective device closest to the fault.
protective device closest to the ensure that they are coordinated to only
fault. trip the protective device closest to the
fault.
14. Raceway for safety-related UPS Analyses of the as-built safety-related For the as-built safety-related UPS system,
system circuits are sized in UPS system will be performed to raceway sizing is in accordance with design
accordance with design determine required raceway sizing. requirements and raceway loading is within
requirements. that assumed in the electrical analyses.
2.13-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS B31
250VDC BUS11 250VDC BUS12 250VDC BUS21 250VDC BUS22
UPS 1-1 UPS 1-2 UPS 2-1 UPS 2-2
RECTIFIER RECTIFIER RECTIFIER RECTIFIER
INVERTER INVERTER INVERTER INVERTER

120VAC 120VAC 120VAC 120VAC
SXS SXS SXS SXS
120VAC BUS 11 120VAC BUS 12 120VAC BUS 21 120VAC BUS 22
120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS
SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 1 SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 2
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS C31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS D31
250VDC BUS31 250VDC BUS32 250VDC BUS41 250VDC BUS42
UPS 3-1 UPS 3-2 UPS 4-1 UPS 4-2
INVERTER INVERTER INVERTER INVERTER

120VAC 120VAC 120VAC 120VAC
SXS SXS SXS SXS
120VAC BUS 31 120VAC BUS 32 120VAC BUS 41 120VAC BUS 42
120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS
SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 3 SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 4
DEVICE KEY
SXS: STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
Figure 2.13.5-1. Safety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement
2.13-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS 250VDC BUS

480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø
480 / 480VAC INVERTER INVERTER 480 / 480VAC 480 / 480VAC INVERTER INVERTER 480 / 480VAC
3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 3Ø 3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 3Ø
480VAC BUS 480VAC BUS 480VAC BUS 480VAC BUS
TYPICAL LOADS GROUP A TYPICAL LOADS GROUP A TYPICAL LOADS GROUP B TYPICAL LOADS GROUP B
NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY LOAD GROUP A NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY LOAD GROUP B
480VAC POWER CENTER DCIS SWING BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS A3 & B3)
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3)
250VDC BUS
RECTIFIER
480V,3Ø DEVICE KEY
SXS: STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
MTS: MAINTENANCE TRANSFER SWITCH
INVERTER 480 / 480VAC

480V,3Ø 3Ø
480VAC BUS
TYPICAL LOADS GROUP C
NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY LOAD GROUP C
Figure 2.13.5-2. Sh 1. Nonsafety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement
2.13-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
125VDC BUS 125VDC BUS
RECTIFIER RECTIFIER
480-208/120VAC 3Ø 480-208/120VAC 3Ø
480VAC-3Ø 480VAC-3Ø
TSC-INVERTER TSC-INVERTER
480-208/120VAC 3Ø 480-208/120VAC 3Ø
SXS SXS
MTS MTS
208/120VAC 3Ø 208/120VAC 3Ø
TYPICAL LOADS TYPICAL LOADS
NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE TSC SYSTEM
Figure 2.13.5-2 Sh 2
Nonsafety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement
2.13-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.6 (Deleted)
2.13-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.7 Communications System

No ITAAC are required for this system
2.13-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.7-1
(Deleted)

1. (Deleted)
2.13-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.8 Lighting Power Supply

Design Description
The plant lighting systems furnish the illumination required for safe performance of plant
operation, security, shutdown, and maintenance activities. The lighting systems include the
Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting, normal, standby, and DC
self-contained battery operated emergency lighting. The security lighting is described in
separate security documents.
(1) The functional arrangement of Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency
Lighting is as described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.13.8.
(2) The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting meets Seismic
Category I requirements for mountings.
(3) The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting equipment and
cables are physically separated.
(4) The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting provides
illumination levels equal to or greater than those recommended by the Illuminating
Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) for at least 72 hours following a design
basis accident and a loss of all AC power sources.
(5) The DC Self-Contained Battery-Operated Lighting Units provide illumination levels equal
to or greater than those recommended by the IESNA in the remote shutdown rooms and in
those areas of the plant required for power restoration and recovery from a fire, for at least
eight hours.
(6) Electrical isolation of the nonsafety-related Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station
emergency lighting circuits from the safety-related Uninterruptible AC power supply is
accomplished by the use of two series isolation devices.
(7) The Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting shall be capable of
being powered by a reliable power source after the first 72 hours of a design basis event.
associated acceptance criteria for the Control Room and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency
Lighting Power Supply.
2.13-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.8-1
ITAAC For The Lighting Power Supply
Design Commitments Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The functional arrangement of Inspections of the as-built Control Room The as-built Control Room and Remote
Control Room and Remote Shutdown and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting
Station Emergency Lighting is as Lighting will be conducted. conform to the functional arrangement as
described in the Design Description described in the Design Description of
of this Subsection 2.13.8. this Subsection 2.13.8.
2. The Control Room and Remote Analysis of the Control Room and The Control Room and Remote Shutdown
Shutdown Station Emergency Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Station Emergency Lighting mountings
Lighting meets Seismic Category I Lighting mountings will be performed. meet Seismic Category I requirements.
requirements for mountings.
3. The Control Room and Remote Inspection of the as-built Control Room The as-built Control Room and Remote
Shutdown Station Emergency and Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting
Lighting equipment and cables are Lighting equipment and cables will be equipment and cables are physically
physically separated. performed. separated between safety-related divisions
and between safety-related divisions and
nonsafety-related equipment according to
RG 1.75 and IEEE 384, through spatial
separation, physical barriers, or separate
raceways, conduit or metal troughs, .up to
the electrical isolation devices. Safety-
related cables are routed in respective
divisional raceways or conduit.
Nonsafety-related cables from the
isolation devices to the light fixtures are in
separate raceways or conduit.
2.13-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.8-1

4. The Control Room and Remote Testing of the as-built Control Room and The as-built Control Room and Remote
Shutdown Station Emergency Remote Shutdown Station Emergency Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting
Lighting provides illumination levels Lighting will be performed. provides the illumination required by the
equal to or greater than those IESNA for at least 72 hours following a
recommended by the IESNA for at design basis accident and a loss of all AC
least 72 hours following a design power sources.
basis accident and a loss of all AC
power sources.
5. The DC Self-Contained Battery- Testing of the as-built DC Self-Contained Each of the as-built DC Self-Contained
Operated Lighting Units provide Battery-Operated Lighting Units will be Battery-Operated Lighting Units provide
illumination levels equal to or greater performed. the illumination required by the IESNA in
than those recommended by the the remote shutdown rooms and in areas
IESNA in the remote shutdown of the plant required for power restoration
rooms and in those areas of the plant / recovery from a fire to comply with the
required for power restoration and requirement of RG 1.189. Each unit will
recovery from a fire, for at least eight provide 8 hours of continuous
hours. illumination without battery recharge.
6. Electrical isolation of the nonsafety- Inspection and analysis of the as-built The as-built nonsafety-related Control
related Control Room and Remote lighting circuits will be conducted to Room and Remote Shutdown Station
Shutdown Station emergency lighting verify that the non-safety-related control emergency lighting circuits and the safety-
circuits from the safety-related room and Remote Shutdown Station related Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
Uninterruptible AC power supply is emergency lighting circuits and the safety- are isolated by two series isolation
accomplished by the use of two series related Uninterruptible AC power supply devices.
isolation devices. are isolated by two series isolation
devices.
2.13-57
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.8-1

7. The Control Room and Remote Inspections and tests (as needed) will be The Control Room and Remote Shutdown
Shutdown Station Emergency performed that confirm the capability of Station Emergency Lighting is capable of
Lighting shall be capable of being powering the Control Room and Remote being powered from a reliable power
powered by a reliable power source Shutdown Station Emergency Lighting source that will be available after the first
after the first 72 hours of a design from a reliable power source that will be 72-hours of a design basis event.
basis event. available after the first 72-hours of a
design basis event.
2.13-58
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.13.9 Grounding and Lightning Protection System

Design Description
The electrical grounding and lightning protection system includes:
• A plant grounding grid;
• An instrument and computer grounding network;
• An equipment and system grounding network for grounding the neutral points of the
main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center
transformers, and onsite standby and ancillary diesel generators and for grounding
equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, and the ground bus of switchgear
assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets; and
• A lightning protection network for protection of exposed structures and buildings housing
safety-related and fire protection equipment.
(1) The functional arrangement of the Lightning Protection and Grounding system is as
described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.13.9.
associated acceptance criteria for the grounding and lightning protection system.
2.13-59
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.13.9-1
ITAAC For The Grounding and Lightning Protection System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built Lightning The as-built Lightning Protection and
Lightning Protection and Grounding Protection and Grounding system will Grounding system exists and conforms to the
system is as described in the Design be performed. functional arrangement as described in the
Description of this Subsection design description of Subsection 2.13.9, and:
2.13.9. • Connection exists between the
instrument and computer grounding
network and the plant ground grid.
• Connection exists between the
equipment and system grounding
network and the plant ground grid.
• Connection exists between the lightning
protection network and the plant ground
grid.
2.13-60
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.14 POWER TRANSMISSION

2.14-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.15 CONTAINMENT, COOLING AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
2.15.1 Containment System

Design Description
The Containment System confines the potential release of radioactive material in the event of a
design basis accident. The Containment System is safety-related and is comprised of a
reinforced concrete containment vessel (RCCV), penetrations and DW head.
The Containment System is shown in Figure 2.15.1-1. The RCCV is located in the Reactor
Building.
The MCR set of displays, alarms and controls, based on the applicable codes and standards,
including Human Factors Engineering (HFE) evaluations and emergency procedure guidelines,
for the Containment System is addressed in Section 3.3.
The environmental qualification of Containment Systems components is addressed in Section
3.8; and the environmental and seismic qualification of digital instrumentation and controls
equipment is addressed in Section 3.8.
(1) The functional arrangement of the Containment System is as described in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.15.1 and as shown in Figure 2.15.1-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
a2. The RCCV and its liners are designed to meet the requirements in Article CC-3000 of
ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, and seismic Category I requirements. The steel
components of the RCCV are designed to meet the requirements in Article NE-3000 of
ASME Code, Section III, Division 1.
a3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is designed in
b1. The design of the components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III
will be reconciled with the design requirements.
b2. The RCCV and its liners are designed to meet the requirements in Article CC-3000 of
ASME Code, Section III, Division 2, and seismic Category I requirements. The steel
components of the RCCV are designed to meet the requirements in Article NE-3000 of
ASME Code, Section III, Division 1. The design of these components will be
c1. The components identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are fabricated,
c2. The RCCV and its liners are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with the
requirements in Article CC-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 2. The steel
components of the RCCV are fabricated, installed, and inspected to meet the
requirements in Article NE-3000 of ASME Code, Section III, Division 1.
2.15-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
c3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
(3) a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b
as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination
requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as
ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination
requirements.
(4) The components and piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code
Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
(5) The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c
can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) a. The electrical safety-related components associated with actuation and status
monitoring of final control elements of the Containment System equipment listed in
Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c receive power from their respective safety-
related divisional power supplies.
b. Separate electrical penetrations are provided for circuits of each safety-related division
and for nonsafety-related circuits.
c. The circuits of each electrical penetration are of the same voltage class.
(7) The containment system provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the
atmosphere.
(8) The containment system pressure boundary retains its structural integrity when subject to
design pressure.
(9) The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for
containment boundary integrity.
(10) Containment electrical penetration assemblies, whose maximum available fault current
(including failure of upstream devices) is greater than the continuous rating of the
penetration, are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) The amount of chlorine bearing cable insulation exposed to the containment atmosphere is
limited.
(13) The DW and wetwell (WW) volumes are adequately sized to accommodate the calculated
maximum DW temperature and absolute pressure that are postulated to occur as a result of
a design basis accident.
(14) The water volume of the WW is adequately sized to condense the steam that is forced into
the WW from the DW due to a postulated design basis event.
(15) Each vacuum breaker isolation valve automatically closes if the vacuum breaker does not
fully close when required.
2.15-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(16) a. Each vacuum breaker has proximity sensors to detect open/close position. This
indication is available in the main control room.
b. Each vacuum breaker has temperature sensors to detect bypass leakage at design basis
accident conditions. This indication is available in the main control room.
(17) The containment penetration isolation design for each fluid piping system requiring
isolation meets the single-failure criterion to ensure completion of penetration isolation.
(18) DW to WW bypass leakage is less than the assumed value used in the containment
capability design basis containment response analysis.
(19) Total DW to WW vacuum breaker bypass pathway leakage is less than the assumed value
used in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.
(20) Each vacuum breaker opening differential pressure is less than or equal to the required
opening differential pressure.
(21) Each vacuum breaker closing differential pressure is greater than or equal to the required
closing differential pressure.
(22) a. Containment isolation valves are located as close to the containment as practical,
consistent with General Design Criteria 55, 56 and 57.
b. The as-built location of containment isolation valves relative to containment shall be
reconciled with design requirements.
(23) a. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are designed in accordance
with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE
for Class MC Components and Seismic Category I requirements.
b. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies shall be reconciled with the
c. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are fabricated, installed, and
inspected in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1,
Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components.
associated acceptance criteria for the Containment System.
2.15-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Nuclear Boiler
Total 4 Penetrations (One penetration per main steam line)
Inboard main steam isolation valve
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
(MSIV) (4 valves)
Outboard main steam isolation valve
(MSIV) (4 valves)
Outboard MSIV upstream drain line
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open/closed closed
(4 valves)
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per drain line)
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line
inboard containment isolation valve (1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve)
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
(1 valve)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per feedwater (FW) supply line)
FW supply line second outboard
containment isolation valve (2 valves)
FW supply line outboard containment
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed Closed
isolation valve (2 valves)
FW supply line inboard containment
Yes Yes No Yes No open open/closed –
2.15-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
RWCU/SDC to Feedwater outboard

Yes Yes No Yes No open open/closed Open
containment isolation valve (2 valves)
Isolation Condenser
Total 4 Penetrations (One shared penetration for each pair consisting of one steam supply line and one purge line)
Steam supply line inboard isolation
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open/closed as-is
valve (4 valves)
Steam supply line outboard isolation
valve (4 valves)
Condenser purge line inboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open/closed closed
Condenser purge line outboard
Yes Yes No Yes No open open –
Total 4 Penetrations (One penetration per condensate return line)
Condensate return line inboard
Condensate return line outboard
Total 4 Penetrations (One shared penetration for each pair consisting of one condenser upper header vent line and one condenser lower header vent
line)
Condenser upper header inboard vent
Yes Yes Yes Yes No closed closed closed
valve (4 valves)
Outboard condenser upper header
outboard vent valve (4 valves)
2.15-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
(Deleted)
(Deleted)
Inboard bypass lower header inboard

Yes Yes No Yes No closed open/closed –
vent valve (4 valves)
Outboard bypass lower header
Yes Yes Yes Yes No closed open/closed open
outboard vent valve (4 valves)
Standby Liquid Control
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per SLC injection line)
SLC injection line squib valve (4
Yes Yes No Yes No closed open as-is
valves)
SLC injection line outboard check
Yes Yes No Yes No closed open/closed –
valve (2 valves)
SLC injection line inboard check
Yes Yes No Yes No closed open/closed N/A
valve (2 valves)
Process Radiation Monitoring
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per DW Fission Product Monitoring Line)
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open as-is
Inboard isolation Valve (1 valve)
Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve)
2.15-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position

Inboard isolation Valve (1 valve)
Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve)
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per reactor well drain line)

Reactor well drain line inboard
Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
containment isolation valve (1 valve)
Reactor well drain line outboard
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per GDCS pool return line)
GDCS pool return line outboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed closed closed
isolation valve (1 valve)
GDCS pool return line inboard
isolation check valve (1 valve)
Total 2 Penetrations (Two penetrations per one suppression pool return line)
Suppression pool return line outboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes No closed closed as-is
Suppression pool return line inboard
isolation check valve (2 valves)
2.15-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per DW spray line)

DW spray line outboard isolation
valve (1 valve)
DW spray line inboard isolation check
valve (1 valve)
Total 2 Penetrations (2 penetrations per one suppression pool suction line)
Suppression pool suction line inboard
Suppression pool suction line
outboard isolation valve (2 valves)
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per GDCS pool suction line)
GDCS pool suction line inboard
GDCS pool suction line outboard
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line)

RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line
inboard isolation valve (2 valves)
RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line
2.15-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line
inboard isolation valve (2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per RWCU/SDC bottom head suction sample line)
sample line inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed open/closed closed
valves)
sample line outboard isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed open/closed closed
(2 valves)
Chilled Water
Total 2 penetration (One penetration per Chilled water supply line to DW cooler)
Chilled water supply line to DW
cooler outboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Chilled water supply line to DW
cooler inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
2.15-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
Total 2 penetration (One penetration per Chilled water return line from DW cooler)
Chilled water return line from DW
cooler inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Chilled water return line from DW
cooler outboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Makeup Water
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per makeup water line)
Demin water DW distribution system
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
(1 valve)
Demin water DW distribution system
inboard containment isolation valve (1 Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
valve)
Service Air
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per service air line)
Service air system inboard
Service air system outboard
High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply
2.15-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per N2 supply line to ADS, SRV, and ICIV accumulator)
N2 supply line outboard isolation
valve to ADS, SRV and ICS isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve accumulator (1 valve)
N2 supply line inboard isolation check
valve to ADS, SRV and ICS isolation Yes Yes No Yes No open/closed closed –
valve accumulator (1 valve)
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per N2 supply line to MSIV and other users)
N2 supply line outboard isolation
valve to MSIV and other uses (1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve)
N2 supply line inboard check valve to
Yes Yes No Yes No open/closed closed –
MSIV and other uses (1 valve)
Containment Inerting
Total 2 Penetrations (Two penetrations per Air/N2 supply line)
Air/N2 supply line to suppression pool

inboard isolation valve (1 valve)
Air/N2 supply line to outboard
Air/N2 supply line to upper DW
N2 makeup line outboard isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
2.15-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
valve (1 valve)
N2 makeup line to suppression pool

N2 makeup line to upper DW
outboard isolation valve (1 valve)
Total 2 Penetrations (Two penetrations per exhaust line)
Lower DW exhaust line outboard

Containment atmospheric exhaust line
Suppression pool exhaust line
Suppression pool exhaust line to Stack
Containment atmospheric bleed line
Containment atmospheric bleed line
Suppression pool exhaust line to Stack
2.15-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
Containment Monitoring
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per DW sample line)
DW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
valves)
DW to Sample Rack outboard valve
(2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per WW sample line)
WW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2
valves)
WW to Sample Rack outboard valve
(2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per WW gas sample return line)
Gas Sample Return to WW inboard
valve (2 valves)
Gas Sample Return to WW outboard
valve (2 valves)
Equipment and Floor Drain
Total 1 Penetrations (One penetration per DW equipment drain Low Conductivity Waste (LCW) sump discharge line)
DW equipment drain LCW sump
discharge line inboard isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed closed closed
(1 valve)
2.15-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1a
Loss of
Position
DW equipment drain LCW sump

discharge line outboard isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed closed closed
(1 valve)
Total 1 Penetrations (One penetration per DW equipment drain High Conductivity Waste (HCW) sump discharge line)
DW floor drain HCW sump discharge

line inboard isolation valve (1 valve)
DW floor drain HCW sump discharge

line outboard isolation valve (1 valve)
1
Includes associated piping between containment isolation valves.
2.15-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1b
Containment Mechanical Equipment

See Figure Section Cat. I Component Isolation Power Alarms
(Description) Operated
III Valve Position
2.15.1-1
Vacuum Breaker 11(A) Yes Yes No No - - Yes
Vacuum Breaker Isolation
11a(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(B) Yes Yes No No - - Yes
11a(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(C) Yes Yes No No - - Yes
11a(C) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is Yes
Valve
2.15-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1c
Electrical Equipment
Active
Equipment Name Identifier Control Q- Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Isolation
Category Related Safety
(Description) See Figure DCIS/ DPS Related Operated Valve
I Display Function Actuator
2.15.1-1
Vacuum Breaker 11(A) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(B) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(C) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Close
Vacuum Breaker Vacuum
Isolation Function Breaker
- Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Independent Control Isolation
Platform Valves on
demand
2.15-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
Equipment Name Closure

Time (sec)1
Nuclear Boiler
Inboard main steam isolation valve (MSIV) (4 valves) 3 - 5 sec
Outboard MSIV (4 valves) 3 - 5 sec
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line inboard containment isolation valve (1

15 sec max
valve)
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line outboard containment isolation valve (1

15 sec max
valve)
Outboard MSIV upstream drain line outboard containment isolation valve (4

15 sec max
valves)
FW supply line second outboard containment isolation valve (2 valves) 10 - 15 sec
FW supply line outboard containment isolation valve (2 valves) 10 - 15 sec
FW supply line inboard containment isolation valve (2 valves) –
RWCU/SDC to Feedwater outboard containment isolation valve (2 valves) –
Isolation Condenser
Steam supply line inboard isolation valve (4 valves) 60 sec max
Steam supply line outboard isolation valve (4 valves) 60 sec max
Condensate return line inboard isolation valve (4 valves) 35 sec max
Condensate return line outboard isolation valve (4 valves) 35 sec max
Condenser upper header inboard vent valve (4 valves) 15 sec max
Condenser upper header outboard vent valve (4 valves) 15 sec max
Bypass lower header inboard vent valve (4 valves) –

Bypass lower header outboard vent valve (4 valves) 15 sec max
2.15-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1d

Time (sec)1
Condenser purge line inboard isolation valve (4 valves) 15 sec max
Condenser purge line outboard isolation valve (4 valves) –
Standby Liquid Control

SLC injection line squib valve (4 valves) –
SLC injection line outboard check valve (2 valves) –
SLC injection line inboard check valve (2 valves) –
Process Radiation Monitoring
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line inboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Inboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling
Reactor well drain line containment inboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
Reactor well drain line containment outboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
GDCS pool return line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
GDCS pool return line inboard isolation check valve (1 valve) –
Suppression pool return line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Suppression pool return line inboard isolation check valve (2 valves) –
DW spray line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 35 sec max
DW spray line inboard isolation check valve (1 valve) –
Suppression pool suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Suppression pool suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
2.15-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1d

Time (sec)1
GDCS pool suction line inboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
GDCS pool suction line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 20 sec max
RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 20 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 15 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 15 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line sample line inboard isolation valve (2
15 sec max
valves)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line sample line outboard isolation valve (2
15 sec max
valves)
Chilled Water
Chilled water supply line to DW cooler outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water supply line to DW cooler inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water return line from DW cooler inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water return line from DW cooler outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Makeup Water
Demin water DW distribution system outboard containment isolation valve (1

–
valve)
Demin water DW distribution system inboard containment isolation valve (1

–
valve)
Service Air
Service air system inboard containment isolation valve (1 valve) –
Service air system outboard containment isolation valve (1 valve) –
2.15-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1d

Time (sec)1
High Pressure Nitrogen Gas Supply
N2 supply line outboard isolation valve to ADS, SRV and ICIV accumulator (1
15 sec max
valve)
N2 supply line inboard isolation check valve to ADS, SRV and ICIV
–
accumulator (1 valve)
N2 supply line outboard isolation valve to MSIV and other uses (1 valve) 15 sec max
N2 supply line inboard check valve to MSIV and other uses (1 valve) –
Containment Inerting
Air/N2 supply line to suppression pool outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Air/N2 supply line to outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Air/N2 supply line to upper DW outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Lower DW exhaust line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Containment atmospheric exhaust line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Suppression pool exhaust line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Suppression pool exhaust line to Stack outboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
Containment atmospheric bleed line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Containment atmospheric bleed line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Suppression pool exhaust line to Stack outboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
N2 makeup line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
N2 makeup line to suppression pool outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
N2 makeup line to upper DW outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Containment Monitoring
DW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2 valves) –
DW to Sample Rack outboard valve (2 valves) –
2.15-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-1d

Time (sec)1
WW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2 valves) –
WW to Sample Rack outboard valve (2 valves) –

Gas Sample Return to WW inboard valve (2 valves) –
Gas Sample Return to WW outboard valve (2 valves) –
Equipment and Floor Drain
DW equipment drain (LCW) sump discharge line inboard isolation valve (1

–
valve)
DW equipment drain (LCW) sump discharge line outboard isolation valve (1

–
valve)
DW floor drain (HCW) sump discharge line inboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
DW floor drain (HCW) sump discharge line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
1
This table is used for Acceptance Criteria only
2.15-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will The as-built Containment System
Containment System is as described in be conducted. conforms to the functional arrangement as
the Design Description of this described in Subsection 2.15.1 and Figure
Subsection 2.15.1 and as shown in Figure 2.15.1-1.
2.15.1-1.
2a1. (Deleted)
2a2. The RCCV and its liners are designed Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified,
to meet the requirements in Article CC- Report and certified documents for the when required by ASME Code) exist for
3000 of ASME Code, Section III, RCCV and its liners, and for the steel the RCCV and its liners and steel
Division 2, and seismic Category I components of the RCCV will be components in accordance with ASME
requirements. The steel components of conducted. Code Section III, including those stresses
the RCCV are designed to meet the applicable to loads related to fatigue
requirements in Article NE-3000 of (including environmental effects), thermal
ASME Code, Section III, Division 1. expansion, seismic, and combined.
2a3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (certified,
as ASME Code Section III is designed Reports (NCA 3550) and required when required by ASME Code) exist for
in accordance with ASME Code documents for the piping will be the piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as
Section III requirements. conducted. ASME Code Section III and demonstrates
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} compliance to NCA-3550, including those
stresses applicable to loads related to
fatigue (including environmental effects),
thermal expansion, seismic, and
combined.
2.15-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

2b1. The design of the components A reconciliation analysis of the The as-built components are reconciled
identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME components using as-designed and as- with the design documents used for design
Code Section III will be reconciled built information and ASME Code analysis. For ASME Code Components,
with the design requirements. Design Reports (NCA 3550) will be the reconciliation report includes
conducted. comparison to the ASME Code Design
Report (NCA-3550) (certified, when
required by ASME Code), and concludes
that the design of as-built components
2b2. The RCCV and its liners are designed A reconciliation analysis of the RCCV The as-built components are reconciled
to meet the requirements in Article CC- and its liners and steel components with the design documents used for design
3000 of ASME Code, Section III, using as-designed and as-built analysis. For ASME Code Components,
Division 2, and seismic Category I information and ASME Code Design the reconciliation report includes
requirements. The steel components of Reports will be conducted. comparison to the ASME Code Design
the RCCV are designed to meet the Report (certified, when required by ASME
requirements in Article NE-3000 of Code) and documents the results of the
ASME Code, Section III, Division 1. reconciliation analysis.
The design of these components will be
reconciled with the design
requirements.
2.15-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

2b3. The as-built piping identified in Table A reconciliation analysis of the piping The as-built piping has been reconciled
2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III using the as-designed and as-built with the design documents used for design
shall be reconciled with the piping information and ASME Code Design analysis. The reconciliation report
design requirements. Reports (NCA 3550) will be conducted. includes comparison to the ASME Code
Design Reports (NCA-3550) (certified,
when required by ASME Code) and
analysis.
2c1. The components identified in Table Inspections of the components will be ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are conducted. 5 Data reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in (certified, when required by ASME Code)
requirements.
2.15-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

2c2. The RCCV and its liners are fabricated, Inspection of the ASME Code Section ASME Code Report(s) (certified, when
installed, and inspected in accordance III documents for as-built components required by ASME Code) exist and
with the requirements in Article CC- and piping, for the RCCV and its liners, conclude that ASME Code Section III
3000 of ASME Code, Section III, and for the steel components of the stress report(s) exist for the as-built RCCV
Division 2. The steel components of RCCV will be conducted. and its liners and steel components.
the RCCV are fabricated, installed, and ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude
inspected to meet the requirements in that for ASME Section III, Division 2
Article NE-3000 of ASME Code, construction, ASME Code Section III
Section III, Division 1. stress reports demonstrate compliance to
NCA-3350 through NCA-3380, and NCA-
3454. ASME Code Report(s) exist and
conclude that for ASME Section III,
Division 1 construction, ASME Code
Section III stress reports demonstrate
compliance to NCA-3350. ASME code
inspection reports document results of
inspections.
2.15-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

2c3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 Inspection of ASME Code Section III ASME Code Report(s) (certified, when
as ASME Code Section III is documents for as-built will be required by ASME Code) exist and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in conducted. conclude that an ASME Code Section III
accordance with ASME Code Section stress report(s) exist for the as-built piping
III requirements. identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME
Code Section III. ASME Code Report(s)
exist and conclude that for ASME Section
III, Division 2 construction, ASME Code
Section III stress reports demonstrate
compliance to NCA-3350 through NCA-
3380, and NCA-3454. ASME Code
Report(s) exist and conclude that for
ASME Section III, Division 1
construction, ASME Code Section III
stress reports demonstrate compliance to
NCA-3350. ASME code inspection
reports document results of inspections.
3a. Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude
components identified in Tables boundary welds will be performed in that the ASME Code Section III
2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME accordance with ASME Code Section requirements are met for non-destructive
Code Section III meet ASME Code III. examination of pressure boundary welds
Section III non-destructive in the Containment System.
examinations requirements.
2.15-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code Report(s) exist and conclude
identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and boundary welds will be performed in that the ASME Code Section III
2.15.1-1b as ASME Code Section III accordance with ASME Code Section requirements are met for non-destructive
meet ASME Code Section III non- III. examination of pressure boundary welds
destructive examination requirements. in the Containment System.
4. The components and piping identified i. A hydrostatic pressure test will be i. ASME Code report exists and
in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as performed on the components and concludes that the results of the
ASME Code Section III retain their piping required by the ASME Code hydrostatic pressure test of the
pressure boundary integrity at their Section III to be tested. components and piping identified in
design pressure. Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as
ASME Code Section III comply with
the requirements of the ASME Code
Section III.
ii. Impact testing will be performed on ii. ASME Code report exists and
the containment and pressure- concludes that the containment and
retaining materials in accordance pressure-retaining penetration
with the ASME Code Section III to materials comply with fracture
confirm the fracture toughness of toughness requirements of the ASME
the materials. Code Section III.
5. The Seismic Category I equipment i. Inspections will be performed to i. The Seismic Category I equipment
identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, verify that the Seismic Category I identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a,
2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c can withstand equipment identified in Tables T2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c is housed in
Seismic Category I loads without loss 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c a Seismic Category I structure.
of safety-related function. is located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
2.15-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

ii. Type tests, analyses, or a ii. The Seismic Category I equipment
combination of type tests and identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a,
analyses of Seismic Category I 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c can withstand
equipment identified in Tables Seismic Category I loads without loss
2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c, of safety function.
assumptions, or under conditions
iii. Inspections and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment, including
performed to verify that the as-built anchorage, identified in Tables
equipment, including anchorage, 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c ,
identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, can withstand Seismic Category I
2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c, is bounded loads without loss of safety function.
by the tested or analyzed conditions.
6a. The electrical safety-related Test(s) will be performed for the The electrical components in a singular
components associated with actuation electrical safety-related components for division for the equipment of the
and status monitoring of final control the equipment of the Containment Containment System listed in Tables
elements of the Containment System System listed in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c
equipment listed in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c by providing a receive power from a safety-related power
2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c receive power test signal in only one safety-related supply in the same division.
from their respective safety-related division at a time.
divisional power supplies.
6b. Separate electrical penetrations are Inspection of the as-built electrical Each as-built electrical penetration
provided for circuits of each safety- containment penetrations will be contains cables of only one division or
related division and for nonsafety- performed. contains nonsafety-related cables.
related circuits.
2.15-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

6c. The circuits of each electrical Inspections of the as-built containment Each as-built circuit of each electrical
penetration are of the same voltage electrical penetrations will be performed. penetration is of the same voltage class.
class.
7. The containment system provides a Perform Type A, B and C leak rate tests Leak rates are less than the acceptance
barrier against the release of fission in accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix criterion established per 10 CFR 50
products to the atmosphere. J. Appendix J.
8. The containment system pressure A Structural Integrity Test (SIT) of the The containment system pressure
boundary retains its structural integrity containment structure is performed in boundary retains its structural integrity
when subject to design pressure. accordance with Article CC-6000 of when tested and evaluated in accordance
ASME Code Section III, Division 2 with ASME Code Section III, Division 2
and Regulatory Guide 1.136, after at a test pressure of at least 115% of the
completion of the containment design pressure of 310 kPaG (45 psig).
construction. The first prototype
containment structure will be
instrumented to measure strains per
ASME Code Section III, Division 2, CC-
6370.
9. The containment system provides the i. Tests will be performed to i. The containment isolation valves
safety function of containment demonstrate that containment close within the required response
isolation for containment boundary isolation valves close within the times identified in Table 2.15.1-1d.
integrity. required response times.
2.15-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

ii. Tests will be performed to ii. The remote manual operated valves
demonstrate that remote manual identified in Table 2.15.1-1a as having
operated containment isolation a containment isolation signal
valves reposition to the required reposition to the required post-
post-accident position using real or accident state after receiving a
simulated containment isolation containment isolation signal.
signals.
iii. Exercise testing of the process iii. Each as-built process actuated check
actuated check valves identified in valve changes position as indicated in
Table 2.15.1-1a will be performed Table 2.15.1-1a.
under preoperational test pressure,
temperature and fluid flow
conditions.
iv. Tests will be performed to iv. The lower drywell equipment and
demonstrate that the lower drywell personnel hatches are able to be
equipment and personnel hatches closed from outside the lower drywell,
can be closed from outside the and a program in place to track the
drywell. status of each hatch while open during
MODE 5 and 6 operation.
v. Testing of the as-built valves will be v. After a loss of motive power, each
performed under the conditions of remote manual valve identified in
loss of motive power. Table 2.15.1-1a assumes the indicated
loss of motive power position.
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Table 2.15.1-2

10. Containment electrical penetration An analysis of the as-built containment Analysis exists for the as-built
assemblies, whose maximum available electrical penetration assemblies will containment electrical penetration
fault current (including failure of be performed to demonstrate either (1) assemblies and concludes that the
upstream devices) is greater than the the maximum over current of the penetrations, whose maximum available
continuous rating of the penetration, circuits does not exceed the continuous fault current (including failure of
are protected against currents that are current rating of the penetration, or (2) upstream devices) is greater than the
greater than the continuous ratings. circuits whose maximum available continuous rating of the penetration, are
fault currents are greater than the protected against currents that are greater
continuous current rating of the than their continuous ratings.
penetration are provided with
redundant over current interrupting
devices.
11. (Deleted)
12. The amount of chlorine bearing cable Analyses and inspection will be used The amount of chlorine bearing cable
insulation exposed to the containment to confirm the final exposed chlorine insulation exposed to the containment
atmosphere is limited. bearing cable insulation mass. atmosphere (i.e. not within an enclosed
cable tray, pipe, conduit, or metal cable
jacketing) is ≤ 3400 kg (7500 lbs).
13. The DW and WW volumes are Using as-built dimensions, the DW The as-built DW free gas volume is
adequately sized to accommodate the and WW volumes will be calculated. within the analyzed limits of the free gas
calculated maximum DW temperature volume assumed in the containment
and absolute pressure that are performance safety analysis; and the as-
postulated to occur as a result of a built WW free gas volume is greater than
design basis accident. the analyzed limit of the free gas volume
assumed in the containment performance
safety-analysis.
2.15-31
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Table 2.15.1-2

14. The water volume of the WW is Using as-built dimensions of the WW The calculated suppression pool water
adequately sized to condense the steam and a minimum measured suppression volume is equal to or greater than the
that is forced into the WW from the DW pool depth of 5.4 meters (213 inches), water volume assumed in the
due to a postulated design basis event. the volume of the suppression pool containment performance safety analysis.
will be calculated.
15. Each vacuum breaker isolation valve A test will be performed by providing a Each as-built vacuum breaker isolation
automatically closes if the vacuum simulated or real not-fully closed valve automatically closes when a
breaker does not fully close when vacuum breaker signal originating from simulated or real not-fully closed signal
required. the closed position proximity sensor and is provided from the closed position
temperature sensors to close the proximity sensor of its associated
associated vacuum breaker isolation vacuum breaker.
valve.
16a. Each vacuum breaker has proximity Testing will be performed with each Each as-built vacuum breaker proximity
sensors to detect open/close position. as-built vacuum breaker to sensor indicates an open position with
This indication is available in the main demonstrate that the proximity sensors the vacuum breaker open and indicates a
control room. indicate open and closed position. An closed position when the vacuum breaker
inspection will be performed in the is in the fully closed position. The open
MCR. and closed position indications of the as-
built vacuum breakers are available in
the main control room.
16b. Each vacuum breaker has temperature A type test will be performed on a Vacuum breaker temperature sensors
sensors to detect bypass leakage at vacuum breaker to detect bypass discriminate within the range of ≥ 0.3
design basis accident conditions. This leakage at simulated design basis cm2 and ≤ 0.6 cm2 (A/√K) of bypass
indication is available in the main accident conditions. An inspection leakage area at design basis accident
control room. will be performed in the MCR. conditions. Indication exists in the
MCR.
2.15-32
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Table 2.15.1-2

17. The containment penetration isolation Single-failure analysis is performed on A study of all applicable containment
design for each fluid piping system the isolation design of each fluid fluid system penetrations demonstrates
requiring isolation meets the single- system penetration class or that, for each penetration or penetration
failure criterion to ensure completion penetration, as applicable. class isolation design, the single-failure
of penetration isolation. criterion is satisfied.
18. DW to WW bypass leakage is less than A DW to WW bypass leakage test will The results of the DW to WW bypass
the assumed value used in the be conducted. leakage is less than or equal to 50% of
containment capability design basis the assumed value in the containment
containment response analysis. capability design basis containment
response analysis.
19. Total DW to WW vacuum breaker A DW to WW bypass leakage test will The results of the total DW to WW
bypass pathway leakage is less than the be conducted for each vacuum breaker vacuum breaker bypass pathway leakage
assumed value used in the containment and associated vacuum breaker is less than or equal to 35% of the
capability design basis containment isolation valve. assumed value in the containment
response analysis. capability design basis containment
response analysis.
20. Each vacuum breaker opening An opening differential pressure test The results of the opening differential
differential pressure is less than or will be conducted for each vacuum pressure test is less than or equal to 3.07
equal to the required opening breaker. kPa (0.445 psi).
differential pressure.
21. Each vacuum breaker closing A closing differential pressure test will The vacuum breaker closing differential
differential pressure is greater than or be conducted for each vacuum breaker. pressure is greater than or equal to 2.21
equal to the required closing kPa (0.320 psi).
differential pressure.
2.15-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.1-2

22a. Containment isolation valves are Inspection of piping design isometric Based on a review of piping design
located as close to the containment as drawings will be conducted. isometric drawings, containment isolation
practical, consistent with General {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} valves are designed to be located as close
Design Criteria 55, 56 and 57. to containment as practical, considering
required access for:
• In-service inspection of non-
isolable welds,
• 10CFR50 Appendix J leak testing,
• Cutout and replacement of isolation
valves using standard pipe fitting
tools and equipment,
• Local control, and
• Valve seat resurfacing in place.
22b. The as-built location of containment A reconciliation evaluation of A design reconciliation has been
isolation valves relative to containment containment isolation valve locations completed for the as-built locations of
shall be reconciled with design relative to containment using as- containment isolation valves relative to
requirements. designed and as-built information will the design requirements. The report
be performed. documents the results of the reconciliation
evaluation.
2.15-34
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Table 2.15.1-2

23a. The containment boundary electric Inspection of ASME Code Certified ASME Code Certified Design Report(s)
penetration assemblies are designed in Design Reports and required documents exist and conclude that the design of the
accordance with ASME Boiler and will be conducted. containment boundary electric penetration
Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, assemblies comply with the requirements
Section III, Subsection NE for Class of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel
MC Components. Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection
NE for Class MC Components, including
for those stresses and loads related to
seismic and electromagnetic forces
produced by rated short-circuit currents.
23b. The containment boundary electric A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Certified Design Report(s)
penetration assemblies shall be components using as-designed and as- exist and conclude that design
reconciled with the design built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed in
requirements. Certified Design Reports will be accordance with the ASME Code for as-
performed. built reconciliation of the containment
boundary electric penetration assemblies.
23c. The containment boundary electric Inspection of the components will be ASME Code Data Report(s) and
penetration assemblies are fabricated, conducted. Inspection Report(s) exist and conclude
installed, and inspected in accordance that the containment boundary electric
with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel penetration assemblies are fabricated,
Code, Division 1, Section III, installed, and inspected in accordance with
Subsection NE for Class MC ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Components. Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE for
Class MC Components.
2.15-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.15.1-1. Containment System
2.15-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.15.2 Containment Vessel

Design Description and ITAAC are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
2.15-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.15.3 Containment Internal Structures

Design Description
The functions of the containment internal structures include (1) support of the reactor vessel
radiation shielding, (2) support of piping and equipment, and (3) formation of the pressure
suppression boundary. The containment internal structures consist of the diaphragm floor slab
that separates the DW and the WW, vent wall, Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) pool
walls, reactor shield wall, and the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) support bracket.
The Containment Internal Structures are as shown in Figure 2.15.3-1 and the component
locations of the Containment System are as shown in Table 2.15.3-1.
(1) The functional arrangement of the Containment Internal Structures is described in the
Design Description of Subsection 2.15.3.
(2) Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 are designed and constructed
in accordance with ANSI/AISC N690 requirements.
(3) The Containment Internal Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1 conform to Seismic
Category I requirements and can withstand seismic design basis loads, suppression pool
hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss of coolant accident generated loads and annulus
pressurization loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) The diaphragm floor and vent wall structures that separate the DW and WW retain their
integrity when subjected to the maximum design differential pressure.
(6) (Deleted)
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) The drywell floor drain sump channels prevent molten debris from an accident from
entering the drywell sump.
associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Internal Structures.
2.15-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.3-1
Containment Internal Structures Locations
Component Component Location

Diaphragm Floor Slab Inside of Containment Boundary
Vent Wall Inside of Containment Boundary
Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS) Pool Walls Inside of Containment Boundary
Reactor Shield Wall Inside of Containment Boundary
RPV Support Bracket Inside of Containment Boundary
2.15-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.3-2
ITAAC For The Containment Internal Structures

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built Containment Internal
Containment Internal Structures is conducted. Structures conform with the Design
described in the Design Description of Description in Subsection 2.15.3.
Subsection 2.15.3.
2. The Containment Internal Structures Inspection and analyses will be The as-built components of the
identified in Table 2.15.3-1 are performed for the as-built components Containment Internal Structures identified
designed and constructed in of the Containment Internal Structures in Table 2.15.3-1 comply with ANSI/AISC
accordance with ANSI/AISC N690 identified in Table 2.15.3-1. N690 requirements.
requirements.
3. The Containment Internal Structures i. Analyses will be performed on the i. The as-built Containment Internal
identified in Table 2.15.3-1 conform Containment Internal Structures Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1
to Seismic Category I requirements identified in Table 2.15.3-1 to can withstand seismic design basis
and can withstand seismic design ensure they meet Seismic Category I dynamic loads, suppression pool
basis loads, suppression pool requirements and can withstand hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss
hydrodynamic loads, design basis loss seismic design basis loads, of coolant accident generated loads and
of coolant accident generated loads suppression pool hydrodynamic annulus pressurization loads without
and annulus pressurization loads loads, design basis loss of coolant loss of structural integrity and safety
without loss of structural integrity and accident generated loads and function.
safety function. annulus pressurization loads without
loss of structural integrity and safety
function.
ii. Inspections of the as-built ii. The as-built Containment Internal
Containment Internal Structures Structures identified in Table 2.15.3-1
identified in Table 2.15.3-1 will be are housed in a Seismic Category I
performed to verify that they are structure.
housed in a Seismic Category I
structure.
2.15-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.3-2
ITAAC For The Containment Internal Structures

4. (Deleted )
5. The diaphragm floor and vent wall Part of the containment Structural The Structural Integrity Test results
structures that separate the DW and Integrity Test specified in Table 2.15.1-2 demonstrate compliance with ASME Code
WW retain their integrity when ITAAC # 8 will test the diaphragm floor Section III requirements for the applied test
subjected to the maximum design and vent wall structure with a test pressure for the containment structures.
differential pressure. pressure equal to 1.0 times the
maximum design differential pressure
conducted with the DW pressure greater
than WW pressure.
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8. (Deleted)
9. The drywell floor drain sump channels Inspections and measurements of the The drywell floor sump channels are sized
prevent molten debris from an drywell floor drain sump channels are to preclude debris from passing to the
accident from entering the drywell performed. sump.
sump.
2.15-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.15.3-1. Containment Internal Structures
2.15-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.15.4 Passive Containment Cooling System

Design Description
The Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS), in conjunction with the suppression pool,
maintains the containment within its pressure limits for DBAs such as a LOCA, by condensing
steam from the DW atmosphere and returning the condensed liquid to the Gravity Driven
Cooling System (GDCS) pools. The system is passive, with no components that must actively
function in the first 72 hours after a DBA.
The environmental qualification of PCCS components is addressed in Section 3.8.
(1) The functional arrangement for the PCCS is as described in the Design Description in this
Subsection 2.15.4, Table 2.15.4-1 and Figure 2.15.4-1.
(2) a1. (Deleted)
(6) Each mechanical train of the PCCS located inside the containment is physically separated
from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related
function.
(7) The PCCS together with the pressure suppression containment system will limit
containment pressure to less than its design pressure for 72 hours after a LOCA.
(8) (Deleted)
2.15-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(9) The elevation of the PCCS vent line discharge point is submerged in the suppression pool
at an elevation below low water level and above the uppermost horizontal vent.
(10) The PCCS will be designed to limit the fraction of containment leakage through the
condensers to an acceptable value.
(11) The PCCS vent fans flow rate is sufficient to meet the beyond 72 hours containment
cooling requirements following a design basis LOCA.
(12) The PCCS vent fans can be remotely operated from the MCR.
(13) The PCCS drain piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases from the
PCCS drain lines to the PCCS condenser vent lines to prevent collection in the PCCS drain
lines.
(14) The elevation of the PCCS vent fan discharge point is submerged within the drain pan
located in the GDCS pool at an elevation below the lip of the drain pan.
(15) PCCS vent catalyst modules are mounted within each PCCS vent line.
(16) To reduce hydrogen accumulation in the PCCS vent lines, vent line catalyst modules
recombine hydrogen at a required minimum rate at a minimum allowed velocity.
Table 2.15.4-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Passive Containment Cooling System.
2.15-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-1
Passive Containment Cooling System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Seismic RCPB Containment Remotely Loss of

(Description) Identifier Code Cat. I Component Isolation Operated Motive
see Figure Section Valve Valve Power
2.15.4-1 III Position
PCCS Heat PCCS Yes Yes No – – –
Condenser Condenser
PCCS Inlet Line P-1(A1) Yes Yes No – – –
Condensate Drain P-2(A1) Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Vent Fan Isolation Vent Fan Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is
Valve Isolation
Valve
Non-Condensables P-3(A1) Yes Yes No – – –
Vent Line
Vent Fan Vent Fan No No No – – –
Non-Condensables Sparger No Yes No – – –
Vent Line Sparger
PCCS Inlet Pipe – No Yes No – – –
Debris Filter
PCCS Vent Fan P-4 (A1) Yes No No – – –
Line
PCCS Vent Catalyst - Yes Yes No - - -
Module
1
Train A; Typical for Trains B, C, D, E & F.
2.15-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System

1. The functional arrangement for the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built PCCS conforms to the
PCCS is as described in the Design conducted. functional arrangement for the PCCS as
Description in this Subsection 2.15.4, described in the Design Description in this
Table 2.15.4-1 and Figure 2.15.4-1. Subsection 2.15.4, Table 2.15.4-1 and
Figure 2.15.4-1.
2a1 (Deleted)
Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code components identified in Table 2.15.4-1 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Section III shall be reconciled with as ASME Code Section III using as- Code) exist and conclude that design
the design requirements. designed and as-built information and reconciliation has been completed, in
ASME Code Design Reports (NCA-3550) accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
will be performed. reconciliation of the components
Code Section III, and that the design of
as-built components identified in Table
2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III
complies with the requirements of ASME
Code Section III. The report documents
the results of the reconciliation analysis.
2.15-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2

2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
are fabricated, installed, and will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
inspected in accordance with ASME and inspection reports exist and conclude
Code Section III requirements. that the components identified in Table
requirements.
2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.15.4- Inspection of ASME Code Design ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
1 as ASME Code Section III is Reports (NCA-3550) and required 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Code Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} of the piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1
as ASME Code Section III complies with
the requirements of the ASME Code,
Section III, including those stresses
applicable to loads related to fatigue
(including environmental effects), thermal
expansion, seismic, hydrogen combustion,
and combined.
2.15-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2

Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
Section III shall be reconciled with Code Section III using as-designed and Code) exist and conclude that design
the piping design requirements. as-built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed, in
2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.4- Inspections of the piping identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified,
1 as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III when required by ASME Code) and
requirements.
components identified in boundary welds in components identified that ASME Code Section III requirements
Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section are met for non-destructive examination of
Section III meet ASME Code Section III will be performed in accordance with pressure boundary welds in components
III non-destructive examination ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME
requirements. Code Section III.
2.15-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2

Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III are met for non-destructive examination of
Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with pressure boundary welds in piping
examination requirements. ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME
Code Section III.
4a. The components identified in Table A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III those code components identified in Table conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
retain their pressure boundary 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III that test of components identified in Table
integrity at their design pressure. are required to be hydrostatically tested by 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III
ASME Code Section III. comply with the requirements of ASME
Code Section III.
4b. The piping identified in A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
Table 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code the code piping identified in Table conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
Section III retains its pressure 2.15.4-1 as ASME Code Section III that is test of piping identified in Table 2.15.4-1
boundary integrity at its design required to be hydrostatically tested by as ASME Code Section III comply with
pressure. ASME Code Section III. the requirements in ASME Code Section
III.
Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I that the Seismic Category I equipment Category I in Table 2.15.4-1 is located
can withstand Seismic Category I identified in Table 2.15.4-1 are in a Seismic Category I structure.
loads without loss of safety function. located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
2.15-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2

of type tests and analyses, of Table 2.15.4-1 as Seismic Category I
equipment identified in Table 2.15.4-1 can withstand Seismic Category I
as Seismic Category I, will be loads without loss of safety function.
requirements.
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.15.4-1 including anchorage,
equipment identified in Table 2.15.4- can withstand Seismic Category I
1, including anchorage, is bounded by loads and the hydrodynamic effects of
the testing or analyzed conditions, surrounding water for submerged
including the hydrodynamic effects of components without loss of safety
surrounding water for submerged function.
components.
6. Each mechanical train of the PCCS Inspections or analysis will be conducted Each mechanical train of PCCS located
located inside the containment is for each of the PCCS mechanical trains inside containment is protected against
physically separated from the other located inside the containment. design basis events and their direct
train(s) so as not to preclude consequences by spatial separation,
accomplishment of the intended safety- barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not
related function. to preclude accomplishment of the
2.15-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.15.4-2

7. The PCCS together with the pressure A PCCS Unit Heat Removal Capability Analyzed containment pressure for 72
suppression containment system will Type test will be performed on a PCC unit hours after a LOCA is less than
limit containment pressure to less to establish the heat removal capability containment design pressure, and
than its design pressure for 72 hours under design basis accident conditions. the PCC unit heat removal capacity
after a LOCA. exceeds heat removal calculated in
the design basis accident analysis
following reactor depressurization
below containment design pressure.
8. (Deleted)
9. The elevation of the PCCS vent A visual inspection will be performed of The elevation of the discharge on the
discharge point is submerged in the the PCCS vent discharge point relative to PCCS vent line is > 0.85 m (33.5 in) and
suppression pool at an elevation the horizontal vents. < 0.90 m (35.4 in) above the top of the
below low water level and above the uppermost horizontal vent.
uppermost horizontal vent.
10. The PCCS will be designed to limit A pneumatic leakage test of the PCCS The combined leakage from each of the
the fraction of containment leakage will be conducted. PCCS heat exchangers is ≤0.01% of
through the condensers to an containment air weight per day.
acceptable value.
11. The PCCS vent fans flow rate is For each PCCS vent fan line, a flow rate The tested and analyzed flow rates are
sufficient to meet the beyond 72 test will be performed with the greater than or equal to the flow rates of
hours containment cooling containment at pre-operational ambient the design basis LOCA containment
requirements following a design conditions. Flow measurements will be analysis model for the PCCS vent fan
bases LOCA. taken on flow to the GDCS pools. An lines at containment pre-operational
analysis of the test configuration will be ambient conditions.
performed.
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Table 2.15.4-2

12. The PCCS vent fans can be remotely PCCS vent fans will be started using The PCCS vent fans start and the block
operated from the MCR. manually initiated signals from the MCR. valves open when the PCCS vent fans are
manually initiated from the MCR.
13. The PCCS drain piping is installed to Inspection(s) will be conducted of as-built Based on inspection(s) of as-built PCCS
allow venting of non-condensable PCCS drain piping to ensure there are no drain piping, the as-built piping conforms
gases from the PCCS drain lines to elevated piping loops or high-point traps to a design that allows venting of non-
the PCCS condenser vent lines to in piping runs to the GDCS pools. condensable gases from the PCCS drain
prevent collection in the PCCS drain lines to the PCCS condenser vent lines.
lines.
14. The elevation of the PCCS vent fan A visual inspection will be performed of The elevation of the discharge on the
discharge point is submerged within the PCCS vent fan discharge point relative PCCS vent fan line is 24 cm (9.4 in)
the drain pan located in the GDCS to the lip of the drain pan. below the top of the drain pan lip with a
pool at an elevation below the lip of tolerance of 1.4 cm (0.6 in).
the drain pan.
15. PCCS vent catalyst modules are Inspection will be performed of the as- A total of 12 PCCS vent catalyst modules
mounted within each PCCS vent line. built installation of PCCS vent catalyst are installed with one module per PCCS
modules in each PCCS vent line. vent line.
16. To reduce hydrogen accumulation in Type tests will be performed to verify a Type tests show that the as-built catalyst
the PCCS vent lines, vent line minimum required hydrogen module will recombine hydrogen at a
catalyst modules recombine hydrogen recombination rate at a minimum allowed minimum rate of 1.66 kg/h (3.66 lbm/h)
at a required minimum rate at a velocity. when exposed to a test stream consisting
minimum allowed velocity. of 4% hydrogen in its stoichiometric ratio
with oxygen, the balance being inert gas,
and whose minimum velocity through the
module is 0.166 m/s (0.545 ft/s).
2.15-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.15.4-1. Passive Containment Cooling System Schematic
2.15-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.15.5 Containment Inerting System

Design Description
The Containment Inerting System (CIS) establishes and maintains an inert atmosphere within the
containment during all plant operating modes, except during plant shutdown for refueling or
equipment maintenance and during limited periods of time to permit access for inspection at low
reactor power. The objective of the system is to reduce oxygen concentration to levels that do
not support post-accident hydrogen combustion. The CIS also provides instruments and logic for
MCR monitoring and alarming of DW temperature described in Table 2.15.5-1 associated with
ITAAC (3) below.
The CIS does not perform any safety-related function except for its containment isolation
function. Containment isolation valves and penetrations are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1 for
the Containment System.
(1) The containment can be inerted to less than or equal to 4% oxygen by volume.
(2) (Deleted)
(3) The DW temperature indications are retrievable in the main control room.
acceptance criteria for the Containment Inerting System.
2.15-54
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Table 2.15.5-1
Containment Inerting System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Safety- Safety- Active Loss of Remotely Containme
ID Q-DCIS/ Related Related Function Motive Operated nt Isolation
DPS Electrical Display Power Valve Valve
Equipment Position
DW Temperature – No No No No – – –
Transmitters(s)
2.15-55
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Table 2.15.5-2
ITAAC For The Containment Inerting System

1. The containment can be inerted to less Test of the containment in an inerted state The containment can be inerted to less
than or equal to 4% oxygen by will be conducted to determine oxygen than or equal to 4% oxygen by volume.
volume. concentration by volume.
2. (Deleted)
3. The DW temperature indications are Inspections of main control room The DW temperature indications are
retrievable in the main control room. indications will be conducted and verified provided in the MCR.
for retrievability of DW temperature
indications.
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2.15.6 Drywell Cooling System

Design Description
The Drywell Cooling System (DCS) does not perform or ensure any safety-related function, is
not required to achieve or maintain safe shutdown, and is not subject to high regulatory
oversight. Therefore the system is nonsafety-related and has no safety design basis.
2.15-57
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Table 2.15.6-1
(Deleted)
Table 2.15.6-2
(Deleted)
2.15-58
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2.15.7 Containment Monitoring System

Design Description
The Containment Monitoring System (CMS) provides instrumentation listed in Table 2.15.7-1 to
monitor the following parameters:
• DW and WW Hydrogen and Oxygen concentrations
• DW and WW Gross Gamma Radiation levels
• DW and WW Pressures
• DW/WW Differential Pressure
• Upper DW Level
• Lower DW Level
• Suppression Pool Water Level
• Suppression Pool Temperature
Refer to Subsection 2.2.15 for “Instrumentation & Controls Compliance With IEEE Std. 603.”
The environmental qualification of CMS components is addressed in Section 3.8; and the
The containment isolation portions of the CMS system are addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
CMS software is developed in accordance with the software development program described in
Section 3.2 as part of the SSLC/ESF software projects.
(1) The functional arrangement for the CMS is as described in the Design Description in this
Subsection 2.15.7, Table 2.15.7-1 and Figure 2.15.7-1.
(2) Each of the safety-related components identified in Table 2.15.7-1 is powered from its
respective safety-related division.
(3) Each CMS measured parameter in Table 2.15.7-1 will indicate the measured parameter and
initiate separate alarms in the control room when values exceed applicable setpoints.
(4) The Hydrogen/Oxygen (H2/O2) monitoring subsystem of CMS is active during normal
operation. Additional sampling capacity is automatically initiated by a LOCA signal for
post-accident monitoring of oxygen and hydrogen content in the containment.
(5) In each CMS Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring (SPTM) division, signals from the
CMS SPTM temperature and the CMS suppression pool water narrow range transmitters
are provided for the divisional RPS logic processors to calculate the suppression pool
average temperature.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
2.15-59
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(9) (Deleted)
Table 2.15.7-2 provides the definitions of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Containment Atmospheric
Monitoring System and the suppression pool monitoring portions of CMS.
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Table 2.15.7-1
Containment Monitoring System Electrical Equipment
Identifier Control Seismic Safety-
Safety- Active Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Category Related
See Figure Related Function Operated Valve
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
DW Hydrogen
Sampling Transmitter (H2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
(2 divisional channels)
DW Oxygen Sampling
Transmitter (2 (O2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels)
WW Hydrogen
Sampling Transmitter (H2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
WW Oxygen Sampling
Transmitter (2 (O2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
Upper DW Gamma
RDT2
Radiation Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Upper DW)
Lower DW Gamma
RDT2
Radiation Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Lower DW)
WW Gamma Radiation
RDT2
Transmitter No No No No No – –
(WW)
DW Pressure
Transmitter (Safety- PT2
Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
related) (4 divisional (DW)
channels)
2.15-61
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Table 2.15.7-1
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
WW Pressure
Transmitter (Safety- PT2
related) (4 divisional (WW)
channels)
DW Pressure Wide
Range Transmitter PT2
(Safety-related) (2 (DW)
WW Wide Range
Pressure Transmitter PT2
(Safety-related) ) (2 (WW)
DW Pressure PT2
Transmitter (Nonsafety- Yes No No No No – –
related) (4) (DW)
WW Pressure PT2
Transmitter (Nonsafety- No No No No No – –
related) (WW)
DW/WW Differential
Pressure Transmitter (2 PDT2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
Upper DW Level LT2
Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Upper DW)
Lower DW Level LT2
Transmitter (4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels) (Lower DW)
2.15-62
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Table 2.15.7-1
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
Lower DW Level LT2
Transmitter (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels) (Lower DW)
Suppression Pool Water LT2

Level Narrow Range
(Suppression Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
Transmitter (4
divisional channels) Pool)
Suppression Pool Water LT2

Level Wide Range (Suppression No No No No No – –
Transmitter (4 channels) Pool)
Suppression Pool
Temperature TE2
Transmitter (4 (Suppression Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels Pool)
multiple sensors)
1
DPS input; See Section 2.2.14.
2
Shown as representative in Figure 2.15.7-1.
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Table 2.15.7-2
ITAAC For The Containment Monitoring System

1. The functional arrangement for the Inspections of the as-built system will be The as-built CMS conforms with the
CMS is as described in the Design performed. functional arrangement described in the
Description in this Subsection 2.15.7, Design Description of this Subsection
Table 2.15.7-1 and Figure 2.15.7-1. 2.15.7, Table 2.15.7-1 and Figure 2.15.7-
1.
2. Each of the safety-related components Testing will be performed on the CMS by A test signal exists in the safety-related
identified in Table 2.15.7-1 is powered providing a test signal in only one safety- division (or at the equipment identified in
from its respective safety-related division. related division at a time. Table 2.15.7-1 powered from the safety-
related division) under test in the CMS.
3. Each CMS measured parameter in Table Using simulated signal inputs, CMS testing Each simulated signal representing a
2.15.7-1 will indicate the measured will be performed. measured parameter in Table 2.15.7-1
parameter and initiate separate alarms in indicates the measured parameter and
the control room when values exceed initiates separate alarms in the control
applicable setpoints. room when levels exceed applicable
setpoints.
4. The Hydrogen/Oxygen (H2/O2) Using simulated signals, CMS testing will The H2/O2 monitor can be operated and
monitoring subsystem of CMS is active be performed to verify that the system can that it will be in operation within 90
during normal operation. Additional be operated and that operation will initiate minutes, including warm-up time, after
sampling capacity is automatically following a simulated LOCA signal. occurrence of a LOCA initiation signal,
initiated by a LOCA signal for post- which requires the monitor to be
accident monitoring of oxygen and functional.
hydrogen content in the containment.
2.15-64
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Table 2.15.7-2

5. In each CMS Suppression Pool Tests will be conducted in each division For each SPTM division, output signals
Temperature Monitoring (SPTM) of the SPTM using simulated temperature from the CMS SPTM temperature and
division, signals from the CMS SPTM sensor signals. the CMS suppression pool water narrow
temperature and the CMS suppression range transmitters are received to
pool water narrow range transmitters generate a suppression pool average
are provided for the divisional RPS temperature by the RPS logic
logic processors to calculate the processors.
suppression pool average temperature.
Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.15.7-1 is
can withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in located in a Seismic Category I
without loss of safety function. Table 2.15.7-1 are located in a structure.
of type tests and analyses, of Table 2.15.7-1 as Seismic Category I
equipment identified in Table 2.15.7- can withstand Seismic Category I
1 as Seismic Category I, will be loads without loss of safety function.
requirements.
2.15-65
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Table 2.15.7-2

equipment identified in Table can withstand Seismic Category I
conditions.
7. (Deleted)
8. (Deleted)
9. (Deleted)
2.15-66
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Figure 2.15.7-1. Containment Monitoring System Functional Arrangement
2.15-67
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2.15.8 Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner

Design Description
The Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner (PAR) consists of independently mounted, self-contained
units which are each capable of recombining a stoichiometric mix of hydrogen and oxygen into
water vapor. The PAR System consists of sufficient capacity PAR units to effect a minimum
safety factor of two with respect to any efficiency loss primarily due to introduced catalytic
poisons.
(1) Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARs) are mounted within the Wetwell airspace and
Drywell compartments.
(2) PARs are of a quantity and size in each compartment (Wetwell and Drywell) to ensure a
minimum safety factor.
acceptance criteria for the Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner System.
2.15-68
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Table 2.15.8-1
ITAAC For The Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner

1. Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners Inspection will be performed of the as- The PARs are installed in the Wetwell
(PARs) are mounted within the built installation of PARs in the Wetwell airspace and the Drywell.
Wetwell airspace and the Drywell airspace and the Drywell compartments.
compartments.
2. PARs are of a quantity and size in An analysis will be performed to verify the The quantity and size of the installed
each compartment (Wetwell and quantity and size of the PARs PARs in each containment compartment
Drywell) to ensure a minimum safety configuration in each compartment (Wetwell and Drywell) conforms to a
factor. (Wetwell and Drywell) and that the safety factor of at least two with respect
design conforms to a minimum safety to the hydrogen generation rate greater
factor of two with respect to the hydrogen than 72 hours.
generation rate at 72 hours.
2.15-69
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2.16 STRUCTURES AND SERVICING SYSTEMS/EQUIPMENT
2.16.1 Cranes, Hoists and Elevators

Design Description
Cranes and hoists are used for maintenance and refueling tasks. The reactor building (RB) crane,
fuel building (FB) crane and associated lifting devices, such as hoists, and elevators in various
areas of the plant are nonsafety-related.
(1) The RB crane has a lifting capacity greater than its heaviest expected load.
(2) The FB crane has a lifting capacity greater than its heaviest expected load.
(3) The RB crane is interlocked to prevent movement of heavy loads over new or spent fuel in
the RB.
(4) The FB crane is interlocked to prevent movement of heavy loads over spent fuel in the FB.
(5) The RB crane is classified as Seismic Category I to maintain crane structural integrity.
(6) The FB crane is classified as Seismic Category I to maintain crane structural integrity.
(7) The RB crane passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified
design that are to be lifted.
(8) The FB crane passes over the centers of gravity of heavy loads included in the certified
design that are to be lifted.
(9) Heavy load handling equipment other than the RB crane, FB crane, fuel handling machine
and refueling machine are designed or interlocked such that movement of heavy loads is
restricted to areas away from stored fuel.
(10) The RB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the
capability of the crane to safely retain the load.
(11) The FB crane is designed such that a single failure will not result in the loss of the
capability of the crane to safely retain the load.
(12) The GDCS system is not susceptible to a load drop that could result in the GDCS not
meeting the Technical Specifications for Modes 5 and 6.
acceptance criteria for the Cranes, Hoists and Elevators.
2.16-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.1-1
ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators

1. The RB crane has a lifting capacity A load test at 125% of the rated capacity The RB crane is successfully load tested at
greater than its heaviest expected will be performed. 125% of its rated capacity.
load.
2. The FB crane has a lifting capacity A load test at 125% of the rated capacity The FB crane is successfully load tested at
greater than its heaviest expected will be performed. 125% of its rated capacity.
load.
3. The RB crane is interlocked to Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB The RB crane interlock prevents the
prevent movement of heavy loads crane movement using a heavy load. carrying of a load greater than one fuel
over new or spent fuel in the RB. assembly and its associated handling
device over new or spent fuel in the RB.
4. The FB crane is interlocked to Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB The FB crane interlock prevents the
prevent movement of heavy loads crane movement using a heavy load. carrying of a load greater than one fuel
over spent fuel in the FB. assembly and its associated handling
device over spent fuel storage in the FB.
5. The RB crane is classified as Inspection and analyses of the as-built RB The RB crane conforms to Seismic
Seismic Category I to maintain crane will be performed to verify that the Category I requirements.
crane structural integrity. design meets Seismic Category I
requirements.
6. The FB crane is classified as Inspection and analyses of the as-built FB The FB crane conforms to Seismic
Seismic Category I to maintain crane will be performed to verify that the Category I requirements.
crane structural integrity. design meets Seismic Category I
requirements.
7. The RB crane passes over the Tests will be conducted of the as-built RB The RB crane passes over the expected
centers of gravity of heavy loads crane. locations of the centers of gravity of heavy
included in the certified design that loads included in the certified design that
are to be lifted. are to be lifted.
2.16-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.1-1

8. The FB crane passes over the Tests will be conducted of the as-built FB The FB crane passes over the expected
centers of gravity of heavy loads crane. locations of the centers of gravity of heavy
included in the certified design that loads included in the certified design that
are to be lifted. are to be lifted.
9. Heavy load handling equipment Inspections of as-built heavy load handling Heavy load handling equipment is designed
other than the RB crane, FB crane, equipment will be performed. or interlocked such that movement of
fuel handling machine and heavy loads is restricted to areas away from
refueling machine are designed or stored fuel.
interlocked such that movement of
heavy loads is restricted to areas
away from stored fuel.
10. The RB crane is designed such that The following inspections and tests will be The following tests have been successfully
a single failure will not result in the conducted: completed for the as-built RB crane so that
loss of the capability of the crane to a single failure will not result in the loss of
safely retain the load. the capability of the crane to safely retain
the load:
welded structural connections of the welded structural connections of the
RB crane will be performed in RB crane performed in accordance
accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, with ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph
Paragraph 4251.4. 4251.4
ii. The RB crane will be static load-tested ii. The RB crane has passed static load-
to 125% of the manufacturer’s rated testing to 125% of the manufacturer’s
load. rated load.
2.16-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.1-1

iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB crane will iii. A Full-Load Test on the RB crane in
be performed in accordance with accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004,
ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422. Paragraph 7422.
iv. A No-Load Test on the RB crane will iv. A No-Load Test on the RB crane
be performed in accordance with performed in accordance with ASME
ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and
and 7421.1. 7421.1.
blocks, and hook component sheave blocks, and hook component
dimensions and material composition. dimensions and material compositions
match design specifications.
vi. Inspection of the wire rope (s) for vi. Inspection records show the wire rope
proper reeving. (s) are correctly reeved.
11. The FB crane is designed such that The following inspections and tests will be The following tests have been successfully
a single failure will not result in the conducted: completed for the as-built FB crane so that
loss of the capability of the crane to a single failure will not result in the loss of
safely retain the load. the capability of the crane to safely retain
the load:
welded structural connections of the welded structural connections of the
FB crane will be performed in FB crane performed in accordance with
accordance with ASME NOG-1, 2004, ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph
Paragraph 4251.4. 4251.4
ii. The FB crane will be static load-tested ii. The FB crane has passed static load-
to 125% of the manufacturer’s rated testing to 125% of the manufacturer’s
load. rated load.
2.16-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.1-1

iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB crane will iii. A Full-Load Test on the FB crane
ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422. NOG-1, 2004, Paragraph 7422.
iv. A No-Load Test on the FB crane will iv. A No-Load Test on the FB crane
ASME NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 NOG-1, 2004, Paragraphs 7421 and
and 7421.1. 7421.1.
blocks, and hook component sheave blocks, and hook component
dimensions and material composition. dimensions and material compositions
match design specifications.
vi. Inspection of the wire rope (s) for vi. Inspection records show the wire rope
proper reeving. (s) are correctly reeved.
12. The GDCS system is not Inspection and analysis of the GDCS The GDCS components are not susceptible
susceptible to a load drop that piping will be performed. to a load drop that could result in the
could result in the GDCS not GDCS not meeting the Technical
meeting the Technical Specification for Modes 5 and 6.
Specifications for Modes 5 and 6.
2.16-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.2 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning
2.16.2.1 Reactor Building HVAC

Design Description
The Reactor Building HVAC System (RBVS) serves the Reactor Building. The RBVS consists
of three subsystems. The Reactor Building Clean Area HVAC Subsystem (CLAVS) serves the
clean (non-radiologically controlled) areas of the Reactor Building and is shown in Figure
2.16.2-1. The Reactor Building Contaminated Area HVAC Subsystem (CONAVS) serves the
potentially contaminated areas of the Reactor Building and is shown in Figure 2.16.2-2. The
Reactor Building Refueling and Pool Area HVAC Subsystem (REPAVS) serves the refueling
area of the Reactor Building and is shown in Figure 2.16.2-3.
The RBVS automatically isolates the Reactor Building boundary (CONAVS and REPAVS
subsystems) during accidents. The isolation dampers and ducting penetrating the Reactor
Building boundary, and associated controls that provide the isolation signal are safety-related.
Safety-related components for the RBVS are listed in Table 2.16.2-1.
Mechanical cooling of the Reactor Building rooms is not provided as a safety-related function
while the boundary is isolated. Passive means are provided by the ESBWR design to limit the
temperature rise in the Reactor Building rooms to acceptable levels for the first 72 hours
following a design basis accident.
RBVS software that controls the safety-related RBVS components is developed in accordance
with the software development program described in Section 3.2.
RBVS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section
3.3.
The remaining portion of the RBVS is nonsafety-related.
(1) The functional arrangement of the RBVS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.2.1 and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-1, 2.16.2-2 and 2.16.2-3.
(2) The RBVS isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of a high radiation signal or
(CONAVS and REPAVS) or loss of AC power (CONAVS, REPAVS and CLAVS).
(4) The RBVS maintains the hydrogen concentration levels in the battery rooms below 2% by
volume.
(5) CONAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure
relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated
air.
(6) REPAVS maintains served areas of the reactor building at a slightly negative pressure
relative to surrounding clean areas to minimize the exfiltration of potentially contaminated
air.
(7) The RBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for DCIS, CRD and RWCU pump rooms,
electrical cabinet cooling and CRD/RWCU motor cooling.
2.16-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related
(10) (Deleted)
(11) The Reactor Building HVAC Online Purge Exhaust Filters are tested to meet RG 1.140
and ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.
(12) a. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters maintains the CONAVS served
areas of the reactor building at a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.)
relative to surrounding clean areas when operating.
b. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and ASME
AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.
(13) The Reactor Building concrete acts as a heat sink that passively maintains the temperature
of the Reactor Building rooms within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a
design basis accident.
Table 2.16.2-2 provides the design commitments, inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance
criteria for the RBVS system.
2.16.2.2 Control Building HVAC System

Design Description
The Control Building HVAC consists of two independent subsystems. The Control Room
Habitability Area HVAC Subsystem (CRHAVS) serves the MCR and associated areas bounded
by the Control Room Habitability Area (CRHA) envelope. The Control Building General Area
HVAC Subsystem (CBGAVS) serves the areas inside the Control Building but outside the
CRHA. Table 2.16.2-3 lists the major Control Building HVAC system safety-related
components.
Both of these subsystems are nonsafety-related except for that portion of the CRHAVS that
forms the CRHA boundary envelope, and the CRHAVS Emergency Filter Units (EFU) and
associated components, which are safety-related. This safety-related CRHA boundary envelope
consists of the CRHA structure, doors, penetrations, redundant boundary isolation dampers,
valves, and that portion of transition ductwork, piping, or tubing that is located between the
CRHA boundary structure and the redundant CRHA isolation dampers or valves. The CRHA
isolation dampers are the major components discussed in this Subsection. Additional systems,
structures, and components (such as EFUs) that are necessary for habitability are discussed in
other subsections.
The mechanical cooling of the Control Building General Areas and the CRHA is not provided as
a safety-related function during a CRHA boundary isolation. Passive means of limiting CRHA
and general area temperature rise to acceptable levels have been provided by the ESBWR design
for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.
2.16-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
The CRHAVS serves the MCR and associated support areas during normal plant operations,
plant start-up and plant shutdown and is shown in Figure 2.16.2-4. The CBGAVS serves the
areas outside the CRHA and is shown in Figures 2.16.2-5a and 2.16.2-5b.
CRHAVS software that controls the safety-related CRHAVS components is developed in
accordance with the software development program described in Section 3.2.
(1) The functional arrangement of the CRHAVS is as described in the Design Description of
this Subsection 2.16.2.2 and is as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.
(2) The CRHA isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of any of the following
signals:
• high radiation in the CRHAVS intake;
• high radiation downstream of an Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) during emergency
operation;
• low airflow through an EFU during emergency operation;
• loss of AC power.
(4) The CRHAVS heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRHA within an
acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.
(5) Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related
(6) CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status (Open/Closed) indication is provided
in the MCR.
(7) The free air volume of the control room envelope is greater than or equal to the volume
assumed in safety analyses.
(8) Normal operation intake flow rate is greater than or equal to the flow rate assumed in the
safety analyses.
(9) (Deleted)
(10) CRHAVS Air Handling Units and Auxiliary Cooling Units support post-72 hour control
room habitability cooling and cooling for post-accident monitoring heat loads.
(11) The CRHA is provided with differential pressure indication for monitoring under normal
and emergency operation.
Table 2.16.2-4 provides definitions of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Control Building HVAC.
2.16-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.2.3 Emergency Filter Units

Design Descriptions
The Emergency Filter Units (EFU) supply pressurized breathing air to the Control Room
Habitability Area (CRHA) during isolation of the CRHA boundary envelope. The EFUs are
safety-related and maintain habitable conditions in the CRHA to ensure the safety of the control
room operators. An EFU is automatically initiated upon CRHA isolation to provide breathing air
and pressurization of the CRHA to minimize infiltration. There are two independent, redundant
EFU trains capable of supplying sufficient air and CRHA pressurization. The EFUs are part of
the CRHAVS, and a simplified system diagram is provided in Figure 2.16.2-4. Design
information on safety-related equipment is provided in Table 2.16.2-5.
EFU software that controls the safety-related EFU components is developed in accordance with
the software development program described in Section 3.2.
EFU alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
(1) The functional configuration of the EFU is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.2.3 and as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.
(2) The selected redundant EFU dampers open upon receipt of a control room habitability
envelope isolation signal.
(4) Independence for the EFU trains is provided between safety-related divisions, and between
safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
(5) a. EFUs maintain the CRHA at the minimum positive pressure with respect to the
surrounding areas at the required air addition flow rate.
b. The in-leakage does not exceed the unfiltered in-leakage assumed by control room
operator dose analysis.
(6) The powered EFU dampers can be remotely operated from the MCR.
(7) EFUs meet the in-place leakage testing requirements of ASME AG-1 and RG 1.52.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) (Deleted)
(10) EFUs are tested to meet the laboratory test requirements described in ASME AG-1 and RG
1.52 for carbon adsorber efficiency.
(11) The standby EFU starts on a low flow signal from the operating EFU.
(12) EFUs maintain habitable conditions in the CRHA.
(13) (Deleted)
criteria for the EFUs.
2.16-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.2.4 Turbine Building HVAC System

Design Description
The Turbine Building Ventilation System (TBVS) is nonsafety-related. The TBVS includes the
Turbine Building supply air fans and associated Air Handling Units (AHUs), and the Turbine
Building exhaust fans and associated filter trains.
The Turbine Building Ventilation System is designed to minimize exfiltration of air to adjacent
areas by maintaining a slightly negative pressure in the Turbine Building relative to adjacent
areas.
(1) The functional arrangement of the Turbine Building Ventilation System (TBVS) is as
described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.4 and is as shown in Figure
2.16.2-6.
(2) The TBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for DCIS in the Turbine Building and room
cooling for the Nuclear Island Chilled Water System and RCCWs pumps.
criteria for the Turbine Building HVAC System.
2.16.2.5 Fuel Building HVAC System

Design Description
The Fuel Building HVAC system (FBVS) does not perform any safety-related functions, except
for automatic isolation of the Fuel Building ventilation systems to mitigate the consequences of
fuel handling accidents with significant radiological releases. The Fuel Building HVAC
subsystems include the Fuel Building General Area HVAC Subsystem (FBGAVS) shown in
Figure 2.16.2-7 and the Fuel Building Fuel Pool HVAC Subsystem (FBFPVS) shown in Figure
2.16.2-8.
FBVS alarms, displays, controls, and status indications in the MCR are addressed by Section 3.3.
(1) The functional arrangement of the FBVS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.2.5 and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-7 and 2.16.2-8.
(2) The Fuel Building HVAC isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of a high
radiation signal.
(4) The FBVS maintains the fuel building at a slightly negative pressure relative to
surrounding areas.
(5) The FBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for FAPCS pump motors and N-DCIS.
(6) (Deleted)
2.16-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10

criteria for the Fuel Building HVAC.
2.16.2.6 Radwaste Building HVAC System

2.16.2.7 Electrical Building HVAC System

Design Description
The Electrical Building Ventilation System (EBVS) is nonsafety-related and includes three
subsystems. The Electric and Electronic Rooms HVAC Subsystem (EERVS), the Technical
Support Center HVAC Subsystem (TSCVS), and the Diesel Generators HVAC Subsystem
(DGVS).
(1) The functional arrangement of the Electrical Building Ventilation System (EBVS) is as
described in the Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.7 and is as shown in Figure
2.16.2-9.
(2) The EBVS provides post 72-hour cooling for Diesel Generators and safety-related
electrical distribution and support for electrical power to FAPCS.
(3) The TSCVS air filtration units (AFU) include HEPA filters to provide a habitable work
environment for personnel when nonsafety-related power is available.
(4) The TSCVS AFU include charcoal adsorbers to provide a habitable work environment for
personnel when nonsafety-related power is available.
(5) The TSCVS AFU maintain the TSC at a slight positive pressure with respect to the
surrounding areas.
criteria for the Electrical Building HVAC System.
2.16-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.2.8 Other Building HVAC Systems

2.16-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-1
Reactor Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
Equipment Seismic Category ASME Code Classification Fail Safe Position

CONAVS building supply air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
CONAVS building exhaust air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
CLAVS building supply air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
CLAVS building exhaust air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
REPAVS building supply air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
REPAVS building exhaust air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
2.16-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the RBVS configuration The as-built RBVS conforms to the
RBVS is as described in the Design will be conducted. description in Subsection 2.16.2.1 and is as
Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.1 shown in Figures 2.16.2-1, 2.16.2-2 and
and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-1, 2.16.2-3.
2.16.2-2 and 2.16.2-3.
2. The RBVS isolation dampers Testing of the RBVS isolation dampers Upon receipt of a simulated high radiation
automatically close upon receipt of a will be performed using simulated signal or a simulated loss of AC power
high radiation signal (CONAVS and signals to close the RBVS isolation signal, the as-built RBVS isolation dampers
REPAVS) or loss of AC power dampers. automatically close.
(CONAVS, REPAVS and CLAVS).
Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic Category I verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.16.2-1 is located
can withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in in a Seismic Category I structure.
analyses, of equipment identified in can withstand Seismic Category I loads
Table 2.16.2-1 as Seismic without loss of safety function.
Category I, will be performed
using analytical assumptions, or
will be performed under conditions
which bound the Seismic Category
I equipment design requirements.
2.16-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-2

performed to verify that the as- Table 2.16.2-1 including anchorage,
built equipment identified in Table can withstand Seismic Category I loads
2.16.2-1, including anchorage, is without loss of safety function.
conditions.
4. The RBVS maintains the hydrogen Testing and analysis of the system will The air flow capability of the as-built RBVS
concentration levels in the battery be performed to demonstrate the air is adequate to maintain the hydrogen
rooms below 2% by volume. flow capability of the RBVS is concentration levels in the battery rooms
adequate to maintain the hydrogen below 2%.
concentration levels in the battery
rooms below 2%.
5. CONAVS maintains served areas of the i. Testing will be performed to i. The time average pressure differential
reactor building at a slightly negative confirm that the contaminated in the as-built CONAVS served areas
pressure relative to surrounding clean areas of the reactor building served of the reactor building as measured by
areas to minimize the exfiltration of by CONAVS maintain a minimum each of the pressure differential
potentially contaminated air. negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in indicators is minimum negative
wg) relative to surrounding clean pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg).
areas when operating CONAVS
supply and exhaust fans in the
normal system fan lineup.
2.16-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-2

ii. Testing will be performed to ii. The exhaust flow rate is greater than or
confirm the ventilation flow rate equal to the as-built CONAVS supply
through the contaminated areas of flow rate.
the reactor building served by
CONAVS when operating
CONAVS supply and exhaust fans
in the normal system fan lineup.
6. REPAVS maintains served areas of the i. Testing will be performed to i. The time average pressure differential
reactor building at a slightly negative confirm that the refueling area of in the as-built REPAVS served areas of
pressure relative to surrounding clean the reactor building served by the reactor building as measured by
areas to minimize the exfiltration of REPAVS maintains a minimum each of the pressure differential
potentially contaminated air. negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in indicators is minimum negative
wg) relative to surrounding clean pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 in wg).
areas when operating REPAVS
supply and exhaust fans in the
normal system fan lineup.
confirm the ventilation flow rate equal to the as-built REPAVS supply
through the refueling area of the flow rate.
reactor building served by
REPAVS when operating
REPAVS supply and exhaust fans
in the normal system fan lineup.
2.16-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-2

7. The RBVS provides post 72-hour Testing of the integrated system will be The integrated system test demonstrates the
cooling for DCIS , CRD and RWCU pump performed to demonstrate the air flow air flow capability to support post-72 hour
rooms, electrical cabinet cooling and CRD capability of the RBVS to support post- cooling for DCIS, CRD and RWCU pump
/ RWCU motor cooling. 72 hour cooling for DCIS, CRD and rooms, electrical cabinet cooling and CRD /
RWCU pump rooms, electrical cabinet RWCU motor cooling.
cooling and CRD / RWCU motor cooling.
8. (Deleted)
9. Independence is provided between i. Tests will be performed on the i. The test signal exists only in the safety-
safety-related divisions, and between RBVS dampers by providing a test related division under test in the as-
safety-related divisions and nonsafety- signal in only one safety-related built RBVS damper.
related equipment. division at a time.
ii. Inspection of the as-built safety- ii. Physical separation and electrical
related divisions in the system will isolation exists between as-built RBVS
be performed. dampers. Physical separation or
electrical isolation exists between
safety-related divisions and nonsafety-
related equipment as defined by RG
1.75.
10. (Deleted)
11. The Reactor Building HVAC Online Each charcoal adsorber will be tested The as-built Reactor Building HVAC
Purge Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 in accordance with RG 1.140. HEPA Online Purge Exhaust filter efficiency meet
and ASME AG-1 requirements for filters will be tested in accordance with the acceptance criteria for laboratory and in
HEPA and carbon filter efficiency ASME AG-1, Section FC. place testing in accordance with RG 1.140
and ASME AG-1.
2.16-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-2

12a. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Testing will be performed to confirm The time average pressure differential in
Exhaust Filters maintains the CONAVS that the Reactor Building HVAC the as-built CONAVS served areas of the
served areas of the reactor building at a Accident Exhaust Filters maintain the reactor building as measured by pressure
minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa CONAVS area at a minimum negative differential indicators is minimum negative
(-1/4 inch W.G.) relative to surrounding pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.) pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.).
clean areas when operating. relative to surrounding clean areas
when operating each filter train.
12b. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident The Reactor Building HVAC Accident The as-built RB HVAC Accident Exhaust
Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and filter efficiencies meet the acceptance
ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA criteria for laboratory and in place testing in
and carbon filter efficiency. and carbon filter efficiency. accordance with RG 1.140 and ASME AG-
1.
13. The Reactor Building concrete acts as a A Control Building and Reactor The bulk average air temperature in the
heat sink that passively maintains the Building Environmental Temperature Reactor Building rooms will not exceed the
temperature of the Reactor Building Analysis for ESBWR will be Thermodynamic Environment Conditions
rooms within an acceptable range for performed using the as-built heat sink Inside Reactor Building for Accident
the first 72 hours following a design dimensions, the as-built heat sink Conditions on a loss of active cooling for
basis accident. thermal properties, the as-built heat the first 72 hours following a design basis
sink exposed surface area, the as-built accident, given post design basis accident
thermal properties of materials conditions and reconciled to as-built
covering parts of the heat sink, and the features and heat loads.
as-built heat loads.
2.16-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-3
Control Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
Equipment Seismic Category ASME Code Classification Notes

CRHA supply air isolation dampers I AG-1 Fail Closed
CRHA Restroom Exhaust isolation I AG-1 Fail Closed
dampers
CRHA Smoke Exhaust intake isolation I AG-1 Fail Closed
dampers
CRHA Smoke Exhaust output I AG-1 Fail Closed
isolation dampers
CRHA Variable Orifice Relief Device I AG-1 Locked in place
2.16-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the CRHAVS The as-built CRHAVS conforms to the
CRHAVS is as described in the configuration will be conducted. design description in this
Design Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.2 and is as shown in
Subsection 2.16.2.2 and as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.
Figure 2.16.2-4.
2. The CRHA isolation dampers Testing of the CRHA isolation dampers The as-built CRHA isolation dampers
automatically close upon receipt of will be performed using simulated automatically close upon receipt of any of
any of the following signals: signals to close the CRHA isolation the following simulated signals:
• high radiation in the CRHAVS dampers. • high radiation in the CRHAVS
intake; intake;
• high radiation downstream of an • a high radiation downstream of an
Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Emergency Filter Unit (EFU)
during emergency operation; during emergency operation;
• low airflow through an EFU • low airflow through an EFU during
during emergency operation; emergency operation;
• loss of AC power. • a loss of AC power signal
can withstand Seismic Category I equipment identified in in a Seismic Category I structure.
loads without loss of safety function. Table 2.16.2-3 are located in a
2.16-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-4

Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category loads without loss of safety function.
I, will be performed using analytical
equipment identified in Table can withstand Seismic Category I
conditions.
4. The CRHAVS heat sink passively i. A Control Building and Reactor i. The CRHA maximum bulk average air
maintains the temperature of the Building Environmental temperature is 33.9º C (93º F) or less
CRHA within an acceptable range for Temperature Analysis for ESBWR on a loss of active cooling for the first
the first 72 hours following a design will be performed using the as-built 72 hours following a design basis
basis accident. heat sink dimensions, the as-built accident, given post design basis
heat sink thermal properties, the as- accident conditions and as reconciled
built heat sink exposed surface area, to as-built features and heat loads.
the as-built thermal properties of
materials covering parts of the heat
sink, and the as-built heat loads.
2.16-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-4

ii. A Control Room Habitability Area ii. The CRHA minimum bulk average air
Minimum Temperature Analysis temperature is 12.8º C (55º F) or above
will be performed using as-built on a loss of normal heating for the first
design inputs established by Table 72 hours following a design basis
2.16.2-4 Item 4i, in addition to accident, given winter post design
minimum assumed heat loads, basis accident conditions and as
minimum assumed outside air reconciled to as-built features and
conditions and minimum assumed assumed minimum temperatures.
normal operation concrete heat sink
temperatures
iii. A Control Building and Reactor iii. The CRHA maximum bulk average
Building Environmental wet bulb globe temperature index is
Temperature Analysis for ESBWR 32.2º C (90.0º F) or less on a loss of
will be performed using the as-built active cooling for the first 72 hours
design inputs established in Table following a design basis accident,
2.16.2-4 Item 4i and using the 0% given post design basis accident
Exceedance Value for wet bulb conditions and as reconciled to as-built
(non-coincident) temperature and features and heat loads, and to limiting
corresponding High Humidity outdoor conditions.
Diurnal Swing. A reconciliation
analysis will be performed for the
as-built features and heat loads, and
limiting outdoor conditions.
5. Independence is provided between i. Tests will be performed on CRHA i. The test signal exists only in the
safety-related divisions, and between isolation damper and EFU operation safety-related division under test in the
safety-related divisions and nonsafety- by providing a test signal in only as-built CRHA isolation damper and
related equipment. one safety-related division at a time. EFU control.
2.16-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-4

ii. Inspection of the as-built safety- ii. Physical separation and electrical
related divisions in the system will isolation exists between as-built
be performed. CRHA isolation dampers and EFU
safety-related divisions. Physical
separation or electrical isolation exists
between safety-related divisions and
nonsafety-related equipment as
defined in RG 1.75.
6. CRHA isolation damper and EFU i. Inspection will be performed to i. The as-built CRHA isolation damper
operational status (Open/Closed) verify CRHA isolation damper and and EFU operational status indication is
indication is provided in the MCR. EFU operational status indication is provided in the MCR.
installed in the MCR.
ii. Testing will be performed to show ii. The operational status indication
that the operational status indication accurately depicts the operational status
in the MCR accurately depicts the of the as-built CRHA isolation dampers
operational status of the CRHA and EFUs.
isolation dampers and EFUs.
7. The free air volume of the control Analyses to be performed based on the The free air volume of the control room
room envelope is greater than or equal as-built control room envelope to envelop is ≥ 2,200 m3 (78,000 ft3).
to the volume assumed in safety determine the free air volume (total
analyses. volume minus equipment and walls).
8. Normal operation intake flow rate is Testing will be performed to verify the The flow rate is ≥ 220 l/s (466 cfm).
greater than or equal to the flow rate normal operation intake flow rate.
assumed in the safety analyses.
9. (Deleted)
2.16-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-4

10. CRHAVS Air Handling Units and Testing of the integrated system will be The integrated system test demonstrates
Auxiliary Cooling Units support post- performed to demonstrate the air-flow the air-flow capability to support post-72
72 hour control room habitability capability of the CRHAVS to support hour cooling for CRHA and Q-DCIS heat
cooling and cooling for post-accident post-72 hour cooling for CRHA and Q- loads.
monitoring heat loads. DCIS heat loads.
11. The CRHA is provided with Testing will be performed to verify that The as-built CRHA pressure indication is
differential pressure indication for the CRHA MCR pressure indication provided in the MCR.
monitoring under normal and operates as designed.
emergency operation.
2.16-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-5
Emergency Filter Units
Equipment Seismic ASME Code Notes

Category
EFU (fan, HEPA, I AG-1 Minimum flow rate of 220 l/s (466 cfm), or 10.5 l/s
and charcoal filters) (22 cfm) per person for up to 21 persons, independent
trains
EFU supply CRHA I AG-1 Redundant dampers in each independent train
isolation dampers,
tornado protection
dampers and missile
protected intake
louvers with
connecting ducting
(including supports)
EFU discharge I AG-1 Redundant dampers in each independent train
CRHA isolation
dampers and
connecting ducting
(including supports)
2.16-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-6
ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units

1. The functional arrangement of the EFU Inspections of the EFU configuration The as-built EFU system conforms with the
is as described in the Design will be conducted. design description in this
Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.3 Subsection 2.16.2.3 and is as shown in
and as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4. Figure 2.16.2-4.
2. The selected redundant EFU dampers Testing of the EFU dampers will be Upon receipt of a simulated control room
open upon receipt of a control room performed using simulated control habitability envelope isolation signal, the as-
habitability envelope isolation signal. room habitability envelope isolation built EFU dampers automatically open.
signal to open the EFU dampers.
2.16-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-6

conditions.
4. Independence for the EFU trains is i. Tests will be performed on EFUs by i. The test signal exists only in the safety-
provided between safety-related providing a test signal in only one related division under test for the EFU
divisions, and between safety-related safety-related division at a time. trains.
divisions and nonsafety-related
equipment.
ii. Inspection of the as-built safety- ii. For the as-built EFU trains, physical
related divisions in the EFU system separation or electrical isolation exists
will be performed. between these safety-related divisions.
Physical separation or electrical isolation
exists between safety-related divisions
and nonsafety-related equipment as
defined in RG 1.75.
5a. EFUs maintain the CRHA at the Testing will be performed to measure The as-built EFUs maintain the CRHA at a
minimum positive pressure with the differential pressure between the positive pressure of > 31 Pa (0.125 in wg)
respect to the surrounding areas at the CRHA and surrounding adjacent areas. with respect to the surrounding areas at the
required air addition flow rate. required air addition flow rate.
5b. The in-leakage does not exceed the Tracer gas testing in accordance with The unfiltered in-leakage measured by
unfiltered in-leakage assumed by ASTM E741 will be performed to tracer gas testing does not exceed the
control room operator dose analysis. measure the unfiltered in-leakage into unfiltered in-leakage assumed by control
the CRHA with EFUs operating. room operator dose analysis.
2.16-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-6

6. The powered EFU dampers can be EFU dampers will be opened and The as-built EFU dampers open and close
remotely operated from the MCR. closed using manually initiated signals when manually imitated signals are sent
from the MCR. from the MCR.
7. EFUs meet the in-place leakage testing EFUs will be in-place leak tested in The as-built EFUs meet the acceptance
requirements of ASME AG-1 and RG accordance with ASME AG-1, Section criteria for in-place testing per RG 1.52,
1.52. TA, to meet the requirements of RG Regulatory Position 6, when tested in
1.52. accordance with the requirements described
in ASME AG-1, Section TA.
8. (Deleted)
9. (Deleted)
10. EFUs are tested to meet the laboratory Each charcoal adsorber will be Charcoal adsorber efficiency meets the
test requirements described in ASME laboratory tested in accordance with the acceptance criteria for laboratory testing per
AG-1 and RG 1.52 for carbon adsorber requirements described in ASME RG 1.52, Regulatory Position 7, when tested
efficiency. AG-1, Section FE. in accordance with the requirements
described in ASME AG-1, Section FE.
11. The standby EFU starts on a low flow Testing will be performed to verify that A low flow test signal from the operating
signal from the operating EFU. the operating EFU is isolated and the EFU will start the standby EFU.
standby EFU is automatically started on
a low flow signal from the operating
EFU.
2.16-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-6

12. EFUs maintain habitable conditions in Testing will ensure that the filtered air The as-built EFUs provide 220 l/s (466 cfm)
the CRHA. supply will not be reduced below the of filtered air when the CRHA is isolated
required 220 l/s (466 cfm) when the and being maintained at a positive pressure
CRHA is isolated and being maintained of >31 Pa (0.125 in. wg) with respect to the
at a positive pressure of >31 Pa (0.125 surrounding areas.
in. wg) with respect to the surrounding
areas.
13. (Deleted)
2.16-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-7
ITAAC For The Turbine Building Ventilation System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the TBVS configuration The as-built TBVS system conforms with the
Turbine Building Ventilation will be conducted. design description in this Subsection 2.16.2.4
System (TBVS) is as described in and shown in Figure 2.16.2-6.
the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.2.4 and shown in
Figure 2.16.2-6.
2. The TBVS provides post 72-hour System testing will be performed and The cooling air flow capability meets the
cooling for DCIS in the Turbine cooling air flow to the specified cubicles requirements to support post 72-hour cooling
Building and room cooling for the will be verified. for DCIS in the Turbine Building and room
Nuclear Island Chilled Water cooling for the Nuclear Island Chilled Water
System and RCCW pumps. System and RCCW pumps.
2.16-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-8
Fuel Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
Equipment Seismic Category ASME Code Classification Fail Safe Position

FBGAVS building supply air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
FBGAVS building exhaust air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
FBFPVS building supply air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
FBFPVS building exhaust air I AG-1 Closed
isolation dampers
2.16-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-9
ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the FBVS configuration The as-built FBVS system conforms to the
FBVS is as described in the Design will be conducted. design description in this
Description of this Subsection 2.16.2.5 Subsection 2.16.2.5 and as shown in Figures
and as shown in Figures 2.16.2-7 and 2.16.2-7 and 2.16.2-8.
2.16.2-8.
2. The Fuel Building HVAC isolation Using a simulated high radiation signal, Upon receipt of a simulated high radiation
dampers automatically close upon tests will be performed on the (Fuel signal, the Fuel Building HVAC isolation
receipt of a high radiation signal. Building HVAC isolation dampers) dampers automatically close.
isolation logic.
2.16-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-9
ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC

conditions.
4. The FBVS maintains the fuel building i. Testing will be performed to i. The average differential pressure in the
at a slightly negative pressure relative confirm that the FBVS maintains a served areas of the fuel building as
to surrounding areas. minimum negative pressure of 62 measured by the pressure differential
Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.) when indicators is a minimum negative
operating FBVS supply and pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.).
exhaust AHUs in the normal
system fan lineup.
confirm the ventilation flow rate equal to the FBVS supply flow rate.
through the fuel building area
when operating the FBVS supply
and exhaust fans in the normal
system fan lineup.
5. The FBVS provides post 72-hour System testing will be performed and The cooling air-flow capability meets the
cooling for FAPCS pump motors and cooling air-flow to the specified requirements to support post 72-hour
N-DCIS. cubicles will be verified. cooling for FAPCS pump motors and N-
DCIS.
6. (Deleted)
2.16-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.2-10
ITAAC For The Electrical Building Ventilation System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the EBVS configuration The as-built EBVS system conforms with the
Electrical Building Ventilation will be conducted. description in Subsection 2.16.2.7 and shown
System (EBVS) is as described in in Figure 2.16.2-9.
the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.2.7 and shown in
Figure 2.16.2-9.
2. The EBVS provides post 72-hour System testing will be performed and The cooling air flow capability meets the
cooling for Diesel Generators and cooling air flow to the specified cubicles requirements to support post 72-hour
Safety-Related Electrical will be verified. cooling for Diesel Generators and safety-
Distribution, and support for related Electrical Distribution, and support
electrical power to FAPCS. for electrical power to FAPCS.
3. The TSCVS air filtration units An inspection of the as-built TSCVS The initially installed HEPA filters have
(AFU) include HEPA filters to HEPA filters procurement documentation been designed, constructed and tested in
provide a habitable work will be performed. accordance with Section FC of ASME AG-
environment for personnel when 1.
nonsafety-related power is
available.
4. The TSCVS AFU include charcoal An inspection of the as-built TSCVS The initially installed charcoal adsorbers
adsorbers to provide a habitable charcoal adsorber procurement have been designed, constructed and tested
work environment for personnel documentation will be performed. in accordance with Section FE of ASME
when nonsafety-related power is AG-1.
available.
5. The TSCVS AFU maintain the TSC Testing will be performed to measure the The as-built TSCVS filtration units maintain
at a slight positive pressure with differential pressure between the TSC the TSC at a positive pressure of > 31Pa
respect to the surrounding areas. and surrounding areas. (0.125 inch water gauge) with respect to the
surrounding areas at the required air addition
flow rate.
2.16-34
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Figure 2.16.2-1. CLAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram (Typical Train A/B)
2.16-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-2. CONAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram (Typical Train A/B)
2.16-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-3. REPAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-4. CRHAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-38
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Figure 2.16.2-5a. CBGAVS (Set A) Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-5b. CBGAVS (Set B) Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-6. TBVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-7. FBGAVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-8. FBFPVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 2.16.2-9. EBVS Functional Arrangement Diagram
2.16-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.3 Fire Protection System

Design Description
The Fire Protection System (FPS) is a nonsafety-related, integrated complex of components and
equipment that detects and suppresses fires in the plant.
The FPS is a as shown in Figure 2.16.3-1 and the component locations of the FPS are as shown
in Table 2.16.3-1
The MCR set of displays, alarms and controls, based on the applicable codes and standards,
including Human Factors Engineering (HFE) evaluations and emergency procedure guidelines,
is addressed in Section 3.3.
(1) The functional arrangement of the FPS is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.3 and as shown on Figure 2.16.3-1.
(2) The FPS components and piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 and Table 2.16.3-1 remain
functional during and after an SSE.
(3) The FPS provides for manual fire suppression capability to plant areas containing
safety-related equipment.
(4) a. The FPS provides the primary storage tanks that contain the required combined
minimum usable fire water storage capacity.
b. The FPS provides the designated site-specific secondary firewater storage source
contains the combined minimum usable firewater storage capacity.
(5) Each fire pump provides the required minimum discharge flow with adequate pressure.
(6) Smoke detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms in
areas containing safety-related equipment.
(7) a. The primary diesel-driven fire pump is available to provide post-72 hour makeup to the
IC/PCCS pools or Spent Fuel Pool.
b. The fuel oil tank for the primary diesel-driven fire pump contains adequate fuel oil
capacity to support the function of providing makeup water from 72 hours to 7 days
after an accident.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or
Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function
following a seismic event.
acceptance criteria for the Fire Protection System.
2.16-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3-1
Fire Protection System Equipment
Principal Components Location(s) Seismic Category

Seismic Category I piping loop and valves including OO I
supports providing source of makeup water to
IC/PCCS and fuel pools
Primary fire water storage tanks OO I
Fire pump enclosure OO I
Primary diesel-driven fire pump OO I
Primary diesel fire pump fuel tank OO I
Seismic Category II piping and valves including OO, RB, CB, FB II
supports (includes balance of primary piping and valves)
Primary motor-driven fire pump and primary jockey OO II
pump
Location codes:
CB = Control Building RB = Reactor Building
OO = Outdoors Onsite FB = Fuel Building
2.16-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System

1. The functional arrangement of the FPS Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built FPS conforms with the basic
is as described in Subsection 2.16.3 and conducted. configuration contained in the Design
as shown on Figure 2.16.3-1. Description of Subsection 2.16.3 and
Figure 2.16.3-1.
2. The FPS components and piping i. Analysis of the FPS components and i. Analyses demonstrate that the FPS
identified in Table 2.16.3-1 and Table piping identified in Table 2.16.3-1 will components and piping identified in
2.16.3-1 remain functional during and be performed to demonstrate that the Table 2.16.3-1 and Table 2.16.3-1 will
after an SSE. components and piping will remain remain functional during and after an
functional during and after an SSE. SSE.
ii. Inspection of the as-built FPS ii. The as-built components and piping
components and piping identified in identified in Table 2.16.3-1 are installed
Table 2.16.3-1 will be performed to in accordance with the configurations
verify that the components and piping specified by the analyses.
are installed in accordance with the
configurations specified by the
analyses.
2.16-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3-2

3. The FPS provides for manual fire The following inspections will be The as-built manual fire suppression system
suppression capability to plant areas performed: has the following features:
containing safety-related equipment.
i. Inspection of the as-built manual fire i. Standpipe and hose rack stations are
suppression system outside the located such that any safety-related
Containment not protected by a fixed equipment outside Containment not
fire suppression system will be protected by a fixed fire suppression
performed to verify that any location system can be reached by an effective
that contains or could present a hazard hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with a
to safety-related equipment can be maximum of 30.5 m (100 ft) of hose
reached by two effective hose streams from each of two hose stations on
with a maximum of 30.5 meters (100 separate standpipes.
feet) of hose.
ii. Inspection of the as-built manual fire ii. Standpipe and hose rack stations are
suppression system will be performed located such that any safety-related
to verify that any location outside equipment outside Containment
Containment protected by a fixed fire protected by a fixed fire suppression
suppression system that contains or system can be reached by an effective
could present a hazard to safety-related hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with a
equipment can be reached by at least maximum of 30.5 m (100 ft) of hose
one hose stream with a maximum of from at least one hose station.
30.5 meters (100 feet) of hose.
2.16-48
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Table 2.16.3-2

iii. Inspection of the as-built manual fire iii. Standpipe and hose rack stations are
suppression system will be performed located such that any location within
to verify that any location within Containment can be reached by an
Containment can be reached by two effective hose stream 9.1 m (30 ft) with
effective hose streams with a maximum a maximum of 61 m (200 ft) of hose
of 61 meters (200 feet) of hose. from each of two hose stations on
separate standpipes.
4a. The FPS provides the primary storage Inspection of the as-built water supply The as-built water supply sources meet the
tanks that contain the required sources and volumetric calculations using volumetric requirements of a combined
combined minimum usable firewater as-built dimensions will be performed. minimum usable firewater storage capacity
storage capacity. of ≥3900 m3 (1,030,000 gallons) as
specified in the Certified Design
Commitment.
4b. The FPS provides the designated site- Inspection of the as-built water supply The as-built water supply sources meet the
specific secondary firewater storage sources and volumetric calculations using volumetric requirements of ≥2082 m3
source contains the combined minimum as-built dimensions will be performed. (550,000 gallons).
usable firewater storage capacity.
5. Each fire pump provides the required i. Testing or analysis (or both) of each i. Each fire pump provides a flow rate of
minimum discharge flow with adequate fire pump will be performed to at least 484 m3/hr (2130 gpm).
pressure. demonstrate that each fire pump
provides a flow rate of at least 484
m3/hr (2130 gpm).
2.16-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3-2

ii. Testing will be performed to ii. Acceptable flow and rated pressure at
demonstrate rated flow and rated water the most hydraulically remote Turbine
pressure at the most hydraulically Building and Reactor standpipe - a.) 40
remote standpipes in the Turbine mm (1.5 inch) hoses; total flow of 22.7
Building and the Reactor Building. m3/hr (100 gpm) at a minimum pressure
of 448.2 kPaG (65 psig) and b.) 65 mm
(2.5 inch) hoses; total flow of 113.5
m3/hr (500 gpm) at a minimum pressure
of 689 kPaG (100 psig).
6. Smoke detectors provide fire detection Testing will be performed on the as-built The as-built individual smoke detectors
capability and can be used to initiate individual fire detectors in areas containing respond to simulated fire conditions and
fire alarms in areas containing safety- safety-related equipment by providing a initiate fire alarms in areas containing
related equipment. simulated fire condition. safety-related equipment.
7a. The primary diesel-driven fire pump is Test will be performed to demonstrate that The primary diesel-driven fire pump starts
available to provide post-72 hour the primary diesel-driven fire pump starts on a manual signal and supplies a minimum
makeup to the IC/PCCS pools or Spent on a manual signal and supplies a minimum of 46 m3/hr (≥200 gpm) makeup water to
Fuel Pool. of 46 m3/hr (≥200 gpm) makeup water to the IC/PCCS pools or Spent Fuel Pool.
the IC/PCCS pool or the Spent Fuel Pool.
7b. The fuel oil tank for the primary diesel- The as-built primary diesel-driven fire The as-built fuel oil tanks for the diesel-
driven fire pump contains adequate fuel pump fuel oil tank capacity will be driven fire pumps have greater than a 3.79
oil capacity to support the function of calculated. m3 (1000 gallon) capacity to support the
providing makeup water from 72 hours function of providing makeup water from
to 7 days after an accident 72 hours to 7 days after an accident before
refilling based upon the as-built fuel tanks
and fuel consumption rates and margin
criteria provided in NFPA 24.
2.16-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3-2

8. (Deleted)
9. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be performed Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic
and Seismic Category NS Structures, to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs
Systems or Components (SSCs) will Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their failure will not impair the
not impair the ability of RTNSS will not impair the ability of RTNSS adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS
Criterion B SSCs to function following Criterion B SSCs to function following a Criterion B SSCs to function following a
a seismic event. seismic event. seismic event.
2.16-51
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Figure 2.16.3-1. Fire Protection System
2.16-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.3.1 Fire Barriers

Design Description
A Fire Barrier is a continuous vertical or horizontal fire-resistance rated construction assembly
designed and constructed to limit the spread of heat and fire and to restrict the movement of
smoke. Fire dampers protect ventilation duct openings in fire barriers.
(1) Fire barriers of three-hour fire resistance rating are provided that separate:
• Safety-related systems from any potential fires in nonsafety-related areas that could affect
the ability of safety-related systems to perform their safety function.
• Redundant divisions or trains of safety-related systems from each other to prevent
damage that could adversely affect a safe shutdown function from a single fire.
• Components within a single safety-related electrical division that present a fire hazard to
components in another safety-related division.
• Electrical circuits (safety-related and nonsafety-related) whose fire-induced failure could
cause a spurious actuation that could adversely affect a safe shutdown function.
(2) Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed or closed to provide fire resistance ratings at
least equal to that of the barriers, and elevator doors will have a minimum fire rating of 1.5
hours.
(3) Fire dampers protect ventilation duct openings in fire barriers.
(4) Exposed structural steel protecting areas containing safety-related equipment is fireproofed
with material with a fire rating of up to 3 hours as determined from the Fire Hazards
Analysis (FHA).
(5) The exposure of the distributed control and information system (Q-DCIS and N-DCIS)
equipment to heat and smoke caused by a fire in a single fire area does not cause spurious
actuations that could adversely affect safe shutdown.
Table 2.16.3.1-1 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Fire Barriers.
2.16-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3.1-1
ITAAC For Fire Barriers

1. Fire barriers of three-hour fire resistance Inspections will assure 3-hour fire All locations listed in Subsection 2.16.3.1
rating are provided that separate: barriers are installed. are protected by 3-hour fire barriers.
• Safety-related systems from any
potential fires in nonsafety-related
areas that could affect the ability of
safety-related systems to perform their
safety function.
• Redundant divisions or trains of safety-
related systems from each other to
prevent damage that could adversely
affect a safe shutdown function from a
single fire.
• Components within a single safety-
related electrical division that present a
fire hazard to components in another
safety-related division.
• Electrical circuits (safety-related and
nonsafety-related) whose fire-induced
failure could cause a spurious actuation
that could adversely affect a safe
shutdown function.
2.16-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.3.1-1
ITAAC For Fire Barriers

2. Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed Inspections will confirm that as- The as-built penetrations through fire
or closed to provide fire resistance ratings built penetrations through fire barriers provide fire resistance ratings at
at least equal to that of the barriers, and barriers are sealed or closed to least equal to that required of the barriers
elevator doors will have a minimum fire provide fire resistance ratings at and that elevator doors have a minimum
rating of 1.5 hours. least equal to that required of the rating of 1.5 hours.
barriers (elevator doors at 1.5
hours).
3. Fire dampers protect ventilation duct Inspections will be performed to The presence of fire dampers in
openings in fire barriers. confirm the presence of fire ventilation duct openings, consistent with
dampers in ventilation duct the fire areas identified in Table 2.16.3.1-
openings. 1.
4. Exposed structural steel protecting areas Inspections will be performed to The presence of fireproofing on structural
containing safety-related equipment is confirm the presence of fireproofing steel protecting areas containing
fireproofed with material with a fire rating on structural steel protecting areas safety-related equipment with material
of up to three hours as determined from the containing safety-related equipment. with a fire rating of up to three hours as
FHA. determined from the FHA.
5. The exposure of the distributed control and Inspections, tests and /or analyses The exposure of the distributed control
information system (Q-DCIS and N-DCIS) will be performed to show that the and information system (Q-DCIS and N-
equipment to heat and smoke caused by a exposure of the distributed control DCIS) equipment to smoke and heat
fire in a single fire area does not cause and information system (Q-DCIS caused by a fire in a single fire area does
spurious actuations that could adversely and N-DCIS) equipment to smoke not cause spurious actuations that could
affect safe shutdown. and heat caused by a fire in a single adversely affect safe shutdown.
fire area does not cause spurious
actuations that could adversely
affect safe shutdown.
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This Page is Intentionally Blank.
2.16-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.4 Equipment and Floor Drain System

Design Description
The Equipment and Floor Drain System (EFDS) collects waste liquids from their point of origin
and transfers them to a suitable processing or disposal system. The Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundary (RCPB) leakage detection systems utilize features of the EFDS to provide a means of
detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the source of the reactor coolant leakage.
The detection of small, unidentified leakage within the DW is accomplished by monitoring the
DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump pump activity and the DW sump level
changes.
The detection of small, identified leakage within the DW is accomplished by monitoring the DW
equipment drain low conductivity waste (LCW) sump pump activity and sump level increases.
The containment isolation portion of the EFDS is addressed in Subsection 2.15.1.
(1) The functional arrangement of the EFDS is as described in this Subsection 2.16.4.
(2) The EFDS collects liquid wastes from floor drainage in the DW and directs these wastes to
the DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump.
(3) The EFDS collects liquid wastes emanating from equipment in the DW and directs these
wastes to the DW equipment drain low conductivity waste (LCW) sump.
(4) (Deleted)
acceptance criteria for the Equipment and Floor Drain System.
2.16-57
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.4-1
ITAAC For The Equipment and Floor Drain System

1. The functional arrangement of the Inspections of the as-built EFDS will be The as-built EFDS conforms with the
EFDS is as described in Subsection performed. description in Subsection 2.16.4.
2.16.4.
2. The EFDS collects liquid wastes A test will be performed by pouring The water poured into these drains is
from floor drainage in the DW and water into the floor drains in the DW collected in the DW floor drain high
directs these wastes to the DW floor inside the containment boundary. conductivity waste (HCW) sump.
drain high conductivity waste (HCW)
sump.
3. The EFDS collects liquid wastes A test will be performed by pouring The water poured into these leak-off lines is
emanating from equipment in the water into equipment leak-off lines in the collected in the DW equipment drain low
DW and directs these wastes to the DW inside the containment boundary. conductivity waste (LCW) sump.
DW equipment drain low
conductivity waste (LCW) sump.
4. (Deleted)
2.16-58
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.5 Reactor Building

Design Description
The Reactor Building (RB) houses the reactor system, reactor support and safety systems,
concrete containment, essential power supplies and equipment, steam tunnel, and refueling area.
On the upper floor of the RB are the new fuel pool and small spent fuel storage area,
dryer/separator storage pool, refueling and fuel handling systems, the upper connection to the
Fuel Transfer System and the overhead crane. The Isolation Condenser/Passive Containment
Cooling System pools are below the refueling floor.
The RB structure is integrated with a reinforced concrete containment vessel (RCCV); the
RCCV is located on a common basemat with the RB. The RB is a rigid box type shear wall
building. The external walls form a box surrounding a large cylindrical containment. The RB
shares a common wall and sits on a large common basemat with the Fuel Building. The RB is a
safety-related, Seismic Category I structure. The building is partially below grade. The RB
subcompartments are equipped with overpressure protection devices in the event of high-energy
line breaks or overpressure of the areas.
The key characteristics of the RB are as follows:
(1) The RB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static and thermal
loading conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations, which form
the structural design basis. The loads are (as applicable) those associated with:
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornados (including tornado missiles), earthquakes,
rain and snow.
• Internal events—floods, pipe breaks including LOCA and missiles.
• Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads, temperature effects and building
vibration loads.
(2) The functional arrangement of the RB is as described in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.5 and is as shown in Figures 2.16.5-1 through 2.16.5-11.
(3) The critical dimensions used for seismic analyses and the acceptable tolerances are
provided in Table 2.16.5-1.
(4) The RB Contaminated Area Ventilation Subsystem (CONAVS) area design provides a
holdup volume and delays release of radioactivity to the environment consistent with the
LOCA dose analysis maximum exfiltration assumptions.
(5) The RB provides three-hour fire barriers for separation of the four independent safe
shutdown divisions.
(6) For external flooding, the RB incorporates structural provisions into the plant design to
protect the structures, systems, or components from postulated flood and groundwater
conditions. This approach provides:
• Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads;
2.16-59
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood
and groundwater levels;
• Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and
groundwater levels;
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis
maximum flood and groundwater levels; and
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural
capacity of the roof for design loads.
• Exterior access opening sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
(7) Protective features used to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of internal flooding are:
• Structural enclosures or barriers
• Curbs and sills
• Leakage detection components
• Drainage systems
(8) The internal flooding protection features prevent flood water in one division from
propagating to other division(s) and ensure equipment necessary for safe shutdown is
located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions
by:
• Divisional walls
• Sills
• Watertight doors
(9) a. The RB is protected against pressurization effects associated with postulated rupture of
pipes containing high-energy fluid that occur in subcompartments of the RB.
b. The RB structure in the refuel floor area is equipped with overpressure protection
devices in the event of overpressure of this area.
(10) The Reactor Building CONAVS area volume meets design assumptions for the mixing of
fission products following a LOCA.
(11) RTNSS equipment in the RB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
is qualified for flood conditions.
(12) The buffer pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is
equipped with embedments designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
(13) Doors that connect the RB with the EB galleries are watertight for flooding of the galleries
up to the ground level elevation.
Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their
2.16-60
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a
seismic event.
associated acceptance criteria for the RB.
2.16-61
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
Concrete Containment
2500 +60,-0
101 RPV Pedestal Cylinder Not Applicable From -10400 to 4650
(8'-2⅜") (+2 ⅜",-0)
2000 +60,-0
102 RCCV Cylinder Not Applicable From 4650 to 24600
(6'-6 ¾") (+2 ⅜",-0)
5100 +50,-20
103 Containment Basemat Below RPV Pedestal Cylinder -10400
(16'-8 ¾") (2",-¾ ")
Between RPV Pedestal Cylinder 2000 +60,-0

104 Suppression Pool Slab 4650
and RCCV Cylinder (6'-6 ¾") (+2 ⅜",-0)
From DW Head to RCCV 2400 +60,-0

105 Top Slab 27000
Cylinder (7'-10 ½") (+2 ⅜",-0)
Outside Concrete Containment
2000 +25,-20
1 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RG From -11500 to 3650
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
2 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RG From -11500 to 3650
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
3 Wall at Column Line RA From R1 to R7 From -11500 to 3650
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
4 Wall at Column Line RG From R1 to R7 From -11500 to 3650
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
5 Wall between Column Lines R1 and R2 From between RA and RB to RC From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
6 Wall between Column Lines R1 and R2 From RE to between RF and RG From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-62
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Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
1000 +25,-20
7 Wall between Column Lines RA and RB From between R1 and R2 to R3 From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
8 Wall between Column Lines RF and RG From between R1 and R2 to R3 From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +60,-0
9 Cylinder below RCCV Not Applicable From -11500 to 2650
(6'-6 ¾") (+2 ⅜",-0)
10 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 1400 Minimum
(4'-7 ⅛")
1400
11 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 Minimum
(4'-7 ⅛")
600
12 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 Minimum
(1'-11 ⅝")
600
13 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant From -11500 to -7400 Minimum
(1'-11 ⅝")
1350
14 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant From -6400 to -1900 Minimum
(4'-5 ⅛")
1500 +25,-20
15 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RG From 4650 to 16500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
16 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RG From 4650 to 16500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
17 Wall at Column Line RA From R1 to R7 From 4650 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
18 Wall at Column Line RG From R1 to R7 From 4650 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-63
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
1500 +25,-20
19 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RC From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
20 Wall at Column Line R1 From RE to RG From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
22 Wall at Column Line R7 From between RD and RE to RG From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1300 +25,-20
23 Main Steam Tunnel Wall East side From 17500 to 24600
(4'-3⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1300 +25,-20
24 Main Steam Tunnel Wall West side From 17500 to 24600
(4'-3⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
25 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RB From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
26 Wall at Column Line R1 From RB to RC From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
3500 +25,-20
27 Wall at Column Line R1 From RC to RE From 27000 to 34000
(11'-5¾") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
28 Wall at Column Line R1 From RE to RF From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
29 Wall at Column Line R1 From RF to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-64
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
34 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RB From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
35 Wall at Column Line R7 From RB to between RC and RD From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
2440 +25,-20
36 Wall at Column Line R7 From between RC and RD to RE From 27000 to 34000
(8'-0") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
37 Wall at Column Line R7 From RE to RF From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
38 Wall at Column Line R7 From RF to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
39 Wall at Column Line RA From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
40 Wall at Column Line RB From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
41 Wall between Column Lines RB and RC From R6 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
42 Wall at Column Line RC (Pool Girder) From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-65
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
1600 +25,-20
43 Wall at Column Line RE (Pool Girder) From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
44 Wall between Column Lines RE and RF From R6 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
45 Wall at Column Line RF From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(6’-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
46 Wall at Column Line RG From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
47 Reactor Cavity Wall (Northeast side) From RC to between RC and RD From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
48 Reactor Cavity Wall (Northwest side) From between RD and RE to RE From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
49 Reactor Cavity Wall (Southeast side) From RC to between RC and RD From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
50 Not used
1000 +25,-20
51 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R2 and R3 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
52 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R2 and R3 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
400 +15,-10
53 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R3 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
54 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R3 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
2.16-66
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
400 +15,-10
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
59 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R5 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
60 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R5 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
470 +15,-10
(1'-6 ½") (+ ½",-⅜")
470 +15,-10
(1'-6 ½") (+ ½",-⅜")
From between R2 and R3 to 1000 +15,-10

63 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines RB and RC From 27000 to 33000
between R5 and R6 (3'-3⅜") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
64 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line RC From R2 to between R2 and R3 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
65 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line RE From R2 to between R2 and R3 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
From between R2 and R3 to 1000 +15,-10

66 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
between R5 and R6 (3'-3⅜") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
67 Wall at Column Line R1 From RB to RF From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-67
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
1000 +25,-20
68 Wall at Column Line R7 From RB to RF From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
69 Wall at Column Line RB From R1 to R7 From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
70 Wall at Column Line RF From R1 to R7 From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
4000 +50,-20
71 Basemat excluding Containment Basemat From R1 to R7 and RA and RG -11500
(13'-1½") (2",-¾ ")
600 +15,-10
72 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
600 +15,-10
73 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
74 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant -6400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
600 +15,-10
75 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
76 Floor outside Cylinder below RCCV From R1 to R7 and RA and RG -6400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1"- ¾")
700 +15,-10
77 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant -1000
(2'-3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
700 +15,-10
78 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant -1000
(2' 3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
900 +15,-10
79 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant -1000
(2'-11½") (+ ½",-⅜")
2.16-68
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
700 +15,-10
80 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant -1000
(2'-3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
81 Floor outside Cylinder below RCCV From R1 to R7 and RA to RG -1000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
82 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 4650
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
85 Main Steam Tunnel Floor From RC to RE 17500
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
86 Floor excluding Main Steam Tunnel Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 17500
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2400 +25,-20
87 Main Steam Tunnel Roof From RC to RE 27000
(7'-10 ½") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
88 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RC 27000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
89 Floor From R1 to R7 and RE to RG 27000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
90 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RC 34000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
91 Floor From R1 to R7 and RE to RG 34000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-69
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Column Line or
Region
700 +15,-10
92 Roof From R1 to R7 and RB to RF 52700
(2'-3⅝") (+½",-⅜")
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-70
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-1
Nominal Dimension* Tolerance*
Key Dimension Reference Dimension mm mm
(ft-in) (ft)
Distance from RPV Centreline to Outside Surface of Wall at Column 24500 +/-300
Line RA when Measured at Column Line R1 X1 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Line RG when Measured at Column Line R1 X2 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Line R1 when Measured at Column Line RA X3 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Line R7 when Measured at Column Line RA X4 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Distance from Top of Basemat Outside Containment to Design Plant 16150 +/-300
Grade X5 (Figure 2.16.5-10)
(53'-0") (+/- 1')
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof 48050 +/-300
X6 (Figure 2.16.5-10)
(157'- 7 ¾") (+/- 1')
2.16-71
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building

1. The RB is designed and constructed to Analyses of the as-built RB will be The as-built RB conforms to the structural
accommodate the dynamic, static and conducted. design basis loads specified in the Design
thermal loading conditions associated Description of this subsection 2.16.5
with the various loads and load associated with:
combinations, which form the structural • Natural phenomena—wind, floods,
design basis. The loads are (as tornados (including tornado
applicable) those associated with: missiles), earthquakes, rain and
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, snow.
tornados (including tornado • Internal events—floods, pipe breaks
missiles), earthquakes, rain and including LOCA and missiles.
snow. • Normal plant operation—live loads,
• Internal events—floods, pipe breaks dead loads, temperature effects and
including LOCA and missiles. building vibration loads.
• Normal plant operation—live loads,
dead loads, temperature effects and
building vibration loads.
2. The functional arrangement of the RB is Inspections of the as-built RB will be The RB conforms to the functional
as described in the Design Description conducted. arrangement described in the Design
of this Subsection 2.16.5 and is as Description of this Subsection 2.16.5 and
shown in Figures 2.16.5-1 through is as shown in Figures 2.16.5-1 through
2.16.5-11. 2.16.5-11.
2.16-72
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2

3. The critical dimensions used for seismic Inspection of the RB will be Reconciliation of construction deviations
analyses and the acceptable tolerances performed. Deviations from the from the critical dimensions and tolerances
are provided in Table 2.16.5-1. design conditions will be analyzed specified in Table 2.16.5-1 will
using the design basis loads. demonstrate that the as-built RB will
withstand the design basis loads specified
in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.5 without loss of structural
integrity or the safety-related functions.
4. The RB CONAVS area design provides Leakage rate testing of the as-built RB The RB CONAVS area leakage rate under
a holdup volume and delays release of CONAVS area under a differential the conditions expected to exist during a
radioactivity to the environment pressure of 62.3 Pa (0.25 in wg.) will LOCA is < 141.6 l/s (300 cfm).
consistent with the LOCA dose analysis be conducted.
maximum exfiltration assumptions.
5. The RB provides three-hour fire barriers Inspections of the as-built RB will be Each division is separated by fire barriers
for separation of the four independent conducted. having > 3-hour fire ratings.
safe shutdown divisions.
2.16-73
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2

6. For external flooding, the RB Inspection of the as-built flood control The as-built RB conforms with the
incorporates structural provisions into features will be conducted. following flood protection features
the plant design to protect the structures, specified in the Design Description of this
systems, or components from postulated subsection 2.16.5.
flood and groundwater conditions. This • Wall thicknesses below flood level
approach provides: are designed to withstand
• Wall thicknesses below flood level hydrostatic loads;
designed to withstand hydrostatic • Water stops in all expansion and
loads; construction joints below design
• Water stops in all expansion and basis maximum flood and
construction joints below design groundwater levels;
basis maximum flood and • Waterproofing of external surfaces
groundwater levels; below design basis maximum flood
• Waterproofing of external surfaces and groundwater levels;
below design basis maximum flood • Water seals in external walls at pipe
and groundwater levels; penetrations below design basis
• Water seals in external walls at pipe maximum flood and groundwater
and electrical penetrations below levels;
design basis maximum flood and • Roofs are built to prevent pooling of
groundwater levels; large amounts of water in excess of
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling the structural capacity of the roof
of large amounts of water in excess for design loads; and.
of the structural capacity of the roof • Exterior access opening sealed in
for design loads; and external walls below flood and
• Exterior access opening sealed in groundwater levels.
external walls below flood and
groundwater levels.
2.16-74
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2

7. Protective features used to mitigate or Inspections of the as-built RB flood The following flood protection features
eliminate the consequences of internal protection features will be conducted. specified in the Design Description 2.16.5
flooding are: are in place in the as-built RB to mitigate
• Structural enclosures or barriers or eliminate the consequences of internal
• Curbs and sills flooding:
• Leakage detection components • Structural enclosures or barriers
• Drainage systems • Curbs and sills
• Leakage detection components
• Drainage systems
8. The internal flooding protection features Inspections of the as-built RB flood The following flood protection features
prevent flood water in one division from protection features will be conducted. specified in the Design Description 2.16.5
propagating to other division(s) and are in place in the as-built RB to prevent
ensure equipment necessary for safe flood water in one division from
shutdown is located above the propagating to other division(s) and to
maximum flood level for that location ensure equipment necessary for safe
or is qualified for flood conditions by: shutdown not located above the maximum
• Divisional walls flood level for that location is qualified for
• Sills flood conditions:
• Watertight doors • Divisional walls
• Sills
• Watertight doors
9a. The RB is protected against Inspections of the RB subcompartments The as-built RB subcompartments which
pressurization effects associated with that rely on overpressure protection rely on overpressure protection devices
postulated rupture of pipes containing devices will be conducted. are equipped with over pressure
high-energy fluid that occur in protection devices specified in the Design
subcompartments of the RB. Description 2.16.5.
2.16-75
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2

9b. The RB structure in the refuel floor area Inspection and analysis of the as-built The as-built RB structure overpressure
is equipped with overpressure protection RB structure overpressure protection protection devices specified in the Design
devices in the event of overpressure of devices will be performed. Description 2.16.5 can relieve excessive
this area. positive pressure generated by steam
buildup during auxiliary pool design
boiling conditions.
10. The Reactor Building CONAVS area Inspections of the as-built dimensions The as-built RB CONAVS area volume
volume meets design assumptions for of the areas in the RB credited in the meets design assumptions for the mixing
the mixing of fission products following design basis mixing analysis will be of fission products following a LOCA.
a LOCA. performed. The results will be
compared to the calculation of the
total mixing volume to verify that the
results match the assumptions.
11. RTNSS equipment in the RB is located Inspections of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the RB
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the RB will be is located above the maximum flood level
location or is qualified for flood conducted. for that location or is qualified for flood
conditions. conditions.
12. The buffer pool is a reinforced concrete Inspection and analysis of the as-built The as-built buffer pool is a reinforced
structure with a stainless steel liner that buffer pool will be performed. concrete structure with a stainless steel
is equipped with embedments designed liner that is equipped with embedments
to Seismic Category I requirements. and can withstand seismic dynamic loads
without loss of structural integrity.
2.16-76
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.5-2
13. Doors that connect the RB with the EB Inspections of the doors for RB to EB The doors connecting the RB to EB are
galleries are watertight for flooding of galleries will be conducted. watertight doors.
the galleries up to the ground level
elevation.
14. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built
and Seismic Category NS Structures, performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic
Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their
impair the ability of safety-related SSCs Category NS SSCs will not impair the failure will not impair the adequacy and
to perform their safety-related functions. ability of safety-related SSCs to acceptability of safety-related SSCs to
perform their safety-related functions. perform their safety-related functions.
15 Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built
and Seismic Category NS Structures, performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category
Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic NS SSCs confirm that their failure will
impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B Category NS SSCs will not impair the not impair the adequacy and acceptability
SSCs to function following a seismic ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function
event. function following a seismic event. following a seismic event.
2.16-77
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Note: Subsection 1.1.2-4 applies to this figure.

Figure 2.16.5-1. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –11500
2.16-78
{{{Security-Related Information – Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390}}}
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Note: Subsection 1.1.2.4 applies to this figure.

2.16-79
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Note: Subsection 1.1.2.4 applies to this figure

2.16-80
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.5-4. RB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650
2.16-81
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-82
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-83
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-84
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-85
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-86
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.5-10. RB Concrete Outline N-S Section
2.16-87
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.5-11. RB Concrete Outline E-W Section
2.16-88
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.6 Control Building

Design Description
The Control Building (CB) houses the essential electrical, control and instrumentation
equipment, the Main Control Room (MCR), and the CB HVAC equipment. The CB is a
reinforced concrete box type shear wall structure consisting of walls and slabs and is supported
on a foundation mat. The CB structure is a Seismic Category I structure.
The key characteristics of the CB are as follows:
(1) The CB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static, and thermal
the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles), earthquakes,
rain and snow.
• Internal events—floods
• Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects.
(2) The functional arrangement of the CB is as described in the Design Description of this
(3) The critical CB dimensions used for seismic analyses and the acceptable tolerances are
provided in Table 2.16.6-1.
(4) The MCR envelope is separated from the rest of the CB by walls, floors, doors and
penetrations, which have three-hour fire ratings.
(5) The lowest elevation in the CB is divided into separate divisional areas for instrumentation
and control equipment. CB flooding resulting from component failures in any of the CB
divisions does not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.
For external flooding, protection features are:
• Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
• Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads.
• Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum
flood and groundwater levels.
• Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and
groundwater levels;
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis
maximum flood and groundwater levels; and
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the
structural capacity of the roof for design loads.
For internal flooding, protection features are:
2.16-89
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• Flood water in one division is prevented from propagating to other division(s) by

divisional walls, sills and watertight doors.
• Equipment necessary for safe shutdown is located above the maximum flood level for
that location or is qualified for flood conditions.
(6) RTNSS equipment in the CB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
(7) Doors that connect the CB with the EB galleries are watertight for flooding of the galleries
up to the ground level elevation.
acceptance criteria for the Control Building.
2.16-90
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-1
Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 1
Column Line or
Region
Wall at Column Line C1 From CA to CD From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
1
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C5 From CA to CD From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
2
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CA From C1 to C5 From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
3
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CD From C1 to C5 From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
4
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C3 From CA to CB From -7400 to -2500 1000 +25,-20
5
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1", ¾")
Wall at Column Line C3 From CC to CD From -7400 to -2500 1000 +25,-20
6
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1", ¾")
Wall at Column Line C1 From CA to CD From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
7
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C5 From CA to CD From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
8
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CA From C1 to C5 From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
9
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CD From C1 to C5 From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
10
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Basemat From C1 to C5 and CA to CD -7400 3000 +50,-20
11
(9'-10") (+2",- ¾")
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD -2000 500 +15,-10
12
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
2.16-91
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-1
Column Line or
Region
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 4650 500 +15,-10
13
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 9060 500 +15,-10
14
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Roof From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 13800 700 +15,-10
15
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
2.16-92
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-1
(ft-in) (ft)
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line CA to Column 10400 ±300
Line CB when Measured at Column Line C1 X1 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(34'-1 ⅜") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line CD to Column 13400 ±300
Line CB when Measured at Column Line C1 X2 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(43'-11 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line C1 to Column 15150 ±300
Line C3 when Measured at Column Line CA X3 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(49'-8 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line C5 to Column 15150 ±300
Line C3 when Measured at Column Line CA X4 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(49'-8 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Top of Basemat to Design Plant Grade 12050 ±300
X5 (Figure 2.16.6-5)
(39'-6 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof 9150 ±300
X6 (Figure 2.16.6-5)
(30'-0 ¼") (± 1')
2.16-93
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building

1. The CB is designed and constructed to Analyses of the as-built CB loads The as-built CB conforms to the structural
accommodate the dynamic, static, and will be conducted. design basis loads specified in the Design
thermal loading conditions associated with Description of this subsection 2.16.6
the various loads and load combinations, associated with:
which form the structural design basis. The • Natural phenomena—wind, floods,
loads are those associated with: tornadoes (including tornado
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow.
tornadoes (including tornado missiles), • Internal events—floods.
earthquakes, rain and snow. • Normal plant operation—live loads,
• Internal events—floods. dead loads and temperature effects
• Normal plant operation—live loads,
dead loads and temperature effects.
2. The functional arrangement of the CB is as Inspections of the as-built CB The CB conforms to the functional
described in the Design Description of this will be conducted. arrangement described in the Design
Subsection 2.16.6 and is as shown in Description of this Subsection 2.16.6 and as
Figures 2.16.6-1 through 2.16.6-5. shown in Figures 2.16.6-1 through 2.16.6-5.
3. The critical CB dimensions and acceptable Inspection of the as-built CB will Reconciliation of construction deviations
tolerance are provided in Table 2.16.6-1. be performed. Deviations from from the critical dimensions and tolerances
the design conditions will be specified in Table 2.16.6-1 demonstrates
analyzed using the design basis that the as-built CB will withstand the
loads. design basis loads specified in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.16.6
without loss of structural integrity or the
2.16-94
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-2

4. The MCR envelope is separated from the Inspections of the as-built CB The as-built CB has a MCR envelope
rest of the CB by walls, floors, doors and will be conducted. separated from the rest of the CB by walls,
penetrations, which have three-hour fire floors, doors and penetrations with >3-hour
ratings. fire rating.
2.16-95
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-2

5. The lowest elevation in the CB is divided Inspections of the as-built CB The as-built CB contains the following
into separate divisional areas for flood control features will be features:
instrumentation and control equipment. conducted. For external flooding:
CB flooding resulting from component • Exterior access openings are sealed in
failures in any of the CB divisions does not
external walls below flood and
prevent safe shutdown of the reactor. groundwater levels.
For external flooding, protection features • Wall thickness below flood level
are: designed to withstand hydrostatic
• Exterior access openings sealed in loads.
external walls below flood and • Water stops in all expansion and
groundwater levels. construction joints below design basis
• Wall thickness below flood level maximum flood and groundwater
designed to withstand hydrostatic levels.
loads. • Waterproofing of external surfaces
• Water stops in all expansion and below design basis maximum flood
construction joints below design basis and groundwater levels;
maximum flood and groundwater • Water seals in external walls at pipe
levels. and electrical penetrations below
• Waterproofing of external surfaces design basis maximum flood and
below design basis maximum flood groundwater levels; and
and groundwater levels; • Roofs designed to prevent pooling of
large amounts of water in excess of
the structural capacity of the roof for
design loads.
2.16-96
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-2

5. (continued) For internal flooding:
• Water seals in external walls at pipe • Flood water in one division is
and electrical penetrations below prevented from propagating to other
design basis maximum flood and division(s) by divisional walls, sills
groundwater levels; and and watertight doors.
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of • Equipment necessary for safe
large amounts of water in excess of the shutdown is located above the
structural capacity of the roof for maximum flood level for that location
design loads. or is qualified for flood conditions.
For internal flooding, protection features
are:
• Flood water in one division is
prevented from propagating to other
division(s) by divisional walls, sills
and watertight doors.
• Equipment necessary for safe
shutdown is located above the
maximum flood level for that location
or is qualified for flood conditions.
6. RTNSS equipment in the CB is located Inspections of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the CB is
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the CB will be located above the maximum flood level for
location or is qualified for flood conditions. conducted. that location or is qualified for flood
conditions.
7. Doors that connect the CB with the EB Inspections of the doors for CB to The doors connecting the CB to EB are
galleries are watertight for flooding of the EB galleries will be conducted. watertight doors.
galleries up to the ground level elevation.
2.16-97
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.6-2

8. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic
Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems performed to verify failure of as- Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs
or Components (SSCs) will not impair the built Seismic Category II and confirm that their failure will not impair the
ability of safety-related SSCs to perform Seismic Category NS SSCs will adequacy and acceptability of safety-related
their safety-related functions. not impair the ability of safety- SSCs to perform their safety-related
related SSCs to perform their functions.
9. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic
Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems performed to verify failure of as- Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs
or Components (SSCs) will not impair the built Seismic Category II and confirm that their failure will not impair the
ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to Seismic Category NS SSCs will adequacy and acceptability of RTNSS
function following a seismic event. not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a
Criterion B SSCs to function seismic event.
2.16-98
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.6-1. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –7400
2.16-99
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.6-2. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –2000
2.16-100
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Figure 2.16.6-3. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650
2.16-101
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.6-4. CB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 9060
2.16-102
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Figure 2.16.6-5. CB Concrete Outline E-W Section
2.16-103
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2.16.7 Fuel Building

Design Description
The Fuel Building (FB) contains the spent fuel pool, cask loading area, fuel handling systems
and storage areas, lower connection to the Fuel Transfer System, overhead crane, and other plant
systems and equipment. The FB is a Seismic Category I structure except for the penthouse that
houses HVAC equipment. The penthouse is a Seismic Category II structure. The FB is a
rectangular reinforced concrete box type shear wall structure consisting of walls and slabs and is
supported on a foundation mat. The FB is integrated with the RB, sharing a common wall
between the RB and FB as well as a large common foundation mat. The building is partially
below grade.
There is no safety-related component in the FB that could be affected by internal flooding in this
structure. Flooding in the FB could not affect the RB because the connection points in the lower
elevation are watertight. To protect the FB against external flooding, penetrations in the external
walls below flood level are provided with watertight seals.
The key characteristics of the FB are as follows:
(1) The FB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic, static, and thermal
the structural design basis. The loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (including tornado missiles),
earthquakes, rain and snow;
• Internal events—floods;
• Normal plant operation—live loads, dead loads and temperature effects; and
• Loads from spent fuel storage racks.
(2) The functional arrangement of the FB is as described in the Design Description of this
(3) The critical dimensions and acceptable tolerances for the FB are as described in Table
2.16.7-1.
(4) The walls forming the boundaries of the FB and penetrations through these walls have
three-hour fire ratings.
(5) The FB external flooding protection features are:
• Exterior access openings are sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater
levels;
• Wall thickness below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads;
• Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in external walls below
flood and groundwater levels;
flood and groundwater levels; and
2.16-104
26A6641AB Rev. 10

(6) Internal flooding analysis of the FB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines
to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.
(7) RTNSS equipment in the FB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
(8) The spent fuel pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is
equipped with embedments designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
(9) The gates that connect the SFP to adjacent pools are designed to Seismic Category I
requirements, and are designed so that the bottom of the gate is at least 3.05 m (10.0 ft)
above TAF.
(10) The FB structure above the spent fuel pool is equipped with overpressure protection
devices in the event of overpressure of this area.
acceptance criteria for the Fuel Building.
2.16-105
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-1
Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1
Column Line or
Region
3640 +25,-20
1 Wall at Column Line F3 From FA to between FB and FC From -10000 to 3350
(11'-11¼") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
2 Wall at Column Line F3 From between FB and FC to FF From -11500 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
3 Wall at Column Line FA From F1 to F3 From -10000 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
4 Wall at Column Line FF From F1 to F3 From -11500 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
4500 +25,-20
5 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FA to FB From -10000 to 4650
(14'- ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1935 +25,-20
6 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FB to between FB and FC From -10000 to 4650
(6'-4 ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
7 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to -6400
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 (Wall between Cask 1000 +25,-20
8 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to 4650
Pit and Incline Fuel Transfer Tube Pit) (3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
9 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FE to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
10 Wall at Column Line F2 From between FE and FF to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1150 +25,-20
11 Wall between Column Lines F2 and F3 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to -1300
(3'-9 ¼") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
12 Wall between Column Lines F2 and F3 From FE to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-106
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-1
Column Line or
Region
1500 +25,-20
13 Wall between Column Lines FB and FC From between F1 and F2 to F3 From -10000 to 4650
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
14 Wall at Column Line FC From F1 to between F1 and F2 From -11500 to 4650
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
15 Wall at Column Line FC From between F1 and F2 to F3 From -11500 to 3350
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
From between F1 and F2 to F2 1000 +25,-20

16 Wall at Column Line FE From -11500 to -7200
and F3 (3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
600 +15,-10
17 Wall at Column Line FE From between F2 and F3 to F3 From -11500 to -7200
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
2000 +25,-20
18 Wall between Column Lines FB and FC From F1 to F1 and F2 From -6400 to 4650
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
19 Wall between Column Lines F2 and F3 From between FB and FC to FC From -1300 to 3350
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
20 Wall at Column Line F3 From FA to FF From 4650 to 21800
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
21 Wall at Column Line FA From F1 to F3 From 4650 to 21800
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
Wall at Column Line FF 1000 +25,-20
22 From F1 to F3 From 4650 to 21800
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
Basemat of Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, and Incline Fuel 5500 +50,-20
23 Transfer Tube Pit Not Applicable -10000
(18"-0 ½") (+2", ¾")
Basemat excluding Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, and Incline 4000 +50,-20
24 Fuel Transfer Tube Pit Not Applicable -11500
(13'-1 ½") (+2", ¾")
2.16-107
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-1
Column Line or
Region
Floor 800 +15,-10
25 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF -6400
(2'-7 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor 800 +15,-10
26 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF -1000
(2'-7 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor (Cask Pit) 1175 +25,-20
27 Not Applicable -1300
(3'-10") (+1",- ¾")
Floor 1300 +25,-20
28 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF 4650
(4'-3 ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
Roof 700 +15,-10
29 From F1 to F3 and FA to FF 22500
(2'- 3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
2.16-108
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-1
(ft-in) (in)
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line FA to Column 21700 +300,-200
Line FC when Measured at Column Line F1 X1 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(71'-2⅜") (+12",-7⅞")
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line FF to Column 27300 ±300
Line FC when Measured at Column Line F1 X2 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(89'-6¾") (±12")
Distance between Outside Surface of Walls at Column Lines R7 and F3 21000 +300,-200
when Measured at Column Line FA X3 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(68'-10¾") (+12",-7⅞")
Distance from Top of Basemat to Design Plant Grade (Basemat 16150 ±300
excluding Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, and Incline Fuel Transfer Tube X4 (Figure 2.16.7-6)
Pit) (52'-11⅞") (±12")
Deleted
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof (Excluding 17850 ±300
Seismic Category-II Portion) X5(Figure 2.16.7-6)
(58'-6¾") (±12")
2.16-109
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building

1. The FB is designed and constructed to Analyses of the as-built FB will be The as-built FB conforms to the structural
accommodate the dynamic, static, and conducted. design basis loads specified in the Design
thermal loading conditions associated Description of this subsection 2.16.7
combinations, which form the • Natural phenomena—wind, floods,
structural design basis. The loads are tornadoes (including tornado
those associated with: missiles), earthquakes, rain and
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, snow;
tornadoes (including tornado • Internal events—floods; and
missiles), earthquakes, rain and • Normal plant operation—live
snow; loads, dead loads and temperature
• Internal events—floods; effects; and
• Normal plant operation—live • Loads from spent fuel storage
loads, dead loads and temperature racks.
effects; and
• Loads from spent fuel storage
racks.
2. The functional arrangement of the FB Inspections of the as-built FB will be The FB conforms to the functional
is as described in the Design conducted. arrangement described in the Design
Description of this Subsection 2.16.7 Description of this Subsection 2.16.7 and
and is as shown in Figures 2.16.7-1 as shown in Figures 2.16.7-1 through
through 2.16.7-6. 2.16.7-6.
2.16-110
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-2

3. The critical dimensions and acceptable Inspection of the FB will be performed. Reconciliation of construction deviations
tolerances for the FB are as described Deviations from the design conditions from the critical dimensions and
in Table 2.16.7-1. will be analyzed using the design basis tolerances specified in Table 2.16.7-1 will
loads. demonstrate that the as-built FB will
withstand the design basis loads specified
in the Design Description of this
Subsection 2.16.7 without loss of
structural integrity or the safety-related
functions.
4. The walls forming the boundaries of Inspections of the as-built FB walls and The as-built walls forming the
the FB and penetrations through these penetrations will be conducted. boundaries of the FB and penetrations
walls have three-hour fire ratings. through these walls have > 3-hour fire
ratings.
2.16-111
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Table 2.16.7-2

5. The FB is protected against an external Inspection of the as-built FB flood The following as-built FB flood protection
flooding. control features will be conducted. features exist:
Protection features are: Protection features are:
• Exterior access openings are sealed • Exterior access openings are sealed
in external walls below flood and in external walls below flood and
groundwater levels; groundwater levels.
• Wall thickness below flood level • Wall thickness below flood level
designed to withstand hydrostatic designed to withstand hydrostatic
loads; loads;
• Water seals at pipe and electrical • Water seals at pipe and electrical
penetrations are installed in penetrations are installed in
external walls below flood and external walls below flood and
groundwater levels. groundwater levels.
• Water stops in all expansion and • Water stops in all expansion and
construction joints below design construction joints below design
basis maximum flood and basis maximum flood and
groundwater levels; and groundwater levels; and
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling • Roofs designed to prevent pooling
of large amounts of water in excess of large amounts of water in excess
of the structural capacity of the of the structural capacity of the
roof for design loads. roof for design loads.
6. Internal flooding analysis of the FB is Internal flooding analysis of the FB will Internal flooding analysis of the FB has
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
1988 guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
RTNSS equipment. RTNSS equipment.
2.16-112
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-2

7. RTNSS equipment in the FB is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the FB
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the FB will be conducted. is located above the maximum flood level
location or is qualified for flood for that location or is qualified for flood
conditions. condition.
8. The spent fuel pool is a reinforced Inspection or analysis of the as-built The as-built spent fuel pool is a reinforced
concrete structure with a stainless steel spent fuel pool will be performed. concrete structure with a stainless steel
liner that is equipped with embedments liner that is equipped with embedments
designed to Seismic Category I and can withstand seismic dynamic loads
requirements. without loss of structural integrity.
9. The gates that connect the SFP to Inspection of the as-built spent fuel pool The gates that connect the SFP to adjacent
adjacent pools are designed to Seismic will be performed. pools can withstand seismic dynamic loads
Category I requirements, and are without loss of structural integrity, and are
designed so that the bottom of the gate built so that the bottom of the gate is at
is at least 3.05 m (10.0 ft) above TAF. least 3.05 m (10.0 ft) above TAF.
10. The FB structure above the spent fuel Inspection and analysis of the as-built The as-built FB structure overpressure
pool is equipped with overpressure FB structure overpressure protection protection devices specified in the Design
protection devices in the event of devices will be performed. Description 2.16.7 can relieve excessive
overpressure of this area. positive pressure generated by steam
buildup during SFP design boiling
conditions.
11. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built Seismic
and Seismic Category NS Structures, performed to verify failure of as-built Category II and Seismic Category NS
Systems or Components (SSCs) will Seismic Category II and Seismic SSCs confirm that their failure will not
not impair the ability of safety-related Category NS SSCs will not impair the impair the adequacy and acceptability of
SSCs to perform their safety-related ability of safety-related SSCs to perform safety-related SSCs to perform their
functions. their safety-related functions. safety-related functions.
2.16-113
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.7-2

Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic SSCs confirm that their failure will not
impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B Category NS SSCs will not impair the impair the adequacy and acceptability of
SSCs to function following a seismic ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function
2.16-114
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Figure 2.16.7-1. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL –11500
2.16-115
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-116
26A6641AB Rev. 10

2.16-117
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.7-4. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 4650
2.16-118
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.7-5. FB Concrete Outline Plan at EL 22500
2.16-119
26A6641AB Rev. 10

Figure 2.16.7-6. FB Concrete Outline N-S Section
2.16-120
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.8 Turbine Building

Design Description
The Turbine Building (TB) encloses the turbine generator, main condenser, condensate and
feedwater systems, condensate purification system, offgas system, turbine-generator support
systems and bridge crane. The TB is designed as a Seismic Category II structure.
The key characteristics of the TB are as follows:
(1) The TB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the
load combinations and the acceptance criteria, for loads associated with:
• Natural phenomenon –wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles),
earthquakes, rain and snow. In addition, the TB is designed for hurricane wind to
protect RTNSS systems.
• Normal plant operation – live loads and dead loads.
(2) The RTNSS systems in the TB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane
wind and missiles.
(3) The internal flooding analysis of the TB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988
guidelines to ensure protection of RTNSS equipment.
(4) RTNSS equipment in the TB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
(5) The TB external flooding features are:
• Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below flood and
groundwater levels.
• Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints below flood and
groundwater levels.
(6) The TB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from
the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built TB structural integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the TB.
2.16-121
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.8-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Building
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The TB analysis and design is the same Analyses of the TB will be conducted. The TB analysis and design is the same as
as a Seismic Category I structure, a Seismic Category I structure including
including the load combinations and the the load combinations and the acceptance
acceptance criteria, for loads associated criteria, for loads associated with:
with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods,
• Natural phenomenon –wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado
tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain, snow
missiles), earthquakes, rain and and hurricane wind (for RTNSS
snow. In addition, the TB is protection).
designed for hurricane wind to • Normal plant operations – live
protect RTNSS systems. loads and dead loads.
• Normal plant operation—live loads
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the TB are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the TB are
surrounded by barriers to protect them systems in the TB will be conducted. surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. from hurricane wind and missiles.
3. The internal flooding analysis of the TB Internal flooding analysis of the TB Internal flooding analysis of the TB has
is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- will be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
1988 guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
4. RTNSS equipment in the TB is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the TB
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the TB will be is located above the maximum flood level
condition. condition.
2.16-122
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.8-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Building

5. The TB is protected against external Inspection of the as-built TB flood The following as-built TB flood
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted protection features exist:
features are: • Water seals at pipe penetrations are
• Water seals at pipe penetrations are installed in external walls below
installed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in
• Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints
expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater
below flood and groundwater levels. levels.
6. The TB is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built TB is constructed in
with the design documents, with any of the as-built TB will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
deviations from the design documents with any deviations reconciled
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built TB appropriately to demonstrate structural
structural integrity. integrity.
2.16-123
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.9 Radwaste Building

Design Description
The Radwaste Building (RW) is a box-shaped reinforced concrete structure housing tanks and
equipment including processing systems for radioactive liquid and solid waste processing. The
RW is designed in accordance with RG 1.143 Classification RW-IIa with additional
requirements for: Tornado Wind Speed, Radius, Pressure drop, and Rate of Pressure Drop. The
RW structure is designed for full Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) instead of ½ SSE.
The key characteristics of the RW are as follows:
(1) The RW method of analysis is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the
load combinations and the acceptance criteria. The RW is designed in accordance with RG
1.143 Classification RW-IIa. The earthquake loading is the full SSE instead of ½ SSE as
shown in RG 1.143. The RW loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomenon – wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain
and snow.
• Internal events - floods
(2) The RW external flooding features are:
• Water seals at pipe penetrations installed in external walls below flood and
groundwater levels.
groundwater levels.
(3) The RW is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from
the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built RW structural integrity.
Table 2.16.9-1 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the RW.
2.16-124
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.9-1
ITAAC For The Radwaste Building

1. The RW method of analysis is the same Analyses of the RW will be The RW method of analysis is the same as
as a Seismic Category I structure, conducted. a Seismic Category I structure, including
including the load combinations and the the load combinations and the acceptance
acceptance criteria. The RW is designed criteria. The RW is designed in
in accordance with RG 1.143 accordance with RG 1.143 Classification
Classification RW-IIa. The earthquake RW-IIa. The earthquake loading is the full
loading is the full SSE instead of ½ SSE SSE instead of ½ SSE as shown in RG
as shown in RG 1.143. The RW loads 1.143. The RW loads are those associated
are those associated with: with:
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, • Natural phenomena – wind, floods,
tornadoes, tornado missiles, tornadoes, tornado missiles,
earthquakes, rain and snow. earthquakes, rain and snow.
• Internal events - floods • Internal events – floods.
• Normal plant operation—live loads • Normal plant operation – live loads
and dead loads. and dead loads.
2. The RW is protected against external Inspection of the as-built RW flood The following as-built RW flood
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted. protection features exist:
2.16-125
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.9-1
ITAAC For The Radwaste Building

3. The RW is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built RW is constructed in
with the design documents, with any of the as-built RW will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built appropriately to demonstrate structural
RW structural integrity. integrity.
2.16-126
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.10 Service Building

Design Description
The Service Building (SB) houses the equipment and control facilities associated with personnel
entry into the power block, health physics operations offices, and the operations support center.
The SB is designed as a Seismic Category II structure.
The key characteristics of the SB are as follows:
(1) The SB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the
• Natural phenomenon – wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles),
earthquakes, rain and snow.
(2) The SB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are:
groundwater levels.
groundwater levels.
(3) The SB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations from
the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SB structural integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the SB.
2.16-127
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.10-1
ITAAC For The Service Building

1. The Service Building (SB) analysis and Analyses of the SB will be conducted. The SB analysis and design is the same as
design is the same as a Seismic Category a Seismic Category I structure, including
I structure, including the load the load combinations and the acceptance
combinations and the acceptance criteria, criteria, for loads associated with:
for loads associated with: • Natural phenomena – wind, floods,
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado
tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles), earthquakes, rain and
missiles), earthquakes, rain and snow.
snow. • Normal plant operation – live loads
• Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.
and dead loads.
2. The SB is protected against external Inspection of the as-built SB flood The following as-built SB flood protection
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted features exist:
3. The SB is constructed in accordance with Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built SB is constructed in
the design documents, with any of the as-built SB will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SB appropriately to demonstrate structural
2.16-128
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.11 Ancillary Diesel Building

Design Description
The Ancillary Diesel Building (ADB) houses the Ancillary Diesel Generators and their
associated supporting systems and equipment. The ADB is designed as a Seismic Category II
structure.
The key characteristics of the ADB are as follows:
(1) The ADB analysis and design is the same as a Seismic Category I structure, including the
• Natural phenomenon –wind, floods, tornadoes (excluding tornado missiles),
earthquakes, rain and snow. In addition, the ADB is designed for hurricane wind to
protect RTNSS systems.
(2) The RTNSS systems in the ADB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane
wind and missiles.
(3) Internal flooding analysis of the ADB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988
(4) RTNSS equipment in the ADB is located above the maximum flood level for that location
or is qualified for flood conditions.
(5) The ADB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are:
groundwater levels
groundwater levels.
(6) The ADB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviations
from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built ADB structural integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the ADB.
2.16-129
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Table 2.16.11-1
ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building

1. The Ancillary Diesel Building (ADB) Analyses of the ADB will be The ADB analysis and design is the same
analysis and design is the same as a conducted. as a Seismic Category I structure,
Seismic Category I structure, including including the load combinations and the
the load combinations and the acceptance acceptance criteria, for loads associated
criteria, for loads associated with: with:
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, • Natural phenomena – wind, floods,
tornadoes (excluding tornado tornadoes (excluding tornado
missiles), earthquakes, rain and missiles), earthquakes, rain, snow
snow. In addition, the ADB is and hurricane wind (for RTNSS
designed for hurricane wind to protection).
protect RTNSS systems. • Normal plant operation – live loads
• Normal plant operation—live loads and dead loads.
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the ADB are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the ADB
surrounded by barriers to protect them systems in the ADB will be conducted. are surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. from hurricane wind and missiles
3. Internal flooding analysis of the ADB is Internal flooding analysis of the ADB The internal flooding analysis of the ADB
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 will be performed. has been performed using ANSI/ANS
guidelines to ensure protection of 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection
RTNSS equipment. of RTNSS equipment.
4. RTNSS equipment in the ADB is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the ADB will be ADB is located above the maximum flood
location or is qualified for flood conducted. level for that location or is qualified for
condition. flood condition.
2.16-130
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.11-1
ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building

5. The ADB is protected against external Inspection of the as-built ADB flood The following as-built ADB flood
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted protection features exist:
6. The ADB is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built ADB is constructed in
with the design documents, with any of the as-built ADB will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
ADB structural integrity. integrity.
Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic SSCs confirm that their failure will not
impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B Category NS SSCs will not impair the impair the adequacy and acceptability of
SSCs to function following a seismic ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function
2.16-131
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.12 Fire Water Service Complex

Design Description
The Firewater Service Complex (FWSC) consists of two Firewater Storage Tanks (FWS) and a
Fire Pump Enclosure (FPE) that share a common basemat. Each FWS is designed with a
cylindrical reinforced concrete wall and a dome-shaped reinforced concrete roof. The FWSC is a
Seismic Category I structure, non-safety related.
The key characteristics of the FWSC are as follows:
(1) The FWSC is designed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading conditions
associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural design
basis. The loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomenon – wind, floods, tornadoes, tornado missiles, earthquakes, rain
and snow.
(2) Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988
(3) RTNSS equipment in the FWSC is located above the maximum flood level for that
location or is qualified for flood conditions.
(4) The FWSC is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are:
• Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
• Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic loads.
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below flood and
groundwater levels
(5) The FWSC is constructed in accordance with the design documents with any deviation
from the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built FWSC structural
integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the FWSC.
2.16-132
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.12-1
ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex
1. The Firewater Service Complex (FWSC) Analyses of the FWSC will be The FWSC design conforms to the
is designed to accommodate the dynamic conducted structural design basis loads specified in
and static loading conditions associated the Design Description of Subsection
with the various loads and load 2.16.12 associated with:
combinations that form the structural • Natural phenomena - wind, floods,
design basis. The loads are those tornadoes, tornado missiles,
associated with: earthquakes, rain and snow.
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, • Normal plant operation—live loads
tornadoes, tornado missiles, and dead loads.
earthquakes, rain and snow.
• Normal plant operation—live loads
and dead loads.
2. Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC Internal flooding analysis of the Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC
is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- FWSC will be performed. has been performed using ANSI/ANS
1988 guidelines to ensure protection of 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection
RTNSS equipment. of RTNSS equipment.
3. RTNSS equipment in the FWSC is Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the
located above the maximum flood level equipment in the FWSC will be FWSC is located above the maximum
for that location or is qualified for flood conducted. flood level for that location or is qualified
conditions for flood condition.
2.16-133
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Table 2.16.12-1
ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex
4. The FWSC is protected against external Inspection of the as-built FWSC flood The following as-built FWSC flood
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted. protection features exist:
features are: • Exterior access openings sealed in
• Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and
external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
groundwater levels. • Wall thicknesses below flood level
• Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic
designed to withstand hydrostatic loads.
loads. • Water seals in external walls at pipe
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below
and electrical penetrations below flood and groundwater levels.
flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in all
• Water stops in all expansion and expansion and construction joints
construction joints below design below design basis maximum flood
basis maximum flood and and groundwater levels.
groundwater levels. • Roofs designed to prevent pooling
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of of large amounts of water in excess
large amounts of water in excess of of the structural capacity of the roof
the structural capacity of the roof for for design loads.
design loads.
5. The FWSC is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built FWSC is constructed in
with the design documents with any of the as-built FWSC will be accordance with the design documents
deviations from the design documents performed. with any deviations reconciled
FWSC structural integrity. integrity.
2.16-134
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.13 Electrical Building

Design Description
The Electrical Building (EB) houses the two non-safety-related standby diesel, associated
supporting systems and equipment, and non-safety-related power supplies. The EB also provides
space for the Technical Support Center. The EB is seismic category NS.
The key characteristics of the EB are as follows:
(1) The EB is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading
conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural
design basis. The loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomenon – hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow.
(2) The RTNSS systems in the EB are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane
wind and missiles.
(3) Internal flooding analysis of the EB is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines
(4) RTNSS equipment in the EB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
is qualified for flood condition.
(5) The EB is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are:
groundwater levels.
(6) The EB is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviation from
the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built EB structural integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the EB.
2.16-135
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.13-1
ITAAC For The Electrical Building
1. The Electrical Building (EB) is designed Analyses of the EB will be conducted The EB design conforms to the structural
to accommodate the dynamic and static design basis loads specified in the Design
loading conditions associated with the Description of Subsection 2.16.13
various loads and load combinations that associated with:
form the structural design basis. The • Natural phenomena - hurricane
loads are those associated with: wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and
• Natural phenomena - hurricane snow.
wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and • Normal plant operation - live loads
snow. and dead loads.
• Normal plant operation - live loads
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the EB are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the EB are
surrounded by barriers to protect them equipment in the EB will be surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. conducted. from hurricane wind and missiles.
3. Internal flooding analysis of the EB is Internal flooding analysis of the EB Internal flooding analysis of the EB has
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 will be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
4. RTNSS equipment in the EB is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the EB
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the EB will be is located above the maximum flood level
2.16-136
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.13-1
ITAAC For The Electrical Building
5. The EB is protected against external Inspection of the as-built EB flood The following as-built EB flood protection
features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical
• Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in
penetrations are installed in external external walls below flood and
walls below flood and groundwater groundwater levels.
levels. • Water stops are provided in
6. The EB is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built EB is constructed in
with the design documents with any of the as-built EB will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built EB appropriately to demonstrate structural
2.16-137
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.16.14 Service Water Building

Design Description
The Service Water Building (SF) houses the non-safety-related vertical pumps and associated
valves, strainers, piping and electrical buses. The SF is seismic category NS.
The key characteristics of the SF are as follows:
(1) The SF is designed and constructed to accommodate the dynamic and static loading
conditions associated with the various loads and load combinations that form the structural
design basis. The loads are those associated with:
• Natural phenomenon – hurricane wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and snow.
(2) The RTNSS systems in the SF are surrounded by barriers to protect them from hurricane
wind and missiles.
(3) Internal flooding analysis of the SF is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 guidelines
(4) RTNSS equipment in the SF is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
is qualified for flood condition.
(5) Plant Service Water equipment or other equipment designated as RTNSS that is located
outdoors is qualified for flood condition and protected from hurricane wind and missiles
when buried underground. RTNSS equipment that is not buried directly underground is
protected by cell enclosures that provide flooding, wind and missile protection.
(6) The SF is protected against external flooding. The following protection features are:
groundwater levels.
(7) The SF is constructed in accordance with the design documents, with any deviation from
the design documents reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SF structural integrity.
associated acceptance criteria for the SF.
2.16-138
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.16.14-1
ITAAC For The Service Water Building
1. The Service Water Building (SF) is Analyses of the SF will be conducted The SF design conforms to the structural
designed to accommodate the dynamic design basis loads specified in the Design
and static loading conditions associated Description of Subsection 2.16.14
combinations that form the structural • Natural phenomena - hurricane
design basis. The loads are those wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and
associated with: snow.
• Natural phenomena - hurricane • Normal plant operation - live loads
wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and and dead loads.
snow.
• Normal plant operation - live loads
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the SF are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the SF are
surrounded by barriers to protect them equipment in the SF will be conducted. surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. from hurricane wind and missiles.
3. Internal flooding analysis of the SF is Internal flooding analysis of the SF Internal flooding analysis of the SF has
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 will be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
4. RTNSS equipment in the SF is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the SF
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the SF will be conducted. is located above the maximum flood level
location or is qualified for flood for that location or is qualified for flood
2.16-139
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Table 2.16.14-1
ITAAC For The Service Water Building
5. Plant Service Water equipment or other Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment that is
equipment designated as RTNSS that is equipment located outdoors will be located outdoors is qualified for flood
located outdoors is qualified for flood conducted. condition and protected from hurricane
condition and protected from hurricane wind and missiles when buried
wind and missiles when buried underground. RTNSS equipment that is
underground. RTNSS equipment that is not buried directly underground is
not buried directly underground is protected by cell enclosures that provide
protected by cell enclosures that provide flooding wind and missile protection.
flooding, wind and missile protection.
6. The SF is protected against external Inspection of the as-built SF flood The following as-built SF flood protection
features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical
• Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in
penetrations are installed in external external walls below flood and
walls below flood and groundwater groundwater levels.
levels. • Water stops are provided in
7. The SF is constructed in accordance with Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built SF is constructed in
the design documents with any of the as-built SF will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SF appropriately to demonstrate structural
structural integrity integrity.
2.16-140
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2.17 Intake Structure and Servicing Equipment
2.17.1 Intake and Discharge Structure

2.17-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.18 YARD STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT
2.18.1 Oil Storage and Transfer Systems

2.18-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.18.2 Site Security

2.18-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
2.19 PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM

Design Description
The physical security system of the standard plant provides physical features to detect, delay,
assist response to, and defend against the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage.
The physical security system consists of physical barriers and an intrusion detection system. The
details of the physical security system are categorized as Safeguards Information. The physical
security system provides protection for vital equipment and plant personnel.
(1) a. Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.
b. Access to vital equipment requires passage through a vital area barrier.
(2) (Deleted)
(3) (Deleted)
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) The external walls, doors, ceiling and floors in the Main Control Room and Central
Alarm Station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) 752
(2006) Level 4.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) a. (Deleted)
b. (Deleted)
(9) (Deleted)
(10) Unoccupied vital areas are locked and alarmed with activated intrusion detection
systems that annunciate in the Central Alarm Station.
(11) a. (Deleted)
b. The Central Alarm Station is located inside a protected area and the interior is not
visible from the perimeter of the protected area.
(12) The secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment
contained in the Central Alarm Station and non-portable communications equipment
contained in the Central Alarm Station is located within a vital area.
(13) a. Security alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper
indicating and self-checking, (e.g. an automatic indication is provided when failure of
the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power) and alarm
annunciation indicates the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit
alarms) and location.
b. Intrusion detection and assessment systems provide visual display and audible
annunciation of the alarm in the Central Alarm Station.
2.19-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(14) Intrusion detection systems recording equipment exists to record onsite security alarm
annunciation including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper
indication and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.
(15) Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are alarmed and secured by
locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
(16) a. The central Alarm Station has conventional (land line) telephone service with the
control room and local law enforcement authorities.
b. The central Alarm Station is capable of continuous communication with security
personnel.
c. Non-portable communications equipment in the Central Alarm Station must remain
operable from an independent power source in the event of the loss of normal power.
Table 2.19-1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analysis, together with associated
acceptance criteria for physical security system.
2.19-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.19-1
ITAAC For The Plant Security

1a. Vital equipment is located only Inspections will be performed of all vital Vital equipment is located only within a
within a vital area. equipment locations. vital area.
1b. Access to vital equipment requires Inspections will be performed of all vital Vital equipment is located such that
passage through a vital area equipment locations. access to the vital equipment requires
barrier. passage through a vital area barrier.
2. (Deleted)
3. (Deleted)
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. The external walls, doors, ceiling Type test, analysis or a combination of The external walls, doors, ceilings, and
and floors in the Main Control type test and analysis of the external walls, floors in the Main Control Room and the
Room and Central Alarm Station doors, ceilings, and floors in the Main Central Alarm Station are bullet resistant
are bullet resistant to at least Control Room and Central Alarm Station to at least UL 752 Level 4.
Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) will be performed.
752 (2006) Level 4.
7. (Deleted)
8a. (Deleted)
8b. (Deleted)
9. (Deleted)
2.19-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.19-1

10. Unoccupied vital areas are locked Tests, inspections, or a combination of Unoccupied vital areas are locked and
and alarmed with activated tests and inspections of unoccupied vital intrusion is detected and annunciated in
intrusion detection systems that area intrusion detection equipment and the Central Alarm Station.
annunciate in the Central Alarm locking devices will be performed.
Station.
11a. (Deleted)
11b. The Central Alarm Station is Inspections of the Central Alarm Station The Central Alarm Station is located
located inside a protected area and location will be performed. inside a protected area and the interior is
the interior is not visible from the not visible from the perimeter of the
perimeter of the protected area. protected area.
12. The secondary security power Inspections of the secondary security The secondary security power supply for
supply system for alarm power supply will be performed. alarm annunciator equipment contained in
annunciator equipment contained the Central Alarm Station and
in the Central Alarm Station and non-portable communications equipment
non-portable communications contained in the Central Alarm Station is
equipment contained in the Central located within a vital area.
Alarm Station is located within a
vital area.
2.19-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.19-1

13a. Security alarm devices including Tests will be performed on all security Security alarm devices including
transmission lines to annunciators alarm devices and transmission lines. transmission lines to annunciators are
are tamper indicating and self- tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g.,
checking, (e.g. an automatic an automatic indication is provided when
indication is provided when failure failure of the alarm system or a
of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is
component occurs, or when on on standby power) and that alarm
standby power) and alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm,
annunciation indicates the type of (e.g., intrusion alarms, emergency exit
alarm, (e.g., intrusion alarms, alarms) and location.
emergency exit alarms) and
location.
13b. Intrusion detection and assessment Tests will be performed on intrusion The intrusion detection and assessment
systems provide visual display and detection and assessment systems. systems provide a visual display and
audible annunciation of the alarm audible annunciation of alarms in the
in the Central Alarm Station. Central Alarm Station.
14. Intrusion detection systems Tests will be performed on the intrusion Intrusion detection systems recording
recording equipment exists to detection systems recording equipment. equipment is capable of recording each
record onsite security alarm onsite security alarm annunciation
annunciation including the location including the location of the alarm, false
of the alarm, false alarm, alarm alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication
check, and tamper indication and and the type of alarm, location, alarm
the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.
circuit, date, and time.
2.19-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 2.19-1

15. Emergency exits through vital area Tests, inspections, or a combination of Emergency exits through vital area
boundaries are alarmed and tests and inspections of emergency exits boundaries are alarmed and secured by
secured by locking devices that through vital area boundaries will be locking devices that allow prompt egress
allow prompt egress during an performed. during an emergency.
emergency.
16a. The Central Alarm Station has Tests, inspections, or a combination of The Central Alarm Station is equipped
conventional (land line) telephone tests and inspections of the Central Alarm with conventional (land line) telephone
service with the control room and Station conventional (land line) telephone service with the control room and local
local law enforcement authorities. service will be performed. law enforcement authorities.
16b. The Central Alarm Station is Tests, inspections, or a combination of The Central Alarm Station is capable of
capable of continuous tests and inspections of the Central Alarm continuous communication with security
communication with security Station continuous communication officers, watchmen or armed response
personnel. capability will be performed. individuals, or other security personnel
that have responsibilities during a
contingency event.
16c. Non-portable communications Tests, inspections or a combination of Non-portable communication devices
equipment in the Central Alarm tests and inspections of the non-portable (including conventional telephone
Station must remain operable from communications equipment will be systems) in the Central Alarm Station are
an independent power source in the performed. wired to an independent power supply that
event of the loss of normal power. enables those systems to remain operable
(without disruption) during the loss of
normal power.
2.19-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3. NON-SYSTEM BASED MATERIAL

3.1 DESIGN OF PIPING SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS
Design Description
Piping systems and their components are designed and constructed in accordance with their
applicable design code requirements identified in the individual system design specifications.
The piping systems have a design life of 60 years. These requirements apply to systems that are
ASME B&PV Code Class 1, 2, or 3, and are subject to ASME (B&PV) Code, Section III,
pressure boundary requirements. The specific Tier 1 sections that contain these systems are as
follows:
2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1.2 Nuclear Boiler System
2.2.2 Control Rod Drive System
2.2.4 Standby Liquid Control System
2.4.1 Isolation Condenser System
2.4.2 Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.6.1 Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6.2 Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.11.1 Turbine Main Steam System
2.15.1 Containment System
2.15.4 Passive Containment Cooling System
(1) (Deleted)
(2) (Deleted)
(3) Systems, structures, and components, that are required to be functional during and
following an SSE, shall be protected against or qualified to withstand the dynamic and
environmental effects associated with analyses of postulated failures in Seismic Category I
and nonsafety-related piping systems.
(4) (Deleted)
(5) (Deleted)
(6) On an individual component or system basis, the as-built systems, structures, and
components shall be reconciled with the analyses results of the postulated failures in
Seismic Category I and nonsafety-related piping systems.
Table 3.1-1 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Piping Design.
3.1-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.1-1
ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components

1. (Deleted)
2. (Deleted)
3. Systems, structures, and components, Inspections of the as designed pipe-break The as-designed pipe-break analysis
that are required to be functional analysis results report will be conducted. concludes that for each postulated piping
during and following an SSE, shall be Pipe break events involving high-energy failure, the reactor can be shut down
protected against or qualified to fluid systems are analyzed for the effects safely. Reports document the results of
withstand the dynamic and of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, the analyses to determine where
environmental effects associated with room pressurization, and temperature protection features are necessary to
analyses of postulated failures in effects. Pipe break events involving mitigate the consequences of a pipe break.
Seismic Category I and nonsafety- moderate-energy fluid systems are {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
related piping systems. analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding,
and other environmental effects, as
appropriate.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
3.1-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.1-1
ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components

6. On an individual component or A reconciliation analysis using the as- On an individual component or system
system basis, the as-built systems, designed pipe-break analysis report and basis, the protective features are installed
structures, and components shall be as-built information will be performed. in the as-built plant as described in the
reconciled with the analyses results of Inspect the as-built piping systems and design and reconciliation analysis.
the postulated failures in Seismic equipment to identify that the features that
Category I and nonsafety-related protect against dynamic effects of pipe
piping systems. failures, such as whip restraints,
equipment shields, drainage systems, and
physical separation of piping, equipment,
and instrumentation are installed as
defined in the design analyses.
3.1-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.2 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Summary
Design Description
The safety-related Distributed Control and Information Systems (Q-DCIS) comprise the
platforms that are defined in Table 2.2.10-1. A subset of the nonsafety-related Distributed
Control and Information Systems (N-DCIS) comprise the network segments that are defined in
Table 2.2.11-1. These platforms and network segments comprise systems of integrated software
and hardware elements. Software projects are developed for the various platforms and network
segments.
Each platform and network segment software projects follows a development process that
comprises the following 3-stages:
(1) Develop the platform and network segment software plans and cyber security programs
for each platform. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
• Software Management Program Manual (SMPM)
- Software Management Plan (SMP)
- Software Development Plan (SDP)
- Software Integration Plan (SintP)
- Software Installation Plan (SIP)
- Software Operation and Maintenance Plan (SOMP)
- Software Training Plan (STrngP)
• Software Quality Assurance Program Manual (SQAPM)
- Software Quality Assurance Plan (SQAP)
- Software Safety Plan (SSP)
- Software Verification & Validation Plan (SVVP)
- Software Configuration Management Plan (SCMP)
- Software Test Plan (STP)
• Cyber Security Program Plan (CySPP)
- Cyber Security Program (CySP)
(2) Implement the software projects for each platform and network segment in accordance
with the approved platform and network segment software plans and cyber security
programs to ensure the process produces adequate software products at the conclusion of
each software life-cycle phase baseline as documented by the life-cycle phase Summary
Baseline Review Records (BRR).
(3) Perform a multiple-phase test process as part of the installation phase to confirm that the
as-built platform and network segment performs as designed.
In support of the above described software development process, the following 3-stage software
design commitments are made:
3.2-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
1a1. The SMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.

1a2. The SMP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1a3. The SMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1a4. The SMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1a5. The SMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1a6. The SMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1a7. The SMP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1a8. The SMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1a9. The SMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1b1. The SDP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1b2. The SDP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1b3. The SDP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1b4. The SDP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1b5. The SDP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1b6. The SDP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1b7. The SDP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1b8. The SDP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1b9. The SDP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1c1. The SIntP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1c2. The SIntP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1c3. The SIntP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1c4. The SIntP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1c5. The SIntP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1c6. The SIntP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1c7. The SIntP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1c8. The SIntP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1c9. The SintP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1d1. The SIP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1d2. The SIP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1d3. The SIP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1d4. The SIP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1d5. The SIP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
1d6. The SIP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1d7. The SIP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1d8. The SIP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1d9. The SIP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1e1. The SOMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1e2. The SOMP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1e3. The SOMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1e4. The SOMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1e5. The SOMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1e6. The SOMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1e7. The SOMP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1e8. The SOMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software
projects.
1e9. The SOMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1f1. The STrngP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1f2. The STrngP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1f3. The STrngP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1f4. The STrngP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1f5. The STrngP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1f6. The STrngP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1f7. The STrngP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1f8. The STrngP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software
projects.
1f9. The STrngP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1g1. The SQAP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1g2. The SQAP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1g3. The SQAP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1g4. The SQAP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1g5. The SQAP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1g6. The SQAP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1g7. The SQAP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1g8. The SQAP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1g9. The SQAP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
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1h1. The SSP is developed for the RTIF software projects.

1h2. The SSP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1h3. The SSP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1h4. The SSP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1h5. The SSP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1h6. The SSP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1h7. The SSP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1h8. The SSP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1h9. The SSP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1i1. The SVVP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1i2. The SVVP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1i3. The SVVP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1i4. The SVVP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1i5. The SVVP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1i6. The SVVP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1i7. The SVVP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1i8. The SVVP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1i9. The SVVP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1j1. The SCMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1j2. The SCMP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1j3. The SCMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1j4. The SCMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1j5. The SCMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1j6. The SCMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1j7. The SCMP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1j8. The SCMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software
projects.
1j9. The SCMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1k1. The STP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1k2. The STP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1k3. The STP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1k4. The STP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1k5. The STP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
1k6. The STP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1k7. The STP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1k8. The STP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1k9. The STP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1l1. The CySP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1l2. The CySP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1l3. The CySP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1l4. The CySP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1l5. The CySP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1l6. The CySP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1l7. The CySP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1l8. The CySP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1l9. The CySP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2a1. The planning phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the RTIF software projects.
2a2. The planning phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are
completed for the NMS software projects.
2a3. The planning phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are
completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2a4. The planning phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP
are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2a5. The planning phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the VBIF software projects.
2a6. The planning phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are
completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2a7. The planning phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
2a8. The planning phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software projects.
2a9. The planning phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software
plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2b1. The requirements phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the RTIF software projects.
2b2. The requirements phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and the CySP
are completed for the NMS software projects.
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2b3. The requirements phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and the
CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2b4. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and the
CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2b5. The requirements phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the VBIF software projects.
2b6. The requirements phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and the
CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2b7. The requirements phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and the CySP are
2b8. The requirements phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software projects.
2b9. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software projects.
2c1. The design phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and the CySP are
2c2. The design phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and the CySP are
2c3. The design phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2c4. The design phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and the CySP
2c5. The design phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and the CySP are
2c6. The design phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and the CySP
are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2c7. The design phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and the CySP are
2c8. The design phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
2c9. The design phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans
and the CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2d1. The implementation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP
are completed for the RTIF software projects.
2d2. The implementation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP
are completed for the NMS software projects.
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2d3. The implementation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and
CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2d4. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and
CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2d5. The implementation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP
are completed for the VBIF software projects.
2d6. The implementation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and
CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2d7. The implementation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
2d8. The implementation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
2d9. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software
projects.
2e1. The test phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed
for the RTIF software projects.
2e2. The test phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed
for the NMS software projects.
2e3. The test phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are
completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2e4. The test phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are
completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2e5. The test phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed
for the VBIF software projects.
2e6. The test phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are
completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2e7. The test phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed
for the PIP software projects.
2e8. The test phase activities detailed in the HP CRD software plans and CySP are
completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
2e9. The test phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function and CySP are
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
3a1. The installation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are
3a2. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.
3a3. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.
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3b1. The installation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are
3b2. The NMS software projects performs as designed.
3b3. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.
3c1. The installation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP
are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects
3c2. The SSLC/ESF software projects performs as designed.
3c3. The SSLC/ESF software projects is cyber secure.
3d1. The installation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP
3d2. The ATWS/SLC software projects performs as designed.
3d3. The ATWS/SLC software projects is cyber secure.
3e1. The installation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are
3e2. The VBIF software projects performs as designed.
3e3. The VBIF software projects is cyber secure.
3f1. The installation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP
are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
3f2. The GENE DPS software projects performs as designed.
3f3. The GENE DPS software projects is cyber secure.
3g1. The installation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
3g2. The PIP software projects performs as designed.
3g3. The PIP software projects is cyber secure.
3h1. The installation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software projects.
3h2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects performs as designed.
3h3. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is cyber secure.
3i. The complete ESBWR instrumentation and control systems with sensors and
actuators is capable of operating as designed.
3j1. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.
3j2. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.
3k1. The NMS software projects performs as designed.
3k2. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.
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3l1. The SSLC/ESF software projects performs as designed.

3l2. The SSLC/ESF software projects is cyber secure.
3m1. The ATWS/SLC software projects performs as designed.
3m2. The ATWS/SLC software projects is cyber secure.
3n1. The VBIF software projects performs as designed.
3n2. The VBIF software projects is cyber secure.
3o1. The GENE DPS software projects performs as designed.
3o2. The GENE DPS software projects is cyber secure.
3p1. The PIP software projects performs as designed.
3p2. The PIP software projects is cyber secure.
3q1. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects performs as designed.
3q2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is cyber secure.
3r1. The installation phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software
plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
3r2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects performs as designed.
3r3. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is cyber secure.
3s1. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects performs as designed.
3s2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects is cyber secure.
Table 3.2-1 defines the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria, which will be applied to the software and hardware platforms and network segments.
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
1a1. The SMP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SMP for the RTIF The SMP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
1a2. The SMP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SMP for the NMS The SMP for NMS software projects
1a3. The SMP is developed for the Inspection of the SMP for the SSLC/ESF The SMP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1a4 The SMP is developed for the Inspection of the SMP for the ATWS/SLC The SMP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
1a5. The SMP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SMP for the VBIF The SMP for VBIF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1a6. The SMP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SMP for the GENE DPS The SMP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1a7. The SMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SMP for the PIP software The SMP for PIP software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1a8. The SMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SMP for the HP CRD The SMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
1a9. The SMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SMP for the ICS DPV The SMP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SMPM.
1b1. The SDP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SDP for the RTIF The SDP for the RTIF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1b2. The SDP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SDP for the NMS The SDP for NMS software projects
1b3. The SDP is developed for the Inspection of the SDP for the SSLC/ESF The SDP for SSLC/ESF software projects
1b4 The SDP is developed for the Inspection of the SDP for the ATWS/SLC The SDP for ATWS/SLC software projects
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1b5. The SDP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SDP for the VBIF The SDP for VBIF software projects
1b6. The SDP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SDP for the GENE DPS The SDP for GENE DPS software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1b7. The SDP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SDP for the PIP software The SDP for PIP software projects
1b8. The SDP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SDP for the HP CRD The SDP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1b9. The SDP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SDP for the ICS DPV The SDP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
1c1. The SIntP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SIntP for the RTIF The SIntP for the RTIF software projects
1c2. The SIntP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SIntP for the NMS The SIntP for NMS software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1c3. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the SSLC/ESF The SIntP for SSLC/ESF software projects
1c4. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the ATWS/SLC The SIntP for ATWS/SLC software
1c5. The SIntP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SIntP for the VBIF The SIntP for VBIF software projects
1c6. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the GENE DPS The SIntP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
1c7. The SIntP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SIntP for the PIP The SIntP for PIP software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1c8. The SIntP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SIntP for the HP CRD The SIntP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1c9. The SIntP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SIntP for the ICS DPV The SIntP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
1d1. The SIP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SIP for the RTIF software The SIP for the RTIF software projects
1d2. The SIP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SIP for the NMS software The SIP for NMS software projects
1d3. The SIP is developed for the Inspection of the SIP for the SSLC/ESF The SIP for SSLC/ESF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1d4. The SIP is developed for the Inspection of the SIP for the ATWS/SLC The SIP for ATWS/SLC software projects
1d5. The SIP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SIP for the VBIF The SIP for VBIF software projects
1d6. The SIP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SIP for the GENE DPS The SIP for GENE DPS software projects
1d7. The SIP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SIP for the PIP software The SIP for PIP software projects complies
software projects. projects will be performed. with the criteria contained in the SMPM.
1d8. The SIP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SIP for the HP CRD The SIP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1d9. The SIP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SIP for the ICS DPV The SIP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
3.2-16
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Table 3.2-1
1e1. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the RTIF The SOMP for the RTIF software projects
RTIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1e2. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the NMS The SOMP for NMS software projects
NMS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1e3. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the SSLC/ESF The SOMP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
1e4. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the The SOMP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SMPM.
1e5. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the VBIF The SOMP for VBIF software projects
VBIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
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Table 3.2-1
1e6. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the GENE The SOMP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. DPS software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
1e7. The SOMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SOMP for the PIP The SOMP for PIP software projects
1e8. The SOMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SOMP for the HP CRD The SOMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1e9. The SOMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SOMP for the ICS DPV The SOMP for ICS DPV Isolation
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be Function software projects complies with
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
1f1. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the RTIF The STrngP for the RTIF software projects
RTIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
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Table 3.2-1
1f2. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the NMS The STrngP for NMS software projects
NMS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1f3. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the The STrngP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. SSLC/ESF software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
1f4. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the The STrngP for ATWS/SLC software
1f5. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the VBIF The STrngP for VBIF software projects
1f6. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the GENE The STrngP for GENE DPS software
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Table 3.2-1
1f7. The STrngP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the STrngP for the PIP The STrngP for PIP software projects
1f8. The STrngP is developed for the HP Inspection of the STrngP for the HP CRD The STrngP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1f9. The STrngP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the STrngP for the ICS DPV The STrngP for ICS DPV Isolation
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
1g1. The SQAP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SQAP for the RTIF The SQAP for the RTIF software projects
{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
1g2. The SQAP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SQAP for the NMS The SQAP for NMS software projects
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
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Table 3.2-1
1g3. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the SSLC/ESF The SQAP for SSLC/ESF software
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
1g4. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the The SQAP for ATWS/SLC software
performed. contained in the SQAPM.
1g5. The SQAP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SQAP for the VBIF The SQAP for VBIF software projects
1g6. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the GENE DPS The SQAP for GENE DPS software
1g7. The SQAP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SQAP for the PIP The SQAP for PIP software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1g8. The SQAP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SQAP for the HP CRD The SQAP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
1g9. The SQAP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SQAP for the ICS DPV The SQAP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
1h1. The SSP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SSP for the RTIF The SSP for the RTIF software projects
1h2. The SSP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SSP for the NMS The SSP for NMS software projects
1h3. The SSP is developed for the Inspection of the SSP for the SSLC/ESF The SSP for SSLC/ESF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1h4. The SSP is developed for the Inspection of the SSP for the ATWS/SLC The SSP for ATWS/SLC software projects
1h5. The SSP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SSP for the VBIF The SSP for VBIF software projects
1h6. The SSP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SSP for the GENE DPS The SSP for GENE DPS software projects
1h7. The SSP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SSP for the PIP software The SSP for PIP software projects
1h8. The SSP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SSP for the HP CRD The SSP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
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Table 3.2-1
1h9. The SSP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SSP for the ICS DPV The SSP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
1i1. The SVVP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SVVP for the RTIF The SVVP for the RTIF software projects
1i2. The SVVP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SVVP for the NMS The SVVP for NMS software projects
1i3. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the SSLC/ESF The SVVP for SSLC/ESF software
1i4. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the The SVVP for ATWS/SLC software
3.2-24
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Table 3.2-1
1i5. The SVVP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SVVP for the VBIF The SVVP for VBIF software projects
1i6. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the GENE DPS The SVVP for GENE DPS software
1i7. The SVVP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SVVP for the PIP The SVVP for PIP software projects
1i8. The SVVP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SVVP for the HP CRD The SVVP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1i9. The SVVP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SVVP for the ICS DPV The SVVP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
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Table 3.2-1
1j1. The SCMP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SCMP for the RTIF The SCMP for the RTIF software projects
1j2. The SCMP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SCMP for the NMS The SCMP for NMS software projects
1j3. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the SSLC/ESF The SCMP for SSLC/ESF software
1j4. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the The SCMP for ATWS/SLC software
1j5. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the VBIF The SCMP for VBIF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1j6. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the GENE The SCMP for GENE DPS software
1j7. The SCMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SCMP for the PIP The SCMP for PIP software projects
1j8. The SCMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SCMP for the HP CRD The SCMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
1j9. The SCMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SCMP for the ICS DPV The SCMP for ICS DPV Isolation
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
1k1. The STP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the STP for the RTIF The STP for the RTIF software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1k2. The STP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the STP for the NMS The STP for NMS software projects
1k3. The STP is developed for the Inspection of the STP for the SSLC/ESF The STP for SSLC/ESF software projects
1k4. The STP is developed for the Inspection of the STP for the ATWS/SLC The STP for ATWS/SLC software projects
1k5. The STP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the STP for the VBIF The STP for VBIF software projects
1k6. The STP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the STP for the GENE DPS The STP for GENE DPS software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1k7. The STP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the STP for the PIP software The STP for PIP software projects
hardware and software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
1k8. The STP is developed for the HP Inspection of the STP for the HP CRD The STP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
hardware and software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
1k9. The STP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the STP for the ICS DPV The STP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function hardware Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
and software projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
1l1. The CySP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the CySP for the RTIF The CySP for the RTIF software projects
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
1l2. The CySP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the CySP for the NMS The CySP for NMS software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1l3. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the SSLC/ESF The CySP for SSLC/ESF software projects
1l4. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the ATWS/SLC The CySP for ATWS/SLC software
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the CySPP.
1l5. The CySP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the CySP for the VBIF The CySP for VBIF software projects
1l6. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the GENE DPS The CySP for GENE DPS software
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the CySPP.
1l7. The CySP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the CySP for the PIP The CySP for PIP software projects
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Table 3.2-1
1l8. The CySP is developed for the HP Inspection of the CySP for the HP CRD The CySP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the CySPP.
1l9. The CySP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the CySP for the ICS DPV The CySP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
projects. performed. contained in the CySPP.
2a1. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the RTIF software plans and analyzed for the RTIF software conclude that the RTIF software projects
and CySP are completed for the projects. planning phase activities were performed
RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the RTIF software
plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
detailed in the NMS software plans and analyzed for the NMS software conclude that the NMS software projects
NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the NMS software
SQAPM, and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software conclude that the SSLC/ESF software
plans and CySP are completed for projects. projects planning phase activities were
the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software conclude that the ATWS/SLC software
the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
CySPP.
detailed in the VBIF software plans and analyzed for the VBIF software conclude that the VBIF software projects
VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the VBIF software
SQAPM, and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the GENE DPS software and analyzed for the GENE DPS software conclude that the GENE DPS software
the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the GENE
DPS software plans and CySP as derived
from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
detailed in the PIP software plans and analyzed for the PIP software projects. conclude that the PIP software projects
and CySP are completed for the PIP {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} planning phase activities were performed
software projects. in compliance with the PIP software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation conclude that the HP CRD Isolation
Bypass Function software plans and Bypass Function software projects. Bypass Function software projects
CySP are completed for the HP CRD {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} planning phase activities were performed
Isolation Bypass Function software in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation
projects. Bypass Function software plans and CySP
as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. Function software projects planning phase
are completed for the ICS DPV {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
Isolation Function software projects. with the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
2b1. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the RTIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the RTIF exist and conclude that the RTIF software
and CySP are completed for the software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the RTIF
detailed in the NMS software plans inspected and analyzed for the NMS exist and conclude that the NMS software
NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the NMS
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF exist and conclude that the SSLC/ESF
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. software projects requirements phase
the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the SSLC/ESF software plans and
CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC exist and conclude that the ATWS/SLC
the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the ATWS/SLC software plans and
and CySPP.
detailed in the VBIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the VBIF exist and conclude that the VBIF software
VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the VBIF
3.2-35
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the GENE DPS software inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS exist and conclude that the GENE DPS
the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the GENE DPS software plans and
and CySPP.
detailed in the PIP software plans inspected and analyzed for the PIP exist and conclude that the PIP software
and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the PIP
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD exist and conclude that the HP CRD
Bypass Function software plans and Isolation Bypass Function software Isolation Bypass Function software
CySP are completed for the HP CRD projects. projects requirements phase activities were
Isolation Bypass Function software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the HP CRD
projects. Isolation Bypass Function software plans
SQAPM, and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV exist and conclude that the ICS DPV
Function software plans and CySP Isolation Function software projects. Isolation Function software projects
are completed for the ICS DPV {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} requirements phase activities were
Isolation Function software projects. performed in compliance with the ICS
DPV Isolation Function software plans and
and CySPP.
2c1. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the RTIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the RTIF software projects. conclude that the RTIF software projects
are completed for the RTIF software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the RTIF software plans
SQAPM, and CySPP.
in the NMS software plans and CySP analyzed for the NMS software projects. conclude that the NMS software projects
are completed for the NMS software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the NMS software plans
SQAPM, and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
in the SSLC/ESF software plans and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software conclude that the SSLC/ESF software
CySP are completed for the projects. projects design phase activities were
SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
CySPP.
in the ATWS/SLC software plans analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software conclude that the ATWS/SLC software
and CySP are completed for the projects. projects design phase activities were
ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
CySPP.
in the VBIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the VBIF software projects. conclude that the VBIF software projects
are completed for the VBIF software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the VBIF software plans
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-38
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Table 3.2-1
in the GENE DPS software plans and analyzed for the GENE DPS software conclude that the GENE DPS software
CySP are completed for the GENE projects. projects design phase activities were
DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the GENE
DPS software plans and CySP as derived
in the PIP software plans and CySP analyzed for the PIP software projects. conclude that the PIP software projects
are completed for the PIP software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the PIP software plans
SQAPM, and CySPP.
in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass conclude that the HP CRD Isolation
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. Bypass Function software projects design
are completed for the HP CRD {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} phase activities were performed in
Isolation Bypass Function software compliance with the HP CRD Isolation
projects. Bypass Function software plans and CySP
as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-39
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Table 3.2-1
in the ICS DPV Isolation Function analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation
software plans and CySP are Function software projects. Function software projects design phase
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
Function software projects. with the ICS DPV Isolation Function
2d1. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are RTIF software projects implementation
detailed in the RTIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the RTIF phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the RTIF software plans
RTIF software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d2. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are NMS software projects implementation
detailed in the NMS software plans inspected and analyzed for the NMS phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the NMS software plans
NMS software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d3. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are SSLC/ESF software projects
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the
the SSLC/ESF software projects. SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
CySPP.
3.2-40
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Table 3.2-1
2d4. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are ATWS/SLC software projects
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the
the ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
CySPP.
2d5. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are VBIF software projects implementation
detailed in the VBIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the VBIF phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the VBIF software plans
VBIF software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d6. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are GENE DPS software projects
detailed in the GENE DPS software inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the GENE
the GENE DPS software projects. DPS software plans and CySP as derived
2d7. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are PIP software projects implementation
detailed in the PIP software plans inspected and analyzed for the PIP phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects. compliance with the PIP software plans
software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
2d8. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD software projects implementation phase
Bypass Function software plans and Isolation Bypass Function software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the HP CRD projects. with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Isolation Bypass Function software Function software plans and CySP as
projects. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
2d9. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are ICS DPV Isolation Function software
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV projects implementation phase activities
Function software plans and CySP Isolation Function software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the ICS DPV ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans
Isolation Function software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e1. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and RTIF software projects test phase activities
the RTIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the RTIF software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the RTIF software RTIF software plans and CySP as derived
projects. from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e2. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and NMS software projects test phase activities
the NMS software plans and CySP analyzed for the NMS software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the NMS software NMS software plans and CySP as derived
3.2-42
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Table 3.2-1
2e3. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and SSLC/ESF software projects test phase
the SSLC/ESF software plans and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the projects. with the SSLC/ESF software plans and
SSLC/ESF software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e4. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and ATWS/SLC software projects test phase
the ATWS/SLC software plans and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the projects. with the ATWS/SLC software plans and
ATWS/SLC software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e5. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and VBIF software projects test phase activities
the VBIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the VBIF software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the VBIF software VBIF software plans and CySP as derived
2e6. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and GENE DPS software projects test phase
the GENE DPS software plans and analyzed for the GENE DPS software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the GENE projects. with the GENE DPS software plans and
DPS software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e7. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and PIP software projects test phase activities
the PIP software plans and CySP are analyzed for the PIP software projects. were performed in compliance with the PIP
completed for the PIP software software plans and CySP as derived from
projects. SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-43
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Table 3.2-1
2e8. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
the HP CRD Isolation Bypass analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass software projects test phase activities were
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. performed in compliance with the HP CRD
are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans
Isolation Bypass Function software and CySP as derived from SMPM,
projects. SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e9. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and ICS DPV Isolation Function software
the ICS DPV Isolation Function analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation projects test phase activities were
software plans and CySP are Function software projects. performed in compliance with the ICS
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation DPV Isolation Function software plans and
Function software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3a1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the RTIF RTIF software projects installation phase
detailed in the RTIF software plans software projects, including RTIF FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the RTIF Cyber Security FAT, are inspected with the RTIF software plans and CySP as
RTIF software projects. and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3a2. The RTIF software projects performs FAT is performed on the RTIF software RTIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the RTIF software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3a3. The RTIF software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed RTIF software projects is in compliance
secure. for the RTIF software projects. with the RTIF cyber security program
requirements as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-44
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Table 3.2-1
3b1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the NMS NMS software projects installation phase
detailed in the NMS software plans software projects, including NMS FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the NMS Cyber Security FAT, are inspected with the NMS software plans and CySP as
NMS software projects. and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3b2. The NMS software projects performs FAT is performed on the NMS software NMS software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the NMS software plans as derived
3b3. The NMS software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed NMS software projects is in compliance
secure. for the NMS software projects. with the NMS cyber security program
requirements as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3c1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the SSLC/ESF software projects installation
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software SSLC/ESF software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for SSLC/ESF FAT and SSLC/ESF Cyber compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
the SSLC/ESF software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3c2. The SSLC/ESF software projects FAT is performed on the SSLC/ESF SSLC/ESF software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3.2-45
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Table 3.2-1
3c3. The SSLC/ESF software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed SSLC/ESF software projects is in
cyber secure. for the SSLC/ESF software projects. compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3d1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the ATWS/SLC software projects installation
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software ATWS/SLC software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for ATWS/SLC FAT and ATWS/SLC Cyber compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
the ATWS/SLC software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3d2. The ATWS/SLC software projects FAT is performed on the ATWS/SLC ATWS/SLC software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
and CySPP.
3d3. The ATWS/SLC software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed ATWS/SLC software projects is in
cyber secure. for the ATWS/SLC software projects. compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as
CySPP.
3e1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the VBIF VBIF software projects installation phase
detailed in the VBIF software plans software projects, including VBIF FAT activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the and VBIF Cyber Security FAT, are with the VBIF software plans and CySP as
VBIF software projects. inspected and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-46
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Table 3.2-1
3e2. The VBIF software projects performs FAT is performed on the VBIF software VBIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the VBIF software plans as derived
3e3. The VBIF software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed VBIF software projects is in compliance
secure. for the VBIF software projects. with the VBIF CySP as derived from the
3f1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the GENE DPS software projects installation
detailed in the GENE DPS software GENE DPS software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for GENE DPS FAT and GENE DPS Cyber compliance with the GENE DPS software
the GENE DPS software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3f2. The GENE DPS software projects FAT is performed on the GENE DPS GENE DPS software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the GENE DPS software
and CySPP.
3f3. The GENE DPS software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed GENE DPS software projects is in
cyber secure. for the GENE DPS software projects. compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as
CySPP.
3g1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the PIP PIP software projects installation phase
detailed in the PIP software plans software projects, including PIP FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the PIP PIP Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and with the PIP software plans and CySP as
software projects. analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
3g2. The PIP software projects performs FAT is performed on the PIP software PIP software projects is in compliance with
as designed. projects. the PIP software plans as derived from the
3g3. The PIP software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed PIP software projects is in compliance with
secure. for the PIP software projects. the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3h1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the HP HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation CRD Isolation Bypass Function software software projects installation phase
Bypass Function software plans and projects, including HP CRD Isolation activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the HP CRD Bypass Function FAT and HP CRD with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Isolation Bypass Function software Isolation Bypass Function Cyber Security Function software plans and CySP as
projects. FAT, are inspected and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3h2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass FAT is performed on the HP CRD HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects performs Isolation Bypass Function software software projects is in compliance with the
as designed. projects. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3h3. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A cyber security FAT will be performed HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects is cyber for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the
secure. software projects. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP
as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
3i. The complete ESBWR An overlapping and encompassing SAT is The complete ESBWR instrumentation and
instrumentation and control systems performed on the as-built platforms and control system with sensors and actuators
with sensors and actuators is capable network segments. is capable of operating as designed and is
of operating as designed. in compliance with the software projects
plans and CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM and CySPP.
3j1. The RTIF software projects performs A RTIF software projects SAT is The RTIF software projects is in
as designed. performed. compliance with the RTIF CySP as derived
3j2. The RTIF software projects is cyber A RTIF software projects cyber security RTIF software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the RTIF CySP as derived from the
3k1. The NMS software projects performs A NMS software projects SAT is NMS software projects is in compliance
as designed. performed. with the NMS software plans as derived
3k2. The NMS software projects is cyber A NMS software projects cyber security NMS software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the NMS CySP as derived from the
3l1. The SSLC/ESF software projects A SSLC/ESF software projects SAT is SSLC/ESF software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
and CySPP.
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Table 3.2-1
3l2. The SSLC/ESF software projects is A SSLC/ESF software projects cyber SSLC/ESF software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as
CySPP.
3m1. The ATWS/SLC software projects An ATWS/SLC software projects SAT is ATWS/SLC software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
and CySPP.
3m2. The ATWS/SLC software projects is An ATWS/SLC software projects cyber ATWS/SLC software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as
CySPP.
3n1. The VBIF software projects performs A VBIF software projects SAT is VBIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. performed. with the VBIF software plans as derived
3n2. The VBIF software projects is cyber A VBIF software projects cyber security VBIF software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the VBIF CySP as derived from the
3o1. The GENE DPS software projects A GENE DPS software projects SAT is GENE DPS software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the GENE DPS software
and CySPP.
3.2-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.2-1
3o2. The GENE DPS software projects is A GENE DPS software projects cyber GENE DPS software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as
CySPP.
3p1. The PIP software projects performs A PIP software projects SAT is performed. PIP software projects is in compliance with
as designed. the PIP software plans as derived from the
3p2. The PIP software projects is cyber A PIP software projects cyber security PIP software projects is in compliance with
secure. SAT is performed. the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3q1. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects performs software projects SAT is performed. software projects is in compliance with the
as designed. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3q2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects is cyber software projects cyber security SAT is software projects is in compliance with the
secure. performed. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP
as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.2-1
3r1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the ICS ICS DPV Isolation Function software
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation DPV Isolation Function software projects, projects installation phase activities were
Function software plans and CySP including ICS DPV Isolation Function performed in compliance with the ICS
are completed for the ICS DPV FAT and ICS DPV Isolation Function DPV Isolation Function software plans and
Isolation Function software projects. Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
analyzed. and CySPP.
3r2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function FAT is performed on the ICS DPV ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects performs as Isolation Function software projects. projects is in compliance with the ICS
designed. DPV Isolation Function software plans as
CySPP.
3r3. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A cyber security FAT will be performed ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects is cyber secure. for the ICS DPV Isolation Function projects is in compliance with the ICS
software projects. DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived
3s1. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A ICS DPV Isolation Function software ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects performs as projects SAT is performed. projects is in compliance with the ICS
designed. DPV Isolation Function software plans as
CySPP.
3s2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A ICS DPV Isolation Function software ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects is cyber secure. projects cyber security SAT is performed. projects is in compliance with the ICS
DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived
3.2-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.3 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING

Design Description
The Human Factors Engineering (HFE) design process represents a comprehensive, synergistic,
iterative design approach for the development of human-centered control and information
infrastructure for the ESBWR.
The general objectives of the program can be stated in “human-centered” terms, which, as the
HFE program develops, is refined and used as a basis for HFE planning, test and evaluation
activities. HFE design goals include ensuring that:
• Personnel tasks can be accomplished within time and performance criteria;
• Human-System Interfaces (HSIs), procedures, staffing/qualifications, training and
management and organizational variables support a high degree of operating crew
situation awareness;
• Allocation of functions accommodates human capabilities and limitations;
• Operator vigilance is maintained;
• Acceptable operator workload is met;
• Operator interfaces contribute to an error-free environment; and
• Error detection and recovery capabilities are provided.
The elements of the ESBWR HFE Program Management are provided in the plan entitled “Man-
Machine Interface System and Human Factors Engineering Implementation Plan” (MMIS and
HFE Implementation Plan). In the plan the following are described:
• HFE goals/objectives;
• A technical program to accomplish the objectives;
• The system to track HFE issues;
• The HFE design team; and
• Management and organizational structure for the technical program.
The proposed methodologies for the conducts of the HFE activities are described in separate
implementation plans. The results and outcomes of the activities are summarized in individual
results summary reports.
The MMIS and HFE Implementation Plan and supporting HFE activity implementation plans are
submitted for NRC staff review in the pre-design project phase. The results summary reports
are available for the NRC staff review, and are included in the list of items for Inspections, Tests,
Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria.
The following are the HFE elements and their associated implementation plans:
(1) Operating Experience Review (OER) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Operating Experience Review Implementation Plan.
3.3-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(2) Functional Requirements Analysis (FRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR
HFE Functional Requirements Analysis Implementation Plan and Allocation of Functions
(AOF) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Allocation of Functions
Implementation Plan.
(3) Task Analysis is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Task Analysis
(4) Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Staffing and Qualifications Implementation Plan.
(5) Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Human Reliability Analysis Implementation Plan.
(6) Human-System Interface (HSI) Design is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Human-System Interface Design Implementation Plan.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Human Factors Verification and Validation (HF V&V) is performed in accordance with the
ESBWR HFE Verification and Validation Implementation Plan.
(10) Design Implementation is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Design
(11) The strategy for the Human Performance Monitoring (HPM) process is developed in
accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Performance Monitoring Implementation Plan.
(12) Integrated system validation scenarios are developed that incorporate detailed information
related to sampling dimensions, scenario identification, scenario definition, simulation of
remote actions, performance measurement characteristics, performance measurement
selection, performance measurement criteria, test design, and data analysis.
A minimum inventory of human system interfaces (alarms, displays, and controls) needed to
implement the plant’s emergency operating procedures, carry out those human actions shown to
be important from the probabilistic risk assessment, and to bring the plant to a safe condition
were developed using a detailed and comprehensive task analysis process.
To identify tasks that support implementing the emergency operating procedures, the strategies
and actions of the BWROG EPG/SAG, Revision 2 are compared with the ESBWR design. This
comparison is a functional analysis; linking the strategy and task guidance contained in the
BWROG document with the design specifics and system capabilities of the ESBWR.
Tasks that support the completion of risk-important human actions were identified through
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analysis of design basis accidents and the resulting event
strategies, sequences, and actions. Any human action included in these sequences is analyzed in
the context of the ESBWR plant and systems design and operating strategies to determine error
probabilities and consequences. Using ranking methodologies, risk-important human actions and
tasks were identified.
3.3-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Analysis of plant manipulations necessary for achieving and maintaining safe, stable shutdown
following design basis MCR evacuation identified tasks that must be completed at the Remote
Shutdown System (RSS).
These groups of tasks are then analyzed through task analysis to identify the alarms, displays,
and controls that are needed to ensure their successful completion by ESBWR operators. The
resulting list of HSIs is the ESBWR minimum inventory of alarms, displays, and controls.
The results for the MCR HSIs are contained in Table 3.3-1a and the RSS HSIs are contained in
Table 3.3-1b.
Table 3.3-2 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for Human Factors Engineering.
3.3-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-1a
Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls
Description Alarm Display Control
Reactor Power X X
Reactor Pressure X X
Reactor Water Level X X
Containment Water Level X
Suppression Pool Level X X
Average Drywell Temperature X X
Suppression Pool Bulk Average Temperature X X
Drywell Pressure X X
Wetwell Pressure X
Containment Isolation Valves X X
Containment Radiation X
Drywell Hydrogen Concentration X X
Wetwell Hydrogen Concentration X X
Drywell Oxygen Concentration X X
Wetwell Oxygen Concentration X X
Isolation Condenser Valves X X
Isolation Condenser Pool Level X X
Shutdown Cooling Initiation X
Passive Containment Cooling Pool Level X X
Gravity Driven Cooling Pool Level X
Gravity Driven Cooling Injection Valves X X
Gravity Driven Cooling Equalization Valves X X
Reactor Scram X X X
Main Steam Isolation X X X
Main Steam Relief Valves X X
Standby Liquid Control Accumulator Level X
Standby Liquid Control Initiation X
Standby Liquid Control Accumulator Isolation Valves X X X
Automatic Depressurization System Inhibit X X
Depressurization Valves X X
Containment High Pressure Nitrogen Status X
Reactor Building Area Temperature High X
3.3-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-1a
Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls
Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation High X X
Reactor Building Area Radiation High X
Reactor Building Area Water Level High X
Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation X X
3.3-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-1b
Minimum Inventory of RSS Alarms, Displays, and Controls

Reactor Pressure X X
Reactor Water Level X X
Isolation Condenser System X X X
Isolation Condenser Pool Level X X
Main Steam Isolation X X X
3.3-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering

1. Operating Experience Review (OER) An inspection is performed on the OER A results summary report(s) exists that
is performed in accordance with the results summary report(s). concludes that the OER activity was
ESBWR HFE Operating Experience {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} conducted in accordance with the
Review Implementation Plan. implementation plan and contains:
• The scope of the OER;
• The list of sources of operating
experience reviewed and summary
of documented results;
• List of risk-important human
actions and their resolutions from
predecessor plants; and
• A description of the process for
issue analysis, tracking, and
review.
3.3-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

2. Functional Requirements Analysis An inspection is performed on the FRA A results summary report(s) exists that
(FRA) is performed in accordance and AOF results summary report(s). concludes that the FRA and AOF
with the ESBWR HFE Functional {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were conducted in accordance
Requirements Analysis with the implementation plans and
Implementation Plan and Allocation contains:
of Functions (AOF) is performed in
accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Allocation of Functions
3.3-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

(continued) • Scope of the FRA;
• Functional hierarchy for plant
safety functions including the
identification of Critical Safety
Functions;
• Plant systems and configurations
that support safety functions;
• Definition of high-level plant
functions, their support needs, and
monitoring parameters;
• Scope of AOF;
• Safety function allocations. A
summary of AOF results; and
refining and updating functional
allocations.
3.3-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

3. Task Analysis is performed in An inspection is performed on the Task A results summary report(s) exists that
accordance with the ESBWR HFE Analysis results summary report(s). concludes that the Task Analysis activity
Task Analysis Implementation Plan. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} was conducted in accordance with the
implementation plan and contains:
• The scope of the Task Analysis.
• A list of Task descriptions.
documenting and retaining task
analysis results.
• Examples of detailed task analysis
results.
4. Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q) is i. An inspection is performed on the i. A results summary report(s) exists
performed in accordance with the S&Q results summary report(s). that concludes that the S&Q design
ESBWR HFE Staffing and {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activity was conducted in accordance
Qualifications Implementation Plan. with the implementation plan and
contains:
• The scope of the S&Q activity.
• A summary of design requirements
and inputs to the S&Q.
3.3-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

ii. An inspection is performed on the ii. A final results summary report(s)
final S&Q results summary report(s). exists that concludes that the S&Q
process was conducted in accordance
with the implementation plan and
contains:
• Final staffing levels and
qualifications.
• The basis for the S&Q concluding
that issues and concerns raised in
other HFE activities are addressed.
5. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is i. An inspection is performed on the i. A results summary report(s) exists
performed in accordance with the HRA results summary report(s). that concludes that the HRA design
ESBWR HFE Human Reliability {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} was conducted in accordance with the
Analysis Implementation Plan. implementation plan and contains:
• The scope of the HRA.
• A list of risk-important human
actions input to Human Factors
activities.
3.3-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

final HRA results summary report(s). exists that concludes that the HRA
process was conducted in accordance
with the implementation plan and
contains:
• A list of potentially risk-important
human actions, human interactions,
and operational failure events and a
summary of how these basic events
and their associated tasks, and
scenarios are addressed during the
various phases of the design
process.
• A summary that demonstrates how
risk management actions taken in
the design keep the potentially risk-
important human interactions as
low as practical.
• A discussion of the validation of
HRA assumptions.
3.3-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

6. Human System Interface (HSI) i. An inspection is performed on the i. A results summary report(s) exists
Design is performed in accordance HSI Design results summary that concludes that the HSI Design
with the ESBWR HFE Human report(s). specification was conducted in
System Interface Design {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} accordance with the implementation
Implementation Plan. plan and contains:
• The scope of the HSI Design.
• A description of the concept of
operations for HSI Design.
• A list of HFE standards and
guideline documents used in the
activity.
• Descriptions of the Style Guide and
design specifications for HSI
design.
• A list of accident monitoring
instruments that comply with RG
1.97 and supporting analysis.
• A description of the functional
requirement specification for HSIs.
3.3-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

final HSI Design results summary exists that concludes that the HSI
report(s). Design process was conducted in
accordance with the implementation
plan and contains:
• A summary of the methods used
for the evaluation and verification
of the HSI.
• A description of the final inventory
of HSI including alarms,
information displays, and controls.
• The results of the verification
concluding that all MCR and RSS
minimum inventory HSIs described
in Tables 3.3-1a and 3.3-1b are
incorporated into the final
inventory of HSIs.
7. (Deleted)
8. (Deleted)
3.3-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

9. Human Factors Verification and An inspection is performed on the HF A results summary report(s) exists that
Validation (HF V&V) is performed in V&V results summary report(s). concludes that the HF V&V activity was
accordance with the ESBWR HFE conducted in accordance with the
Human Factors Verification and implementation plan and contains:
Validation Implementation Plan. • The scope of the HF V&V.
• Major conclusions and their basis.
documenting and retaining the
detailed HF V&V results.
• A summary of the following
activities:
- Operational conditions used for
the HF V&V.
- HSI inventory and
characterization.
- HSI task support verification.
- HFE design verification.
- Integrated system validation.
- Human Engineering
Discrepancy resolution.
3.3-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

10. Design Implementation is performed An inspection is performed on the Design A results summary report(s) exist that
in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Implementation results summary concludes that the Design Implementation
Design Implementation Plan. report(s). activity was conducted in accordance with
the implementation plan and contains:
• The results of the final (as-built)
HSI Verification concluding that
the “As-Built” HSIs and their
design characteristics correspond to
the HSI Requirements and that
Human Engineering Discrepancies
(if any) resulting from non-
conformance are resolved.
• The results of the confirmation of
the “As-Built” procedures and
training design implementation
concluding that Human
Engineering Discrepancies
resulting from adapted sections (if
any) are resolved.
3.3-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

• The results of the verification of
HFE design not performed in the
HF V&V concluding that items in
the verification list meet
verification criteria and Human
Engineering Discrepancies (if any)
resulting from non-conformance
are resolved.
• A description of the resolution to
Human Engineering Discrepancies
and Open issues in the issue
tracking system (HFEITS).
• A summary of turnover of
remaining Human Engineering
Discrepancies/HFEITS issues.
3.3-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

11. The strategy for the Human An inspection is performed on the HPM A results summary report(s) exists that
Performance Monitoring (HPM) results summary report(s). concludes that the HPM strategy was
process is developed in accordance developed in accordance with the
with the ESBWR HFE Human implementation plan and contains:
Performance Monitoring • A description of the HPM strategy
Implementation Plan. including the scope, structure, and
provisions for specific cause
determination, trending of
performance degradation and
failures, and corrective actions.
• A description of the database to
track activities and corrective
actions.
3.3-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.3-2

12. Integrated system validation scenarios An inspection is performed on the The integrated system validation
are developed that incorporate integrated system validation scenarios. scenarios were developed in accordance
detailed information related to {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} with the HF V&V implementation plan
sampling dimensions, scenario and meet the review criteria in following
identification, scenario definition, sections of NUREG-0711, Rev. 2:
simulation of remote actions, • 11.4.1.2.1, Sampling Dimensions
performance measurement • 11.4.3.2.2, Validation Test Beds
characteristics, performance • 11.4.3.2.4, Scenario Definition
measurement selection, performance • 11.4.3.2.5, Performance
measurement criteria, test design, and Measurement
data analysis.
• 11.4.3.2.6, Test Design
• 11.4.3.2.7, Data Analysis and
Interpretation
3.3-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.4 RADIATION PROTECTION

Design Description
The ESBWR Standard Plant is designed to maintain radiation exposures to plant personnel As
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Radiation protection is provided by application of
the design and radiation control principles:
(1) Plant design provides for containment of airborne radioactive materials, and the ventilation
system ensures that concentrations of airborne radionuclides are maintained at levels
consistent with personnel access needs.
(2) (Deleted)
(3) The plant design provides radiation shielding for rooms, corridors and operating areas
commensurate with their occupancy requirements.
(4) a. (Deleted)
b. (Deleted)
Table 3.4-1 provides definitions of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for ventilation and airborne containment and shielding.
3.4-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.4-1
ITAAC For Radiation Protection

1. Plant design provides for Expected concentrations of airborne Analyses results for radioactive airborne
containment of airborne radioactive material will be analyzed concentration demonstrates that:
radioactive materials, and the by radionuclide for normal plant • For normally occupied rooms and
ventilation system ensures that operations, anticipated operational areas of the plant (i.e., those areas
concentrations of airborne occurrences for each equipment requiring routine access to operate and
radionuclides are maintained at cubicle, corridor, and operating area maintain the plant), equilibrium
levels consistent with personnel requiring personnel access. concentrations of airborne
access needs. Calculations will consider: radionuclides will be a small fraction
• Design ventilation flow rates (10% or less) of the occupational
for each area; concentration limits listed in 10 CFR 20
• Typical leakage characteristics Appendix B.
for equipment located in each • For rooms that require infrequent
area access (such as for non-routine
• A radiation source term in each equipment maintenance), the
fluid system will be determined ventilation system is capable of
based upon an assumed off gas reducing radioactive airborne
rate of 3,700 MBq/second concentrations to and maintaining
(30 minute decay) appropriately them at or below the occupational
adjusted for radiological decay concentration limits listed in
and buildup of activated 10 CFR 20 Appendix B during the
corrosion and wear products. periods that occupancy is required.
• Testing of safety-related • For rooms that seldom require access,
isolation dampers will be plant design provides containment and
performed in accordance with ventilation to reduce airborne
IEEE-338 requirements. contamination spread to other areas of
lower contamination.
• A test report documents that isolation
dampers close within the designed
3.4-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.4-1

time frame and limit leakage to a rate
below the design assumed leakage
rate.
2. (Deleted)
3. The plant design provides Analyses (with inspections) of the Analysis/inspection report(s) demonstrate
radiation shielding for rooms, expected radiation levels in each plant that the maximum expected radiation dose
corridors and operating areas area will verify the adequacy of the rates in each plant area (deep dose
commensurate with their shielding designs. equivalent measured at 30 cm from the
occupancy requirements. source of the radiation, not contact dose
rates) are no greater than the dose rates
specified for the following zones, based on
the access requirements of that area for plant
operation and maintenance.
Zone Max Dose Rate Access
(mSv/hr)1 Requirements
A 0.006 Uncontrolled,
unlimited access
B 0.01 Controlled and
unlimited
access
C 0.05 Controlled and
limited access
(20 hr/week)
3.4-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.4-1

Zone Max Dose Rate Access
(mSv/hr)1 Requirements
D 0.25 Controlled and
limited access
(4 hr/week)
E 1 Controlled and
limited access
(1 hr/week)
F 10 Limited and
controlled
access
with special
authorization
permit required
G 100 Same as Zone F
H 1000 Same as Zone F
I 5000 Same as Zone F
J > 5000 Inaccessible
during power
and
shutdown
operations
1
1 Sv = 100 rem
4a. Deleted
3.4-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.4-1

4b. Deleted
3.4-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.5 INITIAL TEST PROGRAM

Design Description
The ESBWR Initial Test Program (ITP) is a program that will be conducted following
completion of construction and construction-related inspections and tests and extends to
commercial operation. The test program will be composed of preoperational and startup test
phases. The general objective of the ITP is to confirm that performance of the as-built facility is
in compliance with the design characteristics used for safety evaluations.
The preoperational test phase of the ITP will consist of those test activities conducted prior to
fuel loading. Preoperational testing will be conducted to demonstrate proper performance of
structures, systems, or components, and design features in the assembled plant. Tests will
include, as appropriate, logic and interlocks tests, control and instrumentation functional tests,
equipment functional tests, system operational tests, and system vibration and expansion
measurements.
The startup test phase of the ITP will begin with fuel loading and extends to commercial
operation. The primary objective of the startup phase testing will be to confirm integrated plant
performance with the nuclear fuel in the reactor pressure vessel and the plant at various power
levels. Startup phase testing will be conducted at five test conditions during power ascension:
open vessel, heatup, low power, mid-power, and high power. The following tests will be
conducted during power operation testing:
(1) Core performance analysis,
(2) Steady-state testing,
(3) Control system tuning and demonstration,
(4) System transient tests; and
(5) Major plant transients (including trips).
Testing during all phases of the ITP will be conducted using step-by-step written procedures to
control the conduct of each test. Such test procedures will delineate established test methods and
applicable acceptance criteria. The test procedures will be developed from preoperational and
startup test specifications. Approved test procedures will be made available to the NRC
approximately 60 days prior to their intended use for preoperational tests and 60 days prior to
scheduled fuel loading for startup phase tests. The preoperational and startup test specifications
will also be made available to the NRC. Administratively, the ITP will be controlled in
accordance with a startup administrative manual. This manual will contain the administrative
requirements that govern the conduct of test program, review, evaluation and approval of test
results, and test records retention.
This section represents a commitment that combined operating license applicants referencing the
certified design will implement an ITP that meets the objectives presented above. ITAAC,
aimed at verification of ITP implementation, are neither necessary nor required.
3.5-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.6 DESIGN RELIABILITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

Design Description
The GEH ESBWR Design Reliability Assurance Program (D-RAP) is used during detailed
design and specific equipment selection phases to assure that the important ESBWR reliability
assumptions of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) will be considered throughout the plant
life. The PRA is used to evaluate plant responses to abnormal event initiations and the
corresponding plant mitigation functions, to ensure potential plant damage scenarios pose a very
low probability of risk to the public.
The objectives of the D-RAP are to provide reasonable assurance that SSCs in the scope of the
D-RAP are designed such that: (1) Assumptions from the risk analysis are utilized; (2) SSCs
when challenged, function in accordance with the assumed reliability; (3) SSCs whose failure
results in a reactor trip, function in accordance with the assumed reliability; and (4) Maintenance
actions to achieve the assumed reliability are identified.
The scope of the ESBWR D-RAP includes risk-significant SSCs, both safety-related and
nonsafety-related, that provide defense-in-depth or result in significant improvement in the PRA
evaluations, and all SSCs designated as RTNSS.
(1) Ensure that the design of systems, structures, and components within the scope of the
reliability assurance program (RAP SSCs) is consistent with the risk insights and key
assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).
Table 3.6-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the
D-RAP.
3.6-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.6-1
ITAAC For The Design Reliability Assurance Program

1. Ensure that the design of systems, An analysis will confirm that the All RAP SSCs have been designed in
structures, and components within the design of all RAP SSCs has been accordance with the applicable reliability
scope of the reliability assurance completed in accordance with assurance activities for the D-RAP.
program (RAP SSCs) is consistent applicable D-RAP activities.
with the risk insights and key
assumptions (e.g., SSC design,
reliability, and availability).
3.6-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.7 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

Design Description
The Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) instrumentation provides information required to monitor
variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for post-accident conditions as appropriate to
ensure adequate safety. This information may be safety-related or nonsafety-related.
The ESBWR Distributed Control and Information System (DCIS) provides the required signal
paths to process this information. The ESBWR DCIS is subdivided into the safety-related DCIS
(Q-DCIS) and the nonsafety-related DCIS (N-DCIS). For PAM instrumentation associated with
critical safety functions and powered from safety-related sources the safety related Q-DCIS
provides the required signal path to process this data. This information then is shown on Q-
DCIS divisional safety-related displays. The safety-related information is also available to the
N-DCIS through the qualified safety-related isolation devices for input to nonsafety-related
displays, Plant Computer Functions (PCF), and the Alarm Management System (AMS). Type A,
Type B, and Type C variables are powered from safety-related sources, and Type D and Type E
variables will have their power source determined as part of the design process, (Regulatory
Guide 1.97 addresses the types of variables).
For variables that are powered from nonsafety-related sources the N-DCIS provides the required
signal paths to process this information. This information is used for input to nonsafety-related
displays, plant computer functions, and the Alarm Management System.
There is a Human Factors Engineering defined process to determine the appropriate variables
and types (A, B, C, D, or E). That is, the determination of the scope of instrumentation relied
upon to fulfill the post-accident monitoring function is determined through the Human Factors
Engineering process (see Section 3.3).
For each variable and type the process determines additional characteristics appropriate to that
variable as outlined below:
Performance criteria
• Range
• Accuracy
• Response time
• Required instrument functional duration
• Reliability
• Performance assessment documentation
Design criteria
• Single failure
• Common cause failure
• Independence and separation
• Isolation
3.7-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• Information ambiguity
• Power supply
• Calibration
• Testability
• Direct measurement
• Control of access
• Maintenance and repair
• Auxiliary supporting features
• Portable instruments
• Documentation of Design Criteria
Qualification criteria
• Type A variables
• Type B variables
• Type C variables
• Type D variables
• Type E variables
• Portable instruments
• Post Event operating time
• Documentation of qualification criteria
Display criteria
• Information characteristics
• Human factors
• Anomalous indications
• Continuous vs. on-demand display
• Trend or rate information
• Display identification
• Type of monitoring channel display
• Display location
• Information ambiguity
• Recording
• Digital display signal validation
3.7-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
• Display criteria documentation

PAM Instrumentation software is developed in accordance with the software development
program described in Section 3.2.
Table 3.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for post
accident monitoring instrumentation.
3.7-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.7-1
ITAAC For Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

1. The installed post-accident monitoring Inspections, tests or analysis will be The installed post accident monitoring
instrumentation (scope as determined performed to verify that the installed instrumentation conforms with the
by the Human Factors Engineering post-accident monitoring instrumentation requirements as described in Section 3.7.
process in Section 3.3) conforms with conforms with the requirements as
the requirements (variables, types, described in Section 3.7.
performance criteria, design criteria,
qualification criteria, display criteria,
and quality assurance) as described in
Section 3.7.
2. (Deleted)
3.7-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
3.8 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF MECHANICAL AND

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
Equipment qualification applies to safety-related electrical and mechanical equipment located in
harsh environments and digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) equipment in mild
environments. The electrical equipment identified in 10 CFR 50.49 as electric equipment
important to safety covered by (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) are subject to equipment qualification.
Certain equipment that supports Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS)
functions and that is located in harsh environments is also subject to equipment qualification.
Table 3.8-1 lists equipment subject to environmental qualification requirements, except that the
specific digital I&C equipment subject to environmental qualification requirements are defined
through the Design Acceptance Criteria process.
Dynamic and seismic qualification for digital I&C is addressed in this section. The specific
digital I&C equipment subject to dynamic and seismic qualification are defined through the
Design Acceptance Criteria process.
Design Description
(1) The electrical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can
perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases
accident environmental conditions.
(2) The mechanical equipment listed in Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh environment can
perform its safety-related or RTNSS function under normal, abnormal and design bases
(3) The safety-related digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including
digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) located in a mild
environment can perform its safety-related function under normal and AOO environmental
conditions.
(4) The Seismic Category I digital I&C equipment in systems listed in Table 2.2.15-1
(including digital components in the safety-related electrical distribution system) can
perform its safety-related function before, during and after dynamic and seismic design
bases event conditions.
Table 3.8-2 specifies the equipment qualification inspections, tests, analyses, and associated
acceptance criteria for equipment qualification program mechanical and electrical equipment.
3.8-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Nuclear Boiler System
Depressurization Valves 8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Safety Relief Valves 10 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Temperature element in
18 CV ESF 72 hr EH
DPV/SRV Discharge
MSIV - Inboard 4 CV PB 100 Days MH
MSIV - Outboard 4 ST PB 100 Days MH
MSIV Drain Bypass Valve 2 ST ESF 72 hr MH
Steam Line Lowpoint Drain
1 TB ESF 72 hr MH
Bypass Valve
Feedwater isolation valve 8 ST, CV PB 100 Days MH
RPV Level Transmitters All RB ESF 100 Days EH
RPV Temperature Elements All CV ESF 100 Days EH
RPV Pressure Transmitter All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Feed Piping Diff Pressure
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Transmitter
Steam Line Flow
Transmitter
Electrical Modules and CV, RB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable ST, TB
Isolation Condenser System
Isolation Valves 16 CV PB 100 Days MH
Isolation Valves Operator 16 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Condensate Return Valves 4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Condensate Return Valves
4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Operator
3.8-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Condensate Return Bypass
Valve
Condensate Return Bypass
Valve Operator
Upper Header Vent Valve 8 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Upper Header Vent Valve
Actuator
Lower Header Vent Valve 16 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Lower Header Vent Valve
Actuator
Pool Cross-Connect Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Vent Line Temperature
8 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Element
Condensate Drain
Temperature Element
Steam Piping Diff Pressure
Transmitter
Condensate Drain Diff
Pressure Transmitter
Electrical Modules and
All CV, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Rod Control and Information System
All CB, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Cable
Control Rod Drive System
HCU Scram Solenoid Pilot
135 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valve
FMCRD Passive Holding
269 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Brake
3.8-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
FMCRD Separation Switch 538 CV ESF 72 hr EH
Charging Water Header
4 RB ESF 72 hr EH
Pressure Transmitter
All CV, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Cable
High Pressure CRD
Makeup Line Isolation 2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valves
Backup Scram Valve
2 RB ESF 72 hr EH
Solenoids
Leak Detection and Isolation System
CV, RB,
Pressure Transmitters All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
CV, RB,
Temperature Sensors All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
Feedwater Control System
Electric Modules and Cable All CB, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Neutron Monitoring System
Detector and Tube
All CV ESF 72 hr MH
Assembly
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
Remote Shutdown System
Electrical Panels, Modules
All RB ESF 100 Days C
and Cable
3.8-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (DCIS)
All RB, CB ESF 100 Days C
Cable
Reactor Protection System
All CB, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Diverse Protection System
Electrical Modules and CB, RB,
All ESF, ISOL 100 Days EH
Cable TB
Safety System Logic and Control
Cable
Standby Liquid Control System
Isolation Check Valves 4 CB, RB PB 100 days MH
Squib Injection Valves 4 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Injection Shut-Off Valves
4 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Actuator
Nitrogen Charging Globe
2 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Valve
Nitrogen Charging Globe
Valve Actuator
Nitrogen Charging Check
2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valve
Accumulator
4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Depressurization Valves
Accumulator
Depressurization Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Actuator
Accumulator Relief Valve 2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
3.8-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Injection Shut Off Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Accumulator Level
Instrumentation
Accumulator Pressure
Instrumentation
Cable
Process Radiation Monitoring System
CV, RB,
Isolation Valves 4 ESF 100 Days MH
CB
Radiation Monitors,
CV, RB,
Sensors, Electrical Modules All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
and Cable
Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS)
GDCS Pool Level
Instrumentation
GDCS Squib Valve to
8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
GDCS Pool
GDCS Check Valve to
8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
GDCS Pool
GDCS Squib Valve to
4 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Suppression Pool
GDCS Check Valve to
4 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Suppression Pool
GDCS Squib Valve to
12 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Lower Drywell (DW)
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
3.8-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
Valve (CIV) - Drywell 1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Spray - Outboard
CIV - Drywell Spray -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV – Suppression Pool
Cooling (SPC) Suction - 4 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - SPC Return -
2 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - SPC Return - Inboard 2 CV PB 100 Days MH
CIV - GDCS Suction -
1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - GDCS Suction -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV - GDCS Return -
1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - GDCS Return -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
LPCI Isolation 4 FB, RB PB 100 Days MH
IC/PCCS Pool Level
All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Fuel Pool Level
2 FB ESF 100 Days EH
Instruments
Electrical Modules and CV, FB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB, CB
CIV - Mid Vessel - Inboard 2 CV PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
CIV - Mid Vessel -
2 RB PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - Mid Vessel - Inboard
2 CV ISOL 72 hr EH
Operator
CIV - Mid Vessel -
2 RB ISOL 72 hr EH
Outboard Operator
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 CV PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 RB PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 CV ISOL 72 hr EH
Inboard Operator
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 RB ISOL 72 hr EH
Outboard Operator
CIV - Process Sampling
2 CV PB, PAMS 100 Days MH
Line -Inboard
2 RB PB, PAMS 100 Days MH
Line -Outboard
2 CV ISOL, PAMS 100 Days EH
Line -Inboard Operator
2 RB ISOL, PAMS 100 Days EH
Line -Outboard Operator
Return Line Shutoff Valve 2 RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Check Valve to Feedwater 4 RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Mid-vessel Flow
All CV ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Mid-vessel Temperature
Instrumentation
Bottom Drain Flow
Instrumentation
3.8-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Bottom Drain Temperature
Instrumentation
Return Line Flow
Instrumentation
Return Line Temperature
Instrumentation
Overboard Flow
Instrumentation
Overboard Temperature
Instrumentation
Cables
Main Control Room (MCR) Panels
Panels, Modules and Cables All CB ESF 100 Days C
MCR Back Room Panels
Panels, Modules and Cable All CB ESF 100 Days C
Local Panels and Racks
Panels, Modules and Cable All ALL ESF 100 Days EH
Condensate and Feedwater System
Feed Line Temperature
All ST ESF 100 Days EH
Element
Feed Piping Diff Pressure
All ST ISOL 100 Days EH
Transmitter
All ST, CB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Makeup Water System
Isolation Valves All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Chilled Water System
Service Air System
High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System
Isolation Valves 4 CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)
CB, FB,
Cable and Supports All ESF 100 Days EH
RB
Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
Electrical Modules and CV, CB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB
Direct Current Power Supply
Divisional 250 VDC
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Battery
Divisional 250 VDC
Normal/Standby Battery 12 RB ESF 100 Days E
Charger
Divisional 250 VDC Power
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Center
Divisional 250 VDC
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Transfer Switch Box
Isolation Power Center
Normal Main Circuit 4 RB ISOL 100 Days E
Breaker
Alternate Main Circuit 4 RB ISOL 100 Days E
Breaker
3.8-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Supply Breaker to Division
12 RB ISOL 100 Days E
250 VDC Normal Battery
Charger
Electrical Modules and CV, CB,
All ESF 100 Days E
Cable RB, TB
Raceway System
Electrical Penetrations All CV PB 100 Days EH
CV, CB,
Conduit, Cable Trays and
All RB, TB, ESF 100 Days EH
Supports
FB
Containment System
Vacuum Breakers 3 CV ESF 100 Days MH
3 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Valves
Instrumentation and Cables All CV ESF 100 Days EH
Basemat Internal Melt
Arrest Coolability
ALL CV ESF 100 Days EH
(BiMAC) Temperature
Element
BiMAC Temperature
ALL CV ESF 100 Days EH
Switch
Passive Containment Cooling System
Vent Fan Isolation Valves 6 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Passive Containment
Cooling System Vent Fan
Vent Line Catalyst Module 12 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Containment Inerting System
Isolation Valve 0 CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Cable
Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner System
Passive Autocatalytic
All CV ESF 100 Days MH
Recombiners
Containment Monitoring System
All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Valves
Electrical Modules and CB, CV,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB
Drywell Pressure
All RB ESF 100 days EH
Transmitters
All RB ESF 100 days EH
Transmitters
Suppression Pool
All CV ESF 100 days EH
Temperature Element
Lower DW Level
All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitter
Suppression Pool Level
All RB PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitters
Suppression Pool Pressure
All RB PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitters
Hydrogen Analyzers All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Oxygen Analyzers All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Reactor Building HVAC
Building Isolation Dampers All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Electrical All RB ESF 100 Days EH
3.8-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Control Building HVAC
Control Room Habitability
Area (CRHA) Supply Air All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
Emergency Filter Unit
(EFU) Downstream All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Restroom Exhaust
All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Smoke Purge Intake
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Smoke Purge
Exhaust Isolation Dampers
Emergency Filter Unit
(EFU)
Cable
Fuel Building HVAC
Fuel Building General Area
HVAC Subsystem
(FBGAVS) Building All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Supply Air Isolation
Dampers
FBGAVS Building Exhaust
All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Air Isolation Dampers
Fuel Building Fuel Pool
Area HVAC Subsystem
(FBFPVS) Building Supply
FBFPVS Building Exhaust
3.8-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-1
Required
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 4)
(note 3)
Cable
Note 1: CV – Containment Vessel
ST – Steam Tunnel
RB – Reactor Building
FB – Fuel Building
CB – Control Building
TB – Turbine Building
OO – Outdoors Onsite
When multiple locations are listed, information in this table applies to equipment in all
locations listed that also meets the other criteria shown.
Note 2: ESF – Engineered Safety Feature

PAMS – Post Accident Monitoring
ISOL – Containment Isolation
PB – Primary Pressure Boundary
When multiple functions are listed, information in this table applies to equipment
associated with either function that also meets the other criteria shown.
Note 3: Required operation time refers to the period of time which the equipment must remain
available or operational. Required operation times apply to equipment when all
criteria shown in the first four columns of the table are met.
Note 4: E – Electrical Equipment Program

M – Mechanical Equipment Program
C – Computer Based I&C System Program
H – Harsh Environment (omission of H indicates Mild Environment)
Qualification program classifications apply to equipment when all criteria shown in the
first four columns of the table are met.
Note 5: Valve operators/actuators are considered to be part of the valve assembly and are
generally not listed separately in this table.
3.8-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment

1. The electrical equipment listed in
Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh
environment can perform its safety-
related or RTNSS function under
normal, abnormal and design bases i. (Deleted)
ii. Type tests, or a combination of type ii. The electrical equipment listed in
tests and analyses, will be performed. Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh
environment is qualified to perform its
safety-related or RTNSS function during
the applicable normal and abnormal
environmental conditions that would
exist before, during, and following a
design basis accident without loss of
safety-related or RTNSS function for the
time required to perform the safety
function.
3.8-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2

iii. Inspection will be performed of the iii. The EQD exists and concludes that
EQD for the as-built electrical the as-built electrical equipment
equipment and the associated wiring, listed in Table 3.8-1 and the
cables, and terminations located in a associated wiring, cables, and
harsh environment. terminations located in a harsh
environment are qualified for a
harsh environment and are bounded
by type tests, or a combination of
type tests and analyses.
2. The mechanical equipment listed in
Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh
environment can perform its safety-
related or RTNSS function under i. (Deleted)
normal, abnormal and design bases
ii. Type tests, or a combination of type ii. The mechanical equipment listed in
tests and analyses, will be performed. Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh
environment is qualified to perform
its safety-related or RTNSS function
during the applicable normal and
abnormal environmental conditions
that would exist before, during, and
following a design basis accident
without loss of safety function for
the time required to perform the
safety function.
3.8-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2

EQD for the as-built mechanical the as-built mechanical equipment
equipment located in a harsh located in a harsh environment are
environment. qualified for a harsh environment
and are bounded by type tests, or a
combination of type tests and
analyses.
3. The safety-related digital I&C
equipment in systems listed in Table
2.2.15-1 (including digital
components in the safety-related
electrical distribution system) located i. Analysis will be performed to identify i. The analyses results identify the
in a mild environment can perform its the environmental design bases of environmental design bases for the
safety-related function under normal digital I&C equipment in systems Seismic Category I digital I&C
and AOO environmental conditions. listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including equipment in systems listed in Table
digital components in the safety- 2.2.15-1 (including digital
related electrical distribution system) components in the safety-related
to identify the equipment to be electrical distribution system) to
environmentally qualified. identify the equipment to be
environmentally qualified.
3.8-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2

ii. Type tests, or a combination of type ii. The safety-related digital I&C
tests and analyses, will be performed. equipment (including digital
electrical distribution system)
located in a mild environment is
qualified to perform its safety
function during the applicable
normal and abnormal environmental
conditions that would exist before,
during, and following a design basis
accident without loss of safety
function for the time required to
perform the safety function.
EQD for the as-built digital I&C the as-built safety-related digital
equipment located in a mild I&C equipment (including digital
environment components in the safety-related
electrical distribution system) and
the associated wiring, cables, and
terminations located in a mild
environment are qualified for a mild
environment and are bounded by
type tests, analyses, or a
analyses.
3.8-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2

4. The Seismic Category I digital I&C i. Analysis will be performed to identify i. The analyses results identify the
equipment in systems listed in Table the dynamic and seismic design bases dynamic and seismic design bases
2.2.15-1 (including digital of digital I&C equipment in systems for the Seismic Category I digital
components in the safety-related listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including I&C equipment in systems listed in
electrical distribution system) can digital components in the safety- Table 2.2.15-1 (including digital
perform its safety-related function related electrical distribution system) components in the safety-related
before, during and after dynamic and to identify the equipment to be electrical distribution system) to
seismic design bases event conditions. seismically qualified. identify the equipment to be
seismically qualified.
ii. Dynamic and seismic type tests, or a ii. The Seismic Category I digital I&C
combination of type tests and equipment in systems listed in Table
analyses, will be performed. 2.2.15-1 (including digital
electrical distribution system) and
subject to seismic qualification can
withstand the dynamic and seismic
conditions that would exist before,
during, and following a design basis
event without loss of safety
function.
3.8-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 3.8-2

iii. Inspection will be performed of the iii. The DQD exists and concludes that
DQD for the as-built equipment. the as-built Seismic Category I
digital I&C equipment in systems
listed in Table 2.2.15-1 (including
digital components in the safety-
related electrical distribution
system) and subject to seismic
qualification is bounded by dynamic
and seismic type tests, or a
analyses.
3.8-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
4. INTERFACE MATERIAL
An applicant for a combined license (COL) that references the ESBWR certified design must
provide design features or characteristics that comply with the interface requirements for the
plant design and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) for the site-
specific portion of the facility design, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.80 (a).
Tier 1 interfaces are identified for the conceptual design portion of the Plant Service Water
System for the certified design.
4.1 PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

Design Description
The Plant Service Water System (PSWS) is the heat sink for the Reactor Component Cooling
Water System (RCCWS). The PSWS does not perform any safety-related function. There is no
interface with any safety-related component. The PSWS provides the non-safety related
functions to support the post-72 hour cooling for RCCWS. The PSWS system must have the
volume of water necessary to accommodate losses due to evaporation, drift, etc. without make-
up for seven days using the most limiting condition of operation as defined by the PRA model.
The volume maintained must also ensure that the PSWS pumps have sufficient available net
positive suction head at the pump suction location for the lowest probable water level of the heat
sink. The most limiting condition equates to 2.02x107 MJ (1.92x1010 BTU) over a period of
seven days.
The PSWS cooling towers and basins are not within the scope of the certified design. A specific
design for this portion of the PSWS shall be selected for any facility, which has adopted the
certified design. The plant-specific portion of the PSWS shall meet the interface requirements
defined below.
Interface Requirements
The interface requirements are necessary for supporting the post 72-hour cooling function of the
PSWS. The volume of water shall be sufficient such that no active makeup shall be necessary to
remove 2.02x107 MJ (1.92x1010 BTU) over a period of seven days. Additionally, the PSWS
pumps must have sufficient available net positive suction head at the pump suction location for
the lowest probable water level of the heat sink. Consequently, verification of compliance with
the interface requirements shall be achieved by inspections, tests, and analyses that are similar to
those provided for the certified design. The combined license applicant referencing the certified
design shall develop these inspections, tests, and analyses, together with their associated
acceptance criteria.
4.1-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
4.2 OFFSITE POWER

Design Description
The offsite portion of the Preferred Power Supply (PPS) consists of at least two electrical circuits
and associated equipment that are used to interconnect the offsite transmission system with the
plant main generator and the onsite portions of the PPS. The PPS consists of the normal
preferred and alternate preferred power sources and includes those portions of the offsite power
system and the onsite power system required for power flow from the offsite transmission system
to the safety-related Isolation Power Centers (IPC) incoming line breakers.
The interface between the normal preferred ESBWR certified plant onsite portion of the PPS and
the site-specific offsite portion of the PPS is at the switchyard side terminals of the high side
Motor Operated Disconnect (MOD) of the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) circuit breaker
and main generator circuit breaker. The interface between the alternate preferred ESBWR
certified plant onsite portion of the PPS and the site specific offsite portion of the PPS is at the
switchyard side terminals of the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) high side MODs.
Interface Requirements
A combined license applicant referencing the ESBWR certified design shall develop an ITAAC
to verify that the as-built offsite portion of the PPS from the transmission network to the
interface with the onsite portions of the PPS satisfy the applicable provisions of GDC 17.
Specifically, the ITAAC shall verify:
(1) At least two independent circuits supply electric power from the transmission network to
the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS.
(2) Each offsite circuit interfacing with the onsite portions of the PPS is adequately rated to
supply the load requirements during design basis operating modes (refer to Table 2.13.1-2,
Item 9).
(3) During steady state operation, the offsite portion of the PPS is capable of supplying voltage
at the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS that will support operation of safety-
related loads during design basis operating modes.
(4) During steady state operation, the offsite portion of the PPS is capable of supplying
required frequency at the interface with the onsite portions of the PPS that will support
operation of safety-related loads during design basis operating modes.
(5) The fault current contribution of the offsite portion of the PPS is compatible with the
interrupting capability of the onsite fault current interrupting devices.
4.2-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
5. SITE PARAMETERS
5.1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE
The intent of this section is to provide Tier 1 material that complies with the 10 CFR Part 52
requirements to define the site parameters postulated for the ESBWR certified design.
Assuming the certified design will be referenced for a wide range of sites, it is necessary to
specify a set of site parameters enveloping the conditions that could occur at most potential
power plant sites in the United States. These parameters are provided in Table 5.1-1. It is
intended that any facility that references the certified design will utilize a site where the actual
site-specific conditions are within the defined envelope.
In the case of seismic design and soil parameters not meeting the defined conditions, site-specific
soil-structure interaction analyses may be performed. The results may be used to confirm the
seismic design adequacy of the certified design using approved methods and acceptance criteria.
5.1-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (1)
Maximum Ground Water Level: 0.61 m (2 ft) below plant grade
(8)
Extreme Wind: Seismic Category I, II and Radwaste Building Structures
- 100-year Wind Speed (3-sec gust): 67.1 m/s (150 mph)
- Exposure Category: D
Other Seismic Category NS Standard Plant Structures
- 50-year Wind Speed (3-sec gust): 58.1 m/s (130 mph)
Maximum Flood (or Tsunami) Level: 0.3 m (1 ft) below plant grade
Tornado: - Maximum Tornado Wind Speed: 147.5 m/s (330 mph)
- Maximum Rotational Speed: 116.2 m/s (260 mph)
- Translational Speed: 31.3 m/s (70 mph)
- Radius: 45.7 m (150 ft)
- Pressure Drop: 16.6 kPa (2.4 psi)
- Rate of Pressure Drop: 11.7 kPa/s (1.7 psi/s)
- Missile Spectrum(7): Spectrum I of SRP 3.5.1.4,
Rev 2 applied to full building
height.
Precipitation (for Roof Design): - Maximum Rainfall Rate: 49.3 cm/hr (19.4 in/hr)
- Maximum Short Term Rate: 15.7 cm (6.2 in) in
5 minutes
- Maximum Ground Snow Load 2394 Pa (50 lbf/ft2)
for normal winter precipitation
event:
- Maximum Ground Snow Load 7757 Pa (162 lbf/ft2)
for extreme winter precipitation
event:
Ambient Design Temperature: 2% Annual Exceedance Values
- Maximum: 35.6°C (96°F) dry bulb
26.1°C (79°F) wet bulb (mean coincident)
27.2°C (81°F) wet bulb (non-coincident)
- Minimum: -23.3°C (-10°F)
1% Annual Exceedance Values
- Minimum: -23.3°C (-10°F)
0% Exceedance Values
- Minimum: -40°C (-40°F)
5.1-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (continued)
Soil Properties: (6) - Minimum Static Bearing Capacity (2): Greater than or equal to the
maximum static bearing demand.
Maximum Static Bearing Demand:
Reactor/Fuel Building: 699 kPa (14,600 lbf/ft2)
Control Building: 292 kPa (6,100 lbf/ft2)
Fire Water Service Complex: 165 kPa (3,450 lbf/ft2)
- Minimum Dynamic Bearing Capacity (2): Greater than or equal to
the maximum dynamic bearing demand.
Maximum Dynamic Bearing Demand (SSE + Static):
Reactor/Fuel Building:
Soft: 1100 kPa (23,000 lbf/ft2)
Medium: 2700 kPa (56,400 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 1100 kPa (23,000 lbf/ft2)
Control Building:
Soft: 500 kPa (10,500 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 420 kPa (8,800 lbf/ft2)
Firewater Service Complex (FWSC):
Soft: 460 kPa (9,600 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 1200 kPa (25,100 lbf/ft2)
- Minimum Shear Wave Velocity: (3) 300 m/s (1000 ft/s)
- Liquefaction Potential:
Seismic Category I None under footprint of
Structures Seismic Category I structures
resulting from site-specific
SSE.
- Angle of Internal Friction ≥ 35 degrees
(in-situ and backfill)
- Backfill on sides of and underneath Seismic Category I structures
Product of peak ground acceleration α (in g), Poisson’s ratio ν
and density γ:
α(0.95ν+0.65)γ: 1220 kg/m3 (76 lbf/ft3) maximum
Product of at-rest pressure coefficient k0 and density:
k0γ: 750 kg/m3 (47 lbf/ft3) minimum
Soil density:
γ: 2000 kg/m3 (125 lbf/ft3) minimum
Seismology: - SSE Horizontal Ground Response See Figure 5.1-1
Spectra: (4)
- SSE Vertical Ground Response See Figure 5.1-2
Spectra: (4)
5.1-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 5.1-1
Hazards in Site Vicinity: - Site Proximity Missiles and Aircraft: < about 10-7 per year
- Volcanic Activity: None
- Toxic Gases: None *
* Maximum toxic gas concentrations < toxicity limits

at the MCR HVAC intakes:
Required Stability of Slopes: - Factor of safety for static (non-seismic) loading 1.5
- Factor of safety for dynamic (seismic) loading 1.1
due to site-specific SSE
Maximum Settlement Values for Seismic
Category I Buildings (5)
Maximum Settlement at any corner - Under Reactor/Fuel Building 103 mm (4.0 inches)
of basemat - Under Control Building 18 mm (0.7 inches)
- Under FWSC Structure 17 mm (0.7 inches)
Average Settlement at four corners - Under Reactor/Fuel Building 65 mm (2.6 inches)

of basemat - Under Control Building 12 mm (0.5 inches)
- Under FWSC Structure 10 mm (0.4 inches)
Maximum Differential Settlement - within Reactor/Fuel Building 77 mm (3.0 inches)

along the longest mat foundation - within Control Building 14 mm (0.6 inches)
dimension - within FWSC Structure 12 mm (0.5 inches)
Maximum Differential Displacement 85 mm (3.3 inches)

between Reactor/Fuel Buildings and
Control Building
5.1-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 5.1-1
Meteorological Dispersion (X/Q): EAB X/Q:
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3
LPZ X/Q:
0-8 hours: 1.90E-04 s/m3
8-24 hours: 1.40E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 7.50E-05 s/m3
4-30 days: 3.00E-05 s/m3
* First value is for unfiltered Control Room X/Q: *

inleakage. Second value is for air Reactor Building
intakes (emergency and normal) 0-2 hours: 1.90E-03 s/m3 1.50E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 1.30E-03 s/m3 1.10E-03 s/m3
8-24 hours: 5.90E-04 s/m3 5.00E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 5.00E-04 s/m3 4.20E-04 s/m3
4-30 days: 4.40E-04 s/m3 3.80E-04 s/m3
Passive Containment Cooling System / Reactor Building Roof
0-2 hours: 3.40E-03 s/m3 3.00E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 2.70E-03 s/m3 2.50E-03 s/m3
3
8-24 hours: 1.40E-03 s/m 1.20E-03 s/m3
3
1-4 days: 1.10E-03 s/m 9.00E-04 s/m3
4-30 days: 7.90E-04 s/m3 7.00E-04 s/m3
HELB Blowout Panels/Reactor Building
0-2 hours: 7.00E-03 s/m3 5.90E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 5.00E-03 s/m3 4.70E-03 s/m3
8-24 hours: 2.10E-03 s/m3 1.50E-03 s/m3
1-4 days: 1.70E-03 s/m3 1.10E-03 s/m3
4-30 days: 1.50E-03 s/m3 1.00E-03 s/m3
Turbine Building
0-2 hours: 1.20E-03 s/m3 1.20E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 9.80E-04 s/m3 9.80E-04 s/m3
8-24 hours: 3.90E-04 s/m3 3.90E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 3.80E-04 s/m3 3.80E-04 s/m3
4-30 days: 3.20E-04 s/m3 3.20E-04 s/m3
Fuel Building
0-2 hours: 2.80E-03 s/m3 2.80E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 2.50E-03 s/m3 2.50E-03 s/m3
8-24 hours: 1.25E-03 s/m3 1.25E-03 s/m3
1-4 days: 1.10E-03 s/m3 1.10E-03 s/m3
4-30 days: 1.00E-03 s/m3 1.00E-03 s/m3
5.1-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Table 5.1-1
Meteorological Dispersion (X/Q):
(continued) Technical Support Center X/Q:*
Reactor Building
0-2 hours: 1.00E-03 s/m3 1.00E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 6.00E-04 s/m3 6.00E-04 s/m3
3
8-24 hours: 3.00E-04 s/m 3.00E-04 s/m3
3
1-4 days: 2.00E-04 s/m 2.00E-04 s/m3
4-30 days: 1.00E-04 s/m3 1.00E-04 s/m3
Turbine Building
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3 2.00E-03 s/m3
3
2-8 hours: 1.50E-03 s/m 1.50E-03 s/m3
3
8-24 hours: 8.00E-04 s/m 8.00E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 6.00E-04 s/m3 6.00E-04 s/m3
3
4-30 days: 5.00E-04 s/m 5.00E-04 s/m3
Passive Containment Cooling System / Reactor Building Roof
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3 2.00E-03 s/m3
3
2-8 hours: 1.10E-03 s/m 1.10E-03 s/m3
8-24 hours: 5.00E-04 s/m3 5.00E-04 s/m3
3
1-4 days: 4.00E-04 s/m 4.00E-04 s/m3
3
4-30 days: 3.00E-04 s/m 3.00E-04 s/m3
Notes:
(1) The site parameters defined in this table are applicable to Seismic Category I, II, and
Radwaste Building structures, unless noted otherwise.
(2) At the foundation level of Seismic Category I structures. The dynamic bearing pressure is
the toe pressure. The maximum static bearing demand is compared with the site-specific
allowable static bearing pressure, which is obtained by dividing the ultimate soil bearing
capacity by a factor of safety appropriate for the design load combination. The maximum
dynamic bearing demand is compared with the site-specific allowable dynamic bearing
pressure, which is obtained by dividing the ultimate soil bearing capacity by a factor of
safety appropriate for the design load combination. When a site-specific shear wave
velocity is between soft soil and medium soil the larger of the soft or medium maximum
dynamic bearing demand will be used. When a site-specific shear wave velocity is
between medium soil and hard soil the larger of the medium or hard maximum dynamic
bearing demand will be used. Alternatively, for soils with a site-specific shear wave
velocity a linearly interpolated dynamic bearing demand between soft and medium soil or
between medium and hard soil can be used. The shear wave velocities of soft, medium and
hard soils are 300 m/sec (1000 ft/sec), 800 m/sec (2600 ft/sec) and greater than or equal to
1700 m/sec (5600 ft/sec), respectively.
(3) This is the minimum shear wave velocity of the supporting foundation material and
material surrounding the embedded walls associated with seismic strains for lower bound
soil properties at minus one sigma from the mean. The ratio of the largest to the smallest
shear wave velocity over the mat foundation width of the supporting foundation material
does not exceed 1.7.
5.1-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
(4) Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) design ground response spectra of 5% damping, also
termed Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS), are defined as free-field
outcrop spectra at the foundation level (bottom of the base slab) of the Reactor/Fuel and
Control Building structures. For the Firewater Service Complex, which is essentially a
surface founded structure, the CSDRS is 1.35 times the values shown in Figures 5.1-1 and
5.1-2 and is defined as free-field outcrop spectra at the foundation level (bottom of the base
slab) of the Firewater Service Complex structure.
(5) Settlement values are long-term (post-construction) values except for differential
settlement within the foundation mat. The design of the foundation mat accommodates
immediate and long-term (post construction) differential settlements after the installation
of the basemat.
(6) For sites not meeting the soil property requirements, a site-specific analysis is required to
demonstrate the adequacy of the standard plant design.
(7) Tornado missiles do not apply to Seismic Category NS and Seismic Category II buildings.
For the Radwaste Building, the tornado missiles defined in Regulatory Guide 1.143,
Table 2, Class RW-IIa apply. The hurricane missile spectrum for Seismic Category NS
and Seismic Category II structures that house RTNSS equipment is consistent with the
tornado missile spectrum identified in this table.
(8) Values were selected to comply with expected requirements of southeastern coastal
locations, which include the consideration of hurricanes as described in ASCE 7-02. Wind
speeds are considered to be at 10 m (33 ft) above ground per ASCE 7-02. Seismic
Category NS buildings that house RTNSS equipment are designed to withstand hurricane
Category 5 wind velocity at 87.2 m/s (195 mph), 3-second gust, and missiles generated by
that wind velocity.
5.1-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 5.1-1. ESBWR Horizontal SSE Design Ground Spectra at Foundation Level
5.1-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
Figure 5.1-2. ESBWR Vertical SSE Design Ground Response Spectra at Foundation Level
5.1-9

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GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy

ESBWR Design Control Document

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1.1-1

2.5.8 FMCRD Maintenance Area ............................................................................................ 2.5-17

2.13.3 Direct Current Power Supply ...................................................................................... 2.13-19

3.4 Radiation Protection ................................................................................................................... 3.4-1

Table 2.10.1-1 Major Equipment in LWMS .......................................................................... 2.10-2

Figure 1.1.1-1 RPV Water Level Range Definition ................................................................ 1.1-8

Figure 2.16.2-8. FBFPVS Functional Arrangement Diagram ............................................. 2.16-43

1.1 DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

equipment will be addressed by ITAAC. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Radio

Verification of the Functional Arrangement of a system, as used in an ITAAC, means

1.1.2 General Provisions

1.1.2.1 Treatment of Individual Items

1.1.2.2 Implementation of ITAAC

1.1.2.3 Discussion of Matters Related to Operations

1.1.2.4 Interpretation of Figures

1.1.2.5 Rated Reactor Core Thermal Power

Figure 1.1.1-1 RPV Water Level Range Definition

1.2 FIGURE LEGEND

Figure 1.2-1. Legend for Tier 1 System Diagrams

SXS STATIC TRANSFER

1.3 TABLE LEGEND

1.4 DESIGN ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

2. DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS AND ITAAC

2.1 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY

2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria

(2) RCPB = Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary

(3) MCR = Main Control Room

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

2.1.2 Nuclear Boiler System

Inboard main steam V8

Outboard main steam V9

Figure 2.1.2-2. NBS Steamlines and Feedwater Lines

Figure 2.1.2-3. Safety Relief Valve Discharge Line Quencher Arrangement

2.2 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

2.2.1 Rod Control and Information System

RC&IS Dedicated Operator Interface is located in the MCR.

Major Functional Group Functions

Major Functional Group Functions

Major Functional Group Functions

Major Functional Group Functions

Function Initiator Interfacing System

Function Initiator Interfacing System

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

Figure 2.2.1-1. (Deleted)

2.2.2 Control Rod Drive System

Percent Insertion Time (sec)

Function Initiator Interfacing System

Table 2.2.2-4 (Continued)

• The control valves reopen and the pump minimum

Table 2.2.2-4 (Continued)

FMCRD reactor coolant FMCRD Yes Yes Yes

HCU purge water supply line HCU Yes Yes No

High pressure makeup isolation HP CRD Yes Yes No –

Scram accumulator Div 1-4 Yes Yes Yes MCR - -