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ML14100A493
ML14100A493
26A6641AB
Revision 10
April 2014
NOTICE
The design, engineering, and other information contained in this document is furnished by GE-
Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC (GEH) for the purpose of supporting the GEH
application to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certification of the
ESBWR nuclear plant design pursuant to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52.
No use of or right to copy any of the information contained in this document, other than by the
NRC and its contractors in support of GEH application, is authorized except by contract with
GEH. The information provided in this document is part of and dependent upon a larger set of
knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights pertaining to standardized, nuclear
powered, electric generating facilities that utilize the design certification, as designed and
certified to U.S. Codes, Standards, and Regulations by GEH, and referred to as the ESBWR
nuclear power plant design. Without access and a GEH grant of rights to that larger set of
knowledge, technology, and intellectual property rights, this document is not practically or
rightfully usable by others, except by the NRC or through contractual agreements with
Combined License Applicants and Licensees or customers and participating utilities.
This document contains sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI) related to the
physical protection of an ESBWR Nuclear Plant pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(d).
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Contents
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List of Tables
Table 2.1.1-1 Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Mechanical Equipment ........................ 2.1-3
Table 2.1.1-2 Key Dimensions of RPV Components and Acceptable Variations................... 2.1-4
Table 2.1.1-3 ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals .................................... 2.1-5
Table 2.1.2-1 Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment .............................................. 2.1-18
Table 2.1.2-2 Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment .................................................. 2.1-22
Table 2.1.2-3 ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System .......................................................... 2.1-24
Table 2.2.1-1 RC&IS Functional Arrangement ....................................................................... 2.2-2
Table 2.2.1-2 RC&IS Major Functional Groups ..................................................................... 2.2-3
Table 2.2.1-3 RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems . 2.2-7
Table 2.2.1-4 RC&IS Rod Block Functions ............................................................................ 2.2-9
Table 2.2.1-5 RC&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ..................................................... 2.2-11
Table 2.2.1-6 ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System................................... 2.2-12
Table 2.2.2-1 CRD System Functional Arrangement ............................................................ 2.2-18
Table 2.2.2-2 CRD Maximum Allowable Scram Times for Vessel Bottom Pressures Below
7.481 MPaG (1085 psig) ............................................................................... 2.2-19
Table 2.2.2-3 CRD System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
....................................................................................................................... 2.2-20
Table 2.2.2-4 CRD System Controls and Interlocks.............................................................. 2.2-21
Table 2.2.2-5 Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment ........................................ 2.2-24
Table 2.2.2-6 Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment ........................................... 2.2-26
Table 2.2.2-7 ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System ................................................... 2.2-28
Table 2.2.3-1 FWCS Functional Arrangement ...................................................................... 2.2-40
Table 2.2.3-2 FWCS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems 2.2-41
Table 2.2.3-3 FWCS Controls ............................................................................................... 2.2-42
Table 2.2.3-4 ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System ................................................... 2.2-43
Table 2.2.4-1 (Deleted) .......................................................................................................... 2.2-49
Table 2.2.4-2 SLC System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
....................................................................................................................... 2.2-50
Table 2.2.4-3 SLC System Controls and Interlocks .............................................................. 2.2-51
Table 2.2.4-4 SLC System Mechanical Equipment ............................................................... 2.2-52
Table 2.2.4-5 SLC System Electrical Equipment .................................................................. 2.2-57
Table 2.2.4-6 ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System ........................................... 2.2-60
Table 2.2.5-1 NMS Functional Arrangement ........................................................................ 2.2-73
Table 2.2.5-2 NMS Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems .................... 2.2-74
Table 2.2.5-3 NMS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ........................................................ 2.2-75
Table 2.2.5-4 ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System ................................................. 2.2-76
Table 2.2.6-1 RSS Functional Arrangement .......................................................................... 2.2-79
Table 2.2.6-2 RSS Controls ................................................................................................... 2.2-80
Table 2.2.6-3 ITAAC For The Remote Shutdown System .................................................... 2.2-81
Table 2.2.7-1 RPS Functional Arrangement .......................................................................... 2.2-83
Table 2.2.7-2 RPS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems .... 2.2-84
Table 2.2.7-3 RPS Controls, Interlocks (System Interfaces), and Bypasses ......................... 2.2-85
Table 2.2.7-4 ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System ................................................... 2.2-86
Table 2.2.9-1 SB&PC System Functional Arrangement ....................................................... 2.2-91
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Table 2.2.9-2 SB&PC System Functions and Initiating Conditions ...................................... 2.2-91
Table 2.2.9-3 ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System ........................ 2.2-92
Table 2.2.10-1 Q-DCIS Platforms ......................................................................................... 2.2-95
Table 2.2.11-1 N-DCIS Network Segments .......................................................................... 2.2-97
Table 2.2.12-1 (Deleted) ...................................................................................................... 2.2-100
Table 2.2.12-2 LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables ......................................... 2.2-101
Table 2.2.12-3 LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables ............................................ 2.2-104
Table 2.2.12-4 LD&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ................................................. 2.2-107
Table 2.2.12-5 ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System ............................... 2.2-108
Table 2.2.13-1 SSLC/ESF Functional Arrangement ........................................................... 2.2-111
Table 2.2.13-2 SSLC/ESF Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing
Systems ........................................................................................................ 2.2-112
Table 2.2.13-3 SSLC/ESF Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses ........................................... 2.2-113
Table 2.2.13-4 ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control
(SSLC/ESF) ................................................................................................. 2.2-114
Table 2.2.14-1 Diverse Instrumentation and Control Systems Functional Arrangement .... 2.2-118
Table 2.2.14-2 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing
Systems 1 ..................................................................................................... 2.2-119
Table 2.2.14-3 Diverse Instrumentation and Controls Controls, Interlocks and Bypasses1 2.2-121
Table 2.2.14-4 ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls .............................. 2.2-122
Table 2.2.15-1 IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2) ......................... 2.2-139
Table 2.2.15-2 ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation ............................... 2.2-142
Table 2.2.16-1 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Functional Arrangement............. 2.2-188
Table 2.2.16-2 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Automatic Functions, Initiators,
and Associated Interfacing Systems ............................................................ 2.2-189
Table 2.2.16-3 HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Controls, Interlocks, and
Bypasses ...................................................................................................... 2.2-190
Table 2.2.16-4 ITAAC For The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP .......................... 2.2-191
Table 2.3.1-1 Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1) .................................. 2.3-3
Table 2.3.1-2 ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System ................................... 2.3-7
Table 2.3.2-1 ARM Locations ............................................................................................... 2.3-13
Table 2.3.2-2 ITAAC For Area Radiation Monitoring System .............................................. 2.3-16
Table 2.4.1-1 ICS Mechanical Equipment ............................................................................... 2.4-5
Table 2.4.1-2 ICS Electrical Equipment ................................................................................ 2.4-11
Table 2.4.1-3 ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System ................................................. 2.4-15
Table 2.4.2-1 GDCS Mechanical Equipment ......................................................................... 2.4-32
Table 2.4.2-2 GDCS Electrical Equipment............................................................................ 2.4-40
Table 2.4.2-3 ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven
Cooling System ............................................................................................. 2.4-46
Table 2.5.5-1 ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment .............................................................. 2.5-7
Table 2.5.6-1 ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility............................................................. 2.5-13
Table 2.5.10-1 ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System .......................................................... 2.5-20
Table 2.6.1-1 Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System.......................................... 2.6-3
Table 2.6.1-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System............. 2.6-10
Table 2.6.2-1 FAPCS Mechanical Equipment ....................................................................... 2.6-19
Table 2.6.2-2 ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System ........................... 2.6-24
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Table 2.16.1-1 ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators ..................................................... 2.16-2
Table 2.16.2-1 Reactor Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment ..................... 2.16-13
Table 2.16.2-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC .................................................. 2.16-14
Table 2.16.2-3 Control Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment ..................... 2.16-19
Table 2.16.2-4 ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem ............ 2.16-20
Table 2.16.2-5 Emergency Filter Units................................................................................ 2.16-25
Table 2.16.2-6 ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units..................................................... 2.16-26
Table 2.16.2-7 ITAAC For The Turbine Building Ventilation System ............................... 2.16-30
Table 2.16.2-8 Fuel Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment........................... 2.16-31
Table 2.16.2-9 ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC ........................................................ 2.16-32
Table 2.16.2-10 ITAAC For The Electrical Building Ventilation System .......................... 2.16-34
Table 2.16.3-1 Fire Protection System Equipment .............................................................. 2.16-46
Table 2.16.3-2 ITAAC For The Fire Protection System ..................................................... 2.16-47
Table 2.16.3.1-1 ITAAC For Fire Barriers .......................................................................... 2.16-54
Table 2.16.4-1 ITAAC For The Equipment and Floor Drain System ................................. 2.16-58
Table 2.16.5-1 Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1 ....................................... 2.16-62
Table 2.16.5-1 Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 2 ....................................... 2.16-71
Table 2.16.5-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building ............................................................... 2.16-72
Table 2.16.5-2 ITAAC For The Reactor Building ............................................................... 2.16-77
Table 2.16.6-1 Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 1 ....................................... 2.16-91
Table 2.16.6-1 Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 2 ....................................... 2.16-93
Table 2.16.6-2 ITAAC For Control Building ...................................................................... 2.16-94
Table 2.16.7-1 Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1 .......................................... 2.16-106
Table 2.16.7-1 Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 2 .......................................... 2.16-109
Table 2.16.7-2 ITAAC For The Fuel Building .................................................................. 2.16-110
Table 2.16.8-1 ITAAC For The Turbine Building ............................................................. 2.16-122
Table 2.16.9-1 ITAAC For The Radwaste Building........................................................... 2.16-125
Table 2.16.10-1 ITAAC For The Service Building ............................................................ 2.16-128
Table 2.16.11-1 ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building .............................................. 2.16-130
Table 2.16.12-1 ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex ........................................... 2.16-133
Table 2.16.13-1 ITAAC For The Electrical Building ......................................................... 2.16-136
Table 2.16.14-1 ITAAC For The Service Water Building ................................................. 2.16-139
Table 2.19-1 ITAAC For The Plant Security......................................................................... 2.19-3
Table 3.1-1 ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components.............................. 3.1-2
Table 3.3-1a Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls ........................... 3.3-4
Table 3.3-1b Minimum Inventory of RSS Alarms, Displays, and Controls ............................. 3.3-6
Table 3.3-2 ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering ............................................................. 3.3-7
Table 3.4-1 ITAAC For Radiation Protection ......................................................................... 3.4-2
Table 3.6-1 ITAAC For The Design Reliability Assurance Program ..................................... 3.6-2
Table 3.7-1 ITAAC For Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ...................................... 3.7-4
Table 3.8-1 Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification .............. 3.8-2
Table 3.8-2 ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and
Electrical Equipment ..................................................................................... 3.8-15
Table 5.1-1 Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (1) ..................................... 5.1-2
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List of Illustrations
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1. INTRODUCTION
This document provides the Tier 1 material of the ESBWR Design Control Document (DCD).
1.1.1 Definitions
The definitions below apply to terms which may be used in the Design Descriptions and
associated Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC).
Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis results for a
structure, system, or component that demonstrates a Design Commitment is met.
Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation.
Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with
operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components.
As-built means the physical properties of the structure, system, or component, following the
completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site.
Determination of physical properties of the as-built structure, system, or component may be
based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation provided that
subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing do not alter the properties. Many
ITAAC require verification of “as-built” structures, systems, or components (SSCs). However,
some of these ITAAC will involve measurements and/or testing that can only be conducted at the
vendor site due to the configuration of equipment or modules or the nature of the test (e.g.,
measurements of reactor vessel internals). For these specific items where access to the
component for inspection or test is impractical after installation in the plant, the ITAAC closure
documentation (e.g., test or inspection record) will be generated at the vendor site and provided
to the licensee.
ASME Code means Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Some Tier 1 ITAAC design commitments in the ESBWR DCD
specify that structures, systems, and components be designed and constructed in accordance with
ASME Code Section III requirements. When this language is used, it indicates that the ITAAC
for that design commitment will be met by satisfying the edition and addenda of the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III as specified in the DCD and as incorporated by
reference in 10 CFR 50.55a subject to the conditions listed in 10 CFR 50.55a(b), or in
accordance with alternatives to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), or (e) of 10 CFR 50.55a as authorized by
the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3).
ASME Code Report means a report required by the ASME Code and whose content
requirements are stipulated by the ASME Code. Each such ASME Code report is final, and
when required is certified in accordance with the Code.
Cold shutdown means a Safe Shutdown with the average reactor coolant temperature ≤ 93.3°C
(200°F).
Component as used in Tier 1 for reference to ASME components means that subset of
equipment that does not include piping.
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Containment means the Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV) and the Passive
Containment Cooling System (PCCS) Heat Exchangers, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Design Commitment means that portion of the Design Description that is verified by ITAAC.
Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified.
Division is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components that
enables the establishment and maintenance of physical, electrical, and functional independence
from other redundant sets of components.
Equipment as used in Tier 1 as related to ASME Code and Seismic Category I requirements
means both components and piping.
Equipment Identification Number or Equipment Identifier as used in Tier 1 means the
designation on a Tier 1 figure and is not representative of an actual equipment number or tag
number.
Equipment Qualification
For purposes of ITAAC:
Environmental Qualification: Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the safety-related
electrical equipment demonstrate qualification to applicable normal, abnormal and design
basis accident conditions without loss of the safety-related function for the time needed
during and following the conditions to perform the safety-related function. These harsh
environmental conditions, as applicable to the bounding design basis accident(s), are as
follows: expected time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical
effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant
effect on equipment performance.
As used in the associated ITAAC, the term “safety-related electrical equipment” constitutes
the equipment itself, connected instrumentation and controls, connected electrical
components (such as cabling, wiring, and terminations), and the lubricants necessary to
support performance of the safety-related functions of the safety-related electrical
components identified as being subject to the environmental qualification requirements.
Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the safety-related mechanical equipment
demonstrate qualification to applicable normal, abnormal and design basis accident
conditions without loss of the safety-related function for the time needed during and
following the conditions to perform the safety-related function considering the applicable
harsh environmental conditions. As used in this paragraph, “safety-related mechanical
components” refers to mechanical parts, subassemblies or assemblies that are categorized as
Quality Group A, B, or C. Mechanical components qualification also may be by type tests,
type tests and analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of individual parts or
subassemblies or of complete assemblies rather than by type testing the individual parts or
subassemblies separately. ITAAC address analyses of material data for safety-related
mechanical equipment located in a harsh environment.
Safety-related equipment located in a mild environment will be qualified for its
environmental conditions through specifications and certifications to the environments;
however, for a mild environment, only safety-related digital instrumentation and control
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compliance, purchase records, and other documents that may verify that the acceptance criteria
of a particular ITAAC are met.
Inspect for Retrievability of a display means to visually observe that the specified information
appears on a monitor when summoned by the operator.
Operate means the actuation, control, running, or shutting down (e.g., closing, turning off) of
equipment.
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level means the various levels used as reference points
for instrumentation ranges. Figure 1.1.1-1 shows the relative location of the defined water levels
and the overlap in the level measurement ranges.
Report means, as used in the Acceptance Criteria, a document created by or for the licensee that
verifies that the acceptance criteria of the subject ITAAC have been met and references the
supporting documentation. Reports typically include but are not limited to: results of
walkdowns, results of visual inspections, field measurements, and reviews of design and
construction documents. The Functional Arrangement verification report, for ASME Code
Section III components or systems, may be or may include an ASME Code report.
Safe Shutdown (generic definition) is a shutdown with:
(1) The reactivity of the reactor kept to a margin below criticality consistent with Technical
Specifications;
(2) The core decay heat being removed at a controlled rate sufficient to prevent core or reactor
coolant system thermal design limits from being exceeded;
(3) Components and systems necessary to maintain these conditions operating within their
design limits; and
(4) Components and systems, necessary to keep doses within prescribed limits, operating
properly.
Safe Shutdown for Station Blackout means bringing the plant to those shutdown conditions
specified in plant Technical Specifications as Hot Shutdown or Stable Shutdown.
Stable Shutdown means a Safe Shutdown with the average reactor coolant temperature ≤
215.6°C (420°F) and > 93ºC (200ºF) (see “safe stable condition” in SECY-94-084 and stable
shutdown in ESBWR Generic Technical Specifications).
Test or Testing means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions, to
evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
Train means a redundant, identical mechanical function within a system. For nonsafety-
related systems, redundant trains may share passive components (e.g., piping, supports, manual
shutoff valves).
Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer
to qualify other components of that same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a
test of the as-built structures, systems, or components.
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An entry in the ITA column of the ITAAC tables include the words “Inspection will be
performed for the existence of a report verifying…” When these words are used it indicates that
the ITA is tests, type tests, analyses, or a combination of tests, type tests, and analyses and a
report will be produced documenting the results. This report will be available for inspection.
For those nonsystem-based ITAAC, which address piping and equipment qualification, the ITA
and Acceptance Criteria may be satisfied on a system-by-system basis so as not to delay
completion of ITAAC for a particular system. In this manner, a system may be turned over for
operation following verification of the information needed to satisfy the nonsystem-based
ITAAC. Documentation of completion of the ITAAC for a particular system will be retained in
a manner that will allow verification of completion of the ITAAC for the nonsystem-based
ITAAC. Notification to the NRC of completion of the nonsystem-based ITAAC may be on a
system basis throughout construction and should be discussed with the NRC whether notification
should be provided. Notification to the NRC will be made upon final completion of the
nonsystem-based ITAAC for purposes of ensuring that the Acceptance Criteria have been met.
The Acceptance Criteria are generally stated in terms of a value with and acceptable range, or
with a values that is either a minimum or maximum. For these ITAAC, the acceptance criteria
for performing the ITAAC will be as stated in the Acceptance Criteria. In some cases, the
Acceptance Criteria are stated in terms of nominal values without an acceptable range. For these
ITAAC, the acceptable range will be determined at the time of performing the ITAAC.
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TRANSFORMER
RECTIFIER
GENERATOR
REGULATING
TRANSFORMER
CIRCUIT
BREAKER
BREAKER
FUSED BATTERY
DISCONNECT
SWITCH
MAINTENANCE
MTS TRANSFER
SWITCH
Figure 1.2-2. Legend for Tier 1 Electrical System Diagrams
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are fabricated, installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III
requirements.
(4) Pressure boundary welds in the RPV meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive
examination requirements.
(5) The RPV retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(6) The equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic
Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(7) RPV surveillance specimens are provided from the forging material of the beltline region
and the weld and heat affected zone of a weld typical of those adjacent to the beltline
region. Brackets welded to the vessel cladding at the location of the calculated peak
fluence are provided to hold the removable specimen holders and a neutron dosimeter in
place.
(8) a. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney
head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) must meet the limited
provisions of ASME Code Section III regarding certification that these components
maintain structural integrity so as not to adversely affect RPV core support structure.
b. The RPV internal structures listed in Table 2.1.1-1 (chimney and partitions, chimney
head and steam separators assembly, and steam dryer assembly) meet the requirements
of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000, except for the weld quality and fatigue
factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.
(9) The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will withstand flow-induced vibration and
maintain fuel cladding integrity during operation.
(10) The fuel bundles and control rods intended for initial core load have been fabricated in
accordance with the approved fuel and control rod design.
(11) The reactor internals arrangement conforms to the fuel bundle, instrumentation, neutron
sources, and control rod locations shown on Figure 2.1.1-2.
(12) The number and locations of pressure sensors installed on the steam dryer for startup
testing ensure accurate pressure predictions at critical locations.
(13) The number and locations of strain gages and accelerometers installed on the steam dryer
for startup testing are capable of monitoring the most highly stressed components,
considering accessibility and avoiding discontinuities in the components.
(14) The number and locations of accelerometers installed on the steam dryer for startup testing
are capable of identifying potential rocking and of measuring the accelerations resulting
from support and vessel movements.
(15) The initial fuel to be loaded into the core will be able to withstand fuel lift and seismic and
dynamic loads under normal operation and design basis conditions.
(16) The as-built steam dryer predicted peak stress is below the fatigue limitation.
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Table 2.1.1-1
Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Mechanical Equipment
ASME Loss of
Containment Remotely
Code Seismic RCPB(2) Motive MCR(3)
Equipment Name Isolation Operated
Section Cat. I Component Power Alarms
Valve Valve
III Position
RPV Yes Yes Yes - - - -
Core support structures (shroud,
shroud support, top guide, core
plate, control rod guide tubes Yes Yes - - - - -
and fuel supports) which have a
support function
Chimney and partitions Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
Chimney head and steam
Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
separators assembly
Steam dryer assembly Yes(1)(4) - - - - - -
(1) The chimney and partitions, the chimney head and steam separators assembly, and the steam dryer assembly are subject only to the ASME III certification requirements specified in ASME
Code Section III, Subsection NG-1122 (c).
(4) The chimney and partitions, the chimney head and steam separators assembly, and the steam dryer assembly are not ASME B&PV Code components, but their design complies with the
requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Subsection NG-3000 except for the weld quality and fatigue factors for secondary structural non-load bearing welds.
2.1-3
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Table 2.1.1-2
Key Dimensions of RPV Components and Acceptable Variations
Nominal Acceptable
Dimension/
Value Variation
Description Elevation
mm mm
(Figure 2.1.1-1)
(in) (in)
Reference
RPV bottom head inside invert elevation A 0
elevation zero
Bottom of active fuel location from 4405 ±16
B
elevation zero1 (173.4) (0.63)
Top of active fuel location from elevation 7453 ±16
C
zero1 (293.4) (0.63)
27560 ±100
RPV top head inside invert elevation D
(1085) (3.94)
7112 ±51
RPV inside diameter (inside cladding) E
(280.0) (2.01)
RPV wall thickness in beltline (including 182 177.2 min
F
cladding) (7.17) (6.976 min)
1
Dimension is verified by calculations based on as-built interfacing components.
2.1-4
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-5
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Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-6
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
6. The equipment identified in i. Inspection will be performed to verify i. The equipment identified in Table
Table 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I that the Seismic Category I equipment 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I is
can withstand Seismic Category I identified in Table 2.1.1-1 is located located in a Seismic Category I
loads without loss of safety function. in a Seismic Category I structure. structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The equipment identified in Table
of type tests and analyses of 2.1.1-1 as Seismic Category I can
equipment identified in Table 2.1.1-1 withstand Seismic Category I loads
as Seismic Category I will be without loss of safety function.
performed using analytical
assumptions, or will be performed
under conditions which bound the
Seismic Category I design
requirements.
2.1-7
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-9
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-10
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.1-3
ITAAC For The Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals
2.1-11
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Figure 2.1.1-1. Reactor Pressure Vessel and Internals Key Features Layout
2.1-12
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Figure 2.1.1-2. Fuel Bundle, Neutron Sources, Neutron Detectors and Control Rod
Functional Arrangement
2.1-13
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2.1-14
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b. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure
boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(5) The equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category I can
withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) a. (Deleted)
b. (Deleted)
(7) a. Each NBS mechanical train located outside the containment is physically separated
from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
b. Each NBS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated
from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
(8) a. The MSIVs close upon command.
b. The Feedwater Isolation Valves (FWIVs) close upon command.
(9) (Deleted)
(10) MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon loss of electrical power to the actuating solenoid.
(11) Check valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid flow, and
temperature conditions.
(12) The throat diameter of each Main Steamline (MSL) flow restrictor is sized for design choke
flow requirements.
(13) Each MSL flow restrictor has taps for two instrument connections to be used for
monitoring the flow through its associated MSL.
(14) (Deleted)
(15) a. The MSIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow,
and temperature conditions.
b. The FWIVs are capable of fast closing under design differential pressure, fluid flow
and temperature conditions.
(16) a. When all four inboard or outboard MSIVs are stroked from a full-open to full-closed
position by their actuators, the combined leakage through the MSIVs for all four MSLs
will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
b. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their
actuators, the combined liquid inflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater
lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
c. When all four FWIVs are stroked from full-open to full-closed position by their
actuators, the combined gas outflow leakage through the FWIVs for both feedwater
lines will be less than or equal to the design bases assumption value.
(17) The opening pressure for the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) setpoint in mechanical lift mode
validates the overpressure protection analysis by lifting at its nominal setpoint pressure.
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(18) The opening time for the SRVs in the overpressure operation of self-actuated or mechanical lift
mode, which is measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure to when the
valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.
(19) The steam discharge capacity of each SRV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in)
the overpressure protection analysis.
(20) The opening pressure for the Safety Valves (SVs) validates (i.e., is less than or equal to
that used in) the overpressure protection analysis.
(21) The opening time for the SVs, measured from when the pressure exceeds the valve set pressure
to when the valve is fully open, shall be less than or equal to the design opening time.
(22) The steam discharge capacity of each SV validates (i.e., is greater than or equal to that used in) the
overpressure protection analysis.
(23) The relief-mode actuator (and safety-related appurtenances) can open each SRV with the drywell
(DW) pressure at design pressure.
(24) The booster assembly opens each Depressurization Valve (DPV) in less than or equal to the
design opening time (opening time to full rated capacity).
(25) Each DPV minimum flow capacity is sufficient to support rapid depressurization of the
RPV (i.e., has a flow capacity that is greater than or equal to the design flow capacity
under design basis conditions).
(26) (Deleted)
(27) (Deleted)
(28) Vacuum breakers are provided on SRV discharge lines to reduce the post-discharge reflood
height of water in the discharge lines.
(29) The SRV discharge line vacuum breakers close to prevent steam bypass to the DW during
SRV discharge, and open following a discharge completion to permit pressure equalization
with the DW and prevent ingestion of a water slug into the SRV discharge lines.
(30) The pressure loss coefficient of each of the following components is within the uncertainty
band of the pressure loss coefficient used in the natural circulation flow analysis:
• Steam separator
• Fuel bundle
• Fuel support piece orifice
• Control rod guide tubes
• Shroud support
(31) The free volume for each of the following components is within the uncertainty band of the
free volume used in the natural circulation flow analysis:
• RPV
• Downcomer
2.1-16
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• Core
• Chimney
• Separator/dryer
(32) The hydraulic diameter, geometry of the heated surfaces, and flow area in fuel assemblies
are within the uncertainty band of the geometry used in the natural circulation flow
analysis.
(33) (Deleted)
(34) (Deleted)
(35) (Deleted)
(36) The main steam line and SRV/SV branch piping geometry precludes first and second shear
layer wave acoustic resonance conditions from occurring and avoids pressure loads on the
steam dryer at plant normal operating conditions.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.1.2-3 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the NBS.
2.1-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 2.1.2-1
Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment
ASME
Equipment
Code Seismic RCPB Containment Isolation Remotely Loss of Motive
Equipment Name ID on Figure
Section Cat. I Component Valve Operated Power Position
2.1.2-2
III
Main steam lines to the
seismic restraint in the - Yes Yes Yes - - -
steam tunnel
Portions
For valves V8, may be
MSIV actuator and support Portions may be
V9 connected
hardware and associated Yes connected to - - -
to ASME
structural supports (Typ. of 8) RCPB
Code
systems
Main steam flow restrictors - Yes Yes Yes - - -
Inboard and outboard
Steam line drain/bypass upstream drain isolation
- Yes Yes Portions - -
subsystem valves (see Table 2.15.1-
1a)
Feedwater piping from
RPV to seismic restraint
- Yes Yes Yes - - -
upstream of isolation
shutoff valve
2.1-18
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-1
Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment
ASME
Equipment
Code Seismic RCPB Containment Isolation Remotely Loss of Motive
Equipment Name ID on Figure
Section Cat. I Component Valve Operated Power Position
2.1.2-2
III
V7
Safety valves (SV) Yes Yes Yes No No -
(Typ. of 8)
Yes (in Closed for relief
V6
Safety relief valves (SRV) Yes Yes Yes No relief mode
(Typ. of 10) mode)
Depressurization valves V5 (Typ. of 8) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Fail as is
Yes
V1, V2, and (no active
RPV head vent subsystem Yes Yes Yes No Fail as is
V3 safety
function)
2.1-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-1
Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment
ASME
Equipment
Code Seismic RCPB Containment Isolation Remotely Loss of Motive
Equipment Name ID on Figure
Section Cat. I Component Valve Operated Power Position
2.1.2-2
III
System instrumentation –
detection and monitoring
(indication in Main
Control Room):
• Position of
MSIVs
• Position of DPVs Safety-
• Position of SRVs related Safety-related Safety-related fluid
• Differential - fluid Yes fluid portions portions only (see - -
pressure between portions only Subsection 2.15.1)
two feedwater only
lines
• Continuity circuit
for each DPV
squib device
• Continuity circuit
for each SRV
SRV discharge lines - Yes Yes - - - -
SRV discharge line V18, V19
Yes Yes No No - -
vacuum relief valves (Typ. of 10)
SRV discharge line Q1
Yes Yes No - - -
quencher (Typ. of 10)
2.1-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-1
Nuclear Boiler System Mechanical Equipment
ASME
Equipment
Code Seismic RCPB Containment Isolation Remotely Loss of Motive
Equipment Name ID on Figure
Section Cat. I Component Valve Operated Power Position
2.1.2-2
III
Closed
Feedwater outboard V14, V17, (gravity close on
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
isolation valves V20, V21 loss of system
pressure)
Yes
Feedwater inboard No
V12, V15 Yes Yes Yes (will close on reverse -
isolation check valves
flow)
Feedwater branch line Yes Closed
outboard isolation check (active function to close Yes (gravity close on
V13, V16 Yes Yes Yes
valves (RWCU/SDC on LOCA and will close loss of system
system connections) on reverse flow) pressure)
2.1-21
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-2
Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment
Safety- Containment
Control Safety- Seismic
Equipment ID Related Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Related
on Figure 2.1.2-2 Electrical Category I Operated Valve
DPS Display
Equipment Actuator
V8
Inboard MSIV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Typ. of 4)
V9
Outboard MSIV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Typ. of 4)
Yes
V6 (ADS – See
SRV Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(Typ. of 10) Section
2.2.13)
V5
DPV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
(Typ. of 8)
Feedwater outboard V14, V17, V20,
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
isolation valves V21
Feedwater branch line
outboard isolation V13, V16 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
check valves
Reactor pressure
transmitters (1 or more
- Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
in each of the 4
divisions)
Reactor water level
transmitters (1 or more
- Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
in each of the 4
divisions)
MSIV isolation logic - Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
2.1-22
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-2
Nuclear Boiler System Electrical Equipment
Safety- Containment
Control Safety- Seismic
Equipment ID Related Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Related
on Figure 2.1.2-2 Electrical Category I Operated Valve
DPS Display
Equipment Actuator
Leak Detection and
- Yes Yes Yes Yes - -
Isolation System Logic
2.1-23
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1. The functional arrangement of the Inspection of the as-built system will be The as-built NBS conforms to the
NBS is as described in the Design performed. functional arrangement described in the
Description of this Subsection 2.1.2, Design Description of this
Tables 2.1.2-1 and 2.1.2-2 and as Subsection 2.1.2, Tables 2.1.2-1 and
shown in Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and 2.1.2-2 and Figures 2.1.2-1, 2.1.2-2, and
2.1.2-3. 2.1.2-3.
2a1. (Deleted)
2.1-24
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2a2. The components identified in A reconciliation analysis of the ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the design ASME Code Section III using as-designed Code) exist and conclude that design
requirements. and as-built information and ASME Code reconciliation has been completed, in
Design Reports (NCA-3550) will be accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
performed. reconciliation of the components identified
in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section
III, and that the design of as-built
components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
ASME Code Section III complies with the
requirements of ASME Code Section III.
The report documents the results of the
reconciliation analysis.
2a3. The components identified in Table Inspection of the components identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (including N-
2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III 5 Data Reports, where applicable)
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. (certified, when required by ASME Code)
accordance with ASME Code Section and inspection reports exist and conclude
III requirements. that the components identified in Table
2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are
fabricated, installed, and inspected in
accordance with ASME Code Section III
requirements.
2.1-25
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Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2b1. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
as ASME Code Section III is (NCA-3550) and required documents will 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
designed in accordance with ASME be conducted. Code) exist and conclude that the design
Code Section III requirements. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1
as ASME Code Section III complies with
the requirements of ASME Code Section
III, including those stresses applicable to
loads related to fatigue (including
environmental effects), thermal
expansion, seismic, and combined.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b2. The as-built piping identified in A reconciliation analysis of the piping ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code 3550) (certified, when required by ASME
III shall be reconciled with the piping Section III using as-designed and as-built Code) exist and conclude that design
design requirements. information and ASME Code Design reconciliation has been completed, in
Reports (NCA-3550) will be performed accordance with ASME Code, for as-built
reconciliation of the piping identified in
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.
The report documents the results of the
reconciliation analysis.
2.1-26
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2b3. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Inspections of the piping identified in ASME Code Data Report(s) (certified,
as ASME Code Section III is Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III when required by ASME Code) and
fabricated, installed, and inspected in will be conducted. inspection reports (including N-5 Data
accordance with ASME Code Section Reports where applicable) exist and
III requirements. conclude that the piping identified in
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III
is fabricated, installed, and inspected in
accordance with ASME Code Section III
requirements.
3a. Pressure boundary welds in Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude
components identified in boundary welds in components identified that ASME Code Section III requirements
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section are met for non-destructive examination
III meet ASME Code Section III non- III will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in
destructive examination requirements. ASME Code Section III. components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
ASME Code Section III.
3b. Pressure boundary welds in piping Inspection of the as-built pressure ASME Code report(s) exist and conclude
identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME boundary welds in piping identified in that ASME Code Section III requirements
Code Section III meet ASME Code Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are met for non-destructive examination
Section III non-destructive will be performed in accordance with of pressure boundary welds in piping
examination requirements. ASME Code Section III. identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code
Section III
4a. The components identified in A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section those code components identified in Table conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
III retain their pressure boundary 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III that are test of components identified in Table
integrity at their design pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III comply
ASME Code Section III. with the requirements of ASME Code
Section III.
2.1-27
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
4b. The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
as ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at its as ASME Code Section III that is required test of piping identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as
design pressure. to be hydrostatically tested by ASME ASME Code Section III comply with the
Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
5. The equipment identified in i. Inspection will be performed to verify i. The equipment identified as Seismic
Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as that the Seismic Category I equipment Category I in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table
Seismic Category I can withstand identified in Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 is located in a Seismic
Seismic Category I loads without loss 2.1.2-2 are located in a Seismic Category I structure.
of safety function. Category I structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a combination ii. The equipment identified in
of type tests and analyses, of Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as
equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Seismic Category I can withstand
and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category Seismic Category I loads without loss
I, will be performed using analytical of safety function.
assumptions, or will be performed
under conditions which bound the
Seismic Category I equipment design
requirements
iii. Inspection and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment identified in
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.1.2-1 and Table 2.1.2-2 as
equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 Seismic Category I, including
and Table 2.1.2-2 as Seismic Category anchorage, can withstand Seismic
I, including anchorage, is bounded by Category I loads without loss of safety
the testing or analyzed conditions. function.
6a. (Deleted)
6b. (Deleted)
2.1-28
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
7a. Each NBS mechanical train located Inspections and analysis will be conducted Each NBS mechanical train located
outside the containment is physically for each of the NBS mechanical trains outside containment is protected against
separated from the other train(s) so as located outside the containment. design basis events and their direct
not to preclude accomplishment of the consequences by spatial separation,
intended safety-related function. barriers, restraints, or enclosures so as not
to preclude accomplishment of the
intended safety-related function.
7b. Each NBS mechanical train located Inspections and analysis will be conducted Each NBS mechanical train located inside
inside the containment is physically for each of the NBS mechanical trains containment is protected against design
separated from the other train(s) so as located inside the containment. basis events and their direct consequences
not to preclude accomplishment of the by spatial separation, barriers, restraints,
intended safety-related function. or enclosures so as not to preclude
accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
8a. The MSIVs close upon command. Valve closure tests will be performed on The MSIVs close upon command.
the as-built MSIVs using a manual closure
command to simulate an isolation signal.
8b. The Feedwater Isolation Valves Valve closure tests will be performed on The FWIVs close upon command
(FWIVs) close upon command. the as-built FWIVs using a manual closure
command to simulate an isolation signal.
9. (Deleted)
10. MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon Tests will be conducted on the as-built The MSIVs and FWIVs fail closed upon
loss of electrical power to the valve valve under preoperational conditions loss of electrical power to the valve
actuating solenoid. actuating solenoid.
2.1-29
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
11. Check valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 Tests of installed valves for opening and Based on the direction of the differential
open and close under system pressure, closing, will be conducted under system pressure across the valve, each check
fluid flow, and temperature preoperational pressure, fluid flow, and valve listed in Table 2.1.2-1 opens and
conditions. temperature conditions. closes.
12. The throat diameter of each Main Inspections of each as-built MSL flow The throat diameter of each MSL flow
Steamline (MSL) flow restrictor is sized restrictor throat diameter will be performed restrictor is less than or equal to 355 mm
for design choke flow requirements. (14.0 in).
13. Each MSL flow restrictor has taps for Inspections of the as-built installation of Each as-built MSL flow restrictor provides
two instrument connections to be used each MSL flow restrictor will be conducted for two instrument connections.
for monitoring the flow through its to verify that it provides for two instrument
associated MSL. connections.
14. (Deleted)
15a. The MSIVs are capable of fast closing Type tests of the MSIV will be conducted The MSIVs are capable of fast closure in
under design differential pressure, fluid in accordance with the design and not less than 3 seconds and not more than 5
flow and temperature conditions. purchase specifications to demonstrate seconds under design conditions.
that the MSIVs will fast close under
design conditions.
15b. The FWIVs are capable of fast Type tests of the FWIVs will be conducted The FWIVs are capable of fast closure in
closing under design differential in accordance with the design and not less than 10 seconds and not more than
pressure, fluid flow and temperature purchase specifications to demonstrate 15 seconds under design conditions.
conditions. that the FWIVs will fast close under
design conditions.
2.1-30
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
16a. When all four inboard or outboard Tests at preoperational conditions along When all MSIVs are stroked from the
MSIVs are stroked from full-open to with analysis will be performed on the as- full-open to full-closed position by their
full-closed position by their actuators, built MSIVs to determine the leakage as actuators, the combined leakage through
the combined leakage through the adjusted to the specified design the MSIVs for all four MSLs is less than
MSIVs for all four MSLs will be less conditions. or equal to a total combined leakage
than or equal to the design bases (corrected to standard conditions) of less
assumption value. than or equal to 94.4 liters/minute (3.33
ft3/minute) for post-LOCA leakage.
16b. When all four FWIVs are stroked Tests using demineralized water and When all FWIVs are stroked from the
from full-open to full-closed position analysis will be performed on the as-built full-open to full-closed position by their
by their actuators, the combined FWIVs to determine the liquid inflow actuators, the combined leakage through
liquid inflow leakage through the leakage as adjusted to the specified design the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less
FWIVs for both feedwater lines will conditions. than or equal to a total combined liquid
be less than or equal to the design inflow leakage (corrected to standard
bases assumption value. conditions) of less than or equal to 900
cc/minute (0.238 gpm) for post-LOCA
leakage.
16c. When all four FWIVs are stroked Tests and analysis will be performed on the When all FWIVs are stroked from the
from full-open to full-closed position as-built FWIVs to determine the gas outflow full-open to full-closed position by their
by their actuators, the combined gas leakage as adjusted to the specified design actuators, the combined leakage through
outflow leakage through the FWIVs conditions. the FWIVs for both feedwater lines is less
for both feedwater lines will be less than or equal to a total combined gas
than or equal to the design bases outflow leakage (corrected to standard
assumption value. conditions) of less than or equal to 700
cc/minute (1.483 ft3/hour) for post-LOCA
leakage.
2.1-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
17. The opening pressure for the Safety Type tests or setpoint tests will be The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure
Relief Valves (SRVs) setpoint in conducted in accordance with the ASME of 8.366 + 0.251 MPaG (1213 + 36 psig).
mechanical lift mode validates the Code to certify the valves.
overpressure protection analysis by
lifting at its nominal setpoint pressure.
18. The opening time for the SRVs in the Analysis and type tests will be conducted The opening time (as measured from
overpressure operation of self-actuated in accordance with the ASME Code to when the pressure exceeds the valve set
or mechanical lift mode, which is ensure that the valves open within the pressure to when the valve is fully open)
measured from when the pressure design opening time. for the SRVs in the overpressure operation
exceeds the valve set pressure to when of self-actuated or mechanical lift mode is
the valve is fully open, shall be less than less than or equal to 0.5 seconds.
or equal to the design opening time.
19. The steam discharge capacity of each Type tests will be conducted in accordance Valve capacity stamping on each SRV
SRV validates (i.e., is greater than or with the ASME Code Section III for relief records the certified capacity at rated
equal to that used in) the overpressure valve certification. setpoint of 138 kg/s (304 lbm/s)
protection analysis. minimum.
20. The opening pressure for the Safety Type tests or setpoint tests will be The mechanical lift nominal setpoint pressure
Valves (SVs) validates (i.e. is less than conducted in accordance with the ASME of 8.503 + 0.255 MPaG (1233 + 37 psig).
or equal to that used in) the Code Section III to certify the valve.
overpressure protection analysis.
21. The opening time for the SVs, Analysis and type tests will be conducted The opening time (measured from when
measured from when the pressure in accordance with the ASME Code the pressure exceeds the valve set
exceeds the valve set pressure to when Section III to ensure that the valves open pressure to when the valve is fully open)
the valve is fully open, shall be less than within the design opening time. for the SVs is less than or equal to 0.5
or equal to the design opening time. seconds.
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Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
22. The steam discharge capacity of each Type tests will be conducted in accordance Valve capacity stamping on each SV
SV validates (i.e., is greater than or with the ASME Code Section III for relief records the certified capacity at rated
equal to that used in) the overpressure valve certification. setpoint of 140.2 kg/s (309 lbm/s)
protection analysis. minimum.
23. The relief-mode actuator (and safety- An analysis and type test will be performed The relief-mode actuation has the capacity to
related appurtenances) can open each to demonstrate the capacity Section III of lift the SRVs to the full open position one
SRV with the DW pressure at design the relief-mode actuation for each SRV. time with the DW pressure at the DW design
pressure. pressure when the accumulator is isolated
from its pneumatic pressure source.
24. The booster assembly opens each Type testing will be performed on the Each DPV opens when actuated by the
Depressurization Valve DPV in less booster assemblies to confirm that they are booster assembly in less than or equal to
than or equal to the design opening time capable of opening the valve at design basis 0.45 seconds with an inlet pressure of 7,584
(opening time to full rated capacity). conditions. Type testing, along with kPa ± 685 kPaG (1100 psig ± 99 psi).
analyses to adjust for design basis conditions
will be performed to demonstrate that the
booster opens each DPV within the design
opening time (opening time to full rated
capacity) and design conditions.
25. Each DPV minimum flow capacity is Analyses and type tests will be performed. The DPV flow capacity is greater than or
sufficient to support rapid equal to 239 kg/s (527 lbm/s) at an inlet
depressurization of the RPV (i.e., has a pressure of 7.480 MPaG (1085 psig).
flow capacity that is greater than or
equal to the design flow capacity under
design basis conditions).
26. (Deleted)
27. (Deleted)
2.1-33
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Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
28. Vacuum breakers are provided on An inspection and analysis will be The vacuum breakers are installed on the
SRV discharge lines to reduce the performed to confirm that the vacuum SRV discharge lines and the vacuum
post-discharge reflood height of water breakers are installed and to demonstrate breaker capacity and setpoint limit the
in the discharge lines. that the vacuum breaker capacity and water column in the discharge line.
setpoint limit the water column in the
discharge line.
29. The SRV discharge line vacuum Type test will be performed on the The following test criteria are met:
breakers close to prevent steam vacuum breaker for disk-closed leakage at • At SRV discharge line pressure
bypass to the DW during SRV line pressure during SRV discharge, disk during SRV discharges, the vacuum
discharge, and open following cracking (unseating) pressure, and full- breaker leak rate is less than or equal
discharge completion to permit open flow capacity. to design leak rate;
pressure equalization with the DW
• The disk unseat begins at design
and prevent ingestion of a water slug
cracking pressure; and,
into the SRV discharge lines.
• At disk full lift, the vacuum breaker
achieves equal to or greater than
design flow capacity.
2.1-34
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Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
30. The pressure loss coefficient of each As-built component records will be The pressure loss coefficient of each of
of the following components is within inspected and compared against inputs to the following components is within the
the uncertainty band of the pressure the natural circulation analysis, uncertainty band of the pressure loss
loss coefficient used in the natural considering uncertainty, performed to coefficient used in the natural circulation
circulation flow analysis: calculate pressure loss coefficients. flow analysis:
• Steam separator • Steam separator
• Fuel bundle • Fuel bundle
• Fuel support piece orifice
• Fuel support piece orifice
• Control rod guide
• Control rod guide tubes • Shroud support
• Shroud support
31. The free volume for each of the Inspection of as-built component records The free volume of each of the following
following components is within the will be performed to determine the components is within the uncertainty band
uncertainty band of the free volume component free volume for each of the of the free volume used in the natural
used in natural circulation flow listed components. circulation flow analysis:
analysis: • RPV
•RPV • Downcomer
•Downcomer • Core
•Core • Chimney
•Chimney • Separator/dryer
•Separator/dryer
2.1-35
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Table 2.1.2-3
ITAAC For The Nuclear Boiler System
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
32. The hydraulic diameter, geometry of As-built dimension inspection and The hydraulic diameter, geometry of
heated surfaces, and flow area in fuel analyses will be performed to determine heated surfaces, and flow area in the fuel
assemblies are within the uncertainty the geometry of the fuel assemblies to be assemblies are within the uncertainty band
band of the geometry used in the loaded. of the geometry used in the natural
natural circulation flow analysis. circulation flow analysis.
33. (Deleted)
34. (Deleted)
35. (Deleted)
36. The main steam line and SRV/SV Analysis of the as-built piping system and The main steam line and SRV/SV branch
branch piping geometry precludes equipment analysis, for acoustic resonance piping geometry precludes first and
first and second shear layer wave at plant normal operating conditions, will second shear layer wave acoustic
acoustic resonance conditions from be performed. resonance conditions from occurring and
occurring and avoids pressure loads results in no significant pressure loads on
on the steam dryer at plant normal the steam dryer at plant normal operating
operating conditions. conditions.
2.1-36
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Figure 2.1.2-1. Safety Relief Valves, Depressurization Valves and Steamline Diagram
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2.2-1
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Table 2.2.1-1
RC&IS Functional Arrangement
2.2-2
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Table 2.2.1-2
RC&IS Major Functional Groups
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Table 2.2.1-2
RC&IS Major Functional Groups
2.2-4
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Table 2.2.1-2
RC&IS Major Functional Groups
2.2-5
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Table 2.2.1-2
RC&IS Major Functional Groups
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Table 2.2.1-3
RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.1-3
RC&IS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.1-4
RC&IS Rod Block Functions
Permissive
Rod Block Condition Description
Rod separation RMS: STARTUP or Rod withdrawal block only for those selected
detection RUN rod(s) for which the separation condition is
detected and are not in the Inoperable Bypass
condition.
RMS in SHUTDOWN RMS: SHUTDOWN Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
position
SRNM withdrawal RMS: SHUTDOWN, Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block REFUEL, or STARTUP
APRM withdrawal None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block
CRD charging water None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
low pressure
CRD charging water None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
low-pressure trip
bypass
RWM withdrawal Reactor power less Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
RWM insert block Reactor power less Rod insertion block for all control rods.
than setpoint
ATLM withdrawal Reactor power greater Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
MRBM withdrawal Reactor power greater Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
block than setpoint
Gang large deviation RC&IS Mode Switch: Rod withdrawal block for all operable control
GANG: rods of the selected gang upon detection of:
− Large deviation of control rod
positions from RRPS in selected gang.
− Any attempt to withdraw an additional
rod beyond the original control rod
pair.
Refuel mode RMS: REFUEL, Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
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Table 2.2.1-4
RC&IS Rod Block Functions
Permissive
Rod Block Condition Description
withdrawal block refueling platform
over RPV, and fuel
bundle on crane
Startup mode RMS: STARTUP and Rod withdrawal block for all control rods.
withdrawal block refueling platform
over RPV
RAPI trouble RRPS active Rod withdrawal block and rod insertion block
for all control rods.
RAPI Signal None Rod withdrawal block for all control rods
Interface Unit trouble when difference detected between any pair of
input or output A and B channels.
Electrical group None Rod withdrawal block and rod insertion block
power abnormal for all control rods.
2.2-10
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Table 2.2.1-5
RC&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Function Description
Control Single / Ganged mode selection.
Automatic / semi-automatic / manual mode selection.
Normal / notch / continuous control rod movement mode
Insert / Withdraw.
SCRRI/SRI manual initiation.
ARI manual initiation (DPS)
Interlock Single / Dual Rod Sequence Restriction Override
(S/DRSRO) allows an operator to place up to two control
rod associated with the same HCU in S/DRSRO for scram
time surveillance testing.
Rod Inoperable Bypass condition allows up to 8 control rod
to be selected with the Reactor Mode Switch (RMS) in RUN
position (RPS).
Rod Inoperable Bypass condition allows up to 54 control rod
to be selected with the RMS in REFUEL position (RPS).
Bypass RC&IS is capable of continued operation when different
subsystems of RC&IS are bypassed using the following bypass
functions:
Rod position detector channel bypass.
S/DRSRO.
Rod Inoperable Bypass selection.
Communication channel bypasses.
ATLM channel bypass.
RWM channel bypass.
RAPI channel bypass.
2.2-11
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Table 2.2.1-6
ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System
2.2-12
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Table 2.2.1-6
ITAAC For The Rod Control and Information System
2.2-13
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2.2-14
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(4) a. The components identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III retain their
pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
b. The piping identified in Table 2.2.2-5 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure
boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(5) The equipment identified in Table 2.2.2-5 and Table 2.2.2-6 as Seismic Category I can
withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) The FMCRD is capable of positioning control rod incrementally and continuously over its
entire range.
(7) Valves defined in Table 2.2.2-5 and 2.2.2-6 open and close under differential pressure,
fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(8) a. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a high-pressure makeup mode of operation that
injects water to the RPV via the Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling
RWCU/SDC return path.
b. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has a safety-related isolation capability terminating
injection into the RPV.
c. The CRD hydraulic subsystem has an isolation bypass capability allowing injection to
the RPV.
(9) The PIP software project for the CRD system provides automatic functions, initiators, and
associated interfacing systems as defined in Table 2.2.2-3.
(10) The PIP software project for the CRD system provides controls and interlocks as defined in
Table 2.2.2-4.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) The CRD system provides rapid control rod insertion in response to a scram signal.
(13) (Deleted)
(14) (Deleted)
(15) The FMCRD has an electro-mechanical brake with a minimum required holding torque on
the motor drive shaft.
(16) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance have
maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the CRD system that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(17) High Pressure (HP) CRD makeup water isolation valves are normally open and close on a
signal to close and on loss of air.
(18) HP CRD makeup water isolation bypass valves are normally closed and open on a signal to
open.
(19) FMCRDs have continuous control rod position indication sensors that detect control rod
position based on motor rotation.
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(20) FMCRDs have scram position indication switches that detect intermediate and scram
completion control rod positions.
(21) FMCRDs have a bayonet control rod coupling mechanism that requires a minimum
rotation to decouple.
(22) FMCRDs have spring-loaded latches in the hollow piston that engage slots in the guide
tube to prevent rotation of the bayonet coupling except at predefined positions.
(23) FMCRDs have redundant safety-related rod separation switches that detect separation of
the FMCRD from the control rod.
(24) Each FMCRD has a magnetic coupling that connects the associated drive motor to the
drive shaft through the associated CRD housing.
(25) FMCRDs have safety-related scram inlet port check valves that are installed to close under
reverse flow.
(26) HCU scram pilot solenoid valves transfer open to vent on loss of power to both solenoids.
(27) Backup scram solenoid valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when
energized.
(28) ARI valves are closed on loss of power and transfer open to vent when energized.
(29) Each HCU contains a nitrogen-water scram accumulator that can be charged to a
sufficiently high pressure and with the necessary valves and components to fully insert two
CRs.
(30) Scram accumulators are continuously monitored for water leakage by level instruments.
(31) Divisional safety-related power supplies power safety-related FMCRD and HCU equipment.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.2.2-7 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the CRD system.
2.2-17
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Table 2.2.2-1
CRD System Functional Arrangement
HCUs are located in four dedicated rooms in the Reactor Building (RB).
HCUs provide a flow path for purge water to the associated FMCRDs during normal
operation.
HCUs have a test port to allow connection of temporary test equipment for the conduct of
FMCRD ball check valve testing and drive friction testing.
FMCRDs are mounted to the reactor vessel bottom head inside containment.
2.2-18
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Table 2.2.2-2
CRD Maximum Allowable Scram Times for
Vessel Bottom Pressures Below 7.481 MPaG (1085 psig)
2.2-19
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Table 2.2.2-3
CRD System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
2.2-20
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Table 2.2.2-4
CRD System Controls and Interlocks
Parameter Description
Control Manual start (CRD pumps)
Interlock High pressure makeup mode
(RPV water level low (Level 2))
• The standby CRD pump is started. Both pumps
operate in parallel to deliver the required makeup
flow capacity to the reactor.
• The two pump suction filter bypass valves are
opened.
• The scram accumulator charging water header
isolation valve and purge water header isolation
valve are closed.
• Each pump minimum flow line isolation valve
closes.
• The flow control valves in the high pressure makeup
lines open to regulate the makeup water flow rate to
the reactor.
• The test valve in the high pressure makeup line to
the RWCU/SDC system opens if it is closed at the
start of the event and the test valve in the return line
to the CST closes if it is open at the start of the
event.
• The high pressure makeup flow control valves close
to stop flow to the reactor at high reactor water
Level 8.
• Each pump minimum flow line isolation valve
opens and both pumps continue to operate in a low
flow condition by directing their flow back to the
CST through the pump minimum flow lines.
2.2-21
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Parameter Description
2.2-22
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Parameter Description
High pressure makeup mode Isolation Bypass (GDCS
initiation logic and time delay and at least two GDCS pools
not low)
The HP CRD Isolation Bypass valves open to allow
normal high pressure makeup mode.
CRD common pump discharge line pressure low
Starts the standby pump.
CRD common pump discharge line flow
Modulates purge water control valves.
Injection flow
Modulates injection valves.
2.2-23
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Table 2.2.2-5
Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment
Equipment Name Identifier ASME
Seismic RCPB
Code (Deleted) MCR Alarms
(Description) See Figure Cat. I Component
Section III
2.2.2-1
FMCRD components required FMCRD No Yes No
for scram –
2.2-24
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.2.2-5
Control Rod Drive System Mechanical Equipment
Equipment
Equipment Name Identifier ASME
Seismic RCPB
Code (Deleted) MCR Alarms
(Description) See Figure Cat. I Component
Section III
2.2.2-1
High pressure makeup isolation HP CRD Yes Yes No –
bypass valves (not including Isolation
valve operator) Bypass valves
2.2-25
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Table 2.2.2-6
Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- (Deleted) Loss of Remotely
Identifier Q-DCIS/DPS Category I Related Related Motive Operated
(Description) Power Valve
See Figure Display
See Note 1 Position
2.2.2-1
HCU scram solenoid SSPV Yes Yes Yes Associated Vent By RPS
pilot valves scram HCU system
valve scram logic
position valve
status
FMCRD passive FMCRD No Yes Yes Yes Apply -
holding brakes brake
High pressure makeup HP CRD Yes Yes Yes MCR valve Close Yes
isolation valves Isolation position
valves
High pressure makeup HP CRD Yes Yes Yes MCR valve As-Is Yes
isolation bypass Isolation position
valves (not including Bypass
valve operator) valves
2.2-26
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.2.2-6
Control Rod Drive System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- (Deleted) Loss of Remotely
Identifier Q-DCIS/DPS Category I Related Related Motive Operated
(Description) Power Valve
See Figure Display
See Note 1 Position
2.2.2-1
Backup scram valve Backup Yes Yes Yes Associated As-Is By RPS
solenoids scram valves scram system
valve logic
position
status
NOTE 1: See Tables 2.2.2-3, 2.2.2-4, and 2.2.2-5 for control functions and initiating conditions.
2.2-27
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-28
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-29
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-30
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-31
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-32
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-33
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-34
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-35
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-36
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Table 2.2.2-7
ITAAC For The Control Rod Drive System
2.2-37
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2.2-38
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Table 2.2.3-1
FWCS Functional Arrangement
FWCS is located in the Control Building, Reactor Building, and Turbine Building.
2.2-40
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Table 2.2.3-2
FWCS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
2.2-41
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Table 2.2.3-3
FWCS Controls
Parameter Description
RPV Level Control Manual speed control (reactor feed pump)
Manual start/stop (reactor feed pump)
Automatic / manual mode (reactor feed pump control)
Manual control (high pressure FW heater string bypass
valves and isolation valves)
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Table 2.2.3-4
ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System
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Table 2.2.3-4
ITAAC For The Feedwater Control System
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b2. The as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III shall be
reconciled with the piping design requirements.
b3. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
(11) a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code
Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section
III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
(12) a. The components identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III retain their
pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
b. The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-4 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure
boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(13) The equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-4 and Table 2.2.4-5 as Seismic Category I can
withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(14) (Deleted).
(15) Each of the SLC System divisions and safety-related loads/components identified in Tables
2.2.4-4 and 2.2.4-5 is powered from its respective safety-related division.
(16) In the SLC System, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and
between safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
(17) a. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located outside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.
b. Each mechanical train of the SLC System located inside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as to preclude damage to both trains.
(18) Re-positionable (not squib) valves listed in Table 2.2.4-4 open, close, or both open and
close under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(19) The pneumatically operated valve(s) designated in Table 2.2.4-4 fail in the mode listed if
either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the
valve(s) is lost.
(20) Check valves designated in Table 2.2.4-4 as having a safety-related function open and
close under system pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(21) The SLC System injection squib valve will open as designed.
(22) The equivalent natural boron concentration at cold shutdown conditions for the total
solution injection volume is based on the liquid inventory in the RPV at the main steam
line nozzle elevation plus the liquid inventory in the reactor shutdown cooling piping and
equipment of the RWCU/SDC system.
(23) (Deleted)
(24) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves
such that freeze seals will not be required.
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b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the SLC System that
require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(25) Each accumulator tank has an injectable liquid volume of at least 7.80 m3 (2060 gal).
(26) Each accumulator tank has a cover gas volume above the liquid of at least 14.8 m3
(523 ft3).
(27) Each accumulator tank is capable of maintaining an initial nitrogen cover gas absolute
pressure of least 14.82 MPa (2150 psia).
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.2.4-6 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the SLC system.
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Table 2.2.4-1
(Deleted)
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Table 2.2.4-2
SLC System Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.4-3
SLC System Controls and Interlocks
Parameter Description
Control Manual initiation of SLC injection valves
Interlock ATWS trip signal (from ATWS/SLC trip signal to open
SLC injection squib valves )
ECCS initiation signal (from SSLC/ESF to open SLC
injection squib valves)
RWCU/SDC isolation signal to LD&IS on SLC injection
(from ATWS/SLC)
ECCS initiation signal (from DPS to open SLC injection
squib valves)
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Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-4
SLC System Mechanical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-5
SLC System Electrical Equipment
Train A
Accumulator PT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Pressure Sensor
Train B
Accumulator PT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Pressure Sensor
Train A
Accumulator Level LT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Sensor
Train B
Accumulator Level LT Yes Yes Yes Yes – No
Sensor
Train A Injection
Yes
Squib Valve – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note 1
Initiator(s)
Train B Injection
Yes
Squib Valve – Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note 1
Initiator(s)
SLC Train A and
Train B Logic – Yes Yes Yes – – No
Controllers
Train A Nitrogen
Supply Isolation V-18 No Yes No Note 2 Yes No
Valve
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Table 2.2.4-5
SLC System Electrical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-5
SLC System Electrical Equipment
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.4-6
ITAAC For The Standby Liquid Control System
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Table 2.2.5-1
NMS Functional Arrangement
NMS comprises the safety-related SRNM subsystem and the power range neutron monitor
(PRNM) subsystem; and the nonsafety-related automatic fixed in-core probe (AFIP)
subsystem and multi-channel rod block monitor (MRBM) subsystem.
NMS is a four division, redundant, logic based system.
NMS controllers and their preamplifiers are located in divisionally separate rooms in the
Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building (RB).
The PRNM subsystem comprises the local power range monitors (LPRM), the average power
range monitors (APRM), and the oscillation power range monitors (OPRM).
The SRNM subsystem has 12 SRNM channels, each channel having one fixed in-core
regenerative fission chamber sensor.
The LPRM detector assemblies, SRNM detector assemblies, wiring, cables, and connector are
located in the lower DW in the RB.
LPRM subsystem comprises 64 assemblies, divided into four divisions, distributed uniformly
throughout the core, each assembly having four uniformly spaced fixed in-core fission
chamber detectors and seven AFIP sensors .
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Table 2.2.5-2
NMS Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.5-3
NMS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
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Table 2.2.5-4
ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System
2. NMS provides automatic functions Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The NMS performs the automatic
and initiators as described in Table NMS using simulated signals and functions defined in Table 2.2.5-2.
2.2.5-2. actuators for the automatic functions
defined in Table 2.2.5-2.
3. NMS provides controls, interlocks, Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The NMS controls, interlocks and
and bypasses as described in Table NMS and MCRP SSLC/ESF VDUs bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
2.2.5-3. using simulated signals and actuators for main control room, and are performed in
the controls, interlocks, and bypasses response to simulated signals and manual
defined in Table 2.2.5-3. actions as defined in Table 2.2.5-3.
4. (Deleted)
5. (Deleted)
6. (Deleted)
7. (Deleted)
8. NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip Test(s) will be performed using The NMS divisions fail-safe to a trip
condition on critical hardware failure, simulated signals. condition on critical hardware failure,
power failure, or loss of power failure, or loss of communication
communication. failure.
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Table 2.2.5-4
ITAAC For The Neutron Monitoring System
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Table 2.2.6-1
RSS Functional Arrangement
RSS is safety-related
RSS has two redundant, independent, panels located in two separate rooms in different
divisional quadrants of the Reactor Building
RSS panels have a safety-related Division 1 Visual Display Unit (VDU), a safety-related
Division 2 VDU, and nonsafety-related VDUs associated with the PIP A and PIP B network
segments.
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Table 2.2.6-2
RSS Controls
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Table 2.2.6-3
ITAAC For The Remote Shutdown System
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Table 2.2.7-1
RPS Functional Arrangement
The RPS comprises four redundant safety-related divisions of sensor channels, trip logics and
trip actuators.
The RPS comprises two divisions of manual scram controls and scram logic circuitry.
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Table 2.2.7-2
RPS Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.7-3
RPS Controls, Interlocks (System Interfaces), and Bypasses
Parameter Description
Control Manual divisional trip switches
Manual scram trip switches
Reactor Mode Switch
Divisional actuator trip manual switches
RPS trip reset manual switches
RPS scram test switch (to RC&IS)
Interlock (System RPS full scram condition (to RC&IS, CRD)
Interface)
Turbine bypass valves open position indication
APRM Simulated Thermal Power (to NMS)
Reactor Mode Switch positions:
- RUN (to NMS, ICS, PAS, LD&IS)
- STARTUP (to PAS, NMS)
- SHUTDOWN (to CRDS)
- REFUEL (to CRDS, PAS, NMS)
Reactor Mode Switch in the SHUTDOWN position automatic
bypass after a time delay
Scram accumulator charging water header pressure signal (to
RC&IS)
MSIV closure bypass (to LD&IS)
Bypass Special MSIV operational bypass switches
Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown scram manual bypass
switches
Scram accumulator charging water header pressure trip manual
bypass switches (to RC&IS)
MSIV closure trip signals manual bypass switches (to LD&IS)
RPS division of logic (TLU output) manual divisional bypass
switches
RPS Division of sensors (DTM output) manual divisional
bypass switches
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Table 2.2.7-4
ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System
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Table 2.2.7-4
ITAAC For The Reactor Protection System
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Table 2.2.9-1
SB&PC System Functional Arrangement
SB&PC System fault-tolerant digital controllers are located in the Control Building.
SB&PC System interfaces with Nuclear Boiler System (NBS) reactor steam dome pressure
signals.
SB&PC System interfaces with the TGCS turbine power load unbalance signal, turbine trip
signal, and turbine steam flow demand signal.
SB&PC System interfaces with the main condenser pressure signal.
Table 2.2.9-2
SB&PC System Functions and Initiating Conditions
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Table 2.2.9-3
ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System
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Table 2.2.9-3
ITAAC For The Steam Bypass and Pressure Control System
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Table 2.2.10-1
Q-DCIS Platforms
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Table 2.2.11-1
N-DCIS Network Segments
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(12) DW floor drain high conductivity waste (HCW) sump instrumentation is designed with the
sensitivity to detect a leakage step-change (increase) within one hour and to alarm at
excess sump flow rates.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.2.12-5 specifies the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the LD&IS.
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Table 2.2.12-1
(Deleted)
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Table 2.2.12-2
LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
RWCU/SDC Differential
– X – – – – – – – – – –
Mass Flow High
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Table 2.2.12-2
LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
Main Condenser Vacuum
X – – – – – – – – – – –
Low
Turbine Area Ambient
X – – – – – – – – – – –
Temperature High
MSL Tunnel Ambient
X X – – – – – – – – – –
Temperature High
Isolation Condenser Vent
– – X – – – – – – – – –
Exhaust Radiation High
MSL Flow Rate High X – – – – – – – – – – –
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Table 2.2.12-2
LD&IS Isolation Function Monitored Variables
R /B HVAC Exhaust
RWCU/SDC Lines
HP CRD Makeup
Fission Products
Feedwater Lines
Sampling Lines
Water Injection
Vent Valves
Monitored Variables
ICS Lines
Isolation
Coolers
Ducts
Lines
Line
Line
Feedwater Lines
– – – – – – – – – – – X(2)
Differential Pressure
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Table 2.2.12-3
LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables
Isolation Condenser
– – X X – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Steamline Flow High
Isolation Condenser
Condensate Return Flow – – – – X X – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
High
DW Air Cooler Cond.
X – X – – – X – X – X – X – X – – – X –
Flow High
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Table 2.2.12-3
LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables
DW Temperature High X – X – – – – – – – X – X – X – – – X –
DW Fission Product
X – X – X – – – – – X – X – – – – – – –
Radiation High
DW Equip. Drain Sump
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – X – X –
Level Change High
DW Floor Drain Sump
X – X – X – X – X – X – X – X – – – X –
Level Change High
DW Pressure High X – X – – – – – – – X – X – – – – – – –
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Table 2.2.12-3
LD&IS Leakage Source Monitored Variables
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Table 2.2.12-4
LD&IS Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Parameter Description
Control Manual isolation (individually transfer open/close each
CIV and MSIV)
Manual reset (individually reset CIV and MSIV isolation
logic to enable CIV and MSIV manual open function)
MSIV test switches
Isolation logic reset switches
Interlock Reactor Mode Switch
RPV water level low (Level 2) time delay (RTIF)
RPV water level low (Level 2) time delay (SSLC/ESF)
Turbine stop valve closed position
RPV pressure
DW pressure
ADS Inhibit (ATWS/SLC)
Bypass RTIF Division of sensors channel inputs to each division
manual bypass switches
RTIF Divisional actuator trip manual switches
SSLC/ESF Division of sensors channel inputs to each
manual bypass switch
SSLC/ESF manual control bypasses (disables) the load
driver/discrete output
Feedwater Isolation Bypass (ADS Inhibit)
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Table 2.2.12-5
ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System
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Table 2.2.12-5
ITAAC For The Leak Detection and Isolation System
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Table 2.2.13-1
SSLC/ESF Functional Arrangement
SSLC/ESF comprises four redundant, safety-related divisions of trip logics and trip actuators,
located in divisionally separate rooms in the Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building
(RB).
SSLC/ESF video display units (VDUs) comprise two redundant sets of four divisions of
safety-related, VDUs, housed in two separate main control room panels.
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Table 2.2.13-2
SSLC/ESF Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.13-3
SSLC/ESF Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
Parameter Description
Control ADS sequence actuation from VDUs in the MCR (one arm/fire switch per
division)
GDCS sequence actuation from VDUs in the MCR (one arm/fire switch
per division)
Interlock ECCS-LOCA confirmation time delay for ADS
Group 1 SRV open
Group 2 SRV open time delay
Group 1 DPV open and SLC initiation time delay
Group 2 DPV open time delay
Group 3 DPV open time delay
Group 4 DPV open time delay
GDCS manual initiation interlock on low reactor pressure signal
GDCS injection squib valve open time delay
GDCS equalization line squib valve open time delay
GDCS equalization line squib valve open interlock (RPV water level low
(Level 0.5)
CRHAVS CRHA high room temperature signal to trip major N-DCIS
power supplies within CRHA
Bypass SSLC/ESF Division of sensors division manual bypass switch
SSLC/ESF manual control bypasses (disables) the load driver/discrete
output
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Table 2.2.13-4
ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC/ESF)
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Table 2.2.13-4
ITAAC For The Engineered Safety Features Safety System Logic and Control (SSLC/ESF)
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(13) Each ATWS/SLC System division is powered from its respective safety-related power
supply.
(14) DPS is powered from nonsafety-related load group power supplies.
(15) DPS triple redundant digital controllers require agreement in at least two channels out of
three channels for a coincident trip actuation.
(16) DPS logic is “energize-to-actuate”.
(17) DPS process variable sensors are diverse from those used by the RPS and SSLC/ESF.
(18) The DPS network segment uses diverse hardware and software from that used by the RPS
and SSLC/ESF.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.2.14-4 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with associated acceptance
criteria for the ATWS/SLC and DPS.
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Table 2.2.14-1
Diverse Instrumentation and Control Systems Functional Arrangement
ATWS/SLC system is housed within each of the divisional safety-related reactor trip and
isolation function (RTIF) cabinets on a separate chassis from the other equipment within the
cabinet.
RTIF cabinets housing the ATWS/SLC system are located within the divisional electrical
rooms in the control building (CB).
ATWS/SLC has RPV dome pressure sensors and RPV water level sensors that are hardwired
to their respective divisional controller in the CB.
DPS controllers are housed in a cabinet located in the CB.
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Table 2.2.14-2
Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing Systems 1
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Table 2.2.14-2
Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
Functions, Initiators, and Interfacing Systems 1
1
Implementing system is shown in parentheses.
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Table 2.2.14-3
Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
Controls, Interlocks and Bypasses1
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Table 2.2.14-4
ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
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Table 2.2.14-4
ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
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Table 2.2.14-4
ITAAC For The Diverse Instrumentation and Controls
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Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring (SPTM), NBS, and CRD. The report(s) may be
referenced or attached to a software project lifecycle phase summary baseline review record
(BRR) reference described in Subsection 3.2 to close the Table 2.2.15-2 ITAAC.
Table headings contain the software projects or the functional system identifier and a
parenthetical reference to the section or subsection where additional information about the
software projects or functional system can be found. These parenthetical references are reverse
references that point back to the originating system. The IEEE Std. 603 criteria apply only to
those structures, systems, or components (SSCs) directly associated with the performance of the
safety-related function of the software projects. Complete lists of applicable SSCs and functions
are defined in the documentation associated with the {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} ITAAC
closure report for each software project in response to ITAAC defined in Section 3.2. These lists
along with the information in the tables associated with a software project or functional system
in each column define the scope of the IEEE Std. 603 ITAAC.
Refer to Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, as described, for ITAAC associated with the IEEE
Std. 603 criteria that do not appear in Table 2.2.15-1.
When the IEEE Std. 603 design criteria are applied to platforms relying on the use of software to
perform their safety-related functions, additional criteria from IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2, which
augments the IEEE Std. 603 criteria, also apply to the software projects as described under the
applicable IEEE Std. 603 criterion. The evaluation of Q-DCIS platforms for compliance with
IEEE Std. 603 and IEEE Std. 7-4.3.2 criteria includes consideration of the effects that the
associated sensors and actuators have on the performance of the safety-related function.
IEEE Std. 603, Criteria 4.2, 4.3, 4.11, and 4.12, are not included as ITAAC because NUREG
0800, Section 14.3.5, and RG 1.206, Section C.II.1, do not include these criteria as ITAAC.
IEEE Std. 603 Criteria 4.10 is included as ITAAC even though it is not included in NUREG
0800, Section 14.3.5, and RG 1.206, Section C.II.1. This criterion for an overall plant process
control timing budget ensures the completion of protective action in less time than the maximum
time allowable. The timing budget is inclusive of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute
(actuate) loop. The timing budget includes the associated DCIS components of digital signal
conditioning, control data processing, and communications response times. A plant process
control timing budget is required for each function within a functional system and software
project.
IEEE Std. 603, Criterion 5.3, Quality, requires that the Q-DCIS be of a quality that is consistent
with minimum maintenance requirements and low failure rates and be designed, manufactured,
inspected, installed, tested, operated, and maintained in accordance with a prescribed quality
assurance (QA) program. The QA program for Q-DCIS is not addressed in Tier 1.
The following paragraphs provide references to the tables associated with the software projects
and their associated functional systems. For example, RPS refers to Subsection 2.2.7, which
associates Tables 2.2.7-1, 2.2.7-2, and 2.2.7-3 with RPS.
Process sensors and actuators that provide sense and execute functions associated with the
software projects in Table 2.2.15-1 are found in Tables 2.1.2-2, 2.2.2-6, 2.2.4-5, 2.4.1-2, 2.4.2-2,
2.15.1-1c, and 2.15.7-1, and marked “Yes” in the Control Q-DCIS/DPS column.
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Functional arrangement of the software projects platforms (except VBIF and ICS DPV Isolation
Function) are found in Tables 2.2.5-1, 2.2.7-1, 2.2.13-1, 2.2.14-1, and 2.2.16-1.
The independent control platforms associated with the VBIF and ICS DPV Isolation Function
software projects are found in Table 2.15.1-1c and Table 2.4.1-2 respectively.
Functions, initiators, and interfacing systems associated with the software projects (except for the
functional system LD&IS) are found in Tables 2.2.5-2, 2.2.7-2, 2.2.13-2, 2.2.14-2, and 2.2.16-2.
The isolation functions and monitored variables associated with the functional system LD&IS
are found in Table 2.2.12-2.
Isolation valves associated with the functional system LD&IS are found in Table 2.15.1-1a, and
marked “Yes” in the Safety-Related column.
Isolation dampers associated with the functional system LD&IS are found in Tables 2.16.2-1,
2.16.2-3, 2.16.2-5, and 2.16.2-8.
Controls, interlocks, and bypasses associated with the software projects are found in Tables
2.2.5-3, 2.2.7-3, 2.2.12-4, 2.2.13-3, 2.2.14-3, and 2.2.16-3.
The process radiation monitors associated with the functional system PRMS are found in Table
2.3.1-1, marked “Yes” in the Safety-Related column.
Refer to Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.7, and 3.8, as described, for ITAAC associated with the IEEE Std.
603 criteria that do not appear in Table 2.2.15-1.
The design descriptions that demonstrate compliance with the IEEE Std. 603 standard are shown
below:
1a. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The software project’s design bases
list the applicable design basis events, the applicable reactor modes of operation, the initial
conditions requiring protective action, and the allowable limits of plant conditions for each
such event.
1b. Criterion 4.1, Identification of design basis events: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the design bases events, applicable reactor modes of
operation, initial conditions requiring protective action, and allowable limits of plant
conditions for each such event.
2a. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The software project’s design bases
list:
• The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to
manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action;
• The analytical limit associated with each variable;
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable;
and
• The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of
the protective action is ensured.
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2b. Criterion 4.4, Identification of variables monitored: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the list of:
• The variables or combinations of variables, or both, that are to be monitored to
manually or automatically, or both, control each protective action;
• The analytical limit associated with each variable;
• The ranges (normal, abnormal, and accident conditions) associated with each variable;
and
• The rates of change of these variables to be accommodated until proper completion of
the protective action is ensured.
3a. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions
subsequent to initiation: The software project’s design bases list:
• The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed;
• The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by
manual means;
• The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal,
abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be
performed; and
• The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.
3b. Criterion 4.5, Minimum criteria for manual initiation and control of protective actions
subsequent to initiation: The as-built software project’s design bases, with changes
reconciled, list:
• The points in time and the plant conditions during which manual control is allowed;
• The justification for permitting initiation or control subsequent to initiation solely by
manual means;
• The range of environmental conditions imposed upon the operator during normal,
abnormal, and accident conditions throughout which the manual operations will be
performed; and
• The variables that will be displayed for the operator to use in taking manual action.
4a. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The software
project’s design bases list the minimum number and locations of sensors for those
variables that are required to perform a safety-related function and have a spatial
dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of position in a particular region).
4b. Criterion 4.6, Identification of the minimum number and location of sensors: The as-built
software project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the minimum number
and locations of sensors for those variables that are required to perform a safety-related
function and have a spatial dependence (i.e., where the variable varies as a function of
position in a particular region).
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5a. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The software project’s
design bases list the range of transient and steady-state conditions of motive and control
power and the environment (e.g., voltage, frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity,
pressure, and vibration) during normal, abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout
which the safety-related system is to perform.
5b. Criterion 4.7, Range of transient and steady-state conditions: The as-built software
project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the list of the range of transient and steady-
state conditions of motive and control power and the environment (e.g., voltage,
frequency, radiation, temperature, humidity, pressure, and vibration) during normal,
abnormal, and accident circumstances throughout which the safety-related system is to
perform.
6a. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional
degradation of safety-related system’s performance: The software project’s design bases
list the conditions having the potential to cause functional degradation of safety-related
system performance.
6b. Criterion 4.8, Identification of conditions having the potential for causing functional
degradation of safety-related system’s performance: The as-built software project’s design
bases reconcile any changes to the list of the conditions having the potential to cause
functional degradation of safety-related system performance.
7a. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety
system design: The software project’s design bases list the methods and any qualitative
and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the reliability of the safety-related system
design.
7b. Criterion 4.9, Identification of the methods used to determine reliability of the safety
system design: The as-built software project’s design bases reconcile any changes to the
list: of the methods and any qualitative and quantitative reliability goals used to assess the
reliability of the safety-related system design.
8a. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design
basis event: The software project’s design bases ensures that;
• A plant process control timing budget (end-to-end sense, command, and execute loop
including the associated DCIS digital components response times) exists; and
• The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the
specified maximum time allowable.
8b. Criterion 4.10, The critical points in time or the plant conditions, after the onset of a design
basis event: The as-built software project ensures that;
• The plant process control timing budget completes its protective action in less than the
specified maximum time allowable.
9a. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The software project’s design bases show
compliance with the single-failure criterion.
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9b. Criterion 5.1, Single-failure criterion: The as-built software project complies with the
results of the FMEA.
10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project’s design
bases ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of
safety-related functions of the execute features continue until completion.
10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The software project’s design
bases ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the
safety-related systems to normal.
10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project’s
ensures that once initiated (automatically or manually), the intended sequences of safety-
related functions of the execute features continue until completion.
10b2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Protective Actions: The as-built software project’s
ensures that after completion, deliberate operator action is required to return the safety-
related systems to normal.
11a1. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The software project has four independent, redundant
divisions.
11a2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The software project’s inter-divisional communication
systems have;
• Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways; and
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable DIS (e.g., RMU,
controller) cabinets.
11a3. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command Features
and Other Systems: The software project’s safety-related functions are performed
independently of the existence and function of any nonsafety-related component, data, and
communication channel.
11a4. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project’s design bases for intra-
divisional input/output data communications have the following features;
• Sensor inputs sent from instruments to the RMUs via dedicated hard copper wires;
• Sensor inputs sent from the RMU to controller cabinets via dedicated, redundant data
links;
• Data links use optical fibers; and
• Data sent using dedicated RTIF-NMS communication interface modules to shared
reflective memory (scramnet) in downstream chassis.
11a5. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Interactions Between the Sense and Command
Features and Other Systems: The RTIF-NMS software project’s design bases for inter-
divisional data communications within safety-related systems have the following features;
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12b2. Criteria 5.7 and 6.5, Capability for Test & Calibration: The as-built software project’s
maintenance bypasses show that when one division is placed into maintenance bypass
mode, the condition is alarmed in the MCR and the division logic automatically becomes a
two-out-of-three voting scheme.
13a. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The software project is housed within cabinets with key
lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit administrative
control of access to safety-related system equipment.
13b. Criterion 5.9, Control of Access: The as-built software project is housed within cabinets
with key lock doors, has key lock switches, and utilizes passwords that permit
administrative control of access to safety-related system equipment.
14a. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The software project has self-diagnostic features that facilitate the
timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of malfunctioning
equipment.
14b. Criterion 5.10, Repair: The as-built software project has self-diagnostic features that
facilitate the timely recognition, location, replacement, repair, and adjustment of
malfunctioning equipment.
15a. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the software project are distinctly
identified.
15b. Criterion 5.11, Identification: The redundant portions of the as-built software project are
distinctly identified.
16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the software
project’s performance below an acceptable level.
16b. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Other auxiliary features cannot degrade the as-built
software project’s performance below an acceptable level.
17a1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project provides the means to
automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.
17a2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The software project’s design bases show that in
normal operation of the end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control
loops (including the associated DCIS components involved with determinant data
processing and communications) the following features are not used;
• Non-deterministic data communications;
• Non-deterministic computation;
• Interrupts;
• Multi-tasking;
• Dynamic scheduling; and;
• Event-driven actions.
17b1. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project provides the means
to automatically initiate and control the required safety-related functions.
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17b2. Criteria 6.1 and 7.1, Automatic Control: The as-built software project’s normal operation
end-to-end sense, command, and execute plant process control loops (including the
associated DCIS components involved with determinant data processing and
communications) do not use the following features;
• Non-deterministic data communications;
• Non-deterministic computation;
• Interrupts;
• Multi-tasking;
• Dynamic scheduling; and
• Event-driven actions.
18a. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The software project has features in the main control
room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-related functions at
the division level.
18b. Criteria 6.2 and 7.2, Manual Control: The as-built software project has features in the
main control room to manually initiate and control the automatically initiated safety-
related functions at the division level.
19a. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the
software project’s design bases is derived from signals that are direct measures of the
desired variables specified in the plants design bases.
19b. Criterion 6.4, Derivation of System Inputs: Sense and command feature inputs for the as-
built software project’s design basis is derived from signals that are direct measures of the
desired variables specified in the plant’s design bases.
20a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project’s design bases provides for
automatically preventing the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable
permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
20a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The software project’s design bases provides for
automatically removing activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that
an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.
20b1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project automatically
prevents the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive
conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
20b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Bypasses: The as-built software project shows that it
automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that
an activated operating bypass is no longer permissible.
21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The software project’s design bases
provides the capability of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in
maintenance bypass.
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21b1. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures
that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one division is in
maintenance bypass.
21b2. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3, Maintenance Bypasses: The as-built software project ensures
that it is capable of performing its safety-related functions, when one power supply
division is in maintenance bypass.
22a. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: The software project’s setpoints for safety-related functions are
determined by a defined setpoint methodology.
22b. Criterion 6.8, Setpoint: Any changes to the setpoints have been reconciled for the as-built
software project.
23a. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project’s design bases
ensures that electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-
related power supplies.
23b. Criterion 8.1, Electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project’s as-
built electrical components receive power from their respective, divisional, safety-related
power supplies.
24a. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The software project’s design
bases ensures that actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.
24b. Criterion 8.2, Non-electrical Power Source Requirements: The as-built software project’s
actuators receive non-electric power from safety-related sources.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.2.15-2 defines the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with acceptance criteria for
the software projects.
Subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.7, 2.2.10, 2.2.12, 2.2.13, 2.2.14, 2.2.16, 2.3.1, 2.4.1,
2.4.2, 2.15.1, and 2.15.7, 2.16.2.2, 2.16.2.3 define the inspections, tests, and analyses, together
with associated acceptance criteria for the sensors, actuators, functional arrangement, functional
performance, controls, interlocks, and bypasses associated with the software projects.
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Table 2.2.15-1
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2)
Software Project RTIF-NMS Platform ICP Platform
Functional
SSLC/ESF
Systems
Platform
ICS DPV
HP CRD
(Para. Ref.)
ATWS/
NMS
RTIF
VBIF
SLC
IBF
IF
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
LD&IS non-MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (3)]
ATWS/SLC (2.2.14)
SSLC/ESF (2.2.13)
GDCS (2.4.2)
PRMS (2.3.1)
RTIF (2.2.10)
NMS (2.2.5)
CRD (2.2.2)
CRD (2.2.2)
NBS (2.1.2)
RPS (2.2.7)
SLC (2.2.4)
ICS (2.4.1)
(2.2.16)
1 4.1 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
2 4.4 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
3 4.5 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
4 4.6 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
5 4.7 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
6 4.8 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
7 4.9 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
8 4.10 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
9 5.1 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
5.2
10 and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
7.3
11 5.6
Note and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
(7) 6.3
5.7
12 and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
6.5
13 5.9 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
14 5.10 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
15 5.11 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
16 5.12 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
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Table 2.2.15-1
IEEE Std. 603 Criterion System Applicability Matrix (1)(2)
Software Project RTIF-NMS Platform ICP Platform
Functional
SSLC/ESF
Systems
Platform
ICS DPV
HP CRD
(Para. Ref.)
ATWS/
NMS
RTIF
VBIF
SLC
IBF
IF
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
LD&IS non-MSIV (2.2.12) [Note (3)]
ATWS/SLC (2.2.14)
SSLC/ESF (2.2.13)
GDCS (2.4.2)
PRMS (2.3.1)
RTIF (2.2.10)
NMS (2.2.5)
CRD (2.2.2)
CRD (2.2.2)
NBS (2.1.2)
RPS (2.2.7)
SLC (2.2.4)
ICS (2.4.1)
(2.2.16)
6.1
and
7.1 C C
17 R C C C C R R C C C C C C C C R R R R
[Not
e
(6)]
6.2
C C
18 and R C C C C R R C C C C C C C C R R R R
7.2
19 6.4 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
6.6
20 and R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
7.4
6.7,
7.5,
21 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
and
8.3
22 6.8 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
23 8.1 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
24 8.2 R C C C C C R R C C C C C C C C C R R R R
Notes:
(1) R means the IEEE Std. 603 criterion compliance report(s) for the indicated software projects (i.e., RTIF, NMS, SSLC/ESF, VB Isolation Function,
ATWS/SLC, and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function) include(s) the associated parts of the functional systems marked with a C or string of Cs, if
any, immediately to the right of the R. C means compliance with the IEEE Std. 603 criterion is documented by one or more reports written against
the first software projects marked with an R, to the left of the C(s). For example, the report(s) for the RTIF software projects will demonstrate
compliance to IEEE Std. 603 criterion 5.1 for RPS, LD&IS MSIV, CMS-SPTM, NBS, and CRD.
(2) IEEE Std. 603 criteria apply only to the safety-related portions of the functional systems that perform sense, command, or execute functions.
(3) LD&IS non-MSIV functions control the safety-related actuators (isolation valves and isolation dampers) in the following nonsafety-related
systems: RWCU/SDC, FAPCS, EFDS, CIS, CWS, HPNSS, SAS, RBVS, CBVS, FBVS, CRD.
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(4) CMS (non-SPTM) provides sensor inputs for both LD&IS MSIV and LD&IS non-MSIV functions.
(5) CBVS includes the safety-related CB isolation dampers (see Note 3), EFU and CRHAVS. SSLC/ESF platform executes the CRHS function logic
for the safety-related CBVS subsystems, CRHAVS and EFU.
(6) Includes BTP HICB-21 on Design Commitments related to avoiding the use of design practices that lead to non-deterministic timing behaviors.
(7) Data communications between the diverse Q-DCIS platforms is itself diverse. To provide adequate granularity and specificity to the ITAAC
descriptions there are ITAACs that are not common across the software projects. ITAACs 11a4, 11a5, 11a6, 11b4, 11b5, and 11b6 are specific to
the RTIF-NMS platform. ITAACs 11a7, 11a8, 11a9, 11b7, 11b8, and 11b9 are specific to the SSLC/ESF platform. ITAACs 11a10, 11a1, 11b10,
and 11b11 are specific to the ICP platform.
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
10a1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Protective Actions: The software design phase summary BRR verifies that summary BRR show “seal-in” features.
project’s design bases ensures the design bases show “seal-in” features {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
designed so that once initiated are provided to enable system-level
(automatically or manually), the safety-related functions to go to
intended sequences of safety-related completion.
functions of the execute features {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
continue until completion.
10a2. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Protective Actions: The software design phase summary BRR verifies that summary BRR show “manual reset”
project’s design bases ensures that the design bases show “manual reset” features that are provided to require
after completion, deliberate operator features that are provided to require deliberate operator action to return the
action is required to return the safety- deliberate operator action to return the safety-related systems to normal.
related systems to normal. safety-related systems to normal. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
10b1. Criteria 5.2 and 7.3, Completion of Tests will be performed to show that once Once initiated (automatically and
Protective Actions: The as-built initiated (automatically and manually), manually), the intended sequences of
software project ensures that once the intended sequences of safety-related safety-related functions of the “execute
initiated (automatically or manually), functions of the “execute features” features” continue until completion.
the intended sequences of safety- continue until completion.
related functions of the execute
features continue until completion.
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
11b2. Criteria 5.6, Independence and 6.3, Inspection of the as-built software project The as-built software project’s inter-
Interactions Between the Sense and will verify that the inter-divisional divisional communication systems have;
command Features and Other Systems: communication systems have; • Optically isolated fiber optic
The as-built software project’s inter- • Optically isolated fiber optic communication pathways and
divisional communication systems communication pathways; and • Optical fibers are run in conduit
have;
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and terminate in the applicable
• Optically isolated fiber optic and terminate in the applicable DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller)
communication pathways; and DCIS (e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.
cabinets.
• Optical fibers are run in conduit and
terminate in the applicable DCIS
(e.g., RMU, controller) cabinets.
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-165
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-166
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-167
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-168
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-169
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-170
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-171
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-172
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-173
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-174
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-175
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
16a. Criterion 5.12, Auxiliary Features: Inspection of the software project design The software project design phase
Other auxiliary features cannot phase summary BRR will be performed summary BRR show that the design of
degrade the software project’s to confirm that the Criterion 5.1 FMEA other auxiliary features of the software
performance below an acceptable verifies that the design of other auxiliary project do not have failure modes that can
level. features of the software project do not degrade the software project’s
have failure modes that can degrade the performance below an acceptable level.
software project’s performance below an {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
acceptable level.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-178
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-179
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-180
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-181
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
20.a1. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Inspections of the software project’s The software project design’s phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR confirm that the systems
design bases provides for performed to verify that the systems are are capable of automatically preventing
automatically preventing the activation capable of automatically preventing the the activation of an operating bypass,
of an operating bypass, whenever the activation of an operating bypass, whenever the applicable permissive
applicable permissive conditions for an whenever the applicable permissive conditions for an operating bypass are not
operating bypass are not met. conditions for an operating bypass are not met.
met. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
20.a2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Inspection of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR confirm that the systems
design bases provides for performed to verify that they show are removing activated operating
automatically removing activated removal of activated operating bypasses, bypasses, if the plant conditions change
operating bypasses, if the plant if the plant conditions change so that an so that an activated operating bypass is
conditions change so that an activated activated operating bypass is no longer no longer permissible.
operating bypass is no longer permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
permissible. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
20.b2. Criteria 6.6 and 7.4, Operating Tests will be performed to demonstrate The as-built software project
Bypasses: The as-built software that the as-built software project automatically removes activated
project shows that it automatically automatically removes activated operating bypasses, if the plant
removes activated operating bypasses, operating bypasses, if the plant conditions change so that an activated
if the plant conditions change so that conditions change so that an activated operating bypass is no longer
an activated operating bypass is no operating bypass is no longer permissible.
longer permissible. permissible.
21a. Criteria 6.7, 7.5, and 8.3 Maintenance Inspections of the software project’s The software project’s design phase
Bypasses: The software project’s design phase summary BRR will be summary BRR show that it is capable of
design bases provides the capability of performed to verify that it is capable of performing their safety-related functions,
performing their safety-related performing their safety-related functions, when one division is in maintenance
functions, when one division is in when one division is in maintenance bypass.
maintenance bypass. bypass. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-184
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-185
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Table 2.2.15-2
ITAAC For IEEE Std. 603 Compliance Confirmation
2.2-186
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Table 2.2.16-1
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Functional Arrangement
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP is a four division, redundant, logic controller.
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICPs are located in divisionally separate rooms in the
Control Building (CB) and Reactor Building (RB).
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Table 2.2.16-2
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP
Automatic Functions, Initiators, and Associated Interfacing Systems
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Table 2.2.16-3
HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP Controls, Interlocks, and Bypasses
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Table 2.2.16-4
ITAAC For The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP
2. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
ICP provides automatic functions and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP ICP performs the automatic functions
initiators as described in Table using simulated signals and actuators for defined in Table 2.2.16-2.
2.2.16-2. the automatic functions defined in Table
2.2.16-2.
3. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function Test(s) will be performed on the as-built The system controls, interlocks and
ICP provides controls, interlocks, and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP bypasses exist, can be retrieved in the
bypasses as described in Table 2.2.16- using simulated signals and actuators for main control room, and are performed in
3. the controls, interlocks, and bypasses response to simulated signals.
defined in Table 2.2.16-3.
4. Divisional HP CRD Isolation Bypass Test(s) will be performed on each as-built The test signal exists only at the
Function ICP safety-related power HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function ICP terminals of the respective divisional HP
supplies power the HP CRD Isolation division by providing a test signal in only CRD Isolation Bypass Function loads.
Bypass Function ICP divisional loads. one safety-related division at a time
5. PIP power supplies power their Test(s) will be performed on the power The test signal exists only at the
respective HP CRD isolation bypass supply to each as-built HP CRD isolation respective PIP power supply.
valves. bypass valve by introducing a test signal.
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(7) The nonsafety-related PRMS subsystem monitors which perform active/automatic control
functions in order to control offsite doses below 10 CFR 20 limits provide the following:
• Indications in MCR for radiation levels
• Alarms in MCR on radiation level exceeding setpoint
• Alarms in MCR on upscale/downscale or inoperative conditions.
(8) (Deleted)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.3.1-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with the
associated acceptance criteria for the PRMS. As appropriate, each of the ITAAC in Section
2.3.1 may be closed on a system-by-system basis throughout construction, in order that the
PRMS subsystems may be placed in service. ITAAC for the liquid radwaste discharge radiation
monitor and offgas post-treatment radiation monitor also are located in Table 2.10.1-2 and Table
2.10.3-1, respectively.
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Table 2.3.1-1
Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1)
ID on Figure Safety-Related
and Seismic Description Safety Function
2.3.1-1 Category I
1 No MSL
2 Yes Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Continuously monitors gross gamma
quantity of radioactivity being exhausted
from the contaminated area served by
Reactor Building Contaminated Area
(HVAC) Subsystem. The discharge point
from duct is monitored with four physically
and electrically independent and redundant
divisions. In the event of radioactive
releases due to system failures in the Reactor
Building, or due to a fuel handling accident,
RBVS dampers are closed, and exhaust fans
are stopped.
3 Yes Refuel Handling Area HVAC Exhaust Continuously monitors gamma radiation
levels in exhaust plenum of HVAC exhaust
ducts in Refuel Handling Area of Reactor
Building with four divisions of Radiation
Detection Assemblies and channels. In the
event of a radioactive release due to an
accident while handling spent fuel, Reactor
Building HVAC (RBVS) dampers are closed
and exhaust fans are stopped.
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Table 2.3.1-1
Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1)
ID on Figure Safety-Related
and Seismic Description Safety Function
2.3.1-1 Category I
4A Yes Control Room Habitability Area HVAC The Radiation Detection Assembly
Subsystem (CRHAVS) continuously monitors the gamma radiation
levels from air intake plenum for the building
or area containing the MCR and auxiliary
rooms. The Control Room outside air intake
is secured and the emergency air filtration
units are started in the event of a high
radiation level.
4B, 4C Yes CRHAVS Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) Instrument interfaces with safety-related
control and logic system.
5 No TB Normal Ventilation Air HVAC
6 No TB Compartment Area Air HVAC
7 No Offgas Pre-treatment
8 No Charcoal Vault Ventilation
9A, 9B No Offgas Post-treatment
10 No TB Combined Ventilation Exhaust
11 No Liquid Radwaste Discharge
12 No LCW DW Sump Discharge
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Table 2.3.1-1
Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1)
ID on Figure Safety-Related
and Seismic Description Safety Function
2.3.1-1 Category I
13B No TB Stack
13C No RW Stack NA
14 No Main Turbine Gland Seal Steam Condenser NA
Exhaust
15A, 15B No Reactor Component Cooling Water Intersystem NA
Leakage
16 No DW Fission Product NA
17 No Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust NA
18 No FB Combined Ventilation Exhaust NA
19 Yes Isolation Condenser Vent Exhaust Continuously monitors the four Isolation
Condenser Discharge Vents for gross gamma
radiation by sixteen local detectors (four per
isolation condenser vent). High radiation in
the exhaust of a vent results in isolation of
the affected Isolation Condenser loop.
20 No TSC HVAC Air Intake NA
21 Yes FB General Area HVAC Monitors the gross gamma radiation level in
Fuel Building HVAC exhaust duct for the
general area. In the event of an abnormal
radioactivity release, Fuel Building HVAC
exhaust dampers are closed and fans are
stopped.
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Table 2.3.1-1
Process Radiation Monitors (Shown on Figure 2.3.1-1)
ID on Figure Safety-Related
and Seismic Description Safety Function
2.3.1-1 Category I
22 Yes FB Fuel Pool HVAC Monitors the gamma radiation level of air
exiting spent fuel pool and equipment areas.
In the event of radioactive releases due to an
accident while handling spent fuel, Fuel
Building HVAC exhaust dampers are closed
and fans are stopped.
23 Yes Containment Purge Exhaust Monitors gross radiation level in exhaust
duct leading from the containment. In the
event of radioactive releases, monitors
initiate closure of ventilation isolation
dampers prior to exceeding radioactive
effluent limits. In addition to closure of the
RBVS isolation dampers, the RB HVAC
exhaust fans are stopped.
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Table 2.3.1-2
ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System
2.3-7
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Table 2.3.1-2
ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System
2.3-8
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Table 2.3.1-2
ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System
2.3-9
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Table 2.3.1-2
ITAAC For The Process Radiation Monitoring System
2.3-10
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2.3-11
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2.3-12
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Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
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Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
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Table 2.3.2-1
ARM Locations
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Table 2.3.2-2
ITAAC For Area Radiation Monitoring System
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2.4-1
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b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section
III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
(4) a. The components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their
pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
b. The piping identified in Table 2.4.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure
boundary integrity at its design pressure.
(5) The equipment identified in Table 2.4.1-1 and Table 2.4.1-2 as Seismic Category I can
withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) a. Each of the ICS divisions (or safety-related loads/components) identified in Table
2.4.1-2 is powered from its respective safety-related division.
b. In the ICS, independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between
safety-related divisions and non-safety related equipment.
(7) a. Each mechanical train of the ICS located outside the containment is physically
separated from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended
safety-related function.
b. Each mechanical train of the ICS located inside the containment is physically separated
from the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-
related function.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Re-positionable (NOT squib) valves designated in Table 2.4.1-1 open, close, or both open
and close, under differential pressure, fluid flow, and temperature conditions.
(10) The pneumatically operated valve(s) designated in Table 2.4.1-1 fail in the mode listed if
either electric power to the valve actuating solenoid is lost, or pneumatic pressure to the
valve(s) is lost.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) (Deleted)
(13) Each condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens to initiate the ICS.
(14) The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in
Table 2.4.1-1, close automatically on receipt of high vent line radiation from the Process
Radiation Monitoring System (PRMS).
(15) The normally open ICS isolation valves in the steam supply and condensate return lines, listed in
Table 2.4.1-1, close upon receipt of the following automatic actuation signals:
• LD&IS
• Open position on two or more DPVs
(16) Each ICS train normally closed condensate return valve, listed in Table 2.4.1-1, opens upon
receipt of the following automatic actuation signals:
• RPV high pressure following a time delay
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b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance
shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(30) The Lower IC Header Vent Line restricting orifices shown in Table 2.4.1-1 are sized so
that the water level in the RPV during station blackout events does not reach the Level 1
setpoint within 72 hours of the blackout event.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.4.1-3 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Isolation Condenser System.
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Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
– – – – – – –
Train A Isolation
Condenser
IC (A) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (A) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (A) Steam Supply Line P-1(A) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (A) Steam Supply Line V–1(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (A) Steam Supply Line V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate Return P-2(A) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (A) Condensate Return V-3(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate Return V-4(A) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate Return V-5(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
V-6(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
IC (A) Condensate Return
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (A) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (A) Header Vent V-7(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (A) Header Vent V-8(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
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Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-9(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-10(A) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-11(A) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent V-12(A) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header Vent RO(A) Yes Yes No – – –
Line Restricting Orifice
Train B Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (B) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (B) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (B) Steam Supply Line P-1(B) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (B) Steam Supply Line V-1(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (B) Steam Supply Line V-2(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return P-2(B) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (B) Condensate Return V-3(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return V-4(B) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return V-5(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (B) Condensate Return V-6(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
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Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Upper IC (B) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (B) Header Vent V-7(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (B) Header Vent V-8(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-9(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-10(B) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-11(B) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent V-12(B) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header Vent RO(B) Yes Yes No – – –
Line Restricting Orifice
Train C Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (C) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No – – –
Inline Vessel (C) – Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (C) Steam Supply Line P-1(C) Yes Yes Yes – – –
IC (C) Steam Supply Line V-1(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (C) Steam Supply Line V-2(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return P-2(C) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
2.4-7
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Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
IC (C) Condensate Return V-3(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return V-4(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return V-5(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (C) Condensate Return V-6(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (C) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Upper IC (C) Header Vent V-7(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (C) Header Vent V-8(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent – Yes Yes No – – –
Line
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-9(C) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-10(C) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-11(C) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent V-12(C) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header Vent RO(C) Yes Yes No – – –
Line Restricting Orifice
Train D Isolation – – – – – – –
Condenser
IC (D) Heat Exchanger – Yes Yes No No –
Inline Vessel (D) – Yes Yes Yes No –
2.4-8
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Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
IC (D) Steam Supply Line P-1(D) Yes Yes Yes No – –
IC (D) Steam Supply Line V-1(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (D) Steam Supply Line V-2(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Isolation Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return P-2(D) Yes Yes Yes No – –
Line
IC (D) Condensate Return V-3(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return V-4(D) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes As-Is
Line Isolation Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return V-5(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is
Line Valve
IC (D) Condensate Return V-6(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Open
Line Bypass Valve
Upper IC (D) Header Vent – Yes Yes No No – –
Line
Upper IC (D) Header Vent V-7(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Upper IC (D) Header Vent V-8(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Closed
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent – Yes Yes No No – –
Line
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-9(D) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-10(D) Yes Yes No No Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-11(D) Yes Yes No Yes No –
Line Valve
2.4-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-1
ICS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.4.1-1
Lower IC (D) Header Vent V-12(D) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Open
Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header Vent RO(D) Yes Yes No – – –
Line Restricting Orifice
V-13(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
Pool Cross-Connect Valve
(Squib)
V-14(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
Pool Cross-Connect Valve
(Pneumatic)
V-13(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
Pool Cross-Connect Valve
(Squib)
V-14(B) Yes Yes No No Yes As-is
Pool Cross-Connect Valve
(Pneumatic)
2.4-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-2
ICS Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Containment
(Description) Identifier Q-DCIS / Category Related Related Operated Isolation Valve
See Figure DPS I Display Valve Actuator
2.4.1-1
IC (A) Steam Supply V-1(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (A) Steam Supply V-2(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-3(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-4(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-5(A) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (A) Condensate V-6(A) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (A) Header V-7(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (A) Header V-8(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-9(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-10(A) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (A) Header V-12(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Pool Cross Connect V-13(A) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Squib)
Pool Cross Connect V-14(A) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Pneumatic)
IC (B) Steam Supply V-1(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
2.4-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-2
ICS Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Containment
(Description) Identifier Q-DCIS / Category Related Related Operated Isolation Valve
See Figure DPS I Display Valve Actuator
2.4.1-1
IC (B) Steam Supply V-2(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-3(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-4(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-5(B) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (B) Condensate V-6(B) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (B) Header V-7(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (B) Header V-8(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-9(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-10(B) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (B) Header V-12(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Pool Cross Connect V-13(B) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Squib)
Pool Cross Connect V-14(B) Yes/Yes Yes Yes Position Yes No
Valve (Pneumatic)
IC (C) Steam Supply V-1(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (C) Steam Supply V-2(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
2.4-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-2
ICS Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Containment
(Description) Identifier Q-DCIS / Category Related Related Operated Isolation Valve
See Figure DPS I Display Valve Actuator
2.4.1-1
IC (C) Condensate V-3(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-4(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-5(C) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (C) Condensate V-6(C) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (C) Header V-7(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (C) Header V-8(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-9(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-10(C) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (C) Header V-12(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
IC (D) Steam Supply V-1(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (D) Steam Supply V-2(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Line Isolation Valve
IC (D) Condensate V-3(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
IC (D) Condensate V-4(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Return Line Isolation
Valve
2.4-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-2
ICS Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Containment
(Description) Identifier Q-DCIS / Category Related Related Operated Isolation Valve
See Figure DPS I Display Valve Actuator
2.4.1-1
IC (D) Condensate V-5(D) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Valve
IC (D) Condensate V-6(D) Note 1 Yes Yes Position Yes No
Return Line Bypass
Valve
Upper IC (D) Header V-7(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Upper IC (D) Header V-8(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-9(D) No/Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-10(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
Lower IC (D) Header V-12(D) Yes/No Yes Yes Position Yes Yes
Vent Line Valve
ICS DPV Isolation – Yes/No Yes Yes No Yes No
Function Independent
Control Platform
Note 1: Valve pair V-5 and V-6 must have a total of four control inputs to the pair. The minimum control inputs for this pair must include two
different Q-DCIS divisions to one of the valves and a third different Q-DCIS division and DPS to the other valve. The design is such that any
combination of two of four divisions or DPS can initiate ICS flow in all four ICS trains.
2.4-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.1-3
ITAAC For The Isolation Condenser System
2.4-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR
Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.4-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.4-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(7) (Deleted)
(8) a. The GDCS injection lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above
(Top of Active Fuel) TAF for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.
b. The GDCS equalizing lines provide sufficient flow to maintain water coverage above
TAF for 72 hours following a design basis LOCA.
(9) The GDCS squib valves used in the injection and equalization lines open as designed.
(10) a. Check valves designated on Figure 2.4.2-1 open and close under system pressure, fluid
flow, and temperature conditions.
b. The GDCS injection line check valves meet the criterion for maximum fully open flow
coefficient in the reverse flow direction.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) GDCS squib valves maintain RPV backflow leak tightness and maintain reactor coolant
pressure boundary integrity during normal plant operation.
(13) Each GDCS injection line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.
(14) Each GDCS equalizing line includes a nozzle flow limiter to limit break size.
(15) Each of the GDCS divisions is powered from its respective safety-related power division.
(16) Each GDCS mechanical train located inside the containment is physically separated from
the other train(s) so as not to preclude accomplishment of the intended safety-related
function.
(17) The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a minimum drainable water volume.
(18) The GDCS pools A, B/C, and D are sized to hold a specified minimum water level.
(19) The elevation change between low water level of GDCS pools and the centerline of GDCS
injection line nozzles is sufficient to provide gravity-driven flow.
(20) The minimum drainable volume from the suppression pool to the RPV is sufficient to meet
long-term post-LOCA core cooling requirements.
(21) The long-term GDCS minimum equalizing driving head is based on RPV Level 0.5.
(22) The GDCS Deluge squib valves open as designed.
(23) (Deleted)
(24) The GDCS injection piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases to
GDCS pools and to RPV, to prevent collection in the GDCS injection pipes.
(25) Deluge system has redundant nonsafety-related Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
that are connected to thermocouples in each cell of the lower drywell Basemat-Internal
Melt Arrest Coolability (BiMAC) system.
(26) When temperatures exceed the setpoint at one set of thermocouples coincident with
setpoints being exceeded at a second set of thermocouples in adjacent cells, each PLC
starts a deluge squib valve timer.
2.4-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(27) The GDCS deluge valve squib initiation signals are inhibited when either of the safety-
related deluge system lower drywell temperature switches sense temperatures lower than a
preset value coincident with the presence of both deluge squib valve timer signals.
(28) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves
such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the GDCS that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(29) a. (Deleted)
b. The BiMAC has a material located on top of the BiMAC pipes to protect against melt
impingement during the initial corium relocation event.
c. The BiMAC is designed with a cover so that debris will penetrate it in a short period of
time while providing protection for the BiMAC from CRD housings falling from the
vessel.
d. The BiMAC piping is inclined from horizontal to permit natural circulation flow.
e. The material located on top of the BiMAC pipes does not generate non-condensable
gases in quantities that would result in exceeding the containment ultimate pressure.
2.4-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(A) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
2.4-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(A) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(A) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(A) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-8(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-9(A) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Pool Supply
P-1(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line to V-2
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-1(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-2(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
2.4-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Squib V-3(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Valve
GDCS Pool
Injection Line Check V-4(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Valve
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(B) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(B) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(B) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(B) Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
2.4-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Injection
Line from V-2 (V-3) P-2(C) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
to RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(C) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Equalizing
V-6(C) Yes Yes Yes No No – –
Line Check Valve
GDCS Equalizing
V-5(C) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Line Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(C) Yes Yes Yes – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(C) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(C) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-8(C) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-9(C) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
2.4-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
2.4-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Suppression
Pool Supply line to P-5(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
V-5
GDCS Suppression
Pool Injection Line V-6(D) Yes Yes No No No – –
Check Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Injection Line V-5(D) Yes Yes Yes No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Suppression
Pool Equalizing
P-3(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
Line from V-5 to
RPV inlet nozzle
GDCS Deluge Line P-4(D) Yes Yes No – – – –
GDCS Deluge Line
V-7(D) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-8(D) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Deluge Line
V-9(D) Yes Yes No No Yes As-Is Yes
Squib Valve
GDCS Pool
–
Perforated Plate Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-1
GDCS Mechanical Equipment
GDCS Pool
–
Stainless Steel Liner Yes Yes No – – – –
2.4-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-2
GDCS Electrical Equipment
2.4-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.4.2-3
ITAAC For The Emergency Core Cooling System – Gravity-Driven Cooling System
2.4-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR
Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.4-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment
2.5-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment
2.5-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment
2.5-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment
2.5-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.5-1
ITAAC For The Refueling Equipment
2.5-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.6-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility
2.5-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.6-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility
2.5-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.6-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Storage Facility
2.5-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.10-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System
2.5-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.10-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System
2.5-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.5.10-1
ITAAC For The Fuel Transfer System
ii. Tests and inspections will confirm that ii. The as-built interlocks and alarms
the as-built interlocks and alarms exist exist for controlling access to the
for controlling access to the transfer transfer tube area and indicating
tube area and indicating operation of operation of the IFTS.
the IFTS.
2.5-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5.11 (Deleted)
2.5-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.5.12 (Deleted)
2.5-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.6-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
b3. The piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
(9) a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code
Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.6.1-1 as ASME Code Section
III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
(10) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV system that require maintenance have
maintenance valves such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV system of the RWCU/SDC
system that require maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.6.1-2 provides the inspections, tests, and analyses that will be undertaken for the
RWCU/SDC system.
2.6-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-1
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
7. The equipment identified in Table i. Inspection will be performed to i. The equipment identified as Seismic
2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I can verify that the Seismic Category I Category I in Table 2.6.1-1 is located
withstand Seismic Category I loads equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 in a Seismic Category I structure.
without loss of safety function. are located in a Seismic Category I
structure.
ii. Type tests, analyses, or a ii. The equipment identified in
combination of type tests and Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I
analyses, of equipment identified in can withstand Seismic Category I
Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I, loads without loss of safety function.
will be performed using analytical
assumptions, or will be performed
under conditions which bound the
Seismic Category I equipment design
requirements.
iii. Inspections and analyses will be iii. The as-built equipment identified in
performed to verify that the as-built Table 2.6.1-1 as Seismic Category I,
equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1, including anchorage, can withstand
including anchorage, is bounded by Seismic Category I loads without loss
the testing or analyzed conditions. of safety function.
8a1. (Deleted)
2.6-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.1-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
2.6-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.6-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.6-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(7) a. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related suppression pool cooling functions.
b. The FAPCS performs the nonsafety-related low-pressure coolant injection function.
c. The FAPCS provides the nonsafety-related external connection for emergency water to
IC/PCCS pool and Spent Fuel Pool functions.
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Safety-related level instruments with adequate operating ranges are provided for the Spent
Fuel Pool, buffer pool, and IC/PCCS pools.
(10) (Deleted)
(11) Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water
level in the Spent Fuel Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies .
(12) Following a loss of active cooling without makeup that persists for 72 hours, the water
level in the Buffer Pool remains above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies.
(13) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves
such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the FAPCS that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements
(14) Lines that are submerged in the spent fuel pool or buffer pool enter the pools above the
normal water level and are equipped with redundant anti-siphon holes that will preserve a
water inventory above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the event of a break at a
lower elevation.
(15) For all low-pressure coolant injection piping and components between the RWCU/SDC
System and the FAPCS, including the check valves and motor operated valves, the ultimate
rupture strength can withstand the full reactor pressure.
(16) The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in
the FAPCS trains A and B are electrically independent.
(17) The nonsafety-related control cables, instrument cables and power cables for equipment in
the FAPCS trains A and B are physically separated.
(18) a. The electrical equipment supporting the two FAPCS trains is routed to the Reactor
Building and Fuel Building through separate areas that do not contain installed
equipment for lifting heavy loads.
b. Heavy loads that are being transported in the Reactor Building or the Fuel Building
(where the majority of FAPCS equipment is located) that have the potential to
simultaneously compromise both FAPCS trains would be handled by single failure-
proof cranes.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.6.2-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the FAPCS.
2.6-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
2.6-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
2.6-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
2.6-21
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
Piping to interconnect
– Yes Yes No – – –
GDCS pools
2.6-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-1
FAPCS Mechanical Equipment
Containment Remotely Loss of
Equipment Name Equipment ASME Code Seismic Cat. I RCPB
Isolation Operated Motive
Identifier Section III Component Valve Power
(Description)
See Figure Position
2.6.2-1
2.6-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
4a. The components identified in Table A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section those code components identified in conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
IIIretain their pressure boundary Table 2.6.2-1 as ASME Code Section III test of components identified in Table 2.6.2-1
integrity at their design pressure. that are required to be hydrostatically as ASME Code Section III comply with the
tested by ASME Code Section III. requirements of ASME Code Section III.
4b. The piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 A hydrostatic test will be conducted on ASME Code Data Report(s) exist and
as ASME Code Section III retains its the code piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 conclude that the results of the hydrostatic
pressure boundary integrity at its as ASME Code Section III that is test of piping identified in Table 2.6.2-1 as
design pressure. required to be hydrostatically tested by ASME Code Section III comply with the
ASME Code Section III. requirements in ASME Code Section III.
2.6-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
11. Following a loss of active cooling Inspection of the Spent Fuel Pool as- The elevation of the Spent Fuel Pool weir
without makeup that persists for 72 built dimensions will be performed to relative to the bottom of the pool is at least
hours, the water level in the Spent determine the elevation of the pool weir 14.35 m (47 ft) and that there is at least
Fuel Pool remains above the top of relative to the bottom of the pool and 1962 m3 (69300 ft3) of free volume above
the irradiated fuel assemblies. the free volume between the top of the the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies that
irradiated fuel assemblies and the weir can be filled with water.
elevation.
2.6-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.6.2-2
ITAAC For The Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
2.6-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.6-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.7 (DELETED)
2.7.1 (Deleted)
2.7.2 (Deleted)
2.7.3 (Deleted)
2.7-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.8 (DELETED)
2.8.1 (Deleted)
2.8-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.8.2 (Deleted)
2.8-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.9 (DELETED)
2.9-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.10-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.1-1
Major Equipment in LWMS
Equipment Number of Equipment Items
Equipment (Low Conductivity) Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 3
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 3 (one per cubicle)
Collection pumps 3
Process Subsystem: 1
• Filtration system
• Reverse osmosis
• Mixed-bed ion exchanger
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electrical System
Sample tanks 2
Sample tank cubicle steel liner 1 (one per cubicle)
Sample pumps 2
Floor (High Conductivity) Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 2
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 2 (one per cubicle)
Collection pumps 2
Process Subsystem 1
• Filtration system
• Reverse osmosis
• Mixed-bed ion exchanger
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electrical System
Sample tanks 2
Sample tank cubicle steel liner 1 (one per cubicle)
Sample pumps 2
Chemical Drain Subsystem
Collection tank 1
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 1
Collection pump 2
Detergent Drain Subsystem
Collection tanks 2
Collection tank cubicle steel liner 1 (one per cubicle)
Collection pumps 2
2.10-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.1-1
Major Equipment in LWMS
Equipment Number of Equipment Items
Process Subsystem: 1
• Filtration system
• Organic pre-treatment equipment
• Piping
• Instrumentation
• Electric system
Sample tanks 2
Sample tank cubicle steel liner 1 (one per cubicle)
Sample pumps 2
2.10-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.1-2
ITAAC For The Liquid Waste Management System
2.10-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.10-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.2-1
SWMS Tanks Nominal Capacity (Volume)
2.10-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.2-2
ITAAC For Solid Waste Management System
2.10-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.10-8
26A6641AB Rev.10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.3-1
ITAAC For The Gaseous Waste Management System
2.10-9
26A6641AB Rev.10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.3-1
ITAAC For The Gaseous Waste Management System
2.10-10
26A6641AB Rev.10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.10.3-1
ITAAC For The Gaseous Waste Management System
2.10-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
turbine bypass valves (non-inclusive) and the connecting branch lines (nominal 6.35 cm.
(2.5 in.) and larger up to and including the first isolation valve which is either normally
closed or capable of automatic closure during all modes of normal reactor operation, is
classified as Seismic Category II.
(6) The integrity of the as-built MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping,
bypass piping, required drain piping, and main condenser as shown on Figure 2.11.1-1) is
not compromised by non-seismic systems, structures and components.
(7) The non-seismic portion of the MSIV leakage path to the condenser (main steam piping
from the stop valve (inclusive) to turbine nozzle, bypass piping, required drain piping, and
main condenser) maintains structural integrity under SSE loading conditions.
(8) The TMSS piping is sized to ensure that reactor pressure vessel (RPV) dome to turbine
stop valve pressure drop, total main steam system volume, and steamline length are
consistent with assumptions in Abnormal Event analyses.
(9) a. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is designed in
accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements and Seismic Category II
requirements.
b. The as-built TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III shall be
reconciled with the piping design requirements.
c. The TMSS piping portion designated as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements..
(10) a. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III components of TMSS meet
ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in the ASME Code Section III piping of the TMSS meet the
ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination requirements.
(11) a. Valves on lines attached to the RPV that require maintenance have maintenance valves
installed such that freeze seals will not be required.
b. The as-built location of valves on lines attached to the RPV in the TMSS that require
maintenance shall be reconciled to design requirements.
(12) The non-return valves shown on functional arrangement Figure 2.11.1-2 and 2.11.1-3 are
spring assisted to close.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.11.1-1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the TMSS.
2.11-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.1-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Main Steam System
2.11-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.2-1
ITAAC For The Condensate and Feedwater System
2.11-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.2-1
ITAAC For The Condensate and Feedwater System
2.11-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.2-1
ITAAC For The Condensate and Feedwater System
2.11-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.4-1
Additional Equipment Protected from Turbine Missiles
FPS Diesel Driven Pump
FPS Motor Driven Pump
FPS to FAPCS Connection
PARs
PCCS Vent Fans
CRHAVS Air Handling Units
Emergency Lighting
FPS Water Tank
FPS Diesel Fuel Oil Tank
Ancillary Diesel Generators
Ancillary AC Power Buses
Ancillary DG Fuel Oil Tank
Ancillary DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump
Ancillary Diesel Building HVAC
CRHAVS Air Handling Unit auxiliary heaters and coolers
2.11-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.4-2
ITAAC For The Main Turbine
2.11-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.4-2
ITAAC For The Main Turbine
2.11-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.4-2
ITAAC For The Main Turbine
2.11-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.5-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Gland Seal System
2.11-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.6-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Bypass System
2.11-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.6-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Bypass System
2.11-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.11.7-1
ITAAC For The Main Condenser
2.11-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.11-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.1-1
(Deleted)
2.12-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.3-1
ITAAC For The Reactor Component Cooling Water System
2.12-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.5-1
ITAAC For The Chilled Water System
2.12-9
226A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.7-1
ITAAC For The Plant Service Water System
2.12-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.8-1
(Deleted)
2.12-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.12.10-1
(Deleted)
2.12-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.12-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(11) a. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are physically
separate from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits from
the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT) and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) to
the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
b. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuits are electrically
independent from the onsite portions of the alternate preferred power supply circuits
from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
c. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are electrically independent from the alternate
preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
d. The onsite portions of the normal preferred power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate
preferred power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits from the UAT and RAT to the PIP bus incoming line breakers.
e. The UAT and RAT are physically separated to minimize the likelihood of their
simultaneous failure under design basis conditions to the extent practical.
(12) a. The normal power supply circuits are physically separate from the alternate power
supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line
breakers.
b. The normal power supply circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power
supply circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line
breakers.
c. The normal power supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control
circuits are electrically independent from the alternate power supply circuit breaker
control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP buses to the Isolation
Power Center bus incoming line breakers.
d. The onsite portions of the normal power supply circuit breaker control power,
instrumentation, and control circuits are physically separated from the alternate power
supply circuit breaker control power, instrumentation, and control circuits from the PIP
buses to the Isolation Power Center bus incoming line breakers.
(13) Interrupting devices for the Electric Power Distribution Preferred Power System are
coordinated so as to isolate faulted equipment or circuits of the Plant Investment Protection
Buses from the Preferred Power System, prevent damage to equipment, protect personnel,
minimize system disturbances, and maintain continuity of the Preferred Power Supply
System from the PIP buses to all safety-related loads and designated RTNSS B and C
loads.
(14) a. Monitoring of the normal and alternate power feeds on the high voltage side of the
UAT and RAT using the potential and current transformers of the digital protective
relaying used for transformer protection is provided to detect open phase conditions,
whether one, two, or three phases, with or without accompanying ground faults.
2.13-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
b. All three phases of all the UAT or RAT shall be monitored for undervoltage, open phase,
and ground faults by the specific transformer protective relay. When an undervoltage,
open phase or ground fault is detected in any combination of one, two or three phases by
the designated UAT or RAT protective relay, the protective relay shall send an alarm via
the DCIS alarm system to the Main Control Room.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.13.1-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Electric Power Distribution System.
2.13-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-1
Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment
Safety
Equipment Description Location Seismic Cat. I
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Normal Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Alternate Reactor Yes Yes
Main Circuit Breaker Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 250 VDC Bus 11 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 250 VDC Bus 12 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 250 VDC Standby Building
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 UPS Rectifier 1-1 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 1 UPS Rectifier 1-2 Building
2.13-4
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Table 2.13.1-1
Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment
Safety
Equipment Description Location Seismic Cat. I
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 2 250 VDC Bus 21 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 2 250 VDC Bus 22 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 2 250 VDC Standby Building
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 2 UPS Rectifier 2-1 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 2 UPS Rectifier 2-2 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 3 250 VDC Bus 31 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 3 250 VDC Bus 32 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 3 250 VDC Standby Building
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 3 UPS Rectifier 3-1 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 3 UPS Rectifier 3-2 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 4 250 VDC Bus 41 Building
Normal Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 4 250 VDC Bus 42 Building
Normal Battery Charger
2.13-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-1
Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment
Safety
Equipment Description Location Seismic Cat. I
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 4 250 VDC Standby Building
Battery Charger
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 4 UPS Rectifier 4-1 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Supply Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker to Division 4 UPS Rectifier 4-2 Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus A Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus B Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus A Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus B Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus A Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus B Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus A Building
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Circuit Reactor Yes Yes
Breaker from Ancillary Diesel Bus B Building
Isolation Power Center Bus A31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
Isolation Power Center Bus B31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
Isolation Power Center Bus C31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
2.13-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-1
Electrical Power Distribution System Equipment
Safety
Equipment Description Location Seismic Cat. I
Related
Isolation Power Center Bus D31 Protective Reactor Yes Yes
Relaying Building
2.13-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.1-2
ITAAC For The Electric Power Distribution System
2.13-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
SWITCHYARD
MAIN XFMRS UNIT AUX. XFMR-A UNIT AUX. XFMR-B RESERVE RESERVE
27kV AUX. XFMR-A AUX. XFMR-B
13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV 13.8kV 6.9kV
MAIN GENERATOR
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
NORMAL
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
ALTERNATE
POWER POWER POWER POWER
GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG) GENERATION (PG)
13.8kV BUS A1 13.8kV BUS B1 13.8kV BUS A2 13.8kV BUS B2
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 1.
Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement
2.13-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
ALTERNATE
NORMAL
PLANT INVESTMENT PROTECTION (PIP) BUS A3 6.9kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9KV 5 7
LOADS ISOL. PWR. ISOL. PWR.
NORM ALT NORM ALT
CENTER CENTER
BUS B31 BUS D31
ALT. FEED ALT. FEED BUS A31 480V 480V ANCILLARY DIESEL BUS A BUS C31 480V
STANDBY DIESEL
GENERATOR-A
6.9 KV
DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 DIVISION 1 480 V LOADS ANCILLARY DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3 DIVISION 3
UPS UPS NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY DIESEL BUS B NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY UPS UPS
RECTIFIER 1-1 RECTIFIER 1-2 BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY ANCILLARY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY RECTIFIER 3-1 RECTIFIER 3-2
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER DIESEL CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
250VDC 250VDC 250VDC GENERATOR A 250VDC 250VDC 250VDC
BUS 12 BUS 11 BUS 32 BUS 31
ALTERNATE
NORMAL
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9/0.48kV
6.9KV 4 6
LOADS ISOL. PWR. ISOL. PWR.
NORM ALT NORM ALT
CENTER CENTER
BUS A31 BUS C31
ALT. FEED ALT. FEED BUS B31 480V 480V ANCILLARY DIESEL BUS B BUS D31 480V
STANDBY DIESEL
GENERATOR-B
6.9 KV
DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 DIVISION 2 480 V LOADS ANCILALRY DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4 DIVISION 4
UPS UPS NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY DIESEL BUS A NORMAL NORMAL STANDBY UPS UPS
RECTIFIER 2-1 RECTIFIER 2-2 BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY ANCILLARY BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY RECTIFIER 4-1 RECTIFIER 4-2
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER DIESEL CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
250VDC 250VDC 250VDC GENERATOR B 250VDC 250VDC 250VDC
BUS 22 BUS 21 BUS 42 BUS 41
Figure 2.13.1-1 Sh 2.
Electric Power Distribution System Functional Arrangement
2.13-17
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13.2 (Deleted)
2.13-18
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2.13-19
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(12) Electrical cables for the safety-related 250 VDC system are rated to withstand fault current
for the time required to clear the fault from their power source.
(13) Protective devices for the safety-related 250 VDC system are rated to interrupt analyzed
fault currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.
(14) Raceway for safety-related 250 VDC system circuits are sized in accordance with design
requirements.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.13.3-3 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Direct Current Power Supply.
2.13-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-1
Direct Current Power Supply System Equipment
Seismic Safety
Equipment Description Location
Cat. I Related
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 Bus 12 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 Bus 21 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 Bus 22 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 Bus 31 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 Bus 32 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 Bus 41 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 Bus 42 250 VDC Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 1 Bus 12 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 1 250 VDC Standby Battery Charger Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 Bus 21 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 2 Bus 22 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 2 250 VDC Standby Battery Charger Reactor Yes Yes
Building
2.13-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-1
Direct Current Power Supply System Equipment
Seismic Safety
Equipment Description Location
Cat. I Related
Division 3 Bus 31 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 3 Bus 32 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 3 250 VDC Standby Battery Charger Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 Bus 41 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 4 Bus 42 250 VDC Normal Battery Reactor Yes Yes
Charger Building
Division 4 250 VDC Standby Battery Charger Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 Bus 12 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 Bus 21 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 Bus 22 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 Bus 31 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 Bus 32 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 Bus 41 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 Bus 42 250 VDC Power Center Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 Bus 11 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
2.13-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-1
Direct Current Power Supply System Equipment
Seismic Safety
Equipment Description Location
Cat. I Related
Division 1 Bus 12 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 2 Bus 21 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 2 Bus 22 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 3 Bus 31 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 3 Bus 32 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 4 Bus 41 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
Division 4 Bus 42 250 VDC Transfer Switch Reactor Yes Yes
Box Building
2.13-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-2
Direct Current Power Supply Equipment Displays/Status Indication
2.13-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-2
Direct Current Power Supply Equipment Displays/Status Indication
2.13-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply
2.13-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply
2.13-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply
2.13-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply
9. The battery chargers are designed to Testing of each 250 VDC safety-related The 250 VDC safety-related battery
prevent their AC source from battery charger will be performed to chargers prevent the AC input source from
becoming a load on the 250 VDC demonstrate that there is no power becoming a load on the 250 VDC safety-
safety-related batteries when the AC feedback from a loss of AC input power. related batteries during a loss of AC
power source is de-energized or has power condition.
degraded voltage.
10. (Deleted)
11. (Deleted)
2.13-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.3-3
ITAAC For The Direct Current Power Supply
2.13-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A 31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS B 31
NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL
BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY
CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER
TEST
TEST
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM. NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONNECTION CONNECTION
250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER 250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS C 31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS D 31
NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL
BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY
CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER CHARGER 72h CHARGER 72h CHARGER
TEST
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM. NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONNECTION CONNECTION
250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER 250VDC POWER CENTER (TYP.) 250VDC POWER CENTER
2.13-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL NORMAL BATTERY STANDBY BATTERY NORMAL
BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY 250VDC BATTERY
CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER
TEST
TEST
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM. NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF OFF OFF
BATTERY BATTERY
TEST TEST
CONN. CONN.
(TYP.) (TYP.)
INVERTER 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS INVERTER INVERTER 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS 250VDC TYPICAL LOADS INVERTER
LOAD GROUP-A LOAD GROUP-A LOAD GROUP-B LOAD GROUP-B
STANDBY NORMAL
BATTERY BATTERY
CHARGER CHARGER
BATTERY
250VDC
TRANSFER
SWITCH
BOX
TEST
NORM.
OFF
250VDC BUS
INVERTER
250VDC TYPICAL LOADS LOAD GROUP C
2.13-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
BATTERY BATTERY
125VDC 125VDC
TRANSFER TRANSFER
SWITCH SWITCH
BOX BOX
TEST
TEST
NORM. NORM.
OFF OFF
2.13-33
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(3) (Deleted)
(4) The functional arrangement of the Ancillary Diesel Onsite Power Supply System is as
described in the Subsection 2.13.4 and in Table 2.13.4-1.
(5) a. Upon receipt of an under voltage signal from the ancillary diesel 480 VAC bus, the
ancillary diesel generator starts, achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power
to the ancillary diesel bus.
b. Upon receipt of a low ancillary diesel room temperature signal, the ancillary diesel
generator starts and achieves rated speed and voltage, and supplies power to the
ancillary diesel bus.
c. Each ancillary diesel generator is capable of operating at its nameplate rated load and
is sized to accommodate its expected loads.
d. Each ancillary diesel generator fuel oil storage tank contains adequate fuel oil capacity
for seven days of ancillary diesel generator operation based on expected ADG load.
e. Each of the ancillary diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps start automatically and
transfer fuel oil from the ancillary fuel oil storage tank to the ancillary diesel generator
day tank at a rate greater than or equal to the usage rate of the ancillary diesel
generator.
(6) (Deleted)
(7) Each ancillary diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries, buses, fuel tanks, and fuel oil
transfer pumps conform to Seismic Category II requirements.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.13.4-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Standby Onsite Power Supply System and the Ancillary
Diesel Onsite Power Supply System.
2.13-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-1
Equipment Location
2.13-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply
2.13-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply
2.13-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply
2.13-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply
2.13-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.4-2
ITAAC For The Standby On-site AC Power Supply
2.13-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(13) Protective devices for the safety-related UPS system are rated to interrupt analyzed fault
currents and are coordinated to only trip the protective device closest to the fault.
(14) Raceway for safety-related UPS system circuits are sized in accordance with design
requirements.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.13.5-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Uninterruptible AC Power Supply.
2.13-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.5-1
Uninterruptible AC Power Soppy System Equipment
Equipment Description Location Seismic Safety Related
Cat. I
Division 1 UPS 1-1 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 UPS 1-2 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 UPS 2-1 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 2 UPS 2-2 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 UPS 3-1 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 3 UPS 3-2 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 UPS 4-1 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 4 UPS 4-2 Reactor Yes Yes
Building
Division 1 UPS Bus 11 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 1 UPS Bus 12 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 2 UPS Bus 21 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 2 UPS Bus 22 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 3 UPS Bus 31 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 3 UPS Bus 32 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 4 UPS Bus 41 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
Division 4 UPS Bus 42 Reactor Yes Yes
Power Distribution Panel Building
2.13-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.5-2
ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
2.13-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.5-2
ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
2.13-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.5-2
ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
2.13-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.5-2
ITAAC For The Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
2.13-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS A31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS B31
120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS
SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 1 SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 2
480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS C31 480VAC ISOLATION POWER CENTER BUS D31
120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS 120VAC TYPICAL LOADS
SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 3 SAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY DIVISION 4
DEVICE KEY
SXS: STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
2.13-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
480 / 480VAC INVERTER INVERTER 480 / 480VAC 480 / 480VAC INVERTER INVERTER 480 / 480VAC
3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 3Ø 3Ø 480V,3Ø 480V,3Ø 3Ø
TYPICAL LOADS GROUP A TYPICAL LOADS GROUP A TYPICAL LOADS GROUP B TYPICAL LOADS GROUP B
NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY LOAD GROUP A NONSAFETY-RELATED UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY LOAD GROUP B
480VAC POWER CENTER DCIS SWING BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS A3 & B3)
250VDC BUS
RECTIFIER
480V,3Ø DEVICE KEY
SXS: STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH
MTS: MAINTENANCE TRANSFER SWITCH
480VAC BUS
2.13-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-A3) 480VAC POWER CENTER BUS (SUPPLIED FROM PIP BUS-B3)
RECTIFIER RECTIFIER
480-208/120VAC 3Ø 480-208/120VAC 3Ø
480VAC-3Ø 480VAC-3Ø
TSC-INVERTER TSC-INVERTER
480-208/120VAC 3Ø 480-208/120VAC 3Ø
SXS SXS
MTS MTS
208/120VAC 3Ø 208/120VAC 3Ø
Figure 2.13.5-2 Sh 2
Nonsafety-Related UPS System Functional Arrangement
2.13-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13.6 (Deleted)
2.13-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.7-1
(Deleted)
2.13-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.13-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.8-1
ITAAC For The Lighting Power Supply
2.13-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.8-1
ITAAC For The Lighting Power Supply
2.13-57
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.8-1
ITAAC For The Lighting Power Supply
2.13-58
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.13-59
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.13.9-1
ITAAC For The Grounding and Lightning Protection System
2.13-60
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.14-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
c3. The piping identified in Table 2.15.1-1 as ASME Code Section III is fabricated,
installed, and inspected in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.
(3) a. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b
as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination
requirements.
b. Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as
ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III non-destructive examination
requirements.
(4) The components and piping identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a and 2.15.1-1b as ASME Code
Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.
(5) The Seismic Category I equipment identified in Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b and 2.15.1-1c
can withstand Seismic Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(6) a. The electrical safety-related components associated with actuation and status
monitoring of final control elements of the Containment System equipment listed in
Tables 2.15.1-1a, 2.15.1-1b, and 2.15.1-1c receive power from their respective safety-
related divisional power supplies.
b. Separate electrical penetrations are provided for circuits of each safety-related division
and for nonsafety-related circuits.
c. The circuits of each electrical penetration are of the same voltage class.
(7) The containment system provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the
atmosphere.
(8) The containment system pressure boundary retains its structural integrity when subject to
design pressure.
(9) The containment system provides the safety function of containment isolation for
containment boundary integrity.
(10) Containment electrical penetration assemblies, whose maximum available fault current
(including failure of upstream devices) is greater than the continuous rating of the
penetration, are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.
(11) (Deleted)
(12) The amount of chlorine bearing cable insulation exposed to the containment atmosphere is
limited.
(13) The DW and wetwell (WW) volumes are adequately sized to accommodate the calculated
maximum DW temperature and absolute pressure that are postulated to occur as a result of
a design basis accident.
(14) The water volume of the WW is adequately sized to condense the steam that is forced into
the WW from the DW due to a postulated design basis event.
(15) Each vacuum breaker isolation valve automatically closes if the vacuum breaker does not
fully close when required.
2.15-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(16) a. Each vacuum breaker has proximity sensors to detect open/close position. This
indication is available in the main control room.
b. Each vacuum breaker has temperature sensors to detect bypass leakage at design basis
accident conditions. This indication is available in the main control room.
(17) The containment penetration isolation design for each fluid piping system requiring
isolation meets the single-failure criterion to ensure completion of penetration isolation.
(18) DW to WW bypass leakage is less than the assumed value used in the containment
capability design basis containment response analysis.
(19) Total DW to WW vacuum breaker bypass pathway leakage is less than the assumed value
used in the containment capability design basis containment response analysis.
(20) Each vacuum breaker opening differential pressure is less than or equal to the required
opening differential pressure.
(21) Each vacuum breaker closing differential pressure is greater than or equal to the required
closing differential pressure.
(22) a. Containment isolation valves are located as close to the containment as practical,
consistent with General Design Criteria 55, 56 and 57.
b. The as-built location of containment isolation valves relative to containment shall be
reconciled with design requirements.
(23) a. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are designed in accordance
with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1, Section III, Subsection NE
for Class MC Components and Seismic Category I requirements.
b. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies shall be reconciled with the
design requirements.
c. The containment boundary electric penetration assemblies are fabricated, installed, and
inspected in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Division 1,
Section III, Subsection NE for Class MC Components.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.15.1-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Containment System.
2.15-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Nuclear Boiler
Total 4 Penetrations (One penetration per main steam line)
Inboard main steam isolation valve
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
(MSIV) (4 valves)
Outboard main steam isolation valve
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
(MSIV) (4 valves)
Outboard MSIV upstream drain line
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open/closed closed
(4 valves)
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per drain line)
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line
inboard containment isolation valve (1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve)
Inboard MSIV upstream drain line
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
(1 valve)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per feedwater (FW) supply line)
FW supply line second outboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
containment isolation valve (2 valves)
FW supply line outboard containment
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed Closed
isolation valve (2 valves)
FW supply line inboard containment
Yes Yes No Yes No open open/closed –
isolation valve (2 valves)
2.15-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
2.15-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
(Deleted)
(Deleted)
2.15-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
2.15-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
2.15-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
inboard isolation valve (2 valves)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
outboard isolation valve (2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per RWCU/SDC bottom head suction sample line)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line
sample line inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed open/closed closed
valves)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line
sample line outboard isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed open/closed closed
(2 valves)
Chilled Water
Total 2 penetration (One penetration per Chilled water supply line to DW cooler)
Chilled water supply line to DW
cooler outboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Chilled water supply line to DW
cooler inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
2.15-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Total 2 penetration (One penetration per Chilled water return line from DW cooler)
Chilled water return line from DW
cooler inboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Chilled water return line from DW
cooler outboard isolation valve (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valves)
Makeup Water
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per makeup water line)
Demin water DW distribution system
outboard containment isolation valve Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
(1 valve)
Demin water DW distribution system
inboard containment isolation valve (1 Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
valve)
Service Air
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per service air line)
Service air system inboard
Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
containment isolation valve (1 valve)
Service air system outboard
Yes Yes No Yes No closed closed –
containment isolation valve (1 valve)
2.15-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per N2 supply line to ADS, SRV, and ICIV accumulator)
N2 supply line outboard isolation
valve to ADS, SRV and ICS isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve accumulator (1 valve)
N2 supply line inboard isolation check
valve to ADS, SRV and ICS isolation Yes Yes No Yes No open/closed closed –
valve accumulator (1 valve)
Total 1 Penetration (One penetration per N2 supply line to MSIV and other users)
N2 supply line outboard isolation
valve to MSIV and other uses (1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
valve)
N2 supply line inboard check valve to
Yes Yes No Yes No open/closed closed –
MSIV and other uses (1 valve)
Containment Inerting
N2 makeup line outboard isolation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open closed closed
2.15-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
valve (1 valve)
2.15-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Containment Monitoring
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per DW sample line)
DW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
valves)
DW to Sample Rack outboard valve
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
(2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per WW sample line)
WW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
valves)
WW to Sample Rack outboard valve
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
(2 valves)
Total 2 Penetrations (One penetration per WW gas sample return line)
Gas Sample Return to WW inboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
valve (2 valves)
Gas Sample Return to WW outboard
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes open open open
valve (2 valves)
Equipment and Floor Drain
Total 1 Penetrations (One penetration per DW equipment drain Low Conductivity Waste (LCW) sump discharge line)
DW equipment drain LCW sump
discharge line inboard isolation valve Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes closed closed closed
(1 valve)
2.15-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1a
Containment System Penetrations1 and Equipment
Loss of
ASME Remote Containment Post-
Seismic Safety- Normal Motive
Equipment Name Code Manual Isolation Accident
Cat. I Related Position Power
Section III Operation Signal Position
Position
Total 1 Penetrations (One penetration per DW equipment drain High Conductivity Waste (HCW) sump discharge line)
2.15-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1b
Containment Mechanical Equipment
2.15-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1c
Electrical Equipment
Equipment Containment
Active
Equipment Name Identifier Control Q- Seismic Safety- Safety- Remotely Isolation
Category Related Safety
(Description) See Figure DCIS/ DPS Related Operated Valve
I Display Function Actuator
2.15.1-1
Vacuum Breaker 11(A) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(A) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(B) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(B) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Vacuum Breaker 11(C) - Yes Yes Yes Open/Close No No
Vacuum Breaker No
11a(C) Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Close Yes
Isolation Valve
Close
Vacuum Breaker Vacuum
Isolation Function Breaker
- Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Independent Control Isolation
Platform Valves on
demand
2.15-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
Nuclear Boiler
Isolation Condenser
2.15-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line inboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Inboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
DW Fission Product Monitoring Line Outboard isolation Valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
GDCS pool return line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Suppression pool return line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Suppression pool suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Suppression pool suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
2.15-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
GDCS pool suction line inboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
GDCS pool suction line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 20 sec max
RWCU/SDC mid-vessel suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 20 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 15 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 15 sec max
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line sample line inboard isolation valve (2
15 sec max
valves)
RWCU/SDC bottom head suction line sample line outboard isolation valve (2
15 sec max
valves)
Chilled Water
Chilled water supply line to DW cooler outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water supply line to DW cooler inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water return line from DW cooler inboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Chilled water return line from DW cooler outboard isolation valve (2 valves) 30 sec max
Makeup Water
Service Air
2.15-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
N2 supply line outboard isolation valve to ADS, SRV and ICIV accumulator (1
15 sec max
valve)
N2 supply line inboard isolation check valve to ADS, SRV and ICIV
–
accumulator (1 valve)
N2 supply line outboard isolation valve to MSIV and other uses (1 valve) 15 sec max
N2 supply line inboard check valve to MSIV and other uses (1 valve) –
Containment Inerting
Air/N2 supply line to suppression pool outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Air/N2 supply line to upper DW outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Containment atmospheric exhaust line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Suppression pool exhaust line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 30 sec max
Containment atmospheric bleed line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Containment atmospheric bleed line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
N2 makeup line to suppression pool outboard isolation valve (1 valve) 5 sec max
Containment Monitoring
DW to Sample Rack inboard valve (2 valves) –
DW to Sample Rack outboard valve (2 valves) –
2.15-20
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-1d
Containment System Penetration Isolation Valve Closure Times
DW floor drain (HCW) sump discharge line inboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
DW floor drain (HCW) sump discharge line outboard isolation valve (1 valve) –
1
This table is used for Acceptance Criteria only
2.15-21
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-22
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-24
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-25
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-26
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-27
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-28
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-29
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-30
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-31
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-32
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-33
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-34
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.1-2
ITAAC For The Containment System
2.15-35
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-36
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-37
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-38
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.3-1
Containment Internal Structures Locations
2.15-39
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.3-2
ITAAC For The Containment Internal Structures
2.15-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.3-2
ITAAC For The Containment Internal Structures
2.15-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-42
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(9) The elevation of the PCCS vent line discharge point is submerged in the suppression pool
at an elevation below low water level and above the uppermost horizontal vent.
(10) The PCCS will be designed to limit the fraction of containment leakage through the
condensers to an acceptable value.
(11) The PCCS vent fans flow rate is sufficient to meet the beyond 72 hours containment
cooling requirements following a design basis LOCA.
(12) The PCCS vent fans can be remotely operated from the MCR.
(13) The PCCS drain piping is installed to allow venting of non-condensable gases from the
PCCS drain lines to the PCCS condenser vent lines to prevent collection in the PCCS drain
lines.
(14) The elevation of the PCCS vent fan discharge point is submerged within the drain pan
located in the GDCS pool at an elevation below the lip of the drain pan.
(15) PCCS vent catalyst modules are mounted within each PCCS vent line.
(16) To reduce hydrogen accumulation in the PCCS vent lines, vent line catalyst modules
recombine hydrogen at a required minimum rate at a minimum allowed velocity.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.15.4-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the Passive Containment Cooling System.
2.15-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-1
Passive Containment Cooling System Mechanical Equipment
2.15-45
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-47
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-49
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-50
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-51
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.4-2
ITAAC For The Passive Containment Cooling System
2.15-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-53
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-54
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.5-1
Containment Inerting System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Name Equipment Control Safety- Safety- Active Loss of Remotely Containme
ID Q-DCIS/ Related Related Function Motive Operated nt Isolation
DPS Electrical Display Power Valve Valve
Equipment Position
DW Temperature – No No No No – – –
Transmitters(s)
2.15-55
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.5-2
ITAAC For The Containment Inerting System
2.15-56
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-57
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.6-1
(Deleted)
Table 2.15.6-2
(Deleted)
2.15-58
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-59
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(9) (Deleted)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.15.7-2 provides the definitions of the inspections, tests, and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria, which will be undertaken for the Containment Atmospheric
Monitoring System and the suppression pool monitoring portions of CMS.
2.15-60
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-1
Containment Monitoring System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Containment
Identifier Control Seismic Safety-
Safety- Active Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Category Related
See Figure Related Function Operated Valve
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
DW Hydrogen
Sampling Transmitter (H2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
(2 divisional channels)
DW Oxygen Sampling
Transmitter (2 (O2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels)
WW Hydrogen
Sampling Transmitter (H2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
(2 divisional channels)
WW Oxygen Sampling
Transmitter (2 (O2 Skid) Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels)
Upper DW Gamma
RDT2
Radiation Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Upper DW)
(2 divisional channels)
Lower DW Gamma
RDT2
Radiation Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Lower DW)
(2 divisional channels)
WW Gamma Radiation
RDT2
Transmitter No No No No No – –
(WW)
(2 divisional channels)
DW Pressure
Transmitter (Safety- PT2
Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
related) (4 divisional (DW)
channels)
2.15-61
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-1
Containment Monitoring System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Containment
Identifier Control Seismic Safety-
Safety- Active Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Category Related
See Figure Related Function Operated Valve
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
WW Pressure
Transmitter (Safety- PT2
Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
related) (4 divisional (WW)
channels)
DW Pressure Wide
Range Transmitter PT2
Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
(Safety-related) (2 (DW)
divisional channels)
WW Wide Range
Pressure Transmitter PT2
Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
(Safety-related) ) (2 (WW)
divisional channels)
DW Pressure PT2
Transmitter (Nonsafety- Yes No No No No – –
related) (4) (DW)
WW Pressure PT2
Transmitter (Nonsafety- No No No No No – –
related) (WW)
DW/WW Differential
Pressure Transmitter (2 PDT2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels)
Upper DW Level LT2
Transmitter No No No No No – –
(Upper DW)
Lower DW Level LT2
Transmitter (4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels) (Lower DW)
2.15-62
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-1
Containment Monitoring System Electrical Equipment
Equipment Containment
Identifier Control Seismic Safety-
Safety- Active Remotely Isolation
Equipment Name Q-DCIS/ Category Related
See Figure Related Function Operated Valve
DPS1 I Display
2.15.7-1 Actuator
Lower DW Level LT2
Transmitter (2 Yes Yes Yes Yes No – –
divisional channels) (Lower DW)
2.15-63
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-2
ITAAC For The Containment Monitoring System
2.15-64
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-2
ITAAC For The Containment Monitoring System
2.15-65
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.7-2
ITAAC For The Containment Monitoring System
2.15-66
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-67
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.15-68
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.15.8-1
ITAAC For The Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner
2.15-69
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.1-1
ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators
2.16-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.1-1
ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators
2.16-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.1-1
ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators
2.16-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.1-1
ITAAC For Cranes, Hoists and Elevators
2.16-5
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2.16-6
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(8) (Deleted)
(9) Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related
divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
(10) (Deleted)
(11) The Reactor Building HVAC Online Purge Exhaust Filters are tested to meet RG 1.140
and ASME AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.
(12) a. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters maintains the CONAVS served
areas of the reactor building at a minimum negative pressure of 62 Pa (-1/4 inch W.G.)
relative to surrounding clean areas when operating.
b. The Reactor Building HVAC Accident Exhaust Filters meet RG 1.140 and ASME
AG-1 requirements for HEPA and carbon filter efficiency.
(13) The Reactor Building concrete acts as a heat sink that passively maintains the temperature
of the Reactor Building rooms within an acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a
design basis accident.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.16.2-2 provides the design commitments, inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance
criteria for the RBVS system.
2.16-7
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The CRHAVS serves the MCR and associated support areas during normal plant operations,
plant start-up and plant shutdown and is shown in Figure 2.16.2-4. The CBGAVS serves the
areas outside the CRHA and is shown in Figures 2.16.2-5a and 2.16.2-5b.
CRHAVS software that controls the safety-related CRHAVS components is developed in
accordance with the software development program described in Section 3.2.
(1) The functional arrangement of the CRHAVS is as described in the Design Description of
this Subsection 2.16.2.2 and is as shown in Figure 2.16.2-4.
(2) The CRHA isolation dampers automatically close upon receipt of any of the following
signals:
• high radiation in the CRHAVS intake;
• high radiation downstream of an Emergency Filter Unit (EFU) during emergency
operation;
• low airflow through an EFU during emergency operation;
• loss of AC power.
(3) The equipment identified in Table 2.16.2-3 as Seismic Category I can withstand Seismic
Category I loads without loss of safety function.
(4) The CRHAVS heat sink passively maintains the temperature of the CRHA within an
acceptable range for the first 72 hours following a design basis accident.
(5) Independence is provided between safety-related divisions, and between safety-related
divisions and nonsafety-related equipment.
(6) CRHA isolation damper and EFU operational status (Open/Closed) indication is provided
in the MCR.
(7) The free air volume of the control room envelope is greater than or equal to the volume
assumed in safety analyses.
(8) Normal operation intake flow rate is greater than or equal to the flow rate assumed in the
safety analyses.
(9) (Deleted)
(10) CRHAVS Air Handling Units and Auxiliary Cooling Units support post-72 hour control
room habitability cooling and cooling for post-accident monitoring heat loads.
(11) The CRHA is provided with differential pressure indication for monitoring under normal
and emergency operation.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.16.2-4 provides definitions of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for the Control Building HVAC.
2.16-8
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2.16-9
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2.16-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-11
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2.16-12
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.2-1
Reactor Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
2.16-13
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Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC
2.16-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC
2.16-15
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Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC
2.16-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC
2.16-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 2.16.2-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building HVAC
2.16-18
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.2-3
Control Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
2.16-19
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Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem
2.16-20
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Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem
2.16-21
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Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem
2.16-22
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Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem
2.16-23
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Table 2.16.2-4
ITAAC For The Control Building Habitability HVAC Subsystem
2.16-24
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Table 2.16.2-5
Emergency Filter Units
2.16-25
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Table 2.16.2-6
ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units
2.16-26
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Table 2.16.2-6
ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units
2.16-27
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Table 2.16.2-6
ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units
2.16-28
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Table 2.16.2-6
ITAAC For The Emergency Filter Units
2.16-29
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Table 2.16.2-7
ITAAC For The Turbine Building Ventilation System
2.16-30
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Table 2.16.2-8
Fuel Building HVAC System Safety-Related Equipment
2.16-31
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Table 2.16.2-9
ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC
2.16-32
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Table 2.16.2-9
ITAAC For The Fuel Building HVAC
2.16-33
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Table 2.16.2-10
ITAAC For The Electrical Building Ventilation System
2.16-34
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2.16-35
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2.16-36
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2.16-37
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2.16-38
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2.16-39
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-40
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-41
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-42
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2.16-43
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-44
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2.16-45
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Table 2.16.3-1
Fire Protection System Equipment
2.16-46
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Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System
2.16-47
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Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System
2.16-48
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Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System
2.16-49
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Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System
2.16-50
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Table 2.16.3-2
ITAAC For The Fire Protection System
2.16-51
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2.16-52
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2.16-53
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Table 2.16.3.1-1
ITAAC For Fire Barriers
2.16-54
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Table 2.16.3.1-1
ITAAC For Fire Barriers
2.16-55
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2.16-56
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2.16-57
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Table 2.16.4-1
ITAAC For The Equipment and Floor Drain System
2.16-58
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2.16-59
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• Water stops in all expansion and construction joints below design basis maximum flood
and groundwater levels;
• Waterproofing of external surfaces below design basis maximum flood and
groundwater levels;
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below design basis
maximum flood and groundwater levels; and
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of large amounts of water in excess of the structural
capacity of the roof for design loads.
• Exterior access opening sealed in external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
(7) Protective features used to mitigate or eliminate the consequences of internal flooding are:
• Structural enclosures or barriers
• Curbs and sills
• Leakage detection components
• Drainage systems
(8) The internal flooding protection features prevent flood water in one division from
propagating to other division(s) and ensure equipment necessary for safe shutdown is
located above the maximum flood level for that location or is qualified for flood conditions
by:
• Divisional walls
• Sills
• Watertight doors
(9) a. The RB is protected against pressurization effects associated with postulated rupture of
pipes containing high-energy fluid that occur in subcompartments of the RB.
b. The RB structure in the refuel floor area is equipped with overpressure protection
devices in the event of overpressure of this area.
(10) The Reactor Building CONAVS area volume meets design assumptions for the mixing of
fission products following a LOCA.
(11) RTNSS equipment in the RB is located above the maximum flood level for that location or
is qualified for flood conditions.
(12) The buffer pool is a reinforced concrete structure with a stainless steel liner that is
equipped with embedments designed to Seismic Category I requirements.
(13) Doors that connect the RB with the EB galleries are watertight for flooding of the galleries
up to the ground level elevation.
(14) Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or
Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of safety-related SSCs to perform their
safety-related functions.
2.16-60
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(15) Failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS Structures, Systems or
Components (SSCs) will not impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function following a
seismic event.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.16.5-2 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with
associated acceptance criteria for the RB.
2.16-61
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
Concrete Containment
2500 +60,-0
101 RPV Pedestal Cylinder Not Applicable From -10400 to 4650
(8'-2⅜") (+2 ⅜",-0)
2000 +60,-0
102 RCCV Cylinder Not Applicable From 4650 to 24600
(6'-6 ¾") (+2 ⅜",-0)
5100 +50,-20
103 Containment Basemat Below RPV Pedestal Cylinder -10400
(16'-8 ¾") (2",-¾ ")
2.16-62
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1000 +25,-20
7 Wall between Column Lines RA and RB From between R1 and R2 to R3 From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
8 Wall between Column Lines RF and RG From between R1 and R2 to R3 From -11500 to -7400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +60,-0
9 Cylinder below RCCV Not Applicable From -11500 to 2650
(6'-6 ¾") (+2 ⅜",-0)
10 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 1400 Minimum
(4'-7 ⅛")
1400
11 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 Minimum
(4'-7 ⅛")
600
12 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant From -11500 to -1700 Minimum
(1'-11 ⅝")
600
13 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant From -11500 to -7400 Minimum
(1'-11 ⅝")
1350
14 Cylinder between RPV Pedestal and Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant From -6400 to -1900 Minimum
(4'-5 ⅛")
1500 +25,-20
15 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RG From 4650 to 16500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
16 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RG From 4650 to 16500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
17 Wall at Column Line RA From R1 to R7 From 4650 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
18 Wall at Column Line RG From R1 to R7 From 4650 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-63
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1500 +25,-20
19 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RC From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
20 Wall at Column Line R1 From RE to RG From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
21 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RC From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
22 Wall at Column Line R7 From between RD and RE to RG From 17500 to 25500
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1300 +25,-20
23 Main Steam Tunnel Wall East side From 17500 to 24600
(4'-3⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1300 +25,-20
24 Main Steam Tunnel Wall West side From 17500 to 24600
(4'-3⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
25 Wall at Column Line R1 From RA to RB From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
26 Wall at Column Line R1 From RB to RC From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
3500 +25,-20
27 Wall at Column Line R1 From RC to RE From 27000 to 34000
(11'-5¾") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
28 Wall at Column Line R1 From RE to RF From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
29 Wall at Column Line R1 From RF to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
30 Wall at Column Line R2 From RA to RC From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-64
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1000 +25,-20
31 Wall at Column Line R2 From RE to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
32 Wall at Column Line R6 From RA to RC From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
33 Wall at Column Line R6 From RE to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
34 Wall at Column Line R7 From RA to RB From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
35 Wall at Column Line R7 From RB to between RC and RD From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
2440 +25,-20
36 Wall at Column Line R7 From between RC and RD to RE From 27000 to 34000
(8'-0") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
37 Wall at Column Line R7 From RE to RF From 27000 to 33000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
38 Wall at Column Line R7 From RF to RG From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
39 Wall at Column Line RA From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
40 Wall at Column Line RB From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
41 Wall between Column Lines RB and RC From R6 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
42 Wall at Column Line RC (Pool Girder) From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-65
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1600 +25,-20
43 Wall at Column Line RE (Pool Girder) From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
44 Wall between Column Lines RE and RF From R6 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
45 Wall at Column Line RF From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(6’-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
46 Wall at Column Line RG From R1 to R7 From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
47 Reactor Cavity Wall (Northeast side) From RC to between RC and RD From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
48 Reactor Cavity Wall (Northwest side) From between RD and RE to RE From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
49 Reactor Cavity Wall (Southeast side) From RC to between RC and RD From 27000 to 34000
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
50 Not used
1000 +25,-20
51 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R2 and R3 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
52 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R2 and R3 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
400 +15,-10
53 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R3 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
54 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R3 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
55 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R3 and R4 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
2.16-66
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
400 +15,-10
56 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R3 and R4 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
57 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R4 and R5 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
58 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R4 and R5 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
59 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R5 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
400 +15,-10
60 IC/PCCS Pool Wall at Column Line R5 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-3¾") (+ ½",-⅜")
470 +15,-10
61 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R5 and R6 From between RB and RC to RC From 27000 to 33000
(1'-6 ½") (+ ½",-⅜")
470 +15,-10
62 IC/PCCS Pool Wall between Column Lines R5 and R6 From RE to between RE and RF From 27000 to 33000
(1'-6 ½") (+ ½",-⅜")
2.16-67
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1000 +25,-20
68 Wall at Column Line R7 From RB to RF From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
69 Wall at Column Line RB From R1 to R7 From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
70 Wall at Column Line RF From R1 to R7 From 34000 to 52000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
4000 +50,-20
71 Basemat excluding Containment Basemat From R1 to R7 and RA and RG -11500
(13'-1½") (2",-¾ ")
600 +15,-10
72 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
600 +15,-10
73 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
74 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant -6400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
600 +15,-10
75 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant -6400
(1'-11 ⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
76 Floor outside Cylinder below RCCV From R1 to R7 and RA and RG -6400
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1"- ¾")
700 +15,-10
77 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northeast Quadrant -1000
(2'-3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
700 +15,-10
78 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Northwest Quadrant -1000
(2' 3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
900 +15,-10
79 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southeast Quadrant -1000
(2'-11½") (+ ½",-⅜")
2.16-68
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
700 +15,-10
80 Floor inside Cylinder below RCCV Southwest Quadrant -1000
(2'-3⅝") (+ ½",-⅜")
1000 +25,-20
81 Floor outside Cylinder below RCCV From R1 to R7 and RA to RG -1000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
82 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 4650
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
83 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 9060
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
84 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 13570
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1600 +25,-20
85 Main Steam Tunnel Floor From RC to RE 17500
(5'-3") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
86 Floor excluding Main Steam Tunnel Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RG 17500
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2400 +25,-20
87 Main Steam Tunnel Roof From RC to RE 27000
(7'-10 ½") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
88 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RC 27000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
89 Floor From R1 to R7 and RE to RG 27000
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
90 Floor From R1 to R7 and RA to RC 34000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
91 Floor From R1 to R7 and RE to RG 34000
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-69
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
700 +15,-10
92 Roof From R1 to R7 and RB to RF 52700
(2'-3⅝") (+½",-⅜")
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-70
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Table 2.16.5-1
Critical Dimensions of Reactor Building – Part 2
Nominal Dimension* Tolerance*
Key Dimension Reference Dimension mm mm
(ft-in) (ft)
Distance from RPV Centreline to Outside Surface of Wall at Column 24500 +/-300
Line RA when Measured at Column Line R1 X1 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Distance from RPV Centreline to Outside Surface of Wall at Column 24500 +/-300
Line RG when Measured at Column Line R1 X2 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Distance from RPV Centreline to Outside Surface of Wall at Column 24500 +/-300
Line R1 when Measured at Column Line RA X3 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Distance from RPV Centreline to Outside Surface of Wall at Column 24500 +/-300
Line R7 when Measured at Column Line RA X4 (Figure 2.16.5-1)
(80'-4 ½") (+/- 1')
Distance from Top of Basemat Outside Containment to Design Plant 16150 +/-300
Grade X5 (Figure 2.16.5-10)
(53'-0") (+/- 1')
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof 48050 +/-300
X6 (Figure 2.16.5-10)
(157'- 7 ¾") (+/- 1')
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-71
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
2.16-72
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
2.16-73
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
2.16-74
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
2.16-75
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
2.16-76
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Table 2.16.5-2
ITAAC For The Reactor Building
13. Doors that connect the RB with the EB Inspections of the doors for RB to EB The doors connecting the RB to EB are
galleries are watertight for flooding of galleries will be conducted. watertight doors.
the galleries up to the ground level
elevation.
14. Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built
and Seismic Category NS Structures, performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic
Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic Category NS SSCs confirm that their
impair the ability of safety-related SSCs Category NS SSCs will not impair the failure will not impair the adequacy and
to perform their safety-related functions. ability of safety-related SSCs to acceptability of safety-related SSCs to
perform their safety-related functions. perform their safety-related functions.
15 Failure of as-built Seismic Category II Inspection and analysis will be Inspection and analysis of as-built
and Seismic Category NS Structures, performed to verify failure of as-built Seismic Category II and Seismic Category
Systems or Components (SSCs) will not Seismic Category II and Seismic NS SSCs confirm that their failure will
impair the ability of RTNSS Criterion B Category NS SSCs will not impair the not impair the adequacy and acceptability
SSCs to function following a seismic ability of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to of RTNSS Criterion B SSCs to function
event. function following a seismic event. following a seismic event.
2.16-77
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2.16-78
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2.16-79
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-80
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2.16-81
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2.16-82
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-83
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-84
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-85
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-86
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-87
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-88
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
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2.16-89
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2.16-90
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.6-1
Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
Wall at Column Line C1 From CA to CD From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
1
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C5 From CA to CD From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
2
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CA From C1 to C5 From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
3
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CD From C1 to C5 From -7400 to 8560 900 +15,-10
4
(2'-11 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C3 From CA to CB From -7400 to -2500 1000 +25,-20
5
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1", ¾")
Wall at Column Line C3 From CC to CD From -7400 to -2500 1000 +25,-20
6
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1", ¾")
Wall at Column Line C1 From CA to CD From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
7
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line C5 From CA to CD From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
8
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CA From C1 to C5 From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
9
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Wall at Column Line CD From C1 to C5 From 9060 to 13100 700 +15,-10
10
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Basemat From C1 to C5 and CA to CD -7400 3000 +50,-20
11
(9'-10") (+2",- ¾")
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD -2000 500 +15,-10
12
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
2.16-91
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Table 2.16.6-1
Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 4650 500 +15,-10
13
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 9060 500 +15,-10
14
(1'-7¾") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Roof From C1 to C5 and CA to CD 13800 700 +15,-10
15
(2'-3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-92
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Table 2.16.6-1
Critical Dimensions of Control Building – Part 2
Nominal Dimension* Tolerance*
Key Dimension Reference Dimension mm mm
(ft-in) (ft)
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line CA to Column 10400 ±300
Line CB when Measured at Column Line C1 X1 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(34'-1 ⅜") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line CD to Column 13400 ±300
Line CB when Measured at Column Line C1 X2 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(43'-11 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line C1 to Column 15150 ±300
Line C3 when Measured at Column Line CA X3 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(49'-8 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line C5 to Column 15150 ±300
Line C3 when Measured at Column Line CA X4 (Figure 2.16.6-1)
(49'-8 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Top of Basemat to Design Plant Grade 12050 ±300
X5 (Figure 2.16.6-5)
(39'-6 ½") (± 1')
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof 9150 ±300
X6 (Figure 2.16.6-5)
(30'-0 ¼") (± 1')
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-93
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Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building
2.16-94
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Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building
2.16-95
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Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building
2.16-96
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Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building
2.16-97
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Table 2.16.6-2
ITAAC For Control Building
2.16-98
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2.16-100
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2.16-101
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2.16-102
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2.16-103
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2.16-104
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2.16-105
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Table 2.16.7-1
Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
3640 +25,-20
1 Wall at Column Line F3 From FA to between FB and FC From -10000 to 3350
(11'-11¼") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
2 Wall at Column Line F3 From between FB and FC to FF From -11500 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
3 Wall at Column Line FA From F1 to F3 From -10000 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
4 Wall at Column Line FF From F1 to F3 From -11500 to 3350
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
4500 +25,-20
5 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FA to FB From -10000 to 4650
(14'- ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
1935 +25,-20
6 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FB to between FB and FC From -10000 to 4650
(6'-4 ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
2000 +25,-20
7 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to -6400
(6'-6 ¾") (+1",- ¾")
Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 (Wall between Cask 1000 +25,-20
8 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to 4650
Pit and Incline Fuel Transfer Tube Pit) (3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
9 Wall between Column Lines F1 and F2 From FE to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
10 Wall at Column Line F2 From between FE and FF to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
1150 +25,-20
11 Wall between Column Lines F2 and F3 From between FB and FC to FC From -10000 to -1300
(3'-9 ¼") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
12 Wall between Column Lines F2 and F3 From FE to FF From -11500 to -7200
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-106
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Table 2.16.7-1
Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
1500 +25,-20
13 Wall between Column Lines FB and FC From between F1 and F2 to F3 From -10000 to 4650
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1500 +25,-20
14 Wall at Column Line FC From F1 to between F1 and F2 From -11500 to 4650
(4'-11") (+1",- ¾")
1000 +25,-20
15 Wall at Column Line FC From between F1 and F2 to F3 From -11500 to 3350
(3'-3 ⅜") (+1",- ¾")
2.16-107
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Table 2.16.7-1
Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 1
Floor Elevation or Concrete Thickness* Tolerance*
Column Line or
Label Wall or Section Description Elevation Range mm mm
Region
(EL: mm) (ft-in) (in)
Floor 800 +15,-10
25 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF -6400
(2'-7 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor 800 +15,-10
26 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF -1000
(2'-7 ½") (+ ½",- ⅜")
Floor (Cask Pit) 1175 +25,-20
27 Not Applicable -1300
(3'-10") (+1",- ¾")
Floor 1300 +25,-20
28 From F1 to F3 and FC to FF 4650
(4'-3 ⅛") (+1",- ¾")
Roof 700 +15,-10
29 From F1 to F3 and FA to FF 22500
(2'- 3 ⅝") (+ ½",- ⅜")
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-108
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Table 2.16.7-1
Critical Dimensions of Fuel Building – Part 2
Nominal Dimension* Tolerance*
Key Dimension Reference Dimension mm mm
(ft-in) (in)
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line FA to Column 21700 +300,-200
Line FC when Measured at Column Line F1 X1 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(71'-2⅜") (+12",-7⅞")
Distance from Outside Surface of Wall at Column Line FF to Column 27300 ±300
Line FC when Measured at Column Line F1 X2 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(89'-6¾") (±12")
Distance between Outside Surface of Walls at Column Lines R7 and F3 21000 +300,-200
when Measured at Column Line FA X3 (Figure 2.16.7-1)
(68'-10¾") (+12",-7⅞")
Distance from Top of Basemat to Design Plant Grade (Basemat 16150 ±300
excluding Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, and Incline Fuel Transfer Tube X4 (Figure 2.16.7-6)
Pit) (52'-11⅞") (±12")
Deleted
Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Roof (Excluding 17850 ±300
Seismic Category-II Portion) X5(Figure 2.16.7-6)
(58'-6¾") (±12")
* SI units are the controlling units and English units are for reference only.
2.16-109
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Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building
2.16-110
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Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building
2.16-111
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Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building
2.16-112
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Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building
2.16-113
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Table 2.16.7-2
ITAAC For The Fuel Building
2.16-114
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2.16-115
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2.16-116
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-117
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-118
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-119
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-120
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26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
2.16-121
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.8-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Building
2.16-122
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Table 2.16.8-1
ITAAC For The Turbine Building
2.16-123
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2.16-124
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Table 2.16.9-1
ITAAC For The Radwaste Building
2.16-125
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Table 2.16.9-1
ITAAC For The Radwaste Building
2.16-126
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2.16-127
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Table 2.16.10-1
ITAAC For The Service Building
2.16-128
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2.16-129
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Table 2.16.11-1
ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building
2.16-130
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Table 2.16.11-1
ITAAC For The Ancillary Diesel Building
2.16-131
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2.16-132
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Table 2.16.12-1
ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1. The Firewater Service Complex (FWSC) Analyses of the FWSC will be The FWSC design conforms to the
is designed to accommodate the dynamic conducted structural design basis loads specified in
and static loading conditions associated the Design Description of Subsection
with the various loads and load 2.16.12 associated with:
combinations that form the structural • Natural phenomena - wind, floods,
design basis. The loads are those tornadoes, tornado missiles,
associated with: earthquakes, rain and snow.
• Natural phenomena—wind, floods, • Normal plant operation—live loads
tornadoes, tornado missiles, and dead loads.
earthquakes, rain and snow.
• Normal plant operation—live loads
and dead loads.
2. Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC Internal flooding analysis of the Internal flooding analysis of the FWSC
is performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11- FWSC will be performed. has been performed using ANSI/ANS
1988 guidelines to ensure protection of 56.11-1988 guidelines to ensure protection
RTNSS equipment. of RTNSS equipment.
3. RTNSS equipment in the FWSC is Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the
located above the maximum flood level equipment in the FWSC will be FWSC is located above the maximum
for that location or is qualified for flood conducted. flood level for that location or is qualified
conditions for flood condition.
2.16-133
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Table 2.16.12-1
ITAAC For The Firewater Service Complex
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
4. The FWSC is protected against external Inspection of the as-built FWSC flood The following as-built FWSC flood
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted. protection features exist:
features are: • Exterior access openings sealed in
• Exterior access openings sealed in external walls below flood and
external walls below flood and groundwater levels.
groundwater levels. • Wall thicknesses below flood level
• Wall thicknesses below flood level designed to withstand hydrostatic
designed to withstand hydrostatic loads.
loads. • Water seals in external walls at pipe
• Water seals in external walls at pipe and electrical penetrations below
and electrical penetrations below flood and groundwater levels.
flood and groundwater levels. • Water stops are provided in all
• Water stops in all expansion and expansion and construction joints
construction joints below design below design basis maximum flood
basis maximum flood and and groundwater levels.
groundwater levels. • Roofs designed to prevent pooling
• Roofs designed to prevent pooling of of large amounts of water in excess
large amounts of water in excess of of the structural capacity of the roof
the structural capacity of the roof for for design loads.
design loads.
5. The FWSC is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built FWSC is constructed in
with the design documents with any of the as-built FWSC will be accordance with the design documents
deviations from the design documents performed. with any deviations reconciled
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built appropriately to demonstrate structural
FWSC structural integrity. integrity.
2.16-134
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2.16-135
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Table 2.16.13-1
ITAAC For The Electrical Building
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1. The Electrical Building (EB) is designed Analyses of the EB will be conducted The EB design conforms to the structural
to accommodate the dynamic and static design basis loads specified in the Design
loading conditions associated with the Description of Subsection 2.16.13
various loads and load combinations that associated with:
form the structural design basis. The • Natural phenomena - hurricane
loads are those associated with: wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and
• Natural phenomena - hurricane snow.
wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and • Normal plant operation - live loads
snow. and dead loads.
• Normal plant operation - live loads
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the EB are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the EB are
surrounded by barriers to protect them equipment in the EB will be surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. conducted. from hurricane wind and missiles.
3. Internal flooding analysis of the EB is Internal flooding analysis of the EB Internal flooding analysis of the EB has
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 will be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
RTNSS equipment. RTNSS equipment.
4. RTNSS equipment in the EB is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the EB
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the EB will be is located above the maximum flood level
location or is qualified for flood conducted. for that location or is qualified for flood
condition. condition.
2.16-136
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Table 2.16.13-1
ITAAC For The Electrical Building
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
5. The EB is protected against external Inspection of the as-built EB flood The following as-built EB flood protection
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted features exist:
features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical
• Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in
penetrations are installed in external external walls below flood and
walls below flood and groundwater groundwater levels.
levels. • Water stops are provided in
• Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints
expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater
below flood and groundwater levels. levels.
6. The EB is constructed in accordance Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built EB is constructed in
with the design documents with any of the as-built EB will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
deviations from the design documents with any deviations reconciled
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built EB appropriately to demonstrate structural
structural integrity. integrity.
2.16-137
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2.16-138
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 2.16.14-1
ITAAC For The Service Water Building
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1. The Service Water Building (SF) is Analyses of the SF will be conducted The SF design conforms to the structural
designed to accommodate the dynamic design basis loads specified in the Design
and static loading conditions associated Description of Subsection 2.16.14
with the various loads and load associated with:
combinations that form the structural • Natural phenomena - hurricane
design basis. The loads are those wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and
associated with: snow.
• Natural phenomena - hurricane • Normal plant operation - live loads
wind, floods, earthquakes, rain and and dead loads.
snow.
• Normal plant operation - live loads
and dead loads.
2. The RTNSS systems in the SF are Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS systems in the SF are
surrounded by barriers to protect them equipment in the SF will be conducted. surrounded by barriers to protect them
from hurricane wind and missiles. from hurricane wind and missiles.
3. Internal flooding analysis of the SF is Internal flooding analysis of the SF Internal flooding analysis of the SF has
performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-1988 will be performed. been performed using ANSI/ANS 56.11-
guidelines to ensure protection of 1988 guidelines to ensure protection of
RTNSS equipment. RTNSS equipment.
4. RTNSS equipment in the SF is located Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment in the SF
above the maximum flood level for that equipment in the SF will be conducted. is located above the maximum flood level
location or is qualified for flood for that location or is qualified for flood
condition. condition.
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Table 2.16.14-1
ITAAC For The Service Water Building
Design Commitment Inspection, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
5. Plant Service Water equipment or other Inspection of the as-built RTNSS The as-built RTNSS equipment that is
equipment designated as RTNSS that is equipment located outdoors will be located outdoors is qualified for flood
located outdoors is qualified for flood conducted. condition and protected from hurricane
condition and protected from hurricane wind and missiles when buried
wind and missiles when buried underground. RTNSS equipment that is
underground. RTNSS equipment that is not buried directly underground is
not buried directly underground is protected by cell enclosures that provide
protected by cell enclosures that provide flooding wind and missile protection.
flooding, wind and missile protection.
6. The SF is protected against external Inspection of the as-built SF flood The following as-built SF flood protection
flooding. The following protection control features will be conducted features exist:
features are: • Water seals at pipe and electrical
• Water seals at pipe and electrical penetrations are installed in
penetrations are installed in external external walls below flood and
walls below flood and groundwater groundwater levels.
levels. • Water stops are provided in
• Water stops are provided in expansion and construction joints
expansion and construction joints below flood and groundwater
below flood and groundwater levels. levels.
7. The SF is constructed in accordance with Inspection and reconciliation analyses The as-built SF is constructed in
the design documents with any of the as-built SF will be performed. accordance with the design documents,
deviations from the design documents with any deviations reconciled
reconciled to demonstrate the as-built SF appropriately to demonstrate structural
structural integrity integrity.
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2.18-1
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2.18-2
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2.19-1
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(14) Intrusion detection systems recording equipment exists to record onsite security alarm
annunciation including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper
indication and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.
(15) Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are alarmed and secured by
locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.
(16) a. The central Alarm Station has conventional (land line) telephone service with the
control room and local law enforcement authorities.
b. The central Alarm Station is capable of continuous communication with security
personnel.
c. Non-portable communications equipment in the Central Alarm Station must remain
operable from an independent power source in the event of the loss of normal power.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 2.19-1 provides a definition of the inspections, tests and analysis, together with associated
acceptance criteria for physical security system.
2.19-2
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Table 2.19-1
ITAAC For The Plant Security
2.19-3
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Table 2.19-1
ITAAC For The Plant Security
2.19-4
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Table 2.19-1
ITAAC For The Plant Security
2.19-5
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Table 2.19-1
ITAAC For The Plant Security
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3.1-1
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Table 3.1-1
ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components
3.1-2
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Table 3.1-1
ITAAC For The Design of Piping Systems and Components
3.1-3
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1d6. The SIP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1d7. The SIP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1d8. The SIP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1d9. The SIP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1e1. The SOMP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1e2. The SOMP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1e3. The SOMP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1e4. The SOMP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1e5. The SOMP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1e6. The SOMP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1e7. The SOMP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1e8. The SOMP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software
projects.
1e9. The SOMP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1f1. The STrngP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1f2. The STrngP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1f3. The STrngP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1f4. The STrngP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1f5. The STrngP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1f6. The STrngP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1f7. The STrngP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1f8. The STrngP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software
projects.
1f9. The STrngP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1g1. The SQAP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1g2. The SQAP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1g3. The SQAP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1g4. The SQAP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1g5. The SQAP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1g6. The SQAP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1g7. The SQAP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1g8. The SQAP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1g9. The SQAP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
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1k6. The STP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1k7. The STP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1k8. The STP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1k9. The STP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
1l1. The CySP is developed for the RTIF software projects.
1l2. The CySP is developed for the NMS software projects.
1l3. The CySP is developed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
1l4. The CySP is developed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
1l5. The CySP is developed for the VBIF software projects.
1l6. The CySP is developed for the GENE DPS software projects.
1l7. The CySP is developed for the PIP software projects.
1l8. The CySP is developed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
1l9. The CySP is developed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2a1. The planning phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the RTIF software projects.
2a2. The planning phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are
completed for the NMS software projects.
2a3. The planning phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are
completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2a4. The planning phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP
are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2a5. The planning phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the VBIF software projects.
2a6. The planning phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are
completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2a7. The planning phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
2a8. The planning phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software projects.
2a9. The planning phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software
plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2b1. The requirements phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the RTIF software projects.
2b2. The requirements phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and the CySP
are completed for the NMS software projects.
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2b3. The requirements phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and the
CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2b4. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and the
CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2b5. The requirements phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the VBIF software projects.
2b6. The requirements phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and the
CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2b7. The requirements phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and the CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
2b8. The requirements phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software projects.
2b9. The requirements phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software projects.
2c1. The design phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and the CySP are
completed for the RTIF software projects.
2c2. The design phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and the CySP are
completed for the NMS software projects.
2c3. The design phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and the CySP
are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2c4. The design phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and the CySP
are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2c5. The design phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and the CySP are
completed for the VBIF software projects.
2c6. The design phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and the CySP
are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2c7. The design phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and the CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
2c8. The design phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and the CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software projects.
2c9. The design phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans
and the CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
2d1. The implementation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP
are completed for the RTIF software projects.
2d2. The implementation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP
are completed for the NMS software projects.
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2d3. The implementation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and
CySP are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2d4. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and
CySP are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2d5. The implementation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP
are completed for the VBIF software projects.
2d6. The implementation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and
CySP are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2d7. The implementation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
2d8. The implementation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Function software projects.
2d9. The implementation phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software
projects.
2e1. The test phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are completed
for the RTIF software projects.
2e2. The test phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are completed
for the NMS software projects.
2e3. The test phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP are
completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects.
2e4. The test phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP are
completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
2e5. The test phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are completed
for the VBIF software projects.
2e6. The test phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP are
completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
2e7. The test phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are completed
for the PIP software projects.
2e8. The test phase activities detailed in the HP CRD software plans and CySP are
completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects.
2e9. The test phase activities detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation Function and CySP are
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation Function software projects.
3a1. The installation phase activities detailed in the RTIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the RTIF software projects.
3a2. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.
3a3. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.
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3b1. The installation phase activities detailed in the NMS software plans and CySP are
completed for the NMS software projects.
3b2. The NMS software projects performs as designed.
3b3. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.
3c1. The installation phase activities detailed in the SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP
are completed for the SSLC/ESF software projects
3c2. The SSLC/ESF software projects performs as designed.
3c3. The SSLC/ESF software projects is cyber secure.
3d1. The installation phase activities detailed in the ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP
are completed for the ATWS/SLC software projects.
3d2. The ATWS/SLC software projects performs as designed.
3d3. The ATWS/SLC software projects is cyber secure.
3e1. The installation phase activities detailed in the VBIF software plans and CySP are
completed for the VBIF software projects.
3e2. The VBIF software projects performs as designed.
3e3. The VBIF software projects is cyber secure.
3f1. The installation phase activities detailed in the GENE DPS software plans and CySP
are completed for the GENE DPS software projects.
3f2. The GENE DPS software projects performs as designed.
3f3. The GENE DPS software projects is cyber secure.
3g1. The installation phase activities detailed in the PIP software plans and CySP are
completed for the PIP software projects.
3g2. The PIP software projects performs as designed.
3g3. The PIP software projects is cyber secure.
3h1. The installation phase activities detailed in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans and CySP are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software projects.
3h2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects performs as designed.
3h3. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is cyber secure.
3i. The complete ESBWR instrumentation and control systems with sensors and
actuators is capable of operating as designed.
3j1. The RTIF software projects performs as designed.
3j2. The RTIF software projects is cyber secure.
3k1. The NMS software projects performs as designed.
3k2. The NMS software projects is cyber secure.
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1a1. The SMP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SMP for the RTIF The SMP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a2. The SMP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SMP for the NMS The SMP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a3. The SMP is developed for the Inspection of the SMP for the SSLC/ESF The SMP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a4 The SMP is developed for the Inspection of the SMP for the ATWS/SLC The SMP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a5. The SMP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SMP for the VBIF The SMP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1a6. The SMP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SMP for the GENE DPS The SMP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a7. The SMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SMP for the PIP software The SMP for PIP software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a8. The SMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SMP for the HP CRD The SMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1a9. The SMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SMP for the ICS DPV The SMP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b1. The SDP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SDP for the RTIF The SDP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-11
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1b2. The SDP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SDP for the NMS The SDP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b3. The SDP is developed for the Inspection of the SDP for the SSLC/ESF The SDP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b4 The SDP is developed for the Inspection of the SDP for the ATWS/SLC The SDP for ATWS/SLC software projects
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b5. The SDP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SDP for the VBIF The SDP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b6. The SDP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SDP for the GENE DPS The SDP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-12
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1b7. The SDP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SDP for the PIP software The SDP for PIP software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b8. The SDP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SDP for the HP CRD The SDP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1b9. The SDP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SDP for the ICS DPV The SDP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c1. The SIntP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SIntP for the RTIF The SIntP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c2. The SIntP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SIntP for the NMS The SIntP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-13
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1c3. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the SSLC/ESF The SIntP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c4. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the ATWS/SLC The SIntP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c5. The SIntP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SIntP for the VBIF The SIntP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c6. The SIntP is developed for the Inspection of the SIntP for the GENE DPS The SIntP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c7. The SIntP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SIntP for the PIP The SIntP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-14
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1c8. The SIntP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SIntP for the HP CRD The SIntP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1c9. The SIntP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SIntP for the ICS DPV The SIntP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d1. The SIP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SIP for the RTIF software The SIP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d2. The SIP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SIP for the NMS software The SIP for NMS software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d3. The SIP is developed for the Inspection of the SIP for the SSLC/ESF The SIP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-15
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1d4. The SIP is developed for the Inspection of the SIP for the ATWS/SLC The SIP for ATWS/SLC software projects
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d5. The SIP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SIP for the VBIF The SIP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d6. The SIP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SIP for the GENE DPS The SIP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d7. The SIP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SIP for the PIP software The SIP for PIP software projects complies
software projects. projects will be performed. with the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d8. The SIP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SIP for the HP CRD The SIP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1d9. The SIP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SIP for the ICS DPV The SIP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-16
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1e1. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the RTIF The SOMP for the RTIF software projects
RTIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e2. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the NMS The SOMP for NMS software projects
NMS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e3. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the SSLC/ESF The SOMP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e4. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the The SOMP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e5. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the VBIF The SOMP for VBIF software projects
VBIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1e6. The SOMP is developed for the Inspection of the SOMP for the GENE The SOMP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. DPS software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e7. The SOMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SOMP for the PIP The SOMP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e8. The SOMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SOMP for the HP CRD The SOMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1e9. The SOMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SOMP for the ICS DPV The SOMP for ICS DPV Isolation
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be Function software projects complies with
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f1. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the RTIF The STrngP for the RTIF software projects
RTIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-18
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1f2. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the NMS The STrngP for NMS software projects
NMS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f3. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the The STrngP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. SSLC/ESF software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f4. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the The STrngP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f5. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the VBIF The STrngP for VBIF software projects
VBIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f6. The STrngP is developed for the Inspection of the STrngP for the GENE The STrngP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. DPS software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-19
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1f7. The STrngP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the STrngP for the PIP The STrngP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f8. The STrngP is developed for the HP Inspection of the STrngP for the HP CRD The STrngP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1f9. The STrngP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the STrngP for the ICS DPV The STrngP for ICS DPV Isolation
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be Function software projects complies with
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SMPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g1. The SQAP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SQAP for the RTIF The SQAP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g2. The SQAP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SQAP for the NMS The SQAP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-20
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1g3. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the SSLC/ESF The SQAP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g4. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the The SQAP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g5. The SQAP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SQAP for the VBIF The SQAP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g6. The SQAP is developed for the Inspection of the SQAP for the GENE DPS The SQAP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g7. The SQAP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SQAP for the PIP The SQAP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-21
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1g8. The SQAP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SQAP for the HP CRD The SQAP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1g9. The SQAP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SQAP for the ICS DPV The SQAP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h1. The SSP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SSP for the RTIF The SSP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h2. The SSP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SSP for the NMS The SSP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h3. The SSP is developed for the Inspection of the SSP for the SSLC/ESF The SSP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-22
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1h4. The SSP is developed for the Inspection of the SSP for the ATWS/SLC The SSP for ATWS/SLC software projects
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h5. The SSP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SSP for the VBIF The SSP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h6. The SSP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the SSP for the GENE DPS The SSP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h7. The SSP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SSP for the PIP software The SSP for PIP software projects
software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1h8. The SSP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SSP for the HP CRD The SSP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-23
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1h9. The SSP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SSP for the ICS DPV The SSP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i1. The SVVP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SVVP for the RTIF The SVVP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i2. The SVVP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SVVP for the NMS The SVVP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i3. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the SSLC/ESF The SVVP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i4. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the The SVVP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-24
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1i5. The SVVP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the SVVP for the VBIF The SVVP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i6. The SVVP is developed for the Inspection of the SVVP for the GENE DPS The SVVP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i7. The SVVP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SVVP for the PIP The SVVP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i8. The SVVP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SVVP for the HP CRD The SVVP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1i9. The SVVP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SVVP for the ICS DPV The SVVP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-25
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1j1. The SCMP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the SCMP for the RTIF The SCMP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j2. The SCMP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the SCMP for the NMS The SCMP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j3. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the SSLC/ESF The SCMP for SSLC/ESF software
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j4. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the The SCMP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software projects will be projects complies with the criteria
performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j5. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the VBIF The SCMP for VBIF software projects
VBIF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-26
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1j6. The SCMP is developed for the Inspection of the SCMP for the GENE The SCMP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. DPS software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j7. The SCMP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the SCMP for the PIP The SCMP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j8. The SCMP is developed for the HP Inspection of the SCMP for the HP CRD The SCMP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1j9. The SCMP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the SCMP for the ICS DPV The SCMP for ICS DPV Isolation
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be Function software projects complies with
projects. performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k1. The STP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the STP for the RTIF The STP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-27
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1k2. The STP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the STP for the NMS The STP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k3. The STP is developed for the Inspection of the STP for the SSLC/ESF The STP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k4. The STP is developed for the Inspection of the STP for the ATWS/SLC The STP for ATWS/SLC software projects
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k5. The STP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the STP for the VBIF The STP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k6. The STP is developed for the GENE Inspection of the STP for the GENE DPS The STP for GENE DPS software projects
DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-28
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1k7. The STP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the STP for the PIP software The STP for PIP software projects
hardware and software projects. projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k8. The STP is developed for the HP Inspection of the STP for the HP CRD The STP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
hardware and software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1k9. The STP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the STP for the ICS DPV The STP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function hardware Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
and software projects. performed. contained in the SQAPM.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l1. The CySP is developed for the RTIF Inspection of the CySP for the RTIF The CySP for the RTIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l2. The CySP is developed for the NMS Inspection of the CySP for the NMS The CySP for NMS software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-29
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1l3. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the SSLC/ESF The CySP for SSLC/ESF software projects
SSLC/ESF software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l4. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the ATWS/SLC The CySP for ATWS/SLC software
ATWS/SLC software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l5. The CySP is developed for the VBIF Inspection of the CySP for the VBIF The CySP for VBIF software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l6. The CySP is developed for the Inspection of the CySP for the GENE DPS The CySP for GENE DPS software
GENE DPS software projects. software projects will be performed. projects complies with the criteria
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} contained in the CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l7. The CySP is developed for the PIP Inspection of the CySP for the PIP The CySP for PIP software projects
software projects. software projects will be performed. complies with the criteria contained in the
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-30
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ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
1l8. The CySP is developed for the HP Inspection of the CySP for the HP CRD The CySP for HP CRD Isolation Bypass
CRD Isolation Bypass Function Isolation Bypass Function software Function software projects complies with
software projects. projects will be performed. the criteria contained in the CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
1l9. The CySP is developed for the ICS Inspection of the CySP for the ICS DPV The CySP for ICS DPV Isolation Function
DPV Isolation Function software Isolation Function software projects will be software projects complies with the criteria
projects. performed. contained in the CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}} {{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a1. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the RTIF software plans and analyzed for the RTIF software conclude that the RTIF software projects
and CySP are completed for the projects. planning phase activities were performed
RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the RTIF software
plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a2. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the NMS software plans and analyzed for the NMS software conclude that the NMS software projects
and CySP are completed for the projects. planning phase activities were performed
NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the NMS software
plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-31
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2a3. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software conclude that the SSLC/ESF software
plans and CySP are completed for projects. projects planning phase activities were
the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a4. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software conclude that the ATWS/SLC software
plans and CySP are completed for projects. projects planning phase activities were
the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a5. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the VBIF software plans and analyzed for the VBIF software conclude that the VBIF software projects
and CySP are completed for the projects. planning phase activities were performed
VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} in compliance with the VBIF software
plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-32
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2a6. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the GENE DPS software and analyzed for the GENE DPS software conclude that the GENE DPS software
plans and CySP are completed for projects. projects planning phase activities were
the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the GENE
DPS software plans and CySP as derived
from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a7. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the PIP software plans and analyzed for the PIP software projects. conclude that the PIP software projects
and CySP are completed for the PIP {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} planning phase activities were performed
software projects. in compliance with the PIP software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2a8. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation and analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation conclude that the HP CRD Isolation
Bypass Function software plans and Bypass Function software projects. Bypass Function software projects
CySP are completed for the HP CRD {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} planning phase activities were performed
Isolation Bypass Function software in compliance with the HP CRD Isolation
projects. Bypass Function software plans and CySP
as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-33
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2a9. The planning phase activities The planning phase outputs are inspected Planning Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation and analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. Function software projects planning phase
are completed for the ICS DPV {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
Isolation Function software projects. with the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b1. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the RTIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the RTIF exist and conclude that the RTIF software
and CySP are completed for the software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
RTIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the RTIF
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b2. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the NMS software plans inspected and analyzed for the NMS exist and conclude that the NMS software
and CySP are completed for the software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
NMS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the NMS
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
3.2-34
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2b3. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF exist and conclude that the SSLC/ESF
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. software projects requirements phase
the SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the SSLC/ESF software plans and
CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b4. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC exist and conclude that the ATWS/SLC
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. software projects requirements phase
the ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the ATWS/SLC software plans and
CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b5. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the VBIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the VBIF exist and conclude that the VBIF software
and CySP are completed for the software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
VBIF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the VBIF
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2b6. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the GENE DPS software inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS exist and conclude that the GENE DPS
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. software projects requirements phase
the GENE DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
with the GENE DPS software plans and
CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b7. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the PIP software plans inspected and analyzed for the PIP exist and conclude that the PIP software
and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects. projects requirements phase activities were
software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the PIP
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2b8. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD exist and conclude that the HP CRD
Bypass Function software plans and Isolation Bypass Function software Isolation Bypass Function software
CySP are completed for the HP CRD projects. projects requirements phase activities were
Isolation Bypass Function software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the HP CRD
projects. Isolation Bypass Function software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2b9. The requirements phase activities The requirements phase outputs are Requirements Phase Summary BRR(s)
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV exist and conclude that the ICS DPV
Function software plans and CySP Isolation Function software projects. Isolation Function software projects
are completed for the ICS DPV {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} requirements phase activities were
Isolation Function software projects. performed in compliance with the ICS
DPV Isolation Function software plans and
CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c1. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the RTIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the RTIF software projects. conclude that the RTIF software projects
are completed for the RTIF software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the RTIF software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c2. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the NMS software plans and CySP analyzed for the NMS software projects. conclude that the NMS software projects
are completed for the NMS software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the NMS software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2c3. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the SSLC/ESF software plans and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software conclude that the SSLC/ESF software
CySP are completed for the projects. projects design phase activities were
SSLC/ESF software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c4. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the ATWS/SLC software plans analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software conclude that the ATWS/SLC software
and CySP are completed for the projects. projects design phase activities were
ATWS/SLC software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the
ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c5. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the VBIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the VBIF software projects. conclude that the VBIF software projects
are completed for the VBIF software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the VBIF software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2c6. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the GENE DPS software plans and analyzed for the GENE DPS software conclude that the GENE DPS software
CySP are completed for the GENE projects. projects design phase activities were
DPS software projects. {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} performed in compliance with the GENE
DPS software plans and CySP as derived
from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c7. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the PIP software plans and CySP analyzed for the PIP software projects. conclude that the PIP software projects
are completed for the PIP software {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} design phase activities were performed in
projects. compliance with the PIP software plans
and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2c8. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the HP CRD Isolation Bypass analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass conclude that the HP CRD Isolation
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. Bypass Function software projects design
are completed for the HP CRD {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} phase activities were performed in
Isolation Bypass Function software compliance with the HP CRD Isolation
projects. Bypass Function software plans and CySP
as derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2c9. The design phase activities detailed The design phase outputs are inspected and Design Phase Summary BRR(s) exist and
in the ICS DPV Isolation Function analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation conclude that the ICS DPV Isolation
software plans and CySP are Function software projects. Function software projects design phase
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation {{Design Acceptance Criteria}} activities were performed in compliance
Function software projects. with the ICS DPV Isolation Function
software plans and CySP as derived from
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
{{Design Acceptance Criteria}}
2d1. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are RTIF software projects implementation
detailed in the RTIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the RTIF phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the RTIF software plans
RTIF software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d2. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are NMS software projects implementation
detailed in the NMS software plans inspected and analyzed for the NMS phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the NMS software plans
NMS software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d3. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are SSLC/ESF software projects
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software inspected and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the
the SSLC/ESF software projects. SSLC/ESF software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-40
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2d4. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are ATWS/SLC software projects
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software inspected and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the
the ATWS/SLC software projects. ATWS/SLC software plans and CySP as
derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
2d5. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are VBIF software projects implementation
detailed in the VBIF software plans inspected and analyzed for the VBIF phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the software projects. compliance with the VBIF software plans
VBIF software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d6. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are GENE DPS software projects
detailed in the GENE DPS software inspected and analyzed for the GENE DPS implementation phase activities were
plans and CySP are completed for software projects. performed in compliance with the GENE
the GENE DPS software projects. DPS software plans and CySP as derived
from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
2d7. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are PIP software projects implementation
detailed in the PIP software plans inspected and analyzed for the PIP phase activities were performed in
and CySP are completed for the PIP software projects. compliance with the PIP software plans
software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-41
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2d8. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation inspected and analyzed for the HP CRD software projects implementation phase
Bypass Function software plans and Isolation Bypass Function software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the HP CRD projects. with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Isolation Bypass Function software Function software plans and CySP as
projects. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
2d9. The implementation phase activities The implementation phase outputs are ICS DPV Isolation Function software
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation inspected and analyzed for the ICS DPV projects implementation phase activities
Function software plans and CySP Isolation Function software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the ICS DPV ICS DPV Isolation Function software plans
Isolation Function software projects. and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e1. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and RTIF software projects test phase activities
the RTIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the RTIF software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the RTIF software RTIF software plans and CySP as derived
projects. from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e2. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and NMS software projects test phase activities
the NMS software plans and CySP analyzed for the NMS software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the NMS software NMS software plans and CySP as derived
projects. from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-42
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2e3. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and SSLC/ESF software projects test phase
the SSLC/ESF software plans and analyzed for the SSLC/ESF software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the projects. with the SSLC/ESF software plans and
SSLC/ESF software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e4. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and ATWS/SLC software projects test phase
the ATWS/SLC software plans and analyzed for the ATWS/SLC software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the projects. with the ATWS/SLC software plans and
ATWS/SLC software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e5. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and VBIF software projects test phase activities
the VBIF software plans and CySP analyzed for the VBIF software projects. were performed in compliance with the
are completed for the VBIF software VBIF software plans and CySP as derived
projects. from SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e6. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and GENE DPS software projects test phase
the GENE DPS software plans and analyzed for the GENE DPS software activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the GENE projects. with the GENE DPS software plans and
DPS software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
2e7. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and PIP software projects test phase activities
the PIP software plans and CySP are analyzed for the PIP software projects. were performed in compliance with the PIP
completed for the PIP software software plans and CySP as derived from
projects. SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-43
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
2e8. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
the HP CRD Isolation Bypass analyzed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass software projects test phase activities were
Function software plans and CySP Function software projects. performed in compliance with the HP CRD
are completed for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software plans
Isolation Bypass Function software and CySP as derived from SMPM,
projects. SQAPM, and CySPP.
2e9. The test phase activities detailed in The test phase outputs are inspected and ICS DPV Isolation Function software
the ICS DPV Isolation Function analyzed for the ICS DPV Isolation projects test phase activities were
software plans and CySP are Function software projects. performed in compliance with the ICS
completed for the ICS DPV Isolation DPV Isolation Function software plans and
Function software projects. CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3a1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the RTIF RTIF software projects installation phase
detailed in the RTIF software plans software projects, including RTIF FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the RTIF Cyber Security FAT, are inspected with the RTIF software plans and CySP as
RTIF software projects. and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3a2. The RTIF software projects performs FAT is performed on the RTIF software RTIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the RTIF software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3a3. The RTIF software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed RTIF software projects is in compliance
secure. for the RTIF software projects. with the RTIF cyber security program
requirements as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-44
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3b1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the NMS NMS software projects installation phase
detailed in the NMS software plans software projects, including NMS FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the NMS Cyber Security FAT, are inspected with the NMS software plans and CySP as
NMS software projects. and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3b2. The NMS software projects performs FAT is performed on the NMS software NMS software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the NMS software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3b3. The NMS software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed NMS software projects is in compliance
secure. for the NMS software projects. with the NMS cyber security program
requirements as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3c1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the SSLC/ESF software projects installation
detailed in the SSLC/ESF software SSLC/ESF software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for SSLC/ESF FAT and SSLC/ESF Cyber compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
the SSLC/ESF software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3c2. The SSLC/ESF software projects FAT is performed on the SSLC/ESF SSLC/ESF software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3.2-45
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3c3. The SSLC/ESF software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed SSLC/ESF software projects is in
cyber secure. for the SSLC/ESF software projects. compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3d1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the ATWS/SLC software projects installation
detailed in the ATWS/SLC software ATWS/SLC software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for ATWS/SLC FAT and ATWS/SLC Cyber compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
the ATWS/SLC software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3d2. The ATWS/SLC software projects FAT is performed on the ATWS/SLC ATWS/SLC software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3d3. The ATWS/SLC software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed ATWS/SLC software projects is in
cyber secure. for the ATWS/SLC software projects. compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3e1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the VBIF VBIF software projects installation phase
detailed in the VBIF software plans software projects, including VBIF FAT activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the and VBIF Cyber Security FAT, are with the VBIF software plans and CySP as
VBIF software projects. inspected and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-46
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3e2. The VBIF software projects performs FAT is performed on the VBIF software VBIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. projects. with the VBIF software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3e3. The VBIF software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed VBIF software projects is in compliance
secure. for the VBIF software projects. with the VBIF CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3f1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the GENE DPS software projects installation
detailed in the GENE DPS software GENE DPS software projects, including phase activities were performed in
plans and CySP are completed for GENE DPS FAT and GENE DPS Cyber compliance with the GENE DPS software
the GENE DPS software projects. Security FAT, are inspected and analyzed. plans and CySP as derived from SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3f2. The GENE DPS software projects FAT is performed on the GENE DPS GENE DPS software projects is in
performs as designed. software projects. compliance with the GENE DPS software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3f3. The GENE DPS software projects is A cyber security FAT will be performed GENE DPS software projects is in
cyber secure. for the GENE DPS software projects. compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3g1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the PIP PIP software projects installation phase
detailed in the PIP software plans software projects, including PIP FAT and activities were performed in compliance
and CySP are completed for the PIP PIP Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and with the PIP software plans and CySP as
software projects. analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-47
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3g2. The PIP software projects performs FAT is performed on the PIP software PIP software projects is in compliance with
as designed. projects. the PIP software plans as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3g3. The PIP software projects is cyber A cyber security FAT will be performed PIP software projects is in compliance with
secure. for the PIP software projects. the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3h1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the HP HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
detailed in the HP CRD Isolation CRD Isolation Bypass Function software software projects installation phase
Bypass Function software plans and projects, including HP CRD Isolation activities were performed in compliance
CySP are completed for the HP CRD Bypass Function FAT and HP CRD with the HP CRD Isolation Bypass
Isolation Bypass Function software Isolation Bypass Function Cyber Security Function software plans and CySP as
projects. FAT, are inspected and analyzed. derived from SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3h2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass FAT is performed on the HP CRD HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects performs Isolation Bypass Function software software projects is in compliance with the
as designed. projects. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3h3. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A cyber security FAT will be performed HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects is cyber for the HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function software projects is in compliance with the
secure. software projects. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP
as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-48
26A6641AB Rev. 10
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3i. The complete ESBWR An overlapping and encompassing SAT is The complete ESBWR instrumentation and
instrumentation and control systems performed on the as-built platforms and control system with sensors and actuators
with sensors and actuators is capable network segments. is capable of operating as designed and is
of operating as designed. in compliance with the software projects
plans and CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM and CySPP.
3j1. The RTIF software projects performs A RTIF software projects SAT is The RTIF software projects is in
as designed. performed. compliance with the RTIF CySP as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3j2. The RTIF software projects is cyber A RTIF software projects cyber security RTIF software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the RTIF CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3k1. The NMS software projects performs A NMS software projects SAT is NMS software projects is in compliance
as designed. performed. with the NMS software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3k2. The NMS software projects is cyber A NMS software projects cyber security NMS software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the NMS CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3l1. The SSLC/ESF software projects A SSLC/ESF software projects SAT is SSLC/ESF software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the SSLC/ESF software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3.2-49
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3l2. The SSLC/ESF software projects is A SSLC/ESF software projects cyber SSLC/ESF software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the SSLC/ESF CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3m1. The ATWS/SLC software projects An ATWS/SLC software projects SAT is ATWS/SLC software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the ATWS/SLC software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3m2. The ATWS/SLC software projects is An ATWS/SLC software projects cyber ATWS/SLC software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the ATWS/SLC CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3n1. The VBIF software projects performs A VBIF software projects SAT is VBIF software projects is in compliance
as designed. performed. with the VBIF software plans as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3n2. The VBIF software projects is cyber A VBIF software projects cyber security VBIF software projects is in compliance
secure. SAT is performed. with the VBIF CySP as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3o1. The GENE DPS software projects A GENE DPS software projects SAT is GENE DPS software projects is in
performs as designed. performed. compliance with the GENE DPS software
plans as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM,
and CySPP.
3.2-50
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3o2. The GENE DPS software projects is A GENE DPS software projects cyber GENE DPS software projects is in
cyber secure. security SAT is performed. compliance with the GENE DPS CySP as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3p1. The PIP software projects performs A PIP software projects SAT is performed. PIP software projects is in compliance with
as designed. the PIP software plans as derived from the
SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3p2. The PIP software projects is cyber A PIP software projects cyber security PIP software projects is in compliance with
secure. SAT is performed. the PIP CySP as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3q1. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects performs software projects SAT is performed. software projects is in compliance with the
as designed. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
software plans as derived from the SMPM,
SQAPM, and CySPP.
3q2. The HP CRD Isolation Bypass A HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function
Function software projects is cyber software projects cyber security SAT is software projects is in compliance with the
secure. performed. HP CRD Isolation Bypass Function CySP
as derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3.2-51
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Table 3.2-1
ITAAC For Software Development
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
3r1. The installation phase activities The installation phase outputs for the ICS ICS DPV Isolation Function software
detailed in the ICS DPV Isolation DPV Isolation Function software projects, projects installation phase activities were
Function software plans and CySP including ICS DPV Isolation Function performed in compliance with the ICS
are completed for the ICS DPV FAT and ICS DPV Isolation Function DPV Isolation Function software plans and
Isolation Function software projects. Cyber Security FAT, are inspected and CySP as derived from SMPM, SQAPM,
analyzed. and CySPP.
3r2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function FAT is performed on the ICS DPV ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects performs as Isolation Function software projects. projects is in compliance with the ICS
designed. DPV Isolation Function software plans as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3r3. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A cyber security FAT will be performed ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects is cyber secure. for the ICS DPV Isolation Function projects is in compliance with the ICS
software projects. DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3s1. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A ICS DPV Isolation Function software ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects performs as projects SAT is performed. projects is in compliance with the ICS
designed. DPV Isolation Function software plans as
derived from the SMPM, SQAPM, and
CySPP.
3s2. The ICS DPV Isolation Function A ICS DPV Isolation Function software ICS DPV Isolation Function software
software projects is cyber secure. projects cyber security SAT is performed. projects is in compliance with the ICS
DPV Isolation Function CySP as derived
from the SMPM, SQAPM, and CySPP.
3.2-52
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.3-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(2) Functional Requirements Analysis (FRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR
HFE Functional Requirements Analysis Implementation Plan and Allocation of Functions
(AOF) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Allocation of Functions
Implementation Plan.
(3) Task Analysis is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Task Analysis
Implementation Plan.
(4) Staffing and Qualifications (S&Q) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Staffing and Qualifications Implementation Plan.
(5) Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Human Reliability Analysis Implementation Plan.
(6) Human-System Interface (HSI) Design is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE
Human-System Interface Design Implementation Plan.
(7) (Deleted)
(8) (Deleted)
(9) Human Factors Verification and Validation (HF V&V) is performed in accordance with the
ESBWR HFE Verification and Validation Implementation Plan.
(10) Design Implementation is performed in accordance with the ESBWR HFE Design
Implementation Plan.
(11) The strategy for the Human Performance Monitoring (HPM) process is developed in
accordance with the ESBWR HFE Human Performance Monitoring Implementation Plan.
(12) Integrated system validation scenarios are developed that incorporate detailed information
related to sampling dimensions, scenario identification, scenario definition, simulation of
remote actions, performance measurement characteristics, performance measurement
selection, performance measurement criteria, test design, and data analysis.
A minimum inventory of human system interfaces (alarms, displays, and controls) needed to
implement the plant’s emergency operating procedures, carry out those human actions shown to
be important from the probabilistic risk assessment, and to bring the plant to a safe condition
were developed using a detailed and comprehensive task analysis process.
To identify tasks that support implementing the emergency operating procedures, the strategies
and actions of the BWROG EPG/SAG, Revision 2 are compared with the ESBWR design. This
comparison is a functional analysis; linking the strategy and task guidance contained in the
BWROG document with the design specifics and system capabilities of the ESBWR.
Tasks that support the completion of risk-important human actions were identified through
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analysis of design basis accidents and the resulting event
strategies, sequences, and actions. Any human action included in these sequences is analyzed in
the context of the ESBWR plant and systems design and operating strategies to determine error
probabilities and consequences. Using ranking methodologies, risk-important human actions and
tasks were identified.
3.3-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Analysis of plant manipulations necessary for achieving and maintaining safe, stable shutdown
following design basis MCR evacuation identified tasks that must be completed at the Remote
Shutdown System (RSS).
These groups of tasks are then analyzed through task analysis to identify the alarms, displays,
and controls that are needed to ensure their successful completion by ESBWR operators. The
resulting list of HSIs is the ESBWR minimum inventory of alarms, displays, and controls.
The results for the MCR HSIs are contained in Table 3.3-1a and the RSS HSIs are contained in
Table 3.3-1b.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 3.3-2 provides a definition of the inspections, test and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for Human Factors Engineering.
3.3-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-1a
Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls
Description Alarm Display Control
Reactor Power X X
Reactor Pressure X X
Reactor Water Level X X
Containment Water Level X
Suppression Pool Level X X
Average Drywell Temperature X X
Suppression Pool Bulk Average Temperature X X
Drywell Pressure X X
Wetwell Pressure X
Containment Isolation Valves X X
Containment Radiation X
Drywell Hydrogen Concentration X X
Wetwell Hydrogen Concentration X X
Drywell Oxygen Concentration X X
Wetwell Oxygen Concentration X X
Isolation Condenser Valves X X
Isolation Condenser Pool Level X X
Shutdown Cooling Initiation X
Passive Containment Cooling Pool Level X X
Gravity Driven Cooling Pool Level X
Gravity Driven Cooling Injection Valves X X
Gravity Driven Cooling Equalization Valves X X
Reactor Scram X X X
Main Steam Isolation X X X
Main Steam Relief Valves X X
Standby Liquid Control Accumulator Level X
Standby Liquid Control Initiation X
Standby Liquid Control Accumulator Isolation Valves X X X
Automatic Depressurization System Inhibit X X
Depressurization Valves X X
Containment High Pressure Nitrogen Status X
Reactor Building Area Temperature High X
3.3-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-1a
Minimum Inventory of MCR Alarms, Displays, and Controls
Description Alarm Display Control
Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Radiation High X X
Reactor Building Area Radiation High X
Reactor Building Area Water Level High X
Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation X X
3.3-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-1b
Minimum Inventory of RSS Alarms, Displays, and Controls
3.3-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-13
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-14
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-15
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-16
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-17
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-18
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.3-2
ITAAC For Human Factors Engineering
3.3-19
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
(1) Plant design provides for containment of airborne radioactive materials, and the ventilation
system ensures that concentrations of airborne radionuclides are maintained at levels
consistent with personnel access needs.
(2) (Deleted)
(3) The plant design provides radiation shielding for rooms, corridors and operating areas
commensurate with their occupancy requirements.
(4) a. (Deleted)
b. (Deleted)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
Table 3.4-1 provides definitions of the inspections, tests and analyses, together with associated
acceptance criteria for ventilation and airborne containment and shielding.
3.4-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.4-1
ITAAC For Radiation Protection
3.4-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.4-1
ITAAC For Radiation Protection
3. The plant design provides Analyses (with inspections) of the Analysis/inspection report(s) demonstrate
radiation shielding for rooms, expected radiation levels in each plant that the maximum expected radiation dose
corridors and operating areas area will verify the adequacy of the rates in each plant area (deep dose
commensurate with their shielding designs. equivalent measured at 30 cm from the
occupancy requirements. source of the radiation, not contact dose
rates) are no greater than the dose rates
specified for the following zones, based on
the access requirements of that area for plant
operation and maintenance.
Zone Max Dose Rate Access
(mSv/hr)1 Requirements
A 0.006 Uncontrolled,
unlimited access
B 0.01 Controlled and
unlimited
access
C 0.05 Controlled and
limited access
(20 hr/week)
3.4-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.4-1
ITAAC For Radiation Protection
3.4-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.4-1
ITAAC For Radiation Protection
3.4-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.5-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.6-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.6-1
ITAAC For The Design Reliability Assurance Program
3.6-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.7-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
• Information ambiguity
• Power supply
• Calibration
• Testability
• Direct measurement
• Control of access
• Maintenance and repair
• Auxiliary supporting features
• Portable instruments
• Documentation of Design Criteria
Qualification criteria
• Type A variables
• Type B variables
• Type C variables
• Type D variables
• Type E variables
• Portable instruments
• Post Event operating time
• Documentation of qualification criteria
Display criteria
• Information characteristics
• Human factors
• Anomalous indications
• Continuous vs. on-demand display
• Trend or rate information
• Display identification
• Type of monitoring channel display
• Display location
• Information ambiguity
• Recording
• Digital display signal validation
3.7-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.7-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.7-1
ITAAC For Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation
3.7-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
3.8-1
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Nuclear Boiler System
Depressurization Valves 8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Safety Relief Valves 10 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Temperature element in
18 CV ESF 72 hr EH
DPV/SRV Discharge
MSIV - Inboard 4 CV PB 100 Days MH
MSIV - Outboard 4 ST PB 100 Days MH
MSIV Drain Bypass Valve 2 ST ESF 72 hr MH
Steam Line Lowpoint Drain
1 TB ESF 72 hr MH
Bypass Valve
Feedwater isolation valve 8 ST, CV PB 100 Days MH
RPV Level Transmitters All RB ESF 100 Days EH
RPV Temperature Elements All CV ESF 100 Days EH
RPV Pressure Transmitter All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Feed Piping Diff Pressure
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Transmitter
Steam Line Flow
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Transmitter
Electrical Modules and CV, RB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable ST, TB
Isolation Condenser System
Isolation Valves 16 CV PB 100 Days MH
Isolation Valves Operator 16 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Condensate Return Valves 4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Condensate Return Valves
4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Operator
3.8-2
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Condensate Return Bypass
4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Valve
Condensate Return Bypass
4 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Valve Operator
Upper Header Vent Valve 8 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Upper Header Vent Valve
8 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Actuator
Lower Header Vent Valve 16 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Lower Header Vent Valve
12 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Actuator
Pool Cross-Connect Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Vent Line Temperature
8 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Element
Condensate Drain
4 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Temperature Element
Steam Piping Diff Pressure
8 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Transmitter
Condensate Drain Diff
8 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Pressure Transmitter
Electrical Modules and
All CV, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Rod Control and Information System
Electrical Modules and
All CB, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Cable
Control Rod Drive System
HCU Scram Solenoid Pilot
135 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valve
FMCRD Passive Holding
269 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Brake
3.8-3
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
FMCRD Separation Switch 538 CV ESF 72 hr EH
Charging Water Header
4 RB ESF 72 hr EH
Pressure Transmitter
Electrical Modules and
All CV, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Cable
High Pressure CRD
Makeup Line Isolation 2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valves
Backup Scram Valve
2 RB ESF 72 hr EH
Solenoids
Leak Detection and Isolation System
CV, RB,
Pressure Transmitters All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
CV, RB,
Temperature Sensors All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
Electrical Modules and CV, RB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
Feedwater Control System
Electric Modules and Cable All CB, RB ESF 72 hr EH
Neutron Monitoring System
Detector and Tube
All CV ESF 72 hr MH
Assembly
Electrical Modules and CV, RB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
Remote Shutdown System
Electrical Panels, Modules
All RB ESF 100 Days C
and Cable
3.8-4
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Safety-Related Distributed Control and Information System (DCIS)
Electrical Modules and
All RB, CB ESF 100 Days C
Cable
Reactor Protection System
Electrical Modules and
All CB, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Diverse Protection System
Electrical Modules and CB, RB,
All ESF, ISOL 100 Days EH
Cable TB
Safety System Logic and Control
Electrical Modules and
All CB, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Standby Liquid Control System
Isolation Check Valves 4 CB, RB PB 100 days MH
Squib Injection Valves 4 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Injection Shut-Off Valves
4 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Actuator
Nitrogen Charging Globe
2 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Valve
Nitrogen Charging Globe
2 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Valve Actuator
Nitrogen Charging Check
2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
Valve
Accumulator
4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Depressurization Valves
Accumulator
Depressurization Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Actuator
Accumulator Relief Valve 2 RB ESF 72 hr MH
3.8-5
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Injection Shut Off Valves 4 RB ESF 100 Days MH
Accumulator Level
8 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Accumulator Pressure
8 RB ESF 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Electrical Modules and
All CV, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Process Radiation Monitoring System
CV, RB,
Isolation Valves 4 ESF 100 Days MH
CB
Radiation Monitors,
CV, RB,
Sensors, Electrical Modules All ESF 100 Days EH
CB
and Cable
Gravity-Driven Cooling System (GDCS)
GDCS Pool Level
12 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
GDCS Squib Valve to
8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
GDCS Pool
GDCS Check Valve to
8 CV ESF 72 hr MH
GDCS Pool
GDCS Squib Valve to
4 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Suppression Pool
GDCS Check Valve to
4 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Suppression Pool
GDCS Squib Valve to
12 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Lower Drywell (DW)
Electrical Modules and CV, RB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable CB
3.8-6
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Fuel and Auxiliary Pools Cooling System
Containment Isolation
Valve (CIV) - Drywell 1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Spray - Outboard
CIV - Drywell Spray -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV – Suppression Pool
Cooling (SPC) Suction - 4 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - SPC Return -
2 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - SPC Return - Inboard 2 CV PB 100 Days MH
CIV - GDCS Suction -
1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - GDCS Suction -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV - GDCS Return -
1 RB PB 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - GDCS Return -
1 CV PB 100 Days MH
Inboard
LPCI Isolation 4 FB, RB PB 100 Days MH
IC/PCCS Pool Level
All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Fuel Pool Level
2 FB ESF 100 Days EH
Instruments
Electrical Modules and CV, FB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB, CB
Reactor Water Cleanup/Shutdown Cooling System
CIV - Mid Vessel - Inboard 2 CV PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-7
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
CIV - Mid Vessel -
2 RB PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - Mid Vessel - Inboard
2 CV ISOL 72 hr EH
Operator
CIV - Mid Vessel -
2 RB ISOL 72 hr EH
Outboard Operator
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 CV PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Inboard
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 RB PB, ISOL 100 Days MH
Outboard
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 CV ISOL 72 hr EH
Inboard Operator
CIV - Bottom Drain
2 RB ISOL 72 hr EH
Outboard Operator
CIV - Process Sampling
2 CV PB, PAMS 100 Days MH
Line -Inboard
CIV - Process Sampling
2 RB PB, PAMS 100 Days MH
Line -Outboard
CIV - Process Sampling
2 CV ISOL, PAMS 100 Days EH
Line -Inboard Operator
CIV - Process Sampling
2 RB ISOL, PAMS 100 Days EH
Line -Outboard Operator
Return Line Shutoff Valve 2 RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Check Valve to Feedwater 4 RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Mid-vessel Flow
All CV ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Mid-vessel Temperature
All CV ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Bottom Drain Flow
All CV ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
3.8-8
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Bottom Drain Temperature
All CV ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Return Line Flow
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Return Line Temperature
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Overboard Flow
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Overboard Temperature
All RB ISOL 100 Days EH
Instrumentation
Electrical Modules and
All CV, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cables
Main Control Room (MCR) Panels
Panels, Modules and Cables All CB ESF 100 Days C
MCR Back Room Panels
Panels, Modules and Cable All CB ESF 100 Days C
Local Panels and Racks
Panels, Modules and Cable All ALL ESF 100 Days EH
Condensate and Feedwater System
Feed Line Temperature
All ST ESF 100 Days EH
Element
Feed Piping Diff Pressure
All ST ISOL 100 Days EH
Transmitter
Electrical Modules and
All ST, CB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Makeup Water System
Isolation Valves All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-9
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Chilled Water System
Isolation Valves All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Service Air System
Isolation Valves All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
High Pressure Nitrogen Supply System
Isolation Valves 4 CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS)
CB, FB,
Cable and Supports All ESF 100 Days EH
RB
Uninterruptible AC Power Supply
Electrical Modules and CV, CB,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB
Direct Current Power Supply
Divisional 250 VDC
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Battery
Divisional 250 VDC
Normal/Standby Battery 12 RB ESF 100 Days E
Charger
Divisional 250 VDC Power
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Center
Divisional 250 VDC
8 RB ESF 100 Days E
Transfer Switch Box
Isolation Power Center
Normal Main Circuit 4 RB ISOL 100 Days E
Breaker
Isolation Power Center
Alternate Main Circuit 4 RB ISOL 100 Days E
Breaker
3.8-10
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Isolation Power Center
Supply Breaker to Division
12 RB ISOL 100 Days E
250 VDC Normal Battery
Charger
Electrical Modules and CV, CB,
All ESF 100 Days E
Cable RB, TB
Raceway System
Electrical Penetrations All CV PB 100 Days EH
CV, CB,
Conduit, Cable Trays and
All RB, TB, ESF 100 Days EH
Supports
FB
Containment System
Vacuum Breakers 3 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Vacuum Breaker Isolation
3 CV ESF 72 hr MH
Valves
Instrumentation and Cables All CV ESF 100 Days EH
Basemat Internal Melt
Arrest Coolability
ALL CV ESF 100 Days EH
(BiMAC) Temperature
Element
BiMAC Temperature
ALL CV ESF 100 Days EH
Switch
Passive Containment Cooling System
Vent Fan Isolation Valves 6 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Passive Containment
6 CV ESF 100 Days EH
Cooling System Vent Fan
Vent Line Catalyst Module 12 CV ESF 100 Days MH
Containment Inerting System
Isolation Valve 0 CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
3.8-11
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Electrical Modules and
All CB, RB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner System
Passive Autocatalytic
All CV ESF 100 Days MH
Recombiners
Containment Monitoring System
Containment Isolation
All CV, RB ISOL 100 Days MH
Valves
Electrical Modules and CB, CV,
All ESF 100 Days EH
Cable RB
Drywell Pressure
All RB ESF 100 days EH
Transmitters
Differential Pressure
All RB ESF 100 days EH
Transmitters
Suppression Pool
All CV ESF 100 days EH
Temperature Element
Lower DW Level
All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitter
Suppression Pool Level
All RB PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitters
Suppression Pool Pressure
All RB PAMS 100 days EH
Transmitters
Hydrogen Analyzers All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Oxygen Analyzers All RB ESF, PAMS 100 days EH
Reactor Building HVAC
Building Isolation Dampers All RB ESF 100 Days EH
Electrical All RB ESF 100 Days EH
3.8-12
26A6641AB Rev. 10
ESBWR Design Control Document/Tier 1
Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Control Building HVAC
Control Room Habitability
Area (CRHA) Supply Air All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
Emergency Filter Unit
(EFU) Downstream All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Restroom Exhaust
All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Smoke Purge Intake
All CB ESF 100 Days E
Isolation Dampers
CRHA Smoke Purge
All CB ESF 100 Days E
Exhaust Isolation Dampers
Emergency Filter Unit
All CB ESF 100 Days E
(EFU)
Electrical Modules and
All CB ESF 100 Days E
Cable
Fuel Building HVAC
Fuel Building General Area
HVAC Subsystem
(FBGAVS) Building All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Supply Air Isolation
Dampers
FBGAVS Building Exhaust
All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Air Isolation Dampers
Fuel Building Fuel Pool
Area HVAC Subsystem
All FB ESF 100 Days EH
(FBFPVS) Building Supply
Air Isolation Dampers
FBFPVS Building Exhaust
All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Air Isolation Dampers
3.8-13
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Table 3.8-1
Electrical and Mechanical Equipment for Environmental Qualification
Required
Components Function Qualification
Location Operation
Quantity Program
(note 5) (note 1) (note 2) Time
(note 4)
(note 3)
Electrical Modules and
All FB ESF 100 Days EH
Cable
Note 1: CV – Containment Vessel
ST – Steam Tunnel
RB – Reactor Building
FB – Fuel Building
CB – Control Building
TB – Turbine Building
OO – Outdoors Onsite
When multiple locations are listed, information in this table applies to equipment in all
locations listed that also meets the other criteria shown.
Note 3: Required operation time refers to the period of time which the equipment must remain
available or operational. Required operation times apply to equipment when all
criteria shown in the first four columns of the table are met.
Note 5: Valve operators/actuators are considered to be part of the valve assembly and are
generally not listed separately in this table.
3.8-14
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
ii. Type tests, or a combination of type ii. The electrical equipment listed in
tests and analyses, will be performed. Table 3.8-1 as located in a harsh
environment is qualified to perform its
safety-related or RTNSS function during
the applicable normal and abnormal
environmental conditions that would
exist before, during, and following a
design basis accident without loss of
safety-related or RTNSS function for the
time required to perform the safety
function.
3.8-15
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
3.8-16
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
3.8-17
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
3.8-18
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
3.8-19
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Table 3.8-2
ITAAC For Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment
3.8-20
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4. INTERFACE MATERIAL
An applicant for a combined license (COL) that references the ESBWR certified design must
provide design features or characteristics that comply with the interface requirements for the
plant design and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) for the site-
specific portion of the facility design, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.80 (a).
Tier 1 interfaces are identified for the conceptual design portion of the Plant Service Water
System for the certified design.
4.1-1
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4.2-2
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5. SITE PARAMETERS
5.1 SCOPE AND PURPOSE
The intent of this section is to provide Tier 1 material that complies with the 10 CFR Part 52
requirements to define the site parameters postulated for the ESBWR certified design.
Assuming the certified design will be referenced for a wide range of sites, it is necessary to
specify a set of site parameters enveloping the conditions that could occur at most potential
power plant sites in the United States. These parameters are provided in Table 5.1-1. It is
intended that any facility that references the certified design will utilize a site where the actual
site-specific conditions are within the defined envelope.
In the case of seismic design and soil parameters not meeting the defined conditions, site-specific
soil-structure interaction analyses may be performed. The results may be used to confirm the
seismic design adequacy of the certified design using approved methods and acceptance criteria.
5.1-1
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Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (1)
Maximum Ground Water Level: 0.61 m (2 ft) below plant grade
(8)
Extreme Wind: Seismic Category I, II and Radwaste Building Structures
- 100-year Wind Speed (3-sec gust): 67.1 m/s (150 mph)
- Exposure Category: D
Other Seismic Category NS Standard Plant Structures
- 50-year Wind Speed (3-sec gust): 58.1 m/s (130 mph)
Maximum Flood (or Tsunami) Level: 0.3 m (1 ft) below plant grade
Tornado: - Maximum Tornado Wind Speed: 147.5 m/s (330 mph)
- Maximum Rotational Speed: 116.2 m/s (260 mph)
- Translational Speed: 31.3 m/s (70 mph)
- Radius: 45.7 m (150 ft)
- Pressure Drop: 16.6 kPa (2.4 psi)
- Rate of Pressure Drop: 11.7 kPa/s (1.7 psi/s)
- Missile Spectrum(7): Spectrum I of SRP 3.5.1.4,
Rev 2 applied to full building
height.
Precipitation (for Roof Design): - Maximum Rainfall Rate: 49.3 cm/hr (19.4 in/hr)
- Maximum Short Term Rate: 15.7 cm (6.2 in) in
5 minutes
- Maximum Ground Snow Load 2394 Pa (50 lbf/ft2)
for normal winter precipitation
event:
- Maximum Ground Snow Load 7757 Pa (162 lbf/ft2)
for extreme winter precipitation
event:
Ambient Design Temperature: 2% Annual Exceedance Values
- Maximum: 35.6°C (96°F) dry bulb
26.1°C (79°F) wet bulb (mean coincident)
27.2°C (81°F) wet bulb (non-coincident)
- Minimum: -23.3°C (-10°F)
1% Annual Exceedance Values
- Maximum: 37.8°C (100°F) dry bulb
26.1°C (79°F) wet bulb (mean coincident)
27.8°C (82°F) wet bulb (non-coincident)
- Minimum: -23.3°C (-10°F)
0% Exceedance Values
- Maximum: 47.2°C (117°F) dry bulb
26.7°C (80°F) wet bulb (mean coincident)
31.1°C (88°F) wet bulb (non-coincident)
- Minimum: -40°C (-40°F)
5.1-2
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Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (continued)
Soil Properties: (6) - Minimum Static Bearing Capacity (2): Greater than or equal to the
maximum static bearing demand.
Maximum Static Bearing Demand:
Reactor/Fuel Building: 699 kPa (14,600 lbf/ft2)
Control Building: 292 kPa (6,100 lbf/ft2)
Fire Water Service Complex: 165 kPa (3,450 lbf/ft2)
- Minimum Dynamic Bearing Capacity (2): Greater than or equal to
the maximum dynamic bearing demand.
Maximum Dynamic Bearing Demand (SSE + Static):
Reactor/Fuel Building:
Soft: 1100 kPa (23,000 lbf/ft2)
Medium: 2700 kPa (56,400 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 1100 kPa (23,000 lbf/ft2)
Control Building:
Soft: 500 kPa (10,500 lbf/ft2)
Medium: 2200 kPa (46,000 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 420 kPa (8,800 lbf/ft2)
Firewater Service Complex (FWSC):
Soft: 460 kPa (9,600 lbf/ft2)
Medium: 690 kPa (14,400 lbf/ft2)
Hard: 1200 kPa (25,100 lbf/ft2)
- Minimum Shear Wave Velocity: (3) 300 m/s (1000 ft/s)
- Liquefaction Potential:
Seismic Category I None under footprint of
Structures Seismic Category I structures
resulting from site-specific
SSE.
- Angle of Internal Friction ≥ 35 degrees
(in-situ and backfill)
- Backfill on sides of and underneath Seismic Category I structures
Product of peak ground acceleration α (in g), Poisson’s ratio ν
and density γ:
α(0.95ν+0.65)γ: 1220 kg/m3 (76 lbf/ft3) maximum
Product of at-rest pressure coefficient k0 and density:
k0γ: 750 kg/m3 (47 lbf/ft3) minimum
Soil density:
γ: 2000 kg/m3 (125 lbf/ft3) minimum
Seismology: - SSE Horizontal Ground Response See Figure 5.1-1
Spectra: (4)
- SSE Vertical Ground Response See Figure 5.1-2
Spectra: (4)
5.1-3
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Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (continued)
Hazards in Site Vicinity: - Site Proximity Missiles and Aircraft: < about 10-7 per year
- Volcanic Activity: None
- Toxic Gases: None *
Maximum Settlement at any corner - Under Reactor/Fuel Building 103 mm (4.0 inches)
of basemat - Under Control Building 18 mm (0.7 inches)
- Under FWSC Structure 17 mm (0.7 inches)
5.1-4
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Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (continued)
Meteorological Dispersion (X/Q): EAB X/Q:
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3
LPZ X/Q:
0-8 hours: 1.90E-04 s/m3
8-24 hours: 1.40E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 7.50E-05 s/m3
4-30 days: 3.00E-05 s/m3
5.1-5
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Table 5.1-1
Envelope of ESBWR Standard Plant Site Parameters (continued)
Meteorological Dispersion (X/Q):
(continued) Technical Support Center X/Q:*
Reactor Building
0-2 hours: 1.00E-03 s/m3 1.00E-03 s/m3
2-8 hours: 6.00E-04 s/m3 6.00E-04 s/m3
3
8-24 hours: 3.00E-04 s/m 3.00E-04 s/m3
3
1-4 days: 2.00E-04 s/m 2.00E-04 s/m3
4-30 days: 1.00E-04 s/m3 1.00E-04 s/m3
Turbine Building
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3 2.00E-03 s/m3
3
2-8 hours: 1.50E-03 s/m 1.50E-03 s/m3
3
8-24 hours: 8.00E-04 s/m 8.00E-04 s/m3
1-4 days: 6.00E-04 s/m3 6.00E-04 s/m3
3
4-30 days: 5.00E-04 s/m 5.00E-04 s/m3
Passive Containment Cooling System / Reactor Building Roof
0-2 hours: 2.00E-03 s/m3 2.00E-03 s/m3
3
2-8 hours: 1.10E-03 s/m 1.10E-03 s/m3
8-24 hours: 5.00E-04 s/m3 5.00E-04 s/m3
3
1-4 days: 4.00E-04 s/m 4.00E-04 s/m3
3
4-30 days: 3.00E-04 s/m 3.00E-04 s/m3
Notes:
(1) The site parameters defined in this table are applicable to Seismic Category I, II, and
Radwaste Building structures, unless noted otherwise.
(2) At the foundation level of Seismic Category I structures. The dynamic bearing pressure is
the toe pressure. The maximum static bearing demand is compared with the site-specific
allowable static bearing pressure, which is obtained by dividing the ultimate soil bearing
capacity by a factor of safety appropriate for the design load combination. The maximum
dynamic bearing demand is compared with the site-specific allowable dynamic bearing
pressure, which is obtained by dividing the ultimate soil bearing capacity by a factor of
safety appropriate for the design load combination. When a site-specific shear wave
velocity is between soft soil and medium soil the larger of the soft or medium maximum
dynamic bearing demand will be used. When a site-specific shear wave velocity is
between medium soil and hard soil the larger of the medium or hard maximum dynamic
bearing demand will be used. Alternatively, for soils with a site-specific shear wave
velocity a linearly interpolated dynamic bearing demand between soft and medium soil or
between medium and hard soil can be used. The shear wave velocities of soft, medium and
hard soils are 300 m/sec (1000 ft/sec), 800 m/sec (2600 ft/sec) and greater than or equal to
1700 m/sec (5600 ft/sec), respectively.
(3) This is the minimum shear wave velocity of the supporting foundation material and
material surrounding the embedded walls associated with seismic strains for lower bound
soil properties at minus one sigma from the mean. The ratio of the largest to the smallest
shear wave velocity over the mat foundation width of the supporting foundation material
does not exceed 1.7.
5.1-6
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(4) Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) design ground response spectra of 5% damping, also
termed Certified Seismic Design Response Spectra (CSDRS), are defined as free-field
outcrop spectra at the foundation level (bottom of the base slab) of the Reactor/Fuel and
Control Building structures. For the Firewater Service Complex, which is essentially a
surface founded structure, the CSDRS is 1.35 times the values shown in Figures 5.1-1 and
5.1-2 and is defined as free-field outcrop spectra at the foundation level (bottom of the base
slab) of the Firewater Service Complex structure.
(5) Settlement values are long-term (post-construction) values except for differential
settlement within the foundation mat. The design of the foundation mat accommodates
immediate and long-term (post construction) differential settlements after the installation
of the basemat.
(6) For sites not meeting the soil property requirements, a site-specific analysis is required to
demonstrate the adequacy of the standard plant design.
(7) Tornado missiles do not apply to Seismic Category NS and Seismic Category II buildings.
For the Radwaste Building, the tornado missiles defined in Regulatory Guide 1.143,
Table 2, Class RW-IIa apply. The hurricane missile spectrum for Seismic Category NS
and Seismic Category II structures that house RTNSS equipment is consistent with the
tornado missile spectrum identified in this table.
(8) Values were selected to comply with expected requirements of southeastern coastal
locations, which include the consideration of hurricanes as described in ASCE 7-02. Wind
speeds are considered to be at 10 m (33 ft) above ground per ASCE 7-02. Seismic
Category NS buildings that house RTNSS equipment are designed to withstand hurricane
Category 5 wind velocity at 87.2 m/s (195 mph), 3-second gust, and missiles generated by
that wind velocity.
5.1-7
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Figure 5.1-1. ESBWR Horizontal SSE Design Ground Spectra at Foundation Level
5.1-8
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Figure 5.1-2. ESBWR Vertical SSE Design Ground Response Spectra at Foundation Level
5.1-9