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Grassroots, Vol.50, No.

I January-June 2016

WAS JINNAH SECULAR, NATIONALIST OR ISLAMIST?


AN ASSESSMENT

Zafar Mohyuddin
Dr.Amjad Abbas Khan
Dr.Kaleem Ullah Bareach

ABSTRACT
Ever since the creation of Pakistan, its founder Muhammad Ali
Jinnah has been debated regarding proclivities of his ideology of a
nation state. His personality has been interpreted very differently by
different scholars, politicians and literati. Likewise, the issue, that
whether a state can have ideology on the pattern of ‘ideology of
Pakistan’ or not, has been deliberated upon. Intellectuals with liberal
leanings argue that Jinnah was a liberal and progressive
constitutionalist in his demeanor and he wanted a liberal democratic and
progressive country in which all citizens could live life in accordance
with their faith without highhandedness from an individual,
organizations or state it-self. On the other hand, the Islamists argue that
Jinnah was a staunch Muslim and he established Pakistan to be a
laboratory of Islam in the world so that international community could
witness principles of Islam in practice. They stress that Pakistan was
created as an Islamic country, meant for Muslims only and livable with
implementation of Sharia alone. The former group holds that Jinnah was
a nationalist and he did not want partition of India on communal lines.
This is corroborated by Jinnah’s acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan in
which Jinnah acceded to an undivided India and that Jinnah only wanted
maximum constitutional securities for the Muslims of India. It was
circumstances and Congress doggedness that caused creation of
Pakistan eventually. The latter group, however, claims that Jinnah
wanted a country to be a ‘citadel of Islam’ and he wanted religion to be
strictly implemented and practiced in it. This is an interesting debate but
unfortunately it has produced serious consequences for the country too.
The present militant struggle for Sharia is derived and exploited on the
basis of the aforementioned debate about the demeanor of Jinnah and
the nature of Pakistan he wanted to establish.
____________________

Keywords: Islamic Ideology, Militant Islam, Sharia, Liberalism, Secularism,


Constitutionalist, Politics of Identity, Muhammad Ali Jinnah

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INTRODUCTION
Ever since Jinnah’s death in 1948, shortly after the birth of the
new state, there has been a tug of war over his legacy. Perhaps the
most contentious issue in Pakistan since its very inception in 1947 is
the nature of the state. Islamists in Pakistan assert that he wanted an
Islamic state. Islamic modernists say that he wanted a modern Islamic
democratic state; some people from the left opine that he was a
communalist who was not a secular because he voiced for Muslim
separatism. But contrarily there are strong arguments that Jinnah was
secular and wanted a secular, progressive Pakistan in which the state
had no mandate to interfere in the personal lives of its citizens.
Jinnah in his early years of politics Jinnah was prominent
nationalist and was very active member of Congress and Home Rule
League. Time and again he battled with communal and anti-secular
tendencies among the Indians and spoke only about one enemy, the
foreign oppressor. Jinnah was elected in 1910, by the Muslims of the
Bombay presidency as a member of Viceroy’s Legislative Council,
defeating Maulvi Rafiuddin who was the president of Bombay
Muslim League (Jaswat Singh, 2011:69). Jinnah joined Muslim
League in 1913 and according to Sarojini Naidu, he was assured by
Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Syed Wazir Hassan, that he will advocate
the Muslim interests but not at the cost of united national cause of
India to which his life was dedicated (Waheed-uz-Zaman, 2001:5).
He was titled as a “best ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity” and
brought both, Indian National Congress and Muslim League on one
platform on the eve of Lucknow Pact in 1916 (Waheed-uz-Zaman,
2001:5). Jinnah’s popularity as a democrat went to heights when
Willingdon’s (Governor of Bombay) tenure ended in November,
1918. Due to Willington’s biases against the representation of
Indians: “Jinnah could hardly wait for that governor to leave”
(Stanley Wolpert, 1984:60). Some Parsi friends of governor had
planned a public function to honour him but Jinnah launched a mass
opposition movement. It was Jinnah’s “first and most vigorous public
demonstration against a British official” (Stanley Wolpert, 1984:60).
More than three hundred youthful followers of Jinnah staged toughest
stand in front of Bombay Town Hall. The commissioner of Police
ordered hall to be cleared and Jinnah as well as Ruttie and their
friends were forced out of hall. He, however, emerged from the town
hall “a uniquely popular Bombay hero” (Stanley Wolpert, 1984:60).
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Jinnah told the thumping audience that night “Gentlemen, you


are the citizens of Bombay. Your triumph today has made it clear that
even the combined forces of bureaucracy and autocracy [emphasis
added] could not overcome you. December the 11th is a Red Letter
Day in the history of Bombay. Gentlemen, go and rejoice over the day
that has secured us the triumph of democracy [emphasis added]”
(M.H.Saiyid, 1945:342). On the same night a huge demonstration was
held in which “no fewer than 65000 rupees were raised” to build
“People’s Jinnah Memorial Hall”2 that stands in the compound of
Bombay’s Indian National Congress Building commemorating the
triumph of people of Bombay in the leadership of Jinnah
(M.H.Saiyid, 1945:342). Jinnah believed in strength of democracy
and he strived for it throughout his life. Moreover, he spared no time
and energies to denounce authoritarianism and autocracy in every
form.
Jinnah left Congress in 1920 and Nehru in his autobiography is
of the view that temperamentally he did not fit in at all with the new
Congress. He was not comfortable with khadi clad crowed debating in
Hindustani language (M.H.Saiyid, 1945:342). The following decade
was dominated by Khilafat movement and Muslim league’s activities
were very much confined. Jinnah reacted to Khilafat movement and
said that “I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious
approach to politics. I part company with the Congress and Gandhi. I
do not believe in working up mob hysteria. Politics is a gentleman’s
game” (Aitzaz Ahsan, 2003:58). Gail Minault (1999) describes this
situation and crisis of leadership of Indian Muslims in these words:
“Efforts to achieve political cooperation between Hindus and
Muslims had always been a part of the Indian nationalist movement.
Prominent Muslims had taken part in the Congress from its inception,
and there were periodic attempts to bring members of the two
communities together politically. The Allahabad conference of Hindu
and Muslim leaders in 1910, the endorsement of ‘suitable’ self-
government by the Muslim League in 1913, and the Lucknow Pact

2
After Jinnah left Congress and led Muslim League for saving exclusively the
rights of Muslims of India and especially after the establishment of Pakistan that
hall is anonymously referred to only by its initials P. J. Hall. Presently few
Indians know that it was built to pay tribute to a great Indian leader, Mohammad
Ali Jinnah.
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are all cases in point. These efforts at rapprochement were undertaken


on the Muslim side by a small group of barristers [emphasis added]
whose cooperation with nationalism was based on devotion to the
principle of self-determination, and whose specialty was
constitutional negotiation to safeguard Muslim rights. The barristers
were now being overshadowed by a group of Muslim leaders who had
been alienated from British rule and whose political style featured
religious appeals in emotional oratory and journalism, rather than
constitutional debates. The barrister-leadership of the Congress was
similarly confronted at this time with a new type of political leader
‘Gandhi’ (Gail Minault, 1999:67).
So it was not so much a change in Jinnah’s attitude that forced
him to take decision of leaving Congress or for that matter politics
altogether; rather a qualitative and radical transformation in Indian
politics after the end of the First World War. The rise of Gandhi to the
supreme leadership of the Congress and his attempts to mobilize the
masses heightened the tension in a plural society. As the Congress
sought to broaden its support base it naturally used Hindu symbols
and slogans to appeal the majority of the Hindus (Gowher Rizvi,
1994:234). Hindu jargons and symbolism was especially encouraged
to convey Congress message effectively to the illiterate masses living
most of the cases in villages. The period of mass mobilization brought
religious revivalism and injected into politics the venom of
communalism. Jinnah realized the dangers of mass mobilization in a
plural society, but was unable to convince Gandhi of these dangers.
Time proved that Jinnah’s approach was realistic and had the
Congress and Gandhi heeded to it, the future of India would have
been different and communalism would not have found path in body-
politic of colonial India.
It was clear to Jinnah that in the environment of politics of
polarization there was a little room for the politics of accommodation.
Jinnah, more than his contemporaries, worked towards a composite
Indian nationalism to accommodate the diverse demands of the
different religious, linguistic, and ethnic groups. He was essentially a
rational, secular constitutionalist who wanted the politics of
consensus (Gowher Rizvi, 1994:234). He was not wedded to any
particular policy but responded to the circumstances depending on the
attitude of the Congress and the policy of the British. The only
consistency in Jinnah’s policy was his commitment to ensure that
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Muslims were treated fairly and that their distinctive cultural and
religious identities were not impaired. Whether Muslim interests
could be best safeguarded within a united India or in separate Muslim
homeland was a matter of tactics. Had he been adamant in creating a
separate country for Muslims, he would not have accepted Cabinet
Mission plan that outlined a United India with federal political
system.
After the second round table conference Jinnah settled in
London. While he was in self- exile in England, his political thinking
and strategy fundamentally transformed. There are various opinions
about the return of Jinnah from England. It is argued by psycho-
analysts that Jinnah was a man of vanity and ego, and he felt each
rejection as an utter humiliation (Stanley Wolpert, 1984:235). In
economist someone wrote that Nehru’s arrogant remarks about Jinnah
as a ‘failed politician’ prompted him to return to India (Waheed-uz-
Zaman, 2001:20). Another important reason was that there was a
large vacuum of Muslim leadership in India after the death of leaders
like Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Sir Muhammad Shafi. They
had will and capacity to lead Muslims but after them Muslim
leadership generally comprised of discredited individuals who did not
have trust of the lead. Jinnah felt that it was right time to fill this gap
(Waheed-uz-Zaman, 2001:20). According to Sikandar Hayat, “the
traditional Muslim leadership, as a whole, failed to produce any far-
sighted leader who could understand the difficulties confronting the
Muslims, rise above sectional concerns, and show them a real way
out” (Sikandar Hayat, 2008:166).
When Jinnah came back to India he changed his strategy. Here
if we look into theory, a politician to qualify as a secular broadly
needs to fulfill certain criteria: not use religion as a tool to appeal the
masses, cater to the interest of the people not because they belonged
to a certain religious community, and resolve communal, religious
issues in a democratic manner. By this criterion, Jinnah was a stanch
secular till 1937. He had opposed the Khilafat movement and was
blamed as an anti-Muslim. The right of separate electorates given to
the Muslim community under the 1909 reforms was characterized by
him as a virus introduced into the body politic of India with evil
design. Since 1937, Jinnah became the leader and sole spokesperson
for the Muslims in India. Jinnah violated the first criterion of a secular
politician and used religion as a tool to appeal the masses to counter
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the mass base of Congress. Ironically this violation trapped him in


such a manner that his image as well as his plan for a democratic and
secular environment for the Muslims of India became controversial
(Ajeet Jawed, 2009:23).
Here are some explanations to the questions that what caused
him to change his secular and Indian nationalist stance and how he
became a mass politician. It is argued that Jinnah realized that there
was no future for him as a leader of the Muslim party if the party did
not improve its standing among the Muslim masses. Muslim League
from its very birth was almost occupied by titled gentry, nawabs,
zamindars and its activities mostly had remained in-door (Jaswat
Singh, 2011:177). Jinnah realized that Muslim League must not
confine to the upper class: to gain success its popularity in Muslim
masses was necessary. He could no longer afford to ignore popular
politics. After the Muslim League’s defeat in 1936-37 elections
Jinnah completely realized that the politics of compromise and
consensus was no longer in vogue, and he must speak from a position
of strength. He reorganized the Muslim League and encouraged the
publication of a series of reports into the discriminations of the
Congress ministries against the Muslims (Gowher Rizvi, 1994:237).
Pirpur Report and Sharif Report are particularly important to be
mentioned here.
At that time the message of nationalism was not effective as a
tool for Jinnah because Gandhi and Nehru had already mobilized the
masses by using the slogan of nationalism. Jinnah decided to tap
religious instead of national sentiment and he did so by raising the cry
of danger at the prospect of Hindu rule under Congress (Gowher
Rizvi, 1994:237). The dangers that Muslims felt in case of Congress
domination were real in nature and Jinnah pressed Congress to
concede genuine safeguards for Muslim community. He wanted a
constitution of India with autonomous and strong provinces. On the
other hand, Congress wanted strong center because Nehru wished
implementation of his socialist ideals. Gradually convinced about the
stubbornness of Congress leadership, Jinnah changed the League into
a well-organized political party of the Muslim masses. If the league
was to become ‘the sole representative body of Muslim India,’ it was
necessary that “his charisma was ‘routinized’ in the League,”
although “Jinnah’s charisma went beyond the institutional apparatus
of the League,” Hayat writes (Sikandar Hayat, 2008:225). That is
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why, “in addition to securing the support of various groups and


interests to the League, Jinnah also planned a mass-mobilization
campaign to give the Muslims at large a cause to identity with and
influence their attitudes and behaviors as both individuals and
collectivity, as a community” (Sikandar Hayat, 2008:225).
The start of Second World War and the course it took changed
the political scene of India massively. British attitude towards Muslim
League also changed because Muslims made up for nearly 40 percent
of the Indian armed forces. The Lahore Resolution, which electrified
the Indian Muslims and provided a powerful ideology for a separate
Muslim homeland, was a tactical move in response to peculiar
circumstances of Indian politics following the outbreak of World War
(Gowher Rizvi, 1994:242). After March 1940, Jinnah took a clear
stance. All his efforts after that day, his speeches, his negotiations,
and his strategic moves were inspired by the idea of a separate
homeland. Towards the end (1940-47) Jinnah became the actual
leader of almost the entire Muslim community of India. He had
started his political career as a champion of Hindu Muslim unity but
ended as a leader of separate Muslim homeland (Jaswat Singh,
2011:414).
It is true that Jinnah did believe in two-nation theory and he
struggled for the creation of an independent homeland of Muslims on
the very basis of this theory. But Jinnah's two-nation theory lacked
clarity; he did not base his theory on the religion alone but also on the
basis of territorial majority. If we examine his statements that only the
Muslims in the Muslim majority provinces of India constituted a
separate nation while the rest of the Muslims in India were not part of
that nation, we can find out the problem in sustaining that theory.
That's why, Jinnah said goodbye to the two-nation theory at the first
opportunity that is on August 11, 1947. Jinnah clearly in his address
to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 expressed his desire
that Pakistan ought not to be a theocratic state. He stated:
“..…in course of time all these angularities of the majority and
minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim
community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans,
Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have
Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on,
will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance
in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but
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for this we would have been free people long ago. No power can hold
another nation and especially a nation of 400 million soles in
subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had
happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any
length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from
this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to
go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of
Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that, has
nothing to do with the business of the State” (Quaid-i-Azam’s
Speech, 1950:4).
A careful study of the above words of Jinnah suggest that he
believed in pluralism and he wished equal rights for all citizens of
Pakistan irrespective of their religious or regional affiliations.
Moreover, he used the word ‘nation’ retrospectively for all citizens of
India.
In the same speech, Jinnah tried to make his message clear in
different words and stated that: “…..every one of you, no matter to
what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you
in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second
and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and
obligations…. Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our
ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to
be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the
religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual,
but in the political sense as citizen of the State” (Quaid-i-Azam’s
Speech, 1950:4).
Jinnah was a perfect secularist as far as his private life was
concerned, he used to drink wine openly before 1937 and later he
continued this privately. He was not a practicing Muslim and there is
an opinion that he probably read only one book about Islam and that
was Muhammadan Law. He supported the special marriage
amendment bill, which sought to provide mixed religions marriages a
legal protection. He also married to a Parsi woman. He could hardly
speak Urdu and often use English in his public speeches. Jinnah was a
secular in his outlook, but at the same time was very much concerned
about the rights of the Muslims. Jinnah accepted separate electorate as
a ‘necessary evil’, a protection of Muslim interests as long as the
Muslim community was backward. As Jinnah summoned up the
Lucknow session of the Muslim League he said “sentimental
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nonsense and emotion have no place in politics” and he is ‘no lover of


sectarian cries’.
Jinnah signed his last will and testament on May 30, 1939
appointing Fatima, Liaquat Ali Khan and his Bombay solicitor
Mahomed Alli Chaiwalla joint executors and trustees of his estates.
“All shares stocks and securities and current accounts now standing in
the name of my sister Fatima Jinnah are her absolute property. I have
given them all to her by way of gifts during my life time and I
confirm the same and she can dispose them of in any manner she
pleases as her absolute property” (Quaid’s speech, May 30, 1939:2).
He also left her his houses and their contents, his cars, and a life time
income of 2000 rupees a month to be paid from his other properties.
To his three other Sisters Jinnah left a living of 100 rupees a month
for each as he did to his brother Ahmed Ali. For his daughter, Jinnah
set apart 200,000 rupees to be invested in order to provide her with a
living “which will at 6% bring in income of 1000/-,” proving that
financially he was most unorthodox in never adopting Islamic strict
prohibition against charging or accepting any interest (Quaid’s
Speech, May 30, 1939:2). It throws light on the fact that Jinnah was a
liberal person in economic matters too besides his personal dealings
and practices.
Jinnah used religion for his political ends. The major slogan
during the struggle for Pakistan was to establish a distinct identity of
Muslims as a nation and Jinnah used Islam as a motivating force to
rally the Muslims to the cause of Pakistan politically. But the state he
aimed to create was to be secular, not a theocracy. It is true that
Jinnah used religion to mobilize Muslim masses but it is also a fact
that religion was not exclusively used by him for political ends in the
sub-continent. Indian National Congress also generously used the
religious symbols of Hindu India. According to Nehru “Gandhi was
essentially a man of religion, a Hindu to the inner-most depths of
being” (Waheed-uz-Zaman, 2001:11). It was his religion and not his
politics which influenced his Hindu followers (Waheed-uz-Zaman,
2001:11). In that environment of religious frenzy, it was not possible
for any community to detach politics from religion. Jinnah and his
associates were forced to use religion as a tactic to mobilize the
people because religion was obvious mean to counter the Congress
stance. The notion of religion was used to create the Muslim
nationhood and to legitimize the demand for separate Muslim state.
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After independence Jinnah realized that the phase of the


Pakistan Movement was over and the tools used in this movement
required modification. The two-nation theory was only relevant in
British India, and now the new state of Pakistan needed the vigor of
the idea of one nation to strengthen its structure (Muhammad Aslam
Syed, 1995:3). Jinnah did not see any dichotomy between Islam and a
modern democratic state (Muhammad Aslam Syed, 1995:3). Both
Iqbal and Jinnah had stressed the egalitarian features of Islam
(Muhammad Aslam Syed, 1995:12). According to Wali Khan, Jinnah
wanted a secular state and that his push for Pakistan was the result of
British manipulation and divide and rule which made him utilize
Islamist rhetoric for the creation of Pakistan (Wali Khan, 2006:173).
Jinnah wanted a secular democratic state, and a theocracy was not in
his mind. However groups such as Jama‘t-i-Islami, under the
leadership of Abul A’la Maududi, wanted some form of Islamic
government which had no room for modern democracy.
So, Jinnah’s policy did not change much, but the objective
conditions did sometimes change. The young Jinnah of 1905 and the
ambassador of Hindu Muslim Unity of 1916 was very much the same
as the Quaid-i-Azam in 1947. After independence, he hoped for unity
between the communities within Pakistan. Jinnah’s above-mentioned
speech of August 11, 1947 is sufficient to prove that Jinnah re-
captured the vision of a state that he had been thinking about
throughout his life. An ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity had not
died in him. He strongly believed in tolerance and coexistence
between various religious communities. But Jinnah’s apprehensions
were to be confirmed in near future when the “common people,
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs of the subcontinent whose freedom it
actually was” had to suffer ignominiously from the pandemonium
created by religious frenzy and communal divide exacerbated by the
poor planning and implementation of partition plan by the British
government (Rabia Umar Ali, 2012:141). While responding to a
question about the nature of state Jinnah wanted to establish in
Pakistan, Syed Jafar Ahmad stated that: “For that matter not only his
[Jinnah’s] words suffice but his personality, life style, and ways of
politics should also be consulted. He studied in the west and he
favored parliamentary style of government. The rights of Muslims
that he demanded were based upon modern concept of right of self-
determination. He did not see Muslims as a tribe but as a modern
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community” (Daily Express, May 21, 2015:16). For Ahmad, “Jinnah


used the concept of two-nation as a political strategy and his 14
August speech explains his philosophy. He gave the example of
Catholics and Protestants becoming one in Britain due to non-
discrimination of the political system there. He stressed that the State
should deal with citizens on equal grounds. Whether he said it in
words or not, he had in his mind the concept of a modern secular
state [emphasis added]” (Daily Express, May 21, 2015:16).

CONCLUSION
To conclude, Jinnah was a secularist who viewed Islam as an
instrument of identity formation and political mobilization for the
Muslims of South Asia. He was a liberal and progressive Muslim who
could not ignore the Muslim rights and interests in British India. An
insightful constitutionalist as he was, Jinnah could imagine a perilous
future of Indian Muslims in a free India with domination of Congress
and Hindus. He made this point repeatedly to congress as well as the
British government that Muslims were in a very special situation in
India and they, accordingly, need some effective constitutional
safeguards. These safeguards could only be ensured in the shape of
autonomous provincial units so that in Muslim majority provinces
they could secure their political and economic interests in a better
manner. The Congress, especially during and in the wake of
developments of WWII, was in a reactionary mood because
throughout the war period, the government had put all Congress
leadership in jails while it conciliated with the Muslims and Jinnah.
Jinnah showed rare quality of a statesman when he accepted the
Cabinet Mission Plan. It was the best available mechanism for India
in a crisis situation but Congress, having once accepted, backed out.
Resultantly, India had to be partitioned and two independent countries
emerged with the withdrawal of British Empire. It is ironical, that
after partition, India moved gradually towards giving provincial
autonomy while Pakistan increasingly drifted towards more and more
centralization. Both countries adopted opposite way from their pre-
partition vision. Had Congress accepted the same vision of
decentralization before, India could have been saved from partition
and its consequences? Jinnah gave a secular road map for the future
constitution in his 11th August speech. Whenever he talked of Islam,
he also talked about the modern notion of the state, constitutionalism,
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civil and political rights and equal citizenship irrespective of religion


or any other consideration. This means that he was neither a supporter
of religious or orthodox Islamic state nor for a secular system in the
classical Marxist terms. His vision was that Pakistan would be a
modern, democratic state which derives its ethical formation from
basic principles of Islam like justice, equality, honesty and tolerance.

REFERENCES
Aitzaz Ahsan, ‘A Case for Secularism: Were Iqbal and Jinnah
Secularists?’, Pakistan Between Secularism and Islam: Ideology Issues
& Conflict (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 2003).
Ajeet Jawed, Secular and Nationalist Jinnah. (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and
Political Mobilization in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1999).
Gowher Rizvi, ‘Quaid-i-Azam and the Demand for Partition’
Politics and Policies of Quaid-i-Azam (Islamabad: National Institute of
Historical and Cultural Research, 1994).
Jaswant Singh, Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence. (Karachi:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
M. H. Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Lahore: S. M. Ashraf,
1945).
Muhammad Aslam Syed, (ed.,) Islam & Democracy in Pakistan.
(Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1995).
Rabia Umar Ali, Empire in Retreat: The Story of India’s Partition
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Sikandar Hayat, The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
Speeches of Quaid-i-Azam in the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan 1947-48 (Karachi: Governor General’s Press and Publications,
1950).
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1984).
The Daily Express, May 21, 2015.
Waheed-uz-Zaman, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Myth
and Reality (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural
Research, 2001).
Wali Khan, Facts are Facts: The Untold Story of India’s Partition,
(Peshawar: Baacha Khan Trust, 2006).
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