Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. Nos. 234435-36. February 06, 2023
G.R. Nos. 234435-36. February 06, 2023
Before us is a Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[2] dated August 2, 2017 and the Resolution [3] dated September 19, 2017 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 28278 and 28279, which convicted then Lantawan, Basial
Municipal Mayor Tahira S. Ismael (Ismael) and Municipal Treasurer Aida U. Ajijon (Ajijon, collectively,
petitioners) under Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3049, [4] as amended, and Section 3.3.1, in
relation to Section 17.2.3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 8291, [5] for non-
remittance of contributions to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Facts
Since 1997, the Municipality of Lantawanin Basilan was distressed with arrearages on unremitted GSIS
premiums. When Ismael assumed office in 2001, the outstanding balance inflated due to accumulated
penalties.[6] Collection letters corresponding to arrears from January 1999 to June 2001 and July 2001 to
February 2003 were sent to the mayor's office, but the obligation remained unsettled. The failure of the
municipality to remit its GSIS contributions also resulted in the suspension of the members' loan
privileges.[7] This prompted then Vice Mayor Felix B. Dalugdugan, along with other municipality officials
and employees, to lodge a complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioners before the
Ombudsmanon June 28, 2004.[8] The Ombudsman, however, charged petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section3(e) of RA No. 3019 and violations of Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4,
Rule III of the IRR of RA No.8291,[9] viz.:
Criminal Case No. 28278
That sometime in July 2001 to February 2003 or prior or subsequent thereto, in the municipality of
Lantawan, Basilan Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, TAHIRA S. ISMAEL and AIDA V. AJIJON (sic), Municipal Mayor and Municipal
Treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Lantawan, Basilan Province, conspiring and confederating
with each other, and committing the offense herein charged in relation to their offices, taking advantage
of their official position, through evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause undue injury to the officials and employees of the Municipal Government of Lantawan by then and
there failing, refusing, with holding and delaying the turnover and remittance of the GSIS premiums and
contributions/amortizations in the aggregate amount of. THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE PESOS and 07/100 ([PHP] 3,118,005.07), deducted and withheld
every month from the monthly compensation of all the officials and employees of the Municipal
Government of Lantawan, Basilan Province, thereby resulting to the suspension of their loan privileges to
the damage and prejudice of the said officials and employees and the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10] (Emphasis in the original)
That sometime in July 2001 to February 2003 or prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Lantawan, Basilan Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
TAHIRA S. ISMAEL AND AIDA U. AJIJON. Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer,
respectively, of the Municipality of Lantawan, Basilan Province, conspiring and confederating with each
other, while in the performance of their functions, taking advantage of their official position, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, FAIL, REFUSE, WITHHOLD and DELAY the turnover
or remittance of the GSIS contributions in the aggregate amount of THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE PESOS and 07/100 ([P]3,118,005.07), deducted and
withheld each month from the monthly compensation of all the officials and employees of the Municipal
Government of Lantawan, Basilan Province.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11] (Emphasis in the original)On August 2, 2017, the Sandiganbayan rendered
the assailed Decision,[12] convicting petitioners as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 28278, [Ismael] and [Ajijon] are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation Section 3 (e) of [RA] No. 3019 and, pursuant to Section 9 thereof, are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one(1) month[,] as minimum[,]
up to ten (10) years[,] as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
2. In Criminal Case No.28279, [Ismael] and [Ajijon] are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3.3.1 of the IRR of [RA] No. 8291 and, pursuant to Section 17.2.3 thereof, are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years[,] as
minimum[,] up to four (4) years[,] as maximum, and a fine of Three Thousand Pesos ([PHP]
3,000.00), with absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing
any profession or calling licensed by the government.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis in the original)Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration [14] was denied in a
Resolution[15] dated September 19, 2017. Hence, this appeal on certiorari,[16] which ultimately seeks
dismissal of the criminal cases. Petitioners attack the validity of the Informations as they alleged
conspiracy, but failed to implead the municipal accountant and budget officer, who are indispensable in
consummating the offenses charged. Petitioners submit that they cannot be expected to discharge their
respective duties in the remittance of the GSIS contributions without the issuance of the certificate of
availability of funds and remittance vouchers by the municipal accountant and budget officer. Hence, for
petitioners, such incomplete allegation in the Informations violated their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them. [17]
Additionally, petitioners argue that their right to speedy disposition of cases was also violated since the
Informations were filed on June 5, 2005, but resolved only on August 2, 2017. [18] They mentioned in
particular the length of time that it took the Sandiganbayan to resolve their Motion for Transfer of
Markings[19] and their formal offer of evidence.[20]
On the merits, petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan in failing to consider the lack of intent on their part to
perpetrate the act upon which the criminal charges were hinged, i.e., the non-remittance of the
municipality's GSIS contributions. Specifically, petitioners maintain that their failure to remit was due to
several factors beyond their control, such as the terrorism activities in the area which disparaged their
municipality for years, the arrearages left by the previous administration which inflated due to penalties,
and the limited resources of the municipality to meet its fiscal demands. For petitioners, these
circumstances warrant their exemption from liability in failing to settle the municipality's GSIS
obligation.[21]
Issues
I.
Whether petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them was
violated;
II.
Whether petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was violated; and
III.
Whether the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted petitioners of: (a) violation of Section3.3.1, in relation to
Section 17.2.3 of the IRR of RA No. 8291; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Ruling
Along with the legal questions on the violation of constitutional rights, underlying issues requiring the
scrutiny of the evidence on record are also presented,which generally are not within the scope of a review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, as discussed below, the Sandiganbayan has decided a
question of substance—it convicted petitioners of corrupt practices—which is not supported by the
evidence on record[22] and not in accord with law and the applicable decisions of the Court, [23] which must
be rectified. Besides, at present,"appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal" [24] which throws the
entire case wide open for review and confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case to examine
records, modify, or even reverse the judgment appealed from, and cite appropriate provisions of the law.
[25]
We, thus, find no hindrance to proceed with this review.
Petitioners claim that the Informations filed against them were insufficient as they alleged conspiracy in
the non-remittance of GSIS contributions, but some conspirators were not impleaded nor their
participation in the alleged conspiracy stated. Specifically, petitioners argue that their failure to remit
GSIS contributions was due to the failure of the municipal accountant and budget officer to first issue
remittance vouchers and certificates of availability of funds; hence, their participation in the alleged
conspiracy is indispensable and must be clearly stated in the Information. Since the Informations did not
contain such significant allegations, petitioners posit that their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the accusations against them was violated.[27]
Petitioners are mistaken.
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not violated if the complaint or
information sufficiently alleges the facts and circumstances constituting the offense. [28] Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provides the necessary allegations to a criminal information, namely: (1) the
accused's name; (2) the stature's designation of the offense; (3) the acts or omissions complained of that
constitute the offense; (4) the offended party's name; (5) the approximate date of the offense's
commission; and (6) the place where the offense was committed. [29] Relatedly, Section 9 of the same Rule
merely requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense be stated in an
ordinary and a concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged and for the court pronounce judgment.
The two Informations against petitioners clearly and sufficiently stated that they were being charged for
their failure to perform their duties as mayor and treasurer to ensure full and timely remittance of the
municipality's GSIS contributions. The indictment of the purported conspirators, as well as a statement of
their part in the alleged conspiracy, is not necessary to sustain the sufficiency of the Informations. It has
long been settled that, "[a] conspiracy indictment need not x x x aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of
conspiracy."[30] So long as the criminal information clearly alleges the acts constituting the offense
specifically imputed against the accused for them to properly prepare their defense, the constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations is not transgressed. [31] In Tan, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, [32] the Court was emphatic in ruling that "an information alleging conspiracy can stand
even if only one person is charged except that the court cannot pass verdict on the co-conspirators who
were not charged in the information."[33]
Besides, the discretion on who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the
evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. Notably,
prosecuting officers enjoy the presumption that they regularly performed their duties, and this can only be
overcome by proof to the contrary,[34] which is not present in this case.
Therefore, non-inclusion of the municipal accountant and budget officer in the indictment is not violative
of petitioners' right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.
Likewise paramount in the administration of justice is the resolution of cases with dispatch. This lends
credence to the truism that justice delayed is justice denied. [35] Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution unequivocally guarantees "[a]ll persons x x x the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial,quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Courts and administrative bodies are
constitutionally-mandated to resolve matters before them with speed and efficiency. [36] The expeditious
resolution of controversies is even more required in criminal cases because an accused is guaranteed the
right to have a speedy trial under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Equally important as these rights,however,is the State's duty and interest in prosecuting charges. In view
of this, the rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial, albeit regarded as sacrosanct, are not
elixirs that guarantee reprieve upon invocation without qualification. Hence, when a case calls for the
determination of whether these rights are violated, the Court is duty-bound to carefully cast a pragmatic
balance between these fundamental interests. To that end, certain principles have been adopted and
developed over time to aid the Court in the intricate task of harmonizing such significant societal
concerns.
In the earlier case of Martin v. Ver,[37] we first adopted the "balancing test" in determining whether a
defendant's right to a speedy trial and/or speedy disposition of cases has been violated based on the
landmark ruling of Barker v. Wingo.[38] The test compels an ad hoc approach, where in the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defense are assessed in light of the four-fold factors, to wit: (1) length of delay;(2)
reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay. In Remulla v. Sandiganbayan,[39] we noted that "[n]one of these
elements x x x is either a necessary or sufficient condition [on their own as] they are related and must be
considered together with other relevant circumstances."[40]
In the more recent case of Cagang v. Sandiganbayan,[41] we laid down definitive guidelines in resolving
issues involving the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases, synthesized as follows:
[I]nordinate delay in there solution and termination of a preliminary investigation violates the accused's
right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in the dismissal of the case
against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether delay is alleged within the periods
provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to have occurred during the given periods, the
burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was
reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the
delay.
The determination of whether the delay was inordinate is not through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Courts
should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a competent and
independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given case.If there has been
delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for such delay and that no
prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation of the accused's constitutional
rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis. [42](Emphasis supplied)Thus, a finding of delay in the
proceedings does not necessarily evince a violation of the right to speedy disposition of a case or speedy
trial to warrant the outright dismissal of the case. Essentially, these rights are relative and flexible
concepts, which require particular regard of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Invocation
of these rights must be consistent with reasonable delay as they are deemed violated only when there is
inordinate delay, such as in proceedings attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; those
unjustifiably postponed; or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having their case tried. [43] As well, it should be noted that, like any other right, the
rights to speedy disposition of cases and speedy trial may be waived. Hence, if proven through
established jurisprudential standards that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can
no longer be invoked.[44]
Here, the Court is mindful of the length of time that it took the Sandiganbayan to dispose of the criminal
cases. But records also show that petitioners were not blameless for the protracted proceedings. The
Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan on June 5, 2005, and as a matter of course,
arraignment, pre-trial, and trial ensued. Petitioners completed their presentation of evidence on July 3,
2008, and were then given 30 days to file its written formal offer of exhibits, while the prosecution was
given 20 days from receipt of the defense's formal offer to file its comment/objection, and thereafter, the
case will be deemed submittted for resolution. [45] However, instead of filing their formal offer of
evidence, petitioners filed a Motion for Transfer of Markings [46] on August 9, 2008, requesting for
Exhibits "7",[47] "8",[48] and "11"[49] to be formally marked since these documents were only
provisionally marked during trial for being mere photocopies. On August 14, 2008, petitioners also
filed a Supplemental Motion (to the Motion for Transfer of Markings), asking for an additional 15
days to file their formal offer of evidence after the marking. Admittedly, more than five years have
elapsed before the Sandiganbayan acted on the motions. In a Resolution [50] dated June 13, 2014, the
Sandiganbayan allowed the marking for Exhibit"8", but Exhibits "7" and "11" were disallowed because
the new copies submitted remained unverifiable. The witness who testified on the denied exhibits was,
nevertheless, allowed to be recalled. The defense, thus, recalled Ajijon to the witness stand on June
30, 2014. The Sandiganbayan then issued an Order [51] on even date, directing the defense to file its
written formal offer of exhibits within 20 days, and the prosecution 20 days from receipt of the defense's
formal offer to file its comment/objection. Petitioners complied and filed their Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits[52] on July 15, 2014. On December 16, 2016, or two years later, the
Sandiganbayan acted upon the formal offer of evidence, and directed the parties to submit their
memoranda within 10 days from notice. [53] Notably, petitioners still asked for additional time to
submit their formal offer of evidence, which was granted. On January 16, 2017, petitioners finally filed
their Memorandum.[54] On the other hand, the prosecution also moved for extension [55] to file its
Memorandum,[56] which it filed on March 7, 2017. On August 2, 2017, the Sandiganbayan rendered the
assailed Decision.
Undeniably, petitioners contributed to the delay in the proceedings in more ways than the prosecution and
the Sandiganbayan did. In as early as July 2008, the case was ready to be submitted for resolution upon
petitioners' compliance with the formal offer of evidence. But petitioners were not ready to file their
formal offer of evidence, and instead, they moved for the formal marking of documents that they
presented during trial in mere photocopies. Clearly, the proximal cause of the delay was petitioners'
failure to present and submit competent copies of their evidence. Petitioners then had the opportunity to
complete their evidence, but still, they were not able to fully submit the evidence they wanted to present
as the documents they submitted remained unverifiable. What is more, despite the fact that the
Sandiganbayan's action on the motions were concededly late for years, the defense still asked for
additional time to comply with those delayed orders. The sense of urgency that petitioners advocate
before this Court is evidently wanting in the proceedings below.
Inasmuch as the delay is mainly attributable to the defense's actions, we have basis to conclude that such
delay did not cause significant prejudice to petitioners' cause to warrant the outright dismissal of the
cases. Prejudice, in reference to the violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial, is
assessed based on the interest of the accused sought to be protected by such rights, i.e., to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration, minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and limit the possibility
that their defense will be impaired. [57] Here, there was no allegation or proof that such interests were
compromised by the delay, except for the extended period of anxiety and embarrassment. Such prolonged
agony, however, is not a veritable ground to tilt the scales of justice in petitioners' favor. [58] Petitioners are
reasonably expected to endure such predicaments of the protracted criminal prosecution since their course
of action engendered it. Moreover, "not every claim of anxiety [or embarrassment] affords the accused a
ground to decry a violation of the rights to speedy disposition of cases and to speedy trial" [59] since such
emotional and social difficulties are typical consequences of criminal indictments. In People v.
Sandiganbayan,[60] we required that the anxiety be shown to be of such "nature and degree that it becomes
oppressive, unnecessary [,] and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge." [61]
There is no such showing in this case. Truth be told, instead of impairing petitioners' cause, the delay
actually afforded the defense opportunities to complete its evidence.
Too, petitioners were fully aware of the delay in the resolution of their motions, but they remained
passive and exerted no meaningful efforts to protect their rights to speedy disposition of cases and/or
speedy trial that they are invoking before this Court for the first time. In this regard, the Court is not
unaware that the silence of the accused during the period of delay cannot be easily construed as a waiver
or surrender of the right to speedy disposition of cases or speedy trial. [62] Indeed, the actual intention to
relinquish the right must be shown.[63] But here, not only did petitioners show no remonstration, they in
fact actively participated in the proceedings by complying with the delayed resolutions/orders without
raising any constitutional infraction against the Sandiganbayan, indicating their acquiescence to the delay.
Petitioners' renunciation of the right is further demonstrated when they asked for. more time to comply
with the Sandiganbayan Order despite it being presently argued as already behind time. In other words,
petitioners were well aware of the delay in the proceedings, but their indifference with the passage of time
is clearly manifested by their actions.
Considering that the delay was mainly attributable to petitioners, their overt acts positively demonstrated
their renunciation of the rights to speedy disposition of case and speedy trial. More importantly, the delay
did not result in any significant prejudice to petitioners, hence, we find that the delay was not arbitrary,
vexatious, or oppressive and seasonably objected to. Therefore, we cannot grant the "radical relief" [64] of
dismissing the criminal cases outright on the ground of inordinate delay. Apropos is our pronouncement
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[65] viz.:
While the Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases, this
constitutional right is not a magical invocation which can be cunningly used by the accused for his or her
advantage. This right is not a last line of remedy when accused find themselves on the losing end of the
proceedings. The State's duty to prosecute cases is just as equally important and cannot be
disregarded at the whim of the accused, especially when it appears that the contention was raised as
a mere afterthought.[66] (Emphasis supplied)We, thus, proceed to the substantive matters.
The Court finds no basis to hold petitioners guilty of corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019, which states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.Parsed from the provision, to convict the accused for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
(2) he [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence: and
(3) his [or her] action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge oi his functions. [67]Discussion on the
second element is particularly pertinent to this case In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan found
that petitioners acted with evident bad faith solely because they failed to discharge their duty to remit
contributions under RA No. 8291, viz.:
In this case, accused Ismael and Ajijon acted with evident bad faith because they were in breach of
their respective sworn duties. In effect, the proximate cause of the non-remittance of the GSIS
contributions can be traced from the failure of accused Ismael, as the Municipal Mayor, to exercise her
power of general supervision and control over all activities of the municipality — particularly, her duty to
ensure that Municipal Accountant Ladja was performing his functions faithfully. Hence, the Court cannot
accept accused Ismael's act of shifting the blame to Municipal Accountant Ladja for not preparing the
vouchers for the remittances of the GSIS contributions.
xxxx
Accused Ismael cannot feign ignorance about the unremitted GSIS contributions x x x. And, despite her
knowledge of the problem, she ignored the advice given to her and chose not to remit the GSIS
contributions. Verily, her failure to act demonstrates her conscious disregard of her duty to enforce the
GSIS law as part of the governance of the municipality, and affirms her omission to comply with her
obligations prescribed therein.
xxxx
In the same vein, accused Ajijon is not blameless. As the Municipal Treasurer, she is duty-bound to
advice the Municipal Mayor about the disbursement of local funds and matters relating to public finance.
Thus, she evaded her duty when she chose to keep mum about the unremitted GSIS contributions, x x x
xxxx
All told, it is the correlative breach of sworn duties consciously committed by both accused Ismael and
Ajijon which paved the way for the municipality to fail to remit the contributions due to the GSIS. [68]
(Emphasis supplied)We disagree.
Sheer failure to discharge a statutory duty does not automatically serve as basis for conviction under
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. As an element of the offense, the prosecution must present proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the officer's act or omission is accompanied with the elements of manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence to justify the conviction. We are reminded of the
consistent teaching in our jurisprudence that errors or omissions committed by public officials, no matter
how evident, are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. [69] Bad faith is never presumed, [70] especially in criminal cases which
have its existence as an element. Despite apparent non-feasance, the accused enjoys the presumption of
innocence and shall remain so until all the elements of the crime charged are proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[71] More specifically, we have consistently held that bad faith is not simple "bad judgment or
negligence."[72]"It is not enough that the accused violated a provision of law," [73] it must be shown that the
accused acted with a malicious motive or ill will. [74] It "contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes." [75]
Jurisprudence even characterized bad faith as having a "palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will." [76] Gross
inexcusable negligence, on the other hand, "does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly the
exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence." [77] The imputed negligence must be "characterized
by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where[in] there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected."[78] "[I]n cases involving public officials[,] it takes place only when
[the] breach of duty is flagrant and devious." [79] Additionally, bad faith or negligence per se are not
enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or the negligence must in the first
place be evident or gross and inexcusable.[80]
Here, no evidence supports the conclusion that evident bad faith or even gross inexcusable negligence
attended such failure. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred in equating petitioners' failure to discharge their
duties under RANo. 8291 to evident bad faith. Neither can such failure be deemed as gross and
inexcusable as contemplated under RA No. 3019. As we have emphasized in Martel v. People,[81]
violations of RA No. 3019, as its title implies, must be grounded on graft and corruption, which entails
dishonest or fraudulent actions for acquisition of gains. Absent a showing of bad faith, gross negligence,
or acts of dishonesty and fraud, petitioners cannot be held liable under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Petitioners are liable under RA No. 8291
The importance of the GSIS fund cannot be emphasized enough. Aside from ensuring the social security
and insurance benefits of government employees, the GSIS fund was created "to serve as a filing reward
for dedicated public service."[82] Hence, it is a declared policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of
the GSIS funds be preserved and maintained at all times [83] to guarantee government employees all the
benefits due them and their dependents. To this end, the law expressly condemns the non-remittance of
fund contributions, which come from both members and employers. In fact, to ensure prompt collection
and remittance of contributions, RA No. 8291 and its IRR penalizes specific persons who fail, refuse or
delay to remit contributions. Section 52(d) and (g) of RA No. 8291 provide:
(d) The treasurer, finance officer, disbursing officer, budget officer or other official or employee who
fails to include in the annual budget the amount corresponding to the employer and employee
contributions, or who fails or refuses or delays by more than thirty (30) days from the time such
amount becomes due and demandable, x x x shall, upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the
penalties of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than
[t]hree thousand pesos ([PHP] 3,000.00) but not more than [s]ix thousand pesos ([PHP] 6,000.00), and in
addition shall suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing
any profession or calling licensed by the government.
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(g) The heads of the offices of the national government, its political subdivisions, branches, agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial
institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the collection of premium
contributions, loan amortization and other accounts due the GSIS who shall fail, refuse or delay the
payment, turnover, remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from
the time that the same shall have been due and demandable shall, upon conviction by final judgment,
suffer the penalties of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than five years and a fine of
not less than [t]en thousand pesos ([PHP] 10,000.00) nor more than [t]wenty thousand pesos ([PHP]
20,000.00), and in addition shall suffer absolute disqualification from holding public office and from
practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government. (Emphases supplied)
Section 17.2.3. The Heads of Offices, Treasurer, Finance Officer, Cashier, Disbursing Officer, Budget
Officer or other official or employee who fails to include in the annual budget the amount corresponding
to the employer and employee contribution; or who fails or refuses to remit or delays remittances by
more than thirty (30) days from the time such amount becomes due and demandable; x x x shall,
upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than [t]hree thousand pesos ([PHP] 3,000[.00 ]) but not more
than [s]ix thousand pesos ([PHP] 6,000[.00]), and in addition shall suffer absolute perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the
government.
xxxx
Section 17.2.6. The heads of the offices of the national government, its political subdivisions, branches,
agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government
financial institutions, and the personnel of such offices who are involved in the preparation of payroll
reflecting deductions and remittance of the same to GSIS, collection of premium contributions, loan
amortization and other accounts due the GSIS who shall fail, refuse or delay the payment, turnover,
remittance or delivery of such accounts to the GSIS within thirty (30) days from the time that these
become due and demandable shall, upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of
imprisonment of not less than [o]ne (1) year nor more than [f]ive (5) years and a fine of not less than [t]en
thousand pesos ([PHP] 10,000[.00]) nor more than [t]wenty thousand pesos ([PHP] 20.000[.00]), and in
addition shall suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing
any profession or calling licensed by the government. (Emphasis supplied)The provision punishes the
failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause to fully and timely remit the required
contributions. These acts are recognized as mala prohibita, and as such, their commission as defined
under the special law, not the character or its effect, determines whether the provision has been violated.
They may not be considered as inherently wrong by the society, but because of the harm that it inflicts on
the community, it can be outlawed in the exercise of the State's police power. In other words, criminal
intent or the intent to perpetrate the crime is not necessary when the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy. Nonetheless, it must be shown that there was an intent to perpetrate the' act or that the
prohibited act was done freely and consciously.[84] Our pronouncements in the recent case of People v.
Talaue[85] (Talaue), is edifying in this regard, viz.:
[F]ailure x x x is an omission of an expected action, occurrence or performance. Refusal, on the other
hand, is the denial or rejection or something offered or demanded. Delay is defined as the act of
postponing or slowing.
While intent to perpetrate the act may be more easily discernible in cases of refusal or delay,
considering that these usually involve a positive act, such intention is not readily apparent in cases of
failure and must be determined from the circumstances of each case, for the intent to fail cannot be
immediately inferred from the mere occurrence of a failure to remit or pay. [86] (Emphasis supplied)Here,
petitioners do not dispute their responsibilities as mayor and treasurer in ensuring the full and timely
remittance of contributions to the GSIS funds. Their failure to discharge such duty during their term of
office is also admitted. They, however, interpose the defense that there was neither criminal intent nor
intent on their part to perpetrate such prohibited act, arguing that certain factors beyond their control
caused such failure despite efforts to settle the municipality's obligation. [87]
For one, petitioners point out that the unsettled obligation already existed and inflated due to accumulated
interests even before petitioners assumed office, [88] which made it more difficult to settle during their
time.[89] They also insist that it was not possible for Ajijon to prepare and issue checks to pay the GSIS
contributions, and there was no disbursement for Ismael to approve [90] since the municipal accountant
failed to issue remittance vouchers and the budget officer failed to issue a certificate of availability of
funds.[91] Such failure to issue vouchers and certificate of availability of funds, in turn, was due to a
shortage of funds caused by: the increase of government share from 9.5% to 12% under RA No. 8291; the
shift in the responsibility of appropriating and paying government share from the Department of Budget
and Management to the municipality; and the years of restoration and rehabilitation of areas devastated by
the lingering terrorist activities since the 1990's, which depleted the municipality coffer. [92]
Petitioners further bank on their efforts to settle the municipality's obligation despite the challenges to
absolve them from liability. They aver that Ismael immediately called a meeting regarding the status of
the GSIS accounts upon being apprised of the arrears. Ismael also instructed her financial consultant, as
well as the municipal accountant, budget officer, Ajijon as treasurer, and the human resource management
officer to reconcile the municipality's records with the GSIS, assess the situation, and prepare the
remittance vouchers.[93] Ismael also personally coordinated with the GSIS in 2003 to reconcile records for
the proper settlement of the obligation.[94] Through such efforts, the municipality and the GSIS forged a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[95] in 2006, wherein it was agreed that: (1) GSIS shall condone 20%
of the interest; (2) the municipality shall pay PHP 2,000,000.00 as down payment upon signing of the
MOA, while the balance shall be paid in installments; (3) GSIS shall lift, the suspension of the members'
loan privileges also upon signing; and (4) the municipality shall remit current GSIS contributions
regularly.
For petitioners, the foregoing circumstances reveal not only the lack of criminal intent, but also their lack,
of intent to perpetrate the prohibited act. Essentially, they argue that insuperable causes prevented them
from performing their duty to ensure remittance of contributions under the GSIS Law, warranting their
exemption from liability.[96]
The Court is not convinced.
We emphasize that petitioners admittedly failed to fully and timely remit GSIS contributions, albeit they
attempted to justify their failure to perform their statutory duty. [97] However, instead of establishing
absolutory causes, petitioners' evidence merely disclosed their reactive and belated efforts in performing
their duty under the law, and proves no more than a string of blame-shifting.[98]
Foremost, the existence of arrearages before their assumption of office cannot excuse them with ease
from performing their duty under the GSIS Law. It is noteworthy that ismael assumed mayorship in 2001,
but their evidence shows that it was only in 2003 when she called for a meeting with the concerned
municipal officers to tackle their GSIS predicament. [99] It was also only in 2003 when Ismael actively
coordinated with the GSIS to pursue a settlement. Records show that from 2001-2003, the municipality
continued to fail in remitting employees' contributions to the GSIS. [100] As for Ajijon, the Sandiganbayan
observed that she was in office ahead of Ismael and was aware of the arrearages, but failed to advise
Ismael of such important matter.[101]
Petitioners then cite the terrorist activities in their area as a major factor that prevented them from making
full remittance of GSIS contributions. Such fact, however, does not suffice since records show that, at the
very least, members' shares were consistently collected from them, but still, those deductions were not
fully remitted,[102] and no proper accounting was given to explain where the unremitted portions
went. That municipality funds were allegedly used for rehabilitation of areas devastated by terrorism is
likewise unacceptable because Section 6(b)[103] of RA No. 8291 categorically states that remittance by the
employer of the contributions to the GSIS takes priority over and above the payment of any and all
obligations, except salaries and wages of its employees. [104] In any case, there is no competent evidence
presented to support petitioners' claim that the GSIS contributions were actually and legally realigned for
other legitimate purposes.
Finally, petitioners cannot simply pass the buck to the municipal accountant and budget officer since the
"[t]he task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is x x x as much a burden and
responsibility of the mayor [and the treasurer] as it is the burden and responsibility of those personnel
who are involved in the collection of premium contributions." [105] Precisely, Congress included in the list
of liable persons each and every officer and personnel concerned in the collections and remittance of
GSIS contributions to create a sense of urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to
their subordinates[106] or colleagues.
Ismael's initiative may have successfully restructured the municipality's obligation with the GSIS through
negotiations which began in 2003, but such belated effort do not justify petitioners' initial non-feasance.
At this point, such settlement finds relevance only to the civil liability of the municipality and of the
accused. As we have held in Talaue, "[c]riminal liability can neither be mitigated nor extinguished by any
arrangement, that the GSIS may enter into with an employer."[107]
As to the penalty, the Sandiganbayan penalized petitioners under Section 3.3.1, [108] in relation to Section
17.2.3[109] of the IRR of RA No. 8291. But Section 3.3.1 speaks of the duly to deduct and withhold
employees' share from their monthly compensation, and there was neither allegation nor proof that this
provision was violated. Rather, petitioners were charged and found liable for their failure to fully and
timely remit GSIS contributions. Hence, we find it apt to clarify the proper penalty to be imposed.
Both Sections 52(d) and (g) of RA No. 8291, in relation to Sections 17.2.3 and Section 17.2.6 of its IRR,
punishes the failure to fully and timely remit GSIS contributions. Notably, these provisions listed specific
persons who may be held liable for such non-remittance. Pertinently, Section 52(d) and Section 17.2.3
include the treasurer as one of the liable persons, and prescribe the penalty of "imprisonment from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than [t]hree thousand pesos ([PHP]
3,000.00) but not more than [s]ix thousand pesos ([PHP] 6,000.00), and in addition shall suffer absolute
perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling
licensed by the government." On the other hand, Section 52(g) and Section 17.2.6 holds heads of offices
of a political subdivision liable, and prescribe a higher penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year nor more than five years and a fine of not less than [t]en thousand pesos ([PHP] 10,000.00) nor more
than [t]wenty thousand pesos ([PHP] 20,000.00), and in addition shall suffer absolute disqualification
from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government."
Thus, the penalty prescribed under Section 52(d), in relation to Section 17.2.3 applies to Ajijon as
treasurer, while that prescribed under Section 52(g), in relation to Section 17.2.6 applies to Ismael as
municipal mayor.
Accordingly, as to Ajijon, the penalty is modified to a period of one year to three years of indeterminate
imprisonment. The imposed fine amounting to PHP 3,000.00, as well as the absolute disqualification
from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government,
stands. As to Ismael, considering her high-ranking position, [110] the penalty of imprisonment from two to
four years imposed by the Sandiganbayan was within the prescribed period under the applicable
provision, but the fine should be increased from PHP 3,000.00 to PHP 10,000.00. The absolute
disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by the
government likewise stands.
One final note. No less than the fundamental law of the land commands accountability from public
officers. Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that "[p]ublic office is a public trust[,]" and
as such, "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people[.]" Public office
comes with burdens and obligations. Those who accept public office subject themselves to all
constitutional and statutory provisions, and pledge under oath to perform all the duties of their office. A
corollary of public accountability is the highest level of transparency. Indubitably, it would take more
than allegations of uncorroborated explanations and blame-shifting to relieve a public officer of liability
in failing to perform a clear statutory duty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated August 2, 2017 and the Resolution dated September 19, 2017 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 28278 and 28279 are MODIFIED as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 28278, petitioners Tahira S. Ismael (Ismael) and Aida U. Ajijon (Ajijon) are
ACQUITTED of the charge under Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 28279, Ajijon is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 52(d) of RA No. 8291, in relation to Section 17.2.3 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, and is thus sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year, as minimum, to three (3) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of PHP 3,000.00. She
shall further suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from
practicing any profession or calling licensed by the government. On (he other hand, Ismael is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 52(g) of RA No. 8291, in relation to Section
17.2.6 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and is thus sentence to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, as minimum, to four (4) years, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of PHP 10,000.00. She shall also suffer the penalty of absolute perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and from practicing any profession or calling licensed by
the government.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J. Lopez and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur
[1]
Rollo, pp. 62-99.
[2]
Id. at 31-60, Penned by Associate Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz, with the concurrence of Associate Justices
Alex L. Quiroz and Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
[3]
See Minutes of the Proceedings; id. at 8-9. Approved by Associate Justices Alex L. Quiroz, Reynaldo
P. Cruz, and Geraldine Faith A. Econg.
[4]
Entitled "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," approved on August 17, 1960.
[5]
Entitled "AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1146, AS AMENDED,
EXPANDING AND INCREASING THE COVERAGE AND BENEFITS OF THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, INSTITUTING REFORMS THEREIN AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on May 30, 1997.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[7]
Id. at 36.
[8]
Id. at 34-35.
[9]
Id. at 46-47.
[10]
Id. at 32.
[11]
Id. at 32-33.
[12]
Id. at 31-60.
[13]
Id. at 58-59.
[14]
Dated August 16, 2017, Id. at 10-26.
[15]
See Minutes of the Proceeding; id. at 8-9.
[16]
See Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari; id. at 62-99.
[17]
Id. at 82-90.
[18]
Id. at 79-82.
[19]
Dated August 9, 2008. Id. at 264-266.
[20]
Dated July 14, 2014. Id. 273-279.
[21]
Id. at 90-97.
[22]
See Saguin v. People. 773 Phil. 614, 623 (2015 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[23]
See Section 6(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[24]
See Section 1, Rule XI of A.M. No. 13-7-05-SB, entitled "2018 REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN. "approved on October 9, 2018.
[25]
See Ramos v. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; People v.
Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; and People v. Dahil, 750
Phil. 212, 225 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[26]
Villarba v. CA, G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66301> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[27]
Rollo, pp. 84-85.
[28]
People v. Manansala, 708 Phil. 66, 68 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].
[29]
Villarba v. CA, G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66301> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
[30]
Inocencio v. People, 772 Phil. 422, 435 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division], citing Lazarte, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475, 494 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
[31]
Inocencio v. People, id.; and People v. Manansala, 708 Phil. 66, 68 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division].
[32]
354 Phil. 463 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division].
[33]
Id. at 471.
[34]
People v. Dumlao, 599 Phil. 565, 588 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
[35]
Central Cement Corporation (now Union Cement Corporation) v. Mines Adjudication Board,
566 Phil. 275, 287-288 (2008) [Per J.R. Reyes, Third Division].
[36]
Id. at 287.
[37]
208 Phil. 658 (1983) [Per J. Plana, En Banc].
[38]
407 U.S. 514 (1972) [Per J. Powell].
[39]
808 Phil. 739 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
[40]
Id. at 748.
[41]
837 Phil. 815 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[42]
Id. at 876-877.
[43]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, (Special Second Division), G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020, 933
SCRA 173, 192 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. See also Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
247982, April 28, 2021, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67381> [Per J. Delos
Santos, En Banc].
[44]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 197-199, citing Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 837 Phil. 815, 873
(2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
[45]
See Order dated July 3, 2008; rollo, pp. 262-263. Penned by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose
R. Hernandez and Roland B. Jurado.
[46]
Id. at 264-266.
[47]
Id. at 218.
[48]
Id. at 239.
[49]
Department of Budget and Management Circular Letters; see id. 264.
[50]
See Minutes of the Proceedings; id. at 270-271. Approved by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose
R. Hernandez, and Maria Cristina J. Cornejo.
[51]
Id. at 272. Penned by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez, and Maria Cristina J.
Corneio.
[52]
Dated July 14, 2014. Id. at 273-279.
[53]
See Minutes of the Proceedings; id. at 281.
[54]
Dated January 13, 2017. Id. at 282-311.
[55]
See Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum dated January 10, 2017 ( id.
at 312-313); and Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum dated
February 1, 2017 (id. at 314-316).
[56]
Dated March 7, 2017. Id. at 317-327.
[57]
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, June 19, 2019, 905 SCRA 427, 448-449 [Per J, A.
Reyes, Third Division].
[58]
Id.
[59]
Id.
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id. at 450.
[62]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838, 851 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
[63]
Figueroa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 235965-66, February 15, 2022,
<https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/235965-rene-c-figueroa-vs-sandiganbayan-special-third-division-office-of-
the-ombudsman-represented-by-the-office-of-special-prosecutor-and-philippine-amusement-and-gaming-
corporation/> [Per J. M. Lopez, First Division] at 8; and De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 694-695
(1938) [Per J. Laurel. En Banc].
[64]
Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 933 (2001) [Per C.J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
[65]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 231144, February 19, 2020, 933 SCRA 173 [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].
[66]
Id. at 176-177.
[67]
Martel v. People, G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2, 2021,
<https://elibrary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67194> [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[68]
Rollo, pp. 50-55.
[69]
Suba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66943> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[70]
Mahilum v. Spouses Llano, 761 Phil. 334, 353 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
[71]
Martel v. People, G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67194> [Per J. Caguioa, En Banc].
[72]
Martel v. People, id.; and Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan. 308 Phil. 660. 693 (1994) [Per J. Vitug, En
Banc].
[73]
Martel v. People, id
[74]
Id.; Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 132 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division]; and Fonacier
v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 660, 693 (1994) (Per J. Vitug, En Banc).
[75]
Martel v. People, id.
[76]
Id.
[77]
Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 132 (2002) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
[78]
Id.
[79]
Id.
[80]
Martel v. People, G R. No. 224720-23. February 2, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67194>[Per J. Caguioa, En Banc]; and
Sistoza v. Desierto, id. at 130.
[81]
Martel v. People, id.
[82]
See Presidential Decree No. 1146, entitled "AMENDING, EXPANDING, INCREASING AND
INTEGRATING THE SOCIAL SECURITY AND INSURANCE BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES AND FACILITATING THE PAYMENT THEREOF UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT
NO. 186. AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on May 31, 1977.
[83]
See Section 39 of RA No. 8291, which provides:
Section 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all times[.]
[84]
People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66777>[Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[85]
Id.
[86]
Id.
[87]
Rollo, pp. 42-45
[88]
Id. at 42-43.
[89]
Id. at 47.
[90]
Id. at 42-43 and 47.
[91]
Id. at 43 and 47.
[92]
Id. at 40-45 and 222 -225.
[93]
Id. at 42-45.
[94]
See letter dated April 10, 2003: id. at 248.
[95]
See Memorandum of Agreement; id. at 256-260.
[96]
Id. at 97.
[97]
See People v. Lumikid, G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66284> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[98]
See People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248632, January 12, 2021.
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66777> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[99]
Rollo, p. 68.
[100]
The Commission on Audit found that the municipality deducted GSIS contributions from its
employees from 2001-2003, but no vouchers were issued for their remittance; id. at 38.
[101]
Id. at 48-49 and 54-55.
[102]
Id. at 239.
[103]
Section 6. Collection and Remittance of Contributions. — x x x (b) Each employer shall remit directly
to the GSIS the employees' and employers' contributions within the first ten (10) days of the calendar
month following the month to which the contributions apply. The remittance by the employer of the
contributions to the GSIS shall take priority over and above the payment of any and all obligations,
except salaries and wages of its employees. (Emphasis supplied)
[104]
See People v. Talaue, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66777> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
[105]
Id.
[106]
Id.
[107]
Id.
[108]
Section 3.3.1. It shall be compulsory upon the Employer to deduct and withhold each month from the
monthly compensation of each Employee his contributions as specified under Section 31[.]
[109]
Section 17.2.3. The Heads of Offices. Treasure, Finance Officer, Cashier, Disbursing Officer, Budget
Officer or other official or employee who fails to include in the annual budget the amount corresponding
to the employer and employee contribution; or who fails or refuses to remit or delays remittances by more
than thirty (30) days from the time such amount becomes due and demandable; or fails to deduct the
monthly contributions of the employee shall upon conviction by final judgment, suffer the penalties of
imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than [t]hree
thousand pesos ([PHP] 3,000[.00]) but not more than [s]ix thousand pesos ([PHP] 6,000[.00]), and in
addition shall suffer absolute perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from practicing
any profession or calling licensed by the government.
[110]
Malalam v. People, 783 Phil. 711, 732 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
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