Labor Law Case Digests J. M.V. Lopez

LABOR LAW
JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 1

BLUE MANILA, INC. V. JAMIAS
G.R. No. 230919 & 230932 20 January 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: An illness which manifested after the seafarer’s contract is compensable. In this
case, Jamias’ Degenerative Disc Disease was contracted after the term of his employment.
The employer is liable for a diagnosed illness deemed existing during the term of the seafarer’s
employment regardless of whether the illness was the immediate cause of the medical
repatriation.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
Jamias worked for Blue Manila since 1998. In February 2011, Jamias was rehired as a Cook
AB under a 6-month contract. After passing the Pre-Employment Medical Examination
(PEME), Jamias boarded M/V Kwintebank. Jamias work as a Cook involved strenuous
manual work such as pushing, lifting and carrying heavy provision on board the vessel. In
August 2011, Jamias suffered pain in his umbilical area. A few days later, he complained of
abdominal pain in the umbilical area. He was brought to a hospital in Norway where he
was diagnosed with constipation and umbilical hernia. Jamias was repatriated on August
24, 2011. On August 25, 2011, the company-designated doctor ordered him to undergo MRI
of the lumbosacral spine.
On September 24, 2011, Jamias had surgery for his umbilical hernia. Despite of this, he
claims that his lower back pain persisted. On November 12, 2011, the company-designated
physician dismissed his lower back pain and declared Jamias fit-to-work. Jamias requested
that his back pain be medically evaluated. On January 2012, Jamias wrote letters reiterating
his request to be medically evaluated. He did not receive any reply prompting him to
consult with a doctor which found that the lower back pain was due to a “central broad-
based disc herniation”, a grade 8 disability. Jamias was declared unfit to resume his
occupation on board the vessel. Thus, Jemias resorted to Voluntary Arbitration and
demanded payment from Blue Manila.
Ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators
The Panel ordered Jamias to submit to an examination by a third doctor. The third doctor
found that the lower back pain was related to Degenerative Disc Disease. After considering
the report, the Panel issued an Award in favor of Jamias for disability benefits.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals set aside the Panel’s award citing that the sole issue for determination
by the third doctor did not satisfy the standard required under the POEA-Standard

Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). The Court of Appeals ordered the compliance of the
POEA-SEC to assess the disability findings. Hence, this recourse before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether the illness of Jamias is compensable?
RULING:
YES. In our jurisdiction, a seafarer may claim disability benefits arising from (1) an injury
or illness that manifests, or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which
is usually while the seafarer is still on board the vessel; or (2) an illness that manifests, or is
discovered after the contract, which is when the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel.
If the illness or injury falls under the first scenario, the procedure as to how the seafarer
can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency under
Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC applies.
Both the PVA and the CA found that while Jamias' umbilical hernia was medically resolved
by the post-repatriation surgery, the seafarer's back ailment was never attended to, by the
company-designated doctor. Jamias was indeed medically repatriated due to his umbilical
hernia, but this does not mean that the post-employment medical assessment and
treatment should be confined to this ailment. There is nothing in Section 20 (A) of the
POEA-SEC, or the CBA that would suggest, not even remotely, that the medical attention
to be extended to the seafarer must only pertain to the cause of repatriation.
Clearly, any illness complained of, and/or diagnosed during the mandatory PEME under
Section 20 (A) is deemed existing during the term of the seafarer's employment, and the
employer is liable therefor. This is true, regardless of whether the existing illness was the
immediate cause of a medical repatriation. Petitioners' liability for Jamias' low back pain
with radiculopathy 2º to Degenerative Disc Disease, L5-S1, was indubitably established after
the third doctor confirmed that he is suffering from this back ailment. Jamias' Degenerative
Disc Disease, or osteoarthritis is an ailment listed as an occupational disease under the
POEA-SEC. Under Section 32-A (21) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, osteoarthritis is considered as
an occupational disease involving the carrying of heavy provision, among others.
In Olidana v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., we explained that the disability gradings under
Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only comes into play if there is a valid and timely medical
report of a company-designated physician. Since there was no complete medical
assessment for Jamias' back ailment issued by the companydesignated physician in this
case, the disability grading to be issued by a third doctor is rendered unnecessary.
The unceremonious issuance of the fit-to-work certification to Jamias, is a complete

abdication of the company-designated physician's statutory obligation to give a complete
and definite medical assessment of the seafarer's medical condition. The law now steps in
and considers these lapses as equivalent to a declaration of permanent and total disability
in favor of the seafarer.

DUSOL V. LAZO
G.R. No. 200555 20 January 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The sharing of gross returns does not establish a partnership, whether the
persons sharing them have a joint or common right in any property from which the returns
were derived. In this case, Pedro and Maricel were not partners despite having a wide leeway
on running the business affairs of Ralco beach and having a share in the profits, as
commission, because the elements of an employer-employee relationship exist.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
On 06 January 1993, Pedro started working as a caretaker of the Ralco beach. Pedro was the
only employee of Ralco beach. He was tasked to clean, watch and secure the beach area as
well as the other properties in the resort. He also entertained guests and occupants, worked
from 5:00am to 9:00pm daily and was given a weekly allowance. Sometime in 1995, Pedro
was also asked to work in the fishpond business of Lazo’s parents but this only lasted for 7
months.
In 2001, Pedro married Maricel, and on January 28, 2007, Maricel was employed by Lazo to
manage the store in the resort. For her services, she was paid P1,000 a month and entitled
to 15% commission. Sometime in July 2008, Lazo notified Pedro and Maricel that he will be
leasing out Ralco beach because the business was not profitable. Thus, their services were
no longer needed. Pedro and Maricel no longer reported to work on July 31, 2008.
Subsequently, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Pedro and Maricel argued that
they were deprived of procedural due process. On the other hand, Lazo argued that the two
were industrial partners.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Pedro and
Maricel proved that they were employees of Lazo. It was not shown the Lazo controlled or
reserved the right to control not only the ends achieved, but also the manner they
performed the duties.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On appeal, the NLRC ruled that Lazo employed Pedro and Maricel. Lazo’s control is
manifest because Pedro and Maricel did not undertake other independent productive
activities. NLRC also ruled that there was no business partnership as there was no parity of
standing between the parties.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC’s Resolution. The CA
found that no control existed on the part of Lazo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Pedro and Maricel are employees or partners?
RULING:
Employees. On one hand, there is a partnership if two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing
the profits among themselves. A particular partnership may have for its object a particular
undertaking. The existence of a partnership is established when it is shown that: (1) two or
more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common
fund; and (2) they intend to divide the profits among themselves.
Undoubtedly, the best evidence to prove the existence of a partnership is the contract or
articles of partnership. Nevertheless, in its absence, its existence can be established by
circumstantial evidence. Under Article 1769 of the Civil Code, "the receipt by a person of a
share of the profits of a business is a prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the
business, [but] no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment
as wages of an employee [or rent to a landlord]." In addition, "the sharing of gross returns
does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a
joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived."
On the other hand, an employee is any person in the service of another under a contract
for hire, express, or implied, oral or written. To determine whether an employment
relationship exists, the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The most important element is the
employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be
done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. However, the power of control
refers merely to the existence of the power, and not to the actual exercise thereof. No
particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be
admitted. However, a finding that such relationship exists must still rest on some
substantial evidence.
Here, it is undisputed that Pedro and Maricel rendered their services in Ralco Beach and
received compensation sourced from rentals and sales of the resort.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL V. PANGA-VEGA
G.R. No. 228236 27 January 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: A woman employed in the government service may opt to totally or partially
consume the 2 months special leave benefit granted under the Magna Carta for Women. In
this case, Panga-Vega availed of the special leave benefit to undergo hysterectomy but
returned to work four weeks after the procedure with a medical certificate. The employee is
not required to exhaust the full 2 months and when the employee returns to work before the
expiration of her special leave, she may receive both the benefits granted under the maternity
leave law and the salary for actual services rendered effective the day she reports for work.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
On 02 February 2011, Panga-Vega, then Secretary of HRET, requested to avail of the special
benefit leave under the Magna Carta for Women. On the next day, the HRET approved her
request for special leave not exceeding 2 months. On 07 February 2011, Panga-Vega
underwent total hysterectomy. On 07 March 2011, Panga-Vega informed HRET that she was
reassuming her duties and functions. She presented a medical certificate declaring that she
is fit to work.
On 10 March 2011, HRET resolved and directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2 months
special leave. On 14 March 2011, Panga-Vega sought reconsideration of the HRET resolution
which was denied by HRET on 24 March 2011. On 13 April 2011, Panga-Vega filed an appeal
before the Civil Service Commission assailing the HRET Resolutions.
Ruling of the CSC
On 09 October 2012, CSC issued a Decision granting the appeal of Panga-Vega ruling that
she only needed to present a medical certificate attesting her physical fitness to return to
work and need not exhaust the full leave granted under the Magna Carta for Women. HRET
filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals after its reconsideration was denied.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC’s decision that Panga-Vega may opt
not to consume the full leave she applied for upon her submission of the medical certificate.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the full special benefit granted under the Magna Carta for Women should
be consumed before return to work?

RULING:
No. Section 18 of RA No. 9710 entitles a woman, who has rendered a continuous aggregate
employment service of at least six months for the last 12 months, a special leave of two
months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused
by gynecological disorders. In relation to this provision, the case involving Panga-Vega
gives rise to the issue of whether the rules on maternity leave under Sec. 14, Rule XVI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, which provides that the
commuted money value of the unexpired portion of the special leave need not be refunded,
and that when the employee returns to work before the expiration of her special leave, she
may receive both the benefits granted under the maternity leave law and the salary for
actual services rendered effective the day she reports for work, may have a suppletory
application.
The Court finds it just and more in accord with the spirit and intent of RA No. 9710 to
suppletorily apply the rule on maternity leave to the special leave benefit. Similar to the
special leave benefit under RA No. 9710, a maternity leave under the Omnibus Rules on
Leave seeks to protect the health and welfare of women, specifically of working mothers,
as its primary purpose is to afford them some measures of financial aid, and to grant them
a period of rest and recuperation in connection with their pregnancies. The special leave
benefit should be liberally interpreted to support the female employee so as to give her
further means to afford her needs, may it be gynecological, physical, or psychological, for
a holistic recuperation. The recovery period may be a trying time that she needs much
assistance and compassion to regain her overall wellness. Nothing in RA No. 9710 and the
CSC Guidelines bar this more humane interpretation of the provision on special leave
benefit.
Anent Panga-Vega's return to work, while RA No. 9710 and the CSC Guidelines do not
require that the entire special leave applied for be consumed, certain conditions must be
satisfied for its propriety.
Under the CSC Guidelines, a total hysterectomy is classified as a major surgical procedure
requiring a minimum period of recuperation of three weeks to a maximum period of two
months. Aside from observing this time frame, the employee, before she can return to work,
shall present a medical certificate signed by her attending surgeon that she is physically fit
to assume the duties of her position.
In this case, Panga-Vega underwent total hysterectomy on February 7, 2011, and decided to
return to work on March 7, 2011. As it appears, she was already able to observe a period of
recuperation of four weeks.

PAL MARITIME CORP. V. DALISAY
G.R. Nos. 218115 & 218170 27 January 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The concealment of a pre-existing medical condition by a seafarer disqualifies

him from any compensation and benefits. In this case, the seafarer concealed his low back
pain where he was awarded permanent and total disability benefits from his former employer.
The seafarer cannot claim any benefit such as sickness allowance and attorney’s fees as he
knowingly concealed a pre-existing illness.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
In 2012, Dalisay applied for shipboard employment with PAL Maritime. He was directed to
undergo Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). During the PEME, Dalisay
declared that he had no history of any ailment other than a “Varicocelectomy” operation in
2003. Thus, he was declared fit to work and was deployed on 28 November 2012.
Meantime, Dalisay requested for medical attention after experiencing sharp and intense
pain on his lower back while lifting heavy provisions. He was detected to be suffering from
“degeneration of spur lumbar verbae/increase of liver enzymes” and was repatriated on 10
December 2012. He was also diagnosed with low back pain secondary to Disc Protrusion.
On 08 March 2013, PAL Maritime discovered that Dalisay previously filed a claim for
permanent and total disability benefits for his low back pain with his former employer, Phil
Transmarine. As such, PAL Maritime discontinued Dalisay’s medical treatment because of
malicious concealment of a pre-existing illness. This prompted Dalisay to seek medical
attention from other physicians which declared him unfit to work. Thus, Dalisay filed a
complaint against PAL Maritime for permanent and total disability benefits.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit explaining that Dalisay’s
fraudulent misrepresentation disqualified him from claiming any benefits pursuant to
Section 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-Standard Employment Contract.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings holding that the failure to
disclose by Dalisay was due to his “honest belief” that he was already healed.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals partially granted the Petition of PAL Maritime and
held that Dalisay knowingly concealed a pre-existing illness and was disqualified from
claiming permanent disability benefits but retained the award of sickness allowance and
attorney’s fees. Thus, the recourse to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether a seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance/benefits and attorney’s fees

despite deliberate concealment of a pre-existing illness?
RULING:
No. Under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, a seafarer is entitled to several
"compensation and benefits" for any work-related illness or injury that he may have
suffered during the term of the contract such as expenses for medical treatment, sickness
allowance and disability benefits. However, Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC is likewise
explicit that a seafarer who "knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition" shall be
disqualified from claiming "any compensation and benefits." The rule seeks to penalize
seafarers who conceal material information in order to pass the PEME and even makes such
misrepresentation a just cause for termination of employment.
An illness shall be considered as pre-existing if prior to the processing of the POEA

contract, any of the following conditions are present: (a) [t]he advice of a medical doctor
on treatment was given for such continuing illness or condition; or (b) the seafarer had
been diagnosed and has knowledge of such an illness or condition but failed to disclose [it]
during [PEME], and such cannot be diagnosed during [such examination].
Jurisprudence abounds ruling that knowing concealment involves bad faith. The falsity or
non-disclosure of the truth must be for a malicious purpose or coupled with intent to
deceive and to profit from deception. It must also be intentional.
A PEME is not exploratory but merely determines whether one is "fit for sea service." The
PEME does not state the real state of health of an applicant. Relatively, the "fit to work"
declaration in the Dalisay’s PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free
from any ailment prior to his deployment. The fact that Dalisay passed the PEME cannot
excuse his willful concealment nor can it preclude PAL Maritime from rejecting his claims.
Taken together, Dalisay is disqualified from all benefits including sickness allowance.
Attorney's fees may only be awarded upon proof of bad faith. In labor cases, however, the
established rule is that the withholding of wages or benefits need not be coupled with bad
faith. Instead, it is enough that wages or benefits were not paid without justification. Here,
PAL Maritime is justified in denying the claim for sickness allowance and discontinuing
medical treatment when it discovered that Darwin concealed his pre-existing illness. To
award attorney's fees despite the seafarer's malicious concealment would be tantamount to
rewarding his fraudulent conduct.

DOEHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY INC. V. GATCHALIAN, JR.
G.R. No. 207507 17 February 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: A seafarer is bound by the company-designated doctor’s finding if there is

failure to comply with the third-doctor referral requirement. In this case, the seafarer relied
on the findings of the second doctor without referring the matter to a third doctor. The
findings of the second doctor were also made after the complaint was filed.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
Jose Gatchalian, Jr. (Jose) had been working as Chief Cook for Doehle-Philman since 2002.
On 08 June 2006, he signed a 9-month contract as Chief Cook and boarded the vessel on 17
July 2006. On 04 December 2006, Jose experienced intense and unbearable pain in his right
knee which he reported to the ship captain that sometime in August 2006, he figured in an
accident which caused his right kneecap to hit the iron deck and took the full weight of his
fall. When the vessel docked, he was examined and assessed with “Tear Medial Menuscus
Fractured Osteofy” and declared him unfit for duties on board. He was operated on for
partial meniscetomy and medically repatriated on 12 December 2006.
On 15 December 2006, the company-designated surgeon removed the sutures and

scheduled Jose for post-surgery physical therapy session. By 14 February 2007, the
company-designated doctor issued a final assessment that Jose was fit to work. On 11
February 2009, Jose filed a complaint for total disability benefits against Doehle-Philman
anchoring his claim on a medical certificate dated 18 May 2009 diagnosing him with
Traumatic Arthritis, and assessed him with permanent partial disability.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Jose’s complaint for lack of merit which gave more credence
to the company-designated doctor who attended to Jose’s condition and treatment from
time of repatriation until he was declared fit to work. Nevertheless, Jose was awarded
financial assistance.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision but deleted the award of
financial assistance.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC giving more
credence to Jose’s doctor and concluding that the traumatic arthritis is work related
coupled with the fact that Jose was not re-employed by Doehle-Philman.
ISSUE: Whether the seafarer is entitled to disability benefits based on his doctor’s findings?
RULING:
No. A seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits is a matter governed not only by medical
findings, but also by law and contract. The material statutory provisions are Article 197 to
199 of the Labor Code, in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation. By contract, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), the parties' collective
bargaining agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the
employer are pertinent. Specifically, Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC prescribes the
mechanism and procedure on how the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability
benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered while on board
the vessel.
We emphasize that the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-
designated physician within three days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. He is on
temporary total disability for the duration of the treatment, but in no case to exceed 120
days, because he is totally unable to work. During which time, he shall receive his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally. If the 120-day initial period is exceeded
and no declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then
the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days,
subject to the right of the employer to declare that a permanent or total disability already
exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time the declaration is
justified by his medical condition. It is then settled that before a seafarer may claim
permanent total disability benefits from his employer, it must first be established that the
company designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to the seafarer's fitness to
engage in sea-duty or disability grading within the 120-day or 240-day period reckoned
from the time the seafarer reported to the company-designated physician.
Notably, Jose disregarded the provision on the joint appointment of a third doctor. Under
the POEA-SEC, a seafarer may contest the findings of the company-designated doctor by
seeking a second opinion from a doctor of his choice. In the event of disagreement between
the findings of the doctors, the parties shall jointly refer the matter to a third doctor, whose
findings will be final and binding. This referral to a third doctor has been held by this Court
to be a mandatory procedure because of the provision that it is the company-designated
doctor whose assessment should prevail if there is no referral to a third doctor.

Failure to comply with the requirement of referral to a third-party physician is tantamount
to violation of the POEA-SEC, and without a binding third-party opinion, the findings of
the company-designated physician shall prevail over the assessment made by the seafarer's
doctor. Jose, in this case, patently failed to comply with the procedure to contest the
findings of the company-designated doctor.
He did not timely secure and disclose to petitioners, the contrary assessment of his doctor,
and signify his intention to refer the dispute to a third doctor. While it is the employer's
duty to initiate the process for referral to a third doctor, this presupposes that the seafarer
also complied with his correlative duty. Jose's failure to secure the opinion of a doctor of
his choice before filing the complaint shows that he filed the complaint without any basis
at all.

DORELCO EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP V. DON ORESTES ROMUALDEZ
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE (DORELCO)
G.R. No. 240130 15 March 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The aggrieved party is given 10 days from receipt of the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator to file a Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, the aggrieved party has
15 days from receipt of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration to file a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
In 2012, the Union and the Company submitted for arbitration before the NCMB the issue
on whether the rank and file employees are entitled to salary adjustments under the
collective bargaining agreement. Meantime, several employees retired from the service,
namely Pingol, et al. and Lumbre, et al.. Lumbre, et al. signed quitclaims so that they can
receive their retirement benefits. However, Pingol, et al. refused and opted to wait for the
resolution of the arbitration case.
Ruling of the NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator
On 25 September 2012, the NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the employees were
entitled to salary increases in 2010 and 2011. Thereafter, the Union submitted for arbitration
the issue whether Lumbre, et al can claim the salary adjustments where the voluntary
arbitrator held that they are not entitled since they already executed quitclaims. The Union
moved for reconsideration and received the Decision denying its Motion on 27 November
2017. The Union elevated the case before the Court of Appeals on 12 December 2017.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Review explaining that the voluntary
arbitrator’s ruling is not subject to a motion for reconsideration and becomes final and
executory unless appealed within 10 calendar days from notice. Hence, this recourse to the
Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals was timely filed?
RULING:
Yes. Under Article 276 of the Labor Code, the award or decision of voluntary arbitrators
shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from notice. On the other hand, Rule 43

of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal from the judgment or final orders of voluntary
arbitrators must be made within 15 days from notice. With these, the Court has
alternatively used the 10-day or 15-day reglementary periods. In Guagua National Colleges
v. CA, the Court En Banc settled the confusion and clarified that the 10- day period in Article
276 should be understood as the time within which the adverse party may move for a
reconsideration from the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrators. Thereafter, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the CA within 15 days from notice pursuant to Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
Here, the records reveal that the Union received the voluntary arbitrator's resolution
denying its motion for reconsideration on November 27, 2017. As such, the Union had 15
days or until December 12, 2017 within which to perfect an appeal. Verily, the Union filed a
petition for review well within the prescribed period. The CA erred in dismissing the
petition outright based solely on procedural grounds. Thus, a remand of the case for a
resolution on the merits is warranted.

ZONIO V. 1ST QUANTUM LEAP SECURITY AGENCY, INC.
G.R. No. 224944 05 May 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The employer has the burden to prove payment of salary differential, service
incentive leave, holiday pay and 13th month pay. On the other hand, the employee has the
burden to prove claims for overtime pay, premium pays for holidays and rests days. In this
case, Zonio was able to prove his entitlement for overtime pay and night shift differential
through the records found in the logbook which is prima facie evidence of his claim. However,
Zonio failed to prove that he worked during holidays and during his rest days.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
On 13 March 2011, Zonio was hired as a security guard by 1 st Quantum Leap. Zonio worked
7 days a week from 7:00am to 7:00pm or from 7:00pm to 7:00am, alternately every 2 weeks.
1st Quantum Leap did not pay him for overtime work, work rendered on holidays and rest
days, 13th month pay, service incentive leave and night shift differential. On 14 April 2014,
Zonio and others received a memorandum suspending them from 21 April 2014 to 20 May
2014 for sleeping while on duty. No formal investigation was conducted. Nonetheless, Zonio
served his suspension and reported back to work on 21 May 2014 but 1 st Quantum Leap
refused to accept him. Thus, Zonio filed a complaint for illegal suspension, underpayment
and non-payment of benefits.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Zonio was validly suspended for sleeping in his post as proved
by photographs which Zonio did not dispute. Zonio also failed to substantiate his claim for
overtime and holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay and night shift differential.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision ruling that Zonio is entitled to
overtime and holiday pay; holiday and rest day premiums pay and night shift differential.
1st Quantum Leap filed a Petition for Certiorario before the Court of Appeals which partially
granted the Petition deleting the award of overtime pay, holiday and rest day premiums
pay and night shift differential. Thus, this recourse before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether Zonio is entitled to overtime pay, holiday and rest day premiums and
night shift differential?

RULING:
Yes. In determining the employee's entitlement to monetary claims, the burden of proof is
shifted from the employer or the employee, depending on the monetary claim sought. In
claims for payment of salary differential, service incentive leave, holiday pay, and 13th
month pay, the burden rests on the employer to prove payment. This standard follows the
basic rule that in all illegal dismissal cases the burden rests on the defendant-employer to
prove payment rather than on the plaintiff-employee to prove non-payment. This likewise
stems from the fact that all pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and
other similar documents — which show that the differentials, service incentive leave and
other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but are
in the custody and control of the employer. On the other hand, for overtime pay, premium
pays for holidays and rest days, the burden is shifted on the employee, as these monetary
claims are not incurred in the normal course of business. It is thus incumbent upon the
employee to first prove that he actually rendered service in excess of the regular eight
working hours a day, and that he in fact worked on holidays and rest days.
Here, to prove his entitlement to the payment of overtime pay; holiday and rest day
premiums pay; and night shift differentials pay, Zonio submitted a photocopy of the
logbook entries which showed the dates and shift when he reported for work, as well as the
specific tasks he performed on that particular work shift. The logbook also contains the
same information with regard to other security guards. Before and after each particular
work shift, the incoming and outgoing security guard will sign the corresponding entry in
the logbook. However, the logbook does not contain whether Zonio worked on holidays or
during his rest days. Thus, Zonio's claim for holiday and rest day premiums is denied for
lack of factual basis. Meanwhile, the entries in the logbook showed that Zonio worked 12-
hour shifts, which ran from 7:00 a.m./p.m. to 7:00 p.m./a.m. Thus, he is entitled to overtime
pay for work performed beyond eight hours a day, or four hours for every shift. Likewise,
Zonio is entitled to night-shift differential for each hour of work performed between 10:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
Admittedly, the logbook is only a personal record of Zonio and other security guards. It is
not verified or countersigned by respondents. Anyway, the fact that the entries are not
verified or countersigned will not militate against Zonio. The entries in the logbook are
prima facie evidence of Zonio's claim. Prima facie evidence is such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group, or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will
remain sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain
a judgment in favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other
evidence.

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORP V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 246173 22 June 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The rounding-off method used by a government-owned-and-controlled

corporation in computing separation pay has no legal basis and the Labor Code provision on
retirement pay cannot be used suppletorily to justify the method. In this case, TransCo argued
that the Labor Code allows the rounding-off for retirement pay. However, this does not apply
to TransCo as the Labor Code only applies to private employment and not public employment.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
The National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) is a government-owned-and-controlled

corporation created under Republic Act No. 9136. The said law directed the privatization
of TransCo. The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation successfully
bid out a 25-year concession contract to the consortium known as the National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines. As a result, several TransCo employees were separated from
service effective 30 June 2009.
The dismissed employees were granted separation pay pursuant to Board Resolution Nos.
TC 2009-005 and 007 which includes a computation of “Separation Pay = Basic Salary x
Length of Service x 1.5” where a fraction of 1 year, equivalent to 6 months or more, shall be
considered 1 year. To implement these Board Resolutions, the President and CEO of
Transco issued Circular No. 2009-0010 which provided the same computations.
Some disbursements were disallowed by the Commission on Audit totaling P51,989,990.91

where P50,501,712,91 was due to separation benefits given to contractual employees while
P1,488,278.00 was due to rounding off the length of service. The Notices of Disallowance
held liable all individual recipients, approving and certifying officers except the members
of the TransCo Board of Directors. The dissolution of the Notices was sought.
Ruling of the Commission on Audit
In its Decision, the Commission on Audit resolved that only the Members of the Board of
Directors responsible for the passage of the Board Resolutions are held liable. However, the
Commission on Audit Proper sustained all the disallowances but held that the liability was
limited to the amount due to the rounding-off of the length of service.
ISSUE: Whether the rounding-off method used by the National Transmission Corp. proper
in the computation of the separation pay for its separated employees?
RULING:

No. No money shall be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance
of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority. Any disbursement of
government funds that is contrary to law shall be disallowed for being an illegal
expenditure. As will be discussed, the excess amounts of separation pay were properly
disallowed for not being in accord with the EPIRA and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR), RA 9511, and the applicable jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court in the August 2018 TransCo Case and 2019 TransCo Case ruled that the
rounding-off scheme has no legal basis, where it ruled, in part that:
xxx The Court, however, was not convinced. It held that [TransCo] was not given
unbridled discretion to increase the benefits granted to the separated employees.
Sec. 64 of [RA] No. 9136 clearly limited the power of [TransCo] to grant additional
benefits to personnel, wherein any increase of benefits shall be subject to the
approval of the President, to wit:
SEC. 64. Fiscal Prudence. — To promote the prudent management of government

resources, the creation of new positions and the levels of or increase in salaries and
all other emoluments and benefits of [TransCo] and PSALM Corp. personnel shall
be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. The compensation
and all other emoluments and benefits of the officials and members of the Board of
the [TransCo] and PSALM Corp. shall be subject to the approval of the President of
the Philippines.
Thus, the Court held that the rounding-off scheme indeed effectively increased the
separation benefits of the separated employees. Absent the President's approval, it
cannot be sustained. xxx
The provision under Article 302 of the Labor Code on retirement has no application in this
case. Foremost, it can readily be seen that the provision specifically pertains to retirement
pay, not separation pay. We cannot equate the benefits of retirement pay from that of
separation pay since they serve distinct purposes. Moreover, we reiterate that GOCCs, like
TransCo, are government entities created by special law. The terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are different from the rules of employment in private
practice. As we have held in the 2016 TransCo Case, the Labor Code recognizes that the
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including those of
GOCCs, are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, as well as the specific
charters for those GOCCs created by virtue of a special law.

REPUBLIC V. MANEJA
G.R. No. 209052 23 June 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: Backwages may be granted to a government employee if the employee’s

dismissal was done despite the decision not attaining finality. In this case, Maneja’s dismissal
was prematurely executed since the CSC lowered the penalty from dismissal to suspension.
The suspension from December 2003 up to Maneja’s actual reinstatement justifies the grant
of backwages covering that period.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
On 29 October 2001, Cutamora authorized in writing Maneja, a Secondary School Teach in

Macabalan National High School in Macabalan, Cagayan de Oro, to process Cutamora’s
salary loan application amounting to P68,000.00. Maneja processed the loan and a check
amounting to P13,021.00 was issued. Maneja deposited it to her own account and
appropriated the amount without Cutamora’s consent. On 26 June 2022, Cutamora filed a
complaint against Maneja before CSCRO No. X and later on, CSCRO No. X filed a formal
charge for dishonesty against Maneja.
Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
On 25 June 2003, CSCRO No. X promulgated its Decision finding Maneja guilty of
dishonesty and imposed the penalty of dismissal. Maneja’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied prompting her to file an appeal with the CSC.
Meanwhile, the CSC adopted a Resolution which classified the offense of dishonesty into
serious, less serious and simple dishonesty.
On 12 June 2007, the CSC modified the CSCRO No. X’s decision by finding Maneja liable
for the lower offense of Simple Dishonesty and imposing the penalty of 3 months
suspension. Maneja filed a motion for payment of back salaries and other emoluments.
Initially, the CSC denied but upon reconsideration, the CSC issued a Resolution dated 24
July 2008 granting Maneja’s claim for backwages citing that Maneja had the right to
continue rendering work at the Department of Education. Maneja moved for the issuance
of the writ of execution which was granted.
Aggrieved, the Department of Education assailed the CSC Resolutions before the Court of
Appeals. The Courts of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack of merit and holding that
the grant of backwages was proper because Maneja’s dismissal was prematurely executed.

ISSUE: Whether the grant of backwages in favor of Maneja proper?
RULING:
Yes. In CSC v. Cruz, we explained the conditions for backwages to be awarded when
dismissal from the service was immediately executed but the employee was later ordered
reinstated by the CSC. The government employee must not only be found innocent of the
charges; his suspension must likewise, be shown to be unjustified. Nevertheless, we hold
that the conditions laid down in Cruz do not apply in this case.
We find that the ruling in Abellera v. City of Baguio (Abellera), is applicable in this case.
The CA correctly applied Abellera in affirming the grant of backwages to Maneja, viz.:
xxx The Supreme Court in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al., had the occasion to
declare that premature execution of a decision dismissing an employee from
government service could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.
Here, despite the pendency of respondent's appeal with the Commission, the June
25, 2003 Decision of the CSCRO X dismissing him from the service was still
implemented. Evidently, the execution of the decision was premature since the same
had not yet attained finality as it was still subject to review by the Commission. As
a general rule, there can be no execution until and unless the judgment has become
final and executory.
Considering the pendency of respondent's appeal with the Commission, prudence

dictates that petitioner should not have caused the execution of the order of
dismissal. xxx
Here, as in Abellera, CSCRO No. X's decision was hastily executed pending Maneja's appeal
resulting in her dismissal despite the decision not being executory. Therefore, her
suspension from December 2003 up to her actual reinstatement, is unjustified and without
basis warranting the grant of backwages covering that period, notwithstanding the fact that
she was not fully exonerated from her offense of Dishonesty.

SALAZAR V. SIMBAJON
G.R. No. 202374 30 June 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The posting of a cash or surety bond in appeals before the NLRC is both
mandatory and jurisdictional. However, substantial compliance with the rules regarding the
bond requirement may be accepted for the perfection of the appeal. In this case, Salazar was
able to post a cash bond and surety bond within the reglementary period for appeal.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
Simbajon, et al. were employed in Q.S.O Disco Pub & Restaurant. In June 2006, the
management began harassing them after they formed a union. On 30 June 2006, Lucia
informed Simbajon, et al. regarding the last day of their employment as the business is
closing due to bankruptcy. Simbajon, et al. claimed that the closure was a ruse to terminate
them and they filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment
and non-payment against Salazar, Lucia and Quirino. On the other hand, Salazar denied
employment relationship with Simbajon, et al. claiming that he is merely the lessor for
Q.S.O Disco Pub and that the business was registered in the name of Lucia.
The Labor Arbiter held that Salazar, Lucia and Quirino are solidarily liable for Simbajon, et
al.’s dismissal in the total amount of P3,683,394.45. Aggrieved, Salazar appealed to the
NLRC and posted a cash bond of P500,000.00 and a surety bond of P3,100,000.00.
The NLRC exonerated Salazar from liability absent substantial evidence of employment
relationship with Simbajon, et al. which prompted them to elevate the case to the Court of
Appeals
The CA granted the Petition ruling that Salazar did not perfect his Appeal to the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether Salazar perfected his appeal with the NLRC?
RULING:
Yes. Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the requirements of the law. In Labor

Cases, Article 223 of the Labor Code set forth the Rules on Appeal to the NLRC from the
Decisions, Awards or Orders of the Labor Arbiter. The rules specifically provide that "[in]
case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from."
Clearly, Appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the
following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the
Memorandum of Appeal; and (3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. For the
posting of cash or surety bond, its purpose is to assure the employees that they will receive
the monetary award granted them if they finally prevail in the case. The bond also serves
to discourage employers from using the Appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to
satisfy the judgment. Notably, the posting of Appeal Bond is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well.
As Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation aptly summarized:
ALL TOLD, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been
and may be [sic] relaxed in meritorious cases. These cases include instances in which
(1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired
objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the appellants, at the very
least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during
the reglementary period.
Conversely, the reduction of the bond is not warranted when no meritorious ground
is shown to justify the same: the appellant absolutely failed to comply with the
requirement of posting a bond, even if partial; or when circumstances show the
employer's unwillingness to ensure the satisfaction of its workers' valid claims.
Here, the records reveal that Salazar received on March 23, 2007 the Labor Arbiter's
Decision and had ten (10) days or until April 2, 2007 to file an Appeal. On March 30, 2007,
Salazar appealed and moved to reduce the bond. At the same time, Salazar deposited a
cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of Simbajon, et al. On April 2, 2007
or the last day of the period to appeal, Salazar posted a surety bond in the amount of
P3,100,000.00. Subsequently, with the NLRC's approval, Salazar replaced the P500,000.00
check deposit with a surety bond of the same amount. In sum, Salazar posted a total of
P3,600,000.00 within the reglementary period, which substantially covers the total
monetary award of P3,683,394.45. As discussed earlier, these constitute substantial
compliance and demonstrate willingness on the part of Salazar to abide with the Rules on
Perfection of Appeal.

LAURENTE V. HELENAR CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. 243812 07 July 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: An employment shall be deemed regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer. In this case, the allegation of project employment by Helenar Construction
is refuted due to the absence of a project employment contract and given that the work of
Laurente as a painter is usually necessary and desirable to its business.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
Since 2012, Laurente performed tasks for as a painter for Helenar Construction for various
projects until the termination of his service on November 2014. On 24 October 2014,
foreman William required Laurente to sign a labor contract for a period of 3 months with
a clause stating that his employment would be renewable “depending on the evaluation of
the site engineer and foreman”. Laurente refused to sign the contract because it would
violate his security of tenure. On 07 November 2014, Engr. Palattao barred Laurente from
entering the construction site. Thus, he filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money
Claims on 09 November 2014.
The Labor Arbiter held that Laurente is an employee of Helenar Construction and not a
project employee as the respondents failed to report the termination of Laurente’s work
after completion of the projects. Aggrieved, Helenar Construction appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings and declared that no employment
relationship existed between Laurente and Helenar Construction. Laurente elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed the NLRC’s judgment and explained that the unsigned labor contract is of
no moment as the contract shows that Laurente was hired as a painter for the project.
ISSUE: Whether Laurente is a regular employee?
RULING:

Yes. At the outset, we stress that what determines regular employment is not the
employment contract, written or otherwise, but the nature of the job. The applicable test
is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business of the employer. Apropos is Article 280 of the Labor Code, to
wit:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties,
an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
Clearly, the standard supplied by the law itself is whether the work undertaken is necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. This can be assessed by looking
into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which
the business is pursued in the usual course. In this case, respondents are principally
engaged in the construction business. Laurente, as a painter, is tasked with preparing,
sanding and painting various construction works. Inarguably, the nature of Laurente's job
required him to perform activities, which were deemed necessary in the usual business of
respondents. As the LA aptly observed, Laurente's duty is relevant to the core of
respondents' business. Indeed, Laurente's continuous rehiring to different construction
projects of respondents from April 2012 until his termination in November 2014 attests to
the desirability of his services.
In this case, there is no substantial evidence that Laurente was adequately informed of his
status as a project employee at least at the time of his engagement. Also, Laurente was not
fully apprised of the duration and scope of the projects. At most, the CA and the NLRC
heavily relied on the provisions of the unsigned labor contract to characterize Laurente as
a project employee. However, respondents did not offer any plausible reason why their
supposed subcontractor will require Laurente to sign the contract only on October 24, 2014,
or way beyond the date Laurente started reporting for work. Worse, Laurente has no
employment contracts for his past projects in 2012. Evidently, the labor contract was an
afterthought designed to deny Laurente the benefits of a regular employee, particularly, his
security of tenure. On this point, the Court reiterates that a worker shall be presumed a
regular employee absent clear agreement showing that he was properly informed of the
nature of his employment. Thus, the LA correctly held that Laurente is a regular employee
of respondents.

BACABAC V. NYK-FIL SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 228550 28 July 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: An illness not listed as an occupational illness under the POEA-Standard

Employment Contract may be compensable if it is reasonably linked to the work of the
seafarer. In this case, Bacabac’s Cholangitis, which was diagnosed after his repatriation,
reveal that he did not respond well to the initial medical treatment for his kidneys while
working as an oiler.
FACTS:
The Antecedents
On 25 November 2011, NYK-FIL Shipmanagement, Inc. (respondents) hired Bacabac as an

oiler. On 08 December 2011, respondents deployed Bacabac for a period of 9 months. On 11
March 2012, Bacabac felt dizzy and suffered abdominal pain while performing his duties
inside the engine room. He reported the matter to the Second Officer and was given
medicines but the symptoms persisted. While in Chile, it was found that Bacabac’s kidneys
were not functioning well and he had dialysis thrice. Bacabac also underwent surgery to
remove stones in his bile duct and was confirmed for more than 2 months.
On 21 May 2012, Bacabac was medically repatriated and brought to Manila Doctor’s
Hospital. The doctors performed duodenostomy followed by an endoscopy. Bacabac was
diagnosed with Severe Acute Cholangitis. He was discharged from the hospital on 19 June
2012. On 24, September 2012, Bacabac filed a complaint for total and permanent disability
benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of expenses and damages. Respondents
argued that Bacabac’s illness was not compensable as it was declared not work-related.
The Labor Arbiter awarded Bacabac full disability benefits and sickness allowance because
his illness is presumed to be work-related. Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s findings and dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The NLRC noted that the company physician was categorical that Bacabac’s ailment
was not related to his employment. Bacabac then elevated the case before the CA.

The CA affirmed the NLRC’s judgment ruling that Bacabac failed to sufficiently show the
causal connection between his illness and the work he had contracted for especially
considering that the illness is not one of the occupational illnesses under the POEA-SEC.
ISSUE: Whether Bacabac is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits as well as
sickness allowance?
RULING:
Yes. In Ventis Maritime Corporation v. Salenga, the Court clarified that a seafarer's
complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that manifests or is
discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is usually while the seafarer is
on board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is discovered after the contract, which
is usually after the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. The court then laid down the
following set of rules:
x x x In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term of
the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (1) an occupational illness listed
under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-
related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an
illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably
linked to the work of the seafarer.
For the first type, the POEA-SEC has clearly defined a work-related illness as "any
sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." What this means is that to be
entitled to disability benefits, a seafarer must show compliance with the conditions
under Section 32-A, as follows:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described therein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the
described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
As to the second type of illness — one that is not listed as an occupational disease
in Section 32-A — x x x the seafarer may still claim provided that he suffered a
disability occasioned by a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working
conditions. For this illness, "[i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage
between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational
mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment
or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have
had." Operationalizing this, to prove this reasonable linkage, it is imperative that
the seafarer must prove the requirements under Section 32-A: the risks involved in

his work; his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks; the disease
was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it; and he was not notoriously negligent.
In this case, Joemar's employment contract is from December 8, 2011 to September 8, 2012
or for a period of nine months. On March 11, 2012, Joemar suffered pain and symptoms
while he is on board the vessel. On May 21, 2012, Joemar was medically repatriated and was
diagnosed with Severe Acute Cholangitis two days after disembarkation. Clearly, Joemar's
illness manifested or was discovered during the term of his contract. Applying the rules in
Ventis case, Joemar's medical condition is disputably presumed as work-related although
not listed as an occupational disease. As such, it becomes incumbent upon the respondents
to prove otherwise.
Applying the rules in Ventis case, Joemar's medical condition is disputably presumed as
work-related although not listed as an occupational disease. As such, it becomes incumbent
upon the respondents to prove otherwise. Notably, the respondents relied on the company
physician's opinion that Joemar's illness was not work-related. Yet, the Court finds that the
company doctor's medical report is inadequate to overcome the presumption. It bears
emphasis that the company physician's assessment must be complete and definite for the
purpose of ascertaining the degree of the seafarer's disability benefits. The assessment must
truly reflect the extent of the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and his or her capacity to
resume work as such.
Similarly, Joemar is entitled to sickness allowance. If the seafarer suffers from an illness or
injury during the term of the contract, he or she shall also receive sickness allowance from
his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the time he signed
off until he is declared fit to work or the degree of disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician. The period within which the seafarer shall be entitled to
his sickness allowance shall not exceed 120 days. Given that the company physician failed
to give a valid medical assessment, the labor arbiter correctly awarded Joemar sickness
allowance absent proof that this benefit has been paid.

ABRENICA V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 218185 14 September 2021
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: An Administrative rule or regulation may be considered valid only if it conforms

and not contradicts the provisions of the enabling law. If a discrepancy occurs between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the
law cannot be limited nor broadened by mere administrative issuance. An administrative
interpretation that contradicts the law that it purportedly implements cannot be considered
valid or given weight and may be disregarded.
FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of San Lazaro Hospital with salary grades 20 to 26 and received
hazard allowances at a certain rate. The rate was, however, found to be not in accord with
Sec. 21 of RA No. 7305 of the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers and Sec. 7.1.5.a of Rule
XV of its revised implementing rules and regulations which prescribe hazard allowances to
at least 5% of the monthly basic salary of health workers within SG 20 and above. A certain
amount representing the allowances paid beyond 5% of the basic salaries was disallowed.
Petitioners appealed such disallowance to the Commission on Audit (COA) National
Government Section (NGC) on the ground that the hazard pay was given pursuant to
Department of Health (DOH) Administrative Order No. 2006-0011 which fixed the
payment of hazard pay to public health workers with SG 20 and above at a certain rate and
asserted honest belief on their entitlement based on such issuance. The COA NGS ordered
to refund the overpayment of hazard pay since the Supreme Court has already pronounced
DOH AO No. 2006-0011 as void on its face in A.M. No. 03-9-02-SC. COA Proper affirmed
such decision. Petitioners come to court now on the ground that DOH issuance is the
proper legal basis of the overstated hazard pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amounts of hazard pay which exceeded the minimum rate
prescribed under RA 7305 was properly disallowed.
RULING:
YES. In A.m. No. 03-9-02-SC, the Court already ruled that the DOH exceeded its power of
implementing the provisions of RA No. 7305 in fixing an exact amount of hazard pay for
public health workers with SG 20 and above. The Court then ruled that DOH AO No. 2006-
0011 is void on its face for being ultra vires insofar as it conflicts with RA No. 7305. The
executive, through the DOH, is expected to faithfully enforce RA No. 7305. In conferring
power upon the DOH to implement the statute, the legislature recognizes the
impracticability of anticipating and providing for complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing the law. The Legislature is not allowing the Executive to override

its legislative authority as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of congress. It cannot modify, expand, or
subtract from the law that it is intended to implement. The administrative rule must be
germane to the purpose of the law and be in conformity with the standards that the law
prescribe. The judiciary’s power to apply and interpret laws comes in as a necessary
corollary of the system of checks and balances to ensure that the executive’s act does not
go beyond its delegated power. It is true that rules and regulations issued by administrative
bodies to interpret the law also have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
Nevertheless, such issuances are still subject to the interpretation by the Court and must
conform to the provisions of the enabling law.

PUREGOLD PRICE CLUB, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 233474 DATE: 15 February, 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: Petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice
of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. There can no longer by
any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari, save in
exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons.
FACTS:
Petitioner Puregold Price Club, Inc. (PCCI) hired Renato Cruz as a probationary store head
then he became the store office/manager of Puregold Extra and his tasks include the
activation of the intruder alarm system and the principal officer to respond when the alarm
system sends alerts. One time, the alarm system went off and the security guard informed
Renato. However, Renato arrived only hours after the incident and did not see the intruder.
PPCI conducted an investigation and caused a notice to explain to Renato regarding the
incident. PPCI served Renato a notice of termination. Renato subsequently filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against Puregold Extra and Lucio Co before the Labor Arbiter
(LA). The LA rendered a decision that Renato was illegally dismissed, based solely on
Renato’s position paper because the respondents therein failed to appear. PPCI moved to
annul the LA’s decision claiming that the LA had no jurisdiction over them as it was not
properly joined as a respondent and did not receive summons. PPCI then filed a petition to
annul the LA’s decision. The NLRC remanded the case for further proceedings for failure
of the LA to acquire jurisdiction over PPCI due to improper service of summons. On 28
October 2016, the NLRC denied Renato’s motion for reconsideration. On 13 March 2017,
Renato filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the NLRC’s order. The CA gave
due course to Renato’s petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave due
course to Renato’s petition despite being filed out of time?
RULING:
YES. CA erred in giving due course to Renato’s petition for certiorari for being filed out of
time. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
There can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari, save in exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling
reasons. Contrary to Renato's theory, the reglementary period to avail the remedy of
certiorari must be reckoned on December 29, 2016 or the date his counsel received the
NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, and not on January 12, 2017 when

he allegedly received the assailed resolution. Renato’s counsel was validly notified of the
assailed NLRC resolution on 29 December 2016. Renato had sixty (60) days counted from
the date his counsel received on December 29, 2016 the NLRC Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration or until February 27, 2017 within which to avail a petition for
certiorari.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. FREDERICK YAÑEZ
G.R. NO. 214662 2 March 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The employee’s liability for an administrative offense of sexual harassment

should not be determined solely based on Sec. 3 of RA no. 7877. Substantial evidence to
support the administrative charge is sufficient. The “demand, request or requirement of a
sexual favor” requirement in Sec. 3 is not essential before an act can be qualified as sexual
harassment in an administrative charge. It is enough that the respondent’s actions created
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
FACTS:
Respondent Yañez was a supervisor of PAL Passenger Handling Division and he received a
notice containing the summary of an alleged incident between him and flight attendant
Sarte. Sarte reported that Yañez inserted his hand in her right armpit and pressed her arm
and touched the side of her breast. Sarte also claimed that there were other incidents of
inappropriate touching by respondent Yañez. Respondent denied all the charges against
him. PAL issued a notice of administrative charge for violation of Art. 51 of PAL’s Revised
Code of Discipline on Sexual Harassment. PAL notified him on the administrative hearing
to be held in Pasay City but respondent requested that it be held in Cebu. PAL offered the
plane fare and free accommodation but respondent only insisted on his requests so the
hearing in Pasay proceeded. Another hearing was scheduled in Cebu and respondent
requested a copy of the transcript of the Pasay hearing, but the investigating community
denied, which triggered respondent to walk out of the hearing. The investigating
committee found respondent liable for violating the code of discipline and suspended him
for 3 months. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension. The Labor Arbiter ruled
that the suspension was valid as he was afforded due process and it was respondent who
refused to testify. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA’s findings in toto and ruled that
PAL acted within its rights as an employer to impose the disciplinary measure on the erring
employee. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC’s findings and ruled that PAL violated
the manner laid down in Ra 7877 of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 which requires
PAL to create a committee specifically tasked to investigate the sexual harassment charge
and that PAL had no rules and regulations prescribing the procedure for investigating
sexual harassment cases. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it ruled that Yañez was validly suspended?
RULING:
No. The CA erred in reversing the NLRC, and the NLRC did not gravely abuse of its
discretion when it affirmed the findings of the LA. Respondent Yañez have been sufficiently

afforded due process or an opportunity to explain his side and defend his interest. PAL
complied with the requirements of RA No. 7877 on the procedure for investigating sexual
harassment complaints. The employee’s liability for an administrative offense of sexual
harassment should not be determined solely based on Sec. 3 of RA no. 7877. Substantial
evidence to support the administrative charge is sufficient. The “demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor” requirement in Sec. 3 is not essential before an act can be
qualified as sexual harassment in an administrative charge. It is enough that the
respondent’s actions created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee. As the case is an administrative case for violation of Art. 51 of PAL’s revised code
of discipline, it is not necessary that sexual favors or advances are made to constitute sexual
harassment. It is enough that respondent’s inappropriate conduct towards Sarte created a
hostile work environment and uneasy feeling upon Sarte, which affected her job. The
imposition of the 3 month suspension as a sanction is a valid exercise of management
prerogative, provided it is done in good faith and the employer sufficiently complies with
the substantive and procedural requirements.

U R EMPLOYED INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION V. PINMILIW
G.R. NO. 225263 16 March 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction or hear and
decide the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for damages
while the POEA exercises administrative jurisdiction arising out of violations of rules and
regulations and disciplinary jurisdiction over employers, principals, partners and overseas
Filipino workers. These administrative bodies do not have concurrent jurisdiction and the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply between them.
FACTS:
Petitioner U R Employed International Corp. (UREIC) hired respondents as construction

workers in Malaysia for a duration of 2 years with a monthly salary of RM800. The
respondents were then made to live in a place with unsafe living conditions and were being
hidden from the authorities as they didn’t have work permits and only tourist visas. The
respondents sent an email to an editorial magazine narrating their experiences. After
finding out about the email, the petitioner terminated the respondents and processed their
repatriation. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against
UREIC. The Labor Arbiter found that respondents were constructively dismissed due to the
unfavorable working conditions and the termination was done hastily in derogation of the
procedural and substantive requirements of due process. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of
the LA. The petitioners elevated it to the CA, which ruled that there was substantial
evidence that respondents were illegally dismissed. Records reveal that respondents filed
with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint for
violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-Based Overseas workers, with the same set of facts alleged in the
complaint filed in the LA. The POEA dismissed the complaint for failure to substantiate
the allegations and the DOLE affirmed such decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decisions of the NLRC and LA, violated the
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction and in not considering the POEA and DOLE
orders which dealt with the same allegations?
RULING:
NO. While respondents alleged the same set of facts before the LA and POEA, the
complaints raised different causes of action. The LA complaint involved the issue of illegal
dismissal and various money claims, while the POEA complaint involved administrative
disciplinary liability for violation of the POEA rules. Thus, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply. Moreover, a review of the respective jurisdictions of the POEA

and LA reveals that these administrative bodies do not have concurrent jurisdiction. The
Labor Arbiter shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction or hear and decide the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for damages while the
POEA exercises administrative jurisdiction arising out of violations of rules and regulations
and disciplinary jurisdiction over employers, principals, partners and overseas Filipino
workers. The jurisdiction of these administrative bodies does not in any way intersect as to
warrant the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
appreciation by the POEA and LA of the complains should be limited to matters failing
within their jurisdictions.

PEOPLE V. BEGINO
G.R. NO. 251150 16 March 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The elements of large-scale illegal recruitment are: First, the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers. Second, the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of recruitment and placement or any of the prohibited practices. Third, the offender
commits any of the said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
FACTS:
Milagros received a phone call from Accused Regina Begino and Darwin Arevalo who were
conducting interview for applicants interested to work abroad as apple-pickers in Canada.
Milagros paid Regina the processing fee, terminal fee, additional processing fee and surety
bond and Regina recorded the payment in an index card. Milagros shared the job
opportunity to Maelene, Geraldine and Gloria who applied with Regina as well. Regina
received the placement fees of Maelene and others and likewise recorded in an index card.
Unfortunately, no one got to leave for Canada nor got their money back. Regina and Darwin
were charged with large-scale illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa. Only Regina was
brought to the jurisdiction of the RTC while Darwin remained at large. She pleaded not
guilty. The prosecution presented the testimonies of the victims and a certification from
the POEA that Regina and Darwin had no license to recruit workers abroad. Regina denied
the accusations and claimed that she did not promise overseas employment nor receive
money from the victims, and that she was a victim of Darwin who offered her work abroad
as well. The RTC convicted Regina of large-scale illegal recruitment and 3 counts of estafa
as she represented having authority to send complainants abroad and the index cards
established that she received various fees. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision for large-
scale illegal recruitment, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of large-scale illegal recruitment were proved?
RULING:
YES. R.A. No. 90842 as amended by R.A. No. 10022 broadened the concept of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that
constitute economic sabotage – illegal recruitment in large-scale and illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate. The elements of large-scale illegal recruitment are present in
this case. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, the offender
undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of recruitment and placement or any
of the prohibited practices. Third, the offender commits any of the said acts against three
or more persons, individually or as a group. The prosecution established that Regina
engaged in recruitment activities and gave complainants the distinct impression that she

had the ability to send them abroad for work. She also directly transacted with them and
personally received the money from them. Regina failed to explain why the index cards
were in her custody. There were also 4 complainants which qualified the offense to
economic sabotage. The penalty should be increased to the maximum fine of P5,000,000
since Regina is a non-licensee holder, following R.A. No. 10022.

JUNIO V. PACIFIC OCEAN MANNING INC.
G.R. NO. 220657 16 March 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: Whenever confronted by a positive assertion from the seafarer that he was able
to comply with the 3-day obligation to report to the manning agency but was not referred to
a company-designated physician and a plain denial of the manning agency, the seafarer’s
position is entitled more weight. The burden to prove that the seafarer was referred to the
company physician falls on the employer and not the seafarer.
FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino entered into a 9-month employment contract with Pacific Ocean
Manning to serve as a Fitter onboard MCT Monte Rosa. One day, while performing an
overhaul in one of the engines, the hose accidentally detached and hit his left eye. A few
months after, he suddenly collapsed while changing one of the engines and an accident
report was issued. He was referred to an offshore physician, Dr. Jenkins, in Texas and
underwent a MRI of his brain with attention to the left eye. The results of the MRI revealed
that he was suffering sinusitis, hyperlipidemia and acute gastroduodenities. Dr. Jenkins
indicated in the health insurance claim form that petitioner’s illnesses were not work-
related. He was subsequently repatriated and reported to the office of respondent 2 days
upon arrival and requested for medical treatment. However, he was not referred to a
company-designated physician. He then filed a complaint for payment of total disability
benefits. 2 months after filing the complaint, petitioner sought the medical opinion of Dr.
Tan who diagnosed him with trauma to the left eye, hypertension and hypertensive
arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease and was declared unfit for duty as seaman. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the mandatory 3-day
reporting requirement for a post-employment medical examination. The NLRC reversed
the LA’s decision and ruled that petitioner’s left eye was injured while performing his work
which caused him to pass out and that petitioner requested a post-employment medical
examination within 3 days upon repatriation but it was respondent who turned him down.
The Court of Appeals upheld the LA’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner complied with the 3-day mandatory reporting
requirement?
RULING:
YES. A seafarer may claim disability benefits arising from (1) an injury or illness that
manifests, or is discovered during the term of the seafarer’s contract, usually while the
seafarer is still on board the vessel; or (2) an illness that manifests, or is discovered after
the contract, which is when the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. If the illness or
injury falls under the first scenario, the procedure as to how the seafarer can legally demand
the disability benefits from the employer/manning agency under Section 20(A) of the 2010

POEA-SEC applies, which requires that the seafarer shall submit to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within 3 working days upon his
return. It is undisputed that Celestino reported to respondent’s office within 2 days from
repatriation and requested that he be referred to a company-designated physician but his
request was rejected. Whenever confronted by a positive assertion from the seafarer that
he was able to comply with the 3-day obligation to report to the manning agency but was
not referred to a company-designated physician and a plain denial of the manning agency,
the seafarer’s position is entitled more weight. The burden to prove that the seafarer was
referred to the company physician falls on the employer and not the seafarer.

CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. ASSOCIATION OF CDC SUPERVISORY
PERSONNEL UNION
G.R. NO. 207853 30 March 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The right of government employees to self-organization is not as extensive as

that of private employees and the right of government employees to collective bargaining and
negotiation is subject to limitations. Only the terms and conditions of government
employment not fixed by law can be negotiated.
FACTS:
Clark Development Corporation (CDC) executed a renegotiated CBA with its supervisory
employees union Association of CDC Supervisory Personnel (ACSP). The CBA granted
additional benefits like leaves, salary increase, and additional allowance. The Governance
Commission for Government-Owned and Controlled Corporation (GCG) opined that the
CBA violated Sec. 9 of EO No. 7 which imposed a moratorium on increases in salaries,
allowances, incentives and other benefits in GOCCs, unless specifically authorized by the
President. Yet, the President did not give CDC the authority to renegotiate the CBA and
grant increases/additional benefits. ACSP filed a complaint before the NCMB for failure to
implement the CBA. The Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator (AVA) ruled that Sec. 10 of EO
No. 7 series of 2010 suspended the grant of allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks
only until 31 December 2010 and the President’s approval in the grant of additional benefits
was presumed, pursuant to the rule on liberal construction in favor of labor. The CDC
elevated the case to the CA which affirmed the AVA’s findings and explained that EO No.
7 does apply to CDC since it is a GOCC without original charter, as well as to ACSP because
it is composed of supervisory employees and the president’s approval was presumed. Hence
this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of additional benefits to ACSP is allowed?
RULING:
NO. The right of government employees to self-organization is not as extensive as that of

private employees and the right of government employees to collective bargaining and
negotiation is subject to limitations. Only the terms and conditions of government
employment not fixed by law can be negotiated. EO No. 7 series of 2010 imposed a
moratorium on increases in rates of salaries and grant of new increases in allowances,
incentives and benefits. The prohibition is broadly worded and reveals the clearance stance
to halt the grant of additional salaries and allowances to GOCC’s employees and officers.
The only exception is when the increase of salary is pursuant to the implementation of the
Salary Standardization law (SSL). The renegotiated economic provisions of the CBA are
outside the SSL. The President also never lifted the moratorium from the time it was issued
until the time of ruling of the case. As such, the economic terms of the CBA are void for

violating the law. Furthermore, the President issued EO No. 203 series of 2016 barring the
governing boards of all GOCCS to negotiate economic terms of their CBAs.

SKANFIL MARITIME SERVICES, INC V. ALMARIO CENTENO
G.R. NO. 227655 27 April 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The rules on the prescribed period for the company-designated physician to
issue a final medical assessment and the consequence for failure to observe these periods is
as follows: 1) the company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the
seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to
him; 2) if the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within 120 days,
without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total; 3)
if the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within 120 days with a
sufficient justification, then the period of diagnoses and treatment shall be extended to 240
days. The employer has the burden to prove that the physician has sufficient justification to
extend the period; and 4) if the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment
within the 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless
or any justification.
FACTS:
Petitioner Skanfil hired respondent Almario as a mess person on board a ship. One day,
Almario fell from a ladder while performing the job, which resulted to him losing
consciousness and bleeding at the back of the head. Almario was repatriated to the
Philippines afterwards. Skanfil referred Almario to the company-designated physicians, Dr.
Manhubat, Dr. Hao-Quan, Dr. Lim, and Dr. Agsoay. Almario was also referred to Dr.
Chusuan, an orthopedic surgeon and Dr. Sumpio, a neuro surgeon. After the rehabilitation
and weeks of treatment, Dr. Chusuan cleared Almario orthopedic wise and by Dr. Sumpio
from a neurosurgery standpoint. On 7 February 2014, Almario returned to the company-
designated physician where Dr. Hao-Quan finally observed Almario’s functional trunk and
hips range motion and was determined to be fit for duty already. Almario consulted Dr.
Magtira who declared that Almario lost pre-injury capacity and is permanently unfit to
resume sea duties. He then filed a complaint against Skanfil for permanent disability
benefits. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Almario’s complaint for failure to observe the
mandatory third doctor appointment rule given the conflicting findings of the company-
designated physicians and Almario’s physician of choice. The NLRC affirmed the LA
findings which ruled that the company-designated physicians were more qualified to assess
Almario’s condition and they treated him until Almario was cleared by the neurosurgeon
and orthopedic surgeon. In raising the case to the CA, Almario averred that one of the
company-designated physicians, Dr. Sarmiento, a rehabilitation specialist declared that he
was unfit to work and was advised to continue therapy even after 3 months of therapy
already. The CA reversed the findings of the NLRC and LA and ruled that Dr. Sarmiento’s
assessment should prevail since he issued an unfit to work certification eight days after Dr.
Hao-Quan issued the final report.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits?
RULING:
YES. The company-designated physicians failed to issue a valid medical assessment within
120 days from Almario’s repatriation. Consequently, Almario’s disability is considered
permnanent and total. The Court summarized the rules on the prescribed period for the
company-designated physician to issue a final medical assessment and the consequence for
failure to observe these periods: 1) the company-designated physician must issue a final
medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the
time the seafarer reported to him; 2) if the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability
becomes permanent and total; 3) if the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within 120 days with a sufficient justification, then the period of diagnoses and
treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and 4) if the company-designated
physician still fails to give his assessment within the 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability
becomes permanent and total, regardless or any justification. The 120 days must be
reckoned from the date of seafarer’s repatriation and the medical assessment must be final,
conclusive and definite. The assessment must state whether the seafarer is fit to work or
the exact disability rating, or whether such illness is work-related and without any further
condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the
physician.
The final report by Dr. Hao-Quan was issued eight days beyond the 120 day prescriptive
period and failed to justify why the assessment must be issued beyond the 120 days. The
report also failed to explain the progress of Almario’s treatment and recovery period, thus,
Almario’s disability is deemed permanent and total upon the lapse of 120 days. The
Certificate of Fitness for Work is not conclusive on Almario’s state of health, and a medical
assessment that does not reflect the true extent of the seafarer’s sickness or injury and their
capacity to resume work is incomplete and indefinite.

MUTIA V. C.F. SHARP CREW MGT., INC.
G.R. NO. 242928 DATE; 27 June 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: Section 20(E)of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable if the following conditions are
met: 1) the seafarer is suffering from a pre-existing illness or injury as defined under Item 11
(b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC; 2) the seafarer intentionally concealed the illness or injury; and 3)
the concealed pre-existing illness or injury has a causal or reasonable connection with the
illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract. It is enough that the concealed illness
or injury contributed to the seafarer’s disability. In the absence of these conditions, the
employers remain liable for work-related injury or illness consisted with their duties to
provide a seaworthy ship and to take precautions to avoid the seafarer’s accident or injury.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutia was hired as an assistant cook by respondent C.F. Sharp Crew
Management (C.F. Sharp). Mutia underwent a pre-employment medical examination
(PEME) and when asked whether he had a previous medical condition, including ear
trouble and deafness, he ticked the box “No.” However, his audiometry results showed that
he had mild hearing loss, as reflected in the PEME. Even so, he was found fit to work. On
several instances, while carrying heavy boxes, he fell to the floor. He was subsequently
brought to a Croatian hospital and had a CT scan of the brain and eye examination, which
yielded normal results but doctors suspected a clear vision disorder. He was repatriated to
the Philippines and had an MRI of his lumbar spine and was advised to undergo physical
therapy. Despite the therapies, he still had lower back pains which prompted him to
undergo another MRI. At this point, respondent stopped paying for Mutia’s treatment.
Mutia filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits and damages as he claimed
that he was incapacitated to perform his duties for more than 120 days and the company-
designated physician failed to make a definitive assessment of his condition within the
allowed period. The Labor Arbiter granted the claim for permanent total disability benefits.
The NLRC reversed the LA and held that Sec. 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC applies to all
pre-existing illnesses or conditions with no exception. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable because Mutia failed
to disclose his prior ear illness, an unrelated illness to his present claim for disability?
RULING:
NO. An illness shall be considered pre-existing illness under the 2010 POEA-SEC when the
advice of a doctor was given for such continuing illness or condition or the seafarer had
been diagnose of such illness but failed to disclose the same during the PEME and such
cannot be diagnosed during the PEME. The specific details on Mutia’s prior ear illness,
whether it was already healed or needed further treatment is unclear. The audiometry

result of Mutia’s hearing capacity was also not within the normal range. Further, Sec.20(E)
will still be inapplicable because Mutia’s prior ear illness is unrelated to his present medical
conditions. There is no proof that the ear condition caused or aggravated Mutia’s multiple
sclerosis and blurring vision. The concealed illness must be connected with the illness or
injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract and the concealment must be fraudulent. The
unrelatedness of Mutia’s prior ear illness and his present medical conditions negates an
intent to profit from the concealment. Section 20(E)of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable if
the following conditions are met: 1) the seafarer is suffering from a pre-existing illness or
injury as defined under Item 11 (b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC; 2) the seafarer intentionally
concealed the illness or injury; and 3) the concealed pre-existing illness or injury has a
causal or reasonable connection with the illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s
contract. It is enough that the concealed illness or injury contributed to the seafarer’s
disability. In the absence of these conditions, the employers remain liable for work-related
injury or illness consisted with their duties to provide a seaworthy ship and to take
precautions to avoid the seafarer’s accident or injury.

MUTIA V. C.F. SHARP CREW MGT., INC.
G.R. NO. 242928 27 June 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: Section 20(E)of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable if the following conditions are
met: 1) the seafarer is suffering from a pre-existing illness or injury as defined under Item 11
(b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC; 2) the seafarer intentionally concealed the illness or injury; and 3)
the concealed pre-existing illness or injury has a causal or reasonable connection with the
illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract. It is enough that the concealed illness
or injury contributed to the seafarer’s disability. In the absence of these conditions, the
employers remain liable for work-related injury or illness consisted with their duties to
provide a seaworthy ship and to take precautions to avoid the seafarer’s accident or injury.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutia was hired as an assistant cook by respondent C.F. Sharp Crew
Management (C.F. Sharp). Mutia underwent a pre-employment medical examination
(PEME) and when asked whether he had a previous medical condition, including ear
trouble and deafness, he ticked the box “No.” However, his audiometry results showed that
he had mild hearing loss, as reflected in the PEME. Even so, he was found fit to work. On
several instances, while carrying heavy boxes, he fell to the floor. He was subsequently
brought to a Croatian hospital and had a CT scan of the brain and eye examination, which
yielded normal results but doctors suspected a clear vision disorder. He was repatriated to
the Philippines and had an MRI of his lumbar spine and was advised to undergo physical
therapy. Despite the therapies, he still had lower back pains which prompted him to
undergo another MRI. At this point, respondent stopped paying for Mutia’s treatment.
Mutia filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits and damages as he claimed
that he was incapacitated to perform his duties for more than 120 days and the company-
designated physician failed to make a definitive assessment of his condition within the
allowed period. The Labor Arbiter granted the claim for permanent total disability benefits.
The NLRC reversed the LA and held that Sec. 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC applies to all
pre-existing illnesses or conditions with no exception. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 20(E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable because Mutia failed
to disclose his prior ear illness, an unrelated illness to his present claim for disability?
RULING:
NO. An illness shall be considered pre-existing illness under the 2010 POEA-SEC when the
advice of a doctor was given for such continuing illness or condition or the seafarer had
been diagnose of such illness but failed to disclose the same during the PEME and such
cannot be diagnosed during the PEME. The specific details on Mutia’s prior ear illness,
whether it was already healed or needed further treatment is unclear. The audiometry

result of Mutia’s hearing capacity was also not within the normal range. Further, Sec.20(E)
will still be inapplicable because Mutia’s prior ear illness is unrelated to his present medical
conditions. There is no proof that the ear condition caused or aggravated Mutia’s multiple
sclerosis and blurring vision. The concealed illness must be connected with the illness or
injury suffered during the seafarer’s contract and the concealment must be fraudulent. The
unrelatedness of Mutia’s prior ear illness and his present medical conditions negates an
intent to profit from the concealment. Section 20(E)of the 2010 POEA-SEC is applicable if
the following conditions are met: 1) the seafarer is suffering from a pre-existing illness or
injury as defined under Item 11 (b) of the 2010 POEA-SEC; 2) the seafarer intentionally
concealed the illness or injury; and 3) the concealed pre-existing illness or injury has a
causal or reasonable connection with the illness or injury suffered during the seafarer’s
contract. It is enough that the concealed illness or injury contributed to the seafarer’s
disability. In the absence of these conditions, the employers remain liable for work-related
injury or illness consisted with their duties to provide a seaworthy ship and to take
precautions to avoid the seafarer’s accident or injury.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION V. MAGLALANG
G.R. NO. 255864 6 July 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The finding that an employee violated company rules and regulations is subject
to scrutiny by the Court to determine if the dismissal is justified and if so, whether the penalty
imposed is commensurate to the gravity of his offense, The following factors should be
considered in determining whether theft of company property by an employee warrants the
penalty of dismissal: a) period of employment and existence of a derogatory record; b) value
of the property involved; c) cost of damage to the employer; d) effect on the viability of
employer’s operation or company’s interest; and e) employee’s position.
FACTS:
Respondent Roberto Maglalang started working as petitioner Universal Robina

Corporation’s (URC) machine operator in 1997. In 2015, he went to the parking lot to clean
his motorcycle using the alcohol provided by the company for the employees’ use within
the company premises. The security guard noticed the bottle of alcohol in his bag. He was
criminally charged with qualified theft and was placed under preventive suspension.
During the pendency of the case, URC received apology letters with pleas for the
withdrawal of the criminal case and reinstatement of respondent. The parties entered into
a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to waive any and all claims they may have
against one another, given URC’s withdrawal of the criminal case. However, URC denied
respondent’s request for reinstatement and payment of money claims. Respondent filed an
illegal dismissal case against URC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit
and found respondent guilty of serious misconduct for theft of company property. NLRC
upheld the LA’s findings. The CA ruled that respondent was only guilty of simple
misconduct because URC recovered the bottle of alcohol and its value was only P60.00.
Thus, the penalty of dismissal was not commensurate with the misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not the value of the company property stolen, damage to the company,
and employee’s length of service may be considered in determining the gravity of the
misconduct committed?
RULING:
YES. Misconduct, to be a just cause for dismissal, must conform to the following elements:
a) misconduct must be serious; b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer;
and c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. However, the finding that an
employee violated company rules and regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to
determine if the dismissal is justified and if so, whether the penalty imposed is
commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The following factors should be considered in

determining whether theft of company property by an employee warrants the penalty of
dismissal: a) period of employment and existence of a derogatory record; b) value of the
property involved; c) cost of damage to the employer; d) effect on the viability of employer’s
operation or company’s interest; and e) employee’s position. Respondent has been in ERC
for 18 years and has a clean record. The bottle of ethyl alcohol valued at P60.00 is very
minimal and URC did not lose anything as the bottle was timely retrieved. It was also not
shown that respondent’s retention would work undue prejudice to URC’s operations or is
inimical to its interest. Neither does respondent occupy a position of trust and confidence.
Hence, the penalty of dismissal is not proportional with respondent’s misconduct.

CONJUSTA V. PPI HOLDINGS INC.
G.R. NO. 252720 22 August 2022
J. M.V. Lopez
DOCTRINE: The following must be considered in determining whether CBMI is a legitimate

job contractor or is engaged in labor-only contracting: 1) registration with the proper
government agencies; 2) existence of substantial capital or investment; 3) service agreement
that ensures compliance with all the rights and benefits under labor laws; 4) nature of the
activities performed by the employees – if they are usually necessary or desirable to the
operation of the principal or directly related to the main business of the principal; and 5) the
exercise of the right to control the performance of employee’s work. The previous declarations
that a company is an independent job contractor cannot validly be the basis in concluding its
status as such in another case involving a different employee.
FACTS:
Respondent PPI Holdings, Inc. (PPI) hired petitioner Conjusta as a messenger. Eventually,
Conjusta’s employment was transferred to a manpower agency, Consolidated Buildings
Maintenance, Inc. (CBMI). Despite such transfer, he continued to be PPI’s messenger. PPI
then terminated his services. Conjusta filed an illegal dismissal case with money claims
against PPI and CBMI arguing that he was PPI’s regular employee for having worked with
it for 14 years. PPI denied having an employer-employee relationship and argued that he
was merely assigned to it by CBMI, a legitimate job contractor that rendered allied services
to PPI until the termination of the contract of services agreement. CBMI acknowledged
Consulta as its employee assigned to PPI and denied terminating his services as he was
merely placed on floating status. The LA ruled that CBMI is a legitimate job contractor but
Consulta was PPI’s regular employee as he performed tasks which are usually necessary or
desirable to PPI’s main business and. The NLRC ruled that CBMI is a labor-only contractor
and affirmed the LA’s findings that Conjusta’s job as a messenger is necessary and vital to
PPI’s business as the franchisee of Pizza Hut. The CA ruled that CBMI is a legitimate job
contractor applying the ruling in CBMI v. Asprec and PPI v. Cayetano, but still found that
Consulta was illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that CBMI was a legitimate job contractor
and consequently was Conjusta’s direct employer?
RULING:
YES. PPI and CBMI were engaged in the proscribed labor-only contracting. The elements
of labor-only contracting under DO No. 18-A are: a) the contractor does not have
substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the employees recruited and placed are performing activities
which are usually necessary or desirable to the operation of the company, or directly related
to the main business of the principal within a definite or predetermined period, regardless

or whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the
premises of the principal; or the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the
performance of the work of the employee. In fine, the following must be considered in
determining whether CBMI is a legitimate job contractor or is engaged in labor-only
contracting: 1) registration with the proper government agencies; 2) existence of substantial
capital or investment; 3) service agreement that ensures compliance with all the rights and
benefits under labor laws; 4) nature of the activities performed by the employees – iif they
are usually necessary or desirable to the operation of the principal or directly related to the
main business of the principal; and 5) the exercise of the right to control the performance
of employee’s work. While CBMI submitted the certificates of registration, financial
statements and service agreements, a certificate of registration as an independent contract
is not conclusive evidence of such status and merely prevents the legal presumption of
being a labor-only contractor from arising. Furthermore, the true nature of the relationship
between the principal, contractor and employee cannot be dictated by mere expedience of
a unilateral declaration in a contract. CBMI is a labor-only contractor and is considered as
a mere agent of PPI. Furthermore, previous declarations that a company is an independent
job contractor cannot validly be the basis in concluding its status as such in another case
involving a different employee.

Labor Law Case Digests J. M.V. Lopez

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LABOR LAW

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 1

Ruling of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 2

ISSUE: Whether the illness of Jamias is compensable?

The unceremonious issuance of the fit-to-work certification to Jamias, is a complete

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 3

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 4

ISSUE: Whether Pedro and Maricel are employees or partners?

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 5

Ruling of the CSC

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 6

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 7

DOCTRINE: The concealment of a pre-existing medical condition by a seafarer disqualifies

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 8

ISSUE: Whether a seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance/benefits and attorney’s fees

An illness shall be considered as pre-existing if prior to the processing of the POEA

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 9

DOCTRINE: A seafarer is bound by the company-designated doctor’s finding if there is

On 15 December 2006, the company-designated surgeon removed the sutures and

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 10

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 11

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 12

Ruling of the NCMB Voluntary Arbitrator

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 13

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 14

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 15

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 16

DOCTRINE: The rounding-off method used by a government-owned-and-controlled

The National Transmission Corporation (TransCo) is a government-owned-and-controlled

Some disbursements were disallowed by the Commission on Audit totaling P51,989,990.91

Ruling of the Commission on Audit

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 17

SEC. 64. Fiscal Prudence. — To promote the prudent management of government

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 18

DOCTRINE: Backwages may be granted to a government employee if the employee’s

On 29 October 2001, Cutamora authorized in writing Maneja, a Secondary School Teach in

Ruling of the Civil Service Commission

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 19

Considering the pendency of respondent's appeal with the Commission, prudence

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 20

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether Salazar perfected his appeal with the NLRC?

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 21

As Nicol v. Footjoy Industrial Corporation aptly summarized:

JUSTICE M.V. LOPEZ PONENCIAS | LABOR LAW | 22