Ece Trans 180 Add.13 Amend1e
Ece Trans 180 Add.13 Amend1e
1
17 July 2023
Global registry
Amendment 1
_______________
UNITED NATIONS
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
"Contents
Page
I. Statement of technical rationale and justification ............................................................................ 4
A. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4
B. Scope of Work for Phase 1 and Phase 2 .................................................................................. 5
C. Description of typical hydrogen-fuelled vehicles .................................................................... 6
1. Vehicle description .......................................................................................................... 6
2. Hydrogen Fuelling System .............................................................................................. 9
3. Hydrogen Storage System ............................................................................................... 9
4. Hydrogen Fuel Delivery System ..................................................................................... 11
5. Fuel Cell System ............................................................................................................ 11
6. Electric Propulsion and Power Management System ...................................................... 12
7. Internal Combustion Engine ............................................................................................ 12
D. Rationale for Scope, Definitions and Applicability ................................................................. 12
1. Rationale for paragraph 2. (Scope) .................................................................................. 12
2. Rationale for paragraphs 3.9. and 3.48. (Definitions of Service Life and Date of Removal
from Service) ................................................................................................................... 13
3. Rationale for paragraph 4. (Applicability of Requirements) ........................................... 13
E. Rationale for paragraph 5. (Performance Requirements) ........................................................ 14
1. Compressed Hydrogen Storage System Test Requirements and Safety Needs ............... 14
2. Vehicle fuel system requirements and safety needs ........................................................ 52
F. Rationale for Storage and Fuel System Test Procedures ........................................................ 55
1. Rationale for Storage and Fuel System Integrity Tests .................................................. 55
2. Rationale for paragraph 6.2. (Test Procedures for Compressed Hydrogen
Storage Systems) ............................................................................................................ 57
G. Optional Requirements: Vehicles with Liquefied Hydrogen Storage Systems / Rationale ..... 59
1. Background Information for Liquefied Hydrogen Storage Systems ............................... 59
2. Rationale for Liquefied Hydrogen Storage System Design Qualification Requirements of
Paragraph 7.2................................................................................................................... 60
3. Rationale for Vehicle Fuel System Design Qualification Requirements (LH2) .............. 63
4. Rationale for Test Procedures for LHSSs ....................................................................... 63
5. Rationale for paragraph 7.5. (Test Procedure for Post-Crash Concentration
Measurement for Vehicles with Liquefied Hydrogen Storage Systems) ......................... 63
H. National Provisions for Material Compatibility (Including Hydrogen Embrittlement) and
Conformity of Production ........................................................................................................ 66
1. Material Compatibility and Hydrogen Embrittlement .................................................... 66
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A. Introduction
1. In the ongoing debate over the need to identify new sources of energy and to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, companies around the world have explored the use of various
alternative fuels, including compressed natural gas, liquefied propane gas and hydrogen.
Hydrogen has emerged as one of the most promising alternatives due to its vehicle emissions
being virtually zero. In the late 1990s, the European Community allocated resources to study
the issue under its European Integrated Hydrogen Project (EIHP) and forwarded the results,
two proposals for compressed gaseous and liquefied hydrogen, to the ECE secretariat. The
follow-up project, EIHP2, initiated discussions about the possibility of a global technical
regulation for hydrogen-fuelled vehicles. A few years later, the United States of America
outlined a vision for a global initiative, the International Partnership for the Hydrogen
Economy, and invited China, Japan, the Russian Federation, the European Union and many
other countries to participate in this effort.
2. For decades scientists, researchers and economists have pointed to hydrogen, in both
compressed gaseous and liquid forms, as a possible alternative to gasoline and diesel as a
vehicle fuel. Ensuring the safe use of hydrogen as a fuel is a critical element in successful
transitioning to a global hydrogen economy. By their nature, all fuels present an inherent
degree of danger due to their energy content. The safe use of hydrogen, particularly in the
compressed gaseous form, lies in preventing catastrophic failures involving a combination of
fuel, air and ignition sources as well as pressure and electrical hazards.
3. Governments have identified the development of regulations and standards as one of
the key requirements for commercialization of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles. Regulations and
standards will help overcome technological barriers to commercialization, facilitate
manufacturers’ investment in building hydrogen-fuelled vehicles and facilitate public
acceptance by providing a systematic and accurate means of assessing and communicating
the risk associated with the use of hydrogen vehicles, be it to the general public, consumer,
emergency response personnel or the insurance industry.
4. The development of this United Nations Global Technical Regulation (UN GTR) for
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Vehicles occurred within the World Forum for Harmonization of
Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) of the Inland Transport Committee (ITC) of ECE. The goals
of this global technical regulation (UN GTR) are to develop and establish a UN GTR for
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles that: (i) attains or exceeds the equivalent levels of safety of those
for conventional gasoline fuelled vehicles; and (ii) is performance-based and does not restrict
future technologies.
5. On 27 June 2013, UN GTR No. 13, (ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13) was established under
the sponsorship of Germany, Japan and the United States of America. UN GTR 13 applies to
all hydrogen-fuelled vehicles of Categories 1-1 and 1-2, with a gross vehicle mass (GVM) of
4,536 kilograms or less. UN GTR No. 13 consists of three main sections: high voltage system,
hydrogen storage system and hydrogen fuel system at vehicle level. The UN GTR provides
provisions for in-use and post-crash scenarios.
6. The representatives of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the European Union
submitted a proposal authorizing the development of Phase 2 of the United Nations Global
Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 13 by the informal working group on Hydrogen and Fuel
Cell Vehicles – Subgroup safety (IWG HFCV-SGS) (ECE/TRANS/WP.29/2017/56 -
ECE/TRANS/WP.29/AC.3/49). This authorization was transmitted to the Working Party on
Passive Safety (GRSP) who advised that Phase 2 should begin immediately after the
authorization is endorsed by WP.29 and AC.3 at their March 2017 sessions. The work of the
IWG on HFCV-SGS, Phase 2 is scheduled to be completed by the end of the year 2020. The
mandate was extended until December 2022 by WP.29 and AC.3. at their November 2020
and March 2022 sessions.
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Avoid design specific requirements to the extent possible and do not include
provisions that are not technically justified. The main areas of focus are:
(i) Performance requirements for hydrogen storage systems, high-pressure
closures, pressure relief devices, and fuel lines;
(ii) Electrical isolation, safety and protection against electric shock (in use);
(iii) Performance and other requirements for subsystem integration in the
vehicle.
(b) Vehicle-level requirements:
Examine the risks posed by the different types of fuel systems in different crash
modes. Review and evaluate analyses and crash tests conducted to examine the
risks and identify appropriate mitigating measures for hydrogen-fuelled
vehicles. The main areas of focus are as follows:
(i) In-use and post-crash limits on hydrogen releases. Post-crash leakage
limits apply following execution of crash tests (front, side and rear) that
are specified in national requirements for crash safety testing in each
jurisdiction;
(ii) In-use and post-crash requirements for electrical isolation and
protection against electric shock. Post-crash electrical safety criteria
apply following execution of crash tests (front, side and rear) that are
specified in national requirements for crash safety testing in each
jurisdiction.
11. An extension of the mandate for the HFCV-SGS IWG, sponsored by the European
Union, Japan and the Republic of Korea, shall tackle the development of the remaining
issues. Phase 2 activities should begin immediately after the authorization is endorsed by
WP.29 and AC.3 at their March 2017 sessions.
12. IWG will address the following items:
(a) Original items described in ECE/TRANS/WP.29/AC.3/17 shall be kept;
(b) Potential scope revision to address additional vehicle classes;
(c) Requirements for material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement;
(d) Requirements for the fuelling receptacle;
(e) Editorial or technical amendments on each requirement and test procedure;
(f) Revisions based on the research results reported after completion of Phase 1 –
specifically research related to hydrogen storage systems, fire test, and post-
crash safety;
(g) Revision to 200 per cent Nominal Working Pressure (NWP) or lower as the
minimum burst requirement;
(h) Revisions for the new types of containers such as conformable tanks.
1. Vehicle description
13. Hydrogen-fuelled vehicles can use either internal combustion engine (ICEs) or fuel
cells to provide power. Hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) have an electric drive-
train powered by a fuel cell that generates electric power electrochemically using hydrogen.
In general, HFCVs are equipped with other advanced technologies that increase efficiency,
such as regenerative braking systems that capture the kinetic energy lost during braking and
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store it in a battery or ultra-capacitors. While the various HFCVs are likely to differ in the
details of the systems and hardware/software implementations, the following major systems
are common to most HFCVs:
(a) Hydrogen fuelling system;
(b) Hydrogen storage system;
(c) Hydrogen fuel delivery system;
(d) Fuel cell system;
(e) Electric propulsion and power management system.
14. A high-level schematic depicting the functional interactions of the major systems in a
hydrogen-fuelled fuel cell vehicle (HFCV) is shown in Figure 1. During fuelling, hydrogen
is supplied to the vehicle through the fuelling receptacle and flows to the hydrogen storage
system. The hydrogen supplied to and stored within the hydrogen storage system can be
either compressed gaseous or liquefied hydrogen. When the vehicle is started, hydrogen gas
is released from the hydrogen storage system. Pressure regulators and other equipment within
the hydrogen delivery system reduce the pressure to the appropriate level for operation of the
fuel cell system. The hydrogen is electro-chemically combined with oxygen (from air) within
the fuel cell system to produce high-voltage electric power. That electric power is supplied
to the electric propulsion power management system where it is used to power electric drive
motors and/or charge batteries and ultra-capacitors.
Figure 1
Example of a High-level Schematic of the Key Systems in HFCVs
A. Hydrogen Fueling C. Hydrogen D. Fuel Cell System E. Electric Propulsion
Delivery Power Management
Fueling Exhaust
Receptacle Batteries
Cathode Anode Super/
Exhaust Exhaust Ultra
Capacitors
T/PRD Z Check
Valve Fuel Electric
Flow Cell Power
Shutoff Regulator Controller Management
Valve
Hydrogen
Storage Air Blower Drive Motor
Container Controller & Drive
Electric Motor
Braking
B. Hydrogen Storage
15. Figures 2 to 4 illustrate typical layouts of key components in the major systems of a
typical hydrogen fuel cell vehicle (HFCV). The fuelling receptacle is shown in a typical
position on the rear quarter panel of the passenger car, however, positioning may vary
depending on the vehicle type. As with gasoline containers, hydrogen storage containers,
whether compressed gas or liquefied hydrogen, are usually mounted transversely in the rear
of passenger car, but could also be mounted differently, such as lengthwise in the middle
tunnel of the vehicle or on the roof in case of buses. Fuel cells and ancillaries are usually
located (as shown) under the passenger compartment or in the traditional "engine
compartment," along with the power management, drive motor controller, and drive motors.
Given the size and weight of traction batteries and ultra-capacitors, these components are
usually located in the vehicle to retain the desired weight balance for proper handling of the
vehicle.
16. Typical arrangements of componentry of hydrogen-fuelled vehicles with compressed
hydrogen storage and powered by a fuel cell is shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4.
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Figure 2
Example of a Hydrogen Fuel Cell Passenger Car
Fueling
Receptacle
Hydrogen
Storage
Figure 3
Example of a hydrogen fuel cell bus
Traction Battery
Hydrogen Line
Bulkhead
Servo Pump
Junction Box
Junction Box
Air Compressor
Traction Motor
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Figure 4
Example of a hydrogen fuel cell truck
Hydrogen Tanks
Battery Packs
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Figure 5
Typical Compressed Hydrogen Storage System
Check
TPRD Valve
vent
Shut-off
Valve
Storage
Containment
Container
Vessel
22. The hydrogen storage containers store the compressed hydrogen gas. A hydrogen
storage system may contain more than one container depending on the amount that needs to
be stored and the physical constraints of the particular vehicle. Hydrogen fuel has a low
energy density per unit volume. To overcome this limitation, compressed hydrogen storage
containers store the hydrogen at very high pressures. On current development vehicles (prior
to 2011), hydrogen has typically been stored at a nominal working pressure of 35 MPa or 70
MPa, with maximum fuelling pressures of 125 per cent of nominal working pressure (43.8
MPa or 87.5 MPa respectively). During the normal "fast fill" fuelling process, the pressure
inside the container(s) may rise to 25 per cent above the nominal working pressure as
adiabatic compression of the gas causes heating within the containers. As the temperature in
the container cools after fuelling, the pressure is reduced. By definition, the settled pressure
of the system will be equal to the nominal working pressure when the container is at 15 °C.
Different pressures (that are higher or lower or in between current selections) are possible in
the future as commercialization proceeds.
23. Containers are currently constructed from composite materials in order to meet the
challenge of high pressure containment of hydrogen at a weight that is acceptable for
vehicular applications. Most high-pressure hydrogen storage containers used in fuel cell or
ICE vehicles consist of two layers: an inner liner that prevents gas leakage/permeation
(usually made of metal or thermoplastic polymer), and an outer layer that provides structural
integrity (usually made of metal or thermoset resin-impregnated fibre-reinforced composite
wrapped over the gas-sealing inner liner).
24. A container may store hydrogen in a single chamber or in multiple permanently
interconnected chambers. Closure should not occur between the permanently interconnected
chambers. Disassembly of a container should not be permitted and should result in permanent
removal from service of the container.
25. A container might have container attachments that are non-pressure bearing parts
which provide additional support and/or protection to the container.
26. During fuelling, hydrogen enters the storage system through a check valve. The check
valve prevents back-flow of hydrogen into the fuelling line.
27. An automated hydrogen shut-off valve prevents the out-flow of stored hydrogen when
the vehicle is not operating or when a fault is detected that requires isolation of the hydrogen
storage system.
28. In the event of a fire, thermally activated pressure relief devices (TPRDs) provide a
controlled release of the gas from the compressed hydrogen storage containers before the
high temperatures in the fire weaken the containers and cause a hazardous rupture. TPRDs
are designed to vent the entire contents of the container rapidly. They do not reseat or allow
re-pressurization of the container. Storage containers and TPRDs that have been subjected to
a fire are expected to be removed from service and destroyed.
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vehicle to prevent electrical shorts that could damage equipment or harm people if the
insulation is breeched.
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2. Rationale for paragraphs 3.9. and 3.48. (Definitions of Service Life and Date of
Removal from Service)
46. These definitions pertain to qualification of the compressed hydrogen storage system
for on-road service. The service life is the maximum time period for which service (usage) is
qualified and/or authorized. This document provides qualification criteria for liquid and
compressed hydrogen storage systems having a service life of 25 years or less (para. 5.1.).
The service life is specified by the manufacturer.
47. The date of removal from service is the calendar date (month and year) specified for
removal from service. The date of removal from service may be set by a regulatory authority.
It is expected to be the date of release by the manufacturer for initial usage plus the service
life.
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regulation. Hydrogen containers may be unlikely to experience gunfire during their service,
but there could be implications for security, vandalism or terrorism."
57. Comparable stringency with current national regulations for on-road service was
assured through examination of the technical basis for requirements of individual contracting
parties with respect to on-road safety and subsequent recognition that the relevant expected
safety objective is achieved by the UN GTR requirement. Two examples are noteworthy.
(a) First example: some national regulations have required that compressed
storage be subjected to 45,000 full-fill hydraulic cycles without rupture if no
intervening leak occurs;
(b) Second example: an overriding requirement for initial burst pressure
(> 225 per cent NWP for carbon fibre composite containers and > 350 per cent
NWP for glass fibre composite containers) has been used previously in some
places for lower pressure CNG containers. The basis for this type of burst
pressure requirement for new (unused) containers was examined. A credible
quantitative, data-driven basis for historical requirements linked to demands of
on-road service was not identified. Instead, modern engineering methods of
identifying stressful conditions of service from decades of experience with
real-world usage and designing qualification tests to replicate and compound
extremes of those conditions were used to force systems to demonstrate
capability to function and survive a lifetime’s exposure. However, a risk factor
that could be identified as not already addressed by other test requirements and
for which a burst pressure test would be relevant was the demonstration of
capability to resist burst from over-pressurization by a fuelling station through-
out service life. The more stringent test condition applies to containers at the
"end-of-life" (as simulated by extreme test conditions) rather than new
(unused) containers. Therefore, a residual (end-of-life) requirement of
exposure (without burst) to 180 per cent NWP for 4 minutes was adopted based
on the demonstrated equivalence of the probability for failure after 4 min at
180 per cent NWP to failure after 10 hours at 150 per cent NWP (based on
time to failure data for "worst-case" glass composite strands). Maximum
fuelling station over-pressurization is taken as 150 per cent NWP. Experiments
on highly insulated containers have shown cool down from compressive
heating lasting on the order of 10 hours. An additional requirement
corresponding to minimum burst pressure of 200 per cent NWP for new,
unused containers has been under consideration as a screen for minimum new
containers capability with potential to complete the durability test sequence
requiring burst pressure above 180 per cent NWP considering < ±10 per cent
variability in new containers strength. The historical minimum, 225 per cent
NWP has been adopted in this document as a conservative placeholder without
a quantitative data-driven basis but instead using previous history in some
Contracting Parties with the expectation that additional consideration and
data/analyses will be available to support the 225 per cent NWP value or for
reconsideration of the minimum new containers burst requirement.
58. The historical minimum of 225 per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite containers,
had been adopted as a placeholder because of the lack of quantitative data in UN GTR No.
13, Phase 1. In subsequent discussions of Phase 2, the capability of containers to achieve the
end-of-life burst pressure of 180 per cent NWP was verified based on the data of carbon-fibre
composite containers for 70 MPa provided by Japan, assuming that the variation of the initial
burst pressure is within BPO ±10 per cent. As a result, it has been validated that the initial
burst pressure should be specified as 200 per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite
containers.
59. The requirement of paragraph 5.1.1.2. (baseline initial pressure cycle life) is
22,000 cycles. The 22,000 full-fill cycles correspond to well over 7 million vehicles
kilometres travelled in lifetime service (at 350-500 km travelled per full-fuelling). Since the
expected lifetime service is far less than 1 million km, the requirement for 22,000 pressure
cycles was judged to provide substantial margin above extreme worst-case vehicle service.
Second, there are various provisions in national standards to assure sufficient strength to
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survive exposures to static (parking) and cyclic (fuelling) pressure exposures with residual
strength. The capability to survive individual static and cyclic pressure exposures has
generally been evaluated by tests that are the equivalent of paragraphs 5.1.2.4., 5.1.2.5.
and 5.1.2.6., but with each performed on a separate new container. An overriding requirement
for initial burst pressure (>225 per cent NWP for carbon-fibre composite containers and >350
per cent NWP for glass-fibre composite containers) was commonly used to indirectly account
for un-replicated factors such as the compounding of individually applied stresses and
chemical/physical impacts and ability to survive over-pressurizations in fuelling. The UN
GTR requirements, however, provide for direct accounting for these factors with explicit
replication of the compounding of stresses and chemical/physical impacts and
over-pressurizations. Unlike conditions for other gaseous fuels, specifications for hydrogen
fuelling provide safeguards to limit potential over-pressurizations to extremes replicated in
container testing. In addition, the UN GTR requirements assure residual strength for end-of-
life extreme over-pressurization with retained stability sufficient to assure capability to resist
burst at pressures near (within 20 per cent) of new container capability. All of the UN GTR
requirements are explicitly derived using published data that clearly and quantitatively links
the test criteria to specified aspects of safe on-road performance. Thus, criteria providing
indirect inference of safe performance through-out service life and at end-of-life were
replaced with criteria providing direct verification of capability for safe performance at end-
of-life under compounded worst-case exposure conditions; hence, the result is added
stringency in assurance in capability for safe performance throughout service life. Examples
of such added stringency include the UN GTR requirement for pressure cycle testing with
hydrogen gas at extreme temperatures (para. 5.1.3.2.) rather than ambient temperature only,
permeation testing with hydrogen gas at extreme temperature and at replicated end-of-life
(para. 5.1.3.3.), end-of-life residual strength (para. 5.1.2.7.) after compounded exposure to
multiple stress factors (para. 5.1.2.), and localized and engulfing fire testing (para. 5.1.4.).
6049. The following sections (paras 5.1.1. to 5.1.4.) specify the rationale for the performance
requirements established in para. 5.1. for the integrity of the compressed hydrogen storage
system.
(a) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.1. verification tests for baseline metrics
61. Verification tests for baseline metrics have several uses: (i) verify that systems
presented for design qualification (the qualification batch) are consistent in their properties
and are consistent with manufacturer’s records for production quality control; (ii) establish
the median initial burst pressure, which is used for performance verification testing
(paras. 5.1.2. and 5.1.3.) and can be used for production quality control (i.e., to assure
conformity of production with properties of the qualification batch), and (iii) verify that
requirements are met for the minimum burst pressure and number of pressure cycles before
leak.
62. The baseline initial burst pressure requirements differ from the "end-of-life" burst
pressure requirements that conclude the test sequences in paragraphs 5.1.2. and 5.1.3. The
baseline burst pressure pertains to a new, unused container and the "end-of-life" burst
pressure pertains to a container that has completed a series of performance tests
(paragraphs 5.1.2. or 5.1.3.) that replicate conditions of worst-case usage and environmental
exposure in a full service life. Since fatigue accumulates over usage and exposure conditions,
it is expected that the "end-of-life" burst pressure (i.e. burst strength) could be lower than that
of a new and unexposed container.
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this UN GTR. For example, a 200 per cent minimum initial burst pressure requirement can
be supported by the data-driven performance-linked justification that a greater-than 180 per
cent NWP end-of-service burst requirement (linked to capability to survive the maximum
fuelling station over-pressurization) combined with a 20 per cent lifetime decline (maximum
allowed) from median initial burst strength is equivalent to a requirement for a median initial
burst strength of 225 per cent NWP, which corresponds to a minimum burst strength of
200per cent NWP for the maximum allowed 10per cent variability in initial strength. The
interval between Phase I and Phase II provides opportunity for development of new data or
analysis pertaining to a 225 per cent NWP (or another per cent NWP) minimum prior to
resolution of the topic in Phase 2.
64. In paragraph 5.1.1.1., the minimum initial burst pressure was specified as 225 per cent
NWP for carbon fibre containers (and 350 per cent NWP for glass fibre containers) as a
historical placeholder in UN GTR No. 13, Phase 1.
65. In subsequent discussions of Phase 2, Japan presented data from experiments using
carbon-fibre composite containers for 70 MPa, to support the minimum initial burst pressure
change from 225 per cent NWP to 200 per cent NWP for carbon fibre containers only
(Tomioka, J. et al. (2019 September); "Influences of Hydraulic Sequential Tests on the Burst
Strength of Type-4 Compressed Hydrogen Containers." 2019 International Conference on
Hydrogen Safety. Technical Paper ID 159).
Note: the requirement for glass fibre containers remains unchanged at 350 per cent NWP.
Figure 6
Relationship between the initial burst pressure and end-of-life burst pressure
(estimated)
+10%
Burst pressure [% NWP]
+10%
BP
0 -10%
-10%
BP
EOL
225
-10%
200
180
180%NWP
0
Initial End of life
66. The relationship between the current initial burst pressure requirement and the
estimated end-of-life burst pressure requirement is shown in Figure 6. The Japanese
experiment showed that containers which met the BPO ±10 per cent requirement and
subjected to the hydraulic sequential tests, were able to meet end-of-life burst pressure of at
least 180 per cent NWP, even if the minimum initial burst pressure is reduced to 200 per cent
NWP.
67. Verification method via the sequential hydraulic tests: The variation in initial burst
pressure and end-of-life burst pressure, as well as the average of degradation ratio between
the initial and the end-of-life burst pressure were investigated using test data from carbon-
fibre containers (N ≥ 10). The containers were selected from a single batch with known
capability of greater than 225 per cent NWP initial burst pressure.
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Figure 7
Results from the Verification Test
+8% (result)
+8% (result)
BP0 -5% (result)
Burst pressure [% NWP]
BPEOL
-7%
225
-16%
200
BPmin ≥200% NWP
180
BPEOL ≥180% NWP
(Safety requirement)
0
Initial End of life
Figure 8
BPO and BPEOL Distribution
Initial burst pressure End of life burst pressure
+10%
BP0 BPEOL
-10%
68. The test results are shown in Figure 7. The minimum value of the initial burst pressure
was greater than 225 per cent, and within the ±10 per cent of BP O requirement. The end-of-
life burst pressure, which takes into account the variation and degradation ratio due to testing,
was greater than 180 per cent NWP. It was also greater than 80 per cent of BPO by a sufficient
margin (Figure 8).
69. The results show that the minimum initial burst pressure of 225 per cent NWP can be
reduced to 200 per cent NWP while maintaining end-of-life burst pressure (BPEOL) above
180 per cent NWP and 80 per cent of BPO requirements.
70. This conclusion applies to all containers based on an application of BP min relative to
design NWP. There is currently no evidence that variability is dependent on NWP. However,
in Phase 2 discussions, another Contracting Party stated that the data to change the initial
burst pressure requirement of the containers for 35 MPa is not sufficient. Therefore, the
requirement value for the carbon-fibre composite containers for 35 MPa was left at 225 per
cent NWP as an option for Contracting Parties with the expectation that additional data or
analysis will become available in the future. While the minimum initial burst pressure of 200
per cent NWP for the carbon-fibre containers is considered sufficient as a performance-based
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requirement for UN GTR No. 13, the verification data are based on the tests with containers
selected from a single batch. The production quality related to the variation between different
production batches, etc. shall be recognized as the responsibility of container manufacturers.
71. In addition to being a performance requirement, it is expected that satisfaction of this
requirement will provide assurance to the testing facility of container stability before the
qualification testing specified in paras. 5.1.2., 5.1.3. and 5.1.4. is undertaken.
(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.1.2. baseline initial pressure cycle life
72. The requirement specifies that three (3) randomly selected new containers are to be
hydraulically pressure cycled to 125 per cent NWP without rupture for 22,000 cycles or until
leak occurs. Leak shall not occur within 7,500 or 11,000 cycles for light-duty vehicles (LDV),
determined at the discretion of Contracting Parties, and 11,000 cycles for heavy-duty vehicles
(HDV). For a service life of over 15 years and up to 25 years, the number of pressure cycles
in which no leakage may occur is 11,000. The rationale for the numerical values used in this
specification follows:
a. Rationale for "Leak before burst" aspect of baseline pressure cycle life requirements
73. The baseline pressure cycle life requirement is designed to provide an initial check for
resistance to rupture due to the pressure cycling during on-road service. The baseline pressure
cycle test requires either (i) the occurrence of leakage (that is designed to result in vehicle
shut down and subsequent repair or removal of the container from service (para. 5.2.1.4.3.))
before the occurrence of rupture, or (ii) the capability to sustain 22,000 full-fill hydraulic
pressure cycles without rupture or leakage.
74. Regardless of the container failure mode, this requirement provides sufficient
protection for safe container use over the life of the vehicle. The minimum distance travelled
prior to a container leaking would depend on a number of factors including the number of
cycles chosen by the Contracting Party and the fill mileage for the vehicle. Regardless, the
minimum design of 7,500 cycles before leak and using only 320 km (200 miles) per fill
provides over 1.6 million km (1 million miles) before the container would fail by leakage.
Worst case scenario would be failure by rupture in which case the container shall be capable
of withstanding 22,000 cycles. For vehicles with nominal on-road driving range of 480 km
(300 miles) per full fuelling, 22,000 full fill cycles correspond to over 10 million km (6
million miles), which is beyond a realistic extreme of on-road vehicle lifetime range (see
discussion in para.5.1.1.2.2. below). Hence, either the container demonstrates the capability
to avoid failure (leak or rupture) from exposure to the pressure cycling in on-road service, or
leakage occurs before rupture and thereby prevents continued service that could potentially
lead to rupture.
75. A greater number of pressure cycles, 22,000, is required for demonstration of
resistance to rupture (in the absence of intervening leak) compared to the number of cycles
required for demonstration of resistance to leak (between 7,500 and 11,000) because the
higher severity of a rupture event suggests that the probability of that event per pressure cycle
should be lower than the probability of the less severe leak event. Risk = (probability of
event) x (severity of event).
(Note: cycling to a higher pressure than 125 per cent NWP could elicit failure in less testing
time, however, that could elicit failure modes that could not occur in real world service.)
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
(a) Vehicle fleet odometer data (including taxis): Sierra Research Report No.
SR2004-09-04 for the California Air Resource Board (2004) reported on
vehicle lifetime distance travelled by scrapped California vehicles, which all
showed lifetime distances travelled below 560,000 km (350,000 miles). Based
on these figures and 320 - 480 km (200 - 300 miles) driven per full fuelling,
the maximum number of lifetime empty-to-full fuellings can be estimated as
1,200 – 1,800;
(b) Vehicle fleet odometer data (including taxis): Transport Canada reported that
required emissions testing in British Columbia, Canada, in 2009 showed the 5
most extreme usage vehicles had odometer readings in the 800,000 – 1,000,000
km (500,000 – 600,000 miles) range. Using the reported model year for each
of these vehicles, this corresponds to less than 300 full fuellings per year, or
less than 1 full fuelling per day. Based on these figures and 320 - 480 km (200
- 300 miles) driven per full fuelling, the maximum number of empty-to-full
fuellings can be estimated as 1,650 – 3,100;
(c) Taxi usage (Shifts/Day and Days/Week) data: The New York City (NYC)
taxicab fact book (Schaller Consulting, 2006) reports extreme usage of 320 km
(200 miles) in a shift and a maximum service life of 5 years. Less than 10 per
cent of vehicles remain in service as long as 5 years. The average mileage per
year is 72,000 for vehicles operating 2 shifts per day and 7 days per week.
There is no record of any vehicle remaining in high usage through-out the full
5 year service life. However, if a vehicle were projected to have fuelled as
often as 1.5 – 2 times per day and to have remained in service for the maximum
5-year New York City (NYC) taxi service life, the maximum number of
fuellings during the taxi service life would be 2,750 – 3,600;
(d) Taxi usage (Shifts/Day and Days/Week) data: Transport Canada reported a
survey of taxis operating in Toronto and Ottawa that showed common high
usage of 20 hours per day, 7 days per week with daily driving distances of 540
– 720 km (335 – 450 miles). Vehicle odometer readings were not reported. In
the extreme worst-case, it might be projected that if a vehicle could remain at
this high level of usage for 7 years (the maximum reported taxi service life);
then a maximum extreme driving distance of 1,400,000 – 1,900,000 km
(870,000 – 1,200,000 miles) is projected. Based on 320 – 480 km (200 - 300
miles) driven per full fuelling, the projected full-usage 15-year number of full
fuellings could be 2,900 – 6,000. Consistent with these extreme usage
projections, the minimum number of full pressure hydraulic qualification test
cycles for hydrogen storage systems is set at 5,500 for UN GTR No. 13, Phase
1. The upper limit on the number of full-fill pressure cycles is set at 11,000,
which corresponds to a vehicle that remains in the high usage service of 2 full
fuellings per day for an entire service life of 15 years (expected lifetime vehicle
mileage of 3.5 – 5.3 million km (2.2 – 3.3 million miles)).
77. In establishing number of cycles, it was recognized that practical designs of some
storage system designs (such as composite wrap systems with metal liner interiors) might not
qualify for service at 70 MPa NWP if number of cycles is greater than 5,500. In establishing
cycles, it was recognized that if number of cycles is specified at a lower value than 11,000,
some Contracting Parties may require usage constraints to assure actual fuellings do not
exceed number of cycles.
78. In Phase 2, data from various regions (Japan, Germany, United States) supported the
proposal to maintain 11,000 hydraulic test pressure cycles and 22,000 "leak before burst"
cycles when the service life is extended to 25 years for both light-duty vehicles (LDV) and
heavy-duty vehicles (HDV).
(a) Japan – A database of Japanese legal inspection records as of July 2019 was
analysed. This database contained 6,000 records for light-duty vehicles and
21,000 records for heavy-duty vehicles (all fuel types). For the purpose of UN
GTR No. 13, the focus was on the analysis of the records for commercial
vehicles, as these vehicles have a higher usage (consistent with the rationale
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
for Phase 1). The maximum lifetime miles travelled for each vehicle were
determined and by applying a range per fuelling of 320 km for light-duty
vehicles and 400 km for heavy-duty vehicles. Using the above, the number of
pressure cycles were calculated and are shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Results of the Japanese Study
HD 15 yrs -- -- 11,000
Commercial 20 yrs 3,500,000 km 8,450 11,000
25 yrs 4,000,000 km 9,750 11,000
While the details of this analysis can be found in the document "UN
GTR13-11-12b TF1 210927 Estimation of VMT TF1-JAMA.pdf"
(https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/140706658/UN GTR13-
11-
12b%20TF1%20%20210927%20Estimation%20of%20VMT%20TF1
-JAMA.pdf?api=v2), a brief summary of the methodology is as
follows:(i) Records from periodic legal inspections were collected
from about 400,000 on-road vehicles. Heavy-duty vehicles were
defined according to the Japanese categorization as those with greater
than a number of 10 seats and a loading capacity of greater than 1,250
kg (assuming the vehicle weight is greater than 3,500 kg); (ii) The
annual VMT (km/year) of each vehicle was calculated by the taking the
difference between the records of the current inspection less the
previous inspection. An average vehicle mile travelled (VMT) per year
(VMTyear) was calculated for the vehicles of a certain age. A maximum
VMT for each year for each vehicle age was also calculated by adding
three times the standard deviation of the VMT year to the average.
maxVMTyear = aveVMTyear + 3sigma*VMTyear
(iii) Finally, a maximum lifetime miles travelled (VMT life) was calculated
by summing maxVMTyear over the years.
VMTlife (km) = ∑max𝑉𝑀𝑇𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
Data for commercial vehicles were then separated and analysed since
commercial vehicles have higher mileage than personal vehicles;
(iv) The number of lifetime refuellings was calculated by dividing VMTlife
by the fuelling interval. In Phase 1 of the UN GTR No. 13, the filling
range of 320 km (200 mi.) was assumed for light-duty vehicles. While
production HFCVs have a much longer range now, the same value was
applied to LDV as to stay consistent with the earlier methodology. For
HDVs, a range of 400 km (250 mi.) was determined to be reasonable,
as HDVs typically have a larger fuel capacity and therefore range.
While it is difficult to get a single data-based fuelling interval value for
hydrogen fuelled HDVs, an assumption of 400 km (250 mi.) can be a
sufficiently conservative value;s
(v) Finally, a data filtration process was performed to ensure the data set
overcame limitations of the vehicle odometer (limited to five or six
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
digits) and those records deemed as extreme outliers. In this study, the
threshold of maximum effective VMT year was defined to the maximum
value of the sum of averaged VMTyear and six times the standard
deviation within the first five years of the vehicle ages. The data shows
that the VMTyear of a vehicle’s early years in service are higher than
later years so those that exceeded the maximum effective VMTyear were
removed. While these maximum effective VMT year can seem nearly
impossible in the Japanese market (1,000 km/day and 365,000
km/year), these maximum values were maintained since only a few
vehicles were close to this maximum limit and thus their effects
negligible.
(b) Germany – The most recent available mileage data from heavy duty semi-
trailer trucks were collected from the German Federal Motor Transport
Authority (KBA). The data are from inspection records from 2014 to 2018 of
new semi-trailer trucks after one year of service. The data shows that the
average VMT over 20 or 25 years is lower than the average of the first three
years, which is consistent with the industry practice for trucks to be driven the
most in the first few years of use. After examining the results from the data,
the highest annual VMT from new truck data was used for this calculation as
a very conservative value, rather than the average over the actual service life.
The assumptions are as follows:
• Trucks are driven the same number of miles each year over its service
life (115,017 km annually), representing an extreme usage case.
• The average European truck driver works nine hours per day.
• The maximum speed on German highways for trucks is 80 km/h.
• A fully-fuelled hydrogen truck has a conservative range of 500 km.
Using the above assumptions, a total range of 720 km per work day is
calculated, resulting in approximately 1.5 fuelling cycles a day. Since UN GTR
No. 13, Phase 1 did not consider partial fuelling, this number was rounded to
two. With the VMT rate expanded over 20 and 25 years, the number of fuelling
cycles was estimated as follows:
Table 2
Results of the German Study
Lifetime No/ of
fills
Max lifetime miles ("pressure test Ref: UN GTR No. 13,
Vehicle Type Max svc. life travelled cycles") Phase 2 Proposal
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
estimated to have been cycled from 1,000 to 4,400 pounds per square inch
gauge (psig), six times per week for 15 years, resulting in an estimated total of
4,680 fatigue cycles over its useful life.
Non-destructive evaluation (via modal acoustic emission, MAE) and physical
testing (per CSA/ANSI NGV 2) were performed on these tanks. Twenty of the
60 tanks were burst-tested without being subjected to any additional damage
to establish a baseline understanding of the tank’s structural integrity at EOL.
An additional 20 tanks were subjected to artificial notch and impact damage
followed by fatigue cycling and burst pressure testing to understand structural
durability. Another 20 tanks were subjected to hydraulic fatigue cycling
followed by a burst test to simulate continued use of the tanks beyond their
defined EOL.
The results of the structural integrity testing of the Type III and Type IV CNG
fuel tanks at the end of their defined useful life of 15 years suggests the
"potential opportunity of continued use of tanks", as all 60 tanks were beyond
their defined useful life of 15 years but seemed to be structurally sound based
on the results of the initial visual inspection and MAE examination. The tanks
maintained the required strength for burst pressurization at the time of
manufacture and did not experience any significant strength degradation
during their use in service as determined by the burst pressurization test.
Even after additional hydraulic fatigue cycling, the tank integrity based on the
burst test "suggest the potential of additional service life for CNG tanks beyond
their defined end of life."
79. The current UN GTR No. 13 requirement of 11,000 initial baseline cycles is already
very conservative for a tank with a service life of 15 years. Data from Japanese and German
trucks in service show that a 25-year VMT, and consequently the number of refuelling cycles,
are much lower than what is already in the UN GTR No. 13. Furthermore, the end-of-life
testing of CNG tanks designed to similar requirements at the UN GTR No. 13 showed an
acceptable structural integrity even after further damage and cycling. For these reasons, the
Phase 2 group agreed that the current UN GTR No. 13 requirements of 11,000 initial baseline
cycles and 22,000 "leak without burst" cycles could be applied to an extended service life of
25 years.
(b) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.2. Verification test for on-road performance durability
(hydraulic sequential tests)
80. The verification test for on-road performance durability ensures the system is fully
capable of avoiding rupture under extreme conditions of usage that include extensive fuelling
frequency (perhaps associated with replacement of drive train components), physical damage
and harsh environmental conditions. These durability tests focus on structural resistance to
rupture. The additional attention to rupture resistance under harsh external conditions is
provided because (i) the severity of consequences from rupture is high, and (ii) rupture is not
mitigated by secondary factors (leaks are mitigated by onboard leak detection linked to
countermeasures). Since these extreme conditions are focused on structural stress and fatigue,
they are conducted hydraulically – which allows more repetitions of stress exposure in a
practical test time.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
is not realistic to expect that a container could only encounter one type of
exposure through the life of the vehicle;
(c) Severe usage: exposure to physical impacts
(i) Drop impact (para. 5.1.2.2.) – the risk is primarily an aftermarket risk
during vehicle repair where a new storage system, or an older system
removed during vehicle service, is dropped from a fork lift during
handling. The test procedure requires drops from several angles from a
maximum utility forklift height. The test is designed to demonstrate that
containers have the capability to survive representative pre-installation
drop impacts;
(ii) Surface damage (para. 5.1.2.3.) – cuts characteristic of wear from
mounting straps that can cause severe abrasion of the composite
overwrap. All metal containers are therefore exempt from the surface
flaw damage tests;
(iii) On-road impacts that degrade exterior structural strength and/or
penetrate protective coatings (e.g. flying stone chips) (para. 5.1.2.3.) –
simulated by pendulum impact.
(d) Severe usage: exposure to chemicals in the on-road environment
(para. 5.1.2.4.)
(i) Fluids include fluids used on vehicles (battery acid and washer fluid),
chemicals used on or near roadways (fertilizer nitrates and lye), and
fluids used in fuelling stations (methanol and gasoline);
(ii) The primary historical cause of rupture of high-pressure vehicle
containers (CNG containers), other than fire and physical damage,
has been stress corrosion rupture – rupture occurring after a
combination of exposure to corrosive chemicals and pressurization;
(iii) Stress corrosion rupture of on-road glass-composite wrapped
containers exposed to battery acid was replicated by the proposed test
protocol; other chemicals were added to the test protocol once the
generic risk of chemical exposure was recognized;
(iv) Penetration of coatings from impacts and expected on-road wear can
degrade the function of protective coatings — recognized as a
contributing risk factor for stress corrosion cracking (rupture);
capability to manage that risk is therefore required.
(v) The ambient temperature limits have been changed to 20 ± 15 °C
unless otherwise specified. The 20 ± 5 °C requirement is an
unnecessarily stringent test temperature range for the container skin
and fluid. The new limits allow skin and fluid temperatures to rise to
a reasonable temperature that is incapable of harming a robust
container or materially affecting test performance. Additionally, these
limits are consistent with those specified in ISO 554:1976 ("Standard
Atmospheres For Conditioning And/Or Testing – Specifications").
(vi) Chemical exposure can be continued up to the last 10 cycles and can
be removed after the cycling is complete. Containers have been
shown to be unaffected after a few additional hours of chemical
exposure. This change makes the test less burdensome without
changing its severity.
(e) Extreme number of fuellings/defuellings
Rationale for number of cycles greater than 7.500 and less than
11,000 is provided in paras. 76 - 79 section E.1.(a).(ii).b above.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
(c) Rationale for paragraph 5.1.3. verification test for expected on-road performance
(pneumatic sequential tests)
82. The verification test for expected on-road performance requires the demonstration of
capability to perform essential safety functions under worst-case conditions of expected
exposures. "Expected" exposures (for a typical vehicle) include the fuel (hydrogen),
environmental conditions (such as often encountered temperature extremes), and normal
usage conditions (such as expected vehicle lifetime range, driving range per full fill, fuelling
conditions and frequency, and parking). Expected service requires sequential exposure to
parking and fuelling stresses since all vehicles encounter both uses and the capability to
survive their cumulative impact is required for the safe performance of all vehicles in
expected service.
83. Pneumatic testing with hydrogen gas provides stress factors associated with rapid and
simultaneous interior pressure and temperature swings and infusion of hydrogen into
materials; therefore, pneumatic testing is focused on the container interior and strongly linked
to the initiation of leakage. Failure by leakage is marginally mitigated by secondary
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
protection – monitoring and vehicle shut down when warranted (below a conservative level
of flammability risk in a garage), which is expected to result in very timely repair before
leakage can develop further since the vehicle will be out of service. For the purposes of the
test protocol, a maximum allowable leakage rate has been defined in accordance with
paragraph 5.1.3.3.(c).
84. The vehicle fuel storage system may contain more than one complete, functionally
independent compressed hydrogen storage systems as defined in paragraph 3.8. Such a
vehicle fuel storage system containing identical repeating elements (i.e., two or more CHSSs
consisting of containers of the same dimensions and the same components), should be
allowed to be qualified via a pneumatic sequential test of a single CHSS.
85. Data used in developing para. 5.1.3. test protocol include:
(a) Proof pressure test (paragraph 5.1.3.1.) – routine production of pressure
containers includes a verifying, or proof, pressure test at the point of
production, which is 150 per cent NWP as industry practice, i.e. 20 per cent
above the maximum service pressure;
(b) Leak-free fuelling performance (para. 5.1.3.2.)
(i) Expected environmental conditions — weather records show
temperatures less than or equal to -40 °C occur in countries north of the
45-th parallel; temperatures ~50 °C occur in desert areas of lower
latitude countries; each with frequency of sustained extreme
temperature ~5 per cent in areas with verifiable government records.
Actual data shows ~5 per cent of days have a minimum temperature
below -30 °C. Therefore sustained exposure to below -30 °C is less than
5 per cent of vehicle life since a daily minimum is not reached for a full
24 hr period. Data record examples (Environment Canada 1971-2000):
https://climate.weather.gc.ca/climate_normals/index_e.html#1971
(ii) Number of fuelling/defuelling cycles
a. The number of full fuellings required to demonstrate capability
for leak-free performance in expected service is taken to be 500.
i. Expected vehicle lifetime range is taken to be 250,000
km (155,000 miles);
Figure 9
Vehicle age vs. average odometer
Vehicle Age
Roadside Mean
Smog Check data CARB Pilot Scrappage Program. avg.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
28
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
29
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
30
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
31
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 10
Required ventilation of space surrounding the vehicle
46 mL/L/H CHSS Permeation/Leakage
Less Than 25% LFL
0.200
0.180
Ventilation Rate (1/Hour)
Less than
0.160 0.18 air exchanges
per hour
0.140 FC Car
0.120
FC Bus
0.100
Tractor FC Truck
0.080
House with Only
0.060 “Tight” Attached
With
Garage
0.040 Trailor
0.020
0.000
0.00 50.00 100.00 150.00 200.00 250.00
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
(d) Rationale for paragraphs 5.1.4. and 6.2.5. verification test for service-terminating
performance in fire
86. Verification of performance under service-terminating conditions is designed to
prevent rupture under severe conditions. Fire is the only service-terminating condition
accounted for design qualification.
87. A comprehensive examination of CNG container in-service failures during the past
decade (SAE Technical Paper 2011-01-0251 (Scheffler, McClory et al., "Establishing
Localized Fire Test Methods and Progressing Safety Standards for FCVs and Hydrogen
Vehicles")) showed that, while some of fire incidents occurred on storage systems that did
not utilize properly designed thermally-activated pressure relief devices (TPRDs), the
majority resulted when TPRDs did not respond to protect the container because TPRDs were
improperly installed and did not sense the heat exposure even though the localized fire was
able to degrade the container wall and eventually cause the storage container to burst. The
localized fire exposure has not been addressed in previous regulations or industry standards.
The fire test method in para. 6.2.5. addresses both localized and engulfing fires.
88. The fire test conditions of para. 6.2.5. were based on vehicle-level tests by the
Japanese Automobile Research Institute (JARI) and US manufacturers. A summary of data
is found in paper SAE Technical Paper 2011-01-0251. As part of the preparatory
requirements for this regulation, the paper and data were reviewed for the purpose of
improving reproducibility of fire results. Key findings are as follows:
(a) About 30 – 50 per cent of the vehicle laboratory fires investigated resulted in
conditions that could be categorized as a localized fire since the data indicates
that a composite compressed gas container could have been locally degraded
before conventional TPRDs on end bosses (away from the local fire exposure)
would have activated. A temperature of 300°C was selected as the start of the
localized fire condition as thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA) indicates that
composite container materials begins to degrade rapidly at this temperature);
(b) While vehicle laboratory fires often lasted 30-60 minutes, the period of
localized fire degradation on the storage containers lasted less than 10 minutes;
(c) As shown in Figure 11, peak temperatures on the surface of cylinders used for
the vehicle fire test reached 700 °C during the localized fire stage. While this
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 11
Cylinder Temperatures during the Localized Fire Stage of Vehicle Fire Tests
Peak Temperatures During Localized Fire Stage
Flame side
800 700°C
700
600
Temperature (°C)
500
450°C
400
Opposite
side
300
300°C
200
100
0
A1S A2S A3S A5F A5R A6F A6R
Vehicle fire test #
Surface Facing Fire Worst Case Surface Opposite Fire
(d) The rise in peak temperature near the end of the localized fire period often
signalled the transition to an engulfing fire condition;.
(e) As shown in Figure 12, the peak temperatures on the surface of cylinders used
for the vehicle fire test reached 1,000 °C during the engulfing fire stage;
Figure 12
Cylinder temperatures during engulfing fire stage of vehicle fire tests
Peak Temperatures During Engulfing Fire Stage
1200
Flame
Less than
1000 side
Flame Side
Temperature (°C)
800
600 Opposite
600°C side
400
200
100°C
0
A1S A2S A3S A5F A5R A6F A6R
Vehicle fire test #
Surface Facing Fire Worst Case Surface Opposite Fire
89. Based upon the above findings, performance-based limits as shown in Figures 11 and
12; the limits were defined to characterize the thermal exposure during the localized and
engulfing fire stages. The maximum cylinder surface temperature during the localized fire
stage for the side of the cylinder facing the fire was set to 50 °C above the highest value that
was experienced during the JARI vehicle fire tests to provide a margin for testing. A
maximum limit for the engulfing stage was not necessary as the temperature is a naturally
limited flame temperature. The minimum surface temperatures on the side facing the flame
were set to the lowest value in the range of data during the engulfing fire stage but was limited
to one standard below average during the localized fire stage so that a challenging (but
reasonable) thermal condition even though the full range of data was significantly skewed.
90. Experience conducting container fire tests has found that the temperature on the side
of the cylinder opposing the intended fire exposure also needs to be controlled to minimize
site-to-site test variations as differences in the length of flames during the fire test can
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inadvertently lead to temperatures above the JARI vehicle fire test experience on the side
opposite the intended fire exposure and subsequently cause excessive material degradation
on the top of the container and, in some cases, premature response of TPRD(s). For this
reason, both the minimum and maximum allowable temperatures for the engulfing fire stage
were based on the range of data that occurred during the vehicle fire tests, and the minimum
and maximum temperatures during the localized stage were limited to slightly less than one
standard deviation from average to maintain a challenging (but reasonable) thermal
condition.
91. The temperature limits found on Figures 11 and 12 were also used to establish the
maximum and minimum allowable temperatures in Table 10 in Part II for the development
and checkout of burner used for fire testing. Since (as shown in Figure 13) the container is
mounted above the burner for fire testing, the bottom of the container faces the fire and the
top of the container is the side opposite the fire exposure, Table 10 in Part II defines criteria
relative to the bottom and top of the container as this terminology is consistent with container
fire testing. Also, the maximum temperature for the bottom of the cylinder was applied to
thermocouple locations on both the bottom centre and mid-height sides of the container as
all these locations represent the thermal exposure on the side facing the fire during the JARI
vehicle fire tests.
Figure 13
Containers in a Fire Testing
92. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was selected as the fuel for the test burner as it is
globally available and easily controllable to maintain the required thermal conditions during
the localized and engulfing fire stages. The use of LPG was deemed adequate to reproduce
the thermal conditions on the cylinder that occurred during the vehicle fire tests in Figures
11 and 12 without concerns of carbon formation (i.e. coking) that could occur with liquid
fuels. Additionally, the relatively low H/C ratio of LPG at approximately 2.67 allows the
flame to display flame radiation characteristics (from carbon combustion products) more
similar to petroleum fires (with a H/C of roughly 2.1) than natural gas, for example, which
has an H/C ratio of approximately 4.0.
93. The burner defined in paragraph 6.2.5.3. for localized and engulfing fire zones were
developed and verified to Table 10 in Part II so that setup and conduct of the container fire
tests by test laboratories could be performed in a straight-forward manner without needing to
conduct a burner development programme. Use of a standardized burner configuration is
viewed as practical way of conducting fire testing that should reduce variability in test results
through commonality in hardware.
94. An example of the burner configuration is shown in Figures 14 and 15. The burner
can be assembled using commercially available piping or tubing, fittings, and burner nozzles.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
See Figure 16 and Table 3. Since the nozzles in Table 3 are fabricated to commercial
practices, it is necessary for the test laboratories to check that the nozzle is within the
specification in Table 8 in Part II by inspection or bench checking to ensure uniformity of
flow distribution and therefore heat release of the burner zones.
Figure 14
Prescribed Bunsen-type Air Pre-Mix Nozzles
Figure 15
Prescribed Arrangement of Air Pre-Mix Burner Nozzles
Figure 16
Burner Fuel Nozzles
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Table 3
Definition of Burner Nozzles for the Prescribed Burner
Item Description
95. The overall dimensional requirements of the burner zones are provided in paragraph
6.2.5.3.2. The width (W) of both the localized and engulfing fire zones is fixed to 500 ±
50mm regardless of the diameter/width of the container. The length of the localized fire zone
(LLOC) is also fixed to 250 ± 50mm for all fire tests. While the length of the engulfing burner
extension (LEXT) is defined as a maximum of 1,400 ± 50 mm, flexibility is provided to use
shorter burner a long as the burner extends beyond the pre-test cylinder and the CHSS test
article when positioned for CHSS fire test. Since the engulfing burner zone is comprised of
the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner extension, the length of the engulfing
burner zone (LENG) is the sum of LLOC and LEXT.
96. The precise dimensions of the burner zones are influenced by the number of burner
nozzles along the length, the spacing of the nozzles along the length, and the spacing of
manifolds or rails along the width. For example, length of the localized burner length (L LOC)
can be either 200 mm long with four nozzles, 250 mm long with five nozzles, or 300 mm
long with six nozzles for a constant nozzle spacing (SN) selected to be the nominal value of
50 mm from Table 8 in Part II. Similarly, the length of the extension of the engulfing burner
(LEXT) can vary from 1,350 mm with 27 nozzles to 1,450 mm with 29 nozzles with the same
nozzle spacing (SN) of 50 mm as with the localized burner zone in the previous example.
97. The burner tube array in Figure 17 has a nozzle spacing of 50 mm, a localized burner
zone with six nozzles so the resultant length is 300 mm, and the extension of the engulfing
zone has 28 nozzles so the resultant length of the extension is 1.4 m, bringing the total length
of the engulfing burner to 1.7 m. Note that all lengths are within the allowable tolerances in
paragraph 6.2.5.3.2.1.
98. Figure 17 shows the boundaries of the localized burner zones and the engulfing burner
extension. The borderline shared by the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner
extension is established midway between the last row of nozzles in the localized burner zone
and the first row in the engulfing burner extension. This line serves as a datum where the
opposite end of the localized burner zone is located L LOC to the left and the opposite end of
the engulfing burner zone extension is located LEXT to the right. The width (W) of both the
burner zones spans the distance from the centre of the top rail in the zone to the centre of the
bottom rail.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 17
Definition of burner zone borders
99. A pre-test cylinder (fabricated from a steel pipe with caps) is used for the pre-test to
confirm proper operation of the burner zones. The pre-test cylinder that is similar to cylinders
used in JARI vehicle fire tests was required to ensure technical soundness of the empirical
process of thermal mapping the localized and engulfing burner zones and then comparing the
results to criteria based on the JARI vehicle fire tests. The pre-test cylinder is instrumented
in the same manner as the containers in the vehicle fire tests and mounted above the burner
in the same manner as the CHSS to be fire tested (see Figure 18). After initial development
testing by JARI, a round robin test was conducted. The thermal mapping was performed by
stepping up the fuel flow rate over the expected operating range of HRR/A for the burner.
Results were then compared to the criteria in Table 10 in Part II and used to define the
allowable operating ranges and to select the fuel settings for the localized and engulfing zones
of the burner.
Figure 18
Pre-Test Cylinder Mounted Above the Burner for Thermal Mapping
100. Results of the thermal mapping of the localized burner are shown in Figures 19 to 22
based on available data from the round robin testing. Values are based on 60-second rolling
averages of readings from the round robin testing described above. The location of the
various temperature readings is given in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3. The figures show that the test
laboratories have found acceptable operation between 200 and 500 kW/m 2. The suggested
setting for the localized fire test of 300 kW/m 2 was established to provide a challenging
condition that was acceptable for most laboratories. Typical values in Table 4 for the
localized fire stage are based on 60-second rolling averages of the data at 300 kW/m2 and are
used for burner checkout to verify operation is as expected.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Table 4
Typical Values of a Pre-Test Cylinder and Burner Monitor Temperatures for a
Localized Burner (at 300 kW/m2)
Figure 19
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on bottom during thermal mapping of localized burner
200 – 500 kW/m2
Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800 750 °C Max
700
Temperature (°C)
600
500
400 450 °C Min
300
300 kW/m2
200 Suggested Setting
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
HRR/A (KW / m2)
#1 - Indoor Test #2 - Indoor Test #4 Outdoor Test (Enclosure)
Figure 20a
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on sides during thermal mapping of localized burner
(Front side)
200 – 500 kW/m2
Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800 750 °C Max
700
Temperature (°C)
600
500
400
FRONT SIDE
300
200 300 kW/m2
100 Suggested Setting
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 20b
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on sides during thermal mapping of localized burner
(Rear side)
900
800
750 °C Max
700
600
Temperature (°C)
500
400
REAR SIDE
300
200
100 300 kW/m2
Suggested Setting
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
HRR/A (kW / m2)
Figure 21
Pre-test cylinder temperature on top during thermal mapping of localized burner
200 – 500 kW/m2
Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800
Temperature (°C)
700
300 kW/m2
600 Suggested Setting
500
400
300°
300
200
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
HRR/A (kW / m2)
#1 - Indoor Test #2 - Indoor Test #4 Outdoor Test (Enclosure)
40
ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 22
Temperature of burner monitor during thermal mapping of localized burner
200 – 500 kW/m2
Allowable Operating Range
1400
1200
Temperature (°C)
1000
800
600
300 kW/m2
400 Suggested Setting
200
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200
HRR/A (KW / m2)
#1 - Indoor Test #2 - Indoor Test #4 Outdoor Test (Enclosure)
101. The results of the thermal mapping of the engulfing burner are shown in Figures 23
to 26. As with the localized burner thermal mapping, values are based on 60-second rolling
averages of readings by test laboratories participating in the round robin testing, and the
location of the various temperature readings are given in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3. The figures
show that the test laboratories have found acceptable operation between 400 and 1,000
kW/m2. The suggested setting for the localized fire test of 700 kW/m 2 was established to
provide a challenging condition that was acceptable for most laboratories.
Table 5
Typical Values for Pre-Test Cylinder and Burner Monitor Temperatures for Engulfing
Burners (at 700 kW/m2)
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 23
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on bottom (centre) during thermal mapping of engulfing
burner
400 – 1000 kW/m2 Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800
700
600
Temperature (°C)
400
300
700 kW/m2
200
Suggested Setting
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
HRR/A (KW / m2)
Figure 24
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on sides during thermal mapping of engulfing burner
400 – 1000 kW/m2 Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800
700
Temperature (°C)
600
500
400
300 700 kW/m2
200 Suggested Setting
100
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
HRR/A (kW / m2)
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 25
Pre-test cylinder temperatures on top during thermal mapping of engulfing burner
400 – 1000 kW/m2 Allowable Operating Range
1000
900
800 < TBavg if >750 °C
700
Temperature (°C)
600
500
400
300
700 kW/m2
200 Suggested Setting
100
100 °C Min
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
HRR/A (kW / m2)
#1 - Indoor Test #2 - Indoor Test #4 Outdoor Test (Enclosure)
Figure 26
Temperatures of burner monitor during thermal mapping of engulfing burner
1400
1200
1000
Temperature (°C)
800
600
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
HRR/A (kW / m2)
#1 - Indoor Test #2 - Indoor Test #4 Outdoor Test (Enclosure)
102. Thermal imaging of the container during the fire tests was also performed to ensure that
the prescribed burner delivers uniform thermal conditions over the targeted area of fire exposure.
See Figure 27.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 27
Example of the Thermal Imaging Results for the Prescribed Burner Configuration
103. Depending on whether the test is conducted indoors or outdoors, and on the local
weather conditions if conducted outdoors, wind shielding may be required for the intended
thermal conditions for the fire tests. To ensure that wind shields do not interfere with the
drafting of the fire during the fire tests and cause variations in results, wind shields as defined
in paragraph 6.2.5.2. need to be installed for the pre-test checkout of the burner and test setup,
as well as for the actual CHSS fire test.
104. Prior to conducting the CHSS fire test, a pre-test checkout of the burner should be
performed to ensure that the burner and test equipment are in working order. As with the
thermal mapping described previously, a steel test container is necessary for technical
soundness to ensure that the empirical approach of comparing the checkout results comply
with criteria in Table 10 in Part II and is consistent with prior testing of the burner as defined
in Figures 19 to26. Additionally, the use of a pre-test cylinder for the checkout avoids
possible degradation of container materials that can affect the results. After the checkout is
satisfactorily completed, the pre-test cylinder shall be removed and the CHSS test article
shall be mounted for the CHSS fire test. The need (or frequency) to repeat this pre-test
checkout is based on the test agency's risk assessment and processes and specific
requirements of the Contracting Party having jurisdiction for the test.
105. The CHSS fire test shall be performed with only hydrogen gas such that any potential
leakage that creates a jet flame greater than 0.5 m can be identified and measured. The test
should not be performed specifically using compressed air as the elevated partial pressure of
oxygen in the compressed air may lead to an unsafe condition when the high-pressure air is
combined with minor oil residue and other contaminants.
106. The CHSS should be filled to 100 per cent state-of-charge (SOC) prior to CHSS fire
test but not to 100 per cent NWP because the pressure varies as a function of temperature
while SOC does not. The intent is to have the container fully charged (i.e. filled) at 100 per
cent SOC.
107. The two-stage localized/engulfing fire test defined in paragraph 6.2.5. was based on
preliminary work done by Transport Canada and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) in the United States of America and was originally intended to
evaluate generic (non-vehicle specific) CHSSs where only mitigation devices (such as
thermal shields and barriers) and other non-pressure bearing parts that are permanently
attached to the containers are evaluated. During initial use of the test method, nearly all
testing was performed to verify the acceptability of CHSSs generically for all vehicles, but,
in order to accommodate advanced configurations that require the consideration of vehicle-
specific features to accurately capture the characteristics of the vehicle fire, the CHSS fire
test was expanded to allow the qualification of CHSSs with vehicle-specific features in
addition to CHSSs for generic use in vehicles. When the vehicle manufacturer opts to use
vehicle-specific features, the fire exposure is established based on the direction on the
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
specific vehicle, and the CHSS is not rotated to create the worst-case position as done for
generic qualification for all vehicles.
108. The two-stage localized/engulfing fire test in paragraph 6.2.5. begins with a localized
fire stage. After 10 minutes, the fire test progresses to the engulfing fire stage. While the
spread of the fire can, in fact, progress in all directions, the fire test focuses on the most
technically relevant region, i.e. from the portion of the CHSS being thermally stressed during
both the localized and engulfing stages toward the nearest TPRD that is expected to sense the
fire and vent the contents of the container prior to potential rupture can be evaluated. By so
doing, a single, standardized burner can be used for the qualification test of the full range of
CHSS expected within the scope of this regulation. Situations expected to be encountered
during fire testing are illustrated in Figures 28 to 35. In cases where the widths or diameters
of the CHSS are larger than the burner, the burner should be placed on a diagonal relative to
the CHSS in order that the test evaluate the spread of the fire in the technically relevant
direction (from the localized zone) toward the nearest TPRD.
109. The length of the engulfing fire is extended by a maximum of 1.4 m from 250 mm for
the localized fire stage to a maximum of 1.65 m for the engulfing fire stage. The limit of 1.65
m for the engulfing fire is based on existing regulations and experience in the Canada and
the United States of America, and both this length and time for progression for the localized
and engulfing fire stages are supported by the JARI vehicle fire test data.
110. Examples of commonly encountered situations are provided below based on the above
requirements for targeting the localized fire zone on the CHSS and positioning the engulfing
fire zone under the CHSS:
(a) Figures 28 to 30 address containers that are protected by a single TPRD.
Figure 28 deals with, for example, a cylindrical container. The localized burner
is located under the end of the container that is opposite the TPRD to maximize
the distance from the TPRD (without extending beyond the spherical head of
the container). The engulfing burner extends to the left (toward the TPRD) to
the maximum allowable of 1,400 ± 50 mm. In case 1, the distance to the TPRD
from the localized burner is less than the maximum allowable extension of the
engulfing burner so the engulfing burner is allowed to extend beyond the
container. Conversely, in case 3, the distance to the TPRD from the localized
burner is greater than the maximum allowable extension so the engulfing
burner zone does not reach under the TPRD.
The examples in Figure 28 depict a container assembly where the TPRD is
placed along the axis of the cylinder so the extension of the engulfing burner
is also located along the axis as illustrated in case 1 of Figure 29. If, however,
the vehicle manufacturer has opted to use a vehicle-specific feature (as defined
in paragraph 6.2.5.1.) where the nearest TPRD is located on the side of the
container (and not on the axis) and the diameter of the cylinder is larger than
the width of the burner, then, as illustrated in case 2 of Figure 29, the burner is
turned so that the extension of the engulfing burner is aimed toward the
(nearest) TPRD.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 28
Placement of Localized and Engulfing Fire Zones with TPRD on One End of a Cylinder
TPRD Case 1
Boss
Container Length Less Than
Engulfing Fire Zone Length without TPRD
TPRD Case 2
Boss
Container Length Equal to
Engulfing Fire Zone Length without TPRD
TPRD Case 3
Container Length Greater than Engulfing Fire Boss
Zone Length (of 1.65m max) without TPRD
Figure 29
Top View Showing Extension of the Engulfing Fire Zone Toward the Nearest TPRD on a
Cylinder
Case 2
Nearest TPRD Located Off -axis
TPRD on the Cylinder Wall
Case 1
Nearest TPRD Located on the Axis of the Cylinder
Figure 30 deals with a container that projects a significant planar area where
the width/diameter is larger than the width of the burner. This configuration,
for example, is possible with conformable containers where the vehicle
manufacturer has opted to include vehicle-specific features (as defined in
paragraph 6.2.5.1.) to install the CHSS under the floor of a vehicle and the
CHSS is oriented to evaluate fire exposure to the bottom of the container based
on a pool fire under the vehicle. For this case, the localized burner is located
in the corner opposite the TPRD in order to maximize the distance from the
TPRD and the localized burner zone without extending beyond the corner.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Since the engulfing fire zone extends on an angle towards the TPRD, the
localized burner is allowed to rotate so it aligns with the extension of the
engulfing fire zone. The maximum extension from the localized burner zone
is 1,400 ± 50 mm, and the burner can extend beyond the TPRD if the distance
from the localized burner to the TPRD is less than the maximum allowable
extension.
Figure 30
Bottom View Showing Placement of Localized and Engulfing Fire Zones with TPRD on
One End of a Conformable Container
TPRD
(b) Figures 31 and 32 address containers that are protected by two TPRDs (or
sense points).
In contrast to Figure 28, Figure 31 deals with a typical cylindrical container
that is protected by TPRDs on both ends as opposed to only one end. For this
situation, the localized burner is located under the middle of the cylindrical
section to maximize the distance from both TPRDs, and the engulfing burner
can extend along the axis of the container in either direction (since the TPRDs
are equidistant) to the maximum allowable extension of 1,400 ± 50 mm. In
case 1, the distance to either TPRD from the localized burner is less than
maximum allowable extension of the engulfing burner from the centrally-
located localized burner zone so the engulfing burner is allowed to extend
beyond the end of the container. This case occurs when the container is less
than (1.4 m + 0.25 m + 1.4 m =) 3.05 m long. Conversely, in case 3, the distance
to the TPRDs from the localized burner is greater than the maximum allowable
extension so the engulfing burner zone does not reach under a TPRD in the
either direction. This case occurs when the container is longer than 3.05m.
Case 2 depicts a situation where the container length is exactly long enough
such that the maximum engulfing burner extension reaches the end of the
container. This case can occur when the cylinder is nominally 3.05 m long.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
Figure 31
Placement of Localized and Engulfing Fire Zones with TPRDs on Both Ends of a Cylinder
TPRD TPRD
Case 1
Engulfing Fire Zone Extends Beyond
the End of the Container
Extension for
Engulfing Localized
Extension for
Engulfing Localized
Extension for
Engulfing Localized
Like in case 2 of Figure 29, Figure 32 deals with a container where the
width/diameter is greater that the width of the burner, and TPRDs are located
on either side of the cylinder on the walls. This situation can occur by either
rotation of the cylinder to the worst-case position or as a result of the vehicle
manufacturer opting for test of a vehicle-specific protection features. Since the
distance to either of the TPRDs are equal, the burner can be rotated towards
either TPRD as the result should be equivalent.
Figure 32
Two Equidistant TPRDs Located Off-Axis on the Cylinder Walls on Either Side
TPRD
TPRD
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
distance to the TPRD from the localized burner is greater the maximum
allowable extension, the burner zone will not reach under the TPRD.
Figure 33
Bottom View Showing Placement of Localized and Engulfing Fire Zones with TPRDs
on Both Ends of Conformable Container
TPRD
TPRD
(c) If the container in the CHSS uses additional (or different locations of) TPRDs
or sense points for protection than addressed in items (a) and (b) above, then
the localized fire zone is located to maximize the distance to any TPRD, and
the engulfing fire zone extends from one end of the localized zone toward the
nearest TPRD up to the maximum engulfing burner extension defined above.
The process is illustrated in Figure 34 for a cylinder with a TPRD on the left
end and a second TPRD part way along the length of the container. The
localized burner is located under right-side end of the container to maximize
the distance from the nearest TPRD (without extending beyond the spherical
head). The engulfing burner extends to the left (toward the TPRDs) to the
maximum allowable of nominally 1,400 ± 50 mm. Additionally, as discussed
in (a) above and illustrated in case 2 of Figure 29, the extension of the engulfing
burner should be turned so that the extension is aimed toward the nearest TPRD
if the width/diameter of the CHSS test article is larger the burner width.
Figure 34
Engulfing Burner Configuration when the Localized Fire Zone is Located on the End
of the Container
TPRD
TPRD Boss
Container Length Greater than Engulfing Fire Zone without
Length (of 1.65m max) TPRD
1400 mm 250 mm
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
cylinder, the extension of the engulfing burner should be rotated so that the
extension is aimed toward the (nearest) TPRD which is located on the cylinder
wall when the cylinder diameter is larger than the width of the burner. See item
(a) above and the case 2 in Figure 29.
Figure 35
Engulfing Burner Configuration when the Localized Fire Zone is Located at the
Maximum Distance from Multiple TPRDs
TPRD
TPRD TPRD
Container Length Greater than Engulfing Fire
Zone Length (of 1.65m)
111. The test is completed after the CHSS vents and the pressure falls to less than 1 MPa
within one hour for CHSS of LDV or two hours for CHSS of HDV without rupture of the
container. The time limits were conservatively set to account for long-lasting battery and
garage fires to provide adequate time for gaseous contents of the CHSS to be vented when
the container is thermally protected by coatings and shields. The value for the minimum
pressure was selected such that the risk of container rupture was minimal due to stress
rupture, and the values for the time-out of the test are based on vehicle test data. In order to
minimize the hazard, jet flames from venting through the container walls or joints are
permitted only as long as any jet flames do not exceed 0.5 m. If venting occurs though the
TPRDs, the venting is required to be continuous, indicating that the TPRD and/or the vent
lines are not experiencing periodic flow blockages which could interfere with proper venting
in some situations.
112. If the CHSS fire test in paragraph 6.2.5.7. times out, then the CHSS fails the test. The
gaseous contents of the CHSS should be vented to eliminate the potential for high energy gas
releases during post-test handling, and the CHSS should be purged with inert gas before
ambient air is able to enter the container and potentially form a flammable gas within the
CHSS.
113. The following information is suggested to be provided by the test laboratory along
with the final determination of the result (PASS or FAIL) of the CHSS fire test based on
criteria in paragraph 5.1.4.:
(a) Diagrams and photographs showing the physical arrangement of the burner, container
assembly, and test setup;
(b) Fuel flow and HRR/A during the test;
(c) Temperature readings of the flame monitors (TBLOC25 and TBENG25) at 10-second
intervals and the one-minute rolling averages of flame monitors (that validate or invalidate
the test result);
(d) Pressure level within the container during the test;
(e) Ambient temperature and wind speed and direction if outdoor test;
(f) Timeline of significant events leading to final determination of the result.
(e) Rationale for paragraphs 5.1.5. and 6.2.6. qualification tests for storage-system
hydrogen-flow closures
11469. The reliability and durability of hydrogen-flow closures is essential for the integrity
of the full storage system. The closures are partially qualified by their function in the system-
level performance tests (paragraph 5.1.). In addition, these closures are qualified individually
not only to assure exceptional reliability for these moving parts, but also to enable equivalent
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
number of pressure cycles used in qualification under para. 5.1.1.2. may vary between
Contracting Parties, that number shall be marked on each container.
(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.1.2. overpressure protection for the low pressure system
122. The hydrogen delivery system downstream of a pressure regulator is to be protected
against overpressure due to the possible failure of the pressure regulator.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
(or 1 per cent hydrogen) by volume. The time limit for the rolling-average was determined
by assuming an extremely high hydrogen discharge rate that is equivalent to the input to a
100 kW fuel cell stack. The time was then calculated for this hydrogen discharge to fill the
nominal space occupied by a passenger vehicle (4.6m x 2.6m x 2.6m) to 25 per cent LFL.
The resultant time limit was conservatively estimated to be 8 seconds for a "rolling average,"
demonstrating that the 3-second rolling average used in this document is appropriate and
accommodates variations in garage and engine size. The standard ISO instrumentation
requirement is a factor of 6-10 less than the measured value. Therefore, during the test
procedure according to para. 6.1.4., the 3-second rolling average requires a sensor response
(90 per cent of reading) and recording rate of less than 300 milliseconds.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
recognize 4 per cent hydrogen by volume in air as the LFL (US Department of Interior,
Bureau of Mines Bulletin 503, 1952; Houf and Schefer, "Predicting Radiative Heat Fluxes
and Flammability Envelopes from Unintended Releases of Hydrogen," International Journal
of Hydrogen Energy 31, pp 136-151, 2007; NASA RD-WSTF-0001, 1988). The LFL, which
depends on the temperature, pressure, flame propagation direction and presence of dilution
gases, has been assessed using specific test methods in a fully premixed quiescent mixture
(e.g., American Society for Testing (ASTM) E681-09(2015). Hence, the definition of LFL is
restricted to fully premixed quiescent environments. Under realistic (non-quiescent)
conditions, flame propagation is a function of the fluid dynamic environment, which always
increases the apparent LFL. While the LFL value of 4 per cent is appropriate for evaluating
flammability in general surroundings of vehicles or inside passenger compartments, this
criterion may be overly restrictive for flowing gas situations where ignition requires more
than 4 per cent hydrogen in many cases. Whether an ignition source at a given location can
ignite the leaking gas plume depends on the flow conditions and the type of ignition. At 4 per
cent hydrogen in a stagnant room-temperature mixture, combustion can only propagate in the
upward direction. At approximately 8 to 10 per cent hydrogen in the mixture, combustion
can also be propagated in the downward and horizontal directions and the mixture is readily
combustible regardless of location of ignition source. LFL is usually expressed as per cent
(per cent) (volume fraction of the fuel gas in the mixture). Coward, H.F. et al, "Limits of
flammability of gases and vapors," Bureau of Mines Bulletin 503; 1952, USA; Benz, F.J. et
al, "Ignition and thermal hazards of selected aerospace fluids", RD-WSTF-0001, NASA
Johnson Space Center White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, NM, USA, October 1988;
Houf, W.G. et al, "Predicting radiative heat fluxes and flammability envelopes from
unintended releases of hydrogen", International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, 32 pp136-141,
2007.
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
the value in UN Regulation No. 94 of 30g/min was selected as a basis for the calculations to
establish the post-crash allowable hydrogen leakage for this UN GTR.
133. The criterion for post-crash hydrogen leakage is based on allowing an equivalent
release of combustion energy as permitted by gasoline vehicles. Using a lower heating value
of 120 MJ/kg for hydrogen and 42.7 MJ/kg for gasoline based on the US DOE Transportation
Data Book, the equivalent allowable leakage of hydrogen (WH) can be determined as follows
for vehicles with either compressed hydrogen storage systems or liquefied hydrogen storage
systems:
42.7 𝑀𝐽/𝑘𝑔
WH = 30 𝑔/ min 𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 × = 10.7 𝑔/ min ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒
120 𝑀𝐽/𝑘𝑔
The total allowable loss of hydrogen is therefore 642 g for the 60-minute period following
the crash.
134. The allowable hydrogen flow leakage can also be expressed in volumetric terms (V H)
at normal temperature (0°C) and pressure as follows for vehicles with either compressed or
liquid hydrogen storage:
10.7 𝑔/𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑁𝐿
VH = ∗ 22.41 = 118 𝑁𝐿/𝑚𝑖𝑛
2(1.00794)𝑔/𝑚𝑜𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑙
135. As confirmation of the hydrogen leak rate, JARI conducted ignition tests of hydrogen
leaks ranging from 131 NL/min up to 1000 NL/min under a vehicle and inside the engine
compartment. Results showed that, while a loud noise can be expected from ignition of the
hydrogen, the sound pressure level and heat flux were not enough (even at a 1000 NL/min
leak rate) to damage the under floor area of the vehicle, release the vehicle hood, or injure a
person standing 1 m from the vehicle (SAE Technical Paper 2007-01-0428 "Diffusion and
Ignition Behavior on the Assumption of Hydrogen Leakage from a Hydrogen-Fuelled
Vehicle").
(ii) Rationale for paragraph 5.2.2.2. post-crash concentration limit in enclosed spaces
136. This test requirement has been established to ensure that hydrogen does not
accumulate in the passenger, luggage, or cargo compartments that could potentially pose a
post-crash hazard. The criteria were conservatively set to 4 per cent hydrogen by volume as
the value represents the lowest possible level at which combustion can occur (and the
combustion is extremely weak at this value). Since the test is conducted in parallel with the
post-crash leak test and therefore will extend for at least 60 minutes, there is no need to
provide margin on the criteria to manage dilution zones as there is sufficient time for the
hydrogen to diffuse throughout the compartment.
138. Test procedures in para. 6. replicate on-road conditions for performance requirements
specified in para. 5. Most test procedures derive from test procedures specified in historical
national regulations and/or industry standards.
(a) Rationale for paragraph 6.1.1. test procedure for post-crash leak test procedure for
compressed hydrogen storage systems
139. The post-crash leak test is organized as follows:
6.1.1.1. Test procedure when the test gas is hydrogen
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
(b) Rationale for paragraph 6.1.2. (Test procedure for post-crash concentration test in
enclosed spaces for vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage systems)
144. The test may be conducted by measuring hydrogen or by measuring the corresponding
depression in oxygen content. Sensors are to be located at significant locations in the
passenger, luggage, and cargo compartments. Since the test is conducted in parallel with the
post-crash leak test of the storage system and therefore will extend for at least 60 minutes,
there is no need to provide margin on the criteria to manage dilution zones as there is
sufficient time for the hydrogen to diffuse throughout the compartment.
145. In the case where the vehicle is not crashed with hydrogen and a leak test is conducted
with compressed helium, it is necessary to define a criterion for the helium content that is
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
equivalent to 4 per cent hydrogen by volume. Recognizing that the content of hydrogen or
helium in the compartment (by volume) is proportional to the volumetric flow of the
respective releases, it is possible to determine the allowable helium content by volume, X He,
from the equation developed in paras. 132 to 136 of the preamble by multiplying the
hydrogen concentration criteria by 0.75. The criteria for helium concentration is therefore as
follows:
XHe = 4 per cent H2 by volume x 0.75 = 3.0 per cent by volume.
The criteria for helium concentration is therefore 3 per cent by volume in the
passenger, luggage, and cargo compartments if the crash test of a vehicle with a
compressed storage system is conducted with compressed helium instead of
compressed hydrogen.
146. An example of hydrogen concentration measurement locations can be found in the
document "Examples of hydrogen concentration measurement points for testing" (OICA
report to SGS-3 based on Japanese Regulation Attachment 100).
2. Rationale for paragraph 6.2. (Test Procedures for Compressed Hydrogen Storage
Systems)
147. Most test procedures for hydrogen storage systems derive from test procedures
specified in historical national regulations and/or industry standards. Key differences are the
execution of tests in sequence (as opposed to historical execution of tests in parallel, each on
a separate new container), and slowing of the filling rate in burst testing to correspond to in-
service fuelling rates. In addition, hold times at burst pressure test points have been extended
to 4 minutes. These changes are designed to reduce the sensitivity of initial burst
measurements to the fuelling rate and to evaluate capability to sustain pressure. An evaluation
of the sufficiency and stringency of requirements in this UN GTR document compared to
historical EU requirements is given in Transport Research Laboratory Project Report
RPN1742 "Hydrogen-Powered Vehicles: A Comparison of the European Legislation and the
draft ECE global technical regulation" by C. Visvikis.
(a) Due to the various speeds at which a hydraulic cycle may be performed, a
provision has been added for container manufacturers to specify a pressure
cycle profile (paragraph 6.2.3.2.). This will prevent the premature failure of
the container due to test conditions outside of the design envelope while still
maintaining the stringency of the tests.
(b) The drop test procedure has been streamlined such that only one container will
be dropped once. The container shall withstand the one drop out of any impact
orientations specified in the test procedure.
148. Requirements for closures of the hydrogen storage system (TPRD, automatic shut-off
valve and check valve) have been developed by and published in CSA/ANSI HGV 3.1 and
CSA/ANSI HPRD 1.
(a) Evaluations of cycling durability at 50,000 cycles (para. 6.2.6.2.3.) reflect
multiple pressure pulses against check valves during fuelling and multiple
operations of automatic shut-off valves between fuellings;
(b) Vibration tests (para. 6.2.6.2.8.) were designed to scan frequencies from 10 to
40 Hz because several component testing facilities reported that there can be
more than one resonant frequency. The frequency of 17 Hz used historically in
component vibration tests was established through demonstration of one
vehicle traveling over a variety of road surfaces, and it reflects the influence of
engine proximity. However, it is expected that the resonant frequency could
change based upon the component design and mounting provisions, so to
ensure the most severe condition is identified, a sweep to 40 Hz is required;
(c) Results of closure tests are to be recorded by the testing laboratory and made
available to the manufacturer. In the flow rate test, the flow rate is recorded as
the lowest measured value of the eight pressure relief devices tested in NL per
minute (0 °C and 1 atmosphere) corrected for hydrogen;
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(d) The atmospheric exposure test (para. 6.2.6.2.6.) derives from two historical
tests. The oxygen ageing test was contained in CSA/ANSI NGV 3.1 and
harmonized with ISO 12619-2 ("Road vehicles — Compressed gaseous
hydrogen (CGH2) and hydrogen/natural gas blends fuel system components
— Part 2: Performance and general test methods") and ISO 15500-2 ("Road
vehicles — Compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel system components — Part 2:
Performance and general test methods"). The ozone resistance test
requirements and test procedure were drawn from Regulation No. 110
requirement for CNG components, and has been added to both the hydrogen
and CNG components documents at CSA;
(e) The order of the tests has been corrected in paragraph 6.2.6.1.1. to align with
the requirements of paragraph 5.1.5.1. Specifically, the bench-top activation
test is performed before the flow-rate test. Test requirements have also been
harmonized with ISO 19882 ("Gaseous hydrogen - thermally activated
pressure relief devices for compressed hydrogen vehicle fuel Containers").
Finally, a summary table of pressure cycling conditions has been added for
clarity;
(f) The accelerated life test temperature has been defined (paragraph 6.2.6.1.2.).
The new equation addresses several gaps in the old one. For example, the old
equation produced results that did not balance units across both sides and
yielded different results with Celsius and Fahrenheit temperatures. The new
formula was derived from research on the actual creep performance of
eutectics and gives similar results to the old formula when used in the range of
temperatures that was typically used before, but gives more realistic values at
a broader range and with any input units;
(g) The salt corrosion resistance test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.4.) has been updated per
CSA/ANSI HPRD 1 as this is a more representative automotive environment
test. The test is applied to both TPRD, check valve and shut-off valve;
(h) Use of sodium hydroxide and ammonium nitrate for the vehicle environment
test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.5.) has been eliminated. Sodium hydroxide will react
chemically and destroy aluminium (the main body material of many PRDs) so
it is a very difficult test if submerged (especially if conducted after sulfuric
acid which affects anodized surfaces but does not cause mechanical
degradation). Instead, a spray method is allowed and ethanol/gasoline testing
is added, which is included in CSA/ANSI HPRD 1:21 and CSA/ANSI HGV
3.1-2015 for vehicle crash scenarios, i.e. gasoline exposure from other cars.
The change is applied to shut-off and check valves. The use of ethanol (E10)
has replaced methanol (M5), as E10 is more representative of fuels available
on the roads today;
(i) The updated TPRD drop test procedure allows one TPRD to be dropped in all
six orientations, or alternatively, up to six separate TPRDs can be used for the
six drops. The options are not given to provide varying levels of stringency,
but as a more expedient way to conduct the test;
(j) Three TPRD units instead of two are required for the bench-top activation test
(paragraph 6.2.6.1.9.) to match the number of units required for the flow rate
test. Furthermore, with the addition of the high pressure activation and flow
test of the three samples, there is no longer a need to test a single sample at 100
per cent NWP;
(k) The atmospheric exposure test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.11.) has been added for
TPRDs, as there was no provision for testing of hydrogen exposure for non-
metallic materials. The test is also harmonized with paragraph 6.2.6.2.6. for
check valves and shut-off valves;
(l) The operational cycle definition in the extreme temperature cycling test for
check valve and shut-off valve (paragraph 6.2.6.2.3.) has been modified to
harmonize with CSA/ANSI HGV 3.1.
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149. Since hydrogen-fuelled vehicles are in the early stages of development and
commercial deployment, testing and evaluation of test methods to qualify vehicles for on-
road service has been underway in recent years. However, liquefied hydrogen storage
systems (LHSS) have received considerably less evaluation than have compressed gas
storage systems. At the time of the development of this document, an LHSS vehicle has been
proposed by only one manufacturer, and on-road vehicle experience with LHSS is very
limited. The proposed LHSS requirements in this document have been discussed on a
technical basis, and while they seem reasonable, they have not been validated. Due to this
limited experience with LHSS vehicles, some Contracting Parties have requested more time
for testing and validation. Therefore, the requirements for LHSS have been presented in
section G as optional.
(a) Hydrogen gas has a low energy density per unit volume
150. To overcome this disadvantage, the liquefied hydrogen storage system (LHSS)
maintains the hydrogen at cryogenic temperatures in a liquefied state.
Figure 36
Typical Liquefied Storage System
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(c) During fuelling, liquefied hydrogen flows from the fuelling system to the storage
container(s)
152. Hydrogen gas from the LHSS returns to the filling station during the fill process so
that the liquefied hydrogen can flow into liquefied hydrogen storage container(s) without
over pressurizing the system. Two shut-offs are provided on both the liquefied hydrogen fill
and hydrogen fill return line to prevent leakage in the event of single failures.
(e) During longer parking times of the vehicle, heat transfer will induce a pressure rise
within the hydrogen storage container(s)
154. A boil-off system limits heat leakage induced pressure rise in the hydrogen storage
container(s) to a pressure specified by the manufacturer. Hydrogen that is vented from the
LHSS may be processed or consumed in down-stream systems. Discharges from the vehicle
resulting from over-pressure venting should be addressed as part of allowable
leak/permeation from the overall vehicle.
(f) Malfunction
155. In case of malfunction of the boil-off system, vacuum failure, or external fire, the
hydrogen storage container(s) are protected against overpressure by two independent
Pressure Relief Devices (PRDs) and the vacuum jacket(s) is protected by a vacuum jacket
pressure relief device.
(g) When hydrogen is released to the propulsion system, it flows from the LHSS through
the shut-off valve that is connected to the hydrogen fuel delivery system
156. In the event that a fault is detected in the propulsion system or fuelling receptacle,
vehicle safety systems usually require the container shut-off valve to isolate the hydrogen
from the down-stream systems and the environment.
(a) Rationale for verification tests for baseline metrics for LHSSs paragraph 7.2.1.
160. A proof pressure test and a baseline initial burst test are intended to demonstrate the
structural capability of the inner container.
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(i) Rationale for proof pressure requirement in paragraphs 7.2.1.1. and 7.4.1.1.
161. By design of the container and specification of the pressure limits during regular
operation and during fault management (as demonstrated in paragraphs 7.4.2.2. and 7.4.2.3.),
the pressure in the inner container could rise to 110 per cent of the Maximum Allowable
Working Pressure (MAWP) during fault management by the primary pressure relief device
and no higher than 150 per cent of MAWP even in "worst case" fault management situations
where the primary relief device has failed and the secondary pressure relief device is required
to activate and protect the system. The purpose of the proof test to 130 per cent MAWP is to
demonstrate that the inner container stays below its yield strength at that pressure.
(ii) Rationale for baseline initial burst pressure requirement paragraphs 7.2.1.2. and 7.4.1.2.
162. By design (and as demonstrated in paragraph 5.2.3.3.), the pressure may rise up to 150
per cent of the MAWP when the secondary (backup) pressure relief device(s) may be required
to activate. The burst test is intended to demonstrate margin against burst during this "worst
case" situation. The pressure test levels of either the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure
(in MPa) plus 0.1 MPa multiplied by 3.25, or the MAWP (in MPa) plus 0.1 MPa multiplied
by 1.5 and multiplied by Rm/Rp (where Rm is ultimate tensile strength and Rp is minimum
yield strength of the container material), are common values to provide such margin for
metallic liners.
163. Additionally, the high burst test values (when combined with proper selection of
materials demonstrate that the stress levels are acceptably low such that cycle fatigue issues
are unlikely for metallic containers that have supporting design calculations. In the case of
non-metallic containers, an additional test is required in paragraph 7.4.1.2. to demonstrate
this capability as the calculation procedures have not yet been standardized for these
materials.
(b) Rationale for verification for expected on-road performance paragraph 7.2.2.
(ii) Rationale for hydrogen leak requirement paragraphs 7.2.2.2. and 7.4.2.2.
165. The hydrogen discharge test shall be conducted during boil-off of the liquid storage
system. Manufacturers will typically elect to react all (or most) of the hydrogen that leaves
the container, but in order to have a hydrogen discharge criterion that is comparable to the
values used for Compressed Hydrogen Storage Systems, it should count any hydrogen that
leaves the vehicle boil-off systems with other leakage, if any, to determine the total hydrogen
discharge from the vehicles.
166. Having made this adjustment, the allowable hydrogen discharge from a vehicle with
liquefied hydrogen storage is the same as for a vehicle with compressed hydrogen storage.
According to the discussion in paragraphs 62 and 63 of section E.1.(c) of the preamble, the
total discharge from a vehicle with liquefied hydrogen may therefore be 150 mL/min for a
garage size of 30.4 m3. As with compressed gas, the scaling factor,
[(Vwidth+1)*(Vheight+0.05)*(Vlength+1)/ 30.4], can be used to accommodate alternative
garage/vehicle combinations to those used in the derivation of the rate, and accommodates
small vehicles that could be parked in smaller garages.
167. Prior to conducting this test, the primary pressure relief device is forced to activate so
that the ability of the primary relief device to re-close and meet required leakage is confirmed.
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(iii) Rationale for vacuum loss requirement paragraph 7.2.2.3. and test procedure of
paragraph 7.4.2.3.
168. In order to prove the proper function of the pressure relief devices and compliance
with the allowed pressure limits of the liquefied hydrogen storage system as described in
section G.2.(b) of the preamble and verified in paragraph 7.2.2.3., a sudden vacuum loss due
to air inflow in the vacuum jacket is considered as the "worst case" failure condition. In
contrast to hydrogen inflow to the vacuum jacket, air inflow causes significantly higher heat
input to the inner container due to condensation of air at cold surfaces and evaporation of air
at warm surfaces within the vacuum jacket.
169. The primary pressure relief device should be a re-closing type relief valve so that
hydrogen venting will cease when the effect of a fault subsides. These valves, by globally
accepted design standards, are allowed a total pressure increase of 10 per cent between the
setpoint and full activation when including allowable tolerances of the setpoint setting itself.
Since the relief valve should be set at or below the MAWP, the pressure during a simulation
of the fault that is managed by the primary pressure relief device should not exceed 110 per
cent of MAWP.
170. The secondary pressure relief device(s) should not activate during the simulation of a
vacuum loss that is managed by the primary relief device as their activation may cause
unnecessary instability and unnecessary wear on the secondary devices. To prove fail-safe
operation of the pressure relief devices and the performance of the second pressure relief
device in accordance with the requirements in paragraphs 7.2.2.3. and 7.4.2.3., a second test
shall be conducted with the first pressure relief device blocked. In this case, either relief
valves or burst discs may be used, and the pressure is allowed to rise to as high as 136 per
cent MAWP (in case of a valve used as secondary relief device) or as high as 150 per cent
MAWP (in case of a burst disc used as secondary relief device) during the simulation of a
vacuum loss fault.
(c) Rationale for paragraph 7.2.3. verification test for service-terminating conditions.
171. In addition to vacuum degradation or vacuum loss, fire also may cause overpressure
in liquefied hydrogen storage systems and thus proper operation of the pressure relief devices
have to be proven in a bonfire test.
(d) Rationale for verification of LHSS components: pressure relief device(s) and shut-off
valves paragraph 7.2.4.
(i) Rationale for pressure relief device qualification requirements (LHSS) paragraph 7.2.4.1.
172. The qualification requirements verify that the design shall be such that the device(s)
will limit the pressure of the fuel container to the specified values even at the end of the
service life when the device has been exposed to fuelling/de-fuelling pressure and
temperature changes and environmental exposures. The adequacy of flow rate for a given
application is verified by the hydrogen storage system bonfire test and vacuum loss test
requirements (paras. 7.2.3. and 7.4.3.).
(ii) Rationale for shut-off valve qualification requirements (LHSS) paragraph 7.2.4.2.
173. These requirements are not intended to prevent the design and construction of
components (e.g. components having multiple functions) that are not specifically prescribed
in this standard, provided that such alternatives have been considered in testing the
components. In considering alternative designs or construction, the materials or methods used
shall be evaluated by the testing facility to ensure equivalent performance and reasonable
concepts of safety to that prescribed by this standard. In that case, the number of samples and
order of applicable tests shall be mutually agreed upon by the manufacturer and the testing
agency. Unless otherwise specified, all tests shall be conducted using pressurised gas such as
air or nitrogen containing at least 10 per cent helium. The total number of operational cycles
shall be 20,000 (duty cycles) for the automatic shut-off valves.
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174. Fuel flow shut-off by an automatic shut-off valve mounted on a liquid hydrogen
storage container shall be fail safe. The term "fail safe" shall refer to a device’s ability to
revert to a safe mode or a safe complete shutdown for all reasonable failure modes.
175. The electrical tests for the automatic shut-off valve mounted on the liquid hydrogen
storage containers provide assurance of performance with: (i) over temperature caused by an
overvoltage condition, and (ii) potential failure of the insulation between the component’s
power conductor and the component casing.
where terms are as defined in A 5.2.1.1. applying the volumetric flow ratio as defined above
to account for a system that operates at cryogenic storage conditions but is leak tested at room
temperature to the requirement that there be no greater than 4 per cent by volume of hydrogen
in the actual vehicle, yields a value of approximately 0.8 per cent by volume of helium as the
allowable value for the LHSS post-crash test based on the leakage of gas from the LHSS.
(a) Rationale for paragraph 7.5.1. post-crash leak test – liquefied hydrogen storage
systems (LHSSs)
180. The purpose of the test is to confirm that the leakage from vehicles with LHSSs
following the crash test. During the crash test, the LHSS is filled with either liquefied
hydrogen (LH2) to the maximum quantity or liquefied nitrogen (LN 2) to the equivalence of
the maximum fill level of hydrogen by weight (which is about 8 per cent of the maximum
liquefied hydrogen volume in the LHSS) depending which fluid is planned for the crash test.
The LN2 fill of about 8 per cent is required to simulate the fuel weight for the crash test, and
slightly more liquefied nitrogen is added to accommodate system cooling and venting prior
to the test. Visual detection of unacceptable post-crash leakage as defined in paragraph
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7.5.1.1. may be feasible if the LHSS can be visually inspected after the crash. When using
standard leak-test fluid, the bubble size is expected to be approximately 1.5 mm in diameter.
For a localized rate of 0.005 mg/sec (216 Nml/hr), the resultant allowable rate of bubble
generation is about 2030 bubbles per minute. Even if much larger bubbles are formed, the
leak should be readily detectable. For example, the allowable bubble rate for 6 mm bubbles
would be approximately 32 bubbles per minute, thus producing a very conservative criteria
if all the joints and vulnerable parts are accessible for post-crash inspection.
181. If the bubble test is not possible or desired, an overall leakage test may be conducted
to produce a more objective result. In this case, the leakage criteria is the same as that
developed for vehicles with compressed hydrogen storage systems. Specifically, the
allowable hydrogen leakage from the LHSS is 118 NL/min or 10.7 g/min. The state of flow
leaking from the LHSS may be gaseous, liquid, or a two-phase mixture of both. The leakage
is expected to be in the gaseous state as the piping and shutoff valves downstream of the
container are more vulnerable to crash damage than the highly insulated, double-walled
LHSS container. None-the-less, the post-crash tests prescribed in this document can detect
very small leak sites and thus demonstrate the acceptability even if the leakage in the liquid
state. It is not necessary to address the possibility of a two-phase leak as the flow rate will be
less than that what can occur in the liquid state.
182. The post-crash leak test in paragraph 7.5.1.2.1. is conducted with pressurized helium.
Conduct of this test not only confirms that LHSS leakage is acceptable but also allows the
post-crash helium concentration test as described in paras. 144. to 146. section F.1.(b) of the
preamble to be performed at the same time. The helium leak test is conducted at room
temperature with the LHSS pressurized with helium to normal operating pressure. The
pressure level should be below the activation pressure of the pressure regulators and the
PRDs. It is expected that the helium test pressure can be conducted at approximately 80 per
cent of the MAWP.
Leakage of hydrogen in the liquid state of an operating system is given by:
Wl = Cd x A x (2 x ρl x ΔPl)1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-1
where Wl is the mass flow, Cd is the discharge coefficient, A is the area of the hole, ρ
is the density, and ΔPl is the pressure drop between the operating system and
atmosphere. This equation is for incompressible fluids such as fluids in the liquid
state. Use of this equation is very conservative for this situation as a portion of the
fluid often flashes (that is, changes to a gaseous state) as the fluid passes through the
leakage hole, causing a reduction in density and therefore a reduction in the mass flow.
The leakage of helium gas during the leak test is given by:
WHe = C x Cd x A x (ρHe x PHe)1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-2
where Cd and A are as defined above, ρ and P are the upstream (stagnation) fluid
density and pressure in the LHSS. C is given by:
C = γ /( (γ + 1)/2) (γ+1)/(γ-1) Equation A.7.5.1-3
where γ is the ratio of specific heats for the helium gas that is leaking.
Since Cd and A are constants with the same values for both liquid hydrogen leaking
from the operating LHSS and helium gas during the leak test, the ratio of helium to
liquid hydrogen leakage can be calculated by
WHe / Wl = CHe x (ρHe / ρl) 1/2 x (PHe /(2 x ΔPl)) 1/2 Equation A.7.5.1-4
based on combining Equations A.7.5.1-1 and A.7.5.1-2. Equation A.7.5.1-4 can be
used to calculate the helium mass flow at the beginning of the pressure test, but the
pressure will fall during the pressure test where as the pressure of the operating LHSS
will remain approximately constant until all the liquid has been vented.
183. In order to accurately determine the allowable reduction in pressure during the leak
test, the change in helium flow with pressure needs to be accounted for. Since the density of
helium (ρHe) varies with pressure, the mass flow of helium during the pressure test will also
vary linearly with pressure as given by:
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ECE/TRANS/180/Add.13/Amend.1
185. The above example illustrates how the equations can be used to determine the
reduction in helium pressure over the 60 minutes test period for the leak test. The calculations
were repeated over the likely range of container volume (from 50L to 500L) and typical
container pressure ratings (from 6 atm to 9atm gauge) in order to understand the sensitivity
of the allowable pressure drop to key parameters. See Figure 378. Since the allowable
pressure drop are above 0.5 atm (typically substantially above 0.5 atm) for all likely container
sizes, it was decided to adopt a simple criterion of 0.5 atm for all containers with a storage
capacity greater than 200 litres in order to simplify the execution of the leak test and the
determination of criteria for the passing the test. Similarly, a criterion of 2 atm was adopted
for containers less than or equal to 100 litres, and a criterion of 1 atm for containers greater
than 100 litres and less than or equal to 200 litres.
Figure 37
Allowable Pressure Loss During the LHSS Leak Test
5
4.5
Allowable Pressure Loss (atm)
4
3.5
3
2.5
2.0 atm if <100L 6 atm
2 (gauge)
1.5 9 atm
1.0 atm if >100L and =200L (gauge)
1
0.5 0.5 atm if >200L
0
0 200 400 600
186. While the methodology results in straight-forward test method with an objective result
from a commonly used type of test, it should be noted that the criterion is very conservative
in that the methodology assumes liquid leakage rather than the more likely gaseous leakage
from the piping and valves downstream of the LHSS container. For example, the ratio of
hydrogen gas leakage can be determined using Equation A.7.5.1-2 and the resulting ratio of
allowable helium gas leakage to hydrogen gas leakage is a factor of 5.14 higher than that
calculated assuming liquefied hydrogen leaks.
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expand the available materials for use in high pressure hydrogen use in the future, both these
sets of tests aim to evaluate the safety of the materials to hydrogen embrittlement and to HG-
SCC.
I. Topics for the Next Phase in Developing the UN GTR for Hydrogen-
Fuelled Vehicles
190. Since hydrogen-fuelled vehicles and fuel cell technologies are in early stages of
development of commercial deployment, it is expected that revisions to these requirements
may be suggested by an extended time of on-road experience and technical evaluations. It is
further expected that with additional experience or additional time for fuller technical
consideration, the requirements presented as optional requirements in this document (LHSS
Section G of the preamble) s could be adopted as requirements with appropriate
modifications.
191. Focus topics for Phase 3 are expected to include:
(a) Requirements for material compatibility and hydrogen embrittlement;
(b) Requirements for the fuelling receptacle;
(c) Evaluation of performance-based test for long-term stress rupture proposed in
Phase 1;
(d) Consideration of research results reported after completion of Phase 12 –
specifically research related to hydrogen storage systems, and post-crash
safety;
(e) Review CP options to achieve further harmonization;
(f) Fuel system integrity requirements (careful examination of acceleration/sled
test for all categories and side impact test for HDV as proposed by EC and
Korea, respectively.)
(g) Review of Section 7 Vehicles with a liquefied hydrogen storage system.
(h) Improvements of the fire test procedures (Results of the round robin tests,
container withstand criteria, etc.);
(i) Improvements of the test procedures (Station risk assessment issues, remote
TPRD, etc.).
192. The following test procedure will be considered for long-term stress rupture:
(a) Three containers made from the new material (e.g. a composite fibre reinforced
polymer) shall be burst; the burst pressures shall be within ±10 per cent of the
midpoint, BPo, of the intended application. Then,
(i) Three containers shall be held at > 80 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within 100 hrs; the time to rupture shall be
recorded;
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(ii) Three containers shall be held at > 75 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within 1000 hrs; the time to rupture shall be
recorded;
(iii) Three containers shall be held at > 70 per cent BPo and at 65 (±5) °C;
they shall not rupture within one year;
(iv) The test shall be discontinued after one year. Each container that has
not ruptured within the one year test period undergoes a burst test, and
the burst pressure is recorded.
(b) The container diameter shall be > 50 per cent of the diameter of intended
application and of comparable construction. The tank may have a filling (to
reduce interior volume) if >99 per cent of the interior surface area remains
exposed;
(c) Containers constructed of carbon fibre composites and/or metal alloys are
excused from this test;
(d) Containers constructed of glass fibre composites that have an initial burst
pressure > 350 per cent NWP are excused from this test, in which case BPmin
= 350 per cent NWP shall be applied in paragraph 5.1.1.1. (Baseline Initial
Burst Pressure);
(e) There are carbon fibre containers that use glass fibre as the protective layer,
and some of these containers contribute about 2 per cent of rise in burst
pressure. In this case, it shall be demonstrated, by calculation, etc., that the
pressure double the maximum filling pressure or above can be ensured by
carbon fibre excluding glass fibre. If it can be demonstrated that the rise in
burst pressure due to the glass fibre protective layer is 2 per cent or below and
if the burst pressure is 225 per cent NWP x 1.02 = 230 per cent NWP or more,
the said calculation may be omitted.
193. The existing national regulations and standards as well as international standards
related to this UN GTR are listed below:
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(i) United States – FMVSS No. 303 (1995) – Fuel System Integrity of Compressed
Natural Gas Vehicles.
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(aa) China – GB/T 39132-2020 Fuel cell electric vehicle engineering approval evaluation
program;
(ab) China – QC/T816-2009 Specification of mobile hydrogen refuelling vehicles.
2. Storage System
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194. At this time, the UN GTR does not attempt to quantify costs and benefits for this first
stage. While the goal of the UN GTR is to enable increased market penetration of HFCVs,
the resulting rates and degrees of penetration are not currently known or estimable. Therefore,
a quantitative cost-benefit analysis was not possible.
195. Some costs are anticipated from greater market penetration of HFCVs. For example,
building the infrastructure required to make HFCVs a viable alternative to conventional
vehicles will entail significant investment costs for the private and public sectors, depending
on the country. Especially in the early years of HFCV sales, individual purchasers of HFCVs
are also likely to face greater costs than purchasers of conventional gasoline or diesel
vehicles, the same goes for manufacturers of new HFCVs (However, costs incurred by HFCV
purchasers and manufacturers would essentially be voluntary, as market choice would not be
affected).
196. While some costs are expected, the contracting parties believe that the benefits of UN
GTR are likely to greatly outweigh costs. Widespread use of HFCVs, with the establishment
of the necessary infrastructure for fuelling, is anticipated to reduce the number of gasoline
and diesel vehicles on the road, which should reduce worldwide consumption of fossil fuels 1.
Perhaps most notably, the reduction in greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant emissions (such
as NO2, SO2, and particulate matter) associated with the widespread use of HFCVs is
anticipated to result in significant societal benefits over time by alleviating climate change
and health impact costs. The UN GTR may also lead to decreases in fuelling costs for the
operators of HFCVs, as hydrogen production is potentially unlimited and expected to become
more cost-effective than petroleum production for conventional vehicles. Furthermore,
decreased demand for petroleum is likely to lead to energy and national security benefits for
those countries with widespread HFCV use, as reliance on foreign oil supplies decreases 2.
Additionally, although not attributable to this UN GTR, the UN GTR may create benefits in
terms of facilitating OEM compliance with applicable fuel economy and greenhouse gas
emission standards by promoting a wider production and use of HFCVs.
197. The contracting parties have also not been able to estimate net employment impacts
of the UN GTR. The new market for innovative design and technologies associated with
HFCVs may create significant employment benefits for those countries with ties to HFCV
production. On the other hand, employment losses associated with the lower production of
conventional vehicles could offset those gains. The building and retrofitting of infrastructure
needed to support hydrogen production and storage is likely to generate net additions to the
job market in the foreseeable future.
L. Interoperability Considerations
1. Principal Interoperability Elements
198. Hydrogen-fuelled vehicle safety depends on the hydrogen dispenser operation and the
Hydrogen Fuelling Station (HFS) controls during the vehicle fuelling process. It is thus
important to highlight the considerations critical for understanding and taking into account
interoperability between HFS and a hydrogen-fuelled vehicle.
199. Figure 38 below describes an example of the key components of the fuelling station
dispenser including the hydrogen-fuelled vehicle high pressure hydrogen system, comprising
among others, the receptacle and Compressed Hydrogen Storage Systems (CHSS) with
sensors as well as pressure relief device(s). CHSS has a thermally activated pressure relief
device(s) to protect against overpressure due to a fire. On the station side, there is an
automated dispensing control system (e.g. through a Programmable Logic Controller) for
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performing the fuelling (using an acceptable fuelling protocol such as SAE J2601), as well
as fault detection and management procedures. The station also has an over pressure
protection device such as a pressure relief device(s) or equivalent to protect against over
pressurization of the dispenser and the vehicle.
Figure 38
Example of the Fuelling Station Dispenser Key Components including the Vehicle
High-Pressure Hydrogen System
Ambient
Temperature Vehicle Fuelling Receptacle
Breakaway Sensor
Nozzle + Communication
Dispenser +
Dispenser
Controller Hose
Hose
Temperature
+
Pressure Sensors
Meter
Fuel line
Grounded and
Bonded Fuelling Pad
Compressed Hydrogen
Thermally Activated Pressure Relief Device (TPRD)
Storage System
• CHSS Temperature and Pressure Sensors
CoolingBlock
Cooling block (CHSS)
200. The dispenser at a public fuelling station for light duty vehicles is typically designed
with separate nozzles to fuel vehicles to 35 MPa and/or 70 MPa nominal working pressures.
The station fuelling nozzle may contain a communications receiver and the vehicle may
contain a communications transmitter (such as SAE J2799). The vehicle’s Infrared Data
Association (IrDA) communications system may use the SAE J2799 protocol to transmit the
measured temperature and pressure of the compressed hydrogen storage system on the
vehicle to the hydrogen dispenser. The station dispenser controller may use this data for the
control system to manage the fuelling process.
201. Detailed guidance on general requirements for HFS interoperability with an UN GTR
No. 13 compliant hydrogen-fuelled vehicle can be found in ISO 17268:2020 or SAE
J2600_201510 on vehicle refuelling connection devices and ISO 19880-1:2020 on gaseous
hydrogen fuelling stations. It is assumed that during fuelling an ISO-complaint HFS and an
UN GTR No. 13 compliant hydrogen-fuelled vehicle can follow the same fuelling protocol.
2. Description of SAE J2601
202. SAE J2601 defines the protocols and process limits for hydrogen fuelling of light duty
vehicles, which meet the requirements of the UN GTR No. 13.
203. The fuelling protocols in SAE J2601 are based on a set of boundary and initial
conditions, which reflect CHSSs of current light duty vehicles and associated fuel delivery
components in the vehicle and filling station that affect the fill.
204. SAE J2601 defines fuelling protocols based on either a look-up table approach
utilizing a fixed pressure ramp rate, or a formula-based approach utilizing a dynamic pressure
ramp rate continuously calculated throughout the fill. The table-based protocol provides a
fixed end-of-fill pressure target, whereas the formula-based protocol calculates the end-of-
fill pressure target continuously. Both protocols allow for fuelling with communications or
without communications. For fuelling with communications, SAE J2601 is used in
conjunction with SAE J2799.
205. For hydrogen stations intended for the fuelling of heavy-duty vehicles, SAE J2601-2
is available.
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The recommended strain rate from the CSA/ANSI CHMC 1 standard is 1 x 10-5 s-1, while a
strain rate of ≤ 5 x 10-5 s-1 is recommended in Ref. (H. Kobayashi, T. Yamada, H. Kobayashi,
S. Matsuoka, "Criteria for selecting materials to be used for hydrogen refuelling station
equipment", PVP2016-64033, Proceedings of the ASME 2016 Pressure Vessels and Piping
Division Conference, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 17-21 July 2016) and adopted
here.
5. Test Procedure
220. Materials definition.
(a) The material under consideration shall be defined by a materials specification
– the specification can be a nationally-recognized standard or a company-
defined specification. The materials specification shall include requirements
for the following:
(i) allowable compositional ranges;
(ii) specified minimum tensile yield strength (Sy);
(iii) specified minimum tensile strength (Su); and,
(iv) specified minimum tensile elongation (El).
(b) The material should be tested in the final product form whenever possible.
When the component geometry precludes extraction of test specimens, the
material may be tested in the semi-finished product form with mechanical
properties that are nominally equivalent to the mechanical properties of the
component;
(c) Either the materials manufacturer’s certification or equivalent testing
performed in air at room temperature may be used to verify that the material
meets the specification. The measured tensile strength is denoted S* (average
value from at least two tests at room temperature in air or from the mill
certification) and is used to define the maximum stress for fatigue testing;
(d) Welds and metallurgically-bonded materials:
(i) When materials are welded (or metallurgically-bonded) and the joint is
exposed to gaseous hydrogen, weld specimens shall be tested in
conjunction with the base materials for hydrogen compatibility;
(ii) Welds and metallurgically-bonded materials shall be defined by a
welding procedure specification (WPS) that defines the joining
procedure as well as the composition and specified minimum tensile
requirements (Sy, Su and El) of the joined structure (e.g. weld metal);
(iii) Test specimens should be extracted from the joined structure whenever
possible. Representative joints can be prepared, if test specimens cannot
be extracted from the joined structure;
(iv) Weld test specimens shall be measured in gaseous hydrogen and shall
satisfy the requirements of WPS as well as the testing requirements in
paragraph 222.
221. Environmental test conditions
(a) Gas purity
(i) The purity of the gaseous hydrogen from the testing chamber (referred
to as the sampled gas) shall be verified to satisfy the requirements of
applicable fuelling standards or the values in Table 6;
(ii) If three consecutive tests of the sampled gas meet the oxygen and water
vapor requirements in Table 6, the gas may be sampled periodically at
an interval not exceeding 12 months. If the sampled gas does not meet
the requirements, the test system is modified, the purging procedures
are changed, or the gas sampling interval exceeds 12 months, three
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Table 6
Gaseous Hydrogen Purity Requirements in Parts Per Million by Volume (Except
Where Noted)
(b) Pressure
Testing in gaseous hydrogen shall be performed at a minimum
hydrogen pressure of 1.25 x NWP.
(c) Temperature
(i) The specimen temperature for fatigue life testing in hydrogen shall be
293 ± 5 K;
(ii) The specimen temperature for slow strain rate tensile (SSRT) test in
hydrogen shall be 228 ± 5 K.
222. Testing requirements
(a) The requirements for either the notched specimen methodology (option 1) or
the smooth specimen methodology (option 2) shall be satisfied. It is not
necessary to satisfy both the notched and smooth methods.
(b) Notched specimen methodology (option 1)
(i) Notched bar specimens shall be used with an elastic concentration
factor (Kt) of greater than or equal to 3. A minimum of three specimens
shall be tested in the environmental conditions described in paragraph
221.
a. Force-controlled fatigue life tests shall be performed with a
constant load cycle in accordance with internationally-recognized
standards. The stress at maximum load during fatigue cycling shall
be greater than or equal to 1/3 of S* (the average tensile strength
measured at room temperature in air). The stress is defined as the
load divided by the net-section stress (i.e. minimum initial cross
sectional area of the specimen). The load ratio (R) shall be 0.1,
where R = Smin/Smax (Smin is the minimum net-section stress and
Smax is the maximum net-section stress;
b. The frequency shall be 1 Hz or lower.
(ii) Requirement for notched specimen methodology:
a. For notched-specimen fatigue testing, the number of applied
cycles (N) shall be greater than 105 cycles for each tested
specimen.
(c) Smooth specimen methodology (option 2)
(i) Smooth fatigue specimens shall be used in accordance with
internationally-recognized standards. A minimum of three specimens
shall be tested in the environmental conditions described in paragraph
221.
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Table 7
Summary of Tests and Requirements for Hydrogen Compatibility of Materials
Notched method Smooth method
(option 1) (option 2)
Fatigue life Test conditions H2 pressure = 125% NWP H2 pressure = 125% NWP
Frequency = 1 Hz Frequency = 1 Hz
Number of tests 3 3
Temperature = 228 ± 5 K
Number of tests 3
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Figure 39
Mechanisms of SCC in a Humid Gas Environment
Electrochemical corrosion by salt water SCC by the reaction of metallic Al and H2O
※
Evaluation Current test method applied by each car OEM HG-SCC test method (Improved SLC
test) proposed by Japan for GTR13
225. The vessel is generally exposed to humid conditions on the outside and also is in
contact with water as an impurity in hydrogen gas on the inside. Therefore, this type of SCC
occurs both outside and inside of containers under the presence of water. The crack growth
test by constant load or constant displacement method is intended to demonstrate that the
materials show adequate SCC resistance for anticipated service conditions.
226. Historically, this kind of cracking was observed in scuba diving containers. Seven
accidents of the aluminium 6351 alloy scuba containers that appear to be caused by HG-SCC
occurred in Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America. As a result, the
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aluminium 6351 material was discontinued for scuba containers and the material was
changed to aluminium 6061 alloy.
227. HG-SCC susceptibility depends on the chemical composition and the heat treatment
condition of the material. Both the 6351 alloy and 6082 alloy, whose chemical composition
is similar to 6351, failed the HG-SCC test specified in HPIS E103:2018 (which is modified
from ISO 7866).
228. On the other hand, aluminium 6061 alloy passed this HG-SCC test in HPIS
E103:2018. (G. Itoh, A. Kurumada, S. Aoshima and T. Ogawa, "Effect of alloying
composition on humid-gas stress corrosion cracking behavior in Al-Mg-Si alloys",
Proceedings of the fifty-ninth conference of metallurgists, COM2020, ISBM:978-1-926872-
47-6). Materials with higher HG-SCC susceptibility can be identified by using this test. To
further expand the available materials for use in high pressure hydrogen use in the future, the
safety of the material to HG-SCC can be evaluated using this test.
2. Rationale for Materials Definition
229. This section defines the material for the testing.
Materials definition: Materials for this test are aluminium alloys. In general, materials should
be defined by a materials specification, which specifies compositional ranges and specifies
minimum tensile properties yield strength (Sy), tensile strength (Su) and tensile elongation
(El). Allowable design stresses are often determined from the specified minimum strength
properties of the material, while the elongation provides a qualitative assessment of damage
tolerance. Verification that the material meets the materials definition can be based on the
mill certification or based on testing by (or contracted for) the user. Verification tests are
performed in laboratory air. For the purposes of this performance-based approach, the
materials are assumed to sufficiently insensitive to materials variables, such as composition.
3. Rationale for Environmental Test Conditions and Duration
230. This section defines the environmental conditions for the testing.
(a) Test temperature (paragraph 236(a)): The environmental temperature range for the
vehicle is generally considered to be 233 K to 358 K (-40 ˚C to +85 ˚C). While susceptibility
for SCC at a cold temperature is low, the test temperature shall be at room temperature.
(b) Atmosphere and humidity (paragraph 236(b)): SCC propagates by atomic hydrogen
which is generated by the reaction of water and aluminium on fresh metallic surfaces as
shown in Figure 39. Therefore, the humidity shall be higher than 85 per cent during the test
period. SCC does not occur in dry conditions, and 85 per cent of humidity is required for this
test. If the dew condensation water exists on the specimen, then preferential corrosion will
occur during the test.
(c) Test period (paragraph 236(c)): The test period is 90 days in accordance with B6.6
of ISO 7886:2012.
4. Rationale for Testing Requirements
231. Test specimen (paragraphs 237(a), (b)). Specimens for this test were cut from the
wrought aluminium alloy products (plate, extruded and forged products), It is recommended
that compact specimens (CS), or single edge bend (SE) specimens be used for this test. The
geometry of the compact specimen and single edge bend specimen are shown in ISO7539-
6:2011and ASTM E399-20a.
Net width W and thickness B shall be measured within an accuracy of 0.1 per cent of W along
a line existing within 10per cent of W from the crack plane.
The face of specimen shall be processed to make the crack detectable and its length
measurable.
232. Fatigue pre-crack (paragraph 237(c)). Fatigue pre-crack shall be introduced at room
temperature in the atmospheric condition. Effective crack length a including the fatigue pre-
crack shall fulfil the following equation for small scale yielding as specified in B.5 of ISO
7866:2012.
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a, (W-a) ≧ 1270(K1APP/σ0.2)2
Where:
a: effective crack length (distance between fatigue pre-crack tip and load axis (mm))
W: specimen actual net width (mm)
K1APP: stress intensity factor of a crack when a load was applied to the specimen (MPa√m)
233. Applied load and measurement (paragraphs 237(d), (e)). Both constant load condition
and constant displacement condition are permitted in this test. A constant load condition is
preferable to a constant displacement condition in this test. However, there appears to be no
difference in both condition when cracks do not propagate.
If the monitored load is less than 95 per cent if applied load P, the test specimen should be
rejected without waiting for the final qualification of materials. Studies by Japanese academic
researchers show that the crack length extension by HG-SCC exceeds 0.16 mm when the
threshold load decreases to less than 95 per cent of applied load P.
234. Acceptance Criterion (paragraph 239). The crack extension by HG-SCC is examined
to determine if it exceeds 0.16 mm within the 90-day test period. This value means that crack
growth rate is less than 2 x 10-11m/s and is lower than general SCC criteria of 10-10 m/s.
5. Test procedure
235. Materials definition
(a) The materials are wrought aluminium alloy products.
(b) The material under consideration shall be defined by a materials specification
– the specification can be a nationally-recognized standard or a company-
defined specification. The materials specification shall include requirements
for the following:
(i) Allowable compositional ranges;
(ii) Specified minimum yield strength, Sy;
(iii) Specified minimum tensile strength, Su;
(iv) Specified minimum tensile elongation, El.
(c) Either the materials manufacturer’s certification or equivalent testing
performed in air at room temperature may be used to verify that the material
meets the specification. The measured 0.2 per cent proof stress is denoted σ 0.2
(average value from two specimens measured at room temperature in
accordance with the procedures given in ISO 6892-1:2019) and is used for
introducing fatigue pre-crack.
236. Environmental test conditions and duration
(a) Temperature: 298 ± 5 K for the entire duration of the test;
(b) Atmosphere and humidity: no generation of dew in air measuring 85 per cent
of higher in relative humidity for the entire duration of the test;
(c) Test period: 90 days (in accordance with B6.6 of ISO 7866:2012).
237. Testing requirements
(a) Test specimen: One of the specimen geometries, or a combination of them,
shall be used for test:
(i) Compact specimen of ISO 7539-6:2011;
(ii) Single edge bend specimen (SE specimen or cantilever bend specimen
of ISO 7539-6:2011);
(iii) Double-cantilever-beam specimen (DCB specimen) of ISO 7539-
6:2011;
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(ii) effective crack length up to the tip of the HG-SCC crack, ascc;
Three measurements shall be taken from the direction perpendicular to the
broken surface at 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the specimen
thickness, and the average value of the measurements at these 3 points is
selected as the effective crack length of apre or ascc.
238. Validity of test
(a) Fatigue pre-crack: Of the apre values measured at locations of 25 per cent, 50
per cent and 75 per cent of the specimen thickness, it shall be verified that the
difference between the largest and smallest values does not exceed 5per cent
of net specimen width W;
(b) Small scale yielding and plane strain condition: It shall be verified that a, (W-
a) and B (specimen thickness) satisfy the following equation as specified in
B6.7 of ISO 7866:2012:
a, (W-a), B ≧ 1270 (KI /σ0.2)2
Where a, (W-a) and KI are as follows:
(i) For constant load condition: a = ascc
(W-a) = (W- ascc)
KI = KIAPP
(ii) For constant displacement condition: a = apre
(W-a) = (W- apre)
KI = KIAPP
(c) If the test conditions in (a) and (b) above are not satisfied, the test is invalid.
239. Acceptance Criterion
The applicability of materials shall be judged as follows:
(a) The crack extension (ascc - apre) by HG-SCC in paragraph 238. is examined to
determine if it exceeds 0.16 mm;
(b) The actual applied value of KIAPP, defined as KIA, is calculated by using apre and
the load applied according to paragraph 237.(d)(i) for constant-load condition
and paragraph 237.(d)(ii) for constant-displacement condition;
(c) The validity of materials is judged as per Table 8 below.
Table 8
Qualification of Materials
Pass: Materials that satisfy this requirement are judged to have applicable resistance
to HG-SCC for compressed hydrogen containers as specified in B.7.3 of ISO
7866:2012.
Fail: Materials are judged to be failed for application for compressed hydrogen
containers.
Invalid: Materials cannot be judged in these conditions.
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In case II, another test is recommended if KIA equals to KIAPP or is in some degree
greater than KIAPP.
In case IV, where KIA is considerably greater than KIAPP, another test is recommended because
materials may pass if KIA is a little greater than KIAPP.
(d) A minimum of three valid specimens shall meet the "passed" judgment in this
test.
240. Summary of Tests and Requirements
Table 9
Summary of Test Conditions and Requirements
Temperature 298 ± 5K
Atmosphere and humidity: Air (85 per cent or higher in relative humidity)
Number of specimens 3 (valid)
Test period 90 days
Criteria (ascc – apre) ≦ 0.16 mm
KIA ≧ KIAPP
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Table 10
Optional Tolerances for Test Parameters
Optional
Paragraph Test Parameter Value Tolerance Unit
Pressure
6.2.2.
6.2.3. ≥ or ≤ various per cent
6.2.6. Target pressure NWP 5 per cent NWP
6.2.4. Target pressure ≥ 100 per cent SOC 5 per cent SOC
6.2.4.
6.2.6.1.1. Initial pneumatic
6.2.6.1.3. (c) pressure ≤ 2 MPa 1 MPa
6.2.6.1.11. (a) Atmospheric exposure
6.2.6.2.6. (a) pressure 2 MPa +0.2/-0 MPa
6.2.6.2.3. (b) (i) Post-chatter flow cycle
pressure ≤ 60 per cent NWP 60 per cent NWP
Temperature
6.2.3.
6.2.4. Temperature ≥ or ≤ various °C 10 °C
6.2.6.1.1.
6.2.6.1.3. (a) (c) (d) Temperature cycling /
6.2.6.2.3. (a) (i) pressure cycling ≥ 85°C
6.2.6.2.3. (a) (iii) extreme temperatures ≤ -40°C 5 °C
6.2.6.1.8. ≥ 85°C
6.2.6.2.2. Leak test temperature ≤ -40°C 3 °C
6.2.6.1.11. (a) Atmospheric exposure
6.2.6.2.6. (a) temperature 70°C ±1 °C
Humidity
6.2.3.6. (c)
6.2.4. Hot phase humidity ≥ 80 per cent RH 20 per cent RH
6.2.6.1.4. Dry-off apparatus
6.2.6.2.4. humidity ≤ 30 per cent RH 30 per cent RH
6.2.6.1.4. Humid stage cycle
6.2.6.2.4. humidity 100 per cent RH +0/-20 per cent RH
6.2.6.1.4. Dry stage cycle
6.2.6.2.4. humidity ≤ 30 per cent RH 30 per cent RH
Time
6.2.3.1. Proof pressure test hold
time ≥ 30 seconds 30 s
6.2.3.1. Residual proof pressure
test hold time ≥ 4 minutes 1 min
6.2.3.3. (b) Pendulum impact pre-
conditioning time
6.2.4.2. Permeation test pre-
conditioning time a minimum of 12 hours 72 h
6.2.3.4. Chemical exposure
conditioning time at least 48 hours 2 h
6.2.3.5. High temperature static
pressure test time at least 1000 hours 72 h
6.2.6.1.3. (a) Thermal cycle time at least two hours 72 h
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Optional
Paragraph Test Parameter Value Tolerance Unit
6.2.6.1.3. (c) Pressure cycle
conditioning time
6.2.6.1.4.
6.2.6.2.4. Accelerated corrosion
6.2.6.1.5. (a) cycle time
6.2.6.2.5. (a) Fluid exposure time 24 hours +2/-0 h
6.2.6.1.7. (b)
6.2.6.2.8. Vibration time 30 minutes +1/-0 min
6.2.6.1.7. (b) Frequency range sweep
6.2.6.2.8. time 10 minutes +1/-0 min
6.2.6.1.8. Leak test conditioning
6.2.6.2.2. time at least one hour 24 h
6.2.6.1.8. Leak test immersion
6.2.6.2.2. time at least one minute 2 min
6.2.6.1.9. (b) Bench top activation
conditioning time at least two minutes 8 h
6.2.6.1.11. (a) Atmospheric exposure
6.2.6.2.6. (a) time at least 96 hours 2 h
6.2.6.2.1. (a) Hydrostatic pressure
hold time at least three minutes 1 min
6.2.6.2.3. (b) (i) Chatter flow time at least 24 hours 1 h
6.2.6.2.7. (a) (i) 1st test hold time at least one hour 30 min
6.2.6.2.7. (a) (ii) 2nd test hold time at least one minute 5 s
6.2.6.2.7. (b) Insulation resistance
test voltage application
time at least 2 seconds 1 s
6.2.6.1.6. Ammonia-air exposure
6.2.6.2.9. time at least 10 days 2 h
Rates
6.2.4.1. (b) greater than or equal to
the ramp rates given in
the SAEJ2601_202005
Fuelling ramp rate fuelling tables 7 MPa/min
6.2.4.1. (d) greater than or equal to
the intended vehicle’s -0/+100 per
maximum fuel-demand cent of the
De-fuelling rate rate rate g/s or NL/min
6.2.4.1. (d) greater than or equal to -0/+100 per
the maintenance de- cent of the
De-fuelling rate fuelling rate rate g/s or NL/min
Voltage
6.2.6.2.7. (a) (i) ≥ 1.5 times rated
1st test voltage voltage 0.5 V
6.2.6.2.7. (a) (ii) 2nd test voltage ≥ 2 times rated voltage 0.5 V
6.2.6.2.7. (b) Insulation resistance
test voltage 1000 V DC ±10 V
Distance
6.2.3.2. (a) (i) Horizontal drop height 1.8 m ±0.02 m
6.2.3.2. (a) (ii) (iii) Vertical drop height calculated drop height ±0.02 m
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Optional
Paragraph Test Parameter Value Tolerance Unit
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1. Purpose
This regulation specifies safety-related performance requirements for
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles. The purpose of this regulation is to minimize
human harm that may occur as a result of fire, burst or explosion related to the
vehicle fuel system.
2. Scope
2.1. This regulation applies to all hydrogen-fuelled vehicles of Categories 1 and 2
with a maximum design speed exceeding 25 km/h.
2.2. Contracting Parties may exclude the following vehicles from the application
of this regulation:
(a) A vehicle with four or more wheels whose unladen mass is not more
than 350 kg, not including the mass of traction batteries, whose
maximum design speed is not more than 45 km/h, and whose engine
cylinder capacity and maximum continuous rated power do not exceed
50 cm3 for spark (positive) ignition engines and 4 kW for electric
motors respectively; and
(b) A vehicle with four or more wheels, other than that classified under (a)
above, whose unladen mass is not more than 450 kg (or 650 kg for
vehicles intended for carrying goods), not including the mass of traction
batteries and whose maximum continuous rated power does not exceed
15 kW.
3. Definitions
For the purpose of this regulation, the following definitions shall apply:
3.1. (vacant)
3.2. (vacant)
3.3. "Burst disc" is the non-reclosing operating part of a pressure relief device
which, when installed in the device, is designed to burst at a predetermined
pressure to permit the discharge of compressed hydrogen.
3.4. "Check valve" is a non-return valve that prevents reverse flow.
3.5. "Hydrogen concentration" is the percentage of the hydrogen moles (or
molecules) within the mixture of hydrogen and air (Equivalent to the partial
volume of hydrogen gas).
3.6. "Container" (for hydrogen storage) is the pressure-bearing component on the
vehicle that stores the primary volume of hydrogen fuel in a single chamber or
in multiple permanently interconnected chambers.
3.7. "Container Attachments" are non-pressure bearing parts attached to the
container that provide additional support and/or protection to the container and
that may be only temporarily removed for maintenance and/or inspection only
with the use of tools.
3.8. "Compressed hydrogen storage system (CHSS)" is a system designed to store
compressed hydrogen fuel for a hydrogen-fuelled vehicle, composed of a
container, container attachments (if any), and all primary closure devices
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required to isolate the stored hydrogen from the remainder of the fuel system
and the environment.
3.9. "Date of removal from service" is the date (month and year) specified for
removal from service.
3.10. "Date of manufacture" (of a compressed hydrogen container) is the date
(month and year) of the proof pressure test or final inspection test carried out
by the manufacturer.
3.11. (vacant)
3.12. "Enclosed or semi-enclosed spaces" indicates the special volumes within the
vehicle (or the vehicle outline across openings) that are external to the
hydrogen system (storage system, fuel cell system, internal combustion engine
(ICE) and fuel flow management system) and its housings (if any) where
hydrogen may accumulate (and thereby pose a hazard).
3.13. (vacant)
3.14. (vacant)
3.15. "Electric power train" is the electrical circuit which may include the traction
motor(s), and may also include the REESS, the electrical power conversion
system, the electronic converters, the traction motors, the associated wiring
harness and connectors and the coupling system for charging the REESS.
3.16. (vacant)
3.17. (vacant)
3.18. (vacant)
3.19. (vacant)
3.20. (vacant)
3.21. (vacant)
3.22. (vacant)
3.23. (vacant)
3.24. "Fuel cell system" is a system containing the fuel cell stack(s), air processing
system, fuel flow control system, exhaust system, thermal management system
and water management system.
3.25. "Fuelling receptacle" is the equipment to which a fuelling station nozzle
attaches to the vehicle and through which fuel is transferred to the vehicle. The
fuelling receptacle is used as an alternative to a fuelling port.
3.26. "High voltage" is the classification of an electric component or circuit, if its
maximum working voltage is greater than 60 V and less than or equal to
1500 V of direct current (DC), or greater than 30 V and less than or equal to
1000 V of alternating current (AC).
3.27. "High Voltage Bus" is the electrical circuit, including the coupling system, for
charging the REESS that operates on high voltage.
3.28. "Hydrogen-fuelled vehicle" indicates any motor vehicle that uses compressed
gaseous or liquefied hydrogen as a fuel to propel the vehicle, including fuel
cell and internal combustion engine vehicles. Hydrogen fuel for the vehicles is
specified in ISO 14687:2019-2 and SAE J2719_202003.
3.29. (vacant)
3.30. (vacant)
3.31. (vacant)
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3.32. "Luggage compartment" is the space in the vehicle for luggage and/or goods
accommodation, bounded by the roof, hood, floor, side walls being separated
from the passenger compartment by the front bulkhead or the rear bulkhead.
3.33. "Liquefied hydrogen storage system" indicates liquefied hydrogen storage
container(s) PRDs, shut off device, a boil-off system and the interconnection
piping (if any) and fittings between the above components.
3.34. "Lower flammability limit (LFL)" is the lowest concentration of fuel at which
a gaseous fuel mixture is flammable at normal temperature and pressure.
The lower flammability limit for hydrogen gas in air is conservatively 4 per
cent by volume based on quiescent environment (paragraph 130 in Part I).
3.35. "Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP)" is the highest gauge
pressure to which a container or hydrogen storage system is permitted to
operate under normal operating conditions.
3.36. "Maximum fuelling pressure (MFP)" is the maximum pressure applied to
compressed hydrogen storage system during fuelling. The maximum fuelling
pressure is 125 per cent of the Nominal Working Pressure.
3.37. "Nominal working pressure (NWP)" is the gauge pressure that characterizes
typical operation of a system. For compressed hydrogen storage system, NWP
is the settled pressure of compressed gas in fully fuelled container at a uniform
temperature of 15 °C.
3.38. (vacant)
3.39. (vacant)
3.40. "Passenger compartment" is the space for occupant accommodation, bounded
by the roof, floor, side walls, doors, outside glazing, front bulkhead and rear
bulkhead or rear gate.
3.41. "Pressure relief device (PRD)" is a device that, when activated under specified
performance conditions, is used to release hydrogen from a pressurized system
and thereby prevent failure of the system.
3.42. "Pressure relief valve" is a pressure relief device that opens at a preset pressure
level and can re-close.
3.43. (vacant)
3.44. (vacant)
3.45. "Rechargeable electrical energy storage system (REESS)" is the rechargeable
energy storage system that provides electric energy for electrical propulsion.
3.46. "Rupture" or "burst" both mean to come apart suddenly and violently, break
open or fly into pieces due to the force of internal pressure.
3.47. (vacant)
3.48. "Service life" (of a compressed hydrogen container) indicates the time frame
during which service (usage) is authorized.
3.49. "Shut-off valve" is a valve between the container and the vehicle fuel system
that must default to the "closed" position when not connected to a power
source.
3.50. "Single failure" is a failure caused by a single event, including any
consequential failures resulting from this failure.
3.51. "Specific Heat Release Rate (HRR/A)" is the heat release from a fire per unit
area of the burner where the heat release is based on the rate of fuel being
combusted multiplied by The Lower Heating Value (LHV) of the fuel. LHV
(sometimes called the Net Heating Value) is appropriate for the
characterization of vehicle fires since the product water from combustion
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The density of hydrogen at different pressure and temperature are listed in the
Table 1 below.
Table 1
Compressed Hydrogen Density (g/l)
Temperature Pressure (MPa)
(°C) 1 10 20 30 35 40 50 60 65 70 75 80 87.5
-40 1.0 9.7 18.1 25.4 28.6 31.7 37.2 42.1 44.3 46.1 48.4 50.3 53.0
-30 1.0 9.4 17.5 24.5 27.7 30.6 36.0 40.8 43.0 45.1 47.1 49.0 51.7
-20 1.0 9.0 16.8 23.7 26.8 29.7 35.0 39.7 41.9 43.9 45.9 47.8 50.4
-10 0.9 8.7 16.2 22.9 25.9 28.7 33.9 38.6 40.7 42.8 44.7 46.6 49.2
0 0.9 8.4 15.7 22.2 25.1 27.9 33.0 37.6 39.7 41.7 43.6 45.5 48.1
10 0.9 8.1 15.2 21.5 24.4 27.1 32.1 36.6 38.7 40.7 42.6 44.4 47.0
15 0.8 7.9 14.9 21.2 24.0 26.7 31.7 36.1 38.2 40.2 42.1 43.9 46.5
20 0.8 7.8 14.7 20.8 23.7 26.3 31.2 35.7 37.7 39.7 41.6 43.4 46.0
30 0.8 7.6 14.3 20.3 23.0 25.6 30.4 34.8 36.8 38.8 406 42.4 45.0
40 0.8 7.3 13.9 19.7 22.4 24.9 29.7 34.0 36.0 37.9 39.7 41.5 44.0
50 0.7 7.1 13.5 19.2 21.8 24.3 28.9 33.2 35.2 37.1 38.9 40.6 43.1
60 0.7 6.9 13.1 18.7 21.2 23.7 28.3 32.4 34.4 36.3 38.1 39.8 42.3
70 0.7 6.7 12.7 18.2 20.7 23.1 27.6 31.7 33.6 35.5 37.3 39.0 41.4
80 0.7 6.5 12.4 17.7 20.2 22.6 27.0 31.0 32.9 34.7 36.5 38.2 40.6
85 0.7 6.4 12.2 17.5 20.0 22.3 26.7 30.7 32.6 34.4 36.1 37.8 40.2
4. Applicability of Requirements
4.1. The requirements of paragraph 5. (using test conditions and procedures in
paragraph 6.) apply to all compressed hydrogen-fuelled vehicles with the
following two vehicle mass classes, where applicable:
(a) Light-Duty Vehicle (LDV): Vehicles of Category 1-1 and vehicles of
Categories 1-2 and 2 with GVM not exceeding the mass threshold;
(b) Heavy-Duty Vehicle (HDV): Vehicles of Categories 1-2 and 2 with
GVM exceeding the mass threshold.
Each Contracting Party may determine the mass threshold from the values of
either 3,500 kg or 4,536 kg for application in its national or regional
regulation.3
In paragraph 5. and paragraph 6., where the differences of the applicable
provisions for LHV and HDV are specified with these abbreviations.
3 For the application of this global technical regulation to UN Regulations, 3,500 kg shall be used as
the mass threshold so that LDV covers categories M1, M2 with GVM not exceeding 3,500 kg and
N1 while HDV covers categories M2 with GVM exceeding 3,500 kg, M3, N2 and N3.
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4.2. Each Contracting Party may maintain its existing national crash tests (frontal,
side, rear and rollover) and shall use the limit values of section paragraph 5.2.2.
for compliance.
4.3. The requirements of UN Global Technical Regulation No. 20 apply to all
hydrogen-fuelled vehicles equipped with electric power train containing high
voltage bus.
5. Performance Requirements
5.1. Compressed hydrogen storage system
This section specifies the requirements for the integrity of the compressed
hydrogen storage system.
(a) The primary closure devices shall include the following functions,
which may be combined:
(i) TPRD;
(ii) Check valve; and
(iii) Shut-off valve.
(b) Each Contracting Party may, at its discretion, require that the primary
closure devices shall be mounted directly on or within each container;
(c) CHSS shall meet the performance test requirements summarized in
Table 2. The corresponding test procedures are specified in paragraph 6.
Table 2
Overview of Performance Qualification Test Requirements
5.1.1. Verification tests for baseline metrics Container or container plus container attachments,
as applicable
5.1.2. Verification test for performance durability Container or container plus container attachments,
as applicable
5.1.3. Verification test for expected on-road
performance CHSS
5.1.4. Verification test for service terminating
performance in fire CHSS
5.1.5. Verification test for closure durability Primary closure devices
All new compressed hydrogen storage systems produced for on-road vehicle service shall
have a NWP of 70 MPa or less.
The service life of CHSS shall be determined by the manufacturer, who shall establish the
date of removal from service taking account of the performance requirements applied in the
respective market.
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and statistical analyses) that establish the midpoint burst pressure of new
containers, BPO.
All containers tested shall have a burst pressure within ±10 per cent of BP O
and greater than or equal to a minimum BPmin of 200 per cent NWP. However,
a Contracting Party, at its discretion, may apply 225 per cent NWP for
containers of 35 MPa or less, instead of 200 per cent NWP.
Containers having glass-fibre composite as a primary constituent shall have a
minimum burst pressure greater than 350 per cent NWP.
5.1.1.2. Baseline initial pressure cycle life
Three (3) new containers randomly selected from the design qualification
batch are hydraulically pressure cycled without rupture for 22,000 cycles or
until a leak occurs in accordance with paragraph 6.2.2.2. The container
attachments, if any, shall also be included in this test, unless the manufacturer
can demonstrate that the container attachments do not affect the test results and
are not affected by the test procedure. Leakage shall not occur within 7,500 or
11,000 cycles for light-duty vehicles, at the Contracting Parties’ discretion and
11,000 cycles for heavy-duty vehicles.
5.1.2. Verification tests for performance durability (Hydraulic sequential tests)
If all three pressure cycle life measurements made in para. 5.1.1.2. are greater
than 11,000 cycles, or if they are all within ±25 per cent of each other, then
only one (1) container is tested in para. 5.1.2. Otherwise, three (3) containers
are tested in para. 5.1.2.
Unless otherwise specified, the tests in paragraph 5.1.2. shall be conducted on
the container equipped with its container attachments (if any) that represents
the CHSS without the primary closures.
The container shall not leak during the following sequence of tests, which are
applied in series to a single system and which are illustrated in Figure 1. At
least one system randomly selected from the design qualification batch shall
be tested to demonstrate the performance capability. Specifics of applicable
test procedures are provided in para. 6.2.3.
Figure 1
Verification test for performance durability (hydraulic)
BP <20%
0
burst
180%NWP
Chemical exposure (4 min)
Pressure →
150% NWP
Chemicals
125%NWP
80%NWP
time
Proof Pressure
Damage
Drop
Residual
Strength
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Figure 2
Verification Test for Expected On-Road Performance (Pneumatic/hydraulic)
Pressure
BPO <20%
Burst
180%NWP
4 min
150% NWP
100%SOC
Time
Proof Pressure
+55°C +55°C
Leak / Permeation
Leak / Permeation
5% cy -25°C 5% cy +50°C
5% cy +50°C 5% cy -25°C
40% cy 15-25°C 40% cy 15-25°C
> >
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5.1.6. Labelling
A label shall be permanently affixed on each container or container
attachments with at least the following information: name of the manufacturer,
serial number, date of manufacture, NWP, type of fuel, and date of removal
from service as well as the number of cycles used in the testing programme as
per para. 5.1.1.2. Any label in compliance with this paragraph shall remain in
place and be legible for the duration of the manufacturer’s recommended
service life for the container.
Each Contracting Party may, at its discretion, introduce the maximum length
of the service life such that the date of removal from service shall not be more
than 25 years after the date of manufacture.
5.2. Vehicle fuel system
This section specifies requirements for the vehicle fuel system, which includes
the CHSS, piping, joints, and components in which hydrogen is present.
5.2.1. In-use fuel system integrity
5.2.1.1. Fuelling receptacle requirements
5.2.1.1.1. A compressed hydrogen fuelling receptacle shall prevent reverse flow to the
atmosphere. Test procedure is in accordance with the leak test specified in
paragraph 6.2.6.2.2.
5.2.1.1.2. A label shall be affixed close to the fuelling receptacle; for instance, inside a
refilling hatch, showing the following information: fuel type (e.g. "CHG" for
gaseous hydrogen), NWP, MFP, date of removal from service of containers.
5.2.1.1.3. The fuelling receptacle shall be mounted on the vehicle to ensure positive
locking of the fuelling nozzle. The receptacle shall be protected from
tampering and the ingress of dirt and water (e.g. installed in a compartment
which can be locked). Test procedure is by visual inspection.
5.2.1.1.4. The fuelling receptacle shall not be mounted within the external energy
absorbing elements of the vehicle (e.g. bumper) and shall not be installed in
the passenger compartment, luggage compartment and other places where
hydrogen gas could accumulate and where ventilation is not sufficient. Test
procedure is by visual inspection.
5.2.1.2. Over-pressure protection for the low-pressure system (para. 6.1.6. test
procedure)
The hydrogen system downstream of a pressure regulator shall be protected
against overpressure due to the possible failure of the pressure regulator. The
set pressure of the overpressure protection device shall be lower than or equal
to the maximum allowable working pressure for the appropriate section of the
hydrogen system.
5.2.1.3. Hydrogen discharge systems
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is confirmed that the shut-off valve of the storage system has closed within
5 seconds of the crash and no leakage from the storage system.
5.2.2.3. Container displacement
The container(s) shall remain attached to the vehicle at a minimum of one
attachment point.
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Correspondingly, the final mass of hydrogen in the CHSS, M f, at the end of the
time interval, Δt, can be calculated as follows:
Pf’ = Pf x 288 / (273 + Tf)
ρf’ = –0.0027 x (Pf’)2 + 0.75 x Pf’ + 1.07
Mf = ρf’ x VCHSS
where Pf is the measured final pressure (MPa) at the end of the time interval,
and Tf is the measured final temperature (°C).
The average hydrogen flow rate over the time interval (that shall be less than
the criteria in para. 5.2.2.1.) is therefore
VH2 = (Mf-Mo) / Δt x 22.41 / 2.016 x (Ptarget /Po)
where VH2 is the average volumetric flow rate (NL/min) over the time interval
and the term (Ptarget /Po) is used to compensate for differences between the
measured initial pressure, Po, and the targeted fill pressure Ptarget.
6.1.1.2. Post-crash leak test - compressed hydrogen storage system filled with
compressed helium
The helium gas pressure, P0 (MPa), and temperature T0 (°C), are measured
immediately before the impact and then at a predetermined time interval after
the impact. The time interval, Δt, starts when the vehicle comes to rest after
the impact and continues for at least 60 minutes.
The time interval, Δt, shall be increased if necessary in order to accommodate
measurement accuracy for a CHSS with a large volume operating up to
70MPa; in that case, Δt can be calculated from the following equation:
Δt = VCHSS x NWP /1000 x ((-0.028 x NWP +5.5) x Rs – 0.3) – 2.6 x Rs
where Rs = Ps / NWP, Ps is the pressure range of the pressure sensor (MPa),
NWP is the Nominal Working Pressure (MPa), VCHSS is the volume of the
CHSS (L), and Δt is the time interval (min). If the value of Δt is less than 60
minutes, Δt is set to 60 minutes.
The initial mass of helium in the CHSS is calculated as follows:
Po’ = Po x 288 / (273 + T0)
ρo’ = –0.0043 x (P0’)2 + 1.53 x P0’ + 1.49
Mo = ρo’ x VCHSS
The final mass of helium in the CHSS at the end of the time interval, Δt, is
calculated as follows:
Pf’ = Pf x 288 / (273 + Tf)
ρf’ = –0.0043 x (Pf’)2 + 1.53 x Pf’ + 1.49
Mf = ρf’ x VCHSS
where Pf is the measured final pressure (MPa) at the end of the time interval,
and Tf is the measured final temperature (°C).
The average helium flow rate over the time interval is therefore
VHe = (Mf-Mo) / Δt x 22.41 / 4.003 x (Ptarget / P0)
where VHe is the average volumetric flow rate (NL/min) over the time interval
and the term Ptarget / P0 is used to compensate for differences between the
measured initial pressure (Po) and the targeted fill pressure (Ptarget).
Conversion of the average volumetric flow of helium to the average hydrogen
flow is done with the following expression:
VH2 = VHe / 0.75
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6.1.3.1.1.2. Test gas: Two mixtures of air and hydrogen gas: > 3.0 per cent concentration
of hydrogen in the air to verify function of the warning, and > 4.0 per cent
concentration of hydrogen in the air to verify function of the shut-down. The
proper concentrations are selected based on the recommendation (or the
detector specification) by the manufacturer.
NOTE: The storage of pre-mixed gases of greater than 2 per cent hydrogen in
air in compressed gas cylinders may be restricted or prohibited in various
jurisdictions where test laboratories are located. As an alternative, gas mixtures
up to 4 per cent hydrogen in situ within the test area by a mixing station that
injects the required amount of hydrogen into a flowing streaming of air. The
hydrogen/air mixture can then be delivered to the point of release within the
vehicle by a flexible hose.
6.1.3.1.2. Test method
6.1.3.1.2.1. Preparation for the test: The test is conducted without any influence of wind.
(a) A test gas induction hose is attached to the hydrogen gas leakage
detector;
(b) The hydrogen leak detector is enclosed with a cover to make gas stay
around hydrogen leak detector.
6.1.3.1.2.2. Execution of the test
(a) Test gas is blown to the hydrogen gas leakage detector;
(b) Proper function of the warning system is confirmed within 10 seconds
when tested with the gas to verify function of the warning;
(c) The main shut-off valve is confirmed to be closed within 10 seconds
when tested with the gas to verify function of the shut-down. For
example, the monitoring of the electric power to the shut-off valve or
of the sound of the shut-off valve activation may be used to confirm the
operation of the main shut-off valve of the hydrogen supply.
6.1.3.2. Test procedure for integrity of enclosed spaces and detection systems.
6.1.3.2.1. Preparation:
6.1.3.2.1.1. The test is conducted without any influence of wind.
6.1.3.2.1.2. Special attention is paid to the test environment as during the test flammable
mixtures of hydrogen and air may occur.
6.1.3.2.1.3. Prior to the test the vehicle is prepared to simulate remotely controllable
hydrogen releases from the hydrogen system. Hydrogen releases may be
demonstrated by using an external fuel supply without modification of the test
vehicle fuel lines. The number, location, and flow capacity of the release points
downstream of the main hydrogen shutoff valve are defined by the vehicle
manufacturer taking worst case leakage scenarios under a single failure
condition into account. As a minimum, the total flow of all remotely controlled
releases shall be adequate to trigger demonstration of the automatic "warning"
and hydrogen shut-off functions.
6.1.3.2.1.4. For the purpose of the test, a hydrogen concentration detector is installed where
hydrogen gas may accumulate most in the passenger compartment (e.g. near
the headliner) when testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.2. and hydrogen
concentration detectors are installed in enclosed or semi enclosed volumes on
the vehicle where hydrogen can accumulate from the simulated hydrogen
releases when testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3. (see
para. 6.1.3.2.1.3.).
6.1.3.2.2. Procedure:
6.1.3.2.2.1. Vehicle doors, windows and other covers are closed.
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6.1.3.2.2.2. The propulsion system is started, allowed to warm up to its normal operating
temperature and left operating at idle for the test duration.
6.1.3.2.2.3. A leak is simulated using the remote controllable function.
6.1.3.2.2.4. The hydrogen concentration is measured continuously until the concentration
does not rise for 3 minutes. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3.,
the simulated leak is then increased using the remote controllable function until
the main hydrogen shut-off valve is closed and the tell-tale warning signal is
activated. The monitoring of the electric power to the shut-off valve or of the
sound of the shut-off valve activation may be used to confirm the operation of
the main shut-off valve of the hydrogen supply.
6.1.3.2.2.5. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.2., the test is successfully
completed if the hydrogen concentration in the passenger compartment does
not exceed 1.0 per cent. When testing for compliance with para. 5.2.1.4.3., the
test is successfully completed if the tell-tale warning and shut-off function are
executed at (or below) the levels specified in para. 5.2.1.4.3.; otherwise, the
test is failed and the system is not qualified for vehicle service.
6.1.4. Compliance test for the vehicle exhaust system
6.1.4.1. The power system of the test vehicle (e.g. fuel cell stack or engine) is warmed
up to its normal operating temperature.
6.1.4.2. The measuring device is warmed up before use to its normal operating
temperature.
6.1.4.3. The measuring section of the measuring device is placed along the centre line
of the exhaust gas flow within 100 mm of where the exhaust is released to the
atmosphere.
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6.1.5.5. When a leak detecting liquid is used, hydrogen gas leak detection is performed
immediately after applying the liquid. In addition, visual checks are performed
a few minutes after the application of liquid in order to check for bubbles
caused by trace leaks.
6.1.6. Installation verification
The system is visually inspected for compliance.
6.2. Test procedures for compressed hydrogen storage system
6.2.1. Test procedures for qualification requirements of CHSS are organized as
follows:
Paragraphs 6.2.2. and 6.2.3. contain the test procedures for baseline
performance metrics (requirement of para. 5.1.1.) and performance durability
(requirement of paragraph 5.1.2.)
Paragraph 6.2.4. contains the test procedures for expected on-road
performance (requirement of para. 5.1.3.)
Paragraph 6.2.5. contains the test procedures for service terminating
performance in Fire (requirement of para. 5.1.4.)
Paragraph 6.2.6. contains is the test procedures for performance durability of
primary closures (requirement of para. 5.1.5.)
Unless otherwise specified, the ambient temperature for all tests shall be 20 ±
15 °C.
Unless otherwise specified data sampling for pressure cycling shall be at least
1 Hz.
Unless otherwise specified, the acceptable tolerances of the open ended test
parameters may be recommended by the manufacturer. In lieu of accepting
manufacturer guidance, suggested tolerances are provided in Section O.
6.2.2. Test procedures for baseline performance metrics
6.2.2.1. Burst test (hydraulic)
The burst test is conducted at ambient temperature using a hydraulic fluid. The
rate of pressurization is ≤ 1.4 MPa/s for pressures higher than 150 per cent of
the nominal working pressure. If the rate exceeds 0.35 MPa/s at pressures
higher than 150 per cent NWP, then either the container is placed in series
between the pressure source and the pressure measurement device, or the time
at the pressure above a target burst pressure exceeds 5 seconds. The burst
pressure of the container shall be recorded.
6.2.2.2. Ambient pressure cycling test (hydraulic)
The test is performed in accordance with the following procedure and the test
parameters specified in Table 3:
(a) The test article is filled with a hydraulic fluid;
(b) The test article and fluid are stabilized at the temperature specified in
Table 3 at the start of testing. The environment, hydraulic fluid and the
surface of the test article are maintained at the specified temperature for
the duration of the cycling. The test article temperature may vary from
the environmental temperature during cycling;
(c) The test article is pressure cycled from 2 ± 1 MPa to the target pressure
specified in Table 3;
(d) The temperature of the hydraulic fluid entering the container shall be
maintained at the specified temperature and monitored as close as
possible to the container inlet.
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Table 3
Pressure cycles and conditions
Environment:
Baseline initial 20 ± 15 °C
pressure cycle life 22,000 or until 125 per cent Hydraulic fluid: ≤ 10 cycles
(paragraph 5.1.1.2.) leak occurs NWP 20 ± 15 °C per minute
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45o
No. 1 N o. 2 No. 3*
No. 4
1.8m
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Figure 4
Surface Damage Flow Chart
NO
Does container
attachments exist?
YES
Is the chamber NO
surface accessible?
YES
Remove container
Test on chamber Test on container
attachment and
surface attachment
Test on chamber
surface
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Table 6
Pressure Cycles and Conditions - Extreme Temperature Pressure Cycling Test
Table 7a
Ambient and Extreme Temperature Gas Pressure Cycling Test Parameters
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Table 7b
CHSS Pressurization Rates for Ambient and Extreme Temperature Gas Pressure
Cycling Tests
-25 °C Ambient
CHSS volume 50 °C Ambient 20 °C Ambient -25 °C Ambient Tfuel = 20 °C +/-
(L) -40 °C ≤ Tfuel ≤ -33 °C -40 °C ≤ Tfuel ≤ -33 °C -40 °C ≤ Tfuel ≤ -33 °C 5 °C
50 7.6 19.9 28.5 13.1
100 7.6 19.9 28.5 7.7
174 7.6 19.9 19.9 5.2
250 7.6 19.9 19.9 4.1
300 7.6 16.5 16.5 3.6
400 7.6 12.4 12.4 2.9
500 7.6 9.9 9.9 2.3
600 7.6 8.3 8.3 2.1
700 7.1 7.1 7.1 1.9
1 000 5.0 5.0 5.0 1.4
1 500 3.3 3.3 3.3 1.0
2 000 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.7
2 500 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.5
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(e) The maximum allowable leak rate from the CHSS from a single point
is in accordance with paragraph 6.2.4.3(b).
6.2.4.2. Gas permeation test (pneumatic)
This test is performed after each group of 250 pneumatic pressure cycles in
accordance with paragraph 6.2.4. Table 7a.
The CHSS is fully filled with hydrogen gas to ≥ 100 per cent SOC and soaked
for a minimum of 12 hours at 55 °C to 60 °C in a sealed chamber prior to the
start of the test. The test shall continue until the permeation rate reaches a
steady state based on at least three consecutive rates separated by at least 12
hours being within ±10 per cent of the previous rate, or 500 hours, whichever
occurs first.
6.2.4.3. Localized gas leak test (pneumatic)
A bubble test may be used to fulfil this requirement. The following procedure
is used when conducting the bubble test:
(a) The exhaust of the shut-off valve (and other internal connections to
hydrogen systems) shall be capped for this test (as the test is focused at
on external leakage).
At the discretion of the manufacturer or test laboratory, the test article
may be immersed in the leak-test fluid or leak-test fluid applied to the
test article when resting in open air. Bubbles can vary greatly in size,
depending on conditions. The tester estimates the gas leakage based on
the size and rate of bubble formation.
(b) For a localized rate of 0.005 mg/sec (3.6 NmL/min), the resultant
allowable rate of bubble generation is about 2,030 bubbles per minute
for a typical bubble size of 1.5 mm in diameter. Even if much larger
bubbles are formed, the leak shall be readily detectable. For an
unusually large bubble size of 6 mm in diameter, the allowable bubble
rate would be approximately 32 bubbles per minute.
6.2.5. Test procedures for two-stage localized/engulfing fire test (para. 5.1.4.)
The test consists of two stages: a localized fire stage followed by an engulfing
stage as described in Figure 6.
Figure 6
Temperature Profile of the Fire Test
800o C
Localized Area
600o C Engulfing Region Outside
Localized Area (burner
ramp rate)
300o C
Ignite
Main
Burner
0 1 3 10 12 Minutes
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(c) As illustrated in Figure 9 below, the nozzles on the third and fourth rails
aim toward the centre of the burner to form a "hot zone" in this targeted
area. See also Figures 14 and 15 in Part I.
Table 8
Definition of Burner Nozzles for The Prescribed Burner
Item Description
6.2.5.3.2.2. The values for LLOC, LEXT, and W defined above shall be used for calculating
HRR/As for the localized burner zone and engulfing burner extension.
The borders of the localized burner zone and the engulfing burner extension
shall be defined using LLOC, LEXT, and W so that test articles can be properly
located and oriented for CHSS fire test. The borderline between the localized
burner zone and the engulfing burner extension is located mid-way between
the nozzles of the two zones and used as a datum for locating the outside
borders at distances LLOC and LEXT away from the datum towards the localized
burner zone and the engulfing burner extension, respectively. The centres of
the outside rails of the burner zone(s) define the remaining two borders.
NOTE: Figure 17 in Part 1 shows an illustration of borderlines.
6.2.5.4. Pre-test checkout of burner
The purpose of the pre-test checkout is to verify that the localized and engulfing
burner zones are operating as expected and that the test setup including wind
shields are functional and capable of delivering repeatable results prior to
conducting the CHSS fire tests.
6.2.5.4.1. Pre-test checkout frequency
This pre-test shall be performed at least once prior to conducting CHSS fire
tests. If the burner and test setup is modified then the pre-test checkout shall
be repeated before the CHSS fire test.
6.2.5.4.2. Pre-test cylinder definition
A 320 mm diameter pre-test cylinder (fabricated from 300 mm/12 inch
Schedule 40 NPS steel pipe with end caps) shall be used for the burner pre-test.
The cylindrical length of the pre-test cylinder shall be at least 800mm, and the
overall length shall be equal or longer than the CHSS test article (up to
maximum engulfing burner length in paragraph 6.2.5.3.2.1.).
6.2.5.4.3. Instrumentation and data processing for pre-test check-out
6.2.5.4.3.1. The pre-test cylinder shall be instrumented to ensure that the burner and test
setup will produce temperature levels consistent with performance-based
requirements of the localized and engulfing fire zones. The location of the
instrumentation shall be adjusted along the cylindrical section of the pre-test
cylinder to be consistent with the targeted localized and engulfing fire zones
of the CHSS test article. One set of instrumentation on the cylindrical section
shall be centrally located within the localized zone, and the other two sets
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spread out over the remaining length of the engulfing fire zone (outside the
localized fire zone).
As an example of the process, Figure 7 illustrates a common situation where a
container is protected by a TPRD on one end (i.e. the left end) so the localized
fire zone is located on the right-end end. The surface temperatures are
measured on the top, middle, and bottom of the pre-test cylinder in three
locations along the length of the cylinder. The location on the right end of the
cylindrical section is centrally located in the targeted localized zone, and the
other two locations are in the centre and left ends of the targeted engulfing fire
zones along the cylindrical section.
Figure 7
Example of Placement of Instrumentation on the Pre-Test Cylinder
Thermocouple Placement
TM(L,C,R)R
TBL TBC TBR
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contemplated, then mounting shall maintain the distance between the CHSS
and the burner monitors as the spacing between the burner and CHSS is
adjusted in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.5.
6.2.5.4.3.3. Thermocouple readings shall be recorded at least once a second and then
used to calculate the following parameters:
(a) TBLOC is the bottom surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder based
on TBR;
(b) TMFLOC are the surface temperatures of the front side of the pre-test
cylinder based on TMRF;
(c) TMRLOC is the surface temperatures of the rear side of pre-test cylinder
based on TMRR;
(d) TULOC is the top surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder based on
TUR;
(e) TBLOC25 is the burner monitor below the pre-test cylinder (and
subsequently below the CHSS test article in paragraph 6.2.5.6.) based
on TBR25. Thermocouples used to back up or supplement TBR25 may
also be included in the calculation of the average temperature of the
burner monitors in the localized fire zone. Any thermocouple
measurement that has been compromised or failed (or is not located
within the localized fire zone) shall be disregarded from the calculation
of average temperature of the burner monitor;
(f) TBENG is the bottom surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder based
on the average of TBR, TBC, or TBL within the engulfing fire zone;
(g) TMFENG is the surface temperature of the front side of the pre-test
cylinder based on the average of TMLF, TMCF and TMRF within the
engulfing fire zone;
(h) TMRENG is the surface temperatures of the rear side of the pre-test
cylinder based on the average of TMLR, TMCR and TMRR within the
engulfing fire zone;
(i) TUENG is the top surface temperature of the pre-test cylinder based on
the average of TUR, TUC, or TUL within the engulfing fire zone;
(j) TBENG25 is the burner monitor below the pre-test cylinder (and
subsequently below the CHSS test article in paragraph 6.2.5.6.) based
on the average of the three required thermocouples (TBR25, TBC25, or
TBL25 for the pre-test checkout) within the engulfing fire zone.
Thermocouples used to back up or supplement TBR25, TBC25, or
TBL25 may also be in included in the calculation of average
temperature of the burner monitor in the engulfing fire zone. Any
thermocouple measurement that has been compromised or failed (or is
not located within the engulfing fire zone) shall be disregarded from the
calculation of average temperature in the engulfing fire zone.
6.2.5.4.4. Mounting of the pre-test cylinder
The pre-test cylinder used for the pre-test checkout shall be mounted at a height
of 100 ± 5 mm above the burner and located over the burner such that nozzles
from the two centrally-located manifolds are pointing toward the bottom centre
of the steel container.
NOTE: See the diagrams in Figure 8 and Figure 9 for examples of the mounting
and the photograph in Figure 13 in Part I for the mounting of a pre-
test cylinder for the pre-test checkout.
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Figure 8
Side view of mounting of the pre-test cylinder for pre-test checkout
100 mm
Engulfing Localized
Figure 9
End view of mounting of the pre-test cylinder relative to the burner
T
T T
T
25 mm
T
100 mm
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Table 10
Criteria for the Acceptance of Localized and Engulfing Burners using Alternative
Burner Configurations
6.2.5.4.5.4. Additionally, the allowable limits for the burner monitors during subsequent
CHSS fire test shall be established based on test results at the expected localized
and engulfing burner settings during the pre-test checkout:
(a) The minimum value for the burner monitor during the localized fire
stage (TminLOC25) shall be calculated by subtracting 50 °C from the 60-
second rolling average of TBLOC25. If the resultant minimum values
exceed 600 °C, the minimum value is set to 600 °C for the localized fire
stage.
(b) The minimum value for the burner monitor during the engulfing fire
stage (TminENG25) shall be calculated by subtracting 50 °C from the 60-
second rolling average of TBENG25. If the resultant minimum values
exceed 800 °C, the minimum value is set to 800 °C for the engulfing
fire stage.
If the above requirements are satisfactorily met, then the burner setup is
typically ready for CHSS fire test.
6.2.5.4.5.5. If results are not satisfactory, then the source of the variation in burner
performance shall be identified and corrected and then re-tested until the
requirements for pre-test verification are met. Adjustment of the height is
permissible to achieve acceptable operation within the allowable operating
ranges as defined in Tables 9 and 10.
When the width/diameter of the CHSS test article is larger than the width of
the burner and the shape of the bottom of the CHSS test article (for example,
a flat horizontal plane as illustrated for CHSS in Figures 30 and 33 in part I)
impedes the burner exhaust from readily flowing up and around the CHSS test
article during the CHSS fire test, then the burner air flow can be restricted and
the burner monitors may not be able to achieve the required minimum
temperatures during the localized and/or engulfing fire stages of the CHSS fire
test. If the CHSS test article is expected to impede the burner flow (or if the
burner monitors did not achieve the required temperatures during the CHSS
fire test), then the following additional pre-test is required to determine the
appropriate height for mounting the CHSS test article above the burner such
that required temperatures are achieved:
(a) A pre-test plate (made of steel) with approximately the length and
width/diameter of the CHSS test article is mounted above the burner to
simulate the bottom on the CHSS test article at an initial height of 100
mm.
(b) Burner monitors as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3.2. are located 25 ± 5
mm below the surface.
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(c) The burners are operated in the localized and engulfing modes (at the
HRR/As established above) and the temperatures of the burner monitors
are measured.
(d) If the burner monitors for both the localized and engulfing fire stages
do not meet the minimum criteria (defined in paragraph 6.2.5.4.5.4.),
then the height of the pre-test plate above the burner shall be increased
by 50 mm and the process in steps (b) and (c) are repeated until a
satisfactory height is achieved.
NOTE: Satisfactory results are expected at heights of 200 – 250 mm.
If the burner monitors meet the minimum criteria (defined above) for both the
localized and engulfing fire stages, then the required height for locating the
CHSS test article above the burner has been determined and the pre-test is
complete.
6.2.5.5. Mounting of the CHSS test article above the burner
After the pre-test checkout(s) have been satisfactorily completed, the CHSS
test article shall be mounted above the burner.
6.2.5.5.1. Height and location of the CHSS test article above the burner
The CHSS test article shall be mounted at the same height above the burner as
for the pre-test checkout in paragraph 6.2.5.4. and located over the burner such
that nozzles on the two centrally-located manifolds (or "rails") are pointing
toward the targeted region on the bottom (i.e. the lowest elevation) of the
CHSS test article. See Figures 10 and 11 for examples of the mounting of
cylindrical and conformable containers, respectively.
Figure 10
Position the bottom of the cylindrical container relative to the burner
100 mm or,
if applicable, per 6.2.5.4.5.5. j
Figure 11
Position the bottom of the conformable container relative to the burner
25 mm T
Per 6.2.5.4.5.5.
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6.2.5.5.2. Targeting of the localized and engulfing burner zones on the CHSS
Localized fire shall be targeted on the CHSS test article to challenge the ability
of the TPRDs to sense the fire and respond in order to protect the container.
This requirement is met as follows:
(a) For CHSS where the manufacturer has not opted to include vehicle-
specific features (as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.), the CHSS test article
shall be rotated relative to the localized burner to minimize the ability
to TPRDs to sense the fire and respond. Shields, panels, wraps,
structural elements and other features added to the container shall be
considered when establishing the worst case orientation relative to the
localized fire as parts and features intended to protect sections of the
container but can (inadvertently) leave other potions or joints/seams
vulnerable to attack and/or hinder the ability of TPRDs to respond.
For CHSS where the manufacturer has opted to include vehicle-specific
features (as defined in paragraph 6.2.5.1.), the CHSS test article is
oriented relative to the localized burner to provide the worst case fire
exposure identified for the specific vehicle.
(b) The localized burner shall be located under the CHSS test article such
that the distance from localized fire zone to the nearest TPRD sense
point(s) is maximized.
The engulfing fire zone shall extend in one direction from the localized fire
zone toward the nearest TPRD (or sense point). The engulfing burner can
extend beyond the TPRD(s) if the distance from the localized burner is less
than the maximum allowable extension of the engulfing burner as defined
above (i.e. 1,400 ± 50 mm).
NOTE: Examples of commonly-encountered situations for targeting the
localized fire zone on the CHSS test article and positioning the
engulfing fire zone under the CHSS test article are provided in the
rationale (in Part I Section E Figures 28 to 35).
6.2.5.6. Instrumentation and connections to the CHSS test article
6.2.5.6.1. The definition and mounting of the thermocouples for burner monitoring are
analogous to paragraph 6.2.5.4.3.2. for the pre-test checkout. See Figures 10
and 11 for examples of the mounting below cylindrical and conformable
containers, respectively.
At least one thermocouple for burner monitoring shall be located in the
localized fire exposure of the CHSS test article, and two thermocouples shall
be located in the extension of the engulfing fire exposure on the CHSS test
article. Additional thermocouples may be added to back up or supplement
burner monitoring along the centre line of the localized and engulfing burners.
6.2.5.6.2. The calculation of the burner monitor temperatures (TBLOC25 and TBENG25) are
analogous to the process in paragraph 6.2.5.4.3.3. for the pre-test checkout.
Additional thermocouples may be located at TPRD sensing points or any other
locations for optional diagnostic purposes.
A fluid line shall be connected to the CHSS prior to test to allow fill and vent
of the CHSS as defined within the test procedure.
Shut-off(s) valves shall be installed on the line as required to isolate the CHSS
contents during the test and perform required fill and vent procedures prior to
or after the test.
A pressure transmitter shall also be installed on the line such that the pressure
of contents within the CHSS can be remotely monitored during the test. The
accuracy of the transmitter shall be at least ±1 per cent of full scale and ±10
per cent at 1 MPa.
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6.2.5.7.4. Minor movement of the CHSS test article and subsequent repositioning of the
CHSS test article relative to the burners is allowed when TPRD(s) activate.
The fire test continues until either:
(a) the CHSS vents and the pressure falls to less than 1 MPa; or
(b) a total test of one hour from start of test is reached for CHSS in LDV or
two hours for CHSS in HDV.
When the test is completed, the burner fuel flow shall be shut off within one
minute, and the CHSS shall be depressurized (if not already near ambient
pressure) and then purged with inert gas for safe post-test handling.
NOTE: Suggestions are provided in Part I, Section E(d) for technical data and
information to be provided with CHSS fire test report.
6.2.6. Test Procedures for performance durability of primary closures (para. 5.1.5.
requirement).
Testing is performed with either hydrogen or non-reactive gas as specified in
the following paragraphs:
Hydrogen gas shall be compliant with ISO 14687:2019, SAE J2719_202003,
or meet the following specifications:
(a) Hydrogen fuel index: ≥ 99.97 per cent
(b) Total non-hydrogen gases: ≤ 300 µmol/mol
(c) Water: ≤ 5 µmol/mol
(d) Particle concentrations: ≤ 1 mg/kg
The leak test gas shall be hydrogen, helium, or a non-reactive gas mixture
containing a detectable amount of helium or hydrogen gas.
All tests are performed at ambient temperature of 20 ± 5 °C unless otherwise
specified.
6.2.6.1. Compressed hydrogen storage TPRD qualification performance tests.
6.2.6.1.1. Pressure cycling test.
Five TPRD units undergo 15,000 internal pressure cycles according to Table
11. Following this test, the pressure relief device shall comply with the
requirements of the leak test (para. 6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation test
(paragraph 6.2.6.1.9.) and flow rate test (para. 6.2.6.1.10.). See Table 11 below
for a summary of the pressure cycles.
Table 11
Pressure cycling conditions
Pressure cycles to per cent NWP No. of cycles Sample temperature for cycling
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−1
0.502 0.498
𝑇𝐿 = ( + ) −𝛽
𝛽 + 𝑇𝑓 𝛽 + 𝑇𝑀𝐸
Cycle Condition Temperature (°C) Relative Humidity ( per cent) Cycle Duration)
(b) The apparatus used for this test shall consist of a fog/environmental
chamber, suitable water supply conforming to ASTM D1193-06(2018)
Type IV, provisions for heating the chamber, and the necessary means
of controlling temperature between 22 °C and 62 °C. The apparatus
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(j) Humidity ramp times between the ambient and wet condition, and
between the wet and dry conditions, can have a significant effect on test
acceleration (this is because corrosion rates are highest during these
transition periods). The time from ambient to the wet condition shall be
60 ± 5 minutes and the transition time between wet and dry conditions
shall be 180 ± 10 minutes;
(k) Immediately after the corrosion test, the samples are rinsed with fresh
tap water and allowed to dry before evaluating;
(l) The TPRDs shall then comply with the requirements of the leak test
(paragraph 6.2.6.1.8.), bench top activation test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.9.)
and flow rate test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.10.).
6.2.6.1.5. Vehicle environment test
Resistance to degradation by external exposure to automotive fluids is
determined by the following test:
(a) The inlet and outlet connections of the TPRD are connected or capped
in accordance with the manufacturers installation instructions. The
external surfaces of the TPRD are exposed for 24 hours at ambient
temperature to each of the following fluids:
(i) Sulphuric acid - 19 per cent solution by volume in water;
(ii) Ethanol/gasoline – 10 per cent/90 per cent concentration of E10
fuel; and
(iii) Windshield washer fluid (50 per cent by volume methyl alcohol
and water).
The fluids are replenished as needed to ensure complete exposure for
the duration of the test. A distinct test is performed with each of the
fluids. One TPRD may be used for exposure to all of the fluids in
sequence.
(b) After exposure to each fluid, the TPRD is wiped off and rinsed with
water;
(c) The TPRD shall not show signs of physical degradation that could
impair the function of the component, specifically: cracking, softening,
or swelling. Cosmetic changes such as pitting or staining are not
failures. At the conclusion of all exposures, the TPRD shall comply
with the requirements of the leak test (para. 6.2.6.1.8.), bench top
activation test (paragraph 6.2.6.1.9.) and flow rate test
(para. 6.2.6.1.10.).
6.2.6.1.6. Stress corrosion cracking test.
This test shall only be applicable to TPRDs containing copper alloys exposed
to the outside environment. This test can be performed if the testing agency
does not know whether copper alloys are present.
For TPRDs containing components made of a copper alloy (e.g. brass), one
TPRD unit is tested. All copper alloy components exposed to the atmosphere
shall be degreased and then continuously exposed for at least ten days to a
moist ammonia-air mixture maintained in a glass chamber having a glass
cover.
Aqueous ammonia having a specific gravity of 0.94 is maintained at the bottom
of the glass chamber below the sample at a concentration of at least 20 ml per
litre of chamber volume. The sample is positioned 35 ± 5 mm above the
aqueous ammonia solution and supported in an inert tray. The moist ammonia-
air mixture is maintained at atmospheric pressure at 35 ± 5°C. Copper alloy
components shall not exhibit cracking or delaminating due to this test.
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passes the test. If bubbles are detected, the leak rate is measured. The total
hydrogen leak rate shall be less than 10 NmL/h.
6.2.6.1.9. Bench top activation test
Three new TPRD units are tested without being subjected to other design
qualification tests in order to establish a baseline time for activation, which is
defined as the averaged activation time of these three units. Five additional
pre-tested units (pre-tested according to paras. 6.2.6.1.1., 6.2.6.1.3., 6.2.6.1.4.,
6.2.6.1.5. and 6.2.6.1.7.) undergo bench top activation testing as specified in
other tests in para. 6.2.6.1.
(a) The test setup consists of either an oven or chimney which is capable
of controlling air temperature and flow to achieve 600 ± 10°C in the air
surrounding the TPRD. The TPRD unit is not exposed directly to flame.
The TPRD unit is mounted in a fixture according to the manufacturer’s
installation instructions; the test configuration is to be documented;
(b) A thermocouple is placed in the oven or chimney to monitor the
temperature. The temperature shall remain within the acceptable range
for at least two minutes prior to running the test;
(c) Prior to insertion, the TPRD unit is pressurized to 2 ± 0.5 MPa;
(d) The pressurized TPRD unit is inserted into the oven or chimney, and
the time for the device to activate is recorded;
(e) TPRD units previously subjected to other tests in para. 6.2.6.1. shall
activate within a period no more than two minutes longer than the
baseline activation time;
(f) The maximum difference in the activation time of the three TPRD units
that had not undergone previous testing shall be no more than two
minutes.
6.2.6.1.10. Flow rate test
(a) Eight TPRD units are tested for flow capacity. The eight units consist
of three new TPRD units and one TPRD unit from each of the following
tests: paras. 6.2.6.1.1., 6.2.6.1.3., 6.2.6.1.4., 6.2.6.1.5. and 6.2.6.1.7.;
(b) Each TPRD unit is activated according to para. 6.2.6.1.9. After
activation and without cleaning, removal of parts, or reconditioning,
each TPRD unit is subjected to a flow test;
(c) Flow rate testing is conducted with an inlet pressure of 2 ± 0.5 MPa.
The outlet is at ambient pressure. The inlet pressure and flow rate are
recorded;
(d) Flow rate is measured with accuracy within ±2 per cent. The lowest
measured value of the eight pressure relief devices shall not be less than
90 per cent of the highest flow value.
6.2.6.1.11. Atmospheric exposure test
The atmospheric exposure test applies to qualification of TPRDs if the
component has non-metallic materials exposed to the atmosphere during
normal operating conditions.
(a) All non-metallic materials that provide a fuel containing seal, and that
are exposed to the atmosphere, for which a satisfactory declaration of
properties is not submitted by the applicant, shall not crack or show
visible evidence of deterioration after exposure to oxygen for at least
96 hours at 70 °C and 2 MPa in accordance with ISO 188:2011 or
ASTM D572-04(2019);
(b) All elastomers that are exposed to the atmosphere shall demonstrate
resistance to ozone by one or more of the following:
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(b) The apparatus used for this test shall consist of a fog/environmental
chamber, suitable water supply conforming to ASTM D1193-06(2018)
Type IV, provisions for heating the chamber, and the necessary means
of controlling temperature between 22 °C and 62 °C. The apparatus
shall include provisions for a supply of suitably conditioned
compressed air and one or more nozzles for fog generation. The nozzle
or nozzles used for the generation of the fog shall be directed or baffled
to minimize any direct impingement on the test samples.
(c) The apparatus shall consist of the chamber design as defined in ISO
6270-2:2017. During "wet-bottom" generated humidity cycles, the
testing agency must confirm that visible water droplets are found on the
samples to verify proper wetness.
(d) Steam generated humidity may be used provided the source of water
used in generating the steam is free of corrosion inhibitors. During
steam generated humidity cycles, the proper wetness shall be confirmed
by visual inspection of visible water droplets on the samples.
(e) The apparatus for the dry off stage shall have the ability to obtain and
maintain the following environmental conditions: temperature: 60 ±
2 °C and humidity: ≤ 30 per cent RH. The apparatus shall also have
sufficient air circulation to prevent temperature stratification, and also
allow thorough drying of the test samples.
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(f) The force/impingement from this salt application shall not remove
corrosion or damage the coatings/paints system of test samples.
(g) The complex salt solution in per cent by mass shall be as specified
below:
(i) Sodium Chloride (NaCl): 0.9 per cent;
(ii) Calcium Chloride (CaCl2): 0.1 per cent;
(iii) Sodium Bicarbonate (NaHCO3): 0.075 per cent.
Sodium Chloride must be reagent grade or food grade. Calcium
Chloride must be reagent grade. Sodium Bicarbonate must be reagent
or food grade (e.g. Baking Soda or comparable product is acceptable).
Water must meet ASTM D1193-06(2018) Type IV requirements.
NOTE: Either CaCl2 or NaHCO3 material must be dissolved separately
in water and added to the solution of the other materials. If all solid
materials are added dry, an insoluble precipitate may result.
(h) The component samples shall be installed in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommended procedure and exposed to the cyclic
corrosion test method described in Table 13.
(i) Repeat the cycle daily until 100 cycles of exposure have been
completed. For each salt mist application, the solution shall be sprayed
as an atomized mist, using the spray apparatus to mist the components
until all areas are thoroughly wet / dripping. Suitable application
techniques include using a plastic bottle, or a siphon spray powered by
oil-free regulated air to spray the test samples. The quantity of spray
applied shall be sufficient to visibly rinse away salt accumulation left
from previous sprays. A total of four salt mist applications shall be
applied during the ambient stage. Salt mist is not applied during any
other stage of the test. The first salt mist application occurs at the
beginning of the ambient stage. Each subsequent salt mist application
shall be applied approximately ninety minutes after the previous
application in order to allow adequate time for test sample to dry. If the
test must be interrupted for weekends and holidays, the test article shall
be kept at the ambient temperature of 25 ± 3 °C ˚and the relative
humidity of 45 ± 10 per cent and the cycle shall restart from ambient
stage.
(j) Humidity ramp times between the ambient and wet condition, and
between the wet and dry conditions, can have a significant effect on test
acceleration (this is because corrosion rates are highest during these
transition periods). The time from ambient to the wet condition shall be
60 ± 5 minutes and the transition time between wet and dry conditions
shall be 180 ± 10 minutes.
(k) Immediately after the corrosion test, the sample is rinsed with fresh tap
water and allowed to dry before evaluating.
(l) The tested samples shall then be subjected to the leak test (paragraph
6.2.6.2.2.) and hydrostatic strength test (paragraph 6.2.6.2.1.)
6.2.6.2.5. Vehicle environment test
Resistance to degradation by exposure to automotive fluids is determined by
the following test.
(a) The inlet and outlet connections of the valve unit are connected or
capped in accordance with the manufacturers installation instructions.
The external surfaces of the valve unit are exposed for at least 24 hours
at ambient temperature to each of the following fluids:
(i) Sulphuric acid -19 per cent solution by volume in water;
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(b) Insulation resistance test. 1,000 V D.C. is applied between the power
conductor and the component casing for at least two seconds. The
minimum allowable resistance for that component is 240 kΩ.
6.2.6.2.8. Vibration test
The valve unit is pressurized to ≥ 100 per cent NWP, sealed at both ends, and
vibrated for 30 minutes along each of the three orthogonal axes (vertical, lateral
and longitudinal) at the most severe resonant frequencies. The most severe
resonant frequencies are determined by acceleration of 1.5 g with a sweep time
of 10 minutes within a sinusoidal frequency range of 10 to 500 Hz. If the
resonance frequency is not found in this range the test is conducted at 40 Hz.
Following this test, each sample shall not show visible exterior damage that
indicates that the performance of the part is compromised. At the completion
of the test, the unit shall comply with the requirements of the leak test specified
in para. 6.2.6.2.2. and hydrostatic strength test specified in paragraph 6.2.6.2.1.
6.2.6.2.9. Stress corrosion cracking test
This test shall only be applicable to valve units containing copper alloys
exposed to the outside environment. This test can be performed if the testing
agency does not know whether copper alloys are present.
For the valve units containing components made of a copper alloy (e.g. brass),
one valve unit is tested. The valve unit is disassembled, all copper alloy
components are degreased and then the valve unit is reassembled before it is
continuously exposed for at least 10 days to a moist ammonia-air mixture
maintained in a glass chamber having a glass cover.
Aqueous ammonia having a specific gravity of 0.94 is maintained at the bottom
of the glass chamber below the sample at a concentration of at least 20 ml per
litre of chamber volume. The sample is positioned 35 ± 5 mm above the
aqueous ammonia solution and supported in an inert tray. The moist ammonia-
air mixture is maintained at atmospheric pressure at 35 ± 5 ºC. Copper alloy
components shall not exhibit cracking or delaminating due to this test.
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Table 14
Overview of the Performance Qualification Requirements
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After passing the first part, the test shall be repeated subsequently to re-
generation of the vacuum and cool-down of the container as described above.
(a) The vacuum is re-generated to a value specified by the manufacturer.
The vacuum shall be maintained at least 24 hours. The vacuum pump
may stay connected until the time directly before the start of the vacuum
loss;
(b) The second part of the vacuum loss test is conducted with a completely
cooled-down container (according to the procedure in para. 7.4.2.1.);
(c) The container is filled to the specified maximum filling level;
(d) The line downstream the first pressure relief device is blocked and the
vacuum enclosure is flooded with air at an even rate to atmospheric
pressure;
(e) The test is terminated when the second pressure relief device does not
open any more.
The pressure of the inner container and the vacuum jacket is recorded or
written during the entire test. For steel containers the second part of the test is
passed if the secondary pressure relief device does not open below 110 per cent
of the set pressure of the first pressure relief device and limits the pressure in
the container to a maximum 136 per cent of the MAWP if a safety valve is
used, or, 150 per cent of the MAWP if a burst disk is used as the secondary
pressure relief device. For other container materials, an equivalent level of
safety shall be demonstrated.
7.4.3. Verification test for service-terminating performance due to fire
The tested liquefied hydrogen storage system shall be representative of the
design and the manufacturing of the type to be homologated. Its manufacturing
shall be completely finished and it shall be mounted with all its equipment.
The first part of the test is conducted according to the following procedure:
(a) The bonfire test is conducted with a completely cooled-down container
(according to the procedure in para. 7.4.2.1.);
(b) The container contained during the previous 24 hours a volume of
liquid hydrogen at least equal to half of the water volume of the inner
container;
(c) The container is filled with liquid hydrogen so that the quantity of liquid
hydrogen measured by the mass measurement system is half of the
maximum allowed quantity that may be contained in the inner
container;
(d) A fire burns 0.1 m underneath the container. The length and the width
of the fire exceed the plan dimensions of the container by 0.1 m. The
temperature of the fire is at least 590 ºC. The fire shall continue to burn
for the duration of the test;
(e) The pressure of the container at the beginning of the test is between 0
MPa and 0.01 MPa at the boiling point of hydrogen in the inner
container;
(f) The test shall continue until the storage pressure decreases to or below
the pressure at the beginning of the test, or alternatively in case the first
PRD is a re-closing type, the test shall continue until the safety device
has opened for a second time;
(g) The test conditions and the maximum pressure reached within the
container during the test are recorded in a test certificate signed by the
manufacturer and the technical service.
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gauge shall be 1 per cent of the pressure range. The pressure gauge shall be
installed between the positive shut-off valve and the sample under test.
Throughout the test, the sample shall be tested for leakage, with a surface
active agent without formation of bubbles or measured with a leakage rate less
than 216 Nml/hour.
7.4.4.3. Endurance test
7.4.4.3.1. A component shall be capable of conforming to the applicable leakage test
requirements of paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9., after being subjected to 20,000
operation cycles.
7.4.4.3.2. The appropriate tests for external leakage and seat leakage, as described in
paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. shall be carried out immediately following the
endurance test.
7.4.4.3.3. The shut-off valve shall be securely connected to a pressurized source of dry
air or nitrogen and subjected to 20,000 operation cycles. A cycle shall consist
of one opening and one closing of the component within a period of not less
than 10 ± 2 seconds.
7.4.4.3.4. The component shall be operated through 96 per cent of the number of
specified cycles at ambient temperature and at the MAWP of the component.
During the off cycle the downstream pressure of the test fixture shall be
allowed to decay to 50 per cent of the MAWP of the component.
7.4.4.3.5. The component shall be operated through 2 per cent of the total cycles at the
maximum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) after sufficient
conditioning time at this temperature to ensure thermal stability and at MAWP.
The component shall comply with paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. at the appropriate
maximum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) at the completion of the
high temperature cycles.
7.4.4.3.6. The component shall be operated through 2 per cent of the total cycles at the
minimum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) but not less than the
temperature of liquid nitrogen after sufficient conditioning time at this
temperature to ensure thermal stability and at the MAWP of the component.
The component shall comply with paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. at the appropriate
minimum material temperature (-40 °C to +85 °C) at the completion of the low
temperature cycles.
7.4.4.4. Operational test
The operational test shall be carried out in accordance with EN 13648-1 or EN
13648 2. The specific requirements of the standard are applicable.
7.4.4.5. Corrosion resistance test
Metallic hydrogen components shall comply with the leakage tests referred to
paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. after being submitted to 144 hours salt spray test
according to ISO 9227 with all connections closed.
A copper or brass hydrogen containing component shall comply with the
leakage tests referred to paras. 7.4.4.2. and 7.4.4.9. and after being submitted
to 24 hours immersion in ammonia according to ISO 6957 with all connections
closed.
7.4.4.6. Resistance to dry-heat test
The test shall be carried out in compliance with ISO 188. The test piece shall
be exposed to air at a temperature equal to the maximum operating temperature
for 168 hours. The change in tensile strength shall not exceed ±25 per cent.
The change in ultimate elongation shall not exceed the following values:
Maximum increase 10 per cent,
Maximum decrease 30 per cent.
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LHSS is protected against burst after the crash. If the LHSS vacuum has not
been compromised by the crash, nitrogen gas may be added to the LHSS via
the fill / drain port until pressure controls and/or PRDs are activated. In the
case of re-closing pressure controls or PRDs, activation and re-closing for at
least 2 cycles shall be demonstrated. Exhaust from the venting of the pressure
controls or the PRDs shall not be vented to the passenger, luggage, or cargo
compartments during these post-crash tests.
Following confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are
still functional, a leak test shall be conducted on the LHSS using the procedures
in either para. 6.1.1.1. or para. 6.1.1.2.
Either test procedure para. 7.5.1.1. or the alternative test procedure
para. 7.5.1.2. (consisting of paras. 7.5.1.2.1. and 7.5.1.2.2.) may be undertaken
to satisfy test procedure para. 7.5.1.
7.5.1.1. Post-crash leak test for the liquefied hydrogen storage systems (LHSSs)
The following test would replace both the leak test in para. 7.5.1.2.1. and gas
concentration measurements as defined in para. 7.5.1.2.2. Following
confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are still
functional; the leak tightness of the LHSS may be proven by detecting all
possible leaking parts with a sniff sensor of a calibrated Helium leak test device
used in sniff modus. The test can be performed as an alternative if the following
pre-conditions are fulfilled:
(a) No possible leaking part shall be below the liquid nitrogen level on the
storage container;
(b) All possible leaking parts are pressurized with helium gas when the
LHSS is pressurized;
(c) Required covers and/or body panels and parts can be removed to gain
access to all potential leak sites.
Prior to the test the manufacturer shall provide a list of all possible leaking
parts of the LHSS. Possible leaking parts are:
(a) Any connectors between pipes and between pipes and the container;
(b) Any welding of pipes and components downstream the container;
(c) Valves;
(d) Flexible lines;
(e) Sensors.
Prior to the leak test overpressure in the LHSS shall be released to atmospheric
pressure and afterwards the LHSS shall be pressurized with helium to at least
the operating pressure but well below the normal pressure control setting (so
the pressure regulators do not activate during the test period). The test is passed
if the total leakage amount (i.e. the sum of all detected leakage points) is less
than 216 Nml/hr.
7.5.1.2. Alternative post-crash tests for the liquefied hydrogen storage systems
Both tests of paras. 7.5.1.2.1. and 7.5.1.2.2. are conducted under the test
procedure of para. 7.5.1.2.
7.5.1.2.1. Alternative post-crash leak test
Following confirmation that the pressure control and/or safety relief valves are
still functional, the following test may be conducted to measure the post-
crash leakage. The concentration test in para. 6.1.1.1. shall be conducted in
parallel for the 60 minute test period if the hydrogen concentration has not
already been directly measured following the vehicle crash.
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