Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013

GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police
officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.

The Facts and the Case

On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused
George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100-
CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in absentia. 3

The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio
Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives
on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay
City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded
a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where
the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw
accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in
partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each
other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves,
and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a
table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with
traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil.
The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing. 5

A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for
traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6

Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz
were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it,
three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said,
"D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to
his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there
informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been
recovered from his house.7

On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the
crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two
years and four months, and to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit.

The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused
Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession.
Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith
and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera.

The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and
PO1 Cabutihan’s credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot
session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus
justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.9

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full
the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it. 11 The
accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police
officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.

Ruling of the Court

The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid
warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of
their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the
right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the
paraphernalia they found there.

The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were
no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous
drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative
for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that
even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived
his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s
jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in
flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.14
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly
rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed,
the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded,
given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the
more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street
where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no
activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified:

THE COURT:

Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was
the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open?

A – It was partially open Your Honor.

Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot?

A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor.

Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open
by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door?

A – We pushed the door, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it,
as a police officer?

A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may…

Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the
interior of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior
of the house?

A – Yes, Your Honor.

Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house,
considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house?

A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor.
Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its
opening because you did not know what was happening inside?

A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest
of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest
was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the
various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are
inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit
the accused.17

One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not
enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007
and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack
of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
1âwphi1

further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197807 April 16, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CECILIA LAGMAN y PIRING, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the May 14, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03289, which affirmed the January 18, 2008 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18 in Manila, in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 for Murder and Criminal Case No. 02-200107 for
Frustrated Murder.

The Facts

Two Informations3 charged accused Cecilia Lagman as follows:

Criminal Case No. 02-200106

That on or about February 24, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Jondel Mari Davantes
Santiago, by then and there stabbing him with a knife with an approximate length of 6 ½ inches
(blade and handle) hitting his neck and trunk, thereby inflicting upon said Jondel Mari Davantes
Santiago stab wounds which are necessarily fatal and mortal, which were the direct cause of his
death immediately thereafter.

Criminal Case No. 02-200107

That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there stabbing her hitting her
buttocks, thereby inflicting upon the said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which were
necessarily fatal, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of her will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula
which prevented her death.

During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Donna Maniego (Maniego), Violeta
Sicor (Sicor), Police Officer 3 Ricardo M. Alateit (PO3 Alateit), and PO3 Ronaldo Samson (PO3
Samson).
On February 24, 2002, at about 1:30 p.m, Maniego was in front of her banana cue store on
Lakandula Street, Tondo, Manila. She was seated alongside her mother, Sicor, inside the sidecar of
a motorcycle. Without warning, the accused approached her and punched her face several times.
The accused turned on Sicor, grabbed her and stabbed her in the middle of her buttocks with a small
knife. Maniego got out of the sidecar and ran to the barangay hall for help. Upon finding that the
barangay chairman was not around, Maniego went to check on her common-law spouse, Jondel
Santiago (Santiago), at the house of Santiago’s mother.4 On her way there, she saw the accused
stab Santiago four (4) times from a distance of five (5) to six (6) meters. The distance between
where Maniego was punched and where Santiago was stabbed was about nine (9) meters.5 Maniego
then saw the accused flee the scene of the crime carrying a knife and heading towards Juan Luna
Street. Seeing that Santiago was mortally hurt, Maniego rushed Santiago to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Hospital but he later expired. While Maniego was at the hospital, she saw the accused, who was
being treated after an angry crowd mauled her. Maniego informed the policeman who was escorting
the accused that it was the latter who had stabbed and killed Santiago.6

After receiving the information from Maniego, the accused was arrested and brought to police
headquarters.7

On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for almost ten years and
had a close relationship with her. She stated that the accused got angry with her when she eloped
with Santiago.8

Sicor, Maniego’s mother, corroborated Maniego’s testimony. She saw the accused punch Maniego
several times while they were inside the sidecar on February 24, 2002. The accused then grabbed
her and stabbed her in her buttocks with a small knife. She said that after she was stabbed, two
sidecar boys came to her aid and brought her to the hospital. She added that she was released from
the hospital two hours after receiving treatment.9

PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his motorcycle on his way home.
While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a
stabbing incident had taken place. He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a
commotion. He then saw a woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her head was
bloodied. He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed that she had stabbed someone.
At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell from the woman’s waist. He confiscated the item and
brought the woman to the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the
woman as the accused.10

Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2 Edison Bertoldo was the
police investigator in the case against the accused and that he prepared the following:

(1) Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit "A";

(2) Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit "C";

(3) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit "E";

(4) Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits "F," "F-1" and "F-2"; and

(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002, Exhibit "F-3."11
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date of the incident, he was
assigned at the Western Police District Crime Laboratory Division. He presented before the court the
sharp object used in stabbing the victim (Exhibit "M") and the Request for Laboratory Examination
(Exhibit "M-1").12

For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr. Mario Lato.

Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the date of the stabbing
incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was true that she had been spreading the rumor
that the accused was insane. Maniego answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped
Maniego and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit her with a lead
pipe. Since she needed medical treatment after the attack, she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio
Medical Hospital by her mother and a barangay kagawad.13

At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that nothing was found on her
body when she was frisked. She said that the knife recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that
there were other people in the area where it was found. She added that she had an argument only
with Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.14

Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused, who had a laceration on
the head which was possibly caused by a hard object such as a pipe. He said that the accused
sustained a two-centimeter laceration in her mid-pectoral area.15

Ruling of the Trial Court

On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106 and
Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No. 02-200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No.
02-200106. She is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel
Lari Santiago, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No. 02-200107, this court
finds same accused guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries. She is sentenced to suffer six (6)
months of arresto mayor and to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.16

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness Maniego. She also averred that the same
witness’ credibility was improperly appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from
the one who rendered the decision.

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the totality of the
prosecution’s evidence showed that accused-appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It added that accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
to falsely testify against her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 18, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED.17
Hence, We have this appeal.

The Issues

Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt

II

Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s witness
despite patent inconsistencies

III

Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was attended by treachery

The defense reiterates previous arguments calling for an acquittal of accused-appellant. It casts
1âwphi1

doubt on Maniego’s testimony, claiming that it has irreconcilable inconsistencies which affected her
credibility.

The defense also calls attention to the fact that Maniego testified before Judge Romulo A. Lopez,
while the Decision was penned by Judge Myra Garcia-Fernandez.18 It is further contended that
Maniego did not actually witness Santiago being stabbed, because she admitted in court that she
found out that Santiago had been stabbed when she was already at the hospital attending to her
injured mother.

Moreover, it is pointed out by the defense that the victim was 5’8" in height and of average built while
accused-appellant is only 4’11". It is, thus, incredible that she could have inflicted fatal wounds on
the victim.

Lastly, the defense argues that the prosecution was unable to prove that the killing of Santiago was
accompanied by treachery. Assuming that accused-appellant did stab the victim, the defense claims
that it was not proved that she deliberately and consciously adopted her mode of attack. The
encounter was even preceded by a confrontation between accused-appellant and Maniego, and it
was Sicor and Santiago who followed accused-appellant after the confrontation. The stabbing
incident should have been considered as having occurred in the spur of the moment.

Our Ruling

We deny the appeal, but modify the CA Decision.

Elements of Murder Established

The elements of murder that the prosecution must establish are (1) that a person was killed; (2) that
the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.19

The prosecution was able to clearly establish that Santiago was killed and that it was accused-
appellant who killed him as there was an eyewitness to the crime. Santiago’s killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstance of treachery as testified to by the prosecution eyewitness, Maniego.
Paragraph 16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Maniego’s testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as follows:

Q What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?

A I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay hall to ask help x x x.

Q And what happened after that?

xxxx

A ‘Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta ko ho doon nasalubong

po ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si
Jondel Mari.’ (When I went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the barangay
chairman was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet [sic] Cecilia Lagman and without
any word Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Mari.)

Q And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly stabbed Jondel Mari
Santiago?

A At Asuncion, Lakandula [in Tondo Manila] x x x.

Q When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far were you?

A (Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).

xxxx

Q What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

A He was lighting a cigarette x x x.

Q And what was the reaction of Jondel Santiago when he was stabbed by Cecilia Lagman?

A ‘Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh.’ [He was shocked because
he did not know he was going to be stabbed.]

Q What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was stabbed?

A One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x

Q x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will you be able to identify her?

A Yes x x x.

xxxx
 x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]

Q x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four times is in court will you
be able to identify him or her?

A ‘Siya rin po." [She is the same person.]20

In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him.21 The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape.22 These elements were present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with
approval the appellate court’s finding on the presence of treachery:

In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without warning, stabbed him
four times successively leaving the latter no chance at all to evade the knife thrusts and defend
himself from appellant’s onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that appellant’s act of suddenly
stabbing the victim leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery. 23 x x x

Regardless of the alleged disparity in height between accused-appellant and the victim, We affirm
the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-appellant’s method of inflicting harm
ensured that she would fatally wound Santiago without risk to herself. The perceived advantage of
the victim in terms of height was of no use to him as accused-appellant employed treachery in
attacking him. He was not afforded a means to defend himself as accused-appellant suddenly
started stabbing him repeatedly with an improvised knife.

Finally, the killing of Santiago was neither parricide nor homicide.

Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

We see no reason to overturn the findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It has been
long settled that when the issues raised concern the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s findings
of fact, its calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of the testimonies’ probative weight,
including its conclusions based on said findings, are generally given conclusive effect. It is
acknowledged that the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth.24 Furthermore, accused-
appellant failed to show why Maniego and her mother would falsely accuse her of committing a
terrible crime. Maniego was the common-law spouse of the victim and she would naturally want to
seek justice for his death as well as the injury sustained by her mother.

An examination of the records shows that there is no truth to the allegation of accused-appellant that
Maniego did not witness the stabbing of Santiago. She clearly testified that accused-appellant first
stabbed Santiago on the chest, then on the side of his neck, then twice on his back.25

On the other allegation of accused-appellant, We have earlier held that the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of
conviction.26 That the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the records of the case does
not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support
its conclusion.27
Alibi as a Defense

The defense of alibi is likewise unconvincing. Accused-appellant was positively identified by

eyewitnesses. She herself admitted that she confronted one of the eyewitnesses, Maniego,
moments before she was seen attacking Maniego, Santiago and Sicor. It is well-settled that alibi
cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration but also does not, on its face,
demonstrate the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the place of the crime or in
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.28 In accused-appellant’s case, there is no
corroborative evidence of her alibi or proof of physical impossibility of her being at the scene of the
incident to shore up her defense.

Elements of Less Serious Physical Injuries Not Established

We modify the conviction of accused-appellant with regard to Criminal Case No. 02-200107.
Originally charged with frustrated murder, accused-appellant was convicted of less serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 02-200107. The RTC reasoned that the stabbing injury sustained by
Sicor was not on a vital part of the body and she was able to leave the hospital two hours after
receiving medical treatment. The RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was not frustrated
murder as it was not shown that there was intent to kill.29 However, while the RTC correctly ruled that
the accused-appellant is not guilty of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200107, the records
do not support a conviction for less serious physical injuries.

Art. 265 of the RPC provides, "Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described [as serious physical injuries] but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for
ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less
serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor." Nothing in the records,
however, supports the finding that Sicor was incapacitated for labor for ten (10) days or more or that
she required medical attention for the same period. After the wound on her buttocks was treated,
Sicor was released two hours after she was admitted to the hospital.30 She later returned to the
hospital for the removal of the suture on her wound, according to the RTC, "after a certain period of
time."31 The Medico-Legal Report on Sicor (Exhibit "H") does not indicate how many days of medical
treatment her injury would need.32 Sicor, however, testified that she lost two (2) days of work on
account of the injury she sustained.33 The testimony of her attending physician, Dr. Christian Dennis
Cendeno, on the other hand, was dispensed with following a stipulation by the parties on his
testimony.34 The prosecution was, therefore, unable to establish that the injury sustained by Sicor
falls under less serious physical injuries absent the requirement that her injury required medical
attention for 10 days or incapacitated her for the same period.

The Court can, thus, only convict accused-appellant of slight physical injuries. Under par. 1, Art. 266
of the RPC, the penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor "when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period." There being no modifying circumstances to be
appreciated, and in accordance with par. 1 of Art. 64,35 accused-appellant should be meted a penalty
of imprisonment of arresto menor in its medium period, which has a duration of eleven (11) to twenty
(20) days under Art. 76 of the RPC.

Pecuniary Liability

The CA affirmed the award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 and
PhP 25,000 as temperate damages in Criminal Case No. 02-200106.

People v. Combate36 reiterated the rule on civil indemnity and damages:

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. In People
v. Tubongbanua, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) was ordered to be applied on the award of
damages. This rule would be subsequently applied by the Court in several cases such as Mendoza
v. People, People v. Buban, People v. Guevarra, and People v. Regalario. Thus, we likewise adopt
this rule in the instant case. Interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the award
of civil indemnity and all damages, i.e., actual or compensatory damages, moral damages and
exemplary damages, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

In accordance with the rules cited above, We modify the award of damages. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,37 the award of civil indemnity ex delicto of PhP 50,000 in favor of the heirs of Santiago
is in order. Moral damages of PhP 50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum, are also proper.38

We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since only slight physical
injuries were committed and no proof of medical expenses was presented during trial.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03289 finding
accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No. 02-200106 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari
Davantes Santiago the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid. With respect to Criminal Case No. 02-200107,
accused-appellant is convicted of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20)
days of arresto menor. The award of temperate damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELAS
G.R. No. 176077 August 31, 2011

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in
toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case
No. C-66765 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165,
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information2 dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for
Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 08th day of November 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then
and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control [Methamphetamine]
Hydrochloride (SHABu) weighing 0.24 gram, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the
provisions of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)3

Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To establish its case, the prosecution presented Police Inspector Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa (P/Insp
Dela Rosa), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station and Police Officer 3 Rodrigo Antonio (PO3 Antonio) of the
Caloocan Police Station – Drug Enforcement Unit. The testimony of the police investigator, PO3
Fernando Moran (PO3 Moran), was dispensed with after petitioner’s counsel admitted the facts
offered for stipulation by the prosecution.

On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole witness. The testimonies of
Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner
was dispensed with after the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.

Evidence for the Prosecution

First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa, Forensic Chemical Officer
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan City Police Station who, on the witness stand,
affirmed his own findings in Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. "D," "D-1," and "D-2")
that per qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white crystalline
substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram then contained inside four (4)
separate pieces of small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets (Exhs. "D-4" to "D-7") gave positive
result to the test for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police Station-Drug Enforcement
Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution further endeavored to establish the following:

At about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 8, 2002, P/Insp. Jose Valencia of the Caloocan
City Police Station-SDEU called upon his subordinates after the (sic) receiving an INFOREP Memo
from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along
Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving Abe Miclat, Wily alias "Bokbok" and one Mic
or Jojo (Exhs. "E," "E-1," and (sic) "E-3," and "E-4"). Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a
surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives
from the Drug Enforcement Unit, namely: PO3 Pagsolingan, PO2 Modina, PO2 De Ocampo, and
herein witness PO3 Antonio. After a short briefing at their station, the team boarded a rented
passenger jeepney and proceeded to the target area to verify the said informant and/or
memorandum.

When the group of SPO4 Palting arrived at Palmera Spring II, Caloocan City at around 3:50 o’clock
that same afternoon, they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias "Abe." PO3
Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the
group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3
Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw "Abe" arranging several pieces
of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, said operative inched his
way in by gently pushing the door as well as the plywood covering the same. Upon gaining entrance,
PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while "Abe," on the other hand, after
being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the four (4) pieces of small
plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under
arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper
disposition. The suspect was identified as Abraham Miclat y Cerbo a.k.a "ABE," 19 years old, single,
jobless and a resident of Maginhawa Village, Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. 4

Evidence for the Defense

On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident completely opposed to the
theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he alleged that at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he, together with his sister and father, were at the upper level
of their house watching the television soap "Cindy," they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs
prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside were several male individuals in
civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police operatives from the SDEU out to effect
his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these
officers, but to no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when he
tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together with his father, they
were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3
Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their house. At around 9:00 o’clock
in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally
detained. That upon [petitioner’s] transfer and detention at the said headquarters, his father was
ordered to go home.5
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the
offense charged, rendered a Decision6 convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA
No. 9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, from the facts established, the Court finds the accused ABRAHAM MICLAT Y
CERBO "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of possession of a dangerous drugs (sic)
defined and penalized under the provision of Section 11, sub-paragraph No. (3), Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, in view of the absence of aggravating circumstances. The
Court likewise orders the accused to pay the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(Php300,000.00) as fine.

Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)7

Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 28846.

On October 13, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision8 affirming in toto the decision of the RTC, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)9

In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the
evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against him. Moreover, it was established
that he was informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that
the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the
conviction of the petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Hence, the petition raising the following errors:

1. whether or not a police surveillance team sent to determine the veracity of a camp crame
memorandum of shabu trading activity at caloocan city, which converted their mission from
surveillance to a raiding team, can validly make an arrest and search without a valid warrant
having been first obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction.

2. whether or not peeping thRough a curtain-covered window is within the meaning of "plain
view doctrine" for a warrantless seizure to be lawful.

3. whether or not the belief of po3 antonio that the four (4) pieces of plaStic sachets allegedly
being arranged by petitioner contained shabu justified his entry into the house and arrest
petitioner without any warrant.

4. whether or not arranging four (4) pieces of plaStic sachets constitute as a crime within the
meaning of section 5 (3), rule 113 of the rules of court.
 5. whether or not petitioner was properly appraised (SIC) of his constitutional rights to be
informed of the cause and nature of his arrest and right to be assisted by counsel during the
period of his arrest and continued detention.

6. whether or not the conviction by the lower court of the petitioner, as affirmed by the
honorable court of appeals, on the basis of an illegal search and arrest, is correct.10

Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the subsequent seizure of the
arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was
just watching television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their
home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.

Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their
house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for
the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest.
Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se,
petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no
amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. Moreover,
peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the
plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.

Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs was highly
questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at the place of the arrest and no
acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said evidence.

Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his constitutional rights at any
time during or after his arrest and even during his detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting
officer should be punished accordingly.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest.11 An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if
he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground
before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.12

In the present case, at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the
irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
In effect, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.13

True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an
arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant.
Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;14

For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.15

In the instant case, contrary to petitioner’s contention, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the
police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. The established facts reveal that on the
date of the arrest, agents of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Caloocan City Police
Station were conducting a surveillance operation in the area of Palmera Spring II to verify the
reported drug-related activities of several individuals, which included the petitioner. During the
operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioner’s window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic
sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets
and its suspicious contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about
one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. PO3 Antonio then inched his way in the
house by gently pushing the door. Upon gaining entrance, the operative introduced himself as a
police officer. After which, petitioner voluntarily handed over to PO3 Antonio the small plastic
sachets. PO3 Antonio then placed petitioner under arrest and, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
PO3 Antonio informed him of his constitutional rights.16 PO3 Antonio then took the petitioner and the
four (4) pieces of plastic sachets to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Moran.
Thereafter, the evidence were marked "AMC 1-4," the initials of the name of the petitioner. The heat-
sealed transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance were submitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for drug examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.

Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner,
petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer.

As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the established exceptions.

Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 The right against warrantless
searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

 2. Search of evidence in "plain view";

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial

question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. 19

It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in
plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a
police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was
not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer
in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully
make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In
the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (Emphasis
supplied.)20

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since
petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest
and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing
search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.

As to petitioner’s contention that the police failed to comply with the proper procedure in the transfer
of custody of the seized evidence thereby casting serious doubt on its seizure, this too deserves
scant consideration.

Section 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, Article II of RA No. 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA
Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

x x x x.

Corolarilly, the implementing provision of Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA No. 9165, provides:

(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items.

x x x x.21

From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with the rule is
not fatal. It does not render petitioner’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him
inadmissible.22 What is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."23

Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the integrity of the drugs
seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the
prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of
the case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when
he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately brought to
the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating officer.
There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets and the person of the
petitioner were then entered in the official blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior
Inspector Jose Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the National
Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by PO3 Moran and received by
Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.24 After a qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4)
plastic sachets by the latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.25
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been established by the
prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating officer, and finally to the forensic chemist.
There is no doubt that the items seized from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items
marked by the investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.26 Based on the evidence submitted by the
prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present case. Mere possession of a
regulated drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient
to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession – the onus probandi is
shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.27

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.28 Although not constrained to blindly accept the findings
of fact of trial courts, appellate courts can rest assured that such facts were gathered from witnesses
who presented their statements live and in person in open court. In cases where conflicting sets of
facts are presented, the trial courts are in the best position to recognize and distinguish spontaneous
declaration from rehearsed spiel, straightforward assertion from a stuttering claim, definite statement
from tentative disclosure, and to a certain degree, truth from untruth.29

In the present case, there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. No
evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses
of the events which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the
records, We find no error was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings
that petitioner committed the crime charged against him.

Against the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, petitioner merely denied the accusations
against him and raised the defense of frame-up. The defense of denial and frame-up has been
invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper,
the defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.30

As to the penalty, while We sustain the amount of fine, the indeterminate sentence imposed should,
however, be modified.

Section 11, Article II, RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous
drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

x x x x.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
x x x x.

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if
the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine
or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having
any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less
than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.31

From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less than five
(5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall
below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period
allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 13, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28846 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for one's
personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 10, 2007
Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case
MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue,
Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at
Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an
auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a
case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s
application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get
evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property; 11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of
petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to
privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance
cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video
surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’
construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders. 18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive
portion of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00,
let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed
at the left side of their building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it
elsewhere at the back where petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about
2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its Order22 dated
February 6, 2006.23 Thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners
failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right
to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are
not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras. 29 They are
mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper
parties.31 The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING

the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006
issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:

I.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE
ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT
THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
 II.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER

SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO
PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS
CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE
CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF
PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE

OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING
OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS

FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X
X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and
(2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because
respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving
camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right
to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence,
petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. 36 Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said
provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitioners claim that
respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s
corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where
the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right
to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they
had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by
Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they were
wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
 Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an
individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is
"the right to be let alone."47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s
abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under
the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals

are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and
provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering
inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter."49 The phrase "prying into
the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to
privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:

Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to
his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers
places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA,
therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The "reasonable expectation of

privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the
factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover
places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose
right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the
privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping,
which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order.
The operation by respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,
violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does
not only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and
Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in
asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in
his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of
respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. Respondents’ camera cannot
be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the respondents to do that over the objection
of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their
property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction
is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered
with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication
of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an
injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant's act or omission which
had violated the legal right of the
former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or

injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the
plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the
building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras. 58 Such reasoning, however, is
erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in
order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case. 59 During the
hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents
installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed
a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of
their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents
are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders,
records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of
the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all
her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the
arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are
removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo
seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we
find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the
Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 174629 February 14, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL

(AMLC), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 34,
PANTALEON ALVAREZ and LILIA CHENG, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The present petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 assails the orders and resolutions
issued by two different courts in two different cases. The courts and cases in question are the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, which heard SP Case No. 06-1142001 and the Court of
Appeals, Tenth Division, which heared CA-G.R. SP No. 95198.2 Both cases arose as part of the
aftermath of the ruling of this Court in Agan v. PIATCO3 nullifying the concession agreement
awarded to the Philippine International Airport Terminal Corporation (PIATCO) over the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport – International Passenger Terminal 3 (NAIA 3) Project.

I.

Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3
contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation
Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). On 24 May 2005, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) wrote the AMLC requesting the latter’s assistance "in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the [NAIA 3] Project," and
also noting that petitioner Republic of the Philippines was presently defending itself in two
international arbitration cases filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project.4 The CIS conducted an
intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the
award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC
Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project.5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.6 The search revealed that Alvarez
maintained eight (8) bank accounts with six (6) different banks.7

On 27 June 2005, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 75, Series of 2005,8 whereby the Council
resolved to authorize the Executive Director of the AMLC "to sign and verify an application to inquire
into and/or examine the [deposits] or investments of Pantaleon Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad, Alfredo
Liongson, and Cheng Yong, and their related web of accounts wherever these may be found, as
defined under Rule 10.4 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations;" and to authorize the
AMLC Secretariat "to conduct an inquiry into subject accounts once the Regional Trial Court grants
the application to inquire into and/or examine the bank accounts" of those four individuals. 9 The
resolution enumerated the particular bank accounts of Alvarez, Wilfredo Trinidad (Trinidad), Alfredo
Liongson (Liongson) and Cheng Yong which were to be the subject of the inquiry.10 The rationale for
the said resolution was founded on the cited findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from
a Hong Kong bank account owned by Jetstream Pacific Ltd. Account to bank accounts in the
Philippines maintained by Liongson and Cheng Yong.11 The Resolution also noted that "[b]y
awarding the contract to PIATCO despite its lack of financial capacity, Pantaleon Alvarez caused
undue injury to the government by giving PIATCO unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his official administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or
gross inexcusable negligence, in violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019."12

Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or
examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The
application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005.13 The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy
Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC.14 Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry
order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed "[p]robable
cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1
of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now
the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations,
Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G."15 Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to
inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four. 16

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a
letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez,
PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable
cause to believe that the bank accounts "were used in the commission of unlawful activities that
were committed" in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan.17 Attached to the letter was a memorandum "on why the investigation of the
[accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan." 18

In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005
Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,19 which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to inquire
into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS
Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution
characterized the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutor’s letter as "extensively justif[ying]
the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities mentioned in the
letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,
as amended."20

Following the December 2005 AMLC Resolution, the Republic, through the AMLC, filed an
application21 before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or examine thirteen (13) accounts and two (2)
related web of accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project.
Among said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez and the Metrobank accounts of Cheng
Yong. The case was raffled to Manila RTC, Branch 24, presided by respondent Judge Antonio
Eugenio, Jr., and docketed as SP Case No. 06-114200.

On 12 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order (Manila RTC bank inquiry order) granting
the Ex Parte Application expressing therein "[that] the allegations in said application to be impressed
with merit, and in conformity with Section 11 of R.A. No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 and Rules 11.1 and 11.2 of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations."22 Authority was thus granted to the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts
listed therein.

On 25 January 2006, Alvarez, through counsel, entered his appearance23 before the Manila RTC in
SP Case No. 06-114200 and filed an Urgent Motion to Stay Enforcement of Order of January 12,
2006.24 Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which was issued
following an ex parte application, and he argued that nothing in R.A. No. 9160 authorized the AMLC
to seek the authority to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.25 The day after Alvarez filed his motion,
26 January 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Order26 staying the enforcement of its bank inquiry
order and giving the Republic five (5) days to respond to Alvarez’s motion.

The Republic filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration27 of the 26 January 2006 Manila RTC
Order and likewise sought to strike out Alvarez’s motion that led to the issuance of said order. For
his part, Alvarez filed a Reply and Motion to Dismiss28 the application for bank inquiry order. On 2
May 2006, the Manila RTC issued an Omnibus Order29 granting the Republic’s Motion for
Reconsideration, denying Alvarez’s motion to dismiss and reinstating "in full force and effect" the
Order dated 12 January 2006. In the omnibus order, the Manila RTC reiterated that the material
allegations in the application for bank inquiry order filed by the Republic stood as "the probable
cause for the investigation and examination of the bank accounts and investments of the
respondents."30

Alvarez filed on 10 May 2006 an Urgent Motion31 expressing his apprehension that the AMLC would
immediately enforce the omnibus order and would thereby render the motion for reconsideration he
intended to file as moot and academic; thus he sought that the Republic be refrained from enforcing
the omnibus order in the meantime. Acting on this motion, the Manila RTC, on 11 May 2006, issued
an Order32 requiring the OSG to file a comment/opposition and reminding the parties that judgments
and orders become final and executory upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof,
as it is the period within which a motion for reconsideration could be filed. Alvarez filed his Motion for
Reconsideration33 of the omnibus order on 15 May 2006, but the motion was denied by the Manila
RTC in an Order34 dated 5 July 2006.

On 11 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Motion and Manifestation 35 wherein he manifested having
received reliable information that the AMLC was about to implement the Manila RTC bank inquiry
order even though he was intending to appeal from it. On the premise that only a final and executory
judgment or order could be executed or implemented, Alvarez sought that the AMLC be immediately
ordered to refrain from enforcing the Manila RTC bank inquiry order.

On 12 July 2006, the Manila RTC, acting on Alvarez’s latest motion, issued an Order 36 directing the
AMLC "to refrain from enforcing the order dated January 12, 2006 until the expiration of the period to
appeal, without any appeal having been filed." On the same day, Alvarez filed a Notice of
Appeal37 with the Manila RTC.

On 24 July 2006, Alvarez filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Clarification.38 Therein, he alleged
having learned that the AMLC had began to inquire into the bank accounts of the other persons
mentioned in the application for bank inquiry order filed by the Republic.39 Considering that the
Manila RTC bank inquiry order was issued ex parte, without notice to those other persons, Alvarez
prayed that the AMLC be ordered to refrain from inquiring into any of the other bank deposits and
alleged web of accounts enumerated in AMLC’s application with the RTC; and that the AMLC be
directed to refrain from using, disclosing or publishing in any proceeding or venue any information or
document obtained in violation of the 11 May 2006 RTC Order.40

On 25 July 2006, or one day after Alvarez filed his motion, the Manila RTC issued an
Order41 wherein it clarified that "the Ex Parte Order of this Court dated January 12, 2006 can not be
implemented against the deposits or accounts of any of the persons enumerated in the AMLC
Application until the appeal of movant Alvarez is finally resolved, otherwise, the appeal would be
rendered moot and academic or even nugatory."42 In addition, the AMLC was ordered "not to
disclose or publish any information or document found or obtained in [v]iolation of the May 11, 2006
Order of this Court."43 The Manila RTC reasoned that the other persons mentioned in AMLC’s
application were not served with the court’s 12 January 2006 Order. This 25 July 2006 Manila RTC
Order is the first of the four rulings being assailed through this petition.

In response, the Republic filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration44 dated 27 July 2006,
urging that it be allowed to immediately enforce the bank inquiry order against Alvarez and that
Alvarez’s notice of appeal be expunged from the records since appeal from an order of inquiry is
disallowed under the Anti money Laundering Act (AMLA).

Meanwhile, respondent Lilia Cheng filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction45 dated 10
July 2006, directed against the Republic of the Philippines through the AMLC, Manila RTC Judge
Eugenio, Jr. and Makati RTC Judge Marella, Jr.. She identified herself as the wife of Cheng
Yong46 with whom she jointly owns a conjugal bank account with Citibank that is covered by the
Makati RTC bank inquiry order, and two conjugal bank accounts with Metrobank that are covered by
the Manila RTC bank inquiry order. Lilia Cheng imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Makati and Manila RTCs in granting AMLC’s ex parte applications for a bank inquiry order, arguing
among others that the ex parte applications violated her constitutional right to due process, that the
bank inquiry order under the AMLA can only be granted in connection with violations of the AMLA
and that the AMLA can not apply to bank accounts opened and transactions entered into prior to the
effectivity of the AMLA or to bank accounts located outside the Philippines.47

On 1 August 2006, the Court of Appeals, acting on Lilia Cheng’s petition, issued a Temporary
Restraining Order48 enjoining the Manila and Makati trial courts from implementing, enforcing or
executing the respective bank inquiry orders previously issued, and the AMLC from enforcing and
implementing such orders. On even date, the Manila RTC issued an Order49 resolving to hold in
abeyance the resolution of the urgent omnibus motion for reconsideration then pending before it until
the resolution of Lilia Cheng’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
Resolution directing the issuance of the temporary restraining order is the second of the four rulings
assailed in the present petition.

The third assailed ruling50 was issued on 15 August 2006 by the Manila RTC, acting on the Urgent
Motion for Clarification51 dated 14 August 2006 filed by Alvarez. It appears that the 1 August 2006
Manila RTC Order had amended its previous 25 July 2006 Order by deleting the last paragraph
which stated that the AMLC "should not disclose or publish any information or document found or
obtained in violation of the May 11, 2006 Order of this Court." 52 In this new motion, Alvarez argued
that the deletion of that paragraph would allow the AMLC to implement the bank inquiry orders and
publish whatever information it might obtain thereupon even before the final orders of the Manila
RTC could become final and executory.53 In the 15 August 2006 Order, the Manila RTC reiterated
that the bank inquiry order it had issued could not be implemented or enforced by the AMLC or any
of its representatives until the appeal therefrom was finally resolved and that any enforcement
thereof would be unauthorized.54

The present Consolidated Petition55 for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 2
October 2006, assailing the two Orders of the Manila RTC dated 25 July and 15 August 2006 and
the Temporary Restraining Order dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals. Through an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion56 dated 9 October 2006, petitioner informed the Court that on 22
September 2006, the Court of Appeals hearing Lilia Cheng’s petition had granted a writ of
preliminary injunction in her favor.57 Thereafter, petitioner sought as well the nullification of the 22
September 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thereby constituting the fourth ruling assailed in
the instant petition.58
The Court had initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order59 dated 6 October 2006 and later on a
Supplemental Temporary Restraining Order60 dated 13 October 2006 in petitioner’s favor, enjoining
the implementation of the assailed rulings of the Manila RTC and the Court of Appeals. However, on
respondents’ motion, the Court, through a Resolution61 dated 11 December 2006, suspended the
implementation of the restraining orders it had earlier issued.

Oral arguments were held on 17 January 2007. The Court consolidated the issues for argument as
follows:

1. Did the RTC-Manila, in issuing the Orders dated 25 July 2006 and 15 August 2006 which
deferred the implementation of its Order dated 12 January 2006, and the Court of Appeals, in
issuing its Resolution dated 1 August 2006, which ordered the status quo in relation to the 1
July 2005 Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006 Order of the RTC-Manila, both
of which authorized the examination of bank accounts under Section 11 of Rep. Act No.
9160 (AMLA), commit grave abuse of discretion?

(a) Is an application for an order authorizing inquiry into or examination of bank

accounts or investments under Section 11 of the AMLA ex-parte in nature or one
which requires notice and hearing?

(b) What legal procedures and standards should be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings for the issuance of said order?

(c) Is such order susceptible to legal challenges and judicial review?

2. Is it proper for this Court at this time and in this case to inquire into and pass upon the
validity of the 1 July 2005 Order of the RTC-Makati and the 12 January 2006 Order of the
RTC-Manila, considering the pendency of CA G.R. SP No. 95-198 (Lilia Cheng v. Republic)
wherein the validity of both orders was challenged?62

After the oral arguments, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda, which they
did,63 and the petition was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.

II.

Petitioner’s general advocacy is that the bank inquiry orders issued by the Manila and Makati RTCs
are valid and immediately enforceable whereas the assailed rulings, which effectively stayed the
enforcement of the Manila and Makati RTCs bank inquiry orders, are sullied with grave abuse of
discretion. These conclusions flow from the posture that a bank inquiry order, issued upon a finding
of probable cause, may be issued ex parte and, once issued, is immediately executory. Petitioner
further argues that the information obtained following the bank inquiry is necessarily beneficial, if not
indispensable, to the AMLC in discharging its awesome responsibility regarding the effective
implementation of the AMLA and that any restraint in the disclosure of such information to
appropriate agencies or other judicial fora would render meaningless the relief supplied by the bank
inquiry order.

Petitioner raises particular arguments questioning Lilia Cheng’s right to seek injunctive relief before
the Court of Appeals, noting that not one of the bank inquiry orders is directed against her. Her
"cryptic assertion" that she is the wife of Cheng Yong cannot, according to petitioner,
"metamorphose into the requisite legal standing to seek redress for an imagined injury or to maintain
an action in behalf of another." In the same breath, petitioner argues that Alvarez cannot assert any
violation of the right to financial privacy in behalf of other persons whose bank accounts are being
inquired into, particularly those other persons named in the Makati RTC bank inquiry order who did
not take any step to oppose such orders before the courts.

Ostensibly, the proximate question before the Court is whether a bank inquiry order issued in
accordance with Section 10 of the AMLA may be stayed by injunction. Yet in arguing that it does,
petitioner relies on what it posits as the final and immediately executory character of the bank inquiry
orders issued by the Manila and Makati RTCs. Implicit in that position is the notion that the inquiry
orders are valid, and such notion is susceptible to review and validation based on what appears on
the face of the orders and the applications which triggered their issuance, as well as the provisions
of the AMLA governing the issuance of such orders. Indeed, to test the viability of petitioner’s
argument, the Court will have to be satisfied that the subject inquiry orders are valid in the first place.
However, even from a cursory examination of the applications for inquiry order and the orders
themselves, it is evident that the orders are not in accordance with law.

III.

A brief overview of the AMLA is called for.

Money laundering has been generally defined by the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) `as "any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained
proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources."64 Even before the passage
of the AMLA, the problem was addressed by the Philippine government through the issuance of
various circulars by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Yet ultimately, legislative proscription was
necessary, especially with the inclusion of the Philippines in the Financial Action Task Force’s list of
non-cooperative countries and territories in the fight against money laundering. 65 The original AMLA,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, was passed in 2001. It was amended by R.A. No. 9194 in 2003.

Section 4 of the AMLA states that "[m]oney laundering is a crime whereby the proceeds of an
unlawful activity as [defined in the law] are transacted, thereby making them appear to have
originated from legitimate sources."66 The section further provides the three modes through which
the crime of money laundering is committed. Section 7 creates the AMLC and defines its powers,
which generally relate to the enforcement of the AMLA provisions and the initiation of legal actions
authorized in the AMLA such as civil forefeiture proceedings and complaints for the prosecution of
money laundering offenses.67

In addition to providing for the definition and penalties for the crime of money laundering, the AMLA
also authorizes certain provisional remedies that would aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the
AMLA. These are the "freeze order" authorized under Section 10, and the "bank inquiry order"
authorized under Section 11.

Respondents posit that a bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be obtained only upon the pre-
existence of a money laundering offense case already filed before the courts.68 The conclusion is
based on the phrase "upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act," the word
"cases" generally understood as referring to actual cases pending with the courts.

We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead with the then Solicitor General who
conceded that the use of the phrase "in cases of" was unfortunate, yet submitted that it should be
interpreted to mean "in the event there are violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already
cases pending in court concerning such violations.69 If the contrary position is adopted, then the bank
inquiry order would be limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases, and wholly inutile
as a means for the government to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an
intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in
all likelihood the AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a discovery tool, and thus
would become less circumspect in filing complaints against suspect account holders. After all, under
such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow or even encourage the indiscriminate filing of
complaints under the AMLA with the hope or expectation that the evidence of money laundering
would somehow surface during the trial. Since the AMLC could not make use of the bank inquiry
order to determine whether there is evidentiary basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not
filing any case at all would not be an alternative. Such unwholesome set-up should not come to
pass. Thus Section 11 cannot be interpreted in a way that would emasculate the remedy it has
established and encourage the unfounded initiation of complaints for money laundering.

Still, even if the bank inquiry order may be availed of without need of a pre-existing case under the
AMLA, it does not follow that such order may be availed of ex parte. There are several reasons why
the AMLA does not generally sanction ex parte applications and issuances of the bank inquiry order.

IV.

It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as a general rule, the issuance ex
parte of the bank inquiry order. We quote the provision in full:

SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. ― Notwithstanding the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405, as amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791,
and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment with any
banking institution or non bank financial institution upon order of any competent court in cases of
violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money
laundering offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no court order shall be required in cases
involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into
or examine any deposit of investment with any banking institution or non bank financial
institution when the examination is made in the course of a periodic or special examination,
in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP.70 (Emphasis supplied)

Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a
judicial order in cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
kidnapping for ransom,71 certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,72 hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder. Since
such special circumstances do not apply in this case, there is no need for us to pass comment on
this proviso. Suffice it to say, the proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which presently
confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the
AMLA excludes said proviso.

In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in
Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued
that this silence does not preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is
not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument falls when the immediately preceding provision,
Section 10, is examined.

SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. ― The Court of Appeals,

upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any
monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i)
 hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for
a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.73

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank
inquiry order under Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the
AMLC may avail of to effectively combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially,
Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte application for the provisional relief
therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended to authorize ex
parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed
such intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.

Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the AMLA was crafted at the
same time, through the passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not
the Court of Appeals, which had authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order
always then required, without exception, an order from a competent court.74 It was through the same
enactment that ex parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the AMLA, in the case of
the freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would have been
convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of a
bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the
available legislative record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a
bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.

That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in applications for bank inquiry orders is
confirmed by the present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA, promulgated upon the
passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules
do expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be filed ex parte,75 but no similar
clearance is granted in the case of inquiry orders under Section 11.76 These implementing rules were
promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Insurance Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission,77 and if it was the true belief of these institutions that inquiry orders could be
issued ex parte similar to freeze orders, language to that effect would have been incorporated in the
said Rules. This is stressed not because the implementing rules could authorize ex
parte applications for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but rather because the
framers of the law had no intention to allow such ex parte applications.

Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC78 to enforce the
provisions of the AMLA specifically authorize ex parte applications with respect to freeze orders
under Section 1079 but make no similar authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under
Section 11.

The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte proceedings under Section 10 and in
proscribing the same under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one hand is aimed at
preserving monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such monetary instruments or property would thus
be inhibited from utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order. To make such freeze order
anteceded by a judicial proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for or lead to the
dissipation of such funds even before the order could be issued.

On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical
seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination
of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The
monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in
a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder’s record of
deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected
under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or hidden by the account holder. Said
records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the
account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.

Interestingly, petitioner’s memorandum does not attempt to demonstrate before the Court that the
bank inquiry order under Section 11 may be issued ex parte, although the petition itself did devote
some space for that argument. The petition argues that the bank inquiry order is "a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its name, and made necessary because of a public necessity… [t]hus, by
its very nature, the application for an order or inquiry must necessarily, be ex parte." This argument
is insufficient justification in light of the clear disinclination of Congress to allow the issuance ex
parte of bank inquiry orders under Section 11, in contrast to the legislature’s clear inclination to allow
the ex parte grant of freeze orders under Section 10.

Without doubt, a requirement that the application for a bank inquiry order be done with notice to the
account holder will alert the latter that there is a plan to inspect his bank account on the belief that
the funds therein are involved in an unlawful activity or money laundering offense.80 Still, the account
holder so alerted will in fact be unable to do anything to conceal or cleanse his bank account records
of suspicious or anomalous transactions, at least not without the whole-hearted cooperation of the
bank, which inherently has no vested interest to aid the account holder in such manner.

V.

The necessary implication of this finding that Section 11 of the AMLA does not generally authorize
the issuance ex parte of the bank inquiry order would be that such orders cannot be issued unless
notice is given to the owners of the account, allowing them the opportunity to contest the issuance of
the order. Without such a consequence, the legislated distinction between ex parte proceedings
under Section 10 and those which are not ex parte under Section 11 would be lost and rendered
useless.

There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an ex parte order. Section 11 itself
requires that it be established that "there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to unlawful activities," and it obviously is the court which stands as arbiter whether there is
indeed such probable cause. The process of inquiring into the existence of probable cause would
involve the function of determination reposed on the trial court. Determination clearly implies a
function of adjudication on the part of the trial court, and not a mechanical application of a standard
pre-determination by some other body. The word "determination" implies deliberation and is, in
normal legal contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a court of justice."81

The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot simply take the AMLC’s word that
probable cause exists that the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. It will have
to exercise its

own determinative function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account holder would be
certainly capable of contesting such probable cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the
pending application to inquire into his account; hence a notice requirement would not be an empty
spectacle. It may be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may become more
cumbersome or prolonged because of the notice requirement, yet we fail to see any unreasonable
burden cast by such circumstance. After all, as earlier stated, requiring notice to the account holder
should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the bank records subject of the inquiry which
remain in the possession and control of the bank.
Petitioner argues that a bank inquiry order necessitates a finding of probable cause, a characteristic
similar to a search warrant which is applied to and heard ex parte. We have examined the supposed
analogy between a search warrant and a bank inquiry order yet we remain to be unconvinced by
petitioner.

The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular requirements attaching to search
warrants that are not imposed by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A constitutional
warrant requires that the judge personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce,82 such examination being in the form of searching questions and
answers.83 Those are impositions which the legislative did not specifically prescribe as to the bank
inquiry order under the AMLA, and we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to Section 11
of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it
contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.

Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high procedural standard for the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of search warrants which Congress chose not to
prescribe for the bank inquiry order under the AMLA, Congress nonetheless disallowed ex
parte applications for the inquiry order. We can discern that in exchange for these procedural
standards normally applied to search warrants, Congress chose instead to legislate a right to notice
and a right to be heard— characteristics of judicial proceedings which are not ex parte. Absent any
demonstrable constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute such legislative policy
choices.

VI.

The Court’s construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy
considerations. If sustained, petitioner’s argument that a bank account may be inspected by the
government following an ex parte proceeding about which the depositor would know nothing would
have significant implications on the right to privacy, a right innately cherished by all notwithstanding
the legally recognized exceptions thereto. The notion that the government could be so empowered is
cause for concern of any individual who values the right to privacy which, after all, embodies even
the right to be "let

alone," the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized people. 84

One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the right to privacy, as applied to bank
deposits, warrants our present inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that question has proved
controversial in American jurisprudence. Notably, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Miller85 held that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the bank records of a
depositor.86 Moreover, the text of our Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of allocating
specific rights peculiar to bank deposits.

However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a right to privacy governing bank
accounts in the Philippines, and that such right finds application to the case at bar. The source of
such right is statutory, expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1955. The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law, to wit:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
 depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in
the Philippines.87 Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the zones of
privacy recognized by our laws.88 The framers of the 1987 Constitution likewise recognized that bank
accounts are not covered by either the right to information89 under Section 7, Article III or under the
requirement of full public disclosure90 under Section 28, Article II.91 Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is
repealed or

amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank
deposits.

Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the
Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by
"any person, government official, bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the
depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional
exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality,92 and there have been other similar recognitions as
well.93

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may
inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it
having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section
4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are
related to kidnapping for ransom,94 certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002,95 hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there
is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.

It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11
of the AMLA is a "litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is
when "the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation of the
bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the
application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.

Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it
does not mean that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older
law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x
are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature."96 Indeed, by force of statute, all bank
deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions
referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions in such a manner that
would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking to enforce
those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts,
then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless
Congress passes a law reversing the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential
nature of Philippine bank accounts.
The presence of this statutory right to privacy addresses at least one of the arguments raised by
petitioner, that Lilia Cheng had no personality to assail the inquiry orders before the Court of Appeals
because she was not the subject of said orders. AMLC Resolution No. 75, which served as the basis
in the successful application for the Makati inquiry order, expressly adverts to Citibank Account No.
88576248 "owned by Cheng Yong and/or Lilia G. Cheng with Citibank N.A.,"97 whereas Lilia Cheng’s
petition before the Court of Appeals is accompanied by a certification from Metrobank that Account
Nos. 300852436-0 and 700149801-7, both of which are among the subjects of the Manila inquiry
order, are accounts in the name of "Yong Cheng or Lilia Cheng."98 Petitioner does not specifically
deny that Lilia Cheng holds rights of ownership over the three said accounts, laying focus instead on
the fact that she was not named as a subject of either the Makati or Manila RTC inquiry orders. We
are reasonably convinced that Lilia Cheng has sufficiently demonstrated her joint ownership of the
three accounts, and such conclusion leads us to acknowledge that she has the standing to assail via
certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the examination of her bank accounts as the orders interfere
with her statutory right to maintain the secrecy of said accounts.

While petitioner would premise that the inquiry into Lilia Cheng’s accounts finds root in Section 11 of
the AMLA, it cannot be denied that the authority to inquire under Section 11 is only exceptional in
character, contrary as it is to the general rule preserving the secrecy of bank deposits. Even though
she may not have been the subject of the inquiry orders, her bank accounts nevertheless were, and
she thus has the standing to vindicate the right to secrecy that attaches to said accounts and their
owners. This statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway
upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section 2 of the
Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether
the requirements were indeed complied with.

VII.

There is a final point of concern which needs to be addressed. Lilia Cheng argues that the AMLA,
being a substantive penal statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not
apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164, or on 17
October 2001. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts, opened between 1989 to 1990,
could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.

No ex post facto law may be enacted,99 and no law may be construed in such fashion as to permit a
criminal prosecution offensive to the ex post facto clause. As applied to the AMLA, it is plain that no
person may be prosecuted under the penal provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the
enactment of the law on 17 October 2001. As much was understood by the lawmakers since they
deliberated upon the AMLA, and indeed there is no serious dispute on that point.

Does the proscription against ex post facto laws apply to the interpretation of Section 11, a provision
which does not provide for a penal sanction but which merely authorizes the inspection of suspect
accounts and deposits? The answer is in the affirmative. In this jurisdiction, we have defined an ex
post facto law as one which either:

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when
done, and punishes such an act;

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed;
 (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and

(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty. (Emphasis supplied)100

Prior to the enactment of the AMLA, the fact that bank accounts or deposits were involved in
activities later on enumerated in Section 3 of the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from
the shelter of absolute confidentiality. Prior to the AMLA, in order that bank accounts could be
examined, there was need to secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order
authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in a case where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject
matter of the litigation. The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute
confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account holder. For that reason,
the application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into records of transactions entered
into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be constitutionally infirm, offensive as it is to the ex post
facto clause.

Still, we must note that the position submitted by Lilia Cheng is much broader than what we are
willing to affirm. She argues that the proscription against ex post facto laws goes as far as to prohibit
any inquiry into deposits or investments included in bank accounts opened prior to the effectivity of
the AMLA even if the suspect transactions were entered into when the law had already taken effect.
The Court recognizes that if this argument were to be affirmed, it would create a horrible loophole in
the AMLA that would in turn supply the means to fearlessly engage in money laundering in the
Philippines; all that the criminal has to do is to make sure that the money laundering activity is
facilitated through a bank account opened prior to 2001. Lilia Cheng admits that "actual money
launderers could utilize the ex post facto provision of the Constitution as a shield" but that the
remedy lay with Congress to amend the law. We can hardly presume that Congress intended to
enact a self-defeating law in the first place, and the courts are inhibited from such a construction by
the cardinal rule that "a law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying
it."101

Besides, nowhere in the legislative record cited by Lilia Cheng does it appear that there was an
unequivocal intent to exempt from the bank inquiry order all bank accounts opened prior to the
passage of the AMLA. There is a cited exchange between Representatives Ronaldo Zamora and
Jaime Lopez where the latter confirmed to the former that "deposits are supposed to be exempted
from scrutiny or monitoring if they are already in place as of the time the law is enacted."102 That
statement does indicate that transactions already in place when the AMLA was passed are indeed
exempt from scrutiny through a bank inquiry order, but it cannot yield any interpretation that records
of transactions undertaken after the enactment of the AMLA are similarly exempt. Due to the
absence of cited authority from the legislative record that unqualifiedly supports respondent Lilia
Cheng’s thesis, there is no cause for us to sustain her interpretation of the AMLA, fatal as it is to
the anima of that law.

IX.

We are well aware that Lilia Cheng’s petition presently pending before the Court of Appeals likewise
assails the validity of the subject bank inquiry orders and precisely seeks the annulment of said
orders. Our current declarations may indeed have the effect of preempting that0 petition. Still, in
order for this Court to rule on the petition at bar which insists on the enforceability of the said bank
inquiry orders, it is necessary for us to consider and rule on the same question which after all is a
pure question of law.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally
powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in
which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself
to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he
lives.

- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.

The Facts

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to
attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook3 profile.

Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne,
and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually

suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposure.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school
principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing
the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:

1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity
before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;

2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of
laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have
 known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were
punished outright;

4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the
photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts
of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;

5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and

6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case
No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their
children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents
be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from
service of the writ.

In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties
to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one
where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without
restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation
of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on Habeas Data.10

The Issues

The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be
issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.12

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however,
will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes
real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible
trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to
informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.

a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However,
in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)

Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.

Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the
violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly
then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.

b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of
data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas
data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means
"to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in
pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or
storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature
of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such
will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a
very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a
right which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technology––a right which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of
protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having
an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to
privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––
usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about themselves. 23

With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each
individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the
millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking." 24

It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that
would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in
the landmark case, H v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take
into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose
credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind
that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs
is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities

Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected
to other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a
room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the
control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from
text, to pictures, to music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows
one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers,
people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and
to share and express what matters to them."28

Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established
and both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29

To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users
to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not
foolproof."33

For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos),
posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;

(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and

(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden
or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from
another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the
availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing
need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users
can view that user’s particular post.

STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that
only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35

This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of
privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.37

Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or
her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.38 Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such
that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page
and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view
it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their
function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.

We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users
and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This
determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy
when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected against
unauthorized access and disclosure.

Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were
only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.

Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of
girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many
other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x
x. They even told me that there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to
their friends in Facebook."

In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the
images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students,
who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts.
This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever
resorted to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos
were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke
the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v.
Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page
or the photograph itself.45

Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail
that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools
to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers; 48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.

It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."

To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of
100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200
friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view
the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.

This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute,
thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very
private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.

As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion
since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither
the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These
are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.

In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of
minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject
of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader,
through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such
instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting
his or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible
social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern
of many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally
lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only
STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital
literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that
the children are exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering
the complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children
are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital
citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced
the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it
violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to
1âwphi1

exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or
information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly,
information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.

It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding
relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding
a right which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if
they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these
settings and the site's layout often.

In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.