Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Textbook What S Good For Business Business and American Politics Since World War Ii 1St Edition Kim Phillips Fein Ebook All Chapter PDF
Textbook What S Good For Business Business and American Politics Since World War Ii 1St Edition Kim Phillips Fein Ebook All Chapter PDF
https://textbookfull.com/product/destructive-creation-american-
business-and-the-winning-of-world-war-ii-1st-edition-mark-r-
wilson/
https://textbookfull.com/product/american-foreign-policy-since-
world-war-ii-18th-edition-steven-w-hook/
https://textbookfull.com/product/origins-of-the-warfare-state-
world-war-ii-and-the-transformation-of-american-politics-1st-
edition-carl-boggs/
https://textbookfull.com/product/american-business-
since-1920-how-it-worked-3rd-edition-thomas-k-mccraw/
The Washington War FDR s Inner Circle and the Politics
of Power that Won World War II First Edition James
Lacey
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-washington-war-fdr-s-inner-
circle-and-the-politics-of-power-that-won-world-war-ii-first-
edition-james-lacey/
https://textbookfull.com/product/world-war-ii-spies-secret-
missions-and-hidden-facts-from-world-war-ii-1st-edition-
stephanie-bearce/
https://textbookfull.com/product/war-s-logic-strategic-thought-
and-the-american-way-of-war-1st-edition-antulio-j-echevarria-ii/
https://textbookfull.com/product/u-s-army-chevrolet-trucks-in-
world-war-ii-1st-edition-didier-andres/
https://textbookfull.com/product/old-glory-stories-american-
combat-leadership-in-world-war-ii-1st-edition-cole-c-kingseed/
What’s Good for Business
This page intentionally left blank
What’s Good for Business
Business and American Politics since World War II
E D I T E D B Y K I M P H I L L I P S -F E I N
and
JULIAN E. ZELIZER
1
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University’s objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
Contributors ix
Epilogue 249
KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN AND JULI AN E. ZELIZER
Index 253
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Susan Ferber and Oxford University Press for their out-
standing work on this volume. Daniel Rodgers, Anthony Grafton, and William
Jordan made possible the funding through the David Center, the Center for
Collaborative History, and the Department of History at Princeton University
for a conference that started this volume. Barbara Leavey did a wonderful job
making sure that everything ran smoothly. Kim Phillips-Fein would like to
thank Greg Vargo and Charlotte Phillips for their comments on the introduc-
tion and epilogue. All of the authors of this volume have been wonderful to
work with. We would also like to thank Bruce Schulman and Anthony Badger,
who along with Julian Zelizer, co-organized the Boston University-Cambridge
University-Princeton University Annual Political History Conference at which
the first draft of these chapters were presented.
vii
This page intentionally left blank
CO N T R I B U TO R S
ix
x C ont r ib utors
America was published with Princeton University Press and won the Organiza-
tion of American Historians’ 2006 prize for the best book on modern politics.
She is currently working on a book on the energy crisis of the 1970s.
Andrew Needham is Assistant Professor of History at New York University. His
work examines the intersections of metropolitan growth, energy development,
and environmental change in postwar America. He is the author of Power Lines:
Energy and the Making of the Modern Southwest, forthcoming from Princeton
University Press.
Kim Phillips-Fein is Assistant Professor at the Gallatin School of New York Uni-
versity, where she teaches courses in American political, business, and labor his-
tory. Her first book, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement
from the New Deal to Reagan, was published in 2009 by W. W. Norton. Phillips-
Fein has written widely for publications including The Nation, Bookforum, and
Dissent, to which she has contributed articles and reviews. She is currently
working writing a book New York City in the 1970s.
Elizabeth Tandy Shermer spent two years as the Paul Mellon Fellow of Ameri-
can History at the University of Cambridge before joining Loyola University of
Chicago’s Department of History. Her work has appeared in several edited col-
lections and major journals, including the Journal of American History. Her
monograph, Creating the Sunbelt: Phoenix and the Political Economy of Metropol-
itan Growth, is forthcoming from University of Pennsylvania Press.
Jason Scott Smith is the author of Building New Deal Liberalism: The Political
Economy of Public Works, 1933–1956. After completing his Ph.D. at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, he held postdoctoral fellowships at Harvard and
Cornell before joining the faculty at the University of New Mexico.
Dominique A. Tobbell is Assistant Professor in the Program in the History of
Science, Technology, and Medicine at the University of Minnesota and is author
of Pills, Power, and Policy: The Struggle for Drug Reform in Cold War America and
its Consequences (University of California Press/Milbank Series on Health and
the Public, 2012).
Benjamin Waterhouse is Assistant Professor of History at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His research focuses on the political and eco-
nomic history of the United States during the twentieth century, and he is cur-
rently at work on a book about the role of corporate lobbyists in American
politics during the 1970s and 1980s.
Mark R. Wilson is Associate Professor of History at the University of North
Carolina at Charlotte. He is the author of The Business of Civil War (2006). He is
C ont r ib utors xi
currently at work on a book about the business and politics of the U.S. industrial
mobilization for World War II.
Julian E. Zelizer is Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton Univer-
sity. He is the award-winning author and editor of thirteen books on American
political history. His most recent books are Governing America: The Revival of
Political History (Princeton University Press), Jimmy Carter (Times Books), and
The Presidency of George W. Bush: A First Historical Assessment (Princeton Uni-
versity Press). He writes a weekly column for CNN.Com and is a regular com-
mentator in the media.
This page intentionally left blank
What’s Good for Business
This page intentionally left blank
Introduction
What’s Good for Business
Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer
Early in 2010, the Supreme Court struck down legal century-old restrictions on
corporate donations to political campaigns, finding that restricting business
contributions to fund political advertisements during election campaign was a
violation of the First Amendment. The ruling in Citizens United vs. the Federal
Election Commission—which satisfied long-standing efforts to overturn such
bans—caused many to warn of a new era of business dominance over national
politics, and it brought questions about business influence in politics to the fore-
front of the country’s attention. “With a single, disastrous 5-to-4 ruling, the
Supreme Court has thrust politics back to the robber baron age of the nineteenth
century,” opined the New York Times.1
While there is no doubt that the Citizens United decision has affected the con-
temporary political landscape, this volume demonstrates that the Court’s ruling
was only one recent development in a long history of the political mobilization
of business. This book examines the attempts of business to influence elections,
shape legislation, determine regulations, and contribute to the creation of public
opinion since the end of World War II. Rather than assuming the power of busi-
ness in politics, the authors whose work appears in these pages try to unpack the
evolution of this relationship. The history of business in political life that emerges
from these pages is not a simple story of corporate power easily and unquestion-
ingly exercised; instead, the stories told here show business actors organizing
themselves to affect government in myriad different ways, resulting in an image
of American politics that is more complex and contested than it often has been
thought to be.
Few would argue with the idea that businesses have been profoundly affected
by the labor, regulatory, and fiscal policies of government at the federal, state,
3
4 W h at ’s G o o d f o r B u s i n e s s
and local level. Yet it has taken some time for historians to start to write about
business and politics with the same fine-grained attention to archival detail and
level of social analysis with which they have studied political parties, labor
unions, and grass-roots social movements. A new generation of scholars who are
attempting to reenergize the history of political economy, the authors whose
work is collected here seek to show that the role of business in politics and the
political efforts of economic elites need to be understood as historically specific
and distinct, the subject of research and analysis instead of simply something to
be taken for granted because business operates at a high level of social prestige,
political access, and economic power.
The relationship between economic interests and political power is one of the
oldest themes in U.S. historiography, just as it is in American politics more
broadly. In 1913, the historian and political scientist Charles Beard created a
great stir with the publication of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States. Beard challenged historians such as George Bancroft who had
focused on the intellectual foundations of the Constitution, arguing that the
economic interests of the founding generation best explained the positions that
were taken by the Federalists and Anti-Federalists. That highlighting that the
founders’ economic interests influenced the way that they approached the state
was seen as scandalous suggests the strong emotions that have long surrounded
the problems of economic interest and business power in a democracy.2
Historical scholarship on the twentieth century has been perennially con-
cerned with this issue as well. Progressive historians such as Beard wrote grand
narratives depicting an ongoing tension between business interests and the rest
of American society, namely workers, farmers, and intellectuals, in a struggle
that moved toward greater social equality. According to the progressive histo-
rians, “the people” struggled to gain power and expand government in order to
tame the power of business and financial elites. The history of the United States
was the story of the long fight to live up to its democratic promise—and the
opposition of business was the central obstacle to be overcome. Historians such
as Matthew Josephson advanced the argument that the business leaders of the
late nineteenth century were “robber barons” who came by their wealth primarily
through exploitation and plunder.3 The progressive interpretation saw business
as predatory, both toward its workers and toward the state. Businessmen sub-
verted democratic ideals and sought to gain control over the political process.
During the 1940s and 1950s, liberal historians advanced a somewhat similar
narrative, though they adopted a more pluralistic interpretation. According to
scholars such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the New Deal marked a transformative
moment in which the federal government not only expanded to regulate
destructive business power but also helped non-elite citizens to permanently
organize for themselves. The government created a level playing field. Business
Introduc tion 5
became one interest among many competing for power.4 At the same time, his-
torians such as Richard Hofstadter rejected the idea that American history could
be understood primarily as a struggle over wealth and power, arguing that this
did not leave sufficient room for non-materialist factors in explaining political
behavior. The older progressive interpretation also seemed to overstate the
depth of disagreement about the basic principles of capitalism, which Hofstadter
believed to be widely accepted by most of the populace. If there were conflicts,
they were more likely to be between different interest groups, each seeking its
own advantage in the market, than between a dominant business class and the
rest of the people.5 In a way, the mid-century work on business–government
relations tended to echo the political faiths of liberalism at this point. It de-
emphasized the political power of business and suggested that the expansion of
the state in the New Deal had been able to tame whatever might have been
destructive about private economic power in the early twentieth century.
Neither the “consensus” interpretation nor the pluralist one were convincing
to the group of younger scholars in the 1960s that rejected the liberal under-
standing of the United States. Influenced by Marxian thinkers such as William
Appleman Williams, as well as by the work of C. Wright Mills on the “power
elite,” they tapped back into some of the spirit from Beard’s book on the Consti-
tution to argue that in the twentieth century the expansion of government took
place to protect, not tame, business power. The New Left claimed that many Pro-
gressive Era regulations were put into place because the emerging corporations
of that period sought to stifle competition from small business and quell radical
elements in society. Gabriel Kolko, Martin Sklar, James Weinstein, and others
presented a story about “corporate liberalism” in which business interests played
the central role in government expansion even when legislation seemed like a
populist victory.6 In this view, the Progressive Era marked the moment when the
national ruling elite capable of using government power to augment its own
status and position emerged in the United States. Social historians of this gener-
ation, who paid less attention to government and economic institutions, agreed
with much of their analysis. They downplayed the ability of government to pro-
duce genuine reform given the power of business, focusing instead on grassroots
efforts, from the shop floor to the saloons, to democratize America. (Subsequent
historians, such as David Vogel, Kim McQuaid, Thomas Ferguson, Samuel Hays,
and Colin Gordon, took a more critical attitude toward the idea of corporate
liberalism, focusing on the deep divisions within the business community, as
well as the continued opposition of many companies to almost any expansion of
government regulation.)7
Also in the 1960s and 1970s, a group of historians began to advance what
became known as the “organizational synthesis.” This cohort of scholars—led by
Robert Wiebe, Samuel Hays, Morton Keller, and Louis Galambos—was interested
6 W h at ’s G o o d f o r B u s i n e s s
in cooperative efforts between government and business.8 They argued that the
central political narrative concerned the modernization of American society,
which occurred between 1880 and 1920. The development of large-scale na-
tional institutions—both within the state and in industry—separated the nine-
teenth and twentieth century, and the rise of these massive institutions resulted
in cooperative efforts between business and government to rationalize public
policy and economic competition. While sharing many of the same themes as
the arguments about corporate liberalism, they did not see business as the dom-
inant member of this relationship nor did they frame their story in terms of class
politics.
In the 1970s and 1980s, historians wrote much less about the relationship
between business and government. In part, this had to do with the decline of
political history, as many historians focused on social and cultural questions
instead of legislative battles or the power of the state. Also in the 1970s, eco-
nomic history began to be written primarily by economists, whose questions
and methods were very different from those that interested most historians, fo-
cusing much more closely on the origins and dynamics of economic growth.9
As a result, the literature on business and politics remained focused on the early
part of the twentieth century. This unbalanced coverage meant a paucity of
work on the more contemporary period when the level of government interven-
tion in matters impacting business vastly expanded. The massive growth of the
federal government and the labor movement in the New Deal and the war cre-
ated new political, ideological, and economic problems—as well as new oppor-
tunities—for American business. The period between World War II and the
end of the twentieth century raised vital questions: How did business groups
seek to accomplish their political objectives in a landscape where they had to
negotiate with a newly large and powerful federal state and interest groups, such
as organized labor and the environmental movement, that were often in opposi-
tion to corporate goals? What was the dynamic between postwar liberalism and
business? And how did business relate to the conservative movement that was
developing over these years?
Finally, the subfield of business history itself has only intermittently dealt
with questions about the state. Many of its leading practitioners have focused on
questions about technological change, the development of markets, the struc-
ture of industries, and a wide range of more specifically economic matters, rather
than politics. The work of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. on the rise of vertical integra-
tion and its implications for the modern economy was itself crafted in part as
a rejection of older interpretations that suggested there was no real economic
motivation for the rise of large corporations. Chandler’s classic 1977 work, The
Visible Hand, which defined the field of business history for decades to come,
downplayed the role of the state or politics more broadly. As Richard John wrote
Introduc tion 7
on the twentieth anniversary of its publication, The Visible Hand “pushed to the
margins a host of other topics, including . . . government–business relations and
the role of business in American life.”10 Even historians who challenged Chan-
dler’s central contentions about the efficiency of large corporations—such as
Philip Scranton, in his work on the reasons for the tenacity of small businesses in
the era of industrialization—often shared with him an emphasis on the history
of the firm.11 The relative absence of politics in much older business and eco-
nomic history may be because scholars assumed that business people were not
especially interested in politics, except in very narrow ways. Their actions with
regard to government were only extensions of their market behavior, driven by
economic self-interest instead of by ideas or by other considerations, and their
political motivations are thought to be fairly constant across time and place. The
political power of business might be merely an extension of its economic power:
it exerts what influence it has simply through the promise of investment and the
threat of disinvestment. If this is true, why look specifically at the relationship
between business and the state at all?
But in recent years, political historians and business historians alike have
started to return to the archives to examine the relationship between business
and government, especially in the twentieth century. There are a number of rea-
sons for this reinvigorated interest. First and foremost is just how central busi-
ness and economic issues are to contemporary political life. We live, after all, in
an era when levels of inequality of income and wealth have reached proportions
unknown for a century. Business and lobbying groups seem to exert great power
at all levels of government, shaping public policy in disproportionate ways. The
recent financial crash and subsequent recession have generated concern through-
out the country about how our economic institutions work and what to do when
they fail. Tax cuts, deregulation, welfare, health insurance, Social Security, and
the very idea of the free market all are fiercely contested. High-profile business
scandals—from the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s to the market-frenzy
fraud of Enron to Bernard L. Madoff ’s infamous Ponzi scheme—punctuate the
headlines, although the popular books and articles that appear about them rarely
take a long historical view. In a 2003 forum in the Journal of American History,
David Hollinger called for a new focus on “political economy,” arguing that these
issues have been so important in our contemporary politics that historians need
to do much more to account for them in the recent American past.12
At the same time—and perhaps because of the evident importance of busi-
ness in politics and more generally in our social and cultural life today—there
has been a broader resurgence of scholarship in the field of business history.
Instead of focusing primarily on the questions of organizational structure, inno-
vation, technology, and markets that had previously defined the field, there has
been a strong push to analyze business as at once shaping and being shaped by
8 W h at ’s G o o d f o r B u s i n e s s
American politics, culture, and ideas. This has led historians to treat analyze
many subjects that had not previously been seen as important. Scholars have
written about the politics of advertising and of public relations.13 They have
explored the history of women entrepreneurs and the ways that the world of
business opened up new roles for women, even as it remained a place that
reproduced hierarchies of gender.14 They have written about deindustrializa-
tion, capital flight, and the decline of the Keynesian economic order.15 They
have analyzed the history of the creation of an extensive set of employer-pro-
vided social benefits—especially health insurance—and its impact on public
policy.16 They have done important work on the politics of institutions such as
the New York Stock Exchange and Wal-Mart, and the interplay between corpo-
rate identity and political culture.17 They have looked at the political campaigns
of business in postwar America.18 They have worked on the ways that elite class
identity is shaped at particular moments in history.19 They have studied the
impact of government policies on economic development.20 Historians have
even begun to describe the ways that business prerogatives shape the most per-
sonal cultural experiences—for example, the way that music is produced and
heard.21 Some scholars are suggesting that the old divisions between business,
labor, and economic history should be dissolved, and that historians should
instead write the “history of capitalism,” taking as the starting point for research
the idea that (as Sven Beckert puts it) “states and markets, politics and business”
are mutually constitutive and cannot be understood independently of each
other.22 Property rights and economic relationships, these scholars argue, are
created through state actions. Business people should not be seen as the profit-
maximizing individuals of economic theory; they need to be understood within
cultural, social, and political networks, as well as economic institutions. The
work collected in this book is more narrowly focused on the relationship
between business and government. But the larger revitalization of business his-
tory and the new “history of capitalism” has meant the incorporation of politics
into the field in a new way and at a new level.
The recent revival of political history, too, has led scholars of American poli-
tics to business, just as business historians have come to politics.23 While the
“new political history” began with a focus on civil rights and public welfare, it
has moved naturally to encompass the history of business in politics and the
ways that government policies and institutional structures have influenced the
marketplace. Many of the younger scholars who have focused on business and
politics are people who might, in an earlier era, have approached these problems
of political economy through the lens of labor history instead. But they came of
age politically and intellectually at a time when it seemed clear that in order to
understand the histories of working-class people, it was in fact necessary to start
at the other side. Without analyzing the context in which workers lived and
Introduc tion 9
ways in which businesses shaped the political world in which they needed to
operate.
The contributors to this book cover a vast range of subjects, suggesting how
diverse the category of “business” really is. Most deal with larger businesses, but
some look at the political efforts of smaller or local companies. Not intended to
be comprehensive, these essays illustrate the richness of the field, showing the
way that doing this archival work can illuminate problems in both business and
political history, and demonstrating the ways in which what one might call the
“new business history” can garner insights into twentieth-century American
politics and life. We have organized the book in a roughly chronological fashion,
starting with World War II and ending with the political mobilization of busi-
ness in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This might seem to mirror the story of the
“rise and fall of the New Deal Order,” which is often told about the period, in
which the liberalism of the mid-twentieth-century disintegrates in the 1970s
under the pressures of social upheaval and economic recession. But although the
essays are arranged in this temporal frame, certain important themes run
throughout the collection that cut against this familiar narrative of the postwar
years.
The first has to do with the relationship between business and the ideas and
policies of postwar liberalism. Business leaders and their organizations were
cognizant of how American political culture had changed after the New Deal.
The role of the state in the economy had vastly expanded and continued to do so
through the 1970s. While business actors were often skeptical and even hostile
toward the liberalism that emerged during and after the New Deal, they did not
limit their politics to outright resistance. Many business leaders actively sought
to shape the nature of the postwar state. The relationship was one of negotiation,
also influenced by the ways that liberalism became less confrontational toward
private industry. Sometimes business leaders tried to translate liberal political
ideas into the economic sphere. At other times they attempted to improve their
position within liberal governmental structures so as to have more influence on
the implementation of regulatory policies. From early in the postwar period, the
outright antagonism of some parts of the business world helped to foster the
conservative critique of labor and government. Business was at once inside and
outside the liberal order, both seeking to influence and seeking to oppose its
growth.
Mark Wilson looks at the attempts of business during World War II—when
some might imagine that the emergency and patriotism had tamed self-interested
lobbying efforts—to create a sympathetic policy environment for the years of
reconversion, with a focus on its efforts to shape the tax code in ways that would
guarantee that the sacrifices of the war would not fall too heavily on corpora-
tions. Increasingly, political battles took place in technical areas of policy, outside
Introduc tion 11
the scrutiny of much of the public, where business hired experts and lobbyists to
obtain favorable provisions in laws to increase profits. The sophistication of the
business lobby, Wilson suggests, kept pace with the growth of the federal state.
Jason Scott Smith’s essay on the postwar career of David Lilienthal—who went
from being a leading New Dealer and head of the Tennessee Valley Authority to
having a prosperous career in international business in the postwar period—
shows the ways that New Deal ideals about the use of the state for private devel-
opment could be translated into the private sector. It also suggests how liberalism
changed in the postwar period, becoming much less openly critical of business.
Shane Hamilton addresses the rhetorical limitations of postwar liberalism when
it came to addressing problems associated with “monopsony,” or markets domi-
nated by a single (or few) large buyer (or buyers). Policy makers remained
trapped within the language of antimonopoly politics, inherited from the Popu-
list campaigns of the late nineteenth century. Finally, Dominique Tobbell’s piece
on the attempts of the pharmaceutical industry to confront the debate over reg-
ulation of prescription drugs in the 1950s and 1960s—which formed a model
for other industries, including tobacco—demonstrates that the drug companies
pursued a wide array of strategies aimed at gaining greater control over the con-
ditions of regulation. Ultimately, they participated in the creation of the regula-
tory regime, ensuring that it would develop in ways that they did not find too
threatening.
A second major theme running throughout the collection addresses the role
played by business in developing a conservative political mobilization that was
openly opposed to state regulation. Darren Dochuk’s essay about oil and evan-
gelical religion treats the distinctive contributions of businessmen associated
with the extractive industries to building conservative religious institutions in
the postwar period. Dochuk challenges the tendency within the historiography
to separate the “religious right,” supposedly focused primarily on cultural issues,
from economic conservatives and libertarians who advocate less government
regulation, demonstrating, through the history of oil politics, how the two were
interconnected. Andrew Needham’s essay on debates over public power in Phoe-
nix, Arizona, treats the attempts of private electrical utility companies to attack
public utilities. He suggests that the political campaigns they crafted in the early
1960s helped to establish the rhetoric of “taxpayer” politics, helping to nurture
an identity upon which the conservative movement would be able to build. Meg
Jacobs’s essay on business and environmental regulation treats the dramatic ex-
pansion of regulation in the 1970s—a shift in the legal landscape that the con-
servative movement was not able to fully undo in the 1980s or 1990s. In a decade
considered a time of victory for free-market ideas, this highlights an example in
which business opposition to regulation failed. It also explains the ferocity of the
mobilization of the business community in an era that, according to conventional
12 W h at ’s G o o d f o r B u s i n e s s
accounts, should have been hospitable to their needs. Benjamin Waterhouse fo-
cuses on the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, arguing that businesses were
able to overcome significant internal divisions to lobby against Big Business Day,
a 1980 attempt by Ralph Nader and the public interest movement to draw atten-
tion to corporate malfeasance. Waterhouse suggests that the challenges of the
public interest movement and of 1970s regulation spurred businesses to find
ways to build common organizations and work together politically. Louis
Hyman’s piece looks at the changing idea of the corporation in the 1970s, and at
the ways that critiques of the conglomerate movement helped to stimulate a turn
toward “lean” corporations, away from the massive, vertically integrated firms of
the postwar years.
A third theme that appears in many of the essays focuses on the relationship
between business and government at the local level. While historians looking at
business and politics have often dealt primarily with national politics and corpo-
rate institutions that operate at the national level, for much of the business world
it was essential to influence state and local governments, over issues which might
in turn have national significance. Elizabeth Tandy Shermer’s essay on postwar
Phoenix, Arizona, shows how the campaigns of local business leaders to remake
the city government and create a favorable climate for investment helped to
make the sunbelt metropolis a haven for manufacturing corporations eager to
flee the high-tax and heavily unionized states of the Northeast and Midwest.
These businessmen—the colleagues of Senator Barry Goldwater—understood
their local boosterism in deeply political terms, and they conceived of them-
selves as building an economic alternative to New Deal liberalism. They were
not, however, simple antistatists. On the contrary, they wanted to use public in-
vestment to woo business to Phoenix. Nathan Connolly’s essay about the role of
black business in encouraging “law-and-order” politics in Miami, Florida, sug-
gests that black entrepreneurs pressed the city to hire black police officers in the
1950s in order to fight illegal gaming. These essays indicate that the political ac-
tivism of business at the local level can lead to an expansion of government, and
that business actors were often interested in using local government to win fa-
vorable conditions for themselves, even as they also advanced a broader political
criticism of liberalism. They also suggest the dialectical relationship between
local business activism and national politics. But, importantly, businesses often
accepted and adjusted to government only when they had no choice. This dy-
namic is carefully explored by Anthony Chen, who looks at the politics of mu-
nicipal Fair Employment Practices ordinances, focusing on the role of employers.
His article examines battles that occurred in a number of cities, focusing on
Cleveland, where the local Chamber of Commerce abandoned its earlier resis-
tance to mandatory ordinances after it was clear that this opposition had been
largely futile.
Introduc tion 13
Together, the essays in this book show that business people have always tried
to guide politics toward “what’s good for business”—even as they argued
amongst themselves about what this might be, and as they tried to insist that
there should be no distinction between what was good for business and for the
society as a whole. They sought to direct the state activity of the postwar years in
ways that they felt would be favorable to the industries and groups they repre-
sented. At the same time, they helped to invest in campaigns to oppose regula-
tion and labor. While they often acted alone, the political challenges they faced
in postwar America frequently prompted collective action, both at the federal
and at the local level.
Indeed, one of the themes to emerge in this collection is the continuity
between business activism throughout the liberal and conservative periods in
postwar history. Many of the features of business prominence that are thought to
have emerged only after 1980 are in fact evident all throughout the postwar pe-
riod. While the campaigns of labor unions, consumer groups, civil rights organi-
zations, and other liberal and left grassroots groups helped to shape the postwar
political landscape, so too did the organizing efforts of business. A complete un-
derstanding of the history of postwar America demands attention to the deep
relationship among these groups and government.
Notes
1. “The Court’s Blow to Democracy,” New York Times, 22 January 2010, 30.
2. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New
York: MacMillan, 1913).
3. Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861–1901 (New
York: Harcourt, 1934).
4. See, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, 1935–1936, rev. ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).
5. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York:
Knopf, 1948).
6. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History: 1900–
1916 (New York: Free Press, 1963); Martin Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction of Capitalism:
1890–1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988); James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900–1918 (Boston: Bea-
con, 1968). There has also been some important, more recent work on business and polit-
ical organizing in the Progressive Era. For example, see Jeffrey Haydu, Citizen Employers:
Business Communities and Labor in Cincinnati and San Francisco, 1870–1916 (Ithaca, N.Y.:
ILR Press, 2008); Chad Pearson, “‘Organize and Fight’: Communities, Employers and
Open-Shop Movements, 1890–1920” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Albany,
2008).
7. David Vogel, “Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of
American Corporate Executives,” British Journal of Political Science 8 (1978): 45–78; David
Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic
Books, 1989); David Vogel, Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and
Business in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Kim McQuaid, Big
14 W h at ’s G o o d f o r B u s i n e s s
Business and Presidential Power from FDR to Reagan (New York: William Morrow, 1982);
Kim McQuaid, Uneasy Partners: Big Business in American Politics, 1945–1980 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Thomas Ferguson, “Industrial Conflict and the
Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of Multinational Liberalism in America,” in The
Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930–1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princ-
eton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989); Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health and Perma-
nence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985 (New York: Cambridge,
1987); Colin Gordon, New Deals: Business, Labor and Politics, 1920–1935 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
8. Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,”
Business History Review 44 (Autumn 1970): 279–90; Louis Galambos, “Technology, Polit-
ical Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis,”
Business History Review 57 (Winter 1983): 471–93; Morton Keller, The Life Insurance Enter-
prise, 1885–1910: A Study in the Limits of Corporate Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press, 1963); Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism: 1885–1914, 2d ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877–1920
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1966).
9. William H. Sewell, Jr., “A Strange Career: The Historical Study of Economic Life,” History
and Theory 49 (December 2010): 146–66; Robert Whaples, “Is Economic History a
Neglected Field of Study?” Historically Speaking 11 (April 2010): 17–20.
10. Alfred Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1977); Richard John, “Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents:
Alfred J. Chandler, Jr.’s, ‘The Visible Hand’ After Twenty Years,” Business History Review 71
(Summer 1997): 169. John’s essay provides a thorough discussion of Chandler’s historio-
graphical impact, treating him as a contributor to the idea of the organizational synthesis.
Also see Kenneth Lipartito, “The Future of Alfred Chandler,” Enterprise and Society 9 (3
September 2008).
11. Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865–
1925 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
12. Interchange, “The Practice of History,” Journal of American History 90 (September 2003):
576–611, especially 609–11.
13. Pamela Laird, Advertising Progress: American Business and the Rise of Consumer Marketing
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Roland Marchand, Creating the Corpo-
rate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1998).
14. For example, see Kathy Peiss, Hope in a Jar: The Making of America’s Beauty Culture (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998); Vicki Howard, Brides, Inc.: American
Weddings and the Business of Tradition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1996); Angel Kwolek-Folland, Incorporating Women: A History of Women in Business in the
United States (New York: Twayne, 1998); Mary Yeager, Women and Business, 3 vols., The
International Library of Critical Writings in Business History, Elgar Reference Collection
(Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 1999).
15. Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCA’s 70-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1999); Tami Friedman, “Exploiting the North–South Differential: Cor-
porate Power, Southern Politics and the Decline of Organized Labor,” Journal of American
History 92 (September 2008): 323–248; Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States
Traded Factories for Finance (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010).
16. Marie Gottschalk, The Shadow Welfare State: Labor, Business and the Politics of Health Care
in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000); Jennifer Klein, For All
These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America’s Public-Private Welfare State (Princ-
eton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).
17. For example, see Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian
Free Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Julia Ott, When Wall
Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an Investors’ Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2011); Kenneth Lipartido and David Sicilia, Constructing Corporate
America: History, Politics, Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Introduc tion 15
18. Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in
the 1940s (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982); Robert Collins, The Business
Response to Keynes, 1929–1964 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Elizabeth
Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault against Labor and Liberalism, 1945–
1960 (Urbana and Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Sanford Jacoby, Modern
Manors: Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997); Robert Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New
York: Oxford, 2000); Wendy Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus
from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007);
Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New
Deal to Reagan (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).
19. Sven Beckert, The Moneyed Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American
Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James Livings-
ton, Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class and Corporate Capitalism, 1890–
1913 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); Olivier Zunz, Making America
Corporate, 1870–1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Steve Fraser and
Gary Gerstle, Ruling America: A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005).
20. Gerard Berk, Alternative Tracks: The Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865–1917
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Richard John, Network Nation: Invent-
ing American Telecommunications (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2010); Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern
America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
21. David Suisman, Selling Sounds: The Commercial Revolution in American Music (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009).
22. Sven Beckert, “History of American Capitalism,” in American History Now, ed. Eric Foner
and Lisa McGirr (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 319. There have also re-
cently been two notable roundtables on the development of the history of capitalism as a
subfield, one at the 2010 meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Washing-
ton, D.C., and the other at the 2011 New School University conference on “Power and the
History of Capitalism,” as well as a 2011 conference at Harvard University on “The New
History of American Capitalism.”
23. For a discussion of the revival of political history, see Julian Zelizer, Governing America:
The Revival of Political History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); also see
Meg Jacobs, William Novak, and Julian Zelizer, The Democratic Experiment (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003).
| 1 |
As the year 1942 came to a close, Americans could sense that they were witness-
ing the opening of a new chapter in history. Recent Allied successes on the bat-
tlefield were matched by the increasingly impressive munitions production feats
of the U.S. economy, which were turning the country’s armed forces into a fear-
somely destructive world power. This giant leap in American military capacity,
which would continue to shape world events in the years to come, did not come
cheap. The country’s World War II bills would amount to $320 billion, about
half of which the country borrowed by selling bonds to the public. But most of
the rest of the huge war costs, about 43%, were covered by taxes. This was an
impressive fraction, especially in comparison to past and future wars. To achieve
this feat, the United States deployed impressive fiscal innovations. The most
important of these, and the best remembered, was the mass income tax on indi-
viduals. This system was instituted by the Revenue Act of 1942, enacted ten
months after Pearl Harbor, when the country had already spent tens of billions
of dollars to support its global war effort. Before the war was over, the number of
Americans paying individual federal income taxes had jumped from four million
to over forty million people. There was nothing inevitable about this innovation,
which the Roosevelt administration pushed in favor of alternative methods,
such as a national sales tax. But it quickly became the centerpiece of the national
government’s revenue system, which it has remained to this day.1
No less important than the individual income taxes in the financing of World
War II, if somewhat less revolutionary, were robust corporate income taxes. A key
component of the new tax regime created during the Progressive Era,2 corporate
16
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
— Herra, minä olen se mies, sanoi lihava päällikkö liehakoiden.
— Jos joku mies sanoo niin, niin hän valehtelee, sanoi päällikkö,
— sillä ei yksikään hallituksen mies ole nähnyt sellaista.
Pian hän kuuli jälleen sen äänen, joka oli hänet herättänyt. Se oli
kehrääjälinnun hiljainen viserrys.
Hän tuli joen mutkaan juuri kun aurinko oli laskemassa puiden taa
länteen, ja lähetysaseman edessä oleva valkea ranta tuli selvästi
näkyviin.
Abibulla oli kunnianimi hadzi, sillä hän oli käynyt Mekassa ja tunsi
Koraanin paremmin kuin useimmat kristityt tuntevat Raamatun.
Hän kulki nukkuvien yli, kunnes tuli sille puolen kantta, jossa
hausa istui vahtimassa vankeja karbiini ladattuna.
— Herra, kuinka tulee sade tai tuuli? sanoi hän. Tehtiin jokin paha
työ, tanssittiin, syötiin eräs mies; sitten me kaikki maalasimme
itsemme ja tytöt sanoivat: 'Tappakaa!'
Toinen nyökkäsi.
— Tämä vanha mies näki näyn, ja tässä näyssä, jonka hän näki
suuressa tuskassa ja kivussa, voivottaen ja kuumin silmin, hän näki
valkeita miehiä tapettavan ja heidän talojaan poltettavan.
Tämän pohjalla oli totuus, hän ei sitä epäillyt. Jossakin oli kapina,
josta hän ei ollut kuullut. Hyvin nopeasti hän muistutteli kaikki oman
alueensa ja sitä ympäröivien maiden kuninkaat.
— Pam!
— Pam!
Mahdotonta oli nähdä, mihin luoti osui; saattoi kuulla vain sen
vihellyksen ja kaiun, kun se kiiti tietään pensaikon läpi.
Hetken hiljaisuus.
— Ha-ha-ha-ha-ha-ha!
Ampuja oli huolellinen mies, hän ampui sarjoittain, haluten nähdä
laukaustensa tehoisuuden.
— Herra, sanoi hän tyynesti, kun hänet oli tuotu Sandersin eteen,
— tämä on paha palaver. Mitä teet minulle?
Kului pitkä aika, ennen kuin mies puhui, sillä hän oli hyvin vanha ja
hyvin säikähtynyt, ja kuolemanpelko, joka on muutamien vanhusten
peikko, oli hänen yllään.
Sanders odotti.
— Minä näin nämä asiat. Miten voin sanoa, etten nähnyt mitään.
*****
Kuusi päivää myöhemmin Sanders meni takaisin päämajaan
jättäen jälkeensä kauhistuneita ihmisiä.
Kapteeni nyökkäsi.
— Mikä on hätänä? kysyi hän.
Hausaupseeri vihelsi.
Sanders pysähtyi.
*****