www.rsis.edu.sg No.

184 – 14 December 2023

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Advances in Biotechnology:
The Need to Strengthen Biosecurity
By Julius Cesar Trajano, Jeselyn, and Mely Caballero-Anthony

SYNOPSIS

Innovations in biotechnology are expected to have significant implications, both in

terms of benefits and risks, for sustainable development and international security.
However, these advances have rapidly outpaced national governments’ ability to
enhance biosecurity norms and technical approaches to prevent accidents or
deliberate misuse of biological material.

COMMENTARY

Modern biotechnology is one of the critical technological advancements today, along

with others like artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Innovations in these
fields are expected to have significant implications, both in terms of benefits and risks,
for sustainable development and international security.

Advances in life sciences and biotechnology are taking place at an unprecedented

rate, contributing vitally in addressing major challenges such as disease eradication.
However, these innovations are advancing and proliferating at a rate faster than the
ability of companies and governments to shape the institutions and norms needed to
regulate their use and to provide protection from the misuse of, for example, biological
materials and pathogens.

The publication, Our Common Agenda: A New Agenda for Peace, issued recently by
the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, cited the insufficiency of
biosecurity governance frameworks to prevent new and emerging technologies from
being weaponised. It warned that advances in the life sciences have potentially
granted individuals the capability to go beyond the direct hostile use of biology,
including the development of biological weapons, possibly using sophisticated and
dangerous pathogens.
Southeast Asian countries recognise the benefits of the rapidly developing
biotechnology sector. But they are also concerned that emerging innovations in
biotechnology have also increased the risk that non-state actors could develop
biological weapons. It is therefore more important than ever to strengthen the
biosecurity regime by keeping track of the opportunities and risks posed by these
advances.

As defined in the 2020 Biosafety Programme Management by the World Health

Organization (WHO),the biosecurity regime is a set of “principles, technologies and
practices that are implemented for the protection, control and accountability of
biological materials and/or the equipment skills and data related to their handling”. Its
main goal is to prevent any unauthorised access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or
release of biological materials, including dangerous pathogens.

Peaceful Uses and Biosecurity Risks

Advancements in technology are being utilised to bring about a future that is more
resilient to diseases, food insecurity, and environmental instability. However, these
advancements and their relationship with physical security are creating opportunities
for the development of cheaper biological weapons using dangerous pathogens,
which nefarious groups could more easily lay their hands on.

A threat assessment report by the US intelligence community highlights the risks

posed by rapid advances in dual-use biotechnology, including bioinformatics, synthetic
biology, nanotechnology, and genomic editing. These developments are vulnerable to
exploitation by malicious actors, making it necessary to have timely prevention,
detection, attribution, and response systems in place.

In the past, the weaponisation of biological materials and technology revolved

primarily around military and defence concerns. The landscape has since shifted.
Innovations in biotechnology are no longer limited to military use, but now offer a wide
range of solutions to critical problems such as the eradication of most common
diseases, improving food security, and addressing environmental challenges.

Closely associated with the new domain of biotechnological development are gain-of-
function (GoF) research and dual-use research of concern (DURC), which also
perfectly encapsulate both the risks and opportunities of biotechnological
advancement. GoF research involves altering a biological pathway within a pathogen
or an organism with the aim of improving its transmissibility or virulence. On one hand,
it can lead to breakthroughs in understanding diseases, aiding in vaccine development
and improving public health preparedness. On the other hand, the same research can
be harnessed for harmful purposes such as in the making of potent bioweapons.

This dual-use nature underscores the importance of responsible oversight. DURC not
only encompasses the potential misuse of scientific knowledge to create hazardous
pathogens, but also the inadvertent release of these pathogens into the environment.
As biosafety laboratories for peaceful research increase globally, accidental or
deliberate leaks from them can have far-reaching consequences.
The advancement of synthetic biology further amplifies the complexity of GoF
research and its dual-use concern. As an interdisciplinary field, synthetic biology
encompasses the creation, modification and reproduction of biological systems and
organisms, often from scratch. The fabrication of the world’s first synthetic yeast,
production of renewable sources of electricity, and the development of anticancer
drugs, have been attributed to this. Although synthetic biology is intended to be
harmless, its ability to generate new life forms and organisms has ushered in new
biosecurity concerns.

Today, advanced genetic engineering technologies such as CRISPR has radically

reduced the cost and complexity of gene editing to the point where even amateurs can
modify the genes of viruses. CRISPR is being explored as a possible technique to
eliminate disease-carrying mosquito populations. But with the sliding cost and
increasing accessibility of biotechnology, rogue actors could misuse life science
research to produce lethal biological agents easily, and be a grave threat to
international peace and security.

These evolving biosecurity risks, which arise from the growing developments in
biotechnology, and their potential misuse by malicious actors, compel stronger
biosecurity measures.

The Need to Enhance Biosecurity Measures

Global institutions have established important frameworks such as the Cartagena

Protocol on Biosafety, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540), to help mitigate the
potential risks.

While these international regimes form a solid foundation in the disarmament and
non-proliferation of biological weapons, their provisions (particularly that of the BWC),
were drafted decades ago when dual-use innovations in biotechnology were not yet a
significant concern. Furthermore, recent advances in biotechnology have rapidly
outpaced national governments in their ability to strengthen the biosecurity norms and
technical approaches needed to prevent accidents or the deliberate misuse of
biological material.

The existing global conventions are insufficient to provide comprehensive biosecurity

governance covering new technologies. State and non-state stakeholders, including
the scientific community, can turn to the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of
Conduct for Scientists (2021) and the WHO Global guidance framework for the
responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use
research (2022) for the governance of biorisks and dual-use research.

The Tianjin guidelines delve into a wide array of biosecurity concerns, including
guidance on responsible conduct for scientists, laboratory safety, security measures
for handling biological materials, and considerations for preventing accidental or
deliberate misuse of life sciences research.

Similarly, the WHO global guidance framework prioritises ethical factors, risk
assessments, and management strategies to strike a balance between the potential
benefits from scientific advancements and the risks to biosecurity and biosafety. This
emphasis on ethical considerations, risk evaluations, and management approaches is
notably absent in existing international conventions.

Biosecurity in Southeast Asia

Given the need to boost biosecurity measures and the implementation of international
regimes, especially the BWC and recently issued biosecurity guidelines, several
countries in Southeast Asia have begun revising their biosecurity legal frameworks in
light of rapid advances in biotechnology.

In October 2023, biosecurity experts from ASEAN Member States convened for a
regional workshop to deepen the understanding of the BWC, to share good practices
on its national implementation, and information about capacity-building opportunities
available to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity.

A strategic multilateral biosecurity dialogue between Southeast Asian countries and

the United States have been conducted annually since 2014 to encourage informal
Track II discussions among experts and officials on biosecurity risks in the region.

The lack of awareness and disparities in resources among member states pose
significant hurdles in crafting timely biosecurity standards. There is a need for
awareness-raising regarding risks associated with dual-use research among
researchers, the scientific community, government officials, the private sector, and the
general public.

The establishment of a permanent regional biosecurity and biosafety association,

comprising experts from ASEAN Member States, can provide invaluable guidance and
raise awareness. This association would serve as a dynamic platform for information
exchange and policy advocacy. Collaborative research projects, with an emphasis on
emerging threats, can fortify the region’s scientific capabilities. Moreover,
technological advancements should be leveraged to augment surveillance and
response mechanisms. This approach not only bolsters regional security but also
stimulates innovations in biotechnology for peaceful uses.

Julius Cesar Trajano and Jeselyn are Research Fellow and Research Analyst,
respectively, at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore. Mely Caballero-Anthony is Professor of International Relations and
Associate Dean (International Engagement) at RSIS and Head of the NTS Centre.
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore
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