Advances in Biotechnology-1
Advances in Biotechnology-1
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Advances in Biotechnology:
The Need to Strengthen Biosecurity
By Julius Cesar Trajano, Jeselyn, and Mely Caballero-Anthony
SYNOPSIS
COMMENTARY
The publication, Our Common Agenda: A New Agenda for Peace, issued recently by
the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, cited the insufficiency of
biosecurity governance frameworks to prevent new and emerging technologies from
being weaponised. It warned that advances in the life sciences have potentially
granted individuals the capability to go beyond the direct hostile use of biology,
including the development of biological weapons, possibly using sophisticated and
dangerous pathogens.
Southeast Asian countries recognise the benefits of the rapidly developing
biotechnology sector. But they are also concerned that emerging innovations in
biotechnology have also increased the risk that non-state actors could develop
biological weapons. It is therefore more important than ever to strengthen the
biosecurity regime by keeping track of the opportunities and risks posed by these
advances.
Advancements in technology are being utilised to bring about a future that is more
resilient to diseases, food insecurity, and environmental instability. However, these
advancements and their relationship with physical security are creating opportunities
for the development of cheaper biological weapons using dangerous pathogens,
which nefarious groups could more easily lay their hands on.
Closely associated with the new domain of biotechnological development are gain-of-
function (GoF) research and dual-use research of concern (DURC), which also
perfectly encapsulate both the risks and opportunities of biotechnological
advancement. GoF research involves altering a biological pathway within a pathogen
or an organism with the aim of improving its transmissibility or virulence. On one hand,
it can lead to breakthroughs in understanding diseases, aiding in vaccine development
and improving public health preparedness. On the other hand, the same research can
be harnessed for harmful purposes such as in the making of potent bioweapons.
This dual-use nature underscores the importance of responsible oversight. DURC not
only encompasses the potential misuse of scientific knowledge to create hazardous
pathogens, but also the inadvertent release of these pathogens into the environment.
As biosafety laboratories for peaceful research increase globally, accidental or
deliberate leaks from them can have far-reaching consequences.
The advancement of synthetic biology further amplifies the complexity of GoF
research and its dual-use concern. As an interdisciplinary field, synthetic biology
encompasses the creation, modification and reproduction of biological systems and
organisms, often from scratch. The fabrication of the world’s first synthetic yeast,
production of renewable sources of electricity, and the development of anticancer
drugs, have been attributed to this. Although synthetic biology is intended to be
harmless, its ability to generate new life forms and organisms has ushered in new
biosecurity concerns.
These evolving biosecurity risks, which arise from the growing developments in
biotechnology, and their potential misuse by malicious actors, compel stronger
biosecurity measures.
While these international regimes form a solid foundation in the disarmament and
non-proliferation of biological weapons, their provisions (particularly that of the BWC),
were drafted decades ago when dual-use innovations in biotechnology were not yet a
significant concern. Furthermore, recent advances in biotechnology have rapidly
outpaced national governments in their ability to strengthen the biosecurity norms and
technical approaches needed to prevent accidents or the deliberate misuse of
biological material.
The Tianjin guidelines delve into a wide array of biosecurity concerns, including
guidance on responsible conduct for scientists, laboratory safety, security measures
for handling biological materials, and considerations for preventing accidental or
deliberate misuse of life sciences research.
Similarly, the WHO global guidance framework prioritises ethical factors, risk
assessments, and management strategies to strike a balance between the potential
benefits from scientific advancements and the risks to biosecurity and biosafety. This
emphasis on ethical considerations, risk evaluations, and management approaches is
notably absent in existing international conventions.
Given the need to boost biosecurity measures and the implementation of international
regimes, especially the BWC and recently issued biosecurity guidelines, several
countries in Southeast Asia have begun revising their biosecurity legal frameworks in
light of rapid advances in biotechnology.
In October 2023, biosecurity experts from ASEAN Member States convened for a
regional workshop to deepen the understanding of the BWC, to share good practices
on its national implementation, and information about capacity-building opportunities
available to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity.
The lack of awareness and disparities in resources among member states pose
significant hurdles in crafting timely biosecurity standards. There is a need for
awareness-raising regarding risks associated with dual-use research among
researchers, the scientific community, government officials, the private sector, and the
general public.
Julius Cesar Trajano and Jeselyn are Research Fellow and Research Analyst,
respectively, at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore. Mely Caballero-Anthony is Professor of International Relations and
Associate Dean (International Engagement) at RSIS and Head of the NTS Centre.
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore
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