AFP Intelligence Community's Strategic Risk Management Process in Response To External Aggression

IOER INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH JOURNAL, SPECIAL ISSUE, MARCH 2024
AFP INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT

PROCESS IN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION
RODEN R. ORBON
[email protected]
Philippine Christian University
Manila, Philippines
DOI: https://doi.org/10.54476/ioer-imrj/060599
ABSTRACT
In the ever-changing global security landscape, characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and
ambiguity (VUCA), this study serves as a capstone project to provide valuable insights to the AFP
Intelligence Community (AFPIC). Its primary focus is to effectively tackle the exceptional non-military
security threats a foreign adversary poses. China's rapid and significant ascent as an Asian hegemon and
a global superpower has driven its pursuit of resources and influence worldwide. These hegemonic actions
have elicited resentment from smaller and weaker nations adversely affected by them and drawn the ire
of the United States and its allies. The Philippines, strategically located in the South China Sea and the
Pacific region, has become a prime target of China's unconventional warfare strategy, where they seek to
subdue their adversaries without resorting to kinetic force. China's United Front Works (UFW) strategy is
a crucial element of its hybrid warfare approach, providing a platform for intelligence, influence, and
interference operations designed to systematically undermine its enemies. This study aims to describe the
current state of the AFPIC's risk management capabilities in terms of doctrines, organization, and training
concerning the security threats posed by China's UFW. It also seeks to identify the challenges in these
areas and propose appropriate solutions to address them. Overall, the objective of this study is to
contribute to the long-term endeavor of enhancing the AFPIC's doctrines, organization, and training to
address the threats posed by China's UFW and other hybrid security threats effectively. The qualitative
data gathered through document analysis, key informant interviews, and focused group discussions
involving multiple participants from various units and offices within the AFPIC and the AFP Triad, as well
as education and doctrine development circles, underwent an iterative and hybrid process of thematic and
content analysis. Tools such as SWOT, TOWS, and the causal-impact analytical tool were utilized during
this analytical process. The results of this analysis provided valuable insights into the current state of
AFPIC's risk management capability in terms of doctrine, organization, and training, highlighting both the
advantages and disadvantages within these areas. Further exploration revealed the primary challenges
present in these three domains, which encompassed internal and external dynamics that hindered the
optimal implementation of related initiatives. Subsequently, numerous recommendations were formulated
to enhance the AFPIC's doctrine, organization, and training capabilities in response to the exceptional
security threats posed by China's united front works. Central to the research findings were three crucial
factors that influenced the success or failure of the doctrinal, organizational, and training endeavors: the
support of advocates and champions, the role of knowledge management, and the significance of engaging
foreign stakeholders.
Keywords: China’s United Front Works; influence and interference operations; intelligence operations; AFP
Intelligence Community; hybrid security threats
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Proceeding of the International Conference on Engineering, Business, and Technology (ICEBT), 09 – 10 January 2024, Courtyard by Marriott
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ORBON, R.R., AFP Intelligence Community’s Strategic Risk Management Process in Response to External Aggression,
pp. 60 - 75
60
INTRODUCTION economics aimed at shaping the external
environment in a manner that aligns with its
The Philippines faces a complex security interests (US Department of Defense, 2018), the
environment characterized by various AFP Intelligence Community (AFPIC) assumes a
requirements, interests, and incentives that need to critical role. It is entrusted with the task of
be effectively balanced and managed to achieve understanding and countering the existing and
national objectives. The safety, security, and emerging security threats faced by the nation as it
resilience of the country are threatened by a range confronts this evolving national security challenge.
of hazards, including terrorism, cyber threats, Consequently, addressing China's United Front
pandemics, accidents, transnational crime, Works, which serves as a platform for their
external aggression, insurgencies, and natural intelligence gathering, interference operations, and
disasters. Alongside these external risks, the exertion of influence, becomes a key priority for the
Philippines’ security organizations must also AFPIC.
address internal risks related to workforce Instrumental in addressing such threats calls for
management, acquisition operations, and project astute conduct of risk management by the AFPIC.
costs. ISO 31000 defines the risk management process
The United Front Works Department of the as the methodical implementation of management
Communist Party of China (CPC) has a rich history policies, procedures, and practices to effectively
that dates back to the Party's inception. This handle risks through activities such as
department is tasked with covert action and communication, consultation, context
clandestine collection responsibilities (Eftimiades, establishment, risk identification, analysis,
2017). Its acknowledged role involves evaluation, treatment, monitoring, and review
implementing China's foreign policy through (International Organization for Standardization,
interactions with non-governmental organizations 2018).
(non-communist) (Barnett, 2019). In this capacity,
it engages in covert action by seeking to influence OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
organizations in foreign countries to further
Chinese foreign policy objectives.
ISO 31000 is an international standard for risk Specifically, the study aimed to accomplish the
management. Published by the International following objectives:
Organization for Standardization (ISO) (2018), it
provides principles, guidelines, and a framework
for managing risk effectively in organizations of all 1. To describe the status of the AFPIC’s
types and sizes. It guides on identifying, assessing, Strategic Risk Management (SRM) process
treating, monitoring, and communicating risks in terms of doctrines, organization, and
consistently and transparently. training in addressing the security risks
Given its responsibility as the guardian of the posed by PRC's United Front Works.
country's territorial integrity, the Armed Forces of
2. To determine the challenges in the AFPIC's
the Philippines (AFP) finds itself in a situation that SRM doctrine, organization, and training
calls for a well-defined strategy to effectively capabilities in addressing the security risks
address the risks presented by China's United posed by PRC's UFW in the Philippines,
Front Works while simultaneously maintaining including the vulnerabilities of the
positive relations with the Chinese Government. In
Philippines vis-a-vis hybrid security threats.
the context of China's comprehensive and long-
term approach, which encompasses military 3. To recommend policies and a set of actions
transformation, influence and interference to address the said challenges.
operations, psychological warfare, and predatory
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61
METHODOLOGY studying qualitative data that comprises
examining a data set for repeating patterns,
Research Design. The purpose of this understanding them, and reporting them (Clark &
study is to determine the approaches in terms of Braun, 2013).
doctrine, organization, and training that the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) should adopt to
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
enhance its Strategic Risk Management posture to
counter the security risks posed by China's United
Front Works (UFW). Thus, the researcher will use The purpose of this research was to
qualitative research through a Descriptive- determine the approaches that the Armed Forces
Evaluative Research Design Method. of the Philippines Intelligence Community (AFPIC)
Locale of the Study. The general locale of should adopt in the development of its strategic risk
the study is the National Capital Region, management capability in terms of doctrine,
particularly Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo in organization, and training to effectively respond to
Quezon City and Headquarters, Philippine Army in the security risks posed by China's United Front
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. Works (UFW). The research also analyzed the
Participants/respondents from the Office of the specific objectives separately; firstly, to identify the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2), the current capability or status of the AFP Intelligence
Special Intelligence Training School, various Community’s strategic risk management in
counterintelligence and strategic intelligence units, addressing the security risks posed by China's
the AFP Education, Training, and Doctrine UFW in terms of doctrine, organization, and
Command, and Headquarters of the Intelligence training; secondly, to determine the gaps in the
Service Armed Forces of the Philippines are aforesaid capabilities; and lastly, to recommend
situated at Camp Aguinaldo. actions to address the said challenges. To add
depth and rigor to the data that were gathered from
Sampling Design. The researcher selected documents, key informant interviews, and focus
the purposive sampling approach for the key group discussions, analytical tools such as the S-
informed interviews and focused group discussions W-O-T, and causal-impact analysis tools were
on identifying subject matter experts (SME) who used within the content and thematic analysis
are knowledgeable within their respective process.
professions.
Data Collection Procedures. Following the 1. The status of the AFP Intelligence
Descriptive Research Design, the researcher Community’s (AFPIC) doctrinal,
performed the following research-gathering
organizational, and training capabilities in
activities: Before the interview, formal letters were
sent to the identified KIIs. The researcher shall ask relation to strategic risk management in
them their preferred mode of interviews, either via addressing the security risks posed by
Zoom teleconferencing or by filling out Google China’s United Front Works
Forms.
Data Analysis. After conducting the 1.1. Doctrines
interviews and focus group discussions, the
researcher transcribed the responses using the
Quirkos analytical tool, through which the Using the thematic analysis process
researcher determined the emerging codes and prescribed by Clark & Braun (2013), the data
themes using the standard thematic analysis from the key informant interviews and the
procedure. Thematic analysis is a method for focused group discussion yielded meta-
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62
categories or themes that provide a description d. Applicable to the threats being
of what an optimal doctrine must be vis-a-vie confronted – the doctrine, despite being written
security threats posed by UFW and other broadly, must properly articulate the guidelines
special threats with related attributes. Figure 1 on addressing specific security threats.
illustrates the emerging themes from KII and
e. Leverages best practices and lessons
FGD.
learned – doctrines must be the product of
Based on the analytical illustration, the continuous learning and realization in the conduct
optimal state of doctrines vis-a-vie confronting of operations.
extraordinary security threats such as China’s
f. Undergoes wide consultation – doctrines
United Front Works (UFW) is based on seven
must undergo the standard development
(7) attributes:
processes mandated by the AFP doctrine
a. Broadly written and with focus – as with development units. Together with adhering to the
other doctrines, UFW-related doctrines must be standard development processes, doctrines must
broadly written to allow for operational undergo extensive and careful consultations with
adjustment and flexibility. relevant stakeholders, both internal and external.
b. Exemplifies jointness – doctrines must g. Supported by the top leadership and
allow for inter-Services collaboration and advocates – doctrine development about special
integration by using terminologies and and emerging security threats, such as China’s
concepts that are understandable by all United Front Works (UFW) must be supported by
operating units, and consistent with the the top leadership of the defense and military
principles and concepts of the joint and establishments.
combined operational methodologies.
Based on the emerged themes describing the

optimal status of doctrine vis-a-vie dealing with
China’s united front works, and upon the
consolidation and processing of insights from the
participants of the focused group discussions
(FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use
of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state
of doctrine is succinctly described as follows:
a) Too broad. Focus must be articulated.
There is a need to articulate the security threats
being addressed. Currently, the content of doctrinal
references related to Chinese security threats
Figure 1 – Emerging Themes on Doctrine focuses on the workings and intentions of foreign
intelligence and propaganda operatives.
b) Exemplifies jointness. Currently, the
c. Must be progressive – doctrines must lend doctrinal references related to hybrid security
themselves to continuous development to ensure threats offer great room for inter-operability and
that they address the security threats that are jointness among and between AFP units across the
also constantly emerging amid the volatile, Major Services (Army, Air Force, and Navy).
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic
environments that cover both the local and c) Lacks progress. There were stalled efforts
international stages. to develop doctrinal references about hybrid

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63
security threats, including threats posed by China’s Front Works (UFW) is based on seven (7)
united front works. Most of these reference attributes:
materials being developed are being reduced into
reference materials exclusive to particular
intelligence units.
d) Starting to consolidate lessons learned and
best practices. Currently, the AFPIC is embarking
on a strategic effort to consolidate the lessons
learned and best practices in addressing hybrid
security threats.
e) Limited consultation. Some consultations
transpired between certain units and offices, but
due to uncertainty and compartmentalization, the
optimal benefits that these units are supposed to
gain from such consultation are not being
achieved, contributing to the lack of concerted and Figure 2 – Emerging Themes on Organization
united efforts in addressing the aforesaid threats.
Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal
f) Less support from the top. Currently, it is state of the organization vis-a-vie confronting
lamentable that doctrine development pertaining to special security threats such as China’s United
addressing hybrid security threats does not enjoy Front Works (UFW) is based on seven (7)
significant support from the top. attributes:
a. Allocates tasks – the organization must
With the aforesaid description based on allocate specific tasks or intelligence coverage for
integrated analysis, it can be concluded that at every intelligence office and operating unit.
present, in terms of organization, the AFPIC is Allocating intelligence tasks ensures
partially capable of addressing the security risks comprehensive coverage of the security threats
posed by China’s united front works, and other being addressed, and avoids unnecessary
security challenges connected to the Asian overlaps.
hegemon. b. Exemplifies unity of efforts – an
organizational structure dealing with all security
threats should integrate all efforts across various
2. Organization
levels and domains.
c. Based on experiences, acquired
Using the thematic analysis process prescribed knowledge, and best practices. The organization
by Clark & Braun (2013), the data from the key must leverage the available information,
informant interviews and the focused group knowledge, lessons learned, and best practices
discussion yielded meta-categories or themes that from years of dealing with such special security
describe what an optimal organization must be vis- challenges.
a-vie security threats posed by UFW and other
d. Aspires to achieve a common
special threats with related attributes. Figure 2
understanding – an organization must integrate,
illustrates the emerging themes from KII and FGD.
share, and make sense of all intelligence insights
Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal pertaining to security threats. This is to ensure that
state of the organization vis-a-vie confronting operating units possess a standard, updated, and
special security threats such as China’s United
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64
common operational understanding of the threats accumulation of significant experiences and
they are dealing with. insights in the conduct of counterintelligence
operations against security threats posed by China,
e. Leverages specialties and competencies –
these invaluable findings are not properly and
the organization must be able to make the most out
widely disseminated even across the APFIC.
of the specialties and competencies developed by
its people in dealing with unique security concerns. d. Moving towards achieving a common and
shared operational picture and threats
f. Fosters stakeholders collaboration – the
appreciation. The current thrust of the AFP doctrine
organization must aspire to constantly engage and
development initiative is developing doctrinal
collaborate with its internal and external
materials that foster inter-operability or jointness
stakeholders in order to achieve optimum
among and between the different units of the AFP
operational results through multi-agency
and across the Major Services.
operations.
e. Currently leverages available expertise.
g. Supported by the top leadership and
Despite limited dissemination of lessons learned
advocates - any organization, despite possessing
and best practices, there are units within the AFPIC
excellent competencies and institutional
that leverage their capabilities and expertise in
knowledge, will never progress without the
dealing with special kinds of security threats, such
essential support from the top leadership.
as China's united front works, as well as China's
intelligence and propaganda operations.
Based on the emerged themes describing the f. Hindered by a lack of focus, lack of
optimal status of the organization vis-a-vie dealing command guidance, and direction. This implies the
with China’s united front works, and upon the lack of concrete guidance from the top on what to
consolidation and processing of insights from the prioritize or what aspects to prioritize and if there
participants of the focused group discussions are any prioritization of efforts.
(FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use
g. Lesser support compared to other
of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state
organizational initiatives - compared to support
of the organization is succinctly described as
being accorded by top leadership (political,
follows:
defense, and military) to intelligence and security
a. Tasks not properly allocated or assigned - operations related to communist insurgent groups
despite units that take the initiative to study and and terrorist organizations, efforts related to China,
confront the security threats posed by complex apart from its military activities in the West
entities connected to Chinese United Front works, Philippine Sea, receives lesser support and
there is no clear task allocation as to what unit will attention.
confront what aspects of the security threats.
With the aforesaid description based on
integrated analysis, it can be concluded that at
b. Lesser unity of efforts; starting to unify
present, in terms of organization, the AFPIC is
efforts - More often than not, units involved in
partially capable of addressing the security risks
dealing with special security threats, most
posed by China’s united front works and other
especially that of China, lack unity of efforts.
security challenges connected to the Asian
Despite this attribute, the OJ2 is now starting to
hegemon.
organize a unified action to confront the security
risks posed by China.
4. Training
c. Best practices and lessons learned are not
widely disseminated and discussed. Despite the

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65
Using the thematic analysis process prescribed programs that deal with security threats posed
by Clark & Braun (2013), the data from the key by China must be regularly reviewed by the
informant interviews and the focused group collaborative efforts of essential stakeholders.
discussion yielded meta-categories or themes that
d) Capitalized on best practices and lessons
describe what optimal training programs must be
learned. Training programs must be based on
vis-a-vie security threats posed by UFW and other
consolidated experiences of operating units from
special threats with related attributes. Figure 3
years of dealing with complex and hybrid security
illustrates the emerging themes from KII and FGD.
threats posed by China and other foreign and
transnational security threats.
e) Involved stakeholders in the development
and refinement process. Due to the special and
dynamic nature of the security risks posed by
China, collaborative efforts with local and
international stakeholders are essential in order to
acquire the most up-to-date insights pertaining to
the threat and acquire the best ways to deliver and
manage the training programs.
f) With support from the top. Training
development pertaining to special and emerging
security threats, such as China’s United Front
Works (UFW), must be supported by the top
leadership of the defense and military
establishments. Support must also be generated
from the political leadership and other government
Figure 3 – Emerging Themes on Training
entities, as well as private organizations.
Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal
state of training vis-a-vie confronting special
security threats such as China’s United Front Based on the emerged themes describing the
Works (UFW) is based on six (6) attributes: optimal status of training vis-a-vie dealing with
China’s united front works, and upon the
consolidation and processing of insights from the
a) Standard. Training programs must be participants of the focused group discussions
based on doctrines and must be uniform and (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use
consistent across the AFPIC. of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state
of the training is succinctly described as follows:
b) Widely consulted. Training programs
confronting special security threats such as China’s
united front works must be developed in cohorts a) No standard training. Several training
with relevant international and local stakeholders programs or specialized courses are still under
and across the major services and unified construction. Further, doctrinal basis or connection
commands in order to ensure the highest quality of is hardly reflected in these training initiatives.
content and delivery.
b) Not widely consulted. Limited discussions
c) Periodically reviewed and progressive. are going on within the AFPIC as regards
Mindful of the constantly emerging security nature institutionalizing specialized and standard training
of the threats amid the volatile, uncertain, complex, programs.
and ambiguous security environment, training
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66
c) Not periodically reviewed since no standard 3. The challenges in the AFPIC's doctrine,
training programs are in place. Several training organization, and training
programs pertaining to Chinese-related threats,
3.1. Doctrine
such as intelligence and propaganda operations,
united front works, and gray zone tactics are
The following analysis took off from the insights
narrowly discussed across the AFPIC.
generated from Figure 1, which presented the
d) Progress cannot be determined so far. But emerging themes related to doctrine development
efforts to develop training programs on ongoing. from the collective insights taken from FGD and KII.
The Special Intelligence Training School in Figure 4 is an influence diagram that showcases
collaboration with the Strategic Intelligence Force how the different factors that characterize the
of ISAFP, is developing a training program or current doctrine are influenced by several factors,
course intended to conduct intelligence operations such as political influences, the prospects of
overseas. incentives, and the ISO-centric mindsets of
doctrine developers and intelligence officers.
e) Limited dissemination and discussion of
best practices and lessons learned. Currently,
some units within the AFPIC have learned and
experienced significant lessons in dealing with
security threats related to China. However, due to
seemingly too much compartmentalization and the
lack of strategic direction, sharing these invaluable
insights is not thoroughly pursued, if at all.
f) Currently, the AFPIC is involving local and
foreign/international stakeholders in conducting
training and workshops pertaining to threats posed
by China. Academic institutions and think tanks,
both local and international, regularly provide Figure 4-Doctrine Influence Diagram
insights and launch training programs related to the
multi-dimensional nature of security threats posed 3.2. Organization
by China.
g) Limited support from the top. Currently, The following analysis took off from the insights
there is no explicit support from the top as to the generated from Figure 5, which presented the
development and pursuit of relevant threat-based emerging themes related to organizational
training. Even though there are initiatives such as initiatives and development from the collective
workshops and conferences pertaining to security insights taken from FGD and KII.’
development related to China, these events are
done on a case-to-case basis and not
progressively and regularly.
h) With the aforesaid description based on
integrated analysis, it can be concluded that, at
present, in terms of training, the AFPIC is partially
capable of addressing the security risks posed by
China’s united front works, and other security
challenges connected to the Asian hegemon.
Figure 5 – Organization Influence Diagram

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67
Figure 5 is an influence diagram that skills, and the ongoing debate whether to limit
showcases how the different factors that the AFP scope with the military domain of China,
characterize the current organization are setting aside non-military risks posed by China to
influenced by several factors, such as the lack of civilian government law enforcement and
champions or advocates to support the regulatory agencies for appropriate counteractions.
organization, the pre-occupation of intelligence Training managers give priority to preserving and
units to complying with the deadline for ending the propagating ISO lessons and best practices.
communist armed conflicts, and the continuous
emphasis accorded to and attractiveness of
internal security operations (ISO) which yield 4. Recommended policies and a set of
results that are easily recognizable and are easily actions to address the challenges
commended or praised, in contrast to efforts
related to hybrid security threats such as China’s 4.1. Doctrine
UFW, which are very subtle, and most of the time
barely even noticed by the top leadership. Information acquired from the key informant
interview and the focus group discussion agreed on
the four common aspects:
3.3. Training
a. The need for a Doctrine Summit pertaining
to hybrid security threats posed by foreign
The following analysis took off from the adversaries;
insights generated from Figure 6, which presented b. the need for sponsors and advocates at the
the emerging themes related to training initiatives highest levels of the organization to support the
and development from the collective insights taken doctrine development agenda;
from FGD and KII.
c. the need for a systematic risk assessment
process; and
d. the need to engage and leverage local and
international stakeholders to enhance and
advocate for the doctrine development efforts
pertaining to foreign security threats.
Research participants also highlighted the

need for proactive and effective risk management
efforts to address the security risks posed by a
foreign adversary such as China. Research
participants stressed the importance of engaging in
Figure 6 – Training Influence Diagram
collaborating with local and international
counterparts in developing the doctrine vis-a-vis
security threats posed by China's united front
Figure 6 is an influence diagram that showcases works and gray zone on strategies.
how the different factors that characterize the
current training related to China’s UFW are
4.2. Organization
influenced by several factors, such as the lack of
doctrine upon which training programs will be
based, the complexity of hybrid threats posed by The focused group discussion (FGD) yielded
China, the ease of teaching ISO-related tradecraft three recommendations from the participants to
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address the growing threat of China's United Front 4.3. Training
Works in the Philippines. In terms of organization,
participants discussed and agreed on the following KII provided insights on how to remediate the
course of action for the AFPIC: challenges currently faced by the AFPIC in terms
a. Create a dedicated unit that will be primarily of training vis-a-vis security threats posed by
responsible for addressing the threats posed by China’s UFW. Similarly, FGD provided insights on
China’s united front works and Chinese intelligence how to remediate the challenges faced by the
and influence operations; AFPIC in terms of training vis-a-vis security threats
posed by China’s UFW. Members of the focused
b. Involve Civil-Military Operations (CMO) group discussion discussed and agreed that
units in addressing Chinese security threats, lessons learned and best practices must be
especially in the development of appropriate properly documented, shared, and discussed in the
information and operations lines, as well as different military and intelligence training
engaging or interfacing with China-affiliated institutions.
organizations that are identified to be intelligence Information acquired from the key informant
collection and influence operations fronts or interview and the focus group discussion agreed on
platforms of China.; and the four common recommendations to enhance
c. Set a stable, predictable, and incentive- training vis-a-vie security threats posed by China’s
laden career path for civilian intelligence analysts UFW: dedicated office or center for China studies;
who are at the forefront of generating strategic the need for training supporters from the top
intelligence insights for decision-makers and leadership; the development of doctrinal materials
preserving institutional knowledge. as these will drive the training development
process; the need to engage and collaborate with
local and foreign stakeholders who are subject
Information acquired from the key informant matter experts in China-related security studies,
interview and the focus group discussion agreed on hybrid security threats, and international relations
the five common aspects essential to enhancing and geopolitics.
the AFPIC’s organizational capabilities against
China’s united front works and other hybrid security Research participants highlighted the need
threats posed by foreign adversaries and to continuously engage local and foreign
transnational threat groups, as follows: stakeholders who have expertise in hybrid and
complex security challenges, which include China’s
a. issue clearcut task allocation; develop united front works.
doctrinal references since these will drive
the organizational development process; CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, this study finds that the AFP
b. the need to refine or revise the evaluation Intelligence Community (AFPIC)'s doctrines,
criteria for success in dealing with complex organization, and training have some capability to
security threats; and perform strategic risk management to address the
security threats posed by China's United Front
Works (UFW). However, several challenges are
c. the need for supporters and advocates from hindering their effectiveness, including the priority
the strategic leaders; the continuous engagement given to ISO-related operations, the lack of strong
with foreign allies to learn from them on matters advocates and proponents at the strategic levels of
related to organizational structures and threat the government, the inward focus of the AFP's risk
knowledge and strategies. management process, and the complexities of

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69
dealing with non-military threats from formidable a. Political factors: Assessing political
foreign adversaries like China. factors involves examining government policies,
regulations, and geopolitical dynamics that may
Based on the thematic analysis of research
influence security risks.
data, three factors emerged as influential in the
AFPIC's capabilities: advocates and champions, b. Economic factors: Evaluating economic
knowledge management, and foreign stakeholder factors involves analyzing economic conditions,
engagement. trends, and potential financial impacts on security
risks. This includes factors such as economic
growth, inflation, exchange rates, and trade
RECOMMENDATIONS policies.
Proposed Strategic Risk Management c. Sociocultural factors: Examining
Framework for the AFP Intelligence Community sociocultural factors involves understanding social
and cultural influences that may impact security
risks. This includes factors such as demographics,
social attitudes, cultural norms, and public opinion.
d. Technological factors: Assessing
technological factors involves analyzing
advancements, innovations, and the impact of
technology on security risks.
e. Legal factors: Evaluating legal factors

involves considering laws, regulations, and legal
frameworks that may affect security risks. This
Figure 7 – The Proposed Strategic Risk Management includes analyzing relevant legislation, compliance
Framework for AFPIC requirements, and potential legal implications.
Figure 7 showcases the AFPIC Strategic Risk f. Environmental factors: Examining
Management Framework, which has been environmental factors involves assessing
developed based on the findings and efforts of this environmental conditions and sustainability issues
dissertation. The framework provides a that may impact security risks. This includes factors
comprehensive approach that takes into account such as climate change, natural disasters, and
both external factors (PESTELM) and internal resource availability.
attributes (McKinsey's 7-S) of the AFPIC. g. Military factor - The military and law
In strategic risk management against security enforcement agencies play a crucial role in
risks posed by external forces, the use of analytical ensuring the security and defense of a nation. They
frameworks such as PESTLE and McKinsey 7S are responsible for safeguarding the country
can provide valuable insights into both external and against external threats, such as terrorism, foreign
internal factors. aggression, and organized crime.
PESTLE Analysis: PESTLE (Political, The McKinsey 7S framework is a tool used to
Economic, Sociocultural, Technological, Legal, and analyze internal factors within an organization that
Environmental) analysis is a framework used to can influence its risk management capabilities. It
examine the external factors that can impact an examines seven interconnected elements:
organization's operations and risk landscape. Strategy: Within the Intelligence Community,
examining the organization's strategic goals and
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70
objectives is essential for aligning risk and investment partnerships to avoid
management efforts with overarching priorities. overdependence on a single country.
b. Structure: The organizational structure c. Enhanced cybersecurity: Strengthen
within the Intelligence Community influences the cybersecurity defenses and measures to avoid
flow of information, decision-making processes, cyber threats and reduce vulnerabilities that could
and coordination mechanisms related to risk be exploited by China.
management.
c. Systems: Robust systems and processes
2) Reducing
are vital for identifying, assessing, and responding
to security risks. This includes the development a. Military deterrence: Enhance military
and implementation of risk assessment capabilities and deterrence measures to reduce the
methodologies, information-sharing protocols, risk of aggression or territorial disputes escalating
early warning systems, and incident response into armed conflicts.
mechanisms. b. Counterintelligence measures: Implement
d. Skills: The knowledge, expertise, and robust counterintelligence measures to detect and
capabilities of personnel involved in risk mitigate China's influence operations, cyber
management are critical. espionage, and intelligence-gathering activities.
e. Staff: The proper allocation and utilization c. Building regional alliances: Strengthen
of human resources are essential for risk partnerships and alliances with neighboring
management within the Intelligence Community. countries and like-minded nations to collectively
address security concerns and counterbalance
f. Style: Leadership style, organizational
China's influence.
culture, and values greatly influence risk
management practices within the Intelligence
Community. 3) Accepting
g. Shared values: Assessing the shared a. Balancing economic interests: Assess the
beliefs, norms, and attitudes towards risk potential risks and benefits of economic
management within the organization. engagement with China and make informed
decisions on accepting certain risks in pursuit of
economic growth and cooperation.
When dealing with security risks posed by
China, various risk treatment measures can be b. Managing limited influence: Recognize the
applied using the framework of avoiding, reducing, limits of influence over China's domestic affairs and
accepting, and transferring risks. Here's how these accept the constraints in areas where the
measures can be applied by the AFPIC: Philippines may have limited leverage.
1) Avoiding 4) Transferring
a. Diplomatic engagements: Engage in a. International cooperation: Foster
diplomatic talks and negotiations to avoid potential cooperation with other countries, regional
conflicts and reduce tensions related to territorial organizations, and international institutions to
disputes or other security concerns. collectively address security risks posed by China
through information sharing, joint exercises, and
b. Diversifying dependencies: Reduce
collaborative initiatives.
reliance on China by diversifying economic, trade,

pp. 60 - 75
71
b. Engaging international arbitration: Seek https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-
recourse through international arbitration without-war-chinas-united-front-strategy/
mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes or Anon. (n.d). “AFP Wants Gov’t to Reconsider Chinese
other legal challenges. Development on 3 Strategic Luzon Islands.” Cnn.
https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/8/6/AFP
It is crucial to emphasize that risk treatment
-Chinese-development-Philippines-islands.html.
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https://news.abs-cbn.com/business/01/04/23/ph-
china-start-talks-on-narrowing-15-b-trade-deficit-
marcos.
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IOER INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH JOURNAL, SPECIAL ISSUE, MARCH 2024

AFP INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT

P – ISSN 2651 - 7701 | E – ISSN 2651 – 771X | www.ioer-imrj.com

Based on the emerged themes describing the

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Figure 5 – Organization Influence Diagram

Research participants also highlighted the

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e. Legal factors: Evaluating legal factors

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P – ISSN 2651 - 7701 | E – ISSN 2651 – 771X | www.ioer-imrj.com

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