CHAPTER TWO

APPROACHES TO ETHICS
1.1 Chapter Introduction
Before discussing about approaches to ethics, let’s briefly see what Ethics mean and its concern. As we
have been learnt in chapter one, Ethics is the study of what is good or bad, what is right or wrong, what is
acceptable and what is immoral or morally sound in human activities and deeds in the interactions of
humans. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that addresses questions about morality — that is, concepts such
as good and bad, right and wrong, justice virtue, etc. Major branches of ethics include normative ethics
and none normative ethics. Normative Ethics----traditionally, normative ethics (also known as moral
theory) was the study of what makes actions right and wrong.
Human beings ask questions about the nature of morality. In the process of prescriptive inquiry, we
employ moral theories to explain the nature of morality. All moral theories address the questions of what
is Good, why it’s Good, and where the Good is located? If there is anything “easy” about moral inquiry
it’s the fact that there are only three basic kinds of prescriptive moral theories: teleological theories,
deontological theories, and virtue-based theories. Unfortunately, they often (but not always) provide
different and mostly conflicting answers to these basic questions. This chapter aim to introduce you to
various ethical theories.

1.1. Chapter Objectives

After reading this chapter, students will be able to:
o Discuss ideas, feelings and questions about activities regarded as right or wrong, good or bad.
o Explain why there are particular rules about what is right or wrong, good or bad behavior for different
groups and situations.
o Analyze the ethical dimensions of various rules and codes of behavior.
o Examine the personal and community factors involved in defining beliefs about what is right or
wrong, good or bad behavior.
o Analyze how different contexts and situations influence personal values, attitudes, beliefs and
behaviors.
o Critically analyze how groups justify particular actions and behaviors.

1.3 Normative Ethics

We may now begin our review of problems and views in the area of normative ethics, starting with the
theory of obligation and then going on to the theory of moral value and, finally, to the theory of non-moral
value. The ultimate concern of the normative theory of obligation is to guide us in the making of decisions
and judgments about actions in particular situations. A main concern, of course, is to guide us in our
capacity as agents trying to decide what we should do in this case and in that. But we want to know more
than just what we should do in situations before us. We also wish to make judgments about what others

1
should do, especially if they ask us about what we or they should have done, about whether what we or
someone else did was right or wrong, and so on. We are not just agents in morality; we are also spectators,
advisers, instructors, judges, and critics. Still, in all of these capacities our primary question is this: how
may or should we decide or determine what is morally right for a certain agent (oneself or another,
possibly a group or a whole society) to do, or what he morally ought to do, in a certain situation?

Normative ethics;
o Offers theories or accounts of the best way to live. These theories evaluate actions in a systematic
way, i.e., they may focus on outcomes or duties or motivation as a means of justifying human
conduct.
o Includes ethical theories or approaches such as utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics,
principalism, narrative ethics and feminist ethics.
Normative ethics poses questions of the following kind:
✓ Are there general principles or rules that we could follow which distinguish between right and
wrong? Or:
✓ Are there virtues and/or relationships that we can nurture, in order to behave well?

1.1.1. Teleological Ethics (Consequentialist)

What is teleological/Consequentialist ethics?
It is referred as “the end justifies the means”. It believes in purpose, ends or goals of an action, it stress
that the consequences of an action determines the morality or immorality of a given action. Which means
an action is judged as right or wrong, moral or immoral depending on what happens because of it. One
may have the best intention or follow the highest moral principles but if the result, moral act is harmful, or
bad it must be judged as morally or ethically wrong act.

Having agreed on one ground or another that the standard of right and wrong cannot be simply the
prevailing set of moral rules, moral philosophers have offered us a variety of alternative standards. In
general their views have been of two sorts: (1) deontological theories and (2) teleological ones. A
teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate criterion or standard of what is morally right, wrong,
obligatory, etc., is the non-moral value that is brought into being. The final appeal, directly or indirectly,
must be to the comparative amount of good produced, or rather to the comparative balance of good over
evil produced. Thus, an act is right if and only if it or the rule under which it falls produces, will probably
produce, or is intended to produce at least as great a balance of good over evil as any available
alternative; an act is wrong if and only if it does not do so. An act ought to be done if and only if it or the
rule under which it falls produces, will probably produce, or is intended to produce a greater balance of
good over evil than any available alternative.

2
It is important to notice here that, for a teleologist, the moral quality or value of actions, persons, or traits
of character, is dependent on the comparative non-moral value of what they bring about or try to bring
about. For the moral quality or value of something to depend on the moral value of whatever it promotes
would be circular. Teleological theories, then, make the right, the obligatory, and the morally good
dependent on the non-morally good. Accordingly, they also make the theory of moral obligation and
moral value dependent, in a sense, on the theory of non-moral value. In order to know whether something
is right, ought to be done, or is morally good, one must first know what is good in the non-moral sense and
whether the thing in question promotes or is intended to promote what is good in this sense.

It should also be noticed, however, that teleologists may hold various views about what is good in the non-
moral sense. Teleologists have often been hedonists, identifying the good with pleasure and evil with pain,
and concluding that the right course or rule of action is that which produces at least as great a balance of
pleasure over pain as any alternative would. But they may be and have sometimes been non-hedonists,
identifying the good with power, knowledge, self-realization, perfection etc. This fact must not be
forgotten when we are evaluating the teleological theory of obligation. All that is necessary is that the
teleologist have some view about what is good or bad, and that he determine what is right or obligatory by
asking what is conducive to the greatest balance of good over evil.

Deontological theories deny what teleological theories affirm. They deny that the right, the obligatory, and
the morally good are wholly, whether directly or indirectly, a function of what is non-morally good or of
what promotes the greatest balance of good over evil for self, one's society, or the world as a whole. They
assert that there are other considerations that may make an action or rule right or obligatory besides the
goodness or badness of its consequences -- certain features of the act itself other than the value it brings
into existence, for example, the fact that it keeps a promise, is just, or is commanded by God or by the
state. Teleologists believe that there is one and only one basic or ultimate right-making characteristic,
namely, the comparative value (non-moral) of what is, probably will be, or is intended to be brought into
being. Deontologists either deny that this characteristic is right-making at all or they insist that there are
other basic or ultimate right-making characteristics as well. For them the principle of maximizing the
balance of good over evil, no matter for whom, is either not a moral criterion or standard at all, or, at least,
it is not the only basic or ultimate one.

To put the matter in yet another way: a deontologist contends that it is possible for an action or rule of
action to be the morally right or obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest possible balance of
good over evil for self, society, or universe. It may be right or obligatory simply because of some other
fact about it or because of its own nature. It follows that a deontologist may also adopt any kind of a view
about what is good or bad in the non-moral sense.

3
Teleologists differ on the question of whose good it is that one ought to try to promote. Ethical egoism
holds that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good -- that an act or rule of action is
right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over evil for him in the long run as any
alternative would, and wrong if it does not. This view was held by Epicurus, Hobbes, and Nietzsche,
among others. Ethical universalism, or what is usually called utilitarianism, takes the position that the
ultimate end is the greatest general good -- that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it is, or
probably is, conducive to at least as great a balance of good over evil in the universe as a whole as any
alternative would be, wrong if it is not, and obligatory if it is or probably is conducive to the greatest
possible balance of good over evil in the universe. The so-called utilitarians, for example, Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, have usually been hedonists in their view about what is good, asserting that
the moral end is the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. But some utilitarians are not hedonists, for
example, G. E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall, and so have been called "Ideal" utilitarians. That is,
utilitarianism is a certain kind of teleological theory of obligation and does not entail any particular theory
of value, although a utilitarian must accept some particular theory of value.

It would also be possible, of course, to adopt teleological theories intermediate between ethical egoism
and utilitarianism, for example, theories that say the right act or rule is one conducive to the greatest
balance of good over evil for a certain group -- one's nation, class, family, or race. A pure ethical altruist
might even contend that the right act or rule is the one that most promotes the good of other people. We
shall, however, limit our coming discussion to egoism and universalism.

1.1.2. Egoism: Ethical and psychological Egoism

1.1.2.1. Ethical Egoism
We usually assume that moral behavior, or being ethical, has to do with not being overly concerned with
oneself. In other words, selfishness is assumed to be unacceptable attitude. Even among scholars, there is
disagreement about what constitutes ethical behavior. Since very early in western intellectual history, the
view point that humans are not built to look out for other people’s interests has surfaced regularly. Some
scholars even hold that proper moral conduct consist of “looking out for number one,” period. These
viewpoints are known as psychological egoism and ethical egoism respectively.

We may focus on the consequences of our actions because we believe that those consequences justify our
actions (in other words, that the end justify the means), but this does not necessarily imply that the
consequences we hope for are good in the egoist sense that may maximize happiness for one self. We
might, for instance, not agree with the Italian states man Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) that; if the end
is to maintain political power for one self, ones king or ones political party, then this will justify any
means that one might use for that propose, such as force, surveillance, or even deceit. Although this
famous theory is indeed Consequentialist, it does not qualify as utilitarian, because it doesn’t have the
common good as its ultimate end.
4
Dear Students, would you give your view on the following case?
Some years ago, a Good Samaritan stopped to help a man whose car had broken down on the
freeway. The man shot and killed the Samaritan, stole his car, and proceeded to lead the police,
on a high-speed chase. Eventually he ran out of gas and began a shoot-out with the police, who
subsequently killed him. This, of course, didn’t bring the Samaritan back to life. Although most
people would admire the Good Samaritan for what he did and although we may deplore the fact
that few people now would be inclined to follow his example, the ethical egoist would say that,
the Samaritan did the wrong thing. For ethical egoism there is only one rule. Look after yourself
you have no business stopping for anybody on the freeway; indeed, the ethical egoist would say,
if you do stop you are throwing your life away.
This theory is called ethical egoism simply because it is an ethical theory, a normative theory about how
we ought to behave. The theory implies that we ought to be selfish. Or, to put it more gently, we ought to
be self-interested. Calling the theory “ethical” does not suggest that there might be a decent way to be
selfish; it just means that ethical egoism is a theory that advocates egoism as a moral rule.

 You should look after yourself

Ethical egoist insisted that if you don’t take advantage of a situation, you are foolish. The claim that it
makes good sense to look after yourself, and morality is a result of that self –interest. If I mistreat others,
they mistreat me, so I resolve to behave myself. This is a rather twisted version of the Golden Rule (Do un
to others as you would have them do unto you). It is twisted because it is peculiarly slanted toward our
own self –interests. The reason we should treat others the way we would like to be treated is that it gives
us a good chance of receiving just such treatment; we do it for ourselves, not for others. So, do unto others
so that you will be done unto in a similar way.

One argument for ethical egoism follows immediately from the theory of psychological egoism,
which we examined in the previous section. If I am psychologically programmed to act only in
my own best interest, then I can never be obligated to perform altruistic (that is, selfless) acts
toward others. More formally the argument is this:
(1) We all always seek to maximize our own self-interest (definition of psychological egoism).
(2) If one cannot do an act, one has no obligation to do that act (ought to implies can).
(3) Altruistic acts involve putting other people’s interests ahead of our own (definition of
altruism).
(4) But, altruism contradicts psychological egoism and so is impossible (by premises 1 and 3).
(5) Therefore, altruistic acts are never morally obligatory (by premises 2 and 4).

So the ethical egoist might certainly decide to stop for a stranded motorist on the freeway, not for the sake
of the motorist but to ensure that “what goes around, comes around.” The Golden rule usually emphasizes

5
others, but for the ethical egoist it emphasizes the self. Any theory that looks solely to consequences of
actions is known as a Consequentialist theory.

The consequences that ethical egoism stipulates are good consequences for the person taking the action.
Saying that people ought to look after themselves need not, of course, mean that one should annoy others
whenever possible, step on their toes, or deliberately neglect their interests. It simply suggests that one
should do what will be of long term benefit to one self, such as exercising, eating healthy food, avoiding
repetitive argumentative situations, abstaining from over eating, and so forth. In conjunction, it suggests
that other people’s interests are of no importance. If you might advance your own interests by helping
others, then by all means help others but only if you are the main beneficiary. It is fine to help your
children get a head in school, because you love them and this love is a rationale for you. But there is no
reason to lend a hand to your neighbor’s children, unless you like them or you achieve gratification
through your action.

This interpretation, which tells us to do whatever will benefits ourselves results in a rewriting of the
Golden Rule, because, obviously, it is not always the case that you will get the same treatment from other
that you give to them. Occasionally you might get away with not treating others decently because they
may never know that you are the source of the bad treatment they are receiving. Ethical egoism tells you
that it is perfectly all right to treat others in a way that is to your advantage and not to theirs as long as you
can be certain that you will get away with it.

The following are some method to apply the principle of ethical egoism to a particular situation.
• List the possible acts
• For each act, see how much net good it would do for you.
• Identify the act that does the most net good for you

Some important things to notice about ethical egoism:

✓ It does not just say that, from the moral point of view, one’s own welfare counts as well
as that of others. Rather, it says that, from the moral point of view, only one’s own
welfare counts, and others’ does not, when one is making a moral decision about how to
act.
✓ Ethical egoism does not forbid one to help others, or require one to harm others. It just
says that whatever moral reason you have to help others, or not harm them, must
ultimately stem for the way in which helping them or not harming them helps you.
✓ Ethical egoism does not say that one ought always to do what is most pleasurable, or
enjoyable. It acknowledges that one’s own self–interest may occasionally require pain or
sacrifice.

6
 1.1.2.2. Psychological Egoism
The main argument that has been used as a basis for ethical egoism is a psychological one, an argument
from human nature. We are all so constituted, it is said, that one always seeks one's own advantage or
welfare, or always does what he thinks will give him the greatest balance of good over evil. In Butler's
terms, this means that "self-love" is the only basic "principle" in human nature; in one set of contemporary
terms, it means that "ego-satisfaction" is the final aim of all activity or that "the pleasure principle" is the
basic "drive" in every individual. If this is so, the argument continues, we must recognize this fact in our
moral theory and infer that our basic ethical principle must be that of self-love, albeit cool self-love. To
hold anything else is to fly in the face of the facts.

It is usual here to object that one cannot logically infer an ethical conclusion from a psychological premise
in this way. The egoist may not be doing this. He may only be contending that, if human nature is as he
describes it, it is simply unrealistic and even unreasonable to propose that we ought basically to do
anything but what is for our own greatest good. For, in a sense, we cannot do anything but this, except by
mistake, and, as a famous dictum has it. “Ought” implies “can”. Thus understood, the psychological
argument for ethical egoism is at least reasonable, even if it is not logically compelling.

Thus, ethical egoism has generally presupposed what is called psychological egoism -- that each of us is
always seeking his own greatest good, whether this is conceived of as pleasure, happiness, knowledge,
power, self-realization, or a mixed life. The question is not whether egoism is strong in human nature but
whether we ever have any concern or desire for the welfare of others except as a means to our own, any
concern for or interest in their welfare for its own sake, which is not derived from our concern for our own
welfare. In dealing with this ethical theory;

(1) That the desire for one's own good presupposes or builds upon the existence of more basic desires for
food, fame, sex, etc. If we did not have any of these "primary appetites," we would not have any good
to be concerned about; our welfare consists of the satisfaction of such desires.

(2) It follows, that the object of these basic desires is not one's own welfare; it is food, fame, sex, etc., as
the case may be. One's own good is not the object of all of one's desires but only of one of them, self-
love.

(3) That in some cases the object of a basic desire is something for oneself, for example, food or the eating
of food. But there is no necessity about this; the object may be something for someone else, for
example, enjoying the sight of the ocean. In other words, there may be altruistic impulses. There may
also be a desire to do the right as such. Whether there are such desires or not is a question of empirical
fact.

7
(4) As a matter of fact, there are such altruistic interests in the welfare of others (sheer malevolence, if it
exists, is a desire that another experience pain for its own sake), as well as a desire to do the right as
such.

At this point it is usual for the psychological egoist to say, "Yes, we do things for others, but we get
satisfaction out of doing them, and this satisfaction is our end in doing them. Doing them is only a means
to this satisfaction. Hence, even in doing 'altruistic' things for others, like taking them to see the ocean, we
are seeking our own good."

To this criticism, some argued that, of course, we get satisfaction out of doing such things, but we do not
want to do them because of the satisfaction we expect to get out of them, we get satisfaction out of doing
them because we wanted to do them. The psychological egoist is putting the cart before the horse. They
confuses the object of B's desire (A's enjoying the ocean) with the satisfaction that results for B when this
object is attained. Suppose B fails to get A to the ocean or that A does not enjoy seeing it. Then B will
experience frustration, but it will not follow that this frustration is his goal; he experiences frustration
because his goal is to have A enjoy himself. Generally, Egoistic and particularistic consequentialism only
takes into consideration how the consequences of an act will affect oneself or a given group – e.g. one’s
family, fellow citizens/compatriots, class or race. Moral rightness depends on the consequences for an
individual agent or a limited group.

1.1.3. Utilitarianism: Producing the best consequences

That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.

Activity:
Suppose you are at Jigjiga with a dying millionaire. With his final words, he begs you for one
final favor: “I’ve dedicated my whole life to football and for fifty years have gotten endless
pleasure rooting for the Ethiopian Coffee Club. Now that I am dying, I want to give all my
assets, $2 million, to the Ethiopian Coffee Club.” Pointing to a box containing money in large
bills, he continues: “Would you take this money back to Addis Ababa and give it to the
Ethiopian Coffee Club’ owner so that they can buy better players?” You agree to carry out his
wish, at which point a huge smile of relief and gratitude breaks out on his face as he expires in
your arms. After traveling to Addis Ababa, you see a newspaper advertisement placed by your
favorite charity, the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) (whose integrity you do not doubt),
pleading for $2 million to be used to save 100,000 people dying of starvation. Not only will
the $2 million save their lives, but it will also purchase equipment and the kinds of fertilizers
necessary to build a sustainable economy. You decide to reconsider your promise to the dying
Ethiopian Coffee Club fan, in light of this advertisement.
What is the right thing to do in this case?

8
Consider some traditional moral principles and see if they help us come to a decision. One principle often
given to guide action is “Let your conscience be your guide.” Suppose your conscience tells you to give
the money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club and my conscience tells me to give the money to the Ethiopian
Red Cross Society (ERCS). How can we even discuss the matter? If conscience is the end of it, we’re left
mute.

Another principle urged on us is “Do whatever is most loving”; Love is surely a wonderful value. It is a
more wholesome attitude than hate, and we should overcome feelings of hate if only for our own
psychological health. But is love enough to guide our actions when there is a conflict of interest? “Love is
blind,” it has been said, “but reason, like marriage, is an eye-opener.” Whom should I love in the case of
the disbursement of the millionaire’s money—the millionaire or the starving people? It’s not clear how
love alone will settle anything. In fact, it is not obvious that we must always do what is most loving.
Should we always treat our enemies in loving ways? Or is it morally permissible to feel hate for those who
have purposely and unjustly harmed us, our loved ones, or other innocent people? Should the survivors of
Auschwitz love Adolph Hitler? Love alone does not solve difficult moral issues.

A third principle often given to guide our moral actions is the Golden Rule: “Do to others as you would
have them do to you.” This, too, is a noble rule of thumb, one that works in simple, commonsense
situations. But it has problems. First, it cannot be taken literally. Thus, the rule must be modified: “Do to
others as you would have them do to you if you were in their shoes.” However, this still has problems.
Likewise, the Golden Rule doesn’t tell me to whom to give the millionaire’s money.

Conscience, love, and the Golden Rule are all worthy rules of thumb to help us through life. They work
for most of us, most of the time, in ordinary moral situations. But, in more complicated cases, especially
when there are legitimate conflicts of interests, they are limited.

A more promising strategy for solving dilemmas is that of following definite moral rules. Suppose you
decided to give the millionaire’s money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club to keep your promise or because to
do otherwise would be stealing. The principle you followed would be “Always keep your promise.”
Principles are important in life. If you decided to act on the principle of keeping promises, then you
adhered to a type of moral theory called deontology. As you will see so far that deontological systems
maintain that the center of value is the act or kind of act; certain features in the act itself have intrinsic
value. For example, a deontologist would see something intrinsically wrong in the very act of lying. If, on
the other hand, you decided to give the money to the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) to save an
enormous number of lives and restore economic solvency to the society, you sided with a type of theory
called teleological ethics. Sometimes, it is referred to as consequentialist ethics. The center of value here is
the outcome or consequences of the act. For example, a teleologist would judge whether lying was
morally right or wrong by the consequences it produced.

9
We have already examined one type of teleological ethics: ethical egoism, the view that the act that
produces the most amount of good for the agent is the right act. Egoism is teleological ethics narrowed to
the agent himself or herself. Unlike ethical egoism, utilitarianism is a universal teleological system. It calls
for the maximization of goodness in society—that is, the greatest goodness for the greatest number—and
not merely the good of the agent.

1.1.3.1. Classic Utilitarianism

In our normal lives we use utilitarian reasoning all the time. As a formal ethical theory, the seeds of
utilitarianism were sewn by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (342–270 BCE), who stated that
“pleasure is the goal that nature has ordained for us; it is also the standard by which we judge everything
good.” According to this view, rightness and wrongness are determined by pleasure or pain that something
produces. Epicurus’s theory focused largely on the individual’s personal experience of pleasure and pain,
and to that extent he advocated a version of ethical egoism. Nevertheless, Epicurus inspired a series of
eighteenth-century philosophers who emphasized the notion of general happiness—that is, the pleasing
consequences of actions that impact others and not just the individual.

The classical expressions of utilitarianism, though, appear in the writings of two English philosophers and
social reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). They were the
nonreligious ancestors of the twentieth-century secular humanists, optimistic about human nature and our
ability to solve our problems without recourse to God. Engaged in a struggle for legal as well as moral
reform, they were impatient with the rule-bound character of law and morality in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Great Britain and tried to make the law serve human needs and interests.

1.1.3.2. Jeremy Bentham: Quantity over Quality

There are two main features of utilitarianism, both of which Bentham articulated:

➢ The consequentialist principle (or its teleological aspect): states that the rightness or wrongness
of an act is determined by the goodness or badness of the results that flow from it. It is the end, not
the means that counts; the end justifies the means. and

➢ The utility principle (or its hedonic aspect): states that the only thing that is good in itself is some
specific type of state (for example, pleasure, happiness, welfare).

Hedonistic utilitarianism views pleasure as the sole good and pain as the only evil. An act is right
if it either brings about more pleasure than pain or prevents pain, and an act is wrong if it either
brings about more pain than pleasure or prevents pleasure from occurring. Bentham invented a
scheme for measuring pleasure and pain that he called the hedonic calculus: The quantitative
score for any pleasure or pain experience is obtained by summing the seven aspects of a

10
pleasurable or painful experience: its intensity, duration, certainty, nearness, fruitfulness, purity,
and extent.

Adding up the amounts of pleasure and pain for each possible act and then comparing the scores would
enable us to decide which act to perform. With regard to our example of deciding between giving the
dying man’s money to the Ethiopian Coffee Club or to the famine victims, we would add up the likely
pleasures to all involved, for all seven qualities. If we found that giving the money to the famine victims
would cause at least 3 million hedons (units of happiness) but that giving the money to the Ethiopian
Coffee Club would cause less than 1,000 hedons, we would have an obligation to give the money to the
famine victims.

There is something appealing about Bentham’s utilitarianism. It is simple in that there is only one
principle to apply: Maximize pleasure and minimize suffering. It is commonsensical in that we think that
morality really is about reducing suffering and promoting benevolence. It is scientific: Simply make
quantitative measurements and apply the principle impartially, giving no special treatment to ourselves or
to anyone else because of race, gender, personal relationship, or religion.

1.1.3.3. John Stuart Mill: Quality over Quantity

It was to meet these sorts of objections and save utilitarianism from the charge of being a pig philosophy
that Bentham’s successor, John Stuart Mill, sought to distinguish happiness from mere sensual pleasure.
His version of the theory is often called eudaimonistic utilitarianism (from the Greek eudaimonia,
meaning “happiness”). He defines happiness in terms of certain types of higher-order pleasures or
satisfactions such as intellectual, aesthetic, and social enjoyments, as well as in terms of minimal
suffering. That is, there are two types of pleasures. The lower, or elementary, include eating, drinking,
sexuality, resting, and sensuous titillation. The higher include high culture, scientific knowledge,
intellectuality, and creativity. Although the lower pleasures are more intensely gratifying, they also lead to
pain when overindulged in. The higher pleasures tend to be more long term, continuous, and gradual.

Mill argued that the higher, or more refined, pleasures are superior to the lower ones: “It is better to be a
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”
Humans are the kind of creatures who require more to be truly happy. They want the lower pleasures, but
they also want deep friendship, intellectual ability, culture, the ability to create and appreciate art,
knowledge, and wisdom.

The point is not merely that humans wouldn’t be satisfied with what satisfies a pig but that somehow the
quality of the higher pleasures is better. But what does it mean to speak of better pleasure? The formula he
comes up with is this: Happiness … [is] not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made
up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active

11
over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable
of bestowing. Mill is clearly pushing the boundaries of the concept of “pleasure” by emphasizing higher
qualities such as knowledge, intelligence, freedom, friendship, love, and health. In fact, one might even
say that his litmus test for happiness really has little to do with actual pleasure and more to do with a non-
hedonic cultivated state of mind.

1.1.3.4. Act- And Rule-Utilitarianism

There are two classical types of utilitarianism: act- and rule-utilitarianism. In applying the principle of
utility, act-utilitarians, such as Bentham, say that ideally we ought to apply the principle to all of the
alternatives open to us at any given moment. We may define act-utilitarianism in this way:

Act-utilitarianism argues that an act is right if and only if it results in as much good as any available
alternative. One practical problem with act-utilitarianism is that we cannot do the necessary calculations to
determine which act is the correct one in each case, for often we must act spontaneously and quickly. So
rules of thumb are of practical importance—for example, “In general, don’t lie,” and “Generally, keep
your promises.” However, the right act is still that alternative that results in the most utility. A second
problem with act-utilitarianism is that it seems to fly in the face of fundamental intuitions about minimally
correct behavior. The alternative to act-utlitarianism is a view called rule-utilitarianism—elements of
which we find in Mill’s theory. Most generally, the position is this:

Rule-utilitarianism: An act is right if and only if it is required by a rule that is itself a member of a set of
rules whose acceptance would lead to greater utility for society than any available alternative. Human
beings are rule-following creatures. We learn by adhering to the rules of a given subject, whether it is
speaking a language, driving a car, dancing, writing an essay, rock climbing, or cooking. We want to have
a set of action guiding rules by which to live. The act-utilitarian rule, to do the act that maximizes utility,
is too general for most purposes. Often, we don’t have time to decide whether lying will produce more
utility than truth telling, so we need a more specific rule prescribing truthfulness that passes the test of
rational scrutiny.

Activity:
Debates between act- and rule-utilitarians continue today. To illustrate, suppose you are the
driver of a trolley car and suddenly discover that your brakes have failed. You are just about to
run over five workers on the track ahead of you. However, if you act quickly, you can turn the
trolley onto a sidetrack where only one man is working. What should you do?

The Strengths of Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has three very positive features. The first attraction or strength is that it is a single principle,
an absolute system with a potential answer for every situation: Do what will promote the most utility! It’s

12
good to have a simple, action-guiding principle that is applicable to every occasion—even if it may be
difficult to apply (life’s not simple).

Its second strength is that utilitarianism seems to get to the substance of morality. It is not merely a formal
system that simply sets forth broad guidelines for choosing principles but offers no principles—such as the
guideline “Do whatever you can universalize.” Rather it has a material core: We should promote human
(and possibly animal) flourishing and reduce suffering. The first virtue gives us a clear decision procedure
in arriving at our answer about what to do. The second virtue appeals to our sense that morality is made
for people and that morality is not so much about rules as about helping people and alleviating the
suffering in the world. As such, utilitarianism seems commonsensical. For instance, it gives us clear and
reasonable guidance in dealing with the Kitty Genovese case: We should call the police or do what is
necessary to help her, as long as helping her does not create more disutility than leaving her alone. And, in
the case of deciding what to do with the dead millionaire’s $2 million, something in us says that it is
absurd to keep a promise to a dead person when it means allowing hundreds of thousands of famine
victims to die. Far more good can be accomplished by helping the needy than by giving the money to the
Yankees!

A third strength of utilitarianism is that it is particularly well suited to address the problem of posterity—
namely, why we should preserve scarce natural resources for the betterment of future generations of
humans that do not yet exist. Expressed rhetorically, the question is “Why should I care about posterity;
what has posterity ever done for me?” In Chapter 6, we saw that the theory of ethical egoism failed to give
us an adequate answer to this problem. That is, the egoist gains nothing by preserving natural resources for
future generations that do not yet exist and thus can give no benefit to the egoist. However, utilitarians
have one overriding duty: to maximize general happiness. As long as the quality of life of future people
promises to be positive, we have an obligation to continue human existence, to produce human beings, and
to take whatever actions are necessary to ensure that their quality of life is not only positive but high.

What are our obligations to future people? If utilitarians are correct, we have an obligation to leave
posterity to as good a world as we can. This would mean radically simplifying our lifestyles so that we use
no more resources than are necessary, keeping as much top soil intact as possible, protecting endangered
species, reducing our carbon dioxide emissions, preserving the wilderness, and minimizing our overall
deleterious impact on the environment in general while using technology wisely.

Criticism of Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has been around for several centuries, but so too have been its critics, and we need to
address a series of standard objections to utilitarianism before we can give it a “philosophically clean bill
of health.”

13
Problems with Formulating Utilitarianism
The first set of problems occurs in the very formulation of utilitarianism: “The greatest happiness for the
greatest number.” Notice that we have two “greatest” things in this formula: “happiness” and “number.”
Whenever we have two variables, we invite problems of determining which of the variables to rank first
when they seem to conflict. To see this point, consider the following example:

Dear Students;
Suppose that I am offering a $1,000 prize to the person who runs the longest distance in the
shortest amount of time. Three people participate: Abebe runs 5 km in 31 minutes, Kelbesa runs
7 km in 50 minutes, and Obang runs 1 km in 6 minutes. Who should get the prize? Abebe has
fulfilled one part of the requirement (run the longest distance), but Obang has fulfilled the other
requirement (run the shortest amount of time).

This is precisely the problem with utilitarianism. On the one hand, we might concern ourselves with
spreading happiness around so that the greatest number obtain it (in which case, we should get busy and
procreate a larger population). On the other hand, we might be concerned that the greatest possible amount
of happiness obtains in society (in which case, we might be tempted to allow some people to become far
happier than others, as long as their increase offsets the losers’ diminished happiness). So should we
worry more about total happiness or about highest average?

The Comparative Consequences Objection

Another crucial problem with utilitarianism is that it seems to require a super human ability to look into
the future and survey a mind-boggling array of consequences of actions. Of course, we normally do not
know the long-term consequences of our actions because life is too complex and the consequences go on
into the indefinite future.

The Consistency Objection to Rule-Utilitarianism

An often-debated question about rule-utilitarianism is whether, when pushed to its logical limits, it must
either become a deontological system or transform itself into act-utilitarianism. As such, it is an
inconsistent theory that offers no truly independent standard for making moral judgments. Briefly, the
argument goes like this: Imagine that following the set of general rules of a rule-utilitarian system yields
100 hedons (positive utility units). We could always find a case where breaking the general rule would
result in additional hedons without decreasing the sum of the whole. So, for example, we could imagine a
situation in which breaking the general rule “Never lie” to spare someone’s feelings would create more
utility (for example, 102 hedons) than keeping the rule would. It would seem that we could always
improve on any version of rule-utilitarianism by breaking the set of rules whenever we judge that by doing
so we could produce even more utility than by following the set.

14
The No-Rest Objection
According to utilitarianism, one should always do that act that promises to promote the most utility. But
there is usually an infinite set of possible acts to choose from, and even if I can be excused from
considering all of them, I can be fairly sure that there is often a preferable act that I could be doing. For
example, when I am about to go to the cinema with a friend, I should ask myself if helping the homeless in
my community wouldn’t promote more utility. When I am about to go to sleep, I should ask myself
whether I could at that moment be doing something to help save the ozone layer. And, why not simply
give all my assets (beyond what is absolutely necessary to keep me alive) to the poor to promote utility?
Following utilitarianism, I should get little or no rest, and, certainly, I have no right to enjoy life when by
sacrificing I can make others happier. Peter

The Publicity Objection

It is usually thought that moral principles must be known to all so that all may freely obey the principles.
But utilitarians usually hesitate to recommend that everyone act as a utilitarian, especially an act-
utilitarian, because it takes a great deal of deliberation to work out the likely consequences of alternative
courses of action. It would be better if most people acted simply as deontologists. Thus, utilitarianism
seems to contradict our requirement of publicity.

The Relativism Objection

Sometimes people accuse rule-utilitarianism of being relativistic because it seems to endorse different
rules in different societies. In one society, it may uphold polygamy, whereas in our society it defends
monogamy. In a desert society, it upholds a rule “Don’t waste water,” whereas in a community where
water is plentiful no such rule exists. But this is not really conventional relativism because the rule is not
made valid by the community’s choosing it but by the actual situation.

Criticism of the Ends Justifying Immoral Means

Chief among the criticisms of utilitarianism is that utilitarian ends might justify immoral means. There are
many dastardly things that we can do in the name of maximizing general happiness: deceit, torture,
slavery, even killing off ethnic minorities. As long as the larger populace benefits, these actions might be
justified. The general problem can be laid out in this argument:

(1) If a moral theory justifies actions that we universally deem impermissible, then that moral theory
must be rejected.
(2) Utilitarianism justifies actions that we universally deem impermissible.
(3) Therefore, utilitarianism must be rejected.

15
The Lying Objection
William D. Ross has argued that utilitarianism is to be rejected because it leads to the counterintuitive
endorsement of lying when it serves the greater good. Consider two acts, A and B, that will both result in
100 hedons (units of pleasure of utility). The only difference is that A involves telling a lie and B involves
telling the truth. The utilitarian must maintain that the two acts are of equal value. But this seems
implausible; truth seems to be an intrinsically good thing.

What is so important about truth telling or so bad about lying? If it turned out that lying really promoted
human welfare, we’d have to accept it. But that’s not likely. Our happiness is tied up with a need for
reliable information (that is, truth) on how to achieve our ends, so truthfulness will be a member of the
rule-utility’s set. But where lying will clearly promote utility without undermining the general adherence
to the rule, we simply ought to lie. Don’t we already accept lying to a gangster or telling white lies to
spare people’s feelings?

The Justice Objection

The utilitarian response was that we should reconsider whether truth telling and personal integrity are
values that should never be compromised. The situation is intensified, though, when we consider standards
of justice that most of us think should never be dispensed with. Let’s look at two examples, each of which
highlights a different aspect of justice.

First, imagine that a rape and murder is committed in a racially volatile community. As the sheriff of the
town, you have spent a lifetime working for racial harmony. Now, just when your goal is being realized,
this incident occurs. The crime is thought to be racially motivated, and a riot is about to break out that will
very likely result in the death of several people and create long-lasting racial antagonism. You see that you
could frame a tramp for the crime so that a trial will find him guilty and he will be executed. There is
every reason to believe that a speedy trial and execution will head off the riot and save community
harmony. Only you (and the real criminal, who will keep quiet about it) will know that an innocent man
has been tried and executed. What is the morally right thing to do? The utilitarian seems committed to
framing the tramp, but many would find this appalling.

As a second illustration, imagine that you are a utilitarian physician who has five patients under your care.
One needs a heart transplant, one needs two lungs, one needs a liver, and the last two each need a kidney.
Now into your office comes a healthy bachelor needing an immunization. You judge that he would make a
perfect sacrifice for your five patients. Through a utility-calculus, you determine that, without a doubt, you
could do the most good by injecting the healthy man with a fatal drug and then using his organs to save
your five other patients.

16
These careless views of justice offend us. The very fact that utilitarians even consider such actions—that
they would misuse the legal system or the medical system to carry out their schemes—seems frightening.

However, the utilitarian cannot exclude the possibility of sacrificing innocent people for the greater good
of humanity. Wouldn’t we all agree that it would be right to sacrifice one innocent person to prevent an
enormous evil? Suppose, for example, a maniac is about to set off a nuclear bomb that will destroy New
York City. He is scheduled to detonate the bomb in one hour. His psychiatrist knows the lunatic well and
assures us that there is one way to stop him—torture his 10-year-old daughter and televise it. Suppose for
the sake of the argument that there is no way to simulate the torture. Would you not consider torturing the
child in this situation? As the rule-utilitarian would see it, we have two moral rules that are in conflict: the
rule to prevent widespread harm and the rule against torture. To resolve this conflict, the rule-utilitarian
might appeal to this second level conflict-resolving rule: We may sacrifice an innocent person to prevent a
significantly greater social harm. Or, if no conflict-resolving rule is available, the rule-utilitarian can
appeal to this third-level remainder rule: When no other rule applies, simply do what your best judgment
deems to be the act that will maximize utility. Using this remainder rule, the rule-utilitarian could justify
torturing the girl.

Thus, in such cases, it might be right to sacrifice one innocent person to save a city or prevent some wide-
scale disaster. In these cases, the rule-utilitarian’s approach to justice is in fact the same as the above
approach to lying and compromising one’s integrity: Justice is just one more lower-order principle within
utilitarianism. The problem, clearly, is determining which kinds of wide-scale disasters warrant sacrificing
innocent lives. This question invariably comes up in wartime: In every bombing raid, especially in the
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the noncombatant–combatant distinction is
overridden. Innocent civilian lives are sacrificed with the prospect of ending the war. We seem to be
making this judgment call in our decision to drive automobiles and trucks even though we are fairly
certain the practice will result in the death of thousands of innocent people each year. Judgment calls like
these highlight utilitarianism’s difficulty in handling issues of justice

Three-Step Action Formula:

Utilitarianism might be construed as offering a three-step action formula for action:
1. On the basis of what I know, I must project the consequences of each alternative option
open to me (e.g., taking different kinds of actions or taking no action).
2. Calculate how much happiness, or balance of happiness over unhappiness, is likely to be
produced by anticipated consequences of each action or none.
3. Select that action which, on balance, will produce the greatest amount of happiness for the
greatest number of people affected

17
Generally, utilitarianism is a moral theory which takes into account how the consequences of an act will
affect all the parties involved. Moral rightness depends on the consequences for all affected people or
sentient beings. The fundamental principle of utilitarianism is the principle of utility:

The principle of utility

✓ The morally right action is the one that produces the best overall consequences with regard to the
utility or welfare of all the affected parties.
✓ Jeremy Bentham’s slogan: The right act or policy is the one that causes ‘the greatest happiness of
the greatest number’ – that is, maximize the total utility or welfare of the majority of all the
affected parties.

Question for Students:

‘The end justifies the means’. Some commentators think that this policy allows morally
reprehensible acts to be committed with the aim of achieving good ends.
A. On the basis of your experience, do you think that this habit of carrying out unjust or
dishonest acts as means to achieve good ends is so unusual?
B. What about a doctor’s evasion to avoid breaking bad news to a very depressed patient?
What about prescribing antibiotics for flu symptoms at the request of a patient?
C. What does the fairly common occurrence of such events tell us? That utilitarianism is
well-suited to human behavior?

1.1.3.5. Altruism
In altruism, an action is right if the consequences of that action are favorable to all except the actor. Butler
argued that we have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is called
psychological altruism and maintains that at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive
benevolence.

Psychological altruism holds that all human action is necessarily other centered and other motivated. A
parallel analysis of psychological altruism results in opposing conclusions to psychological egoism, and
again arguably the theory is just as closed as psychological egoism. If both theories can be validly
maintained, it follows that the soundness of either or both must be questioned. Suppose, for example, that
Degu, who is not good at swimming, saves a child from drawing in Lake Tana. What ultimately
motivated him to do this? It would be odd to suggest that it’s ultimately his own benefit that Degu is
seeking. After all, he is risking his own life in the process.

Altruists are people who act so as to increase other people’s pleasure. They will act for the sake of
someone else even if it decreases their own pleasure and causes themselves pain.

18
Activity:
Write a case study based on an individual or group you admire for its altruistic motivation.
Provide background and outline the lessons we can learn from this person or persons.

We can differentiate egoistic and altruistic desires in the following way: One’s desire is egoistic if (and
only if) it concerns (what one perceives to be) the benefit of oneself and not anyone else. In the contrary,
one’s desire is altruistic if (and only if) it concerns (what one perceives to be) the benefit of at least
someone other than oneself. Altruists reject the theory of psychological egoism and argue instead that
humans are instinctively benevolent. And instinctive benevolence, they argue, is the feature of our human
nature which is the basis of our altruistic moral obligations.

1.1.4. Deontological Ethics (Non- Consequentialist)

Deontology: What duty asks of us?
What makes a ‘right’ act right? The utilitarian or consequentialist answer to this question is that it is the
good outcome of an act which makes it right. Moral rightness or wrongness is calculated by determining
the extent to which the action promotes values such as pleasure, well-being, happiness, etc. To this extent,
the end justifies the means. In many respects, deontological moral theory is diametrically the opposite of
utilitarianism.

It is referred as “the means justifies the end”. It is coined as “deontics”. This is a theory that the rightness
or wrongness of moral action is determined, at least partly with reference to formal rules of conduct rather
than consequences or result of an action. It is an emphasis on the intentions, motives, moral principles or
performance of duty rather than results, as the sign of right action/morality and immorality. It is a duty
based and according to this theory, the consequences or results of our action have nothing to do with their
rightness or wrongness.

Performance of One’s own Duty

The 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three
headings: duties to God, duties to oneself and duties to others!

Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds: (1) a theoretical duty to know
the existence and nature of God, and (2) a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.
Concerning our duties towards oneself; these are also of two sorts: (1) duties of the soul, which involve
developing one's skills and talents, and (2) duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as
we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.
Concerning our duties towards others; Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are
universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people.

19
Absolute duties are of three sorts: from duties to God - Example; avoid wronging others, Duties to
Others - Example; treat people as equals, and Duties to Oneself- Example; promote the good of others.
Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is the duty is to keep
one's promises.

1.1.4.1. The Divine Command Theory

According to one view, called the divine command theory (DCT), ethical principles are simply the
commands of God. They derive their validity from God’s commanding them, and they mean “commanded
by God.” Without God, there would be no universally valid morality. We can analyze the DCT into three
separate theses:

1. Morality (that is, rightness and wrongness) originates with God.

2. Moral rightness simply means “willed by God,” and moral wrongness means “being against the will
of God.”
3. Because morality essentially is based on divine will, not on independently existing reasons for
action, no further reasons for action are necessary.

There are modified versions of the DCT that drop or qualify one or more of these three theses, but the
strongest form includes all three assertions. We can characterize that position thusly: Necessarily, for any
person S and for all acts A, if A is forbidden (required) of S, then God commands that not-A (A) for S.
Likewise, if A is permitted for S, then God has commanded neither A nor not-A for S. Bringing out the
implications of this, we may list four propositions:

1. Act A is wrong if and only if it is contrary to the command of God.

2. Act A is right (required) if and only if it is commanded by God.
3. Act A is morally permissible if and only if it is permitted by the command of God.
4. If there is no God, then nothing is ethically wrong, required, or permitted.

We can summarize the DCT this way: Morality not only originates with God, but moral rightness simply
means “willed by God” and moral wrongness means “being against the will of God”. That is, an act is
right in virtue of being permitted by the will of God, and an act is wrong in virtue of being against the will
of God. Because morality essentially is based on divine will, not on independently existing reasons for
action, no further reasons for action are necessary. So we may ask, “If God doesn’t exist, everything is
permissible?” If so, nothing is forbidden or required. Without God, we have moral nihilism. If there is no
God, then nothing is ethically wrong, required, or permitted.

Problems with the Divine Command Theory

There are two problems with the DCT that need to be faced by those who hold it.

20
1. DCT would seem to make the attribution of “goodness” to God redundant. When we say “God is
good,” we think we are ascribing a property to God; but if good simply means “what God commands
or wills,” then we are not attributing any property to God. Our statement “God is good” merely means
“God does whatever he wills to do” or “God practices what he preaches,” and the statement “God
commands us to do what is good” merely is the logically empty statement “God commands us to do
what God commands us to do.”
2. DCT is that it seems to make morality into some-thing arbitrary. If God’s decree is the sole arbiter of
right and wrong, it would seem to be logically possible for such heinous acts as rape, killing of the
innocent for the fun of it, and gratuitous cruelty to become morally good actions—if God suddenly
decided to command us to do these things

1.1.4.2. Rights Theory

A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a "right" is a justified claim
against another person's behavior - such as my right to not be harmed by you. Rights and duties are related
in such a way that the rights of one person imply the duties of another person. For example, if I have a
right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This is called the correlativity of
rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights theory is that of 17th century British
philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's
life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following
Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three
foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists
maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property,
movement, speech, and religious expression.

There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights.

✓ First, rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by governments.
✓ Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country.
✓ Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender,
race, or handicap.
✓ Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I cannot hand over my rights to another person, such
as by selling myself into slavery.

1.1.4.3. Kant’s Categorical Imperative

The name of the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is identified with the moral theory
known as deontology. Kant was adamantly opposed to the idea that the outcome of an action could
determine its moral worth. For deontologists, it is not consequences which determine the rightness or
wrongness of an act, but, rather, the intention of the person who carries out the act. The emphasis is on the
correctness of the action, regardless of the possible benefits or harm it might produce. Deontologists

21
maintain that there are some moral obligations which are absolutely binding, no matter what consequences
are produced.

The Categorical Imperative

A Kant’s duty-based theory is emphasizing a single principle of duty. Kant agreed that we have moral
duties to oneself and others, such as developing one’s talents, and keeping our promises to others.
However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular
duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the “categorical imperative.”

 A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that

hinge on some personal desire that we have. For example, “If you want to get a good job, then you
ought to go to college.” By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective
of one’s personal desires, such as “You ought to do X.”

 To understand Kant’s thought, note the emphasis he places on the idea of good intension. Kant
believed that nothing was good in itself except a “good will.” Intelligence, judgment and all other
facets of the human personality are perhaps good and desirable, but only if the will that makes use of
them is good. By will, Kant means the uniquely human capacity to act according to the concepts
behind laws, that is, principles presumably operating in nature. A good will, therefore, acts in
accordance with nature’s laws. For Kant a will could be good without qualification only if it always
had in view one principle: whether the maxim of its action could become a universal law.

This standard is such a crucial part of Kant’s theory of ethics. Kant believed, then, that there was just one
command or imperative that was categorical, that is, one that presented an action as necessary of itself,
without regard to any other end. He believed that from this one categorical imperative, this universal
command, all commands of duty could be derived. Kant’s categorical imperative states that we should act
in such a way that the maxim or general rule governing our action could be a universal law.

Consider his example of making a promise that you are willing to break if it suits your purposes. Your
maxim can be expressed thus: this maxim could not be universally acted up on, because it involves a
contradiction of wills. On the same hand, you are willing to make promises and honor them; on the other
hand, you are willing to beak those promises. Notice that Kant is not a utilitarian: he is not arguing that the
consequences of a universal law condoning promise breaking would be bad and the rule is bad. Instead he
is claiming that the rule is self-contradictory; the institution of promise making would dissolve if such a
maxim were universalized. His appeal is to logical consistency, not to consequences.

Kant gives at least three versions or formulations of the categorical imperative. His categorical
imperative is a deontological ethical theory, which means it is based on the idea that there are certain
objective ethical rules in the world. Kant’s version is possibly the most well-known, and relies heavily on

22
his idea that all people are fundamentally capable of reasoning in the same manner and on the same
level. Kantianism focuses more on intent and action in itself, as opposed to the consequentialist focus of
utilitarianism.

 Hypothetical imperatives tell us which means best achieve our ends. They do not, however, tell us
which ends we should choose. The typical dichotomy in choosing ends is between ends that are
"right" (e.g., helping someone) and those that are "good" (e.g., enriching oneself). Kant considered
the "right" superior to the "good"; to him, the "good" was morally irrelevant. In Kant's view, a
person cannot decide whether conduct is "right," or moral, through empirical means. Such judgments
must be reached a priori, using pure practical reason.

Reason, separate from all empirical experience, can determine the principle according to which all ends
can be determined as moral. It is this fundamental principle of moral reason that is known as the
categorical imperative. Pure practical reason in the process of determining it dictates what ought to be
done without reference to empirical contingent factors. Moral questions are determined independent of
reference to the particular subject posing them. It is because morality is determined by pure practical
reason rather than particular empirical or sensuous factors that morality is universally valid. This moral
universalism has come to be seen as the distinctive aspect of Kant's moral philosophy and has had wide
social impact in the legal and political concepts of human rights and equality.

Kant's theory is hinged by his beliefs on autonomy and his formulation of categorical imperatives. He
believed that, unless a person freely and willingly makes a choice, their action has no meaning (and
certainly no moral value). Autonomy allows us to be self-creating when it comes to our values and
morality. Autonomy is one’s own beliefs, independence, and government: acting without regard for
anyone else. Conversely, heteronomy is acting under the influence of someone else and allows for an
individual to consistently place blame outside of self.

Kant believed that each individual is rational and capable of making free choices; thereby relies on
autonomous thinking. Kant thought that every man, if using reason when looking at moral dilemmas,
would agree with what he called the Categorical Imperative (the CI). So, while the law is objective, Kant
thought that all people could come to understand and agree with it after autonomous reflection. So how,
exactly, does the CI tell us how to act? How does it work? The decision-making procedure of the theory is
actually quite straight forward, and one that many people should be able to grasp intuitively (which is
exactly what Kant wanted to achieve).

Kant thought that when a moral action is being considered, one should ask the following questions; what
would happen if everyone in the world did this, all the time? And would that be the kind of world I’d like
to live in? We can look at the text-book example to illustrate this; murder. So we want to know whether

23
murder is an ethically justifiable action. Well, what would happen if everyone in the entire world started
killing people? Absolute chaos would ensue. It’s not the sort of world many people would like to live in.
Therefore, according to the categorical imperative, murder is wrong. A core aspect of this theory is the
concept of intent. To Kant, it was the intent that mattered to him.

Let’s look at an example. Imagine you’re a murderer walking down the street, and you see a defenseless
young man in front of you. It’s dark, and there’s no one else around. You have a knife in your pocket. It
would be easy for you to kill him. So, you consider. Maybe, in the end, you choose to let the man live –not
because you were worried about acting immorally, but because you didn’t want to take the risk of him
screaming and drawing the attention of the police (or something to that effect). In the end, you do not kill.

According to Kant, you haven’t acted ethically. Your action does not make you a better person. This is
because when you acted (or, rather, chose not to act), you weren’t considering the action in terms of its
morality. You didn’t make a moral choice – you merely acted out of self-preservation. However, if you
were to choose not to kill the man because you suddenly realized that it was wrong to kill and didn’t want
to act unethically, then you would have acted morally, and would be a better person for it. `

Kant concludes that a moral proposition that is true must be one that is not tied to any particular
conditions, including the identity of the person making the moral deliberation. A moral maxim must imply
absolute necessity, which is to say that it must be disconnected from the particular physical details
surrounding the proposition, and could be applied to any rational being. This leads to the first formulation
of the categorical imperative:

A. The Principle of Universality

The first maxim states that we should choose our 'codes of conduct' only if they serve perfect /imperfect
duty and are good for all. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law without contradiction." Kant divides the duties imposed by this
formulation into two subsets: perfect and imperfect duty. Perfect duties are blameworthy if not met and
are the basic requirements for a human being. According to his reasoning, we first have a perfect duty not
to act by maxims that result in logical contradictions when we attempt to universalize them.

The moral proposition A: "It is permissible to steal" would result in a contradiction upon universalisation.
The notion of stealing presupposes the existence of property, but were A universalized, then there could be
no property, and so the proposition has logically negated itself. An example of perfect duty is the
avoidance of suicide. Suicide is the end of life and Kant believed that "self-love impels the improvement
of life;" if a person commits suicide, improvement of life ceases.

Imperfect duties are those that do not achieve blame, rather they receive praise if completed; they are
circumstantial duties such as cultivating talent. They are still based on pure reason, but which allow for

24
desires in how they are carried out in practice. Because these depend somewhat on the subjective
preferences of humankind, this duty is not as strong as a perfect duty, but it is still morally binding. As
such, unlike perfect duties, you do not attract blame should you not complete an imperfect duty but you
shall receive praise for it should you complete it, as you have gone beyond the basic duties and taken duty
upon yourself. Imperfect duties are circumstantial, meaning simply that you could not reasonably exist in
a constant state of performing that duty. This is what truly differentiates between perfect and imperfect
duties, because imperfect duties are those duties that are never truly completed. Examples of imperfect
duties are perfecting the ability to write and produce works.

B. The Principle of Humanity as an End, Never as Merely a Means

The second maxim states that we should not use humanity of ourselves or others as a means to an end.
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other,
never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.” Every rational action must set
before itself not only a principle, but also an end. Most ends are of a subjective kind, because they need
only be pursued if they are in line with some particular hypothetical imperative that a person may choose
to adopt. For an end to be objective, it would be necessary that we categorically pursue it. This principle
has received more widespread approval than any other part of Kant’s moral philosophy. People, as rational
beings, are ends in themselves and should never be used merely as means to other ends. We may use
physical things as means, but when we use people simply as means, as in slavery, prostitution, or
commercial exploitation, we degrade them and violate their innermost beings as people.

The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. For example,
Suicide would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. The
free will is the source of all rational action. But to treat it as a subjective end is to deny the possibility of
freedom in general. Because the autonomous will is the one and only source of moral action, it would
contradict the first formulation to claim that a person is merely a means to some other end, rather than
always an end in themselves. On this basis, Kant derives second formulation of the categorical imperative
from the first. By combining this formulation with the first, we learn that a person has perfect duty not to
use the humanity of themselves or others merely as a means to some other end. An example of the second
maxim would be that of slavery. Although it can be realized that a slave owner has the right to own
property, they do not have the right to own a person. The right to not own a person stems from the ideals
of autonomy and free will. A person who is owned does not have free will and therefore is not
autonomous and cannot be held to duty; the concept of slavery contradicts the first maxim and Kant's
theory does not allow for contradictions of the maxims.

We should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat
people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating
to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By

25
contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve
something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor’s car since I would be treating her as a
means to my own happiness.

C. The Principle of Autonomy

The third maxim states that we should consider ourselves to be members in the universal realm of ends.
Therefore, every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating
member in the universal kingdom of ends.

Because a truly autonomous will would not be subjugated to any interest, it would only be subject to those
laws it makes for itself - but it must also regard those laws as if they would be bound to others, or they
would not be universalizable, and hence they would not be laws of conduct at all. Thus Kant presents the
notion of the hypothetical Kingdom of Ends of which he suggests all people should consider themselves
both means and ends. We should consider our actions to be of consequence to everyone else in that our
actions affect not only ourselves but that of others. Everything we do should not only be of benefit to
ourselves, but benefit each other universally.

"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always at
the same time as an end and never merely as a means." We ought to act only by maxims that would
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. We have perfect duty not to act by maxims that create
incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to universalize them, and we have
imperfect duty not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.

The main problem with the categorical imperative is its rigidity. The famous example that illustrates this is
that of a crazed axe-murderer coming to your front door and asking you where your children are. You
could lie – many would say you should lie – but imagine if everyone in the entire world lied all the time.
That would not be a nice place to live in, so the categorical imperative says you can’t lie. You have to tell
the axe-murderer the truth, so he can go and kill your children. Kant was asked about this personally, and
he said that this was indeed the case. It would be immoral to lie to the man. He did, however, say that you
could also choose to lock your door and call the police. Here’s another example – you’re in a room with a
man who’s holding a gun to your mother’s head. You know he’ll shoot her any second. Right next to you,
there’s a button. If you press the button, the man will fall through a trap door and land in a spike pit, dying
instantly. Your mother will be saved.

According to the categorical imperative, this would be the wrong thing to do. You can’t press the button.
But if you don’t, your mother will die. It’s in situations like this that strict ethical systems with specific
decision procedures tend to fall apart. Morality is simply too complex, too full of exceptions for these
theories to ever fully work.

26
Activity:
Review Kant’s rule of universality;
A. Can you give examples where you think this rule should not or could not be observed?
B. Do you agree with Kant that the consequences of our actions are not fully in our control
and so should not count in the moral appraisal of our actions?

1.1.4.4. Ross’s Prima Facie Duties or Moral Guidelines

A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes
prima facie duties. Sir William David Ross (15 April 1877 – 5 May 1971), usually cited as W. D. Ross,
was a Scottish philosopher, known for work in ethics. The term prima facie means “at a first sight” or “on
the surface.” By prima facie duties, Ross means duties that dictate what we should do when other moral
factors are not considered. Stated another way, prima facie duties are duties that generally obligate us; that
is, they ordinarily impose a moral obligation but may not in a particular case because of circumstances. An
actual duty is the action that one ought to perform after considering and weighing all the prima facie
duties involved.

According to W. D. Ross (1877-1971), there are several prima facie duties that we can use to determine
what, concretely, we ought to do. A prima facie duty is a duty that is binding (obligatory) other things
equal, that is, unless it is overridden or trumped by another duty or duties. Another way of putting it is that
where there is a prima facie duty to do something, there is at least a fairly strong presumption in favor of
doing it. An example of a prima facie duty is the duty to keep promises. Unless stronger moral
considerations override, one ought to keep a promise made. By contrast with prima facie duties, our
actual or concrete duty is the duty we should perform in the particular situation of choice. Whatever one's
actual duty is, one is morally bound to perform it. Prima facie duties relate to actual duties as reasons do to
conclusions of reasoning.

The term "duty" in "prima facie duty" is slightly misleading. The prima facie duties are understood as
guidelines, not rules without exception. If an action does not correspond to a specific guideline, one is not
necessarily violating a rule that one ought to follow. However, not following the rule one ought to follow
in a particular case is failing to do one's (actual) duty. In such cases it makes sense to talk about violating a
rule. The rule might be the same in words as a prima facie duty (minus the phrase "unless other moral
considerations override"), but it would no longer be merely a guideline because it describes what one
concretely should do.

Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are “part of the fundamental
nature of the universe.” However, Ross’s list the following categories of prima facie duties is much
shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:

27
 • Duties of Fidelity: the duty to keep promises and the obligation not to lie. Duties of fidelity are
duties to keep one’s promises and contracts and not to engage in deception.
• Duties of Reparation: This is a duty to make up for the injuries one has done to others. Ross
describes this duty as "resting on a previous wrongful act". It is the duty to compensate others
when we harm them. If, for example, I damage something that belongs to someone else, I have an
obligation to make restitution.
• Duties of Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us. Suppose, for example, an especially
good friend is suddenly in need of assistance, I am duty bound to do all I can help this individual,
who in the past had acted so selflessly toward me.
• Duties of Justice: The duty of justice requires that one act in such a way that one distributes
benefits and burdens fairly. Ross himself emphasizes the negative aspect of this duty: he says that
this type of duty "rests on the fact or possibility of a distribution of pleasure or happiness (or the
means thereto) that is not in accord with the merit of the persons concerned; in such cases there
arises a duty to upset or prevent such a distribution". Thus the duty of justice includes the duty,
insofar as possible, to prevent an unjust distribution of benefits or burdens.
• Duties of Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions of others. The duty to do good to others:
to foster their health, security, wisdom, moral goodness, or happiness. This duty, says Ross, "rests
upon the fact that there are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better in
respect of virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure."
• Duties of Self-improvement: The duty of self-improvement is to act so as to promote one’s own
good, i.e., one’s own health, security, wisdom, moral goodness, virtue, intelligence and happiness.
• Duties of Non-maleficence: The duty of non-injury (also known as non-maleficence) is the duty
not to harm others physically or psychologically: to avoid harming their health, security,
intelligence, character, or happiness. We are obliged to avoid hurting others physically,
emotionally and psychologically.

Jacques Thiroux (2001) claims that Ross' duty of non-injury includes a duty to prevent injury to others.
This seems to be wrong regarding Ross, but it might be reasonable to add such a prima facie duty to the
list. Non-injury in Ross' strict sense is distinct from the prevention of harm to others. Non-injury instructs
us generally to avoid intentionally, negligently, or ignorantly (when ignorance is avoidable) harming
others. Harm-prevention instructs us generally to make a real effort to prevent harm to others from causes
other than ourselves.

In summary, Ross presents seven categories of prima facie duties, although there may be more categories.
However, he does insist that we acknowledge and willingly accept the seven categories without argument.
His appeal for their acceptance does not rely primarily on reason and argument but on intuition. When

28
faced with a situation that presents conflicting prima facie duties, Ross tells us, the more obligatory, our
actual duty. The actual duty has the greatest amount of prima facie rightness over wrongness.

1.1.5. Virtue Ethics

Virtue Ethics: Challenging the adequacy of rule-based theories
“Virtue ethics” is a technical term in contemporary Western analytical moral philosophy, used to
distinguish a normative ethical theory focused on the virtues, or moral character, from others such as
deontology (or contractarianism) and consequentialism. Imagine a case in which it is agreed by every sort
of theorist that I should, say, help someone in need. A deontologist will emphasize the fact that in offering
help, I will be acting in accordance with a moral rule or principle such as “Do unto others as you would be
done by”; a consequentialist will point out that the consequences of helping will maximize well-being; and
a virtue ethicist will emphasize the fact that providing help would be charitable or benevolent – charity
and benevolence being virtues.

1.1.5.1. Aristotle’s Ethics

The ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.) first wrote a detailed discussion of virtue
morality in the Nichomachean Ethics. ‘Virtus’ he understood as strength. Correspondingly, specific
virtues are seen as strengths of character. But, many years after Aristotle’s death, virtue theory came to be
over-shadowed by the development of utilitarianism and deontology.

In the past fifty years, however, virtue theory has resurfaced as a major moral theory. But why is that so?
Virtue ethics has been restated and reinvigorated in the years since 1958 by philosophers such as Philippa
Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe. They and many others became disillusioned with the
promises of mainstream theories. They argue that how we ought to live could be much more adequately
answered by a virtue-based theory than in terms of calculating consequences or obeying rules.

With respect to the good, right, happiness, the good is not a disposition. The good involves a teleological
system that involves actions.
A. Good is that which all things aim. Something is good if it performs its proper function. E.g., a good
coffee cup or a good red oak.
o A right action is that which is conducive to the good, and different goods correspond to the
differing sciences and arts.
o "The god" or best good is that which is desired for its own sake and for the sake which we desire
all other ends or goods. For human beings, eudaemonia is activity of the soul in accordance
with arete (excellence, virtue, or what it's good for). Eudaemonia is living well and doing well in
the affairs of the world.
B. The good of human beings cannot be answered with the exactitude of a mathematical problem since
mathematics starts with general principles and argues to conclusions.

29
 o Ethics starts with actual moral judgments before the formulation of general principles.
o Aristotle presupposes natural tendencies in people.
C. Aristotle distinguishes between happiness (eudaemonia) and moral virtue:
o Moral virtue is not the end of life for it can go with inactivity, misery, and unhappiness
o Happiness, the end of life, that to which all aims, is activity in accordance with reason (reason is
the arete or peculiar excellence of persons).
a. Happiness is an activity involving both moral and intellectual arete.
b. Some external goods are necessary in order to exercise that activity.

The Good Character

A. People have a natural capacity for good character, and it is developed through practice. The
capacity does not come first--it's developed through practice.

o The sequence of human behavior raises the question of which is preeminent--acts or

dispositions. Their interaction is broken by Aristotle's distinction between acts which create good
dispositions and acts which flow from the good disposition once it has been created.
o Arete is a disposition developed out of a capacity by the proper exercise of that capacity.
o Habits are developed through acting; a person's character is the structure of habits and is formed
by what we do.

B. Virtue, arete, or excellence is defined as a mean between two extremes of excess and defect in
regard to a feeling or action as the practically wise person would determine it. The mean cannot be
calculated a priori.
o The mean is relative to the individual and circumstances. For example, consider the
following traits:

Aristotelian Virtues And Vice Of Deficiency Mean Or Virtue Vice Of Excess

Vices Sphere Of Action
Fear Cowardice courage foolhardiness

Pleasure and Pain Insensibility temperance self-indulgence

30
Acquisition (minor) tight wad liberality spendthrift or
prodigality

Acquisition (major) undue humility pride or proper ambition undue vanity

Anger Unirascibility patience or good temper hotheadedness

Self-Expression Self-deprecating truthfulness boastfulness

Conversation Boorishness wittiness buffoonery

Social Conduct Cantankerous friendliness obsequiousness

Exhibition Shamelessness modesty shyness

Indignation Spitefulness righteous indignation envy

o The level of courage necessary is different for a philosophy teacher, a commando, and a systems
programmer.

o Phronesis or practical wisdom is the ability to see the right thing to do in the circumstances.
Notice, especially, Aristotle's theory does not imply ethical relativism because there are
appropriate standards.
o In the ontological dimension, virtue is a mean; in the axiological dimension, it is an extreme or
excellence. Martin Luther King, Jr. relates his struggle to understand this difference in his "Letter
from Birmingham Jail" when he wrote, "You speak of our activity in Birmingham as extreme…
But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extremist, as I continued to think
about the matter I gradually gained a measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an
extremist for love…? Was not Amos an extremist for justice…? Was not Paul an extremist for the
Christian gospel…? Perhaps the South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative
extremists.''
o Some presumptively virtuous behaviors can be an extreme as when, for example, the medieval
philosopher Peter Abélard explains, No long time thereafter I was smitten with a grievous illness,
brought upon me by my immoderate zeal for study. (Peter Abélard, Historia Calamitatum trans.
Ralph Adams Cram (St. Paul, MN: Thomas A. Boyd, 1922), 4.)

31
 o In the ontological dimension, virtue is a mean; in the axiological dimension, it is an extreme or
excellence. E.g., Hartmann's Diagram:

➢ Pleasure and pain are powerful determinants of our actions.

III. Pleasure is the natural accompaniment of unimpeded activity. Pleasure, as such, is neither good nor
bad.
A. Even so, pleasure is something positive and its effect is to perfect the exercise of activity.
Everything from playing chess to making love is improved with skill.
B. Pleasure cannot be directly sought--it is the side-product of activity. It is only an element of
happiness.
C. The good person, the one who has attained eudaemonia, is the standard as to what is truly pleasant
or unpleasant.

IV. Friendship: a person's relationship to a friend is the same as the relation to oneself. The friend can be
thought of as a second self.
A. In friendship a person loves himself (egoism) not as one seeks money for himself, but as he gives
his money away to receive honor.
B. The kinds of friendship:
➢ Utility
➢ Pleasure
➢ The Good--endures as long as both retain their character.

V. The Contemplative Faculty--the exercise of perfect happiness in intellectual or philosophic activity.

A. Reason is the highest faculty of human beings. We can engage in it longer than other activities.
B. Philosophy is loved as an end-in-itself, and so eudaemonia implies leisure and self-sufficiency as an
environment for contemplation.
Aristotle on Pleasure
A summary of Aristotle's ethics clarifies several important distinction between happiness and pleasure.

32
 I. Eudaimonia: the state of personal wellbeing, having self-worth; exhibiting a zest for life; radiating
energy; achieving happiness, "good spirit," or self-presence.
II. Hence, happiness is activity of the soul in accordance with areté (excellence or virtue).
A. I.e. Living well and doing well in the affairs of the world.
B. Picture yourself at your best. Compare Maslow's self-actualizing person or Jung's
individuation of a person with Aristotle's description of eudaimonia.
III. Good is that to which all thing aim; i.e., the good is that which performs its proper function.
A. What constitutes a good wrench or a good coffee cup? The peculiar areté of excellence is
established by its purpose. The peculiar excellence is teleological.
B. What constitutes a good person?"
1) Activity of the soul in accordance with reason (that capacity which is unique to us as persons).
2) This activity is both moral (doing the right thing at the right time)
and intellectual areté (practical wisdom or phronesis).
3) Aristotle notes that some external goods are necessary for the exercise of that activity.
IV. Moral Virtue is not the end of life, for it can go with inactivity, misery, and unhappiness.
V. What is good for a person cannot be answered with the exactitude of mathematics.
A. Ethics attempts to formulate general principles whose application is dependent upon the
circumstances at hand (i.e., initial conditions). (Note that Aristotle's theory does not
imply ethical relativism)
B. The doctrine of the mean is not a doctrine of relativism but doctrine applied to specific
circumstances. E.g., what and how much one eats differs for a weight-lifter and a ballerina-
-even so, proper diet has guidelines and standards which apply differently according to
different initial conditions.
VI. Pleasure, itself, is a side-product of activity; pleasure results from activity without hindrance.
1) As Aristotle expresses it, pleasure is the natural accompaniment of unimpeded activity.
2) Pleasure, as such, is neither good nor bad, but is something positive because the effect of pleasure
perfects the exercise of that activity.
3) Even so, Aristotle emphasizes that pleasure is not to be sought for its own sake. (Cf., the hedonistic
paradox.)

1.2. Non-Normative Ethics/Meta-ethics

1.2.1. What is Meta-ethics?
Suppose I am debating with a friend the question whether or not we ought to give to famine relief,
whether or not we are morally obliged to give to famine relief. The sorts of questions philosophers raise
about this kind of debate fall roughly into two groups. First, there are first order questions about which
party in the debate, if any, is right, and why. Then, there are second order questions about what the parties
in the debate are doing when they engage in it. Roughly, the first order questions are the province of

33
normative ethics, and the second order questions are the province of meta ethics. As one recent writer puts
it:

In meta ethics, we are concerned not with questions which are the province of normative ethics like
'Should I give to famine relief?' or 'Should I return the wallet I found in the street?' but with questions
about questions like these.

Meta-ethics tries to answer question, such as:

 What does “good,” “right,” or “justice” mean?
 What makes something good or right?
 Is moral realism true?
 Is morality irreducible, cognitive, or overriding?
 Do intrinsic values exist?

It is important to be clear that in normative ethics we do not just look for an answer to the question
'Should we give to famine relief?' we also look for some insight into why the right answer is right. It is in
their answers to this latter sort of 'why?' question that the classic theories in normative ethics disagree.
Examples of such theories include:

 act-utilitarianism (one ought to give to famine relief because that particular action, of those
possible, contributes most to the greater happiness of the greatest number); rule-utilitarianism (one
ought to give to famine relief because giving to famine relief is prescribed by a rule the general
observance of which contributes most to the greater happiness of the greatest number); and

 Kantianism (one ought to give to famine relief because universal refusal to give to famine relief
would generate some kind of inconsistency).

Normative ethics thus seeks to discover the general principles underlying moral practice, and in this way
potentially impacts upon practical moral problems: different general principles may yield different
verdicts in particular cases. Meta-ethics, rather, concerned with questions about the following:

(a) Meaning: what is the semantic function of moral discourse? Is the function of moral discourse to
state facts, or does it have some other non-fact-stating role?
(b) Metaphysics: do moral facts (or properties) exist? If so, what are they like? Are they identical or
reducible to some other type of fact (or property) or are they irreducible and sui generis?
(c) Epistemology and justification: is there such a thing as moral knowledge? How can we know
whether our moral judgements are true or false? How can we ever justify our claims to moral
knowledge?

34
 (d) Phenomenology: how are moral qualities represented in the experience of an agent making a
moral judgement? Do they appear to be 'out there' in the world?

(e) Moral psychology: what can we say about the motivational state of someone making a moral
judgement? What sort of connection is there between making a moral judgement and being
motivated to act as that judgement prescribes?
(f) Objectivity: can moral judgements really be correct or incorrect? Can we work towards finding out
the moral truth?

Obviously, this list is not intended to be exhaustive, and the various questions are not all independent (for
example, a positive answer to (f) looks, on the face of it, to presuppose that the function of moral
discourse is to state facts). But it is worth noting that the list is much wider than many philosophers forty
or fifty years ago would have thought. For example, one such philosopher writes:

[Meta ethics] is not about what people ought to do. It is about what they are doing when they talk about
what they ought to do.

The idea that metaethics is exclusively about language was no doubt due to the more general idea that
philosophy as a whole has no function other than the study of ordinary language and that 'philosophical
problems' only arise from the application of words out of the contexts in which they are ordinarily used.
Fortunately, this 'ordinary language' conception of philosophy has long since ceased to hold sway, and the
list of meta ethical concerns – in metaphysics, epistemology, phenomenology and moral psychology, as
well as in semantics and the theory of meaning – bears this out. Positions in meta ethics can be defined in
terms of the answers they give to these sorts of question. Some examples of meta ethical theories are
moral realism, non-cognitivism, error-theory and moral anti-realism.

1.2.2. Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism

Consider a particular moral judgement, such as the judgement that murder is wrong. What sort of
psychological state does this express? Some philosophers, called cognitivists, think that a moral
judgement such as this expresses a belief. Beliefs can be true or false: they are truth-apt, or apt to be
assessed in terms of truth and falsity. So cognitivists think that moral judgements are capable of being true
or false. On the other hand, non-cognitivists think that moral judgements express non-cognitive states such
as emotions or desires. Desires and emotions are not truth-apt. So moral judgements are not capable of
being true or false. (Note that, although it may be true that I have a desire for a pint of beer and false that I
have a desire to see Ethiopia win the World Cup, this does not imply that desires themselves can be true or
false.)

35
 1.2.2.1. Strong Cognitivism: Naturalism
A strong cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements (a) are apt for evaluation in terms of
truth and falsity, and (b) can be the upshot of cognitively accessing the facts which render them true.
Strong cognitivist theories can be either naturalist or non-naturalist. According to a naturalist, a moral
judgement is rendered true or false by a natural state of affairs, and it is this natural state of affairs to
which a true moral judgement affords us access. But what is a natural state of affairs? G. E. Moore's
characterization: “By 'nature', then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject matter of the
natural sciences and also of psychology.”

A natural property is a property which figures in one of the natural sciences or in psychology: examples
might include the property of being conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number and the
property of being conducive to the preservation of the human species. A natural state of affairs is simply a
state of affairs that consists in the instantiation of a natural property.

Naturalist cognitivists hold that moral properties are identical to (or reducible to) natural properties. The
Cornell realists (e.g. Nicholas Sturgeon, Richard Boyd, and David Brink) think that moral properties are
irreducible natural properties in their own right. Naturalist reductionists (e.g. Richard that moral properties
are reducible to the other natural properties that are the subject matter of the natural sciences and
psychology. Both the Cornell realists and the naturalist reductionists are moral realists: they think that
there really are moral facts and moral properties, and that the existence of these moral facts and
instantiation of these moral properties is constitutively independent of human opinion.

1.2.2.1.1. Strong Cognitivism: Non-Naturalism

Non-naturalists think that moral properties are not identical to or reducible to natural properties. They are
irreducible and sui generis. We will look at two types of strong cognitivist non-naturalism: Moore's ethical
non-naturalism, as developed in his Principia Ethica (first published in 1903), according to which the
property of moral goodness is non-natural, simple, and unanalysable; and the contemporary version of
non-naturalism that has been developed by John McDowell and David Wiggins (roughly from the 1970s
to the present day). Again, both types of non-naturalist are moral realists: they think that there really are
moral facts and moral properties, and that the existence of these moral facts and instantiation of these
moral properties is constitutively independent of human opinion.

1.2.2.1.2. Strong Cognitivism without Moral Realism: Mackie's 'Error-Theory'

John Mackie has argued that although moral judgements are apt to be true or false, and that moral
judgements, if true, would afford us cognitive access to moral facts, moral judgements are in fact always
false. This is because there simply are no moral facts or properties in the world of the sort required to
render our moral judgements true: we have no plausible epistemological account of how we could access
such facts and properties, and, moreover, such properties and facts would be metaphysically queer, unlike

36
anything else in the universe as we know it. A moral property would have to be such that the mere
apprehension of it by a moral agent would be sufficient to motivate that agent to act. Mackie finds this
idea utterly problematic. He concludes that there are no moral properties or moral facts, so that (positive,
atomic) moral judgements are uniformly false: our moral thinking involves us in a radical error. Because
Mackie denies that there are moral facts or properties, he is not a moral realist, but a moral antirealist.

1.2.2.1.3. Weak Cognitivism about Morals without Moral Realism: 'Best Opinion' Theories
A weak cognitivist theory is one which holds that moral judgements
(a) are apt for evaluation in terms of truth and falsity, but
(b) cannot be the upshot of cognitive access to moral properties and states of affairs.

Weak cognitivism thus agrees with strong cognitivism on (a), but disagrees on (b). An example of a weak
cognitivist theory would be one which held that our best judgements about morals determine the
extensions of moral predicates, rather than being based upon some faculty which tracks, detects or
cognitively accesses facts about the instantiation of moral properties. (The extension of a predicate is the
class of things, events or objects to which that predicate may correctly be applied.)

Moral judgements are thus capable of being true or false, even though they are not based on a faculty with
a tracking, accessing or detecting role - in other words, even though true moral judgements are not the
upshot of cognitive access to moral states of affairs. This view thus rejects moral realism, not by denying
the existence of moral facts (like the error-theory), but by denying that those facts are constitutively
independent of human opinion.

1.2.3. Non-Cognitivism
Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgements are even apt to be true or false. Non-cognitivists thus
disagree with both weak and strong cognitivism. We shall look at a number of arguments which the non-
cognitivist uses against cognitivism. An example of such an argument is the argument from moral
psychology. Suppose that moral judgements can express beliefs, as the cognitivist claims. Being motivated
to do something or to pursue a course of action is always a matter of having a belief and a desire. For
example, I am motivated to reach for the fridge because I believe that it contains water and I have a desire
for water. But it is an internal and necessary fact about an agent that, if she sincerely judges that X is
good, she is motivated to pursue the course of action X. So if a moral judgement expressed a belief, it
would have to be a belief which sustained an internal and necessary connection to a desire: it would have
to be a necessary truth that an agent who possessed the belief would inter alia possess the desire. But no
belief is necessarily connected to a desire because, as Hume claimed, 'beliefs and desires are distinct
existences', and it is impossible to have a necessary connection between distinct existences. So it cannot
be the case that moral judgements express beliefs. So moral judgements are not truth-apt. If moral
judgements cannot express beliefs, what do they express?

37
We shall look at three versions of non-cognitivism which give different answers to this question:

✓ J. Ayer's emotivism (1936), according to which moral judgements express emotions, or sentiments
of approval or disapproval;
✓ Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism (1984), according to which moral judgements express our
dispositions to form sentiments of approval or disapproval; and
✓ Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism (1990), according to which our moral judgements express our
acceptance of norms.

Perhaps the main challenge to non-cognitivism is what is called the Frege - Geach problem. According to
emotivism, for example, judging that murder is wrong is really just like shouting 'Boo for murder!' (when
I shout 'Boo!' I am evincing my disapproval; I am not attempting to describe something). But what about
'If murder is wrong, then it is wrong to murder your mother-in-law'? This makes sense. But on the
emotivist interpretation it doesn't (what would it sound like on an emotivist interpretation?).

1.2.3.1. Internalism and Externalism, Humeanism and Anti- Humeanism

One of the premises in the argument from moral psychology above is the claim that there is an internal
and necessary connection between sincerely making a moral judgement and being motivated to act in the
manner prescribed by that judgement. This claim is known as internalism, because it says that there is an
internal or conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation.

Activity:
Make note of some of the ethical behavior you witness in your family. How would you classify
these behaviors? What impact do they have on your life? Write up your findings.

Some cognitivist philosophers respond to the argument from moral psychology by denying internalism.
They claim that the connection between judgement and motivation is only external and contingent. Such
philosophers are known as externalists. Other cognitivist philosophers respond to the argument from
moral psychology by denying another premise of the argument, the claim that motivation always involves
the presence of both beliefs and desires (this premise is known as the Humean theory of motivation, since
it received a classic exposition by Hume). McDowell and Wiggins advance an anti-Humean theory of
motivation, according to which beliefs themselves can be intrinsically motivating.

Generally, Meta-ethics:
• Examines the meaning of moral terms and concepts and the relationships between these
concepts.
• Explores where moral values, such as ‘personhood’ and ‘autonomy’, come from.
• Considers the difference between moral values and other kinds of values.

38
 • Examines the way in which moral claims are justified.
Meta-ethics also poses questions of the following kind:
✓ What do we mean by the claim, ‘life is sacred’?
✓ Are moral claims a matter of personal view, religious belief or social standard, or, are
they objective in some sense?
✓ If they are objective, what make them so?
Is there a link between human psychology and the moral claims that humans make?

Chapter Summary
Ethics is one of the most important disciplines that need to be thought to the students to adopt ethical
behavior with respect to good life. It promotes healthy society and fulfilling experience for individual. In
the globalized era, we find that “Ethics will be one of the enablers of competitiveness.” Stressing the
centrality of ethics in the human experience can be a greater favor to humankind in general, and to our
society in particular, to be growing and prosper by qualities that are essentially and absolutely ethical.

Morality Concerned about habits, customs, ways of life, especially when these are assessed as good or
bad, right or wrong. Moral values help to regulate the behavior as a standard. Such values help to maintain
the society and act uniformly. They bring about peace and stability. So individuals have a moral
responsibility to respect and maintain the value of their society and refrain from committing things that
disturb its stability and peace.

While utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue theory have been in place in the canon of moral philosophy
for centuries, they have not remained fixed and static as theories. Volumes have been written which
critique elements of these theories, sharpening them for greater clarity and, attuning them more to the
fullness of human living. In addition, insights into moral living come in fresh forms, breathing new life
into the traditional moral canon. This is the case with contemporary ethical theories such as principlism,
narrative ethics and feminist ethics. In these we find new insights that attempt a number of tasks: to offer
developments of, and improvements on, essential features of traditional theories, to fill in the dimensions
of human living that were often omitted or understated in traditional theorizing and to acknowledge that
the challenges of moral development require that we move from a realm of moral abstractions to concrete
situations.

39