Case No. 8 [G.R. Nos. L-74053-54. January 20, 1988.

]
People of the Philippines and San Miguel Corporation, petitioners, vs. Nathaniel Grospe,
Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga and Manuel Parulan,
respondents.

Facts:
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San
Miguel Corporation “SMC” in Bulacan. In Criminal Case no. 2800 he was charged with violation
of bouncing check law (BP 22) and in Criminal Case no. 2813, he was charged with Estafa under
Art. 315 paragraph 2(d) of RPC. Two cases were filed in RTC Pampanga and tried jointly as the
witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same.

The respondent Judge dismissed the case insofar as the essential elements involving
dishonored checks did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but
rather in Bulacan.

Based on the foregoing decision, this Petition for Certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two
criminal cases on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the
order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the
order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject Respondent-accused to double
jeopardy.

Issues:
1. W/N venue was sufficiently conferred in RTC Pampanga in the two joint cases
2. W/N a petition for certiorari is proper in this case
3. W/N this present condition for certiorari will place respondent-accused in double
jeopardy
4.
Ruling:

1. A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
province where the offense was in part committed. In this case, deceit took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga (where the check was delivered and deposited) while the damage
was inflicted in Bulacan. Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either Bulacan or
Pampanga Court.

2. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by respondent-judge predicated on his lack of
jurisdiction, is correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not
an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering
jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of
grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
3. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of Respondent
Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will
be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a
dismissal upon Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial
jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on
the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense.

Case No. 9 [G.R. No. 106847. March 5, 1993.]

Patricio P. Diaz, petitioner vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, RTC, Br. 8, Marawi City, Sultan Macorro L.
Macumbal, Sultan Linog M. Indol, Macabangkit Lanto and Mohamadali Abedin, respondents

Facts:
On 16 July 1991, the Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato City,
published in its front page the news article captioned "6-Point Complaint Filed vs. Macumbal,"
and in its Publisher's Notes the editorial, "Toll of Corruption," which exposed alleged anomalies
by key officials in the Regional Office of the DENR.

The names mentioned in the news article, who are the private respondents of this case,
instituted separate criminal and civil complaints arising from the libel before the City
Prosecutor's Office and the Regional Trial Court in Marawi City. The publisher-editor of the
Mindanao Kris, petitioner Patricio P. Diaz, and Mamala B. Pagandaman, who executed a sworn
statement attesting to the alleged corruption, were named respondents in both complaints. In
1991, the City Prosecutor’s office dismissed the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction and the
case be filed in Cotabato City where complainants officially holding office and respondents
caused the publication.

On 18 November 1991, petitioner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for damages on
the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. He vehemently
argued that the complaint should have been filed in Cotabato City and not in Marawi City.
On 15 June 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Petitioner thereafter moved for reconsideration of the order of denial which was also denied in
an Order of 27 August 1991.

Issue:
W/N the complaint from private respondents against the petitioner in this case be filed in
Cotabato City and not in Marawi City

Ruling:
The petitioner is correct. Not one of the respondents then held office in Marawi City. From the
provision of Article 360, 3rd Para. of RPC as amended by RA 4363, it is clear that an offended
party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in
two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published.

Case No. 10 [G.R. No. 218255. April 11, 2018.]

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Jerry Bugna y Britanico, accussed-appellant

Facts:
In two separate information dated 28 March 2008, Bugna was charged with two counts of Rape
committed against his very own daughter, AAA on April 7, 2008 and December 21, 2007

During his arraignment on 16 July 2008, Bugna, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to both counts of rape. The prosecution presented AAA and Dr. Neil T. Crespo (Dr.
Crespo) as witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to establish that on sometime April
2007 and December 21, 2007 Bugna pulled her shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA felt pain in her genitals. AAA was able to report the December 21 incident to her mother.
On 2 January 2008, Dr. Crespo conducted a physical examination on AAA, wherein he noted
that AAA's genital area had healed lacerations.

The defense presented Bugna as its lone witness whose testimony sought to prove that on April
4, 2007, at around 8:30 A.M., Bugna travelled with his ducks to Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, and
stayed there until 1 May 2007. Thereafter, he went to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, until 31
December 2007, and was never able to go back home.

The ruling of RTC was Bugna guilty of two counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt. The trial
court noted that AAA positively identified her father as her assailant; as such, Bugna's defense
of denial and alibi deserved scant consideration. He is further ordered to pay the private
offended party the amount of P50,000.00 in each case, as moral damages.

Aggrieved, Bugna appealed before the CA. In its assailed 17 December 2014 decision, the CA
substantially affirmed the RTC judgment and modified of the award of civil indemnity.

Issue:
W/N the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Ruling:
All the foregoing elements of qualified rape are present to convict Bugna for two counts of rape
committed against AAA. After a careful scrutiny of the records, the Court finds no reason to
depart from the findings of the courts a quo. It is settled that an accused may be convicted
based solely on the testimony of the witness, provided that it is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Case No. 11 [G.R. No. 122150. March 17, 2023.]
George (Culhi) Hambon, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Valentino U. Carantes, respondents

Counsel: Solomon R. Chungalao for petitioner

Richard A. Carino for private respondent

Facts:
Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a complaint for damages
for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the respondent bumped
him on the night of December 9, 1985.

Respondent answered that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No.
2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,
had already been provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on
March 23, 1987, due to petitioner's lack of interest; and that the dismissal was with respect to
both criminal and civil liabilities of respondent.

After trial, RTC rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not
barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner's complaint for damages since
the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it
was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried
with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was
provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

Petitioner argues that a civil action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the
criminal action even without reservation to file the same has been made; and that the
requirement of reservation, as provided in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically
diminished/amended/modified his substantial right. To reserve his right to claim for damages,
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988, is the prevailing and governing law in this
case

Issues:
1. W/N the respondent can file a civil action for damages despite the absence of reservation;
2. W/N the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action;
3. W/N the reservation requirement is substantive in character and beyond the rule-making
power of the Court.

Ruling:
The Court expounded that it clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
have been instituted with the criminal case. In other words, the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed
instituted with the criminal action.

Petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for
damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly
instituted therein was likewise dismissed.

Case No. 12 [G.R. No. 182210. March 7, 2012.]

Paz Bernado, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondent

Facts:
In June 1991, Petitioner obtained a loan from the private complainant Bumanglag amounting to
P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991. On May 28, 2003, RTC
Makati City, Branch 56 convicted the petitioner of five (5) counts of violation B.P. 22. The trial
court sentenced her to one (1) year imprisonment for each count, and to pay back toprivate
complainant the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty charges, from
December 1, 1991 until full payment.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner's conviction, but deleted the penalty of
imprisonment. It imposed a P460,000.00 fine and ordered the petitioner to indemnify private
complainant Bumanglag P460,000.00, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution of the
criminal charges in court until full payment.

When the CA denied her motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition.

On March 14, 2011, the petitioner's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on
February 3, 2011. In a November 23, 2011 Resolution, the Court required the petitioner's
counsel to submit a duly authenticated copy of the petitioner's death certificate. On January 17,
2012, the petitioner's counsel submitted the petitioner's duly authenticated death certificate.

They argued that Bernardo's death extinguished her civil liability. In the alternative, they
contended that any civil liability should be settled in a separate civil case.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner’s death extinguished her civil liability

Ruling:
It is an established principle that the death of the accused pending final adjudication of the
criminal case extinguishes the accused's criminal liability. If the civil liability directly arose from
and is based solely on the offense committed, then the civil liability is likewise extinguished

However, In this case, the petitioner's civil liability for the recovery of the face value of the
checks does not appear to directly result from, or is based solely on, the crime of violation of
B.P. 22, but on a contract of loan between the petitioner and the private complainant,
evidenced by a June 1991 promissory note. Thus, the civil liability survives and an action for
recovery can be instituted in a separate civil action either against the executor or administrator
of the estate of the petitioner. Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case
despite her death.

Therefore, the heirs of the deceased petitioner, Paz T. Bernardo, namely Mapalad Bernardo,
Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos, are ordered to be
impleaded, and to appear and substitute for the deceased petitioner in the present petition on
the civil liability aspects of this case.

Case No. 13
[G.R. No. 163879. July 30, 2014.]
Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines and spouses Rodolfo M. Palma
and Rosario F. Palma, respondents.

[G.R. No. 165805. July 30, 2014.]

Dr. Clenio Ynzon, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines and Spouses Rodolfo M. Palma and
Rosario F. Palma, respondents.

Facts:

The abovenamed accused Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon, being then the attending physicians of
Rodolfo Palma Jr. (“JR”), who unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness
and imprudence to perform immediate operation of their patient’s disease (acute appendicitis)
and caused him to die due to cardiorespiratory arrest, acute appendicitis, and cerebral
aneurysm ruptured.
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the
legal heirs of said deceased JR and other consequential damages relative thereto.

No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was

filed against accused for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both
accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.

On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following
circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that accused were indeed negligent in the
performance of their duties. On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused's conviction, the Court of
Appeals gave similar observations.

Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule.
The Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of the court are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts. In the instant case, we find the need to
make certain exception.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to
perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecution's own expert witness, Dr. Antonio
Mateo and Dr. Vivenco Villaflor testified during cross-examinations. Based on the said
examinations, it is clear that if JR's condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in
his death, as what actually happened in the present case.

Issues:

1. Whether the cause of accusation as contained in the information is "failure to perform

immediate operation upon the patient JR of acute appendicitis;
2. Whether the subject information appears to have accused both accused doctors of
conspiracy and the appealed decision seems to have treated both accused doctors to be
in conspiracy;
3. Whether petitioner Dr. Cabugao is a general practitioner (not a surgeon) and have
excluded surgery from the limits of his practice, and it was not and never his duty to
operate the patient JR, that was why he referred subject patient to a surgeon, Dr.
Ynzon;
4. Whether the defense never stated that there is guarantee that doing surgery would
have saved the patient; dactsh
5. Whether the witnesses for the prosecution including prosecution's expert witnesses
ever declared/testified that petitioner Dr. Cabugao had the duty to perform immediate
operation on JR, and they failed to state/show that the proximate cause of death of JR
was acute appendicitis;
6. Whether the expert witnesses presented by the prosecution ever questioned the
management and care applied by petitioner Dr. Cabugao
 7. Whether the expert witnesses presented by the defense are unanimous in approving
the method of treatment applied by both accused doctors on subject patient, and they
declared/affirmed that they would first place subject the patient under observation, and
would not perform immediate operation;
8. Whether the conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon was established with the required
quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the patient was specifically suffering
from and died of acute appendicitis; and
9. Whether the failure to conduct the specific surgical operation known as appendectomy
constituted criminal negligence.

In a nutshell, the petitions brought before this Court raise the issue of whether or not
petitioners' conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from
an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

Ruling:
From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr.
Ynzon failed to practice that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient
and observe the required standard of care expected from doctors.
Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR by
neglecting to monitor effectively the developments and changes on JR's condition during the
observation period, and to act upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his abdominal
pain persisted and his condition worsened, most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an
inexcusable lack of precaution.

The Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr. Cabugao is guilty of reckless
imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Therefore, petitioner Dr. Antonio Cabugao is acquitted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide. Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of
this case, his criminal liability is extinguished. the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is
not based on delict but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.