Cerezo v. Tuazon (G.R. No. 141538)

HERMANA R.
CEREZO, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID TUAZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 141538
March 23, 2004
Topic:
 Vicarious Liability (those in which under their supervision)
Facts:
Sometime in June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle,
driven by respondent David Tuazon, along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Respondent Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Hermana
Cerezo, as owner of the bus, her husband Atty. Juan Cerezo, and bus driver Danilo Foronda.
After considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in
Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was
no service of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages
sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. On appeal, Spouses Cerezo questioned whether the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the
Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party. However, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for certiorari and affirmed the trial court’s order. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is lack of
jurisdiction. Moreover, she asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it
failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Petitioner points out that there was no service of
summons on Foronda. In addition, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil
action for damages in the criminal action.
Issue:
Whether or not the bus driver is an indispensable party to the instant case.
Ruling:
No. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the
present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action
because he opted to file a civil action for damages against petitioner who is primarily and
directly liable for her own civil negligence.
An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action.
There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict,
affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. Here, respondent Tuazon chose to
file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, Foronda is
not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by
the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
However, petitioner’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary,
it is also primary and direct.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable
for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full.
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other
is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs.
Cerezo alone. Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct,
while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. Although liability under
Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the
employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has
himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the
fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the
employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his
own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his
employee. Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over petitioner is sufficient to dispose of the
present case on the merits.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved
party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict and corresponding primary
liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s
jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict
of petitioner and not for the delict of Foronda.

Cerezo v. Tuazon (G.R. No. 141538)

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HERMANA R.

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