ABRC PRE-WEEK REVIEW MATERIALS 2021

JUSTICE LEONEN CASES

CRIMINAL LAW

Dangerous Druges; Presence of 3 witnesses

AUGUSTO REGALADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 216632, March 13,
2019

FACTS: Augusto Regalado was charged with two (2) counts of violating Article II, Section 11
of Republic Act No. 9165 before the Regional Trial Court.

According to the prosecution, a buy-bust operation, with a team of five officers, was conducted
on December 17, 2002. Regalado had sold marijuana to PO1 Pedrigal in exchange of 200 pesos.
The rest of the team rushed to Regalado’s house, identified themselves as police officers, and
arrested him.

Upon the arrest, Regalado admitted having more, pointing to the roof of his house. He turned
over to PO1 Pedrigal a milk box that allegedly had two (2) plastic sachets and four (4) sticks of
marijuana. PO1 Pedrigal kept all the confiscated pieces of evidence.

The police officers informed Regalado of his constitutional rights in Tagalog. Then, after informing
Barangay Captain Isidro Palomares of what had transpired, they brought Regalado to the police
station.

At the police station, PO1 Pedrigal marked with initials "AR" the three (3) plastic sachets and four
(4) sticks of suspected marijuana. He later turned them over, along with the marked money, to
the investigator, PO2 Llante. PO2 Llante then brought the seized evidence, along with a Request
for Laboratory Examination, to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Canlubang,
Laguna to have them tested for the presence of illegal drugs. Police Chief Inspector Lorna Tria
(Chief Inspector Tria), the forensic chemist, confirmed upon a laboratory examination that the
confiscated items were indeed marijuana.

Regalado denied handing the marijuana to PO1 Pedrigal and maintained that the latter took it
from the teenager. He claimed that he signed the confiscation receipt despite not understanding
it as he did not know how to read. He likewise testified that he was not informed of his
constitutional rights.

The Regional Trial Court found Regalado guilty of violating Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165 in one criminal case but has acquitted him in the second case. On appeal, Regalado
argued that the apprehending team failed to prove the integrity and identity of the seized items
under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. However, the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal.

Hence, Regalado filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. He contended
that there was no elected official, media representative, or Department of Justice representative
present during the physical inventory of the seized items; that no photographs of the seized items
were presented in court; that the seized items were not immediately marked after his arrest; and
that there was no sufficient evidence to establish the chain of custody.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of an elective official, a representative from the media, and a
representative from the Department of Justice during the buy-bust operation, as well as the non-
presentation of the photographs of the seized marijuana before the trial court warrants petitioner
Augusto L. Regalado's acquittal?

RULING:

The records show nothing that warrants a reversal of the Decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court. The allegations in both Informations, despite the buy-bust operation,
charged petitioner with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, not sale. In the conviction of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused was
in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug.

Here, the testimonies of the law enforcers who conducted the buy-bust operation are clear and
categorical. They recalled in detail the buy-bust operation and the steps they had taken to
maintain the integrity of the seized marijuana. Petitioner's free and conscious possession of the
dangerous drug has been established, warranting his conviction

However, the Court laments the prosecution’s apparent nonchalance in observing the
procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. The requirements under Section 21 were summarized in Lescano v. People:

As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, requires the performance of two (2) actions: physical
inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when and where these actions must
be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and confiscation." As to where, it
depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search warrant. If a search warrant was
served, the physical inventory and photographing must be done at the exact same place that the
search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, these actions must be done "at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable."

Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the physical
inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s from whom
the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative of the
National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third.
As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there
are two (2) alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her
counsel. As to the representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative
of the media may be present in his or her place.

In People v. Que, the Court explained how Republic Act No. 10640 relaxed the requirements
under Section 21(1):

It was relaxed with respect to the persons required to be present during the physical inventory
and photographing of the seized items. Originally under Republic Act No. 9165, the use of the
conjunctive "and" indicated that Section 21 required the presence of all of the following, in
addition to "the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel":

First, a representative from the media; Second, a representative from the Department of Justice;
and Third, any elected public official.

As amended by Republic Act No. 10640, Section 21 (1) uses the disjunctive "or," i.e., "with
an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or
the media." Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the
National Prosecution Service are now alternatives to each other.

Here, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21(1), as originally worded, was present
during the physical inventory of the seized items.

Moreover, this Court has held that the prosecution has "the positive duty to establish that earnest
efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21 (1) of
[Republic Act No.] 9165, or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so."

Yet, not only did the prosecution fail to establish that earnest efforts were employed in securing
the presence of the three (3) witnesses; it did not even bother to offer any justification for the
law enforcers' deviation from the law's requirements. Since preliminaries do not appear on record,
this Court cannot speculate why the law enforcers neglected the simple rules in the conduct of a
buy-bust operation. Nonetheless, police officers are reminded that lapses like this—absent any
justifiable ground—cast doubt on the integrity of the seized items and can be fatal to the
prosecution's cause.

Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Theft

Monico Ligtas vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

Facts: Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged with theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
he pleaded not guilty. According to the prosecution, Anecita Pacate (Pacate) was the owner of
an abaca plantation in Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 2000, Cabero and
Cipres, among others went to harvest abaca upon Anecita Pacate’s instructions. There they found
Lights and 3 unidentified men harvesting abaca, and threatened them that there would be loss
of life if they persisted harvesting. After reporting the incident to Pacate and the police, Cabero
and Cipres later went back to the plantations and surveyed a loss of 1000 kilos of Abaca worth
28 per kilo. Ligtas and Pacate confronted each other at the police station, Lights admitted to
harvesting abaca but insisted it was his own plantation.

According to the defense, Ligtas had been a tenant of Pacate and her late husband Andres since
1993, and that Andres installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to 2 hectares of the subject land herein
involved. Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000 Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the
land he cultivated, whom Ligtas prevented since he was the rightful tenant of the land. Further,
Ligtas denied harvesting on June 29, 2000 because he was out with Cabero and Cipres attending
a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan when the crime was committed. Ligtas meanwhile filed with
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for
maintenance of Peaceful Possession, the DARAB ruled that Lights was bona fide tenant of the
land. While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence
before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals (CA) and without objection from the People of the Philippines.

The RTC convicted Ligtas of theft, since his defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete
and substantial evidence, nor was his claim of harvest sharing corroborated by any witness, and
his alibi subordinate as negated by positive identification of prosecution witnesses. Ligtas
appealed to the CA, but was dismissed, affirming the RTC decision. His motion for reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition assailing the CA decision and resolution.

Issue:

1. Whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned
by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod,
Southern Leyte is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of
petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

II

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are

independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a
criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is
administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed
and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence
presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented
in the criminal cases. x
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of
facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal
and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of
whether there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while
Criminal Case No. R-225 involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However,
the tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft were proven
by the prosecution.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are
entitled to respect if supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again
"the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as
to] the sufficiency of evidence."

VI

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal property of another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or
make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner’s consent; (4) there was intent
to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or
force upon things.

Tenants have been defined as:

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm
households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both
under the leasehold tenancy system. (Citation omitted)

Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The
landowner’s share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the
harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner’s consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest
the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People, this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the
basis of reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's
part. It failed to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his
knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."There were doubts
as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot
when petitioner had planted her own plants adjacent to it. Thus, it was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private complainant. This court found that
petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the case,
she could not have had a criminal intent."

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a
legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have
been taken, but it is with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime
until proven guilty. "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person." Thus, courts must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of
innocence[.]"Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of
which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the accused must be given the
benefit of doubt and should be acquitted."

Justifying Circumstances

Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velasquez v People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195021,
March 15, 2017

Facts: On May 24, 2003, spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo left their home to sleep in their nipa
hut, about 100m away from their house. The Del Mundo spouses saw Ampong and Nora Castillo
having sex upon arriving at the nipa hit. Aghast at what he perceived to be a defilement of his
property, Jesus Del Mundo shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora who both scampered away.
Jesus decided to pursue them while leaving Ana to fetch their son. Jesus went to the hime when
he was blocked by Ampong and his fellow accused. Petitioners, along with 4 others, executed
blows that left Jesus on the ground. He crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the
accused might return. He got up, and was able to come back to their house.

Ana and Maria Teresita Viado went on to look for Jesus. Maria Teresita hid behind some bamboos
when she heard a sound of a man being beaten. She then saw the accused mauling Jesus.

Issue: Whether petitioners may be held criminally liable for the physical harm inflicted on Jesus
Del Mundo. More specifically, this Court is asked to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence: first, to prove that justifying circumstances existed, and second, to convict the
petitioners.

Ruling:

Petitioners' defense centers on their claim that they acted in defense of themselves, and also in
defense of Mercedes, Nicolas' wife and Victor's mother. Thus, they invoke the first and second
justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives
by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon
another person - a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or
she may have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming
danger upon his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of
protective harm to an erstwhile aggressor.

The accused's admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of
proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability.
All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she
did. To this end, the accused's case must rise on its own merits:

It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the
victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense,
the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish:

(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense."

Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same
first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in case the provocation
was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein."

The first requisite - unlawful aggression - is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and defense
of a relative:

At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed
against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and
this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are
present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the
life and limb of the person claiming self-defense.

The second requisite - reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression - requires a reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the
defensive response: "[t]he means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense." This is a matter that depends
on the circumstances:

Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between
the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the
consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to
which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or
impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
rests upon the imminent danger of such injury . . . As WE stated in the case of People vs. Lara,
in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the
act irresponsible in law for the consequences.

The third requisite - lack of sufficient provocation - requires the person mounting a defense to be
reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching
an assault. This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-
Caballero, "provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that is, adequate
enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense."

II

We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be sorely
wanting.
Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by barging
into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening physical harm
upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression originated from Jesus.

Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative requires,

petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared
out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present independent
and credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly
dubious that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate an attack for no
apparent reason.

The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that Jesus
launched an assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners, Mercedes,
and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his assault despite
being outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts to restrain Jesus.
His persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them that, to neutralize him, they had no other
recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3) times, and to hit him on the
back with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with less severe blows.

As the Regional Trial Court noted, however:

The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big difference in the physical built of the private
complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del
Mundo, private complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused. The said
accused could have had easily held the private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim,
and disarmed him without the need of hitting him.

The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:

3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left

1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left

Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm

Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm

Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.

Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by
petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression.
Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a
relative.

III

In addition to their tale of self-defense, petitioners insist that the testimony of Maria Teresita is
not worthy of trust because she parted ways with Ana while searching for Jesus. They characterize
Maria Teresita as the prosecution's "lone eyewitness." They make it appear that its entire case
hinges on her. Thus, they theorize that with the shattering of her credibility comes the complete
and utter ruin of the prosecution's case. Petitioners claim that Maria Teresita is the prosecution's
lone eyewitness at the same time that they aclmowledge Jesus' testimony, which they dismissed
as laden with inconsistencies.

These contentions no longer merit consideration.

Petitioners' averment of justifying circumstances was dispensed with the need for even passing
upon their assertions against Maria Teresita's and Jesus' testimonies. Upon their mere invocation
of self-defense and defense of a relative, they relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving
the acts constitutive of the offense. They took upon themselves the burden of establishing their
innocence, and cast their lot on their capacity to prove their own affirmative allegations.
Unfortunately for them, they failed.
Even if we were to extend them a measure of consideration, their contentions fail to impress.

Petitioners' primordial characterization of Maria Teresita as the "lone eyewitness," upon whose
testimony the prosecution's case was to rise or fall, is plainly erroneous. Apart from her, Jesus
testified about his own experience of being mauled by petitioners and their co-accused. Maria
Teresita's testimony was only in support of what Jesus recounted.

Moreover, we fail to see how the mere fact of Maria Teresita's having parted ways with Ana while
searching for Jesus diminishes her credibility. No extraordinary explanation is necessary for this.
Their having proceeded separately may be accounted for simply by the wisdom of how
independent searches enabled them to cover more ground in less time.

Regarding Jesus' recollection of events, petitioners' contention centers on Jesus' supposedly

flawed recollection of who among the six (6) accused dealt him, which specific blow, and using
which specific weapon. These contentions are too trivial to even warrant an independent, point
by point audit by this Court.

Jurisprudence is replete with clarifications that a witness' recollection of crime need not be
foolproof: "Witnesses cannot be expected to recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an
event. This is especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in rapid
succession, attended by flurry and excitement." This is especially true of a victim's recollection of
his or her own harrowing ordeal. One who has undergone a horrifying and traumatic experience
"cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account" of every minutiae.

Certainly, Jesus' supposed inconsistencies on the intricacies of who struck him which specific blow
can be forgiven. The merit of Jesus' testimony does not depend on whether he has an
extraordinary memory despite being hit on the head multiple times. Rather, it is in his credible
narration of his entire ordeal, and how petitioners and their co-accused were its authors. On this,
his testimony was unequivocal.

VAWC

STEVEN R. PAVLOW v. CHERRY L. MENDENILLA, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

FACTS:

Pavlow is an American citizen. He married Maria Shella, a Filipino. Barely three (3) months into
their marriage, on May 31, 2005, Maria Sheila filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Pavlow for slight
physical injuries. On June 3, 2005, Maria Sheila filed an Amended Complaint-Affidavit to include
maltreatment in relation to the Anti-VAWC Law as a ground.

On August 25, 2005, Makati Assistant City Prosecutor Romel S. Odronia issued a resolution
dismissing Maria Sheila's criminal complaint, holding that Maria Sheila failed to substantiate her
allegations. Following this, Mendenilla filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court a Petition
for Maria Sheila's benefit, praying for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent
Protection Order under the Anti-VAWC Law.

In her petition, Mendenilla recalled the same ordeal recounted by Maria Sheila in her own criminal
complaint. She claimed tha she had been aware of her daughter's ordeal and that on July 21,
2005, Maria Sheila was admitted to St. Agnes General Hospital for injuries borne by Pavlow's
alleged acts of violence.

On August 31, 2005, Judge Giron-Dizon issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of Maria
Sheila. Issued along with this Order was a Summons addressed to Pavlow. Pavlow filed a motion
to dismiss but such was denied.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla had personality to file a petition for the issuance of
a protection order under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter, Maria
Sheila Mendenilla – Pavlow?
2. Whether respondent Mendenilla engaged in forum shopping by filing a petition for the issuance
of a protection order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was dismissed by the
prosecutor?

RULING:

1. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly
given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b)
of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned
in Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for
herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her
daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.

2. The filing of Maria Sheila's complaint-affidavit did not even commence proceedings on her
own petition for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or
proceedings at the level of the prosecutor, does not form part of trial. It is not a judicial
proceeding that leads to the issuance of a protection order. Thus, the pendency and
subsequent dismissal of Maria Sheila's Complaint-Affidavit did not engender the risk of
either litis pendentia or res judicata.

Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610

PEDRO PEREZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018

FACTS: Pedro Perez was charged with violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 or the Special
Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. Allegedly, on
November 7, 1998, he committed an act of sexual abuse against AAA, a 12-year old child. He
inserted his finger unto her private organ while mashing her breast against her will and without
her consent.

AAA testified that she met Perez in her cousin’s birthday party. She again saw him in her friend’s
house the next day. When she went to kitchen to drink water, Perez followed her. Perez kissed
her nape, told her to keep quiet, and slid his hands in her vagina while mashing her breast. The
medico-legal officer, who examined AAA and a police officer, who received the complaint also
testified in this case.

Perez denied abusing AAA. He claimed that on the day of the incident, he and his aunt went to a
school in New Manila. He left her at 6:00pm and went straight home after.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that Perez was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 in relation to Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals but the petition was dismissed.

ISSUE/S:

1. Assuming that Perez is liable, whether he is only liable for acts of lasciviousness since the
prosecution failed to prove all elements of child abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610?
2. The imposable penalty.

RULING

1. Under Section 5(b), the elements of sexual abuse are: (1) The accused commits the act
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) The child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age.

The presence of the first and third elements was established. Petitioner admits in the pre-
trial that AAA was only 12 years old at the commission of the crime. He also conceded
that if ever he is liable, he is liable only for acts of lasciviousness. However, The second
element was also established in the case.
 In People v. Villacampa, the Court explained that the second element is that the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. To
meet this element, the child victim must either be exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse. In Quimvel v. People, the Court held that the fact that a child is under
the coercion and influence of an adult is sufficient to satisfy this second element and will
classify the child victim as one subjected to other sexual abuse.

Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child

prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand,
paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on
a child subjected to other sexual abuse. In Ricalde v. People, the Court clarified that
the first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that
"children ... who ... due to the coercion ... of any adult ... indulge in sexual intercourse ...
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label
"children exploited in ... other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject
of coercion and sexual intercourse.

By analogy with the ruling in Ricalde, children who are coerced in lascivious conduct are
"deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." When petitioner
inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion,
he is liable for sexual abuse.

ARSON

MARLON BACERRA y TABONES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 204544,
July 3, 2017

FACTS:

Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613. According to the
prosecution, while the Alfredo and his family were asleep, Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo’s house
exclaiming: xxx, Old Fred, I'll bum you now. Later on, Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and
shook it. Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning. Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother
the fire. Edgar contacted the authorities for assistance but it was too late. The nipa hut and its
contents were completely destroyed. The local authorities conducted an investigation on the
incident.

The defense claimed that on the day of the incident, Bacerra was in a drinking spree until 1am
with his friend, Ronald Valencia.

The Regional Trial Court found Bacerra to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. This was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals upon appeal.

Hence, Bacerra filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. He claimed that mitigating
circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the lower
tribunals in computing the imposable penalty.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the
circumstantial evidence adduced during trial? (YES)
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender may
properly be appreciated in this case to reduce the imposable penalty? (NO)
3. Whether the award of temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 was proper? (YES)

RULING:

1. Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal
consequences.
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves
the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense.
Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference. Circumstantial
evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact finder
must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. The probative value of
direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it

may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that
the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct
evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from
any fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and
beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be
established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient

for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of
guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances
must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to
the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.

The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial evidence
in People v. Abayon. None of the prosecution's witnesses actually saw the accused start
the fire. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution, taken in
its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt.

Similarly, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the prosecution has established multiple circumstances, which,
after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.

First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned
private complainant's house and threatened to bum him. Private complainant
testified that he saw petitioner throwing stones at his house and heard petitioner say,
"okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!" (Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum
you now. Petitioner's threats were also heard by private complainant's son and
grandchildren.

Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner
returned a few hours later and made his way to private complainant's nipa hut.
Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m., he saw petitioner pass by their house and
walk towards their nipa hut.This was corroborated by private complainant's son who
testified that he saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it was
burned.

Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was
in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant
testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in front of the nipa hut and
shake its posts just before it caught fire. Private complainant's son likewise saw
petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut before it was burned.
The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed
separately. Instead, they must be viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial
evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven." Each
strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire
picture. The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be disregarded.
Petitioner's threat to bum occurred when he stoned private complainant's house.

2. For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the

accused must neither be habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony.

Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were
impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his or her acts. The bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of
the commission of the crime is insufficient. There must be proof of the fact of intoxication
and the effect of intoxication on the accused.

There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was intoxicated
at the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount of time had lapsed
from petitioner's drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which he could
have regained control of his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance in this case.

Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity.

The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the
acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the authorities the trouble and expense that
may be incurred for his [or her] search and capture. Based on the evidence on record,
there is no showing that petitioner's act of submitting his person to the authorities was
motivated by an acknowledgement of his guilt.

Considering that no mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, imposed by the trial court, stands.

3. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be awarded when there is
a finding that "some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount [cannot], from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The amount of temperate damages to be
awarded in each case is discretionary upon the courts115 as long as it is "reasonable
under the circumstances.

Private complainant clearly suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of the burning of his
nipa hut. However, private complainant failed to substantiate the actual damages that he
suffered. Nevertheless, he is entitled to be indemnified for his loss. The award of
temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 is proper and reasonable under the
circumstances.

Frustrated murder

G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017, CAPISTRANO DAAYATA, DEXTER SALISI, and
BREGIDO MALA CAT, JR., Petitioners vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr. were
charged with frustrated murder.

Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. According to the prosecution, on December 16,
1995, at about 6:00 p.m., Bahian went to the house of Kagawad Abalde. Bahian recounted to
Kagawad Abalde a violent altercation between him and the petitioners in the course of a
basketball game earlier that afternoon. Bahian claimed that Salisi had committed a foul against
him, making him fall to the ground. He complained to the referee and this infuriated Salisi. In
response, he threatened Salisi, telling him that "he would just get even with him." Malacat heard
his threat and positioned himself to punch Bahian. Bahian, however, dodged the blow. Daayata
then came, pointing a gun at Bahian. Bahian then backed off and pleaded that they should not
fight as they were friends.

Kagawad Abalde advised Bahian to bring the matter to the attention of Barangay Captain Y afiez.

Accordingly, the following morning, Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way to Barangay
Captain Yafiez' house. While on their way, they were blocked by petitioners. Daayata hit Bahian
on the left part of his chest. Bahian staggered and fell onto a parked jeep. Salisi then hit Bahian
with a stone on the left side of his forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the ground. While Bahian
was lying prostrate on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked Bahian. Kagawad Abalde tried
his best to get Bahian away but to no avail. All he could do was to shout for help. Daayata then
poked a gun at Bahian, Malacat unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi wielded an iron bar.

Barangay Captain Yafiez rushed to the scene. There, Bahian lay on the ground as Kagawad Abalde
tried to ward off his attackers. Barangay Captain Yafiez shouted to petitioners to stop. Shortly
after, they retreated. Barangay Captain Yafiez and Kagawad Abalde then brought Bahian to
Barangay Captain Yafiez' house, and later to Cagayan de Oro City Hospital. Upon examination,
Dr. Arreza made the following findings on Bahian: "depressed fracture, open frontal bone, left."

Bahian was noted to have possibly died, if not for the timely medical intervention. Dr. Mata
subsequently performed surgery on Bahian.

Issue: Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.

Ruling:

A careful review of this case and of the body of evidence that was available for the Regional Trial
Court's perusal reveals that there has been a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Thus, we reverse and acquit petitioners Capistrano
Daayata, Dexter Salisi, and Bregido Malacat, Jr.

First, it appears that the location where the altercation occurred between Bahian and Kagawad
Abalde, on the one hand, and petitioners, on the other, is not as plain and austere as the
prosecution made it seem. The prosecution merely claimed that Bahian and Kagawad Abalde
were on their way to Barangay Captain Yafiez's house when they were suddenly blocked and
assaulted by petitioners. However, it was actually settled during trial - consistent with the
defense's contention - that the confrontation took place in the vicinity of the house of vicente.

This detail does not intrinsically weigh in favor of either the prosecution or the defense. For
indeed, it may simply have been necessary to pass by Vicente's house en route to Barangay
Captain Yafiez's house and, consistent with what the prosecution claimed, that it may have merely
been the spot where Bahian's attackers chose to launch their assault. But while specificity of
location may ultimately be inconsequential to the prosecution's case, it is the genesis of the
defense's case. As the defense asserts, the altercation was precipitated by Bahian and Kagawad
Abalde's arrival outside Vicente's residence, where Bahian then called out and challenged Salisi.

Second, while the prosecution painted a picture of a relentless assault that lasted for as much as
30 minutes - with petitioners supposedly not content with Bahian falling onto a parked jeep, but
even attacking him until he lay on the pavement, and thereafter still continuing to punch and kick
him- Bahian's "medical certificate showed no injury other than that on [his] forehead."

"Physical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." They have been characterized as "that mute but eloquent manifestations of truth
which rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." Thus, in People v. Vasquez, this Court
refused to undiscerningly lend credence to the incriminating assertions of prosecution witnesses
as to an alleged mauling, and stated that "[t]his Court cannot be persuaded by the prosecution's
claim of perpetration of physical violence in the absence of any marked physical injuries on the
various parts of the victim's face and body."
Third, Bahian himself was noted to have admitted that his head injury was "caused by [him]
hitting the edge of the concrete pavement."

As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, it is true that the prosecution has sought to extenuate
the weight of Bahian's admission by having him explain that he only lied to Dr. Mata because
otherwise, "he would not have been admitted to the hospital and his injury would have not been
operated on." However, even this extenuating explanation does not completely diminish the
significance of his admission.

Moreover, in the present Petition, the defense points out the curious parallelism between, on the
one hand, the admission or otherwise lie made by Bahian to Dr. Mata, and on the other hand,
the defense's main contention that Bahian sustained a head injury through his own fault.

There is no showing that petitioners knew that complainant told his doctor that he hit his head
on the edge of the concrete pavement. They came to know of it only when they heard him admit
it on cross-examination. And yet, that's exactly what they have always been asserting right from
the very start, even during the preliminary investigation, or long before they heard him say it on
the witness stand.

It is too much of a coincidence that petitioners and the complainant should say exactly the same
thing, that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete pavement - unless it is true.

Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the
prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an iron
bar, respectively.

Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:

Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the
immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a
person's very conscience. While indeed imbued with a sense of altruism, this imperative is borne,
not by a mere abstraction, but by constitutional necessity:

This rule places upon the prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on
the strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of an accused.
Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause of the
Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden
upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter
of course, that an accused must be acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippines:

We ruled in People v. Ganguso:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree
of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on
the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The burden is on the
prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.

The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral
certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While
not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events,
they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.

They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were actually stopped in their
tracks to be assaulted, and support the possibility that they may have instead deliberately
intended to bring themselves to Vicente's house to provoke or challenge one (1) of the petitioners.

They also cast doubt on whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the specific
purpose of ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant by one (1)
of the petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and whether petitioners
had actually brandished implements for maiming and killing.

Taking off from the events in the basketball game of December 16, 1995, the prosecution
unravelled a narrative of petitioners' supposed vindictiveness. Yet the contrary is apparent. The
confluence of Bahian's admissions of a prior altercation, his self-issued threat, how he was
constrained to desist, and his own account to Dr. Mata of how he sustained his injury, as well as
the glaring dissonance noted by the defense and backed by physical evidence, demonstrate how
the prosecution has fallen far too short of discharging its burden of proving petitioners' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

Charged with estafa but can be convicted for violation of Art. 138 of the RPC

MARIA OSORIO v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018

FACTS: Osorio introduced herself to Gabriel as an agent of the Philippine American Life and
General Insurance (Philam Life). She offered Gabriel a Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold
Package, which the latter availed of. Gabriel consistently paid the quarterly premiums from
February 2001 to November 2001. Subsequently, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment
opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management under a time deposit scheme. Enticed by the
offer, Gabriel tendered P200, 000.00 to Osorio, who in tum issued Philam Life receipts.

A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment
of premiums. She also received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management
(PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company. As such, she confronted Osorio, who assured
her that she would take responsibility. Garbriel asked Osorio for a refund; she also sent her a
demand letter, but was unable to recover the money.

Hence, Osorio was charged with was charged with estafa, punished under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court found Osorio to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa. Osorio appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
arguing that her act of investing Gabriel's money with PMIAM was done in good faith.

ISSUE/S:

In determining whether the petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished under
Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the question to be resolved is whether the
prosecution was able to prove the alleged false representation or false pretense contained in the
information.

RULING:

The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other
similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar
deceits" has been interpreted, in Guinhawa v. People, as limited to acts of the same nature as
those:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision
to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal
Code.

For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must exist:

(a) The accused makes a false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles
315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended
party suffered damage or prejudice.

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.

Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested
in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance
premiums. This false representation is what induced private complainant to part with her funds
and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was
originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another company, private complainant's
insurance policies lapsed.

Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a)
of the Revised Penal Code, she may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This
rule proceeds from the Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him or her.[68] An exception to this is the rule on
variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if there is
a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be
convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense charged. An accused may
also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.

In Sales v. Court of Appeals, the accused was charged with estafa by means of deceit under
Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. She was convicted of other deceits under Article 318
of the Revised Penal Code. The Court held that there was no violation of the accused's
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against her. Simply put, an accused may
be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge or of an offense
charged which is included in that which is proved. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
convicted of the crime falling under "Other deceits" which is necessarily included in the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) considering that the elements of deceit and damage also
constitute the former. Hence, the petitioner's right to be properly informed of the accusation
against her was never violated.

In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is
necessarily included in the crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Special Penal Laws; Section 10(a) of RA 7610

Van Clifford Torres Y Salera v People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206627, January 18,
2017, Leonen, J.

Facts: Torres was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act No.
7610 through Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

The prosecution established the following facts during trial: CCC, AAA's uncle, previously filed a
complaint for malicious mischief against Torres, who allegedly caused damage to CCC's multicab.
AAA witnessed the alleged incident and was brought by CCC to testify during the barangay
conciliation.

On November 3, 2003, CCC and AAA were at the barangay hall of Clarin, Bohol waiting for the
conciliation proceedings to begin when they chanced upon Torres who had just arrived from
fishing. CCC's wife persuaded Torres to attend the conciliation proceedings to answer for his
liability. Torres vehemently denied damaging CCC's multicab. In the middle of the brewing
argument, AAA suddenly interjected that Torres damaged CCC's multicab and accused him of
stealing CCC's fish nets. Torres told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults. He warned AAA that
he would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA refused to keep silent and continued to
accuse Torres of damaging his uncle's multicab. Infuriated with AAA's meddling, Torres whipped
AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down
from the stairs. CCC came to his nephew's defense and punched Torres. They engaged in a
fistfight until they were separated by Barangay Captain Hermilando Miano. Torres hit AAA with a
wet t-shirt three (3) times.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Torres. Torres appealed before the Court of Appeals. He
argued that the prosecution failed to establish all the elements of child abuse and that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on a judgment premised
on a misapprehension of facts;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: The Petition is Denied. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution is affirmed.

We affirm petitioner's conviction. The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck with a
wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse.

The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function properly within the office of the trial
courts. It is a question of fact not reviewable by this Court. The trial court's findings on the matter
are entitled to great weight and given great respect and "may only be disregarded . . . if there
are facts and circumstances which were overlooked by the trial court and which would
substantially alter the results of the case.”

This Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. The trial court neither
disregarded nor overlooked any material fact or circumstance that would substantially alter the
case. The presence or absence of one person during the incident is not substantial enough to
overturn the finding that petitioner whipped AAA three (3) times with a wet t-shirt.

Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner did whip AAA, petitioner argues that it should not be
considered as child abuse because the law requires intent to abuse. Petitioner maintains that he
whipped AAA merely to discipline and restrain the child "from further intensifying the situation."
He also maintains that his act was justified because AAA harassed and vexed him. Thus, petitioner
claims that there could not have been any intent to abuse on his part.

Petitioner contends that the injuries sustained by AAA will not affect the latter's physical growth
or development and mental capacity. He argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse
without proof that the victim's development had been prejudiced. He begs the indulgence of this
Court and claims that his conviction would only serve as a "precedent to all children to act
recklessly, errantly, and disobediently" and would then create a society ruled by juvenile
delinquency and errant behavior. If at all, petitioner claims that he could only be convicted of
slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code for the contusion sustained by AAA.

Respondent maintains that the act of whipping AAA is an act of child abuse. Respondent argues
that the act complained of need not be prejudicial to the development of the child for it to
constitute a violation of Republic Act No. 7610. Respondent, citing Sanchez v. People, argues that
Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines and punishes four distinct acts.

We reject petitioner's contention that his act of whipping AAA is not child abuse but merely slight
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code. The victim, AAA, was a child when the incident
occurred. Therefore, AAA is entitled to protection under Republic Act No. 7610, the primary
purpose of which has been defined in Araneta v. People:

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared towards the implementation of a national
comprehensive program for the survival of the most vulnerable members of the population, the
Filipino children, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate under Article XV, Section 3,
paragraph 2, that "The State shall defend the right of the children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development."

Under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, child abuse is defined, thus:

Section 3. Definition of Terms

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:

1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
2. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
3. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
4. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
As can be gleaned from this provision, a person who commits an act that debases, degrades, or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being, whether habitual or not,
can be held liable for violation of Republic Act No. 7610.

Although it is true that not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse,
petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of.

To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times. Common
sense and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck,
with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several
times. There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise, AAA would
not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have sustained a
contusion.

Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and stop him from interfering,
he could have resorted to other less violent means.

Instead of reprimanding AAA or walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter.

We find petitioner liable for other acts of child abuse under Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic
Act No. 7610, which provides that "a person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
. . . shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."

In Araneta:
 [Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610] punishes not only those enumerated
under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child
abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute
distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that
these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's
development. . . . [An] accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation
have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development
of the child is different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term
signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
"or" in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development" supposes that there are four punishable
acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation;
and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. The
fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted ... as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not
warrant such construal.

Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades,
and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked
several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons
regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-control rather
than retaliate against a 14-year-old child.

Murder

People of the Philippines vs. King Rex A. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017

Facts: In an Information dated November 28, 2002, accused-appellant King Rex Ambatang
(Ambatang) was charged with the murder of 60-year-old Ely Vidal (Vidal.) According to the
prosecution, Jeniffer Vidal Mateo (Jennifer), barangay tanod Romeo Acaba (Acaba) and Vidal’s
wife Cermelita witnessed the killing. Around 10:30 in the evening Jennifer heard a barrage of
stones thrown onto their house, and outside she saw Ambatang with a certain Loui. Melody Vidal
Navarro (Melody) immediately called the barangay who responded right away, while Ambatang’s
mother were talking to a tanod Acoba allegedly saw Ambatang sharpen a knife in and disappear
from the Sala. Later they found him on top of Vidal, stabbing him repeatedly. Carmelita claimed
Vidal was able to embrace her after the stabs, and told her King Rex stabbed him.

Ambatang claimed that he was at AMA computer learning center from 3PM until 8PM and only
got home at 9:30PM. And was doing laundry when tanods came to their house looking for a
certain “Loui.” Then he heard a commotion outside their house, then her mother instructed him
to stay with her girlfriend Gina Canapi inside. Later he went out to see his friend Rey (Lobo) who
wasn’t there but he spoke to a certain Rael for a few seconds. On his way home he was arrested
by tanods. Both her mother and girlfriend testified he was at home when the stabbing occurred.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant Ambatang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

Ruling:

Accused-appellant also offered alibi as a defense. He asserts that he was at home when the
stabbing incident happened. We reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that the defense of
alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. Thus:

It is well-settled that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as

perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their denials and alibis.
True, accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by Gina Canapi and Nicepura Ambatang.1âwphi1
However, an alibi, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused,
is held by this Court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to fabricate and concoct. Thus, in People
v. Alba/ate, the Supreme Court in rejecting accused's alibi explained:

The alibi proffered by the appellant must be rejected. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly noted that appellant failed to make any mention about this alleged alibi when he was
placed on the witness stand. It was only when defense witness Florentina Escleto (Escleto)
testified that this alibi cropped up. At any rate, the same deserves no consideration at all. Escleto
claimed to be a friend of the appellant. It is settled jurisprudence that an alibi "becomes less
plausible when it is corroborated by relatives and friends who may not be impartial witnesses".

Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. The excuse must be
so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accused-
appellant's presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi will not hold water.

In fine, the age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and
weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions as
witnesses testify before it. It is thus no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have the advantage
of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. We thoroughly review the records of the
case, including the transcript of stenographic notes and we find no cogent reason to overturn the
probative value given by the trial court on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Hence,
we sustain the guilty verdict against herein accused-appellant.

In addition, accused-appellant attributed ill motive on the part of prosecution witness Carmelita.
However, as the Court of Appeals explained, accused-appellant's conviction was not based on the
testimony of Carmelita, but on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Jennifer and Acaba, "whose
credibility was never assailed by accused-appellant."

Accused-appellant assails the supposed inconsistencies in the statements of Jennifer and Acaba,
that is, their statements on how accused-appellant left his residence and stabbed Vidal, and on
the specific number of times that they saw Vidal get stabbed by accused-appellant. These
inconsistencies, however, are too minor. They are ultimately ineffectual in absolving accused-
appellant of liability.

In People v. Bagaua:

[W]e have time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime
do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such
inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their
being rehearsed.

Regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed discrepancies on how accused-appellant left his
residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times they saw him stab Vidal, what ultimately
matters is that they witnessedhow accused-appellant stabbed Vidal.

Accused-appellant also makes a brief reference (devoting a singular paragraph in his

Supplemental Brief) to the circumstances of his apprehension and how the knife used in the
stabbing was never recovered. Again, these are too minor and do not suffice to absolve accused-
appellant of liability. Finding an accused in possession of the weapon used to kill and
apprehending him or her in such a manner that his or her participation in a murder is conspicuous,
is not among the requisites to be convicted of murder.

Treachery is present to qualify Vidal's killing to murder. As pointed out by the Regional Trial Court:

Accused employed treachery when he attacked the victim. This is shown by the suddenness of
the attack against the unarmed victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter's part and
opportunity to defend himself. Accused was a tall, young man with a sturdy physique. Armed
with a sharp bladed weapon, he attacked and repeatedly stabbed the victim who was at that time
sixty years old and inferior in size and built compared to him.

Rape

People of the Philippines v Oliver A. Buclao, G.R. No. 208173, June 11, 2014

Facts: Private complainant AAA testified that she was cleaning their backyard at 11:00 a.m. on
June 3, 2003. AAA’s biological father, accused-appellant, called her to go inside their house.
When AAA was inside, her father closed the door and pushed her onto the bed. AAA’s father
pulled her pants and panties down to her knees then he removed his pants and briefs. Next,
AAA’s father moved on top of her, inserted his erect penis into her vagina, and started pumping
or doing a push and pull or an up and down motion. AAA felt pain during the act, but she could
not fight back so she just cried while she was being sexually assaulted. Her father left after the
incident. However, before he left, the accused appellant threatened her that he would kill her if
she told anyone about what happened.

On the third week of September 2004, AAA was raped for the second time. AAA was afraid so
she kept the incident a secret, and It was onlu in 2006 when AAA told her maternal grandmother
about the rape.23 They reported the incident to the police in Binanga, Tuding, on April 4, 2006.

Accused-appellant denied raping his daughter twice. He argued that the charges were false. He
claimed that it was his daughter BBB who was with him at their house on June 3, 2003. Similarly,
accused-appellant alleged that on the third week of September 2004, it was his other children,
BBB and CCC, who were with him at their house. During trial, accused-appellant admitted that
he was convicted for a previous case of child abuse.

RTC rendered its judgment ruling against the accused appellant, and upon appeal, CA affirmed
RTC’s decision with modification.

In addition, accused-appellant questioned the delay in AAA’s reporting of the incident. Accused-
appellant also ascribed the filing of the charges against AAA’s maternal grandmother. According
to accused appellant, the animosity between him and his mother-in-law was the reason behind
the rape charges. The Office of the Solicitor General, for the people of the Philippines, argued in
its brief that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.48 According to the appellee, AAA’s positive identification
of accused appellant and her categorical testimony of the circumstances during the two rape
incidents cannot be easily overcome by bare assertions of alibi and denial. Moreover, absence of
lacerations in the victim’s genitals does not negate the commission of rape. Rape is also not
negated by the delay in the reporting of the incident, particularly when the delay was founded
on the threats by the accused-appellant to the victim’s life.

Issue: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling: The Court of Appeal’s decision finding Oliver Buclao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is affirmed with modification to
increase the civil indemnity.

We affirm the accused-appellant’s conviction.

Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the elements of the crime of
rape:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. . . .
 Rape is qualified when “the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”53 The elements of
qualified rape are: “(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) [done] by force and without
consent; . . . (4) the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5)
the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.”

In this case, both the trial court and Court of Appeals found that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of qualified rape. This court sees no reason to
depart from the findings of the lower courts. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
AAA’s recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid and straightforward. She was
able to positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual assailant. Her testimony was
given in a “categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner.”

We recently held that “[i]t is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.”

As to accused-appellant’s argument that the absence of hymenal lacerations admits the

possibility that there was never any sexual abuse, we find our disquisition in People v. Araojo
applicable:

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a compelling
proof of defloration. [However,] the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is
the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer.

We also disagree with accused-appellant’s argument that private complainant AAA’s delay in
reporting the alleged rape incidents, together with the prodding of AAA’s grandmother, signals
the falsity of the rape allegations. In People v. Delos Reyes, this court ruled that:

The failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family or to the authorities at
the soonest possible time or her failure to immediately change her clothes is not enough
reason to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of [accused]. This Court has repeatedly held
that delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot
be taken against the victim. Further, it has been written that a rape victim’s actions are
oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the
initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness

To this court’s mind, there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own father
— one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth. Delay brought by
fear for one’s life cannot be deemed unreasonable.

This court has recognized the moral ascendancy and influence the father has over his child. In
cases of qualified rape, moral ascendancy or influence supplants the element of violence or
intimidation. It is not only an element of the crime, but it is also a factor in evaluating whether
the delay in reporting the incident was unreasonable.

Moreover, “[n]ot even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own father to
the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true.” Thus, accused-
appellant’s argument that AAA was forced by her grandmother to fabricate the charges fails to
sway this court.

This court has held before that “mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.” It is settled that
the defense of alibi and denial cannot overcome the victim’s positive and categorical testimony
and identification of the accused-appellant. Presence of other family members is not a valid
defense in rape cases since rape may be carried out in the same room where the family members
are staying.
With all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the Court of Appeals was correct
in modifying the trial court’s decision. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of death was prohibited, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole should be imposed instead.

The suspension of the death penalty in cases where the father rapes his daughter should not,
however, be misinterpreted as reducing the heinous nature of this crime. No matter how high the
penalty, our legal system cannot assuage the deepest injuries caused by the abuse of trust
committed by the father.

A father is supposed to be a daughter’s role model of a man. He is there to protect and comfort
her. With the mother, a father’s love will be every daughter’s assurance that however harsh the
world turns out to be, he will be there for her. Fathers should inspire courage and trust within
their daughters.

That a father abuses this trust to gratify his selfish carnal desires is a dastardly act. It defiles not
only his daughter’s person. It extinguishes all hope the daughter may have of the value of family.
It skews her understanding of the honor that may be inherent in all men.

This court will never countenance such repugnant acts.

In rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the commission of rape,
whereas moral damages are automatically awarded without the need to prove mental and
physical suffering. Exemplary damages are also imposed, as example for the public good and to
protect minors from all forms of sexual abuse.

In People v. Gambao, we increased the amounts of indemnity and damages where the proper
penalty for the crime committed by the accused is death but where it cannot be imposed because
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. We imposed as a minimum the amounts of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) as civil indemnity; One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(100,000.00) as moral damages; and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary
damages.

In view of the depravity of the acts in this crime committed in this case — multiple rape of a
minor by her father — we further increase the amounts awarded to private complainant, AAA.
Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity from Seventy-five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
to One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00); moral damages from Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00); and exemplary damages from
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00). In addition,
interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum should be imposed on all damages awarded from the date
of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Special Penal Laws; Human Trafficking; Section 3(A) of RA 9208, as amended by RA

10364

People of the Philippines v Shirley A. Casio, G.R. No. 211645, December 03, 2014

Facts: International Justice Mission (IJM) coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons
engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. A team of police operatives were designated as decoys,
pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. The team went to
Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room
24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. The
team proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district.
Shirley Casio noticed them and called their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like
girls, guys?). The police operatives told Casio that they have a guests waiting in the hotel. After
a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB The team convinced Casio to come with them
to Queensland Motel and was soon arrested by police operatives.

The trial court found Casio guilty of violating R.A. 9208, otherwise known as the “Anti-Trafficking
in Persons Act of 2003.” Casio argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was
instigated into committing the crime. The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not
even know who their subject was. She denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a
laundrywoman. In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her
decision to display herself to solicit customers.

Issue:

1. Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that
there was no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation;
2. Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt even
though there was no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of engaging
in human trafficking;
3. Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute
Ruling: The Court of Appeal’s decision was affirmed, finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of RA 9208, with
the modification that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was “adopted
and opened for signature, ratification and accession” on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is
supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children” (Trafficking Protocol). This
was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry
into force was on December 25

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:

Article 3

Use of terms

For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer,

harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar
to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth
in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not
involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;

(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the “Anti-Trafficking Act will serve
as the enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the] protocol.”
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking in
persons as follows:

Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is

tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most
flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this
insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape, physical,
mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.

As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child;
the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families;
and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention Against
Organized Crime, including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year. At first glance, it
appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it seems. Despite these
international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall squarely address
human trafficking.

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444,
Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law
when other laws exist that cover trafficking.

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:

At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic]
A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution,
falsification of public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not
respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons resulting in
prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or
some elements of trafficking independent of their results or consequence.

Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human trafficking.
Republic Act No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.

II

Elements of Trafficking in Persons

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, thus:

1. The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with

or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.”
2. The means used which include “threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes “exploitation or the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
or the removal or sale of organs.”
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the
“Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.” Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

 “(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,
offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of
threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor
or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:

1. The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,

maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;”
2. The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person”
3. The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services
were peddled to the police who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled
her services. AAA also stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because she needed money.
Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven
by the testimonies of the witnesses.

III

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She
concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with “customers” for money.69 For liability
under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or

receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes
at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as “trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve
any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons. Accused
was charged under Section 4(a), which states:

SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
judicial, to commit any of the following acts.

a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,

including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons
is qualified.

SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

a. When the trafficked person is a child;

b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
“Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer
or employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the
military or law enforcement agencies; f. When the offender is a member of the military or
law enforcement agencies; and g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking
in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child” as:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act: . . . .

b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen
(18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking
in persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when
she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo
in exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons
were minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at
Queensland Motel. AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her.
Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that she was born on January 27,
1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the offense
of trafficking in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the
trial court:

The act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e.
that ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust money” of Php.1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.
 IV

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to determine
whether there was a valid entrapment operation:

. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the “subjective” or “origin
of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit
the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to
government agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits,
his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a “trap for the unwary innocent
and the trap for the unwary criminal.” If the accused was found to have been ready and
willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will
fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.

Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test. . . . Here, the court considers the nature
of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.
The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce
a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;
for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the
temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77

Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in determining
the whether there was an entrapment operation or an instigation. However, the use of the
objective test should not preclude courts from also applying the subjective test. She pointed out
that:

Applying the “subjective” test it is worth invoking that accused-appellant procures income
from being a laundry woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing
accused-appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is not
even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers for
quite some time.

Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the
entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In
Chang v. People, this court explained that:

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the
apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature
of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the men’s rea originates
from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from
him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to
the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.

Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to commit
the offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a laundrywoman.
On this argument, we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals:

It was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1
Veloso by calling their attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when
 the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait while she
would fetch the girls for their perusal.

This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the
transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by
saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she most
likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D.
Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted
girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused to commit the
crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights. The marked money
retrieved from her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was
presented in court as evidence.

On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals
noted that accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and
cannot be given credence.

With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment
operation’s validity. In People v. Padua this court underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations:

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust

operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as long as
the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass
on the wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.

This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of
rescuing the victims may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law
enforcers.

Abduction and Rape

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNIE CONCEPCION, G.R. No. 214886, April 4,
2018

FACTS:

On February 17, 2001, at around 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived home in a tricycle with a sack of rice.
She was looking for someone to help her carry a sack of rice when Concepcion, who is drunk,
intercepted her at the garage area. Concepcion dragged her to his room; undressed her; pulled
down his pants; cut her undergarments; and inserted his hand unto her vagina, then his penis to
into her vagina.

Shortly after, Chief of Police Pedro Obaldo, Jr. arrived and called on Concepcion to release AAA.
Concepcion refused to release AAA unless Peralta (his girlfriend) admitted that she had been
raped. Peralta refused to admit this, but later did just so Concepcion would release AAA.

Concepcion then again inserted his penis in AAA's vagina, while his knife is on her neck. Mayor
Joaquin Ostrea's arrival interrupted the rape. He tried, but failed to convince Concepcion to
release AAA.

The police forcibly entered Concepcion's room by breaking the window and the door. PO3
Bartolome Oriña, Jr. (PO3 Oriña) pulled AAA and exited through the window. Thereafter,
Concepcion was arrested and brought to the police station. AAA was brought to the hospital
where Dr. Maribeth Baladad (Dr. Baladad) examined her. Dr. Baladad testified that there were
abrasions and lacerations in her genital area, caused by the forceful entry of an object or organ.
The Regional Trial Court found Concepcion guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, it held that the crime rape absorbed forcible abduction.
Concepcion appealed with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether there are two counts of rape?

2. Whether the continued detention was absorb in the crime of rape? (No)

RULING:

1. There were three (3) informations filed against accused-appellant for two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of serious illegal detention. Accused-appellant was uniformly
acquitted of the second count of rape due to the failure of the prosecution to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that it actually happened. As for the remaining two (2) charges,
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals both considered the first count of rape
and the charge of serious illegal detention as necessarily linked.

Upon the records of the case, the Court found AAA's testimony as sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that there was a second incident of rape.
As appreciated by the Court of Appeals, AAA testified and narrated in detail how accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Upon examining the records, it became clear that
AAA testified and narrated two (2) separate incidents of rape.

As properly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, in rape cases, primordial consideration
is given to the credibility of a victim's testimony. Here, AAA's testimonies on both incidents
of rape are equally credible. Considering that the judge who examined AAA found her a
believable witness and considering further that there was nothing wanting in AAA's
testimony on the second rape incident, for the same reasons outlined by the Court of
Appeals in its decision, this Court finds that the evidence was sufficient to establish
accused-appellant's guilt of the second rape charge.

2. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals show that after
raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and refused to release her even
after raping her. Thus, although the initial abduction of AAA may have been
absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the rape
cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention continued after the
rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.

Articles 267 and 268 of the Revised Penal Code provide:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances abovementioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
 Article 268. Slight illegal detention. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed
upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding
article without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.

The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the perpetration
of the crime.

If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three
days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose
intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding seven hundred
pesos.

Thus, the felony of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or m any other manner deprives him of his liberty.
3. That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal.
4. That the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267.

The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. Accusedappellant is a private
individual. The Court of Appeals found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to
detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. It also appreciated AAA's testimony that accused-
appellant placed electrical wires around the room to electrocute anyone who might attempt to
enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his supposed demands were met. The detention
was illegal and not attended by the circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention.
Thus, this Court finds accused-appellant guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention.

Further, in line with current jurisprudence, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages shall be awarded to the victim for each count
of rape.

Hence, the accused appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the
crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua for each
count. Accused-appellant Bernie Concepcion is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period as minimum to sixteen (16) years and five (5) months of reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum.

Child abuse versus Less Serious Physical Injuries

Antonieta Lucido A TONYAY vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217764, August 06,
2017

Facts: Atonieta Lucido Alias Tonyay or (Lucido) was charged of child abuse under Section 10(a)
of the Republic Act 7610, she pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. At pre-trial she offered to
plead guilty to the crime of less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal
Code, or violation of Article 59 (8) of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Her offer was not
accepted by the complaining witnesses and the prosecution thus the trial on the merits ensued.

According to the prosecution, AAA was placed by her parents in the custody of their neighbor
Lucido upon the latter’s request that AAA stay with her because she lives alone. AAA was 8 years
old at that time. There, the child suffered repeated physical abuse including strangulation,
beating, pinching and touching of her sex organ. Lucido also threatened to stab AAA if she told
anyone about what she has done to her.

The prosecution presented neighbor Hinampas, and the findings of Dr. Hilongos to support their
case. Hinampas testified to have seen AAA with neck abrasions, and to whom the latter explained
that those were because she was choked, and beaten on her leg by Lucido. Dr. Hilongos’ found
that there were multiple abrasions on different parts of AAA’s body, and redness on the peripheral
circumference of her hymen.

Lucido denies this, and imputes ill motive against Hinampas due to their ongoing enmity, and too
with AAA who she scolded after the latter damaged her phone.

Issue:

3. Lucido raises Whether Lucido’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt; and
4. Whether the CA erred in not finding that the crime committed was only slight physical injuries
and not child abuse.
5. The prosecution argues that the petition must be denied because it raises questions of fact,
improper with a petition for review under rule 45.

Ruling: Petition denied, the CA decision affirmed.

The issues submitted by Lucido—the prosecution's failure to prove that the abuse suffered by the
victim had prejudiced her normal development and want of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses—are fundamentally factual. However, the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts.
As a rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45."

It is not the function of the SC to review and weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals absent any showing of arbitrariness,
capriciousness, or palpable error. Lucido did not present any substantive or compelling reason for
the SC to apply the exception in this case.

Even if the SC disregards this infirmity, the petition still fails to impress. The SC finds no reversible
error in the Court of Appeals Decision affirming Lucido's conviction for child abuse.

It is a fact that when the incident happened, the victim was a child entitled to the protection
extended by Republic Act No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. Thus, Lucido was properly
charged and found guilty of violating Article VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.

As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is habitual or
not. Lucido's acts fall squarely within this definition.

AAA testified on the physical abuse she suffered in the hands of Lucido. The Regional Trial Court
described her narration of the facts to be in "a straightforward, credible and spontaneous manner
which could not be defeated by the denial of the accused." From the appearance of the victim,
the trial court likewise observed physical evidence of the abuses and ill-treatment inflicted by the
Lucido on AAA aside from the victim's psychological displacement. AAA's testimony was further
corroborated by Dr. Abierra, who noted several observations during his physical examination of
the victim. First, there were "multiple abrasions on different parts of [AAA's] body." Additionally,
he observed a "redness on the peripheral circumference of the hymen," which could have been
caused by a hard pinching. Finally, there was an evident "weakness on the left knee joint," which
could have been caused by the victim falling to the ground or being beaten by a hard object.

Lucido's bare imputations of ill motive on Hinampas and AAA deserve scant consideration. This
defense had been judiciously taken into account and rejected by the trial court, in light of the
clear, consistent, and positive testimonies of AAA, Dr. Abierra, and FFF. As aptly observed by the
trial court, Hinampas "ha[d] no control over the intelligence and will of the victim and the parents
in testifying against [Lucido]." A child witness like AAA, who spoke in a clear, positive, and
convincing manner and remained consistent on cross-examination, is a credible witness.52 Motive
becomes inconsequential when there is a categorical declaration from the victim, which
establishes the liability of the accused.

Moreover, the inconsistencies relied upon by Lucido are trivial and do not minimize the value of
the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. The fact that the victim's father did not mention in his
testimony that he had heard any sound that would indicate Lucido's maltreatment of his daughter
does not render impossible the positive declaration of the victim as to the abuses she suffered.
On the other hand, defense witness Sanchez's testimony is hardly credible because she was no
longer residing in Brgy. Atabay in 2007, when AAA was living with Lucido.54 Further, contrary to
Lucido's assertion, the other defense witness, Lusuegro, testified that she heard AAA cry when
the latter was staying with Lucido.

Indeed, the trial court's assessment on the trustworthiness of AAA and Hinampas will not be
disturbed, absent any facts or circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked,
misappreciated, or misunderstood. Through its firsthand observations during the entire
proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose
testimony to accept and which witness to believe.

II

Lucido further insists that the prosecution failed to prove that the acts complained of were
prejudicial to the victim's development. The Supreme Court, disagrees.

Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e. (a) child abuse,
(b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child's development. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts must
be prejudicial to the child's development pertains only to the fourth offense. Thus: Instructive is
Araneta v. People which held, viz:

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty,
(c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's
development. The Rules and Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately
defined child abuse, cruelty and exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from
one another and from the act prejudicial to the child's development. Contrary to Lucido's
assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove
that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of
the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former
acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
dissociation and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule,
be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610 before the phrase "be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development" supposes that there are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child
abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. The fourth penalized act cannot be interpreted, as Lucido
suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other acts, because an analysis of the entire
context of the questioned provision does not warrant such construal.

Contrary to the proposition of the appellant, the prosecution need not prove that the acts of child
abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an
act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts. The element of
resulting prejudice to the child's development cannot be interpreted as a qualifying condition to
the other acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation.

Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year-old child to cause her to limp are
intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the child's dignity and worth as a
human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious place.
It is not difficult to perceive that this experience of repeated physical abuse from Lucido would
prejudice the child's social, moral, and emotional development.

Lucido's contention that she should only be convicted for slight physical injuries in light of the
ruling in Bongalon v. People, is likewise untenable.
The facts in Bongalon are markedly different from this case. In Bongalon, a father was
overwhelmed by his parental concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of the minor complainant and hit the minor complainant's
back with his hand and slapped his left cheek.

Here, AAA was maltreated by Lucido through repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and
beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline
of an eight (8)-year-old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the positive welfare of a
child. Lucido's actions are diametrically opposite. They are abusive, causing not only physical
injuries as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts of AAA's body and the weakness of
her left knee upon walking, but also emotional trauma on her.

Republic Act No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse
and exploitation and to give a special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It must be stressed
that the crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases,
degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense.

Murder

G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NADY
MAGALLANO, JR. Y FLORES AND ROMEO TAPAR Y CASTRO

Facts:

[O]n or about the 1st day of October 2005, in the municipality of San Miguel, province of Bulacan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [abovenamed] accused, armed
with a hard object and bladed weapon and with intent to kill one [1] Ronnie Batongbakal with
evident premeditation[,] treachery[,] and conspiring with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack[,] assault, hit with a hard object[,] and stab with the said bladed
weapon they were then provided (sic) the said Ronnie Batongbakal, hitting the latter in different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused his
death.

Pineda testified that at around 1:00 a.m. of October 1, 2005, he was at home sleeping beside his
wife when loud voices outside roused him from sleep. He then heard a woman shout, "Romy,
bakit mo s[i]ya sinasaktan, inaano ba kayo[?] " Pineda peeked through his window and saw two
(2) men, whom he later identified as Magallano and Tapar, ganging up on Ronnie Batongbakal,
who was by then lying on the ground. He testified that he saw Magallano repeatedly strike
Batongbakal with a "dos por dos," while Tapar watched.

As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a woman suddenly bolted from the fray. Magallano and
Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and chased the woman. By then, a still-conscious Batongbakal
began to crawl slowly towards a gate.

Magallano and Tapar returned after a few minutes carrying several stones, each about a
volleyball's size. Magallano threw the stones on Batongbakal's head and body, while Tapar
prevented him from crawling away. Pineda testified that he knew Magallano and Tapar since they
both worked at the nearby National Food Authority warehouse. He also stated that the street
outside their house, where Batongbakal was mauled, was well-lit by a streetlight, and that there
was a second streetlight near his house.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellants' guilt for murder beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

In People v. Del Prado:

There is no standard form of human behavioral response when confronted with a frightful
experience. Not every witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with
the expectations of mankind, because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicit[s]
different reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-cut, standard form of behavior can be
drawn.

In the case at bar, it was not even unusual for Hudo's unarmed companions to refrain from risking
their lives to defend him when the assailants were brandishing a foot-long knife, a baseball bat[,]
and a 6x8 - inch stone. Likewise, Pineda's delay in reporting the incident or making a statement
before the police, when adequately explained, neither impairs his credibility as a witness nor
destroys the probative value of his testimony. Further, "there is no rule that the suspect in a
crime should be hurriedly named by a witness."

Murder is committed when a person is killed under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

To sustain a conviction under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must prove
the following beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused-
appellants killed the victim; (3) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide; and (4) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248.

The prosecution likewise proved the lack of relationship between the victim and accused-
appellants, which satisfies the first and third elements of a conviction under Article 248.

The lower courts both found that the victim's killing was attended by treachery and conspiracy.
Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:

ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances:16. That
the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
(Emphasis in the original)

In People v. Abadies, this Court held that "[t]he essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part."67 It further provided
that two (2) conditions must be established by the prosecution for a killing to be properly qualified
by treachery to murder: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself[;] and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method[,]
or form of attack employed by him."

The prosecution failed to show the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Pineda's
testimony began when accused-appellants were in the middle of mauling the victim, and there
was no testimony to prove that the victim did not provoke them or expect their attack. The
prosecution did not present evidence that would show that accused-appellants reflected on and
decided on the form of their attack to secure an unfair advantage over the victim. Even when
accused-appellants returned after chasing the screaming woman and hit the crawling victim with
rocks, treachery is still absent. This is because the second attack was not a surprise, as shown
by the victim's attempt to go back to the safety of his own house.

People v. Tigle stated that for treachery to qualify a killing to murder, it must be present at the
inception of the attack:

For treachery to be appreciated, it must exist at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the
attack continues, even if present at the subsequent stage, treachery is not a qualifying or generic
aggravating circumstance. The prosecution must adduce conclusive proof as to the manner in
which the altercation started and resulted in the death of the victim. If the prosecution fails to
discharge its burden, the crime committed is homicide and not murder.

The prosecution thus only proved that accused-appellants committed homicide, not murder.
Nonetheless, the conspiracy between accused appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[a] conspiracy exists when two (2) or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
Conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence that show a "common design or
purpose"72 to commit the crime.

In upholding the Regional Trial Court's finding of a conspiracy between accused-appellants, the
Court of Appeals noted their concerted and overt acts as evidence of their common purpose to
kill and dispose of the victim's body:

In the case at bar, conspiracy was manifestly shown through the concerted and overt acts of
appellants which demonstrated their actual cooperation in the pursuit of a common purpose and
design. The trial court correctly observed that conspiracy consisted the following acts of accused
appellants: (1) while Magallano was hitting the victim with a [dos por dos], Tapar was watching
them; (2) they both chased Cristina Varilla; (3) they both returned and continued mauling the
victim; [4] Magallano threw stones at the victim while Tapar cornered the victim to prevent him
from crawling; [5] they helped each other in loading the victim into the tricycle; and [6] Magallano
drove the tricycle while Tapar stayed with the victim inside the tricycle as they fled from the crime
scene."

Murder

People of the Philippines vs. Pedrito Ordona Y Rendon, G.R. No. 227863, September
20, 2017

Facts: Pedrito Ordona (Ordona) was charged of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. According to the prosecution, Samuel Cartagens personally knew Ordona and the
victim, Irineo A. Hubay (Hubay.) Ordona was his neighbor while Hubay was a boarder of his
mother. Samuel and his wife Marissa stood 2 feet away when Ordona loitered around the scene
of the crime, and later returned. Ordona greeted “pare” to, and stabbed, Hubay on his shoulder,
that Hubay despite managing to run away was stabbed again to his left torso causing a fatal
wound that caused his death upon arrival at the hospital. The Medico-Legal Officer who conducted
the autopsy confirmed that Hubay died of hemorrhage and shock from the second stab wound.

Ordona as lone witness, denies knowing Hubay and he testified that on the day of the alleged
incident he went to the house of his mother in law to fetch his wife, but was intercepted by a
certain Cornelio de Leon who was running amok. After 5 days, he was arrested by the authorities,
but they failed to recover any bladed weapon from him.

The Regional Trial Court (RCT) pronounced him guilty of murder.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

Ruling: In the present case, accused-appellant alleged that there were material inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses. According to him, Marissa did not testify
that she saw him leave the house for a few minutes. In addition, Samuel and Marissa presented
different accounts on how the crime scene was illuminated.

Accused-appellant's assertion is unmeritorious. The alleged inconsistencies were only minor. They
do not relate to the essential elements of the crime of murder. Slight variances in the testimony
of witnesses, especially if immaterial to the crime charged, do not affect a witness' credibility.
What is material in this case is the act of stabbing. That the second witness did not see accused-
appellant momentarily leave the place of the commission of the crime does not negate Hubay's
killing, Also, both witnesses testified that the place was well-lit for them to see the incident.
Regardless of the source of illumination, both witnesses saw accused appellant stab Hubay twice.

For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following
must be established by the prosecution "with equal certainty as the criminal act itself”:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;

(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and
(c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow
him to reflect upon the. consequences of his act.

It is indispensable for the prosecution to establish "how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out." In People v. Abadies, this Court
underscored this requirement, thus:

Evident premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected,
which indicate deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation
to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.
Criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing a determination to
commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance
must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."

The date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime is
essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from such
date and time.

In this regard, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the

present case. The prosecution failed to establish the time when accused-appellant res.lved to kill
Hubay. There is no evidence on record to show the moment accused-appellant hatched his plan.

In People v. Borbon:

[Evident premeditation] must be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest and
evident-not merely suspecting-indicating deliberate planning. - Evident premeditation like other
circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder, must be established by clear and positive
evidence showing the planning and preparation stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence,
mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice.

It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had
elapsed before it was carried out.

Accused-appellant's act of lurking outside the house can hardly be considered as an over act
indicating his resolution to kill Hubay.

However, accused-appellant is still liable for murder. The killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.

The essence of treachery, as stated in Abadies, is "the swift and unexpected attack on the
unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." Two (2) requisites must be
established by the prosecution, namely: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him [or her]."

Both elements are present in this case. Hubay, who was then unarmed, was casually outside of
his residence when accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him. There was no opportunity for Hubay
to retaliate or to parry accused-appellant's attack, The facts also establish that accused appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack. Accused appellant lurked outside
Hubay's residence and waited for him to appear. When Hubay emerged from the house, accused-
appellant called him "Pare" while walking towards him with a bladed, weapon and immediately
stabbed him.59 Although the attack was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal
attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous.
The second stabbing also indicates treachery. At t. at time, Hubay was already wounded and was
unprepared to put up a defense.

Self-defense

RYAN MARIANO Y GARCIA vs. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 224102, July
26, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioner Mariano was charged with Frustrated Homicide. According to the prosecution, Mariano
stabbed Natividad twice. However, the defense claimed self-defense. Allegedly, Mariano saw Yuki
and Natividad arguing; his common-law wife, Pamela, confronted Natividad and the latter
punched her. As a result, Mariano pushed him. Natividad stood back up and got a piece of wood
and hit Mariano. Mariano picked up a knife and stabbed Natividad on his buttocks. Due to
Natividad's continuous hitting, Mariano stabbed Natividad again, this time on the right side of his
body.

The Trial Court found Mariano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. Hence, Mariano filed a petition before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether Mariano can claim self-defense?

RULING:

At the very least, petitioner acted in defense of a stranger. Article 11(1) and (3) of the Revised
Penal Code provide:

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

....

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the
person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.

UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's defense on the ground that there was no unlawful
aggression and the means employed to prevent or repel Natividad were not reasonable. However,
the Court of Appeals ignored Pamela's testimony that Natividad punched her face and shoulder,
which was corroborated by the testimony of Pamela's daughter, Pia.

On cross-examination, same witness testified; that she did not see when accused Ryan Mariano
stabbed Frederick Natividad because she was then in her room; that she likewise do not know
where was Yuki Rivera and Pamela Rivera when Ryan Mariano stabbed Frederick Natividad.

It is significant that Natividad did not deny attacking Pamela or Pia, as he could not remember
these acts.

An attack showing the aggressor's intention is enough to consider that unlawful

aggression was committed. Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered
as unlawful aggression for purposes of invoking the justifying circumstance of
defense of a stranger.
The Court of Appeals opined that the means employed by petitioner to repel Natividad were not
reasonable, stressing that Natividad was drunk and staggering at the time of the altercation. This
cannot be countenanced.

REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED

The state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or defense of
a stranger must be considered in determining whether a person's means of repelling
an aggressor were reasonable. In Jayme v Repe, the Court explained:

Consequently, we rule that petitioner employed reasonable means to repel the sudden
unprovoked attack of which he was the victim.

"Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that
one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and
make comparisons which can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the
indispensable need but the rational necessity which the law requires. In each particular case, it
is necessary to judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with
the rules of rational logic. The defendant may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to
whether he employed rational means to repel the aggression."

"The rule of reasonable necessity is not ironclad in its application; it depends upon the
circumstances of the particular case. One who is assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. The reason is obvious,
in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and to hold the
actor irresponsible in law for the consequences."

The reasonable necessity of the means employed in the defense, according to the
jurisprudence of courts, does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury.

Here, although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his
blows, his attacks were incessant. He had already attacked three (3) other persons—
two (2) minors as well as petitioner's common-law wife—and was still belligerent.
While it may be true that Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of
the stabbing, it then appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to
protect his family except to commit the acts alleged. It is unreasonable for courts to demand
conduct that could only have been discovered with hindsight and absent the stress caused by the
threats that the petitioner actually faced.

Finally, petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The
victim himself, Natividad, testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the
incident. Thus, all the elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a
stranger were present in this case.

Considering that petitioner was justified in stabbing Natividad under Article 11, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, he should be exonerated of the crime charged.

Mitigating circumstances

G.R. Nos. 208481-82, February 07, 2018, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MARIA
ROWENA REGALADO

Facts:

In October 2006, Carmelita F. Doromal , the owner and administrator of St. Martha's Day Care
Center and Tutorial Center, Inc., went to the Davao Office of the Bureau of Immigration to inquire
about its letter requiring her school to obtain an accreditation to admit foreign students. There,
she met Regalado( Immigration Officer I with the Bureau of Immigration), who told her that she
needed to pay P50,000.00 as "processing fee" for the accreditation. Doromal commented that
the amount was prohibitive. Regalado responded that she could reduce the amount. Citing a copy
of Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 of the Bureau of Immigration, Regalado claimed
that "the head office of the Bureau of Immigration, through the Immigration Regulation Division,
ha[d] the authority to allow the accreditation at a lower amount, depending on her
recommendation."

On April 7, 2007, Regalado called Doromal on the latter's mobile phone asking if the school was
"ready." Doromal responded by saying that the school was ready for inspection, but not to pay
P50,000.00 as accreditation fee. Doromal later sent Regalado a text message, saying that she
could not pay P50,000.00.

On May 3, 2007, Regalado sent Doromal another text message encouraging her to pursue the
accreditation as Regalado allegedly managed to reduce the accreditation fee to P10,000.00.

On May 21, 2007, Regalado came to inspect St. Martha's. When Regalado had finished, Doromal
asked if it was possible to pay the P10,000.00 by check but Regalado insisted on payment by
cash. She also reminded Doromal that she would also have to pay "honorarium." Doromal inquired
how much it was. Regalado responded, "[I]kaw na bahala, ayaw ko na talaga i-mention yan baka
umatras ka pa." Regalado further instructed Doromal to come to her office on May 23, 2007 with
the cash enclosed in an unmarked brown envelope and to say that it contained "additional
documents," if anyone were to inquire about its contents.

Doromal could not personally come to Regalado's office on May 23, 2007 as she had to leave for
the United States, so Diaz went in Doromal's stead. She was accompanied by Mae Kristen Tautho,
a Kindergarten teacher at St. Martha's. Diaz carried with her an unmarked brown envelope
containing the white envelope with P1,500.00 inside as "honorarium."

Upon finding that the contents were only P1,500.00, Regalado blurted, "O my God." Diaz asked,
"Bakit po?" Regalado exclaimed, "You want me to give this amount to my boss?" Diaz asked how
much the honorarium should be. Regalado replied that it should be at least P30,000.00. Diaz
asked what the P30,000.00 was for. Regalado retorted, "It will go to my boss along with your
accreditation papers and endorsement letter . . . Ganyan ang system dito pag magprocess,
actually na lower na nga ang amount because the inspectors are not from Manila, you will not
book them at the Marco Polo Hotel, you will no longer entertain them, it's cheaper." Diaz asked,
"Is this under the table ma'am?" Regalado brazenly replied, "Yes, my dear, that's the system ng
government." Diaz lamented, "So sad to know that." Regalado scoffed, "Ganito ang system, ano
aka magmamalinis?" Diaz and Tautho underscored that the transaction was illegal and asked
what would happen if someone were to pry around. Regalado assured them, "I'll be backing you
up, walang gugulo sa inyo."

On May 24, 2007, Regalado called Diaz, asking if she had cleared with Doromal the payment of
P30,000.00 and emphasized that it was for her boss. On May 29, 2007, Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao a Complaint against Regalado. Thus, an
administrative case was filed for Grave Misconduct, penalized by Rule IV, Section 52(A)(3) of Civil
Service Commission Resolution No. 991936,32 and for violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
No. 6713.

In her defense, Regalado denied ever extorting money from Doromal, Diaz, and Tautho, claiming
they were merely in league with "people who ha[d] a grudge against her." She admitted asking
for P50,000.00 but cited that per Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57, this was the amount
properly due from a school accredited to admit foreign students. She explained that, indeed, the
amount due may be lowered and surmised that her explanations made in good faith to Doromal
were misconstrued. She claimed that she only really wanted to help St. Martha's.

In its November 5, 2008 Decision, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found Regalado
guilty.

Issue: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in meting upon respondent Maria Rowena
Regalado the reduced penalty of one (1)-year suspension without pay, in view of the mitigating
circumstances it appreciated in respondent's favor.

Ruling: Petition is GRANTED.

The 1987 Constitution spells out the basic ethos underlying public office:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

No one has a vested right to public office. One can continue to hold public office only for as long
as he or she proves worthy of public trust. Consistent with the dignity of public office, our civil
service system maintains that misconduct tainted with "any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established rules" is grave. This gravity
means that misconduct was committed with such depravity that it justifies not only putting an
end to an individual's current engagement as a public servant, but also the foreclosure of any
further opportunity at occupying public office.

Accordingly, the 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) consider
grave misconduct as a grave offense warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service
with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from public
office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Terminal leave benefits and personal contributions to Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Retirement and Benefits Administration Service (RBAS) or other equivalent retirement
benefits system shall not be subject to forfeiture.

Apart from the general treatment of misconduct with "any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established rules," Republic Act No.
6713 specifically identifies as unlawful the solicitation or acceptance of gifts "in the course of their
official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office."

Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept,
directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value
from any person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being
regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value
tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or
fellowship grant or medical treatment; or

(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking
place entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of
more than nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the
Philippines, and permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose
of this subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural
exchange programs subject to national security requirements.

It is without question that respondent violated Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. The Court
of Appeals summarized her "modus operandi," as follows:
[T]he modus operandi of [Regalado] is to present to applicants for accreditation a fake copy of
Office Memorandum Order No. RBR 00-57 providing an accreditation fee of P50,000.00 to be able
to charge the said amount, when the actual fee required is only P10,000.00. If the applicant
cannot afford to pay such a high amount, [Regalado], as she did in the present case, will tell the
applicant that through her efforts, she will be able to reduce the accreditation fee to P10,000.00.
However, in return, the applicant will have to give an honorarium to [Regalado's] boss amounting
to at least P30,000.00.

The matter is not a question of whether or not, as respondent mentions in her Comment to the
present Petition, she actually received or profited from the solicitation of any amount from the
complainants, or that she solicited even after she had completed the inspection of St. Martha's.
Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes both solicitation and acceptance. This is similar
to how Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 penalizes both the requesting and receiving of
pecuniary or material benefits. In Section 7(d), the prior or subsequent performance of official
acts is also immaterial.

It is equally without question that respondent engaged in misconduct that was tainted with
corruption and with willful intent to violate the law and to disregard established rules. The act of
requesting pecuniary or material benefits is specifically listed by. Section 3(c) of Republic Act No.
3019 as a "corrupt practice." Further, there is certainly nothing in the records to suggest that
respondent's actions were not products of her own volition.

It is clear, then, that respondent's actions deserve the supreme penalty of dismissal from service.
The Court of Appeals, however, held that certain circumstances warrant the reduction of
respondent's penalty to a year-long suspension. The Court of Appeals was in serious error.

Kidnapping for Ransom by a public official

People of the Philippines vs. PO3 Julieto Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 02, 2017

Facts: PO3 Julieto Borja (Borja) was charged of kidnapping punished under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.

According to collective witnesses of the prosecution, Ronalyn Manatad (Ronalyn) and Vicky
Lusterio (Lusterio) were apprehended while walking along Agham road in Diliman. Ronalyn was
grabbed by Borja, and forced into a van boarding 3 other men. Lusterio managed to escape and
thus reported the incident to Ronalyn’s mother Adelina Manatad (Adelina.) In the van Borja and
his companions asked for contact numbers of Ronalyn’s Relatives and thus they called her brother
Edwin Silvio (Edwin) to ask for ransom money. They initially demanded 200,000Php but after
negotiation it came down to 100,000Php. Ronalyn then was transferred to a car. Edwin sought
assistance from the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force or (NAKTAF) who prepared for an
entrapment operation. Edwin was asked by Borja’s team to meet at the Wildlife Park in Quezon
Avenue, and bring the ransom in an SM plastic bag. There, Edwin gave the cash to Borja, who
was then arrested. Ronalyn however, was brought by Borja’s team to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.

Borja testitfied that on the day of the incident, he was with PO2 Ding Tan at branch 79, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City to testify as witness to a criminal case. But it was postponed so he
went home at 12nn. Around 2:00PM the same day, the caller sought assistance to recoever his
sister who had been arrested. On the second call, he was asked to go to the said park and meet
with a man wearing white t-shirt and bull cap. There in the park, Edwin told Borja that Ronalyn
and Lusterio had been arrested in a buy-bust operation. 30 minutes later, 3 men approached
Borja and he heard “mayroon lang ditong nage-extorsion” he replied “wala Naman akong alam.”
After, Sgt. Cordova shouted “o meron ditong 100,000Php galing kay Borja.PO3 Borja was then
arrested and was charged of kidnapping for ransom.

Borja was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetual.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant PO3 Julieto Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code?
Ruling:

Ronalyn's apprehension for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically negate the
criminal liability of accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission
of the crime with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against
Ronalyn and her kidnapping are events that can reasonably coexist.

Furthermore, a violation of Republic Act No. 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime
of kidnapping. Ronalyn's arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-
appellant's criminal liability. In other words, Ronalyn's innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor
negate the commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this
case will depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. This does
not entail absolute certainty on the accused's guilt. It only requires moral certainty or "that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." The mind and consciousness of a
magistrate must be able to rest at ease upon a guilty verdict.

A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the concurrence of
the following elements:

The offender is a private individual[;]

That individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of
liberty[;]
The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal[;]
In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

a. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days.

b. It is committed by one who simulates public authority.
c. Any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any
threat to kill that person is made.
d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.

Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact that the
accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for
kidnapping against him.

A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom cannot be said to be
acting in an official capacity. In People v. Santiano, this Court explained that public officials may
be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if they act in their private capacity:

The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM" and appellant
Sandigan [is] "a regular member of the PNP" would not exempt them from the criminal liability
for kidnapping. It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim, appellants did so
neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not,
in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, that they have acted in concert
with their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.

Accused-appellant's membership in the Philippine National Police does not automatically preclude
the filing of an information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him. He may be
prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is shown that he committed acts
unrelated to the functions of his office.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is "the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it." The deprivation of a person's liberty
can be committed in different ways. It is not always necessary that the victim be imprisoned. The
second element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there is a showing that
the victim's liberty of movement is restricted.
In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside
a vehicle which drove around Quezon City for 5 hours.

The first two (2) and the last elements of the crime of kidnapping are present in this
case, Ronalyn, a woman, was forcibly taken by accused-appellant and loaded in a van
where she was detained for several hours. These acts are completely unrelated to
accused-appellant's functions as a police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.

The third element of the crime of kidnapping is also present. Accused-appellant and
his companions deprived the victim of her liberty to extort ransom from her family:

Thus, All the elements of kidnapping were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, which cannot
be overturned by accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, there must be a showing that it was physically impossible for
the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In the present
case, accused-appellant failed to overcome this standard. Even if he attended the hearing in
Quezon City Hall of Justice, there is no showing that it was physically impossible for him to be at
Agham Road when the victim was forcibly taken. This Court takes judicial notice that Agham Road
and the Quezon City Hall of Justice are just a few blocks away from each other. Accused-appellant
could have easily slipped out of the city hall at any time.

Moreover, if this Court were to believe accused-appellant's version of the incident, it was highly
irregular for a police officer to meet the victim's relative in a place other than the police station
to discuss the incident reported to him. That he had to wait for 30 minutes for another person to
arrive is also suspect. Moreover, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, it is unusual
for accused-appellant to interfere with an ongoing operation to which he was not assigned. All
these irregularities point to the reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant's purpose in
proceeding to the Wildlife Park was to extort money from the victim's family.

Although the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 9346 proscribed its imposition. In this regard, both the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

However, in line with current jurisprudence, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages
of P50,000.00 imposed by the Court of Appeals should be increased to P100,000.00 each.
Exemplary damages of P100,000.00 should also be imposed.

Rape

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 229862, June 19, 2019

FACTS: ZZZ was charged with the crime of rape.

AAA, a 14-year old child narrated that in the afternoon of April 12, 2006, she had fallen asleep
while his stepfather, ZZZ, was doing carpentry works. Suddenly, she woke up and found ZZZ on
top of her, his lower body naked. ZZZ inserted his penis into her vagina and sat, touched her
vagina, and kissed her breast. She reiterated that she failed to see the insertion of penis but felt
the pain on her vagina.

On August 8, 2008, AAA executed her Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance, praying that the
rape case be dismissed. She claimed that her declarations during the direct and cross-
examinations "were done under duress and that she was afraid of the authorities at that time.
Maintaining that ZZZ did not rape her, she claimed that she was forced by a certain EEE to file
the rape case. The Regional Trial Court found ZZZ to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt and held
that the affidavit of Recantation and Desistance bolstered her earlier statements by reaffirming
that: (1) ZZZ sexually molested her; (2) the prosecutor did not force her to testify; and (3) she
was not put under duress.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether the accused-appellant ZZZ's guilt for the crime of rape has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
2. Whether the Court can give any weight to AAA's Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance?

RULING:

1. The Court held that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant is guilty of raping AAA.

The trial court found AAA's testimony credible and supported by evidence. The Court of
Appeals, likewise, found that AAA's testimony during the direct examination showed that
she clearly remembered how accused-appellant committed the crime. This Court finds no
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

There is also no merit in accused-appellant's argument that force, intimidation, threat,

fraud, or grave abuse of authority was not present. In People v. Gacusan, the Court
reiterated that the abuse of moral influence is the intimidation required in rape committed
by the common-law father of a minor.

As to the inclusion of the word "statutory" in the dispositive portion of the trial court
Judgment, this Court holds that it was erroneously added by the trial court judge.

In People v. Dalan, the Court held that the gravamen of the offense of statutory rape,
as provided for in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused
of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the
complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the
carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.76

Here, the Information against accused-appellant did not allege AAA to be below 12 years
old, but 14 years old, when the crime was committed upon her. The trial court even held
that without documentary or testimonial evidence, the prosecution failed to substantiate
the qualifying circumstance of minority. Despite this, it still found him guilty of
simple statutory rape and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Nonetheless, this Court finds that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is correct as
it is the penalty for offenders who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
rape under Article 266-B77 of the Revised Penal Code.

2. Based on the circumstances here, this Court cannot give any weight to AAA's Affidavit of
Recantation and Desistance.

If the crime did not really happen, AAA would have made the Affidavit at the earliest
instance—but she did not. Instead, she executed it more than two (2) years after the
crime had been committed. If the crime did not really happen, she would not have
submitted herself to physical examination or hours of questioning—but she did.

Moreover, her recollection on how accused-appellant committed the crime was detailed;
her testimony, consistent. There was no evidence that AAA was forced or pressured by
the prosecutor to take the witness stand, as manifested by her answer during the cross-
examination.

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELMER AVANCENA Y CABANELA, JAIME POPIOCO

Y CAMBAYA and NOLASCO TAYTAY Y CRUZ, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017

Facts:
Rizaldo Policarpio (Rizaldo) boarded his Tamaraw FX and as he drove, he noticed a vehicle tailing
him; it was a gray Isuzu Crosswind with no headlights and plate number. Rizaldo decided to head
to the nearest police precinct on Evangelista Street. Upon alighting from his vehicle, he heard
someone call his name. A man, whom he later identified as Avancena, alighted from the gray
Isuzu Crosswind across the street. Rizaldo recognized him because they lived in the same
barangay. Avancena told Rizaldo that one (1) of his companions in the Isuzu Crosswind noticed
that Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo denied Avancena's accusations. Avancena instructed
Rizaldo that they should board Rizaldo's vehicle because Avancena was going to introduce him to
the group's team leader, Tony Abalo (Abalo).

At the corner of Lacuna Street and Evangelista Street, Avancena alighted from Rizaldo's Tamaraw
FX and talked to his companions in the Isuzu Crosswind. Avancena returned to Rizaldo's vehicle,
opened the driver's side door, and told Rizaldo to move over to the passenger's side. Rizaldo
could not complain because Avancena had a gun. He moved to the passenger's side but was
surprised when another person, later identified as Taytay, opened the passenger's side door,
boarded the vehicle, and handcuffed him.

Avancena drove to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot on Adriatico Street,
Malate, Manila. Upon arriving at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot, Avancena
told Rizaldo that they would release him if his father would pay them ₱l50,000.00. At around 5:00
a.m. to 5:30 a.m., Rizaldo's father, Alfonso Policarpio (Alfonso), arrived. Alfonso alighted from his
vehicle and boarded the Isuzu Crosswind on the passenger's side. After breakfast, the group
came back and one (1) of them took off Rizaldo's handcuffs. Alfonso followed the group and
approached Avancena to hand him money, saying, "Pare, this is the only money I have, just call
me by cellphone and I will give the remaining balance later." They returned to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency parking lot to get Rizaldo's vehicle. Then, Rizaldo drove home with his father
following him.

On August 2, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., Rizaldo and Alfonso went to the Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) at Camp Crame to report the incident. While Alfonso
was talking to a certain Colonel Aguilar, Avancena called on his cellphone. He answered and
pointed to it to inform Colonel Aguilar that Avancena was on the other line.

Colonel Aguilar went with them to the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) where
investigations were conducted. They decided that Alfonso would deliver the money on August 9,
2004 in the afternoon. After the phone call, Alfonso called NAKTAF to disclose his agreement with
Abalo. At around 11:00 am on the said date, NAKTAF deployed 20 operatives to Alfonso's place
on Evangelista Street, Barangay Bangkal. A briefing was conducted and Alfonso was given a
plastic bag containing the marked money and was instructed to hand it to Avancena's group.
When the latter’s group arrived, Avancena approached him and retrieved the plastic bag with the
marked money. The group boarded their vehicle and entered Gen. Mojica Street. Suddenly,
Alfonso heard a gunshot and sirens and a commotion followed.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery under Article 294(5) of
the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, exceptwhen the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following
elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person; [second,] he [or she] kidnapped or
detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom."

Accused-appellants claim that they were agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency's Task
Force Hunter but were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claim. The
prosecution, however, was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of the Human Resource Service
of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who testified that accused-appellants"[were] not in any
manner connected with [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency]." It also submitted to the trial
court a letter sent by P/Supt. Edwin Nemenzo of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to
Philippine National Police P/Sr. Supt. Allan Purisima stating that the accused-appellants were not
agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Nonetheless, even if they were employed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
detaining any private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any
way, be construed as within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious illegal
detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act.

The prosecution was likewise able to prove that Rizaldo was illegally deprived of his
liberty. The undisputed facts establish that on August 1, 2004, around midnight, Rizaldo was in
his vehicle being followed by accused-appellants along Evangelista Street. When he alighted from
his vehicle near the police station, accused-appellant Avancena approached him and implied that
he was involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Accusedappellant boarded his vehicle and told Rizaldo
to drive, with the rest of the accused-appellants following in their vehicle. Upon reaching the
comer of Lacuna and Evangelista Streets, accused-appellant Avancena took over the steering
wheel. Accused-appellant Taytay boarded the vehicle and handcuffed Rizaldo and they drove to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot in Malate. Accused-appellant Popioco and
Nazareno also boarded the vehicle. They drove around for a while in the Manila and Makati areas
but eventually returned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot. While on board,
accused-appellant Taytay tried to strangle Rizaldo while accused-appellant Popioco punched him.

In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was
"forcefully transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended "to
deprive the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to
prevent escape falls under this definition.

"[T]he fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused [does] not remove the
element of deprivation of liberty [if] the victim went with the accused on a false inducement
without which the victim would not have done so." Rizaldo would not have gone with the accused-
appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs.

Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them
₱150,000.00. "The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an
unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to so
confine the victim." If Rizal do was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for
Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home only after Alfonso
negotiated his release.
 Taken together, the prosecution was able to establish the elements of
kidnapping for ransom, which is punishable under the Revised Penal Code with death.
Considering the suspension of the death penalty, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellants, however, were also charged with robbery under Article 294(5) of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:

Article 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases.

The elements of simple robbery are "a) that there is personal property belonging to
another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain;
and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things."

Rizaldo 's ordeal did not end with his release from captivity. While reporting the crime to
AIDSOTF in Camp Crame, Alfonso received a call from accused-appellant Avancena demanding
the payment of ₱l50,000.00. Because of the continued demands for payment, NAKTAF had the
opportunity to set up an entrapment operation. Alfonso gave AIDSOTF ₱6,000.00, which NAKTAF
prepared as marked money and placed in a plastic bag.

During the entrapment operation, accused-appellants arrived in the designated place in a

white Toyota Revo. Accused-appellant Avancena approached Alfonso and received the marked
money from him. When they drove away, NAKTAF agents followed them and were able to
apprehend them. NAKTAF was able to recover the marked money from them.

In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso

by means of intimidation. "Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if [the offender] has no opportunity to dispose of the [thing]." The
marked money was recovered from the accused-appellants when they were arrested,
which proves that they were able to gain possession of Alfonso's money.

Criminal Law; violation of a special penal law Republic Act No. 3019

FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202408, June 27,
2018

Facts:

Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works
and Highways in ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when the offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar
held the position of Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the
Director of the Bureau of Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Committee, while Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary.

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman
conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of
DPWH-ARMM for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. On July 31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir,
Guiani, and other officials of DPWH-ARMM. The consolidated cases were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 24963-24983.
Abubakar, Guiani, Baraguir, and two (2) employees of DPWH-ARMM were charged in
Criminal Case No. 24970 for allegedly awarding excessive mobilization fees to Arce
Engineering Services. Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and two (2) other officials of DPWH¬-ARMM
were charged in Criminal Case Nos. 24972, 24975 to 24980, and 24982 to 24983 for allegedly
advancing P14,400,000.00 to several contractors for sub-base aggregates. Lastly,
Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and several other DPWH-ARMM officials were charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 24973, 24974, and 24981 for allegedly causing overpayment on several projects
due to bloated accomplishment reports.

Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-accused entered a
plea of not guilty. Seven (7) of their co-accused remained at large while one (1) died prior to the
scheduled arraignment. Abubakar claimed that he was only implicated due to the presence of his
signature in the disbursement vouchers. He asserted that he examined the supporting documents
and the certifications made by the technical experts before affixing his signature.
Accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for causing the disbursement of 30%
of the mobilization fees or advance payment to Arce Engineering Services.

Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective motions for new trial and reconsideration on
separate dates. They anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged incompetence of their
former counsel.

Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir maintain that they are entitled to a new trial due to
their former counsel's incompetence and negligence. They claim that aside from simply adopting
the evidence submitted by their co-¬accused, their former counsel also failed to present and to
formally offer relevant evidence that would exonerate them from liability. Petitioners Abubakar
and Baraguir believe that they were deprived of the opportunity to fully present their case and to
claim that the following documents should have been presented before the Sandiganbayan:

Aside from this, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that their right to equal
protection was violated due to "selective prosecution." Only a handful of DPWH-ARMM officials
were charged of violation of Republic Act No. 3019. Several employees who allegedly participated
in the preparation of project documents were not indicted.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir are entitled to a
new trial for the alleged incompetence of their former counsel;
2. Whether or not the right of petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir to the
equal protection of the laws was violated due to "selective prosecution";
3. Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar,
Ulama S. Baraguir, and Datukan M. Guiani 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019; and
4. Whether or not petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama S. Baraguir, and Datukan M. Guiani
should be exonerated from criminal liability based on the Arias doctrine.

Ruling:
1. Lawyers act on behalf of their clients with binding effect. This is the necessary
consequence of the fiduciary relationship created between a lawyer and a client. Once
engaged, a counsel holds "the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at
least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit." The acts of counsel are
deemed acts of the client.
Thus, as a rule, parties are bound by the acts, omissions, and mistakes of their
counsel. To adopt a contrary principle may lead to unnecessary delays, indefinite court
proceedings, and possibly no end to litigation for all that a defeated party would do is to
claim that his or her counsel acted negligently. An exception to this is when the gross and
inexcusable negligence of counsel deprives the latter's client of his or her day in court.
The allegation of gross and inexcusable negligence, however, must be substantiated. In
determining whether the case falls under the exception, courts should always be guided
by the principle that parties must be "given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of [their] action or defense."
Liberality has been applied in criminal cases but under exceptional circumstances.
Given that a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case, Umali concedes that the strict
application of the general rule may lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice.96 Thus,
appropriate relief may be accorded to a defendant who has shown a meritorious defense
and who has satisfied the court that acquittal would follow after the introduction of omitted
evidence:
It must be admitted, however, that courts of last resort have occasionally relaxed
the strict application of this rule in criminal cases, where the defendants, having
otherwise a good case, were able to satisfy the court that acquittal would in all
probability have followed the introduction of certain testimony, which was not
submitted at the trial under improper or injudicious advice of incompetent counsel.
Given this standard, this Court holds that petitioners Abubakar and
Baraguir are not entitled to a new trial.
First, they failed to convince this Court that they have a meritorious defense
and that the evidence they seek to introduce would probably lead to their acquittal.
The present case does not involve the same factual circumstances in De
Guzman or in Callangan where the accused were absolutely denied the opportunity
to present evidence due to the actuations of their counsels. In those cases, it was
just and reasonable for this Court to take a much more liberal stance considering that
there was a denial of due process. The same kind of liberality, however, cannot be
applied here. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir, through counsel, presented their
evidence and made out their case before the Sandiganbayan. Based
on Umali and Abrajano, it is incumbent upon them to present a meritorious defense
and to convince this Court that the evidence omitted by their former counsel would
probably alter the results of the case. They cannot simply allege that they were
deprived of due process or that their defense was not fully threshed out during trial.
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir failed to discharge this burden.
Petitioners seek to introduce as evidence their personnel data files, contracts
of service, and appointment papers to prove that they were engaged in a temporary
capacity. These documents would certainly not alter the results of the case.
Regardless of the nature of their employment, petitioners are required to abide by
the rules and regulations on public bidding and disbursement of public funds.
Testimony of handwriting experts, original copies of disbursement vouchers,
and written requests of contractors who wished to avail of the prepayment scheme
under DPWH Department Order No. 42 would probably not change the finding on the
irregularities pertaining to the P14,400,000.00 disbursement for sub-base
aggregates.
The disbursement vouchers that petitioner Abubakar seeks to introduce would
not exonerate him from liability in Criminal Case Nos. 24972, 24979, 24980, 24982,
and 24983, where the disbursement vouchers are not relevant. The disbursement
vouchers relate to the payment of the balance of mobilization fees to contractors.
The criminal cases cited by Abubakar, on the other hand, pertain to the alleged
advance payment for sub-base aggregates.
Likewise, the evidence cited by petitioner Baraguir would not affect the result
of the case against him. There is no reason to introduce pieces of evidence to prove
the publication of the invitation to bid and the conduct of actual bidding. The
occurrence of these events was not disputed by the parties. Meanwhile, the Notices
of Award and Notices to Commence, even if admitted, would not change the finding
that certain contractors deployed their equipment ahead of public bidding. The pieces
of evidence that petitioner Baraguir ought to have presented are those tending to
prove that the contractors only mobilized after they won the bidding. This would have
destroyed the prosecution's theory and the basis for the criminal charge.
Second, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's former counsel was not grossly
negligent. Their former counsel may have failed to present other pieces of evidence
in addition to what their co-accused had presented. He may have also failed to
incorporate other arguments in the record of the case. However, these cannot be
considered as grossly negligent acts.
Assessments regarding the materiality or relevancy of evidence, competency
of witnesses, and procedural technique generally fall within the expertise and control
of counsel. This Court has held that for a claim of gross negligence to prosper,
"nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown."
2. The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the
fiscal. A claim of "selective prosecution" may only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence
of "clear showing of intentional discrimination." The prosecution of one person to the
exclusion of others who may be just as guilty does not automatically entail a violation
of the equal protection clause.
Selective prosecution is a concept that is foreign to this jurisdiction.
It originated from United States v. Armstrong, a 1996 case decided by the United
States Supreme Court. A case for selective prosecution arises when a prosecutor
charges defendants based on "constitutionally prohibited standards such as race,
religion or other arbitrary classification." Essentially, a selective prosecution claim
rests upon an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
Although "selective prosecution" has not been formally adopted in this
jurisdiction, there are cases that have been decided by this Court recognizing the
possibility of defendants being unduly discriminated against through the prosecutorial
process. The burden lies on the defendant to show discriminatory intent through
extrinsic evidence.
In People v. Dela Piedra, the accused was charged and convicted of large-
scale illegal recruitment. Among the arguments she raised in her appeal was the
violation of the equal protection clause as she was the only person who was charged.
She pointed out that a certain Jasmine Alejandro (Alejandro), the person who handed
out application forms, was not indicted. She concluded that the prosecution
discriminated against her based on "regional origins." She was a Cebuana while
Alejandro was a Zamboangueña.
In rejecting the accused's argument, this Court held that the prosecution of
one person to the exclusion of others who may be just as guilty does not automatically
entail a violation of the equal protection clause. There must be a showing of
discriminatory intent or "clear and intentional discrimination," which can only be
established through extrinsic evidence.
Petitioners failed to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the
Ombudsman in choosing not to indict other alleged participants to the anomalous
transactions. Their contention that several other public officials were not criminally
charged, by itself, does not amount to a violation of petitioners Abubakar and
Baraguir's right to equal protection of laws. The evidence against the others may
have been insufficient to establish probable cause. There may have been no evidence
at all. At this point, all this Court could do is speculate. In the absence of extrinsic
evidence establishing discriminatory intent, a claim of selective prosecution cannot
prosper.

3. Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes "any undue
injury to any party, including the Government" or gives "any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence."
A conviction under this provision reqmres the concurrence of the following
elements:
a. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;

b. He [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or [gross]
inexcusable negligence;
c. That his [or her] action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his functions.
The second element provides the modalities by which a violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 may be committed. "Manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or
"gross inexcusable negligence" are not separate offenses,132 and proof of the existence
of any of these three (3) "in connection with the prohibited acts . . . is enough to convict."
 This Court finds that petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave unwarranted benefits
and advantage to several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead
of the scheduled public bidding.
As a matter of policy, public contracts are awarded through competitive public
bidding. The purpose of this process is two (2)-fold.
First, it protects public interest by giving the public the "best possible advantages
thru open competition." Open and fair competition among bidders is seen as a mechanism
by which the public may obtain the best terms on a given contract. Participating bidders
offer competing proposals, which are evaluated by the appropriate authority "to determine
the bid most favorable to the government."
Second, competitive public bidding avoids "suspicion of favoritism and anomalies
in the execution of public contracts."
These important public policy considerations demand the strict observance of
procedural rules relating to the bidding process.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1594, a public contract shall be awarded to the
lowest prequalified bidder. The bid must comply with the terms and conditions stated in
the call to bid and must be the most advantageous to the government. After the evaluation
of the bids, the winning bidder shall be given a Notice of Award. The concerned
government office or agency and the successful bidder will then execute the contract,
which shall be forwarded to the head of the concerned government office or agency for
approval. The contract's approval signifies its perfection and it is at this time when the
successful bidder may be allowed to commence work upon receipt of a Notice to Proceed.
Petitioners Baraguir and Guiani insist that the prosecution failed to establish their
intent to favor some contractors in the bidding process. Petitioner Guiani claims that the
certificates of mobilization, on which the prosecution heavily relies, prove nothing.
Their arguments are unmeritorious.
The certificates of mobilization, which were issued at least one (1) week before
the date of public bidding, categorically identified HMB Construction and Supply, Kutawato
Construction, Al Mohandiz Construction, JM Construction, PMA Construction, Al-Aziz-
Engineering, and MGL Construction as contractors for some portions of the Awang-Nuro
Road and Cotabato-Lanao Road Projects.
The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled public bidding
and of allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment through the issuance of
certificates of mobilization are glaring irregularities in the bidding procedure that engender
suspicion of favoritism and partiality towards the seven (7) contractors. These
irregularities create a reasonable, if not conclusive, presumption that the concerned public
officials had no intention of complying with the rules on public bidding and that the results
were already predetermined.
This appears to be a flimsy excuse. There is no justifiable reason why contractors
should be allowed to deploy their equipment in advance considering that it would defeat
the very purpose of competitive public bidding. Benefits derived from this practice, if any,
would certainly not redound to the government.
Aside from this, the alleged purpose of the contractors in mobilizing their
equipment ahead of public bidding is speculative. Prospective contractors are required to
possess the technical capability to execute the implementation of a given project. Section
3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1594 lists as a condition for all bidders the "[a]vailability
and commitment of the contractor's equipment to be used for the subject project."153
The PreQualification Bids and Awards Committee is mandated under the implementing
rules and regulations to look into the "suitability of [the contractor's] available construction
equipment" in assessing technical capability.
The screening process ensures that bidders have the necessary equipment and
personnel to carry out the implementation of a particular government project. In this
regard, it may not even be possible for a winning bidder to lease equipment from another
contractor after it has won because technical capability is evaluated before the submission
of the bids. Assuming that prospective bidders would be permitted to sublease their
equipment from other entities, the sublease agreement should already be finalized prior
to the conduct of public bidding.
Clearly, petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave seven (7) contractors unwarranted
benefits and advantage through manifest partiality. Petitioner Baraguir also gave
 unwarranted benefits and advantage to the contractors through gross inexcusable
negligence. Admittedly, he failed to check the dates on the certificates of mobilization
when they were presented to him for his signature.

4. This Court's ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal
liability.
Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a
certain extent on the acts of their subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or
enter into negotiations."176 This is based upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot
be expected to examine every single document relative to government transactions:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all-too-common
problems - dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or
positions, or plain incompetence - is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply
because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step
from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction
before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that [the] documents used in
the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead
of being machine numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land
[was] reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of
conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue injury and
damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected
documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for
a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his
signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely
to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare
bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains
important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the
amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the
reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some
added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of
even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and
supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or
departments is even more appalling. (Emphasis supplied)
The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official
has no foreknowledge of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to
investigate or exercise a greater degree of care. In a number of cases, this Court refused
to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there were circumstances that should have
prompted the government official to inquire further.
In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar,
Baraguir, or Guiani from criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have
prompted them to make further inquiries on the transactions subject of this case.
In Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24969 on the early mobilization of contractors, the
irregularity was already apparent on the face of the certificates of mobilization, which bore
dates earlier than the scheduled public bidding. This should have already roused suspicion
from petitioners Baraguir and Guiani, who were the last signatories and final approving
authorities.
The same can be said for Criminal Case No. 24970. The Contract of Survey Work,
which was used as the primary supporting document for the disbursement of the 30%
mobilization fee to Arce Engineering Services, contained a patently illegal stipulation.
Petitioner Guiani cannot blame his subordinates and claim that he acted in good faith
considering that he entered into the contract with Arce Engineering Services.
Petitioners should have also made further inqmnes regarding the P14,400,000.00
advance payment for sub-aggregates. There were no appropriate documents such as
purchase orders and delivery receipts to support this disbursement.
 The rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are imbued with
public interest. The positions and functions of petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani
impose upon them a greater responsibility in ensuring that rules on these matters are
complied with. They are expected to exercise a greater degree of diligence.

Murder; Conspiracy

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SEGFRED L. OROZCO, MANUEL D. OSIR, and

ALBERTO B. MATURAN, ERNIE N. CASTRO, G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017
LEONEN, J.

Facts:

Eyewitness Susan Lalona (Lalona) testified that on the evening of November 15, 1998,
she was at Murillo's Restaurant, Magallanes Street, Surigao City with her friend and herein victim,
Julius Joshua Mata (Mata). Later, Orozco, Osir, Castro, and Maturan, apparently drunk, entered
and occupied the table in front of Lalona and Mata. Shortly after they ordered beer, Orozco
approached Mata from behind and stabbed him twice with a small bolo. Mata shouted that he
was stabbed. Lalona grabbed Orozco and wrestled with him, but he pushed her back. When Mata
tried to run out, the rest of the accused caught him. While Maturan and Osir held Mata's arms,
Castro stabbed him in the chest. The four (4) accused continued stabbing Mata and ran away
when Lalona shouted for help. Lalona took Mata to the Caraga Regional Hospital on a tricycle,
but Mata was pronounced dead on arrival.

All the accused admitted that on the night of November 15, 1998, after drinking beer at Pacelan
Videoke in Bilang-bilang, Surigao City, they ordered another round of beer at Murillo's Restaurant.
However, they had different versions of what had transpired there.

Issue:

Whether or not all the accused are guilty of murder. (Yes)

Ruling:
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public
calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

To sustain a conviction under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must
prove that a person was killed, that the accused killed him, that the killing was not parricide or
infanticide, and that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
under this Article.
 It is admitted that Mata was killed and that accused-appellant was one of those
responsible for the stabs that led to his death. The only element disputed in this case is that the
killing was attended by circumstances which qualify the crime as murder.

In People v. Dela Cruz, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning
and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no
opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted.

The circumstances proved by the prosecution amply show that treachery attended the
killing of Mata:

As above-stated, Mata was completely helpless. His hands were held by two other persons
while he was stabbed. To make matters worse, four persons, who were armed with knives,
ganged-up on Mata. Certainly, Mata was completely deprived of any prerogative to defend
himself or to retaliate.

There is likewise no sufficient ground to overturn the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy

exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Its existence may be inferred and proved through acts that show
a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. In this case, the prosecution
proved the common purpose of all the accused, a concert of action, and a community of interest.
This Court quotes the Court of Appeals:

In the case at hand, the overwhelming evidence is to the effect that accused-appellants
and their co-accused acted in concert with a unity of purpose to kill Mata. After Orozco
stabbed Mata in the back, the latter mustered his remaining strength to run away from
his assailants. However, Osir, Maturan, and Castro chased and caught Mata. While Osir
and Maturan held the hands of Mata, Castro stabbed the latter's chest. This caused Mata
to fall on the ground. Still not contented with the dismal condition of the victim, all of the
accused continued on stabbing the victim. Such carnage would not have stopped if not
for the shouting made by Lalona to call for help. Clearly, the acts of the accused-appellants
showed a unity of the criminal design to kill Mata.

NOTHING FOLLOWS