KASHMIR AND PALESTINE: SIMILAR 'SOLUTION' TO SIMILAR ISSUES?

Author(s): Ghani Jafar

Source: Strategic Studies , Winter 95 & Spring 96, Vol. 18, No. 2/3, SPECIAL ISSUE: THE
JAMMU AND KASHMIR DISPUTE (Winter 95 & Spring 96), pp. 80-101
Published by: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad

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KASHMIR AND PALESTINE: SIMILAR 'SOLUTION'
TO SIMILAR ISSUES?
G ha ni J afar*

The similarities between the Palestine and Kashmir

questions encompass a fairly large scope of areas. These go
back to a number of commonalities in the genesis of the two
issues, and include the nature of many developments in and
affecting both the occupied territories. The relationship
between the two occupying powers, India and the Zionist
entity of Israel, has also evolved in a symbiotic nature
which, in the immediate context, has acquired a pivotal
relevance to their approach to the subjugated people of
Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand, and Palestine, on the
other. Finally, the popular movements for freedom
launched in the two lands, sharé a variety of features.
However, more than the inherent characteristics and
dynamics of the Palestine and Kashmir situations, respec-
tively, it is the ongoing effort spearheaded by the United
States in particular, to find a similar 'solution' to both the
crises,' which has given a topical prominence to their
similarities.

In more precise terms, the progress achieved by the

peace process launched with reference to the Middle East is
already being projected by Washington as sufficient basis
for ensuring stability in that volatile region. The supposed
success of the Middle East peace process in achieving this
goal is, therefore, being advanced to support the feasibility
of its replication in South Asia; specifically, with regard

cases.
to the Kashmir issue.2 It should be thus in order to attempt
an identification of the historical and contemporaneous
commonalities between the two territorial questions; if
only to evaluate the prospects of durable peace which the
similar peace process is supposed to foster in both the

• Mr. Ghani Jatar is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of

Strategic Studies. Islamabad.
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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution' to Similar issues?

It may, however, be noted at the outset that, unless the

efficacy of force In ushering In lasting peace and stability
is taken for granted, any solution to a national question has
to be based on at least the minimal norms of justice If it
can be reasonably expected to prove enduring.
International law In general, as also the two successive
world bodies (the League of Nations and the United Nations)
with specific reference to the Palestine and Kashmir ques-
tions, respectively, have also laid down these legal
requirements applicable to the two cases. The only chrono-
logical difference here is that, unlike the Palestine issue,
whose origin in the aftermath of the first world war made
it relevant to the then League of Nations as well, the
Kashmir dispute has been of concern to the United Nations
atone.

These inalienable rights of the Palestinian and

Kashmiri people, which in effect involve not just the still
valid obligations3 but also the prospects of the interna-
tional system's continued relevance In the post-Cold War
phase, would have to remain the touchstone while retrac-
ing the similarities between the two issues, as also in
weighing the chances of the success of a similar solution
for them.

The Genesis

Both Palestine and Kashmir enjoyed varying degrees of

local autonomy as parts of the two last surviving greatest
Muslim empires of the world (Turk Ottoman and Mughal
Indian, respectively) before they came under British
colonial rule. The two territories had for centuries before
that been ruled by local administrations, even while they
did owe allegiance to the respective imperial authorities.4
The preceding long tradition of self-rule in Palestine and
Kashmir may well have acted as a deterrent against the
Imperial ambitions in the two cases to bring them directly
under central rule.5 Palestine and Kashmir also shared the

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 Strategic Studies

geographical feature of constituting long-distance outposts

in their respective imperial domains which made direct
control over them both expensive and cumbersome.

In the second place, both the territories had for long

centuries retained their overall religious, ethnic, linguis-
tic and cultural identities by virtue mainly of the same
tendency displayed by the two imperial powers not to
undertake their colonization. Palestine and Kashmir
thereby remained not only predominantly Muslim-popu-
lated but also remarkably free of extraneous socio-cul-
tural influences. In this historical past, there were also
very small proportions of the non-Muslim communities
which were, subsequent to the British colonial interven-
tion, to be given over political control of the two territo-
ries (Jews in Palestine, and Hindus in Kashmir).4

Together with this commonality of constituting small

indigenous minorities in both the instances, neither the
Palestinian Jews nor the Kashmiri Hindus were significant
land-owners or cultivators in each case. They did, never-
theless, enjoy the common characteristic of being moneyed
and engaged mainly in finance. By contrast, whereas the
Christians formed the second largest indigenous communi-
ty in Palestine;7 Kashmir, especially its agrarian Jammu
province in the south, was home to a substantial minority
of Sikhs.

It was the British rule over the two territories which

marked the beginning of a change in the traditional demo-
graphic mix of both Palestine and Kashmir. Despite this
influx of Jews in Palestine and Hindus in Kashmir during
the British overlordship in the two territories, however,
both were still predominantly Muslim-majority areas
when the British withdrew from them in the late 1940s.'

Territorial Jurisdiction

Apart from the common features of any number of

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Similar issues?

other circumstances that have attended the progress of the

two issues since their eruption, the very basis of the
carving up of Palestine in 1948 for the creation of the so-
called Jewish State, and India's armed intervention and
occupation of the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir a
year earlier, lies in highly questionable grounds of
assumed international legality. It was, again, the outgoing
British paramount authority, common to both the
instances, which was instrumental in bringing about the
de facto consequences in the two cases, even though they
were achieved through vastly different modalities.
Notwithstanding the differences in the means adopted to
affect the two outcomes, however, the prime responsibili-
ty for them is traced back to the same paramount power:
Great Britain. It has both a strictly legal and a non-for-
mal, but certainly obligatory, component.

In the case of Israel, the establishment of the entity

itself was based on fundamental legal hiatus. Neither the
mandatory power nor the United Nations had legal
sovereignty over Palestine when the General Assembly
adopted its Resolution 181 (II) on November 29, 1947,
for partitioning the territory into an Arab and a Jewish
state.9 As pointed out by Henry Cattan in his landmark
treatise on the subject, "notwithstanding the political
vicissitudes In Palestine (since the First World War),
legal sovereignty still lies today in the original Inhabitants
of the country as they existed at the time of the detachment
of Palestine from Turkey at the end of the First World
War".'0

Not only that, he also establishes on the basis of his-

torical record that "the Palestinians were the descendants
of the Philistines and Canaanites, and have lived continu-
ously in Palestine since the dawn of history, even long
before the ancient Hebrews set foot in the country"."
Conversely, Israel could not have acquired legal
sovereignty over any Palestinian territory by virtue

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 Strategic Studies

either of the Balfour Declaration of November 2. 1917 or

the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947." The
partitioning of Palestine was also violative of the provi-
sions of the British mandate as specified originally by the
League of Nations.13 At the same time, there was no basis
for the United Nations to inherit the mandate from the
League when the latter was disbanded in 1946.'4

As for the other obligations of the British (and Allied

Powers) to the Palestinian people which were not carried
out, include a number of pledges and assurances held out
between 1915 and 1918' 5 which in essence undertook
granting of independence to Arab lands after their separa-
tion from the Ottoman Empire. "These pledges encouraged
the Arab movement for secession from the Turkish
Empire. The Arabs revolted against the Turks in many
parts of the country and. in fact, made a substantial con-
tribution to the Allied victory in the First World War". 14

India's forced annexation of the major portion of the

princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, on the other hand,
was not only in contravention of the British legal frame-
work for grant of independence to and partitioning of the
Subcontinent, but* was also carried out through manifestly
fraudulent means - and with the connivance of the depart-
ing colonial power. By virtue of not forming part of
British India, ruled directly by the colonial authority, the
princely State of Jammu and Kashmir - along with hun-
dreds of other such entities with varying degrees of inter-
nal autonomy throughout the Subcontinent - was allowed
the option to cede to the new Dominions of India or Pakistan
at the time of independence in August 1947. However, this
choice was denied to the overwhelmingly Muslim popula-
tion of the State by India's despatch of troops to the terri-
tory, with the abetment of its British Governor-General,
Lord Mountbatten.' 7

In terms of the purported legality of its armed action,

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution' to Similar issues?

New Delhi has relied on a supposed accession made by the

then Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir to the new State of
India on October 26, before his making a formal request
for despatch of troops. Even without going into the specious
Indian claim that the autocrat ruler of the State did, by
virtue of the British partition plan, have such a right to
decide the political fate of his subjects, the fact remains
that both Lord Mountbatten and the incumbent Indian
Prime Minister (Pandit Nehru) were then acutely con-
scious of the gross irregularity committed in the process
by not ascertaining the wishes of the concerned
population." It was thus that India repeatedly undertook to
allow the subjugated people of Jammu and Kashmir a
chance to decide their geopolitical status/but has not kept
its promise to this day."

At the same time, it has since been authoritatively

established not only that the purported accesston of Jammu
and Kashmir by the Maharaja to the Dominion of India
dated subsequent to the letter's military action, but that no
such accession may in fact have taken place.20 The British
complicity here was two-fold. In the first place. Lord
Mountbatten readily accepted this fake accession. Secondly,
he undertook on behalf of his government that the question
of the State's accession was yet to be conclusively settled
through a reference to its people.2' The betrayal on the lat-
ter count bears an unmistakable similarity to the British
pledges of independence held out to the people of Palestine
during the First World War (as referred to above).

Again, as with the questionable conduct of first the

League of Nations and then the United Nations with regard
to the violation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians
as guaranteed to them by the established international law
as also by the two successive world bodies' own specific
obligations, the Kashmiris continue to be denied their
right to self-determination reinforced in their case by the
relevant UN resolutions as well.

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 Strategic Studies

The Strategic Dimension

Was the occurrence of these two strikingly similar and

unparalleled instances of gross injustice to the people of
Palestine and Kashmir, respectively - at the hands of the
same globally predominant Western colonial power of the
time. Great Britain, involving mainly the same religious
community, Muslims, and within the same year - 1947 -
no more than a mere coincidence, or did it betray a deeper
strategic design? To begin with, it is not easy to reconcile
these two stark aberrations with the otherwise justifiably
proud democratic tradition which Great Britain has not
only itself followed for centuries, but has also taken pains
to introduce, institutionalize and, in some instances,
actively safeguard in large parts of the globe during its
colonial rule over them and later." That, however, is not
the only factor common to the two cases which militates
against the possibility of sheer chance or oversight by the
common paramount power.

As already noted, Britain had wrested both Palestine

and Kashmir from the two great Muslim empires of the
time. It is doubtful if London would in 1947-48 have
relinquished its hold over virtually the entire colonial
empire, these two territories included, but for the State in
which the preceding Second World War had left it." Nor
was the British Commonwealth in the post-colonial era
conceived to be the ineffective forum which it was to later
become. Seen in this perspective, the given determination
of the fate of these two strategically vital pieces of terri-
tory by the colonial power retreating reluctantly and pre-
maturely from the entire stretch of Muslim land between
the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean, makes perfect
sense. Also, even without trying to detect any particular
British bias at the time against the Muslim population in
the region, it would have been essential from a purely
strategic standpoint that both Palestine and Kashmir fall

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Similar Issues?

into the hands of non-Muslim power structures.

Whereas the original population of Palestine was thus

displaced in large numbers to make way for a Jewish
enclave at the Western extreme of this Muslim heartland,"1
overlooking North Africa as well; Kashmir had to fall
under the administrative control of post-independence
(Hindu) India. Morality and law could take a long leave of
absence in both the cases. The existence of such a possible
design is also corroborated by the handing over of the two
territories to communal power structures which had no
love lost for the Muslims in each case. Their large num-
bers in the territory notwithstanding, the Palestinian
Christians could not have been expected to quite fit the bill.
The given level of the Hindu-Muslim antagonism with ref-
erence to the sub-continent of the time, however, would
have provided a perfect setting for the purpose. It is also
relevant to note in this context the high leverage which the
Jewish influence continued to exercise on British state
policies till after the creation of Israel when the numbers
of the community in the Isles depleted sharply.

In terms of strategic location, Palestine's centrality to

the rise and fall of civilizations is borne out since the ear-
liest recorded history; it hardly needs elaboration. Nor can
the traditional role of Kashmir in this context be over-
looked. The British, too, were quick in appreciating the
strategic importance of the territory and its neighbour-
hood where their Indian empire met both the Chinese
empire to the east and the Russian empire to the north-
west.25 Thus, the detachment of Palestine and Kashmir
from their natural environs and bearings - geographic,
historical, cultural, social, religious and political - could
together provide the Western powers, Britain and the
United States in particular, with the potential of a strate-
gic reach extending from Chinese Sinkiang to the Middle
East and North Africa, and taking Muslim Central Asia also
in its sweep.

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 Strategic Studies

Another geo-strategic feature common to the political

status of Palestine and Kashmir as it has been fabricated in
the post-war era, relates to the vast fallback provided In
each case by a contiguous stretch of land or water. Although
unnatural by all other strategic considerations, the Hindu
stranglehold over Kashmir has at least logistically been
sustained till now through a tenuous land linkage with the
'mother country', India. Similarly, the Jewish Israel may
well have remained an equal stranger amidst the Muslim
heartland, but can theoretically be kept well supplied by
Europe courtesy the Mediterranean.
Indo-Israeli Collusion

Irrespective of the complimentarity of their strategic

utility as it may have been perceived by the British in the
first instance, however, both Israel and India had to
become willing partners in any such scheme for it to
become effective in the post-colonial phase. Tel Aviv has
never had any ambiguity in either appreciating this link-
age or in trying to advance it. India, on the other hand,
started off with a backlog of assumed morality which it
found embarrassing to reconcile with the eventuality of
entering into an open relationship with the Zionist entity.
India's founding fathers had on countless earlier occasions
held forth against the creation of the Jewish homeland In
Palestine,26 with Gandhi describing it as "a crime against
humanity".27 Nevertheless, the post-independence leader-
ship of India was quick in resolving the dilemma by enter-
ing into a mainly covert collaboration with the Zionist
entity/even as New Delhi continued to oppose it vehement-
ly at the UN and other international forums.

New Delhi recognized Israel officially some two years

after the latter's creation, but conceded the foregoing
duplicity in its conduct on this regard in the communique
issued on the occasion. The official text extending India's
recognition to the Zionist entity in September 1950 noted,
among other things, that "India and Israel have been
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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution' to Similar issues?

working together for the last two years*.24 In the same

vein, the consulate which India allowed Israel to open in
Bombay the same year, continued to perform clandestine
functions in many areas, including defence cooperation
between the two sides which is traced back to at least the
early 1960s.29 At New York, meanwhile, India would co-
sponsor one UN resolution after another in condemnation of
Israel.30 As noted by an analyst, "In the rigid atmosphere
of the blpolarity created by the Cold War, India had chosen
to align itself with the former superpower, the Soviet
Union, then ally of revolutionary forces. Including the
Palestinians".3' During that phase, the Indian national
leadership also continued to show concern for the sensitiv-
ities of the country's large Muslim minority In keeping
the burgeoning relationship with Israel under wraps.

There Is. at the same time, evidence on record to sug-

gest that the Initial opposition of India's founding fathers
to the Zionist entity was informed not only with principles
of justice but also their unease at the strategic considera-
tions of the British colonial power. Pandit Nehru had, for
instance, remarked as early as In May 1933 that "...
unfortunately, Palestine, being on the sea and air routes to
India and the East, Is a vital factor In the British Imperial
scheme, and Jews and Arabs have been exploited to further
this scheme".32 Also that "responsible Zionist leaders have
constantly urged what an advantage a strong Jewish
National Home would be to the English In guarding the road
to India, just because it was a counteracting force to Arab
nationalism. How India crops up in odd places!"33 Odd as
Pandit Nehru may have found this place for colonized India,
that was exactly where he himself came to place the coun-
try as Its first Prime Minister after Independence in
1947. Indians were more than willing to step into the
British Imperial shoes - the difference in size notwith-
standing - as they fancied themselves as the heirs to the
Raj.

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 Strategìe Studies

Nor did India waste any time in getting rid of the

inconvenience of surreptitiousness in its relations with
the Zionist entity as soon as it was practicable to do so. In
December 1991 - that is. less than two months after the
dissolution of the Soviet bloc - India, then a temporary
member of the Security Council, voted in favour of revok-
ing General Assembly Resolution 3379 (of 1975) equating
Zionism with racism.34 As described by an Indian author,
"at a stroke, India cast away its earlier commitment to
fighting "Israeli racist, expansionist, terrorist policy and
its attempt to Judaize Arab territory'".38 The upgradatbn
of bilateral relations followed in equally indecent haste
with the announcement of the establishment of embassies
by the two countries in New Delhi and Tel Aviv, respec-
tively, on January 29, 1992.34

Together with the end of the Cold War. however. India

had by then also dropped its pretences of secularism as the
Muslims in that country, as also in Occupied Jammu and
Kashmir, started coming under increasing state persecu-
tion and oppression. David Gross, the right-wing editor of
the Jerusalem Post, was candid enough to point out a con-
nection between the strengthening of Indo-Israeli relations
and the developing situation in Occupied Jammu and
Kashmir.37 The decision to open embassies was welcomed as
much by the influential Jewish lobby in the United States
as by the extremist Hindu leaders in India.38 In a press
statement expressing joy. Stephen S. Solar stated that
India and Israel had "much in common".3* Similarly, Shiv
Sareen, President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, hailed
the decision, and said that "it was necessary to counter the
influence of the Islamic bloc on India".40

This commonality of interests came to the surface even

more vividly during the May 1993 visit of Shimon Peres
to New Delhi which was described by an Indian writer as
"a great morale-booster" for India at a time when that
"giant-sized country is hobbled by its own lack of self-

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution' to Similar issues?

confidence to deal with islamic moles and predators".4'

Shimon Peres, on his part, was reported by the Indian
press to have suggested to his hosts a possible political
remedy in dealing with the Kashmiri militants through
applying the same 'solution' which Israel had employed in
colonizing the occupied territories of Gaza and the West
Bank in order to change the demographic status of the Arab
Palestinians.42

The extent of possible collaboration between Israel and

India on Kashmir was not, however, confined to the realm
of the so-called 'political solution' which Shimon Peres
was understood to have suggested to his hosts. It also
spanned the adoption by India in Kashmir of the repressive
measures which the Zionist entity has used ever since its
establishment in trying to crush the rightful owners of
Palestine and, subsequent to the 1967 war. other occupied
Arab territories. In the words of an analyst. "India feels
that it can learn a lot from Israel's experience in counter-
ing the uprising in occupied Arab territories and apply
those imbibed lessons against the Kashmiri populace".43 1 n
fact, the collusion between Israel and India in this field
was reported to have started much before the visit of
Shimon Peres: "There is unconfirmed evidence that the
Indian army is getting anti-terrorist training and advise
from the Israelis. This came to light in September-October
1992 when Kashmiri militants captured some Israeli
commandos (Mossad agents) in Srinagar who were mas-
querading as tourists".44

A Symbiotic Nexus

The relationship between Israel and India is of a

uniquely special nature, indeed. It has found only its first
manifest complimentarity in trying to deal with the popu-
lar uprisings that erupted in quick secession in the terri-
tories occupied by the two partners. The end of the Cold
War may also have enabled the ties between the two sides

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 Strategic Studies

to come out of the closet, but it is unlikely that either of

them would make so bold as to spell out the operational
dynamics of their affinity for at least so long as human
freedom and equality remain characteristics desirable of a
nation. The Israelis in particular have, however, been
giving expression to this crux, albeit in a roundabout
manner, for long years. One such early Instance was a let-
ter written by an Israeli scholar. Dr. Immanuel
Olsvanger, to Pandit Nehru on September 18, 1950, in
which he noted: "There is a great kinship between the
souls of our two nations. It is not given to definition. It
must be felt. I felt it when listening to the chanting of
Ramayana, so reminiscent of the similar chanting of some
passage of Talmud"."5

Shimon Peres, the then Foreign Minister of the Zionist

entity who has since ascended to premiership and head of
the ruling Labour Party after Yitzhak Rabin's assassina-
tion in November 1995, also referred obliquely to this
'kinship' during his May 1993 visit to India. Shimon
Peres, "a Bombay-born Jew""6 who has served as Israel's
Prime Minister even earlier, "waxed eloquent ... on the
ties between the two sides","7 and indicated the regard
which the founder of the Zionist entity had for India by
stating that Gandhi's was one of the three pictures which
Ben Gurion would keep on his desk - the other two being
those of Prophet Moses and Socrates."8 Again, the Israeli
ambassador to New Delhi was reported to have told an
interviewer that "we in Israel have realized that a weak
India will mean a weaker Israel"

Nothing but an unflinching faith in the respective 'des-

tiny' of the two entities, even if the effort of its realization
has to be at the expense of the inalienable rights of 'lesser
people', can quite explain such a mutual perception of
intrinsic commonality between the two sides. Palestinians
are 'dispensable' as they happened to occupy, even though
since time immemorial, the 'promised land' of the chil-

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Simitar issues?

dren of Zion. The Kashmiris, too, cannot be allowed to

break-away their homeland as it forms an utoot ang
(integral part) of 'Mother India'. These irredendist claims
are not the product of just materially ambitious power
structures, but are essential to the "souls" of the two
entities. "India is a country that was created and is ruled
by high-caste Brahmins who enjoy a privileged position
and whose disdain for the Maleech (Muslims) is well-
known; likewise, the Zionist entity of Israel is meant for
the Jews who are "the chosen of God'.50

"According to the elders of Zion, 'Surely, there is no

need to seek further proof that our rule Is predestined by
God",51 and that 'Goyim' (non-Jews and Gentiles) must
always remain subservient and powerless.52 The Indian
historical and religious scriptures talk of Akhand Bharat,
not only of pre-independence British India, but one that
embraces much of Afghanistan, present-day Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Southeast Asia and other adjoining areas. The vision
of gathering together this vast territory has inspired and
enthused many Indian intellectuals, writers and dreamers,
including the present-day fundamentalist religious parties
of India. In like fashion, Zionists also believe that their
land must ultimately spread from the Nile to the Euphrates
in what they dream of as 'Greater Israel'.53

The Solution

To begin with, both India and the Zionist entity have no

legal, historical or moral basis to exercise control over
any part of the occupied territories of the former State of
Jammu and Kashmir and Palestine, respectively. India
came to annex the area on the basis of blatant aggression,
whereas the so-called State of Israel itself is the creation
of the United Nations through the exercise of its ostensible
writ over territory to which the world body could lay no
claim of legal sovereignty. Israel, in its place, has of
course come to progressively occupy much more territory

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 Strategìe Studies

than was purportedly assigned to it by virtue of General

Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of November 29. 1947. The
territories which the Zionist entity has thus seized com-
prise:

1 . More than half the areas which General Assembly res-

olution 181(11) of November 29, 1947, had reserved
for the Arabs of Palestine and were to constitute the
territory of the proposed Arab State. These additional
areas were occupied by Israel in 1948 and 1949.
2 . The City of Jerusalem, which under the same General
Assembly resolution was to have been subject to an
international regime administered by the United
Nations. Israel occupied the New City of (West)
Jerusalem in 1948 and the Old City of (East)
Jerusalem in 1967.
3 . The West Bank of Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula and the
Golan Heights - being territory of Jordan. Egypt and
Syria, respectively. Israel seized these territories in
June 1967.5"

It is thus clear that the ideal solution to the two issues,

and the only one which can ensure durable peace with
regard to both of them, would be one which provides for
the complete vacation of the occupation of Jammu and
Kashmir and the Arab land by India and Israel, respective-
ly. The international community, on the other hand, has at
no stage undertaken to do that. If anything, the Zionist
entity is a creation of the United Nations itself. As for the
Indian occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, the United
Nations resolved, through a Security Council resolution on
January 5, 1949, that the final disposition of the territo-
ry would be made in accordance with the will of the people
expressed through the democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the
UN. as to whether they wish to form part of Pakistan or
India.86

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Similar issues?

No progress hasto date been made by the United Nations

to bring about this solution of the issue. The conduct of the
international community vis-a-vis the Zionist entity has,
however, been even more negligent. It failed to take note of
Israel's occupation of half the proposed Arab State's terri-
tory in 1948 and 1949. Subsequent to the 1967 Arab-
Israel war, the Security Council did pass a resolution, (No.
242, dated November 22. 1967, which called for the
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories
occupied by it, but with the rider: "in the recent conflict".
As with the UN's failure on the question of Jammu and
Kashmir, however, the world body is yet to do anything
tangible by way of getting even the restricted terms of its
own Security Council Resolution 242 implemented.

The burden of finding 'solutions' to the two issues has

in effect been passed on instead to the United States of
America, as noted at the beginning of this paper. The so-
called Middle East peace process has been making halting
progress ever since the signing of the 'Declaration of
Principles' between the Palestine Liberation Organization
and Tel Aviv in Washington. D.C., on September 13, 1993.
The foisting of a similar 'solution' on Jammu and Kashmir,
however, still remains in an embryonic stage. In its
essence, the new formula for projected peace in the Middle
East envisages a long-drawn-out process of granting lim-
ited autonomy to the Palestinians in some parts of the ter-
ritories occupied by the Zionist entity. The proclaimed
replication of this blueprint would, then, involve working
out a similar half-way measure with regard to the future
status of Jammu and Kashmir, irrespective of the exact
modalities which are yet to be worked out.

This brings In the last two features common to the

Kashmir and Palestine questions, both of which militate
against the viability of the nature of 'solution' being pro-
posed in the two cases - not to mention the underlying dic-
tates of durable peace which call for nothing short of

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 Strategic Studies

restoration of full justice to the subjugated people.

Firstly, the people of the two occupied territories have
finally decided to take their destiny In their own hands, and
It is far from certain that they would settle for anything
less than the wresting of their Inalienable right to self-
determination and freedom from the foreign yoke. The
relentless struggle launched by the Palestinians In their
occupied territories In December 1987, as also the popu-
lar uprising which came to full play in Jammu and
Kashmir a year later, have been anything but subdued by
the adoption of all the repressive measures resorted to by
Israel and India, respectively.

In the second place, even In the unlikely event of the

people in both the occupied lands agreeing, or being forced,
to accept a 'solution' which does not come up to their just
aspirations, it has become difficult to see a package of
half- measures being implemented in either case by virtue
of the strong, and at times savage, popular reaction it has
already evoked among the occupying powers of India and
Israel themselves. By a queer coincidence, most damning
evidence to this effect was furnished by two unrelated
developments in New Delhi and Tel Aviv during the first
week of November 1995. A Zionist settler, believed by the
authorities to be working as part of a large and well-orga-
nized group, assassinated the Israeli Prime Minister
because Yitzhak Rabin was, in the words of the murderer,
handing over the Jewish 'promised land' to the
Palestinians.54 In New Delhi, meanwhile, even a cosmetic
'package of autonomy' offered by Indian Prime Minister,
Narasimha Rao, to the people of Jammu and Kashmir was
vehemently opposed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
as, according to the party spokesperson, it amounted to "a
conspiracy against the Indian nation".5'

Also, even as investigations into the assassination of

the Israeli Prime Minister were underway, the widow of
the slain leader accused Berçamin Netanyahu, leader of the

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Similar issues?

Likud Party, of instigating the murder of her husband

through his fiery opposition to the 'peace process' What
is immediately significant here is that the Likud, much
like the present-day BJP in India, represents the main
electoral challenge to the ruling Labour Party. Both the
political organisations of religious zealots - Zionists and
Hindus, respectively - command large enough followings
among the national electorates to hold the democratic
institutions of the two entities in ransom. The only differ-
ence is that whereas the Likud has traditionally enjoyed
this position in Israeli politics, the BJP has ascended to it
in recent years.

This development could only have been expected in the

two cases. Chauvinism and a false sense of racial superior-
ity. when they constitute the very raison d'eter of a polit-
ical structure and its institutions of power, can leave little
ground for politico-economic accommodation of 'non-con-
formist' and 'inferior' communities. That the world at
large should not only have countenanced these tendencies in
India and Israel so soon after the horrors of the Second
World War, but also in effect indulged them in their pur-
suit of self-assumed grandeur, speaks poorly of humani-
ty's learning any enduring lessons from the fascist atroci-
ties of the recent past.

Irrespective of the price of regional peace and stability

which the Indo-Israeli combine appears well set to exact
in the years ahead, however, there seems little likelihood
of either partner's allowing a fair chance to the indigenous
people of the territories occupied by it. to reclaim their
basic human rights. At the same time, the reign of terror
let loose by the occupation forces in both Kashmir and
Palestine has by now also established the ineffectiveness of
the argument of force in either instance. Given the reli-
gious undercurrents of the developing confrontation in at
least the entire region that is spanned by Kashmir and
Palestine, the final battle could prove too costly to human-

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 Strategic Studies

ity as such. India and Israel today represent not just the
only two 'soul partners' in the world with known nuclear
capabilities, their nexus has also come to assume a drive of
its own which could well defy whatever strategic relevance
the erstwhile Western imperial powers may have per-
ceived for themselves in the relationship.

REFERENCES

1 . Although Washington has of late been promoting this approach to

the Kashmir issue in a number of ways, for a specific reference to
a latest relevant development, see. Fahd Hussain. "US move for
alternate choice to Kashmir". The Nation. (Islamabad). October 3.
1995. p. 1.
2. For a discussion of this aspect, see, Mushahid Hussain. "Echoes of
Palestine in Kashmir", The Nation. (Islamabad). October 8, 1995,
p. 6. Given his country's record in initiating the so-called Middle
East peace process through signing the September 17. 1978 Camp
David Accords with Israel, the present Egyptian Ambassador to
Pakistan. Dr. Noman Jalil, has been promoting the theme in public
forums as well. See. for instance, the report of his address to the
Lahore Press Club in The Nation. (Islamabad). November 8. 1995.
p. 8.
3 . Unlike the applicability of the law of limitation to certain areas of
personal rights, the lapse of time does not legitimate either Israeli
occupation of Palestine or that of Jammu and Kashmir by India. For
the relevant provisions of international law. see. E. Giraud. as
cited in Henry Cattan. Palestine, the Arab and Israel. Longman.
London. 1969. p. 275.
4 . Whereas the Mughal Empire in India did not at any stage take on a
monolithic complexion, the Ottoman Turks "made no attempt at the
general colonization of the conquered provinces." - George E.
Kirk, A-Short History of the Middle East. Methuen. London. 1948.
p. 59. This local autonomy was in the case of Palestine, reinforced
for Jerusalem and its surrounding areas which, "instead of being
dependent upon the governor of the province, were linked directly
to Constantinople, the capital of the Empire". - Henry Cattan, Op.
Cit.. p. 7.
5 . The religious character of Jerusalem was the apparent reason for
the grant of a special administrative status to it by the Ottomans.
6 . No reliable figures of the religious break-down of population in
Jammu and Kashmir are avaliable with reference to the pre-
British period. The number of Jews in Palestine was put in 1918 at
56.000 (or eight percent) out of its total population of 700,000;
Survey of Palestine. Government of Palestine. Vol. I. p. 144. cited

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution ' to Simitar issues?

in Henry Cattan, Op. Cit., p. 21.

7. Palestinian Christians numbered 70,000 in 1918, Ibid.
8. There were 1,203,780 Muslims in a total Palestinian population of
1,972,560 in 1946; Appendix I to Report of Sub-Committee i.
Officiai Records of the 2nd Session of the Generai Assembly. Ad
Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, p. 270; cited in Henry
Cattan, Op. Cit., p. 21. At the time of partition in 1947, the
princely State of Jammu and Kashmir had an overall Muslim
majority of 78 percent, while in the valley, the Muslims accounted
for 93 percent; S.M. Burke. Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Oxford
University Press. London. 1973, p. 19. cited in Shaheen Akhtar,
Uprising in Indian-held Jommu and Kashmir, Institute of Regional
Studies. Islamabad, 1991, p. 6.
9 . The proposed Arab state, however, never came into being.
10. Henry Cattan. Op. Cit., p. 243.
1 1 . ibid. p. 245.
12. Ibid, pp 255-266.
13. Ibid. pp. 18-25.
14. In the case of mandates, the League died without a testament ....
There was no transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations ....
Sovereignty, wherever it might lie. certainly did not lie in the
United Nations". - H. Duncan Hall. Mandates. Dependencies and
Trusteeships. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Washington, 1948. p. 274. cited in Ibid, p. 262.
15. Henry Cattan. Op. Cit.. has enumerated these pledges and assur-
ances, p. 9.
16. Ibid. p. 10.
17. Al asta ir Lamb. Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947, Oxford
University Press. Karachi. 1994. pp. 81-103.
1 8 . "Thus, both the Governor General of India, who also happened to
be an architect of partition, and the Prime Minister of India
solemnly pledged to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir
and subjected the Article of Accession to this condition", -
Shaheen Akhtar. Op. Cit.. p. 8.
19. "Nehru kept vacillating on the issue of plebiscite till 1952 when he
suddenly (stated that) ... %the question of referring the matter to
Sfate people did not arise and the accession has become final and
irrevocable". Ibid. p. 9; Nehru's speech cited from Prem Nath
Bazaz, Democracy through Intimidation and Terror. Heritage
Publishers. New Delhi. 1978, p. 15.
20. Alastair Lamb, Op. Cit.
2 1 . "Accepting the Instrument of Accession. Mountbatten. in his letter
to the Maharaja, dated October 27. 1947. stated" %ln consistence
with their policy that in case of any (native) State where the issue
of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of acces-
sion should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people
of the State, it is my government's wish that as soon as law and
order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the

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 Strategìe Studies

Invaders, the question of State's accession should be settled by a

reference to the people", Shaheen Akhtar, Op. Cit., p. 7,
Mountbatten's letter cited from Prem Nath Bazaz, Op. Cit., p. 14.
22. A most forceful illustration of this British approach has come only
recently with Nigeria's Commonwealth membership being suspend-
ed in view of its disregard for the group's 'principles of democra-
cy and respect for human rights". - The Muslim , (Islamabad).
November 12. 1995. The contrast with the British attitude
towards Kashmir in particular is not. however, confined to the
historical perspective of the former colonial power's departure
from the sub-continent in 1947. Neither Britain nor the
Commonwealth has taken any note of India's most brutal record in
Occupied Jammu and Kashmir for the past several years now.
23. '.... the British had no option (confronted with a lack of funds and
will) but to terminate their Indian Empire shortly after the end of
World War II". - Alaistair Lamb. Op. Cit.. p. 165.
24. Rarely in history - atleast in modern history - has a majority of
the population of a country been forcibly displaced and uprooted by
a militant minority of foreign origin. Yet this is what happened in
Palestine in 1948. Nearly a million Palestinians then left or were
forced to leave their homes, towns and villages, were robbed of
their lands, properties and possessions, and became refugees
without any means of livelihood", - Henry Caftan. Op. Cit.. p. 39.
25. Alastair Lamb. Op. Cit.. p. 3.
26. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "The Indo-Israeli nexus". Part I, Puise
Weekly. (Islamabad). May 20-26. 1994. pp. 8-9.
27. Punya Priya Dasgupta. "India and Israel: Old blinkers go". The
Hindustan Times. (New Delhi), May 20. 1993; cited in Ibid.. p. 8.
28. The Statesman. (New Delhi). December 19, 1950; cited in
Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. Op. Cit.. Part II, May 27-June 2. 1994. p. 9.
29. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Op. Cit., Part III, June 3-9. 1994, pp 8-9;
Part IV. June 10-16. 1994. pp. 18-19; Part V. June 17- 23,
1994 .pp. 8-9 (especially on cooperation in the fields of defence
and security); and Part VI, June 24-30, 1994, pp. 18-19 (upgra-
dation of weaponry and technology transfer).
30. "(India) co-sponsored 21 out of the 24 anti-Israel resolutions
adopted by the UN", - A.U. Asif. "indo-Israeli ties: From Covert
to Overt". Radiance. (New Delhi), May 16- 22. 1993. p. 1; cited
in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Op. Cit.. Part I. p. 9.
3 1 . Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Op. Cit.. Part II. p. 8.
32. Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History. Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund, 1988, p. 767; cited in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Op.
Cit.. Part I. p. 9.
33. Jawaharlal Nehru. Op. Cit., pp. 763-764; cited in Maqsudul Hasan
Nuri. Op. Cit.. Part I. p. 9.
34. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, op. Cit., Part II, p. 8.
35. Bansidhar Pradhan. "Indo-Israeli ties after the Peres visit". Link.
(New Delhi). May 23. 1993. p. 20; cited in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri.

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 Kashmir and Palestine: Similar 'Solution' to Similar issues?

Op. Cit.. Part II. p. 8.

36. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. Op. Cit.. Part II. p. 8.
37. Cited in ibid, p. 9.
38. Ibid.
39. ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Ibid. Part VII. July 1-7. 1994. p. 18.
43. Ibid, Part V, p. 9.
44. Ibid.
45. Muhammad Hamid, The Unhoiiy Alliance. Islamic Book Centre,
Lahore. 1978, p. 79; cited in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Op. Cit., Part
IV. p. 18.
46. The Hindustan Times. (New Delhi), May 17, 1993, p. 12; cited in
Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. op. Cit.. Part III, p. 19.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Sunday . (Calcutta), April 25 - May 1. 1993, p. 65; cited in
Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. Op. Cit.. Part VIII. July 8-14, 1994, p. 26.
50. Victor E. Marsden. Protocols of the Meetings of the Eiders of Zion.
pp. 14 and 17; cited in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. Op. Cit., Part VII, p.
18.
5 1 . Victor E. Marsden. Op. Cit., p. 143; cited in Maqsudul hasan Nuri.
Op. Cit.. Part VII. p. 18.
52. Victor E. Marsden, Op. Cit., Passim, cited in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri.
Op. Cit., Part VII. p. 18.
53. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri. Op. Cit.. Part VII, p. 18.
54. Henry Catten, Op. Cit., p. 242.
55. Shaheen Akhtar. Op. Cit.. p. 62.
56. The News. (Islamabad). November 7. 1995, p. 9; Jang.
(Rawalpindi), November 7. 1995. p. 8; and The News.
(Islamabad), November 21, 1995. p. IV.
57. The News. (Islamabad). November 6. 1995, pp. 1 and 10.
58. The Muslim. (Islamabad). November 17. 1995, p. 12.

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