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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Drawing upon Robbie Sabel’s first-hand involvement with many legal

negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, International Law and the Arab-
Israeli Conflict examines international law in relation to the conflict by
analysing its major events and agreements, both historical and contem-
porary. Outlining the role of international law from the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire until the present day, it considers the legal elements of
relevant documents and the various peace treaties that Israel has signed
with its neighbouring Arab States. Using his expertise as a professor,
practitioner and ambassador, Sabel endeavours to represent both sides
of the conflict, offering a wealth of counter-arguments and adding his
own legal interpretations. With this valuable resource, students and
researchers working within a range of disciplines can fully appreciate
the role of international law in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  is Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law,

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University
and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague. He is a
former Counsellor for Political Affairs at the Israel Embassy, Washington,
and later served as the Legal Adviser to the Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Deputy Director General for Arms Control and Disarmament
of the Ministry. He has previously published Rules of Procedure at the UN
and at Inter-Governmental Conferences (2018), which was awarded the
Annual Certificate of Merit of the American Society of International Law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT
ROBBIE SABEL
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467
Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108486842
DOI: 10.1017/9781108762670
© Robbie Sabel 2022
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2022
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Sabel, Robbie, author.
Title: International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict / Robbie Sabel, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021057953 (print) | LCCN 2021057954 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108486842
(hardback) | ISBN 9781108708357 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108762670 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Israel–International status. | Palestine–International status. | Arab-Israeli conflict–
Law and legislation.
Classification: LCC KZ4282 .S233 2022 (print) | LCC KZ4282 (ebook) |
DDC 341.4/2095694–dc23/eng/20220202
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021057953
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021057954
ISBN 978-1-108-48684-2 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-70835-7 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations xvi

Introduction 1
1 Is International Law Relevant? 3
1.1 Is International Law Relevant to the Arab-Israeli Conflict? 5
1.2 Concluding Remarks 13
2 The World War I 14
2.1 Developments during the World War I, 1914–1918 14
2.2 McMahon–Sharif Hussein Correspondence 15
2.2.1 Was the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Binding in
International Law? 16
2.2.2 Did the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Promise
Independence? 19
2.2.3 The Issue of the Secrecy of the
McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 21
2.2.4 Was Palestine Included in the McMahon–Hussein
Correspondence? 22
2.2.5 Support for the Proposition That Palestine Was Included in
McMahon’s Pledge 22
2.2.6 Support for the Proposition That Palestine Was Not Included in
McMahon’s Pledge 24
2.2.7 Concluding Remarks regarding
McMahon–Hussein Correspondence 26
2.3 Sykes–Picot Agreement Background and Text 27
2.3.1 The Legal Validity of the Sykes–Picot Agreement 29
2.3.2 The Sykes–Picot Agreement and the Principle of
Self-Determination 29
2.3.3 Concluding Remarks Regarding the
Sykes–Picot Agreement 30
2.4 Attempts at Zionist–Arab Understanding 31
v
vi 
3 The Zionist Movement and the

1917 Balfour Declaration 32
3.1 Defining Zionism 32
3.2 Are Jews a Nation? 32
3.3 A Right of Self-Determination to the Jewish People as a Whole 34
3.4 Is the Jewish Nation Indigenous to Palestine? 35
3.5 The Zionist Movement and the Local Arab Population 36
3.6 Attempts at Zionist–Arab Cooperation 38
3.7 The Faisal–Weizmann Agreement 39
3.8 British Attitudes to Zionism Prior to World War I 41
3.9 Was Zionism a Colonial Enterprise? 42
3.10 Was International Law Relevant to the Early Zionist
Movement? 45
3.11 The 1917 Balfour Declaration 46
3.11.1 The Text of the 1917 Balfour Declaration 47
3.11.2 International Support for the Balfour Declaration 47
3.11.3 Meaning of the Phrase ‘National Home’ in the
Balfour Declaration 48
3.11.4 The Legal Status of the Balfour Declaration in
International Law 49
3.11.5 Did the Balfour Declaration Contradict the
McMahon–Hussein Correspondence? 50
3.11.6 Did the Balfour Declaration Contradict the Sykes–Picot
Agreement? 51
3.11.7 Was the Balfour Declaration a Binding ‘Unilateral
Undertaking’? 51
3.11.8 The Balfour Declaration and the Right of
Self-Determination 52
3.11.9 In 1917, Did Britain Have Any Rights in Palestine to Give to
the Jewish People? 55
3.11.10 The Clause in the Balfour Declaration Safeguarding
Arab Rights 56
3.11.11 The Clause in the Balfour Declaration Safeguarding Jewish
Rights in Other Countries 57
3.11.12 Arab Reaction to the Balfour Declaration 58
4 Post–World War I and the 1922 League of Nations Mandate
for Palestine, 1920–1947 60
4.1 Palestine as Occupied Military Territory 60
4.2 When, If at All, Did Britain Acquire Any Rights in Palestine? 60
4.2.1 The 1919 King–Crane Commission 61
4.2.2 1920 San Remo Conference 62
4.2.3 The 1920 Sèvres Treaty 64
 vii
4.3 The Legal Basis for the Mandate 65
4.4 Sovereignty of Palestine during the Mandate 67
4.5 Legal Aspects of the Boundaries of the Palestine Mandate 70
4.6 The Text of the Mandate 73
4.6.1 Preamble to the Mandate 73
4.6.2 Securing the Jewish National Home 74
4.7 Arab Reaction to the Mandate 76
4.8 Legality of the Mandate: Did the Mandate Violate Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations? 77
4.9 Did Jewish Immigration to Palestine Prejudice the Rights of the Local
Arab Population? 81
4.10 British Response to Arab Objections to Zionism 82
4.11 The 1937 Peel Report 83
4.12 The 1939 British White Paper 85
4.13 The Legality of the 1939 British White Paper 86
4.14 World War II 88
4.15 British 1947 Renunciation of the Mandate 89
4.16 Is the 1922 League of Nations Mandate Still Relevant? 89
5 The 1947 Partition Plan 93
5.1 The Legal Status of the 1947 Partition Plan 94
5.2 The Reaction of the Jewish Community in Palestine to the
Partition Plan 95
5.3 The Arab Reaction to the Partition Plan 95
5.4 Reliance on the 1947 Partition Plan 97
6 Israel’s Declaration of Independence 102

6.1 Introduction 102
6.2 The Text of the Declaration 102
6.3 Drafting Background to the Declaration of Independence 104
6.4 A Jewish State? 105
6.5 The Arabs of Israel 106
6.6 Israel’s Neighbours 106
6.7 The Declaration and International Law 107
6.8 Self-Determination 107
6.9 The Declaration and the Role of the League of Nations and of the
United Nations 108
6.10 Creation of States in International Law and the Declaration
of Independence 108
viii 
6.10.1 A Permanent Population 109
6.10.2 A Defined Territory 109
6.10.3 Government 111
6.10.4 Capacity to Conduct Foreign Relations 111
6.11 Secession in International Law 112
6.12 The Declaration of Independence and the UN 1947 Partition
Plan 1947 114
7 The 1948 Arab-Israeli War 117
7.1 The Arab Forces 117
7.2 The Jewish Forces 118
7.3 The National Interests of the Arab States 119
7.4 The First Stage of the Fighting and the Prohibition of the Use
of Force 120
7.5 The Legality of the Intervention by Armies of Arab States? 123
7.5.1 Self-Defence? 124
7.5.2 An Act of Collective Regional Self-Defence? 124
7.5.3 Humanitarian Intervention? 125
7.5.4 Invitation to Intervene? 127
7.5.5 Palestine as Terra Nullius, a No Man’s Land? 127
7.6 The Invasion of the Arab Armies and the Borders Proposed by the
Partition Plan 128
7.6.1 International Opinion on the Involvement of the
Arab Armies 130
7.7 The Laws of War, Jus in Bello 130
7.7.1 Expulsion of Civilian Populations 131
7.8 The Role of the United Nations in the 1948 War 133
7.9 The Situation on the Ground at the End of the Fighting 135
7.10 The Palestine Conciliation Commission 136
8 1949 Armistice Agreements 139
8.1 Introduction 139
8.2 Definition of Armistice Agreements 140
8.3 The Substance of the Armistice Agreements 141
8.4 Termination of Armistice Agreements 142
8.5 The Armistice Demarcation Lines 143
8.6 The Work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions 151
8.7 Demilitarised Zones 151
8.8 Israeli Water Projects and the Armistice Agreement 153
 ix
9 The Arab Refugee Problem 156

9.1 Responsibility for the Refugee Problem 156
9.2 Who Is a Palestinian Refugee? 158
9.3 ‘Right of Return’ 160
9.3.1 Does a ‘Right of Return’ Exist as a Treaty Obligation? 161
9.3.2 The ‘Right of Return’ and Customary
International Law 162
9.3.3 UN General Assembly Resolution 194 164
9.3.4 Is Israel the Successor State to Mandatory Palestine? 166
9.3.5 A ‘Right of Return’ and Self-Determination 167
9.4 Mass or Individual Rights 168
9.5 Resettlement into Arab Countries 169
9.6 The Issue of Refugees in the Legal Instruments of the
Peace Process 170
9.7 Right of Return in the Post–Oslo Peace Process 172
9.8 Compensation for Abandoned Property of
Palestinian Refugees 175
9.9 Compensation to Jews Who Fled from Arab Countries 177
9.10 Compensation for the Suffering of the Refugees 178
10 The 1967 Six Day War 181
10.1 1949–1967 and the 1956 Suez Crisis 181
10.2 The Outbreak of the 1967 War 181
10.3 Pre-emptive Self-Defence 182
10.4 Anticipatory Self-Defence 184
10.4.1 Did Egypt Carry Out the Beginning of an Armed
Attack? 185
10.4.2 Closing the Strait of Tiran as an Armed Attack 188
10.5 The UN and Defining Who Was the Aggressor in the Six
Day War 190
10.6 Jordan, Iraq and Syria 191
10.7 The Removal of UNEF and the Role of Peacekeeping Forces 191
10.8 Miscalculations 193
11 UN Security Council Resolution 242 196
11.1 Is UNSC Resolution 242 Binding? 197
11.2 Defining Who Was the Aggressor in the Six Day War 198
11.3 ‘The Preamble’ to the Resolution 199
11.4 The Withdrawal from Territories Clause 200
11.5 ‘Territories Occupied in the Recent Conflict’ 205
x 
11.6 Secure and Recognised Boundaries 206
11.7 Refugees 206
11.8 Freedom of Navigation 207
11.9 Palestinians? 207
11.10 Jerusalem 207
12 Camp David 1978 209

12.1 The Palestinian Role 209
12.2 Begin’s Self Rule Plan 212
12.3 Camp David 1978 215
12.3.1 The Preamble 216
12.3.2 Autonomy 216
12.3.3 Source of Authority 218
12.3.4 Self-Determination 218
12.3.5 Scope of Jurisdiction 220
12.3.6 Elections 221
12.3.7 Powers and Responsibilities of the Self-
Governing Authority 222
12.3.8 Future Palestinian Participation 223
12.3.9 Final Status Issues 224
12.3.10 Linkage between the Egypt–Israel Draft Treaty and the Issue
of the West Bank and Gaza 225
12.4 Jerusalem and West Bank Settlements 225
12.5 Implementing the Camp David Autonomy Plan 226
13 1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty 228
13.1 The Delimitation of the Border between Egypt and Israel 230
13.2 ‘Resident’ Ambassadors 232
13.3 Linkage between the Peace Treaty and Autonomy on the West Bank
and Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East 232
13.4 Security Council Endorsement 237
13.5 The Relationship between the Peace Treaty and Previous Egyptian
Commitments to the Arab League 238
13.6 Peacekeeping Force 242
13.7 Permanence of Security Arrangements 245
13.8 Claims 246
13.9 Dispute Settlement 247
14 Taba Arbitration 251

14.1 The Dispute 251
 xi
14.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanism 252
14.3 Conciliation 252
14.4 Arbitration 252
14.5 The Taba Arbitration Agreement 253
14.6 The Decision of the Arbitrators 253
14.7 Dissenting Opinion 254
14.8 The Boundary as Agreed between Egypt and Israel 255
14.9 The Claim of non-licet 255
14.10 Critical Date in the Taba Arbitration 256
14.11 The Principle of uti possidetis and Stability of Boundaries 257
14.12 Acquiescence and Estoppel 257
14.13 Delimitation and Demarcation of Boundaries 258
15 The Legality of Israeli Exploitation of Oil from Sinai 260

15.1 The Laws of Belligerent Occupation Applicable to
Oil Exploration 260
15.2 Exploitation of Existing Oil Fields 260
15.3 Leasing Oil Wells 262
15.4 Reasonable Utilisation 262
15.5 Exploration and Utilisation of New Oil Fields 263
16 The Oslo Accords 269
16.1 The Road to Oslo 269
16.2 The Oslo Accords 270
16.3 Are the Oslo Accords Binding under International Law? 272
16.3.1 Are the Oslo Accords a Treaty? 273
16.3.2 Are the Oslo Accords Binding Unilateral
Declarations? 275
16.4 Source of Authority of the Palestine Authority 275
16.5 Criticism of the Oslo Accords 277
16.6 Response to Criticism of the Oslo Accords 279
16.7 Are the Oslo Accords Still Binding? 281
17 Israel–Jordan 284
17.1 Negotiating the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty 284
17.2 Border in the Arava Valley 285
17.3 Jordan River as a Border 286
17.4 The Border between the Kingdom of Jordan and the
West Bank 286
xii 
17.5 The ‘Leases’ 287
17.6 Jordan and the Palestinians 288
17.7 Nuclear Weapons 288
18 Post Oslo Developments 291

18.1 Lebanon, Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh and Taba Negotiations 291
18.2 2002 Arab League Peace Plan 292
19 The Status of the ‘West Bank’ (Judea and Samaria) and the
Gaza Strip 295
19.1 The Title ‘West Bank’ 295
19.2 The Borders of the West Bank 296
19.3 The Legal Status of the West Bank 298
19.4 Application of Belligerent Occupation Regime 300
19.5 Claims That the IVth Geneva Convention Is Not Applicable to the
West Bank 302
19.6 Claims That the IVth Geneva Convention Is Applicable to the
West Bank 304
19.7 Jordan and the ‘Missing Reversioner’ 306
19.8 Arab Palestinian Claims to the West Bank 307
19.9 Jewish Claims to the West Bank 307
19.10 The Status of the Gaza Strip 309
19.11 Application of Human Rights Treaties to the West Bank 312
20 Israeli Settlements in the West Bank 316

20.1 Arguments That Israeli Settlements in the West Bank
Are Illegal 316
20.2 Arguments That Israeli Settlements in the West Bank
Are Legal 319
20.3 Separate Legal System and Separate Roads for Settlers 323
21 Controversial Elements of Military Administration 325
21.1 The Right of an ‘Occupied’ People to Use Force against
the Occupier 325
21.2 Security Measures in Occupied Territories 327
21.2.1 Demolition of Houses 327
21.2.2 Deportation and Curfew 329
21.2.3 Administrative Detention 330
21.3 Separation Barrier (Wall) 330
 xiii
22 Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways in

the Region 333
22.1 Freedom of Navigation through the Suez Canal 333
22.1.1 The Legal Background to Right of Navigation through
the Canal 333
22.1.2 Egyptian Legal Justifications for Preventing Israeli Use of
the Canal 335
22.1.3 Israeli Legal Claims for Right to Use the Canal 337
22.1.4 The Role of the UN as Regards Navigation in
the Canal 338
22.1.5 The Canal Post 1967 340
22.2 Navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba 341
22.2.1 The Closing by Egypt of the Strait of Tiran 342
22.2.2 Egyptian Legal Justifications for Closing the Strait 342
22.2.3 Israeli Position on Freedom of Navigation in
the Strait 344
22.2.4 The Strait of Tiran in Security Council
Resolution 242 347
22.2.5 The Strait of Tiran Post 1967 348
22.2.6 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Passage
through Straits 350
22.2.7 Compatibility of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty with the Law
of the Sea Convention 351
23 Israel–Syria 354
23.1 Legal Issues Involved in Attempts to Reach a Peace Treaty
with Syria 354
23.2 Aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War 355
23.3 The Syrian Position as Regards a Peace Treaty with Israel 355
23.4 The Issue of the Borders 356
23.5 The Legal Status of Proposals Made during the Negotiations 358
24 Jerusalem 360
24.1 Jerusalem 1917–1947 360
24.2 Jerusalem and the 1947 UN Partition Plan 361
24.3 West Jerusalem 1948–1967 364
24.4 East Jerusalem 1948–1967 367
24.5 East Jerusalem Subsequent to 1967 368
24.6 International Condemnation of Israel’s Position on
East Jerusalem 369
xiv 
24.7 Responses to International Criticism regarding Israel’s Position on
East Jerusalem 371
24.8 Holy Places in Jerusalem 373
24.9 Jerusalem and the 1978 Camp David Negotiations 375
24.10 Jerusalem and the Oslo Agreements 376
25 Controversial Laws of War Issues 380
25.1 The Law Applicable to Military Activities in the West Bank 381
25.2 Targeted Killing 383
25.3 Israeli Combatants, Dressed as Civilians, during Law Enforcement in
the West Bank 383
25.4 Providing Fuel and Electricity to Gaza 385
25.5 The 2010 Flotilla to Gaza 385
25.6 Civilian Casualties 386
25.7 Proportionality 387
25.8 Pre-emptive Self-Defence 387
26 Is Palestine a State? 390
26.1 Definition of Statehood 390
26.2 Palestine during the British Mandate 390
26.3 Post Mandate Period 392
26.4 The Oslo Accords 392
26.5 Does Palestine Fulfil the Montevideo Criteria? 393
26.6 A Permanent Population 393
26.6.1 Defined Territory 394
26.6.2 Effective Government 395
26.6.3 Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States 396
26.7 Recognition 396
26.8 Illegality of the Unilateral Declaration of Statehood 397
26.9 Palestine and International Organisations 397
26.10 Palestine and the International Criminal Court 398
27 Water Resources: Israel and Neighbours 400
27.1 International Law on Shared Water Resources 400
27.2 Watercourses Shared between Israel and Its Neighbours 403
27.3 The Role of Water-Related Issues in Defining the Boundaries
between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon 403
27.4 The Role of Water-Related Issues in Defining the Boundaries
between Palestine and Transjordan 405
 xv
27.5 Political Boundaries and Water Issues after 1947 406
27.6 The ‘Johnston Plan’ 407
27.6.1 The Legal Status of the Johnston Plan 409
27.7 Water Projects That Have Been Implemented 410
27.7.1 The Israeli National Water Carrier 410
27.7.2 The Jordanian East Ghor Canal 411
27.7.3 De Facto Jordanian–Israeli Understandings on Uses of the
Yarmuk River 411
27.8 The Arab Diversion Plan 411
27.9 Palestinian Riparian Rights? 412
27.9.1 The Western Aquifer 413
27.9.2 Water for Israeli Settlements 414
27.9.3 Israel–PLO Oslo 1995 Interim Agreement 414
27.10 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty 416
27.11 Water Issues in the Future Negotiations between Israel
and Syria 418
27.12 The Role of International Law and the Jordan Basin 419
28 Implications for Future Negotiations 421
Index 427
ABBREVIATIONS
AJIL American Journal of International Law

BYIL British Yearbook of International Law
Cmd. (British) Command Papers
EJIL European Journal of International Law
EU European Union
FO (British) Foreign Office
GAOR General Assembly Official Records
HMSO His Majesty’s Stationary Office
ICC International Criminal Court
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ILA International Law Association
ILC International Law Commission
ILM International Legal Materials
INSS Institute of National Security Studies
Isr. L. Rev. Israel Law Review
LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series
MFO Multinational Force and Observers
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
Pol.
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice
PD (British Parliamentary) Political Declaration
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
PRO (British) Public Records Office
PRO (CAB) Public Records Office, Cabinet
RAF Royal Air Force
SCOR Security Council Official Records
UN United Nations
UN Doc. United Nations Document
UNEF United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
xvi
   xvii
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UNWRA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East
Yale J. Int’l L. Yale Journal of International Law
u
Introduction
On ne doit jamais écrire que de ce qu’on aime.

Joseph Ernest Renan
It is, I believe, legitimate to ask whether there is a substantial role for

international law in international relations in general and in the Arab-
Israeli conflict in particular. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict rooted
in historical, national, geographic, ethnic and religious elements, and the
actors rarely consult international law books before taking action. In
Chapter 1 of the book, I attempt to answer this question by stating that,
although international law is not a dominant factor, nevertheless, it has
played a major and, at times, a crucial part in the development of the
narratives of the parties and in attempts to solve the disputes. Another
problem is that some politicians feel that law is an inhibiting factor.
Former Israel Defence Minister Ezer Weizman writes, concerning the
negotiations at Camp David 1978, ‘I was also perturbed by the large
number of jurists in the Egyptian delegation – as in the Israeli and
American groups, there are lawyers who find a solution to every problem,
I observed, and there are those who find a problem for every solution.
Camp David teemed with the second kind’.1
Writing this book entailed a number of dilemmas. Should one assume
that all readers are experts in international law; if not should the book
include a precis of international law? The problem is that an average
international law library nowadays contains over a thousand books.
A leading condensed textbook used by students and practitioners has
over a thousand pages.2 Another dilemma faced was whether one should
assume that all readers are aware of the history of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the attempts to solve it? Here again the problem is volume.
In 1974, the American Society of International Law produced a study of
1
Ezer Weizman, The Battle for Peace (1981), p. 350.
2
Malcolm Shaw, International Law (9th ed. 2021), 1200 pages.

 
the documents and law articles on the Arab-Israeli conflict.3 It ran to
3 volumes and 1,300 pages, and that was before Camp-David, the Egypt–
Israel Peace Treaty and the Oslo agreements. Of course, the solution was
a compromise. In an attempt to deal only with legal issues, in the chapter
on water resources, for example, I have omitted enumerating the quan-
tities of water in dispute. This, although the numerous academic articles
on water resources in the area view, perhaps correctly, the quantities as
the major factor in dispute. I have tried to introduce each issue with a
very concise explanation of the historical background and the legal issues
involved and hope that readers who are interested will do further read-
ing. As a general introduction to the political background to the dispute,
I would recommend Dowty’s book, Israel/Palestine.4
Another dilemma faced was whether to enumerate the multitude of
suggestions and proposals for settling the Arab-Israeli disputes. The
compromise I have chosen is only to examine those proposals coming
from official sources that contained legal elements and were evaluated by
the parties. This means that I have had to ignore important private
initiatives such as the ‘Geneva initiative’5 even though politically prom-
inent persons were involved, but they were acting in their
private capacity.
The first seventeen chapters deal with legal issues chronologically, the
remaining chapters deal with specific issues such as the status of
Jerusalem and navigation through international watercourses.
A major issue faced was whether to write a dispassionate anodyne
description of the legal issues or to promote my personal views. I served
for nearly thirty years in the Israel Foreign Service, so any claim that I am
a completely disinterested objective observer might well be met with
incredulity. The path I have chosen is to try to give an objective descrip-
tion of the different views on each subject, quoting proponents of Arab
and Israel legal positions. This, I believe, allows readers to make their
own assessment, though in many cases, I then add my own assessment of
the legal situation.
3
John Norton Moore, ed., The Arab-Israeli Conflict (1974).
4
Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine (4th ed. 2017).
5
https://geneva-accord.org/projects/. The principal drafters were Yossi Beilin from Israel
and the Yasser Abed Rabbo from Palestine.
1
Is International Law Relevant?
It is, I believe, legitimate to ask whether there is a substantive role for

international law in international relations. It is axiomatic that States act
out of their own self–interest, dictated by political, military and economic
considerations. Furthermore, international law lacks the elements one
normally associates with a legal system. There is no international sover-
eign; there is no international legislative body; there is, in most cases, no
compulsory adjudication and no enforcement body. There are scholars
who argue that international law plays only a minor role in international
relations, if at all. Werner Levy argues that international law is relevant
‘in justification, not initiation of a foreign policy’, adding that
references to law are virtually absent in papers of statesmen responsible
for the shaping of foreign policy, whether they be official correspondence
with diplomats abroad, intra-office notes and messages, or personal
writings in diaries and memoirs. International law usually occurs as an
afterthought, when for a number of reasons the formulation of a policy
decision in legal language appears desirable before its public appearance.1
The late American political columnist Krauthammer echoed the same

theme, writing that ‘turning foreign policy over to the lawyers is the
laziest, the most brainless way to make policy, the law – international
law – is an ass. It has nothing to offer. Foreign policy is best made
without it. Go in, do what you have to do and then call in the lawyer
to find some retroactive justification for what you’ve done’.2 Textbooks
on international relations and diplomacy often ignore international law
completely; Kissinger’s seminal book on diplomacy does not have a single
entry on international law.3 In the United States, we also may be seeing a
revisionist reaction to the role of international law. For example, the
1
W. Levi, Law and Politics in the International Society (1976), p. 187.
2
C. Krauthammer, ‘The Curse of Legalism’, The New Republic 201 (1989), p. 44.
3
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (1994).

    ?
nuclear understanding with Iran was termed a ‘Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action’ and not a treaty, although the prime motive in using
such a definition presumably was to avoid the need for congressional
approval.
Despite the predominance of realpolitik in policy discussions, it
remains the case, as Henkin put it, that ‘almost all nations observe almost
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations
almost all of the time’.4 The cynical comments of Levy and
Krauthammer may reflect the outlook of the realist school of inter-
national relations, but the reality of diplomatic life shows that inter-
national law is an integral part of the nitty-gritty of international
relations. In most negotiations, there is a desire to garner third-party
support for the positions advanced by the parties involved in the negoti-
ations. Even where the third party may have political sympathy for the
position of one of the sides, it is important that such third party also be
assured that it is supporting a position that is legally correct. Neutral and
disinterested States who follow the negotiations will find it easier to
support a claim they consider legal; conversely, they will be reluctant,
at least openly, to support a claim they consider illegal. Bowie writes, as
regards the 1956 Suez crisis, ‘by resting its access to the Straits of Tiran
on the general right under international law, Israel enabled the U.S. to
commit itself to vindicating that right before Israel’s withdrawal without
seeming to undercut Hammarskjold or the United Nations’.5 An act or
claim that is seen to be in violation of international law will seldom
obtain international support. Establishing a position based on claimed
rights under international law is important not only vis-à-vis third
parties but as a basis for negotiations with the opposite party.
Particularly in territorial disputes, it is normally only possible to negoti-
ate a compromise after a party has established a claim of right. Another
factor lending to the relevance of international law is that the aim of all
international negotiations is, normally, to reach an agreement that obli-
gates the negotiators – in other words, to reach a binding international
agreement or treaty. Henkin writes ‘all international relations and all
foreign policies depend in particular on a legal instrument – the inter-
national agreement – and on a legal principle – that agreements must be
4
L. Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd ed. 1979), p. 47.
5
R. R. Bowie, Suez 1956 – International Crises and the Role of Law (1974), p. 110. Robert
Bowie was founder of Harvard University’s Centre for International Affairs and former US
State Department director of Policy Planning Staff.
.     
carried out’.6 The criteria whereby it will be judged whether an agree-
ment reached is binding on the parties will be the criteria of international
law. International law lays down substantive conditions for classifying a
document as a treaty. The language of agreements is the language of
international law, and international lawyers will interpret the terms of
any agreement using the tools of international law.
Although precedents are not binding in international law,7 they play a
very useful role in international negotiations or in the form of State
practice, when one side makes a claim that a particular precedent reflects
customary international law. Following precedents also means following
a well-trodden path, which has already been subjected to public and legal
scrutiny. Governments, political leaders and negotiators are inherently
cautious. Every young bureaucrat is, with good reason, instructed to
abide by the old platitudes of ‘don’t reinvent the wheel’, and ‘if it ain’t
broke don’t fix it’. If a legal formula has been used and accepted by States,
preferably, the States involved in the negotiations, then it should not
be changed.
1.1 Is International Law Relevant to the Arab-Israeli Conflict?

It could be argued that cynicism towards the importance of international
law is all the more relevant in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict where
many of the States involved are totalitarian regimes that have little regard
for legal norms. In the armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq, realpolitik, not
law, has dominated discussions on how to deal with the chaos. Violent
non-State armed groups have been active participants in the fighting in
Iraq and Syria. Clearly, ISIS, Al Qaida, Hamas and Hezbollah have paid
no attention to the humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict. Syria,
a State member of the United Nations, has, under the leadership of
Bashar al-Assad, flaunted all the basic norms of the laws of war. Even
the Russian air force has apparently not been particular in applying the
rules of distinction to its aerial attacks. On its borders, Israel faces
Hezbollah in the North and Hamas in Gaza, two organisations classified
internationally as terrorist organisations. Said postulated that, in the
Middle East, international law was a tool of imperialism that served only
6
Henkin, How Nations Behave, p. 319.
7
Lord Denning stated that the ‘international law knows no rule of stare decisis’. Trendtex
Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] QB at 554.
    ?
to turn the Orient ‘from alien into colonial space’.8 Allain writes that
international law in the Middle East was ‘simply another political tool of
statecraft used by the strong against the weak’.9 Mazzawi writes, about
the Arab-Israeli conflict, ‘very many aspects of this problem, if not all,
had a distinctly legal character. But law has not had a role in this dispute,
and neither the United Nations nor the League of Nations before it have
seen fit to resort to legal principles in their quest for a solution to the
problem’.10 Kurtzer’s book on negotiating Arab-Israeli peace recom-
mends that a future mediator’s team should include ‘legal expertise’,
however, the writers of the book did not include a lawyer among the
many persons interviewed.11
Nevertheless, international law has played a role in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The Crown Prince of Jordan writes, perhaps unduly optimistic-
ally, ‘analysis of those legal issues which are considered central to the
current Arab-Israeli dispute can play a useful role in any attempt to move
towards reconciliation of the disputants, the preparation of a dialogue
between them and other interested parties and preparing the foundations
of the proposals for future peaceful relations in the area’.12
A particularly salient factor in establishing the relevance of inter-
national law in the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute has been the search by
both parties to establish legitimacy. Fisher writes, correctly I believe,
‘legitimacy and lawful authority are key components of political power’.13
Kattan writes, interestingly, ‘international law was pivotal to the devel-
opment of the Jewish national home’,14 public international law ‘was the
very vehicle through which the Zionist project was to brought to
fruition’.15
8
Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (1995), p. 211.
9
Jean Allain, ‘Orientalism and International Law: The Middle East as the Underclass of the
International Legal Order’, Leiden Journal of International Law 17 (2004), pp. 391–404,
392.
10
Musa Mazzawi, ‘Book Review, Henry Cattan. Palestine in International Law – The Legal
Aspects of the Arab Israeli Conflict (1973)’, Journal of Palestine Studies 3, no. 4 (Summer
1974), pp. 141, 143.
11
Daniel C. Kurtzer and Scott B. Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace (2008), p. 63.
12
Hassan bin Talal, Palestinian Self Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip (1981), p. 21.
13
R. Fisher, International Crises and the Role of Law: Points of Choice (1978), p. 12.
14
V. Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949 (2009), p. 22.
15
Ibid., p. 21.
.     
There are also specific historical reasons as to why international law is
particularly relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Allies in the World
War I, in their attempts to rearrange the former Ottoman Empire, were,
perhaps, the first to introduce international legal elements to the Middle
East. In the nineteenth century, the allies might have been able to annex
unilaterally the territories of the Ottoman Empire as French or British
colonies, but by 1918, this was no longer the case. Thus, we find the
Allies negotiating with Turkey the formal renunciation of Turkish
territory outside Asia Minor,16 and the introduction of the Mandate
system as a compromise between colonialism and the right of self-
determination. Although in 1918 the principle of self-determination
was not a legal principle, nevertheless the Allies felt obliged to take it
into their consideration. They granted self-determination to all the
Arabs in the former Ottoman Empire but, as regards Palestine, they
treated it as a special case, delaying the application of self-determination
until the displaced Jews could return to their country and eventually
become a majority.
World public opinion continues to address the dispute between Israel
and the Palestinians in the terminology of international law. Many legal
arguments addressed to the other side during negotiations, in confer-
ences or in political speeches are often intended for third parties and for
world public opinion. International law has become the lexicon of
international legitimacy. This would explain why all sides invoke it. As
the lingua franca of the Arab-Israeli conflict, international law is a
common language that everyone understands and invokes, usually, to
criticise the other side.
Both the Zionist movement and, later, the Palestinian national move-
ment made strenuous efforts to obtain international legitimacy based on
international law. Herzl, in his book about the proposed Jewish State,
wrote, ‘the land which the Society of Jews will have [sic] secured by
international law’.17 This search for legitimacy was considered vital in the
early years of the Zionist movement as, at the time, it had no territorial
jurisdiction and depended on the good will of the Western States and
16
‘The Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty Sèvres), 10 August
1920’, AJIL 15 (Supp. 1921) (not ratified), p. 179; ‘Treaty of Peace between the Allied
Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne), 24 Jul. 1923’, AJIL 18 (Supp. 1924), p. 1.
17
T. Herzl, The Jewish State der Judenstaat (1896), p. 18, translated from the German by
S. D’Avigdor, and adapted from the edition published in 1946 by the American Zionist
Emergency Council, www.mideastweb.org/jewishstate.pd.
    ?
world public opinion. The Zionist movement worked to transfer the
political promise of a ‘national home in Palestine’ contained in the
1917 Balfour Declaration18 into ‘hard’ international law. The Zionist
movement persuaded the British and French governments to incorporate
the text of the Balfour Declaration into the treaty whereby the two
powers divided the Middle East between them19 and later to get the
unanimous approval of the Council of the League of Nations for the text
to be included in the 1922 Mandate for Palestine.20 The British 1922
‘White Paper’ confirmed again that the Jewish People were in Palestine
‘as of right and not on the [sic] sufferance. That is the reason why it is
necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine
should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally
recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection’.21
Since 1948, and particularly since 1967, the Palestinian national move-
ment, regarding itself as the weaker partner in its dispute with Israel, has
also sought to buttress its position by reliance on rights that it claims
under international law. The Palestinian legal emphasis is largely based
on the premise that they were the indigenous population entitled to self-
determination and that the Jewish settlers are colonialists. Israel’s pos-
ition is that the creation of the State of Israel was based on the right of
self-determination of the Jewish people. The Third World, to a great
extent, has voted against Israel at the United Nations where the
Palestinian position has been buttressed by a wealth of General
Assembly resolutions. The Palestinian contention is that these reso-
lutions reflect the view of the international community as to the legal
issues involved. A factor lending relevance to such resolutions is that the
League of Nations and later the UN have been deeply involved in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and the International Court of Justice has relied
upon these various United Nations resolutions.22 A feature of the
Palestinian position is their demand that any future agreement between
them and Israel must reflect ‘international legitimacy’ as expressed in
such UN resolutions. Ziad Abu-Amr writes, ‘the UN participation [in
18
Balfour Declaration (1917), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/balfourasp.
19
Resolution of the 1920 San Remo Conference, November 1917, www.cfr.org/Israel/san-
remo-resolution/p15248.
20
1922 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/
palmanda.asp.
21
The 1922 British White Paper on Palestine, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_ century/
brwh1922.as.
22
See ICJ Advisory Opinion Construction of a Wall, ICJ Reports 2004.
.     
negotiations] is particularly important from the Palestinian point of view
because the UN represents international legitimacy’.23 Palestinian nego-
tiators tend to regard it as vitally important to establish a right based on
international law and not to be in a position where they have to negotiate
such a right. This approach is reflected in the Palestinian insistence on
Israel recognising the ‘right of return’ of the Palestinian refugees reflected
in UNGA Resolution 194,24 although stating that once the principle is
accepted, the actual number of refugees to be returned can be negoti-
ated.25 The Palestinians hope that such a requirement can help to offset
the perceived advantage that Israel has in any bilateral negotiations. The
counter Israeli view is that UN General Assembly resolutions do not
create international law. The drafters of the UN Charter knowingly
refrained from granting the Assembly such power, and UN General
Assembly resolutions do not necessarily even reflect existing law. This
view is reflected in Weil’s statement that ‘neither is there any warrant for
considering that by dint of repetition, non-normative resolutions can be
transmuted into positive law through a sort of incantatory effect’.26
Furthermore, the Israeli view is that parties to an agreement are free
together to make their own decisions as to the relations between them,
provided there is no violation of a jus cogens rule.
One explanation for this attention to international law is that a
position that is seen to be in violation of international law will not obtain
international support. The lack of such support can have real-life conse-
quences. A salient example of this is the controversy over Israeli settle-
ments in the West Bank, a controversy based nearly exclusively on the
interpretation of an Article in one of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.27
Based on this legal interpretation, Israel’s settlement policy has been
repeatedly condemned by Israel’s allies in Europe and by the UN
Security Council.
23
Ziad Abu-Amr, ‘Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations: A Palestinian Perspective’ in Steven L.
Spiegel, ed. The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace (1992), p. 29.
24
UN Doc. A/RES/194 (III), 11 December 1948.
25
See O. M. Dajani, ‘Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International Law in Palestinian-Israeli
Peace Talks’, Yale J. Int’l L. 32 (2007), p. 61.
26
P. Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law’, AJIL 77 (1983), pp. 413,
417.
27
Art. 49, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Fourth Geneva Convention) (1949), 75 UNTS 287 (1949).
    ?
Terms used in the various agreements made between Israel and her
neighbours, such as ‘general armistice’,28 ‘autonomy’,29 or ‘freedom of
navigation’30 carry with them the interpretation and technical meaning
of terms of international law. For example, the term ‘autonomy’ clearly
implies non-independence. It is used when a State grants ‘a group that
differs from the majority. A means by which it can express its distinct
identity’.31 The phrase appears in the Camp David Framework32 but not
in the Oslo accords. The substance of the powers allocated to the
Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords is very similar to that
envisaged in the Camp David Framework. The omission of the term
‘autonomy’ from the Oslo Agreements was, presumably, to negate any
Palestinian apprehension that they were agreeing to be an autonomous
area under Israel sovereignty. The Oslo II (Interim Agreement) states,
‘Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so
transferred [to the Palestinian Authority]’.33 This seemingly anodyne
clause, in fact, could be interpreted as meaning that the West Bank
continues to be under Israel military occupation as only some of the
powers of the military government were being devolved to the
Palestinian Authority.
Another example, the phrase ‘equitable utilization of joint water
resources’, which appears in the Oslo accords,34 may have seemed to
the political negotiators as a banal euphemism for good neighbourly
behaviour. The international lawyers involved, however, know that it
can be interpreted as a technical term that carries with it the baggage
of numerous rules and precedents of the international law relating to
water resources.
28
See, e.g., Egypt–Israel General Armistice Agreement, signed in Rhodes on 24 February
1949, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/ie_
armistice_1949.pdf.
29
‘Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978’, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Library
The Avalon Project, Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/20th_century/campdav.asp (‘Camp David Accords’).
30
‘Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways’, UNSC Resolution 242,
22 November 1967, UN Doc. S/RES/242 (1967).
31
R. Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (1997), p. 33.
32
‘Camp David Accords’.
33
Article I(1) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
28 September 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/%20foreign
policy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeliPalestinian%20interim%20agreement.aspx.
34
Annex II, Article 1, 1993 Israel PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp.
.     
The legal analysis of terms has also been applied to examining the text
of UN Resolutions. The best-known controversy in this regard is, per-
haps, regards UN Resolution 242. The preamble to this Resolution states:
‘Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.’35
One interpretation of this phrase is that Israel ‘could not gain any
territory as a result of the recent conflict’ and consequently had to
withdraw from all the territory of the West Bank and Gaza.36 Julius
Stone objects to this interpretation, commenting that ‘Arab state-
favoured’ interpretation ‘would end with a rule encouraging aggressors
by insuring them in advance against the main risks involved in case of
defeat’.37
Although precedents are not binding in international law, the Arab-
Israeli peace process is replete with the use of precedents. The text of the
Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty comprises, to a large extent, cut and paste
quotations from the UN Charter, the 1970 Declaration of Principles on
Friendly Relations between States38 and UN Security Council Resolution
242.39 The language of the Israel–Jordan Peace treaty was taken, nearly
verbatim, from the text of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty even though
both sides were aware that some of the earlier phrasings, such as the
dispute settlement clause, had aroused problems of interpretation. The
Jordanian position was that if it had worked, albeit imperfectly, for Egypt,
then they preferred that to negotiating a new formula.40 The language of
the 1993 Israel–PLO Declaration of Principles41 closely followed the
language of the 1978 Camp David Accords.42 In each case, it might quite
well have been possible to negotiate language that was more appropriate,
but it would have extended negotiations considerably. When both sides
35
Preamble, UN Security Council Resolution 242 concerning the Establishment of Peace in
the Middle East, adopted 22 November 1967, UN Doc. S/RES/242 (1967).
36
J. McHugo, ‘Resolution 242: A Legal Reappraisal of the Right-Wing Israeli Interpretation
of the Withdrawal Phrase with Reference to the Conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians’, ICLQ 51 (2002), pp. 851, 865.
37
Julius Stone, Israel and Palestine: Assault on the Law of Nations (1981, 1982), p. 54. The
different interpretations of UNSC Resolution 242 are dealt with in Chapter 11.
38
Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Annex to UNGA. Resolution 2625 XXV (1970).
39
UN Security Council Resolution 242 concerning the Establishment of Peace in the Middle
East, adopted 22 November 1967, UN Doc. S/RES/242 (1967).
40
D. Reisner, ‘Peace on the Jordan’, Justice 4 (1995), pp. 3, 4.
41
1993 Israel PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/isrplo.asp.
42
‘Camp David Accords’.
    ?
reported home to their governments, one can assume that they would not
have been subject to criticism for agreeing to a text that was taken
verbatim from previous agreements and from basic UN documents.
For this reason, one will find references to UN Security Council
Resolution 242 and quotations from it in every major agreement signed
between Israel and the Arabs. Not that Resolution 242 is a panacea but
rather because the negotiators were aware that it is a formula that has
been accepted by all parties concerned and hence can be quoted or
referred to without fear of incurring the wrath of one’s home government
or parliament. A similar logic is also reflected in the way Palestinian
diplomats craft UN resolutions. In order to obtain as much support as
possible, they follow language either that has been used in previous UN
resolutions or that is aligned with US and European positions.
Finding a legal procedure for administering a crisis can, at times, be as
important as the actual outcome of the procedure. It can be an event such
as the Madrid Conference, which although only a platform for set
speeches, nevertheless, provided the opening for the Arab States and
for the Palestinians to commence direct negotiations with Israel. In the
Taba dispute between Israel and Egypt, Israel insisted on a process of
conciliation and Egypt demanded immediate arbitration. A convoluted
legal formula was worked out whereby the arbitration was to commence,
then be suspended to enable a conciliation commission to function, and
should conciliation fail, arbitration would automatically continue. Both
sides claimed a legal victory.43 When negotiating the Oslo Declaration of
Principles with the Palestinians, the question arose as to whether the
result would be a legally binding treaty, which would then require
registration with the UN. The problem was that only agreements signed
by sovereign States, or intergovernmental international organisations,
can be registered with the UN, and Israel was not about to acknowledge
the PLO as a sovereign State. On the other hand, both Israel and the PLO
intended the declaration of principles to be a binding legal instrument.
The legal formula found was to have the document attested to, as
witnesses, by the leaders of the United States, Russia and the EU and
then request the Secretary General of the UN to circulate the accord to all
members of the UN. Thus, there was no formal act implying that it was
an international agreement but a very effective declaration by the parties
that they intended to abide by what they had signed.
43
See, inter alia, E. Lauterpacht, ‘The Taba Case: Some Recollections and Reflections’, Isr.
L. Rev. 23 (1989), p. 443.
.   
The elements shaping the Arab-Israeli conflict undoubtedly are mili-
tary, political, religious and economic interests. International law cannot,
in and of itself, solve disputes as to these issues nor can it provide security
nor produce friendships between nations. Nevertheless, international law
can make and has made a serious contribution. Perhaps the major
contribution of international law is that it enables States to reach agree-
ments that delimit boundaries. Good fences make for good neighbours.
The permanent nature of boundaries is one of the major contributions of
international law to the international community. The automatic adop-
tion by Egypt, Jordan and Israel of the old Mandatory boundaries as the
boundaries between them was a clear manifestation of this principle. The
Mandatory boundary with Egypt was, furthermore, adopted from the
Ottoman era boundary delimited in 1906. Israel and the Palestinians
eventually will also have to reach an agreement on a boundary.
1.2 Concluding Remarks

International law is relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict; it has played an
important role and will continue to do so. All parties desire that their
positions be seen to be legally legitimate, such legitimacy is a political
asset as regards both the other party and vis-à-vis third parties. The
international language of international relations is, largely, the language
of international law, this is particularly true as regards the United
Nations and international organisations. Israel and the Palestinians are
engaged in an intensive campaign to persuade world public opinion of
the legitimacy of their respective cases. Legal precedents, although not
binding, play a highly useful role in assisting the parties to reach agree-
ment. The same is true for dispute settlement mechanisms of inter-
national law. Finally, the object of negotiations is to reach agreement.
The principle that international agreements are binding is a principle of
international law and lawyers, based on international law, will examine
their validity and context.
Although international law undoubtedly has a role to play in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, nevertheless one should always caution oneself with
Brierly’s aphorism ‘the law of nations is neither a chimera nor a
panacea’.44
44
J. L. Brierly, ‘Preface to the First Edition’, Andrew Clapham, ed. Brierly’s Law of Nations
(7th ed. 2012–2014), p. v.
2
The World War I
2.1 Developments during the World War I, 1914–1918

World War I (1914–1918) brought a sea change to the Middle East.
Ottoman Turkey had been regarded for many years as the ‘sick man of
Europe’.1 From the outset of the war, it was clear to the British and
French allies that whatever their situation facing Germany on the
Western front was, they would nevertheless be able to defeat the
Ottoman forces in the Middle East. From 1915, the British and French
began planning what the Middle East would be like after the anticipated
defeat of Ottoman Turkey. This planning included dividing the Middle
East into respective spheres of control with Britain making, what some
regarded as, conflicting promises to the Jews and to the Arabs. This was
combined with American calls for self-determination of peoples and
American objection to attempts to enlarge the British or French empires.
All these factors combined to drastically change the political and
legal face of the area. The British Middle East analyst Jon Kimche wrote,
in 1950:
It therefore did not matter what Sir Henry McMahon wrote to the Sherif
Hussein in 1915 or what private arrangements were made in 1916 between
Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges Picot, or what was the precise wording of
the letter sent by Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild in 1917. These were
agreements and promises which were to be kept if they fitted into the
larger plan, and to be forgotten or explained away if they did not.2
History has, I believe, proved Kimche wrong, and these ‘arrangements’

still influence the borders and political disputes of today’s Middle East.
1
The phrase apparently appeared for the first time in print in the New York Times of
12 May 1860.
2
Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915–1950 (1950), p. 25.

. –   
2.2 McMahon–Sharif Hussein Correspondence
The McMahon–Hussein correspondence was an exchange of letters,
secret at the time, between Sir Henry McMahon, the British high com-
missioner in Egypt, and Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca.3 The British
wanted Hussein’s support in their war with the Ottomans. Sharif
Hussein was the guardian of the Muslim Holy Places and as such was
seen by Britain as a potential leader of the Arab world; Hussein claimed
he could speak on behalf of the whole ‘Arab Nation’. In exchange for
Hussein’s promise to rebel against the Ottomans, Britain provided finan-
cial support, military advice, given by T. H. Lawrence (Lawrence of
Arabia),4 and, most important in the context of this study, a promise
to support Arab independence. McMahon and Hussein exchanged cor-
respondence on this issue over a number of months. The McMahon
letter to Hussein of 24 October 1915 is usually regarded as the key
document in this correspondence. In this letter McMahon writes to
Hussein:
I have received your letter of the 29th Shawal, 1333, with much pleasure
and your expression of friendliness and sincerity have given me the
greatest satisfaction.
I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression
that I regarded the question of limits and boundaries with coldness and
hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the time had
not yet come when that question could be discussed in a
conclusive manner.
I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this
question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have, therefore, lost
no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of
your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on
their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive
with satisfaction. -
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying
to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot
3
Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty’s High Commissioner at
Cairo and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916, 1939. Cmd. 5957. For
the historical background, see Timothy J. Parris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule
1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution (2003), pp. 19–26. The full text was never officially
published. For an explanation, see Isaiah Friedman, The Question of Palestine: British-
Jewish-Arab Relations: 1914–1918 (2nd ed. 1992), p. 65.
4
Described in T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom a Triumph (1935).
    
be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits
demanded. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our
existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.
As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is
free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am
empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the
following assurances and make the following assurances and make the
following reply to your letter:
(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to
recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the
regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.
(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external
aggression and will recognise their inviolability.
(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her
advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the
most suitable forms of government in those various territories.
Hussein subsequently initiated an insurrection against the Ottoman

Empire consisting mainly of guerrilla-type attacks against the Damascus–
Hedjaz railway, the railway being used to ferry Ottoman troops.
2.2.1 Was the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Binding

in International Law?
International law regards treaties and, in certain circumstances, unilateral
undertakings as the method whereby States make legally binding under-
takings. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a treaty would
normally be between sovereign States;5 Britain clearly was a sovereign
State, but it is extremely doubtful whether, at the time of the correspond-
ence, the Hejaz fulfilled the conditions of being an independent State. In
October 1915, Hejaz was still part of the Ottoman Empire. In December
1916, Britain, France and Russia recognised Hussein as king of the
Hejaz;6 however, even if such recognition granted Hejaz the status of
statehood, it would not be effective retroactively.
Could an agreement between a non-sovereign entity and a State be a
treaty? Hussein had a certain amount of autonomy and aspired to be king
of an Arab kingdom, and Britain never attempted to deny that it had
5
See J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (1928), p. 165.
6
Division of Near Eastern Affairs, ‘Mandate for Palestine’ (1931) US State Department
(Report), p. 7. http://education.mei.edu/sites/d-efault/files/mei_library/pdf/6855.pdf.
. –   
made promises of independence to Hussein. Agreements between States
and indigenous peoples were often termed treaties: for example, agreements
between the US government and Native American tribes.7 Kattan cites a
number of treaties signed in the nineteenth century between Britain and
Gulf sheiks.8 In his letter to Hussein, McMahon refers to ‘our existing
treaties with Arab chiefs’,9 although when the Ottoman Empire seized
control of the area, Britain began designating the subsequent agreements
as ‘agreements’ and not ‘treaties’.10 A 1937 treatise on international law
states categorically: ‘The law of nations is concerned only with States. Only
such states as are civilised, sovereign and independent are subject to that
law’,11 though adding, ‘quasi-sovereign States, when they possess the treaty-
making powers at all, may make treaties on only a limited number of
subjects and those of minor importance’.12 As late as 1961, McNair wrote
‘native chiefs and tribes are neither States nor international organizations
and thus possess no treaty-making capacity’.13 There were also doubts as to
how far Hussein represented the Arab world. Austen Chamberlain, British
secretary of state for India, is quoted as saying that Hussein was ‘a nonentity
without power to carry out his proposals’.14 The historian Friedman is of the
opinion that ‘the Correspondence had no contractual validity’,15 and the
historian Tauber comments, ‘a series of events occurred which forced
Husayn to open the Arab revolt before the two sides [Britain and
Hussein] had reached an official agreement’.16 Nevertheless, it is clear from
their subsequent behaviour that Britain and Hussein regarded the corres-
pondence as mutual commitments. British prime minister Lloyd George
described the correspondence as a ‘treaty’ in his conversation with the
French foreign minister at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919.17
7
See, for example Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
8
Victor Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict 1891–1949 (2009), p. 103.
9
The letter of 24 October 1915 quoted above.
10
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits,
Judgment, 1. C. J. Reports 2001, p. 40, para. 44.
11
Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich, The Law of Nations (1937), p. 14.
12
Ibid., p. 113.
13
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), p. 52.
14
Quoted from Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 73.
15
Ibid., pp. 67, 75.
16
Eliezer Tauber, The Arab Movements in World War I (1993), p. 77.
17
See The Council of Four: Minutes of Meetings, 20 March to 24 May 1919, Notes of a
Conference Held in the Prime Minister’s Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday,
20 March 1919 at 3 p.m., Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/101, IC-163A in Foreign
    
The twentieth century saw instances of States making binding agreements
with non-State entities aspiring to be States. Fenwick, an international
lawyer writing originally in 1924, notes, ‘there are cases in which political
communities struggling to attain a condition of separate statehood have
been recognized by international law as possessing a de facto as opposed to a
de jure status’;18 for example, Britain’s agreement with Ireland before it was
independent.19 Fenwick commented on this agreement that the Irish
Sin Fein ‘having at international law no de jure standing until the negoti-
ations preceding the treaty’.20 The Vienna Convention on Treaties recog-
nises that there can be agreements ‘between a state and other subject of
international law’.21
The fact that it was an exchange of letters and not one unitary
document would not affect its validity. It has always been diplomatic
practice to reach agreement by way of exchange of diplomatic notes,
which are formalised letters.22 International law has never demanded
that agreements be in a particular form.23 Modern international law has
codified this previous customary norm.24
Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919, Volume V (1946),
pp. 1–14.
18
Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (3rd ed. 1948), p. 128.
19
1921 Anglo-Irish Articles of Agreement, 26 LNTS 10.
20
Fenwick, International Law, p. 123.
21
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 3. See also
Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd ed. 2007), p. 18.
22
‘Exchange of Notes: Not infrequently agreements are concluded between States by means
of such exchange of notes.’ Melquiades J. Gamboa, A Dictionary of International Law and
Diplomacy (1973), p. 114.
23
ICJ Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Preliminary,
Judgment of 26 May 1961, p. 31.
From the standpoint of the obligatory character of international engage-
ments, it is well known that such engagements may be taken in the form of
treaties, conventions, declarations, agreements, protocols, or exchanges of
notes. As is generally the case in international law, which places the
principal emphasis on the intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no
particular form, parties are free to choose what form they please provided
their intention clearly results from it.
24
‘“Treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.’ Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 2(a).
. –   
It could be argued that the correspondence was a unilateral undertak-
ing by Britain. International law recognises that a State can make a
binding unilateral undertaking to another State or States;25 it is, however,
doubtful that this was international law at the time. Such an undertaking
needs to be addressed to an individual State or to the international
community as a whole. In this case, it was addressed only to Sharif
Hussein and in secret.
It is unlikely that the McMahon–Hussein correspondence was
regarded, at the time, as a treaty; however, whether Hejaz was at the
time an independent State and whether the correspondence amounted to
a treaty is secondary to the sage international law rule that regards the
intention of the parties as the paramount criterion. It is clear that both
sides regarded the correspondence as a mutual exchange of
commitments. Kattan’s comment, that ‘it would seem that at the very
least, it [The correspondence] amounted to a series of mutually agreed
commitments’,26 is, I believe, the correct legal conclusion. The agree-
ment, like all agreements, was conditional on Hussein fulfilling his
promise to revolt against the Ottomans. It has been argued that he failed
to do so effectively.27 Kedourie described it as ‘a hasty and ill-organized
affair’.28 It nevertheless was an attempt to fulfil Hussein’s part of the
agreement. Moreover, Britain did not raise this as a possible reason not to
fulfil its commitments.
2.2.2 Did the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Promise

Independence?
The McMahon letter refers to the ‘independence of the Arabs’. There is
controversy whether the reference to ‘independence’ was intended to
create an independent new State or States or only to promise to deliver
the Arabs from Turkish rule. The first British promise to Hussein stated
that Britain ‘will guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the
Sharifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the
25
See ILC Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of
creating legal obligations, with commentaries thereto 2006, UN Doc. A/61/10.
26
Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest, p. 98.
27
F.O. 371/2776/42233. Grey to Bertie, 22 November 1916. Dis.no. 779, quoted from
Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 79 n. 70.
28
Eli Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon–Husayn Correspondence and
Its Interpretations 1914–1939 (1976), p. 143.
    
Ottomans’.29 Hogarth, the director of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, com-
mented that ‘neither to the Sharif nor to any other Arab did the British
ever explicitly guarantee or even promise any-thing beyond liberation
from the Turks’.30 Clayton, the director of British Military Intelligence in
Cairo, commented that the British intention was ‘merely eliminating
Turkish domination from Arabia’.31 ‘In November 1922, the Amir
Abdullah, in London to regulate the affairs of Transjordan, referred to
unification of the Hijaz, Iraq and Transjordan, only to be told that the
British government had never promised to work for ‘the establishment of
a great Arab kingdom.’32 Lawrence (of Arabia) writes, ‘I longed to tell
him [Abdullah son of Hussein] that the half-witted old man [Hussein]
had obtained from us no concrete or unqualified undertaking of any
sort’.33 The historian Friedman concluded that Arab independence was
at the time understood to be ‘liberation from their supposed adversaries,
not necessarily independence’.34 Bâli comments that Arab demands were
for a ‘united and independent greater Syria’ at the time ‘there was little to
no local support for according independence to smaller units based on
communal identities’.35
On 7 November 1918, the British and French governments issued a
joint Declaration. The essential passage was as follows:
The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East
the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and definite
emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the
establishment of National Governments and administrations deriving
their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous
populations. In order to carry out these intentions France and Great
Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of
indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and
Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in territories the liberation
29
Letter from McMahon to Hussein 31 October 1914.
30
31
Ibid., p. 68.
32
Memo of Amir Abdullah of 13 November 1922 and FO letter of 11 January 1923, quoted
from Suleiman Mousa, ‘A Matter of Principle: King Hussein of The Hijaz and the Arabs
of Palestine’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9 (1978), 183–194, p. 191.
33
Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p. 212.
34
Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 67.
35
Asli Bâli, ‘Sykes–Picot and “Artificial” States, Symposium on the Many Lives and Legacies
of Sykes–Picot’, AJIL Unbound, 110 (2016), p. 118. www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
american-journal-of-international-law/ajil-unbound-by-symposium/many-lives-and-leg
acies-of-sykes-picot.
. –   
of which they are engaged in securing, and in recognizing these as soon as
they are established. Far from wishing to impose on the populations of
these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to secure
by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of
Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations
themselves.36
This 1918 Anglo-French declaration would seem to imply that the

intention was indeed to create independent States. US President
Wilson, however, in his ‘Fourteen Points’ stated ‘the other [non-
Turkish] nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be
assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested
opportunity of autonomous development’.37 In reference to other situ-
ations, President Wilson explicitly referred to ‘sovereignty’; but in this
context, only the phrase ‘autonomous development’ was used. Britain
and France in fact did allow the Arabs to create independent States in
Hejaz, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and later in Jordan.
2.2.3 The Issue of the Secrecy of the

McMahon–Hussein Correspondence
The fact that the agreement was secret did not affect its legality at the
time. ‘International law also imposed no requirement of publication.’38
The Covenant of the League of Nations subsequently changed this
situation by ruling that ‘no such treaty or international engagement shall
be binding until so registered [with the Secretariat of the League]’.39 This
rule, however, was interpreted as meaning only that the League would
not take formal cognizance of non-registered treaties.40 The UN Charter
follows this interpretative precedent and states only that non-registered
agreements may not be invoked ‘before any organ of the UN’.41
36
Anglo French Declaration, 7 November 1918 (Iraq and Syria) Annex I, to the report
contained in Command Paper No. 5974.
37
President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 8 January 1918, Point No. XII. https://
avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.
38
Megan, Donaldson, ‘Textual Settlements: The Sykes–Picot Agreement and Secret Treaty-
Making, Symposium on the Many Lives and Legacies of Sykes–Picot’, AJIL Unbound, 110
(2016), p. 120, 127. www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-inter
national-law/ajil-unbound-by-symposium/many-lives-and-legacies-of-sykes-picot.
39
Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
40
Donaldson, ‘Textual Settlements’, p. 130.
41
Article 103, the UN Charter. Aust comments that even this stipulation is ‘more honoured
in the breach than the observance’. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, p. 346.
    
2.2.4 Was Palestine Included in the McMahon–Hussein
Correspondence?
The British reservation in the McMahon–Hussein correspondence was
that the promise of independence given to Hussein did not include ‘the
two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to
the west of the districts of Damascus’, and only applied to areas ‘within
those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to
the interests of her ally France’. In the correspondence, neither Hussein
nor McMahon refer explicitly to Palestine. This has led to continuing
disagreement as to whether the promise made to Hussein included
Palestine and what Hussein’s understanding was of the British intention.
The disagreement centres largely on what was the understanding at the
time of the phrase ‘portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of
Damascus’ and areas where France had an interest.
2.2.5 Support for the Proposition That Palestine Was Included

in McMahon’s Pledge
The historian Toynbee was of the opinion that ‘with regard to Palestine’
the McMahon letter is committed ‘to its inclusion in the boundaries of
Arab independence’.42 Kattan argues that, as McMahon wrote later that
he was only excluding ‘districts on the Northern coast of Syria’,
'McMahon clearly did not intend to exclude Palestine from his pledge’43
since, ‘at no point in the 20th Century, was Palestine situated on the
northern coast of Syria’.44 Kattan also quotes a British Foreign Office
intelligence memorandum from 1919 that Palestine was included ‘in the
boundaries of Arab independence’ and an internal large-scale Foreign
Office map, undated, but apparently from 1919, that showed Palestine as
included in the area pledged to Hussein.45 A slightly ambiguous message
42
British CAB 27/36, E.C. 2201 quoted from Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 88
n. 126.
43
Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest, p. 106.
44
Victor Kattan, ‘Palestine and International Law: An Historical Overview’ in Victor
Kattan, ed. The Palestine Question in International Law (2008), p. xxvi.
45
Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest, Map. No. 2. However, a Canadian cartographer
comments ‘this map’s reordering of the area was fleeting, and interpretations of it varied’.
Karen Culcasi, ‘Disordered Ordering: Mapping the Divisions of the Ottoman Empire’,
Cartographica: The International Journal for Geographic Information and
Geovisualization, 49, no. 1 (Spring 2014), pp. 2–17. No exact page numbers in online
version.
. –   
by British Commander Hogarth to Sharif Husain stated that ‘the Entente
Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity
of once again forming a nation in the world. So far as Palestine is
concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to
another’.46 Hogarth’s message should perhaps be read in the context of
his contemporary statement that ‘what the British were asked was simply
to promote independence of the Arabs from their present over-Lord, the
Turk’.47 The issue was discussed by a joint Arab–British Committee in
1939.48 The Arab members of the committee held that since the reserva-
tion did not mention Palestine, the only area that had been excluded
from the limits of Arab independence were the coastal regions of north-
ern Syria. The Arab view was that if Britain had intended to exclude
Palestine, they would have referred to the Ottoman designation of
Palestine, the Sanjak (sub-province) of Jerusalem, which Britain did not
do.49 Thus, according to the Arab position, Palestine was included in the
pledge. Sir Michael McDonnel, who had served as chief justice in
Palestine and was present at the committee meetings as a supporter of
the Arab view, supported their position.50 As the 1937 Peel Report
commented, ‘the Arabs had always regarded Palestine as included in
Syria. Even if they had interpreted the [McMahon] Pledge as meaning
that Palestine would not be independent but reserved for French or
British or international control, they could not have foreseen that such
control might cover the establishment of a Jewish National Home’.51
Kattan notes that the Arabs continue to believe that Palestine was
included in the pledge; and in October 1947, the Arab States even
submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly to request an
Advisory Opinion from the ICJ. The draft resolution asked whether the
pledges given by Great Britain to the Sharif of Mecca in 1915–1916 and
46
‘Report of a Committee on Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif
of Mecca’, Parliamentary Papers – Cmd. 5974 (1939), p. 48.
47
F.O. 882/2, ‘Note on the “Arab Question” by Cdr. Hogarth, dated 16 April 1916’. Quoted
from Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 67 n. 10.
48
Report of a Commission Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry
McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916. Presented by the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 16 March 1969, XIV
Parliamentary Papers (1938–1939), Cmd. 5974. Quoted from Kattan, From Coexistence
to Conquest, p. 107 n. 73.
49
Ibid., para. 14.
50
Quoted in Kattan, From Coexistence to Conquest, p. 107.
51
Peel Commission Report, Chapter II Article 23, commenting on the Hogarth message
concerning Palestine. https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/Cmd5479.pdf.
    
her subsequent declarations and assurances to the Arabs included
Palestine.52 The draft was not adopted.
2.2.6 Support for the Proposition That Palestine Was Not Included in
McMahon’s Pledge
McMahon wrote, in 1922, in a confidential letter to the Colonial Office:
‘It was as fully my intention to exclude Palestine as it was to exclude the
more Northern coastal tracts of Syria. I have no recollection of ever
having anything from the Sharif of Mecca, by letter or message, to make
me suppose that he did not understand Palestine to be excluded from
independent Arabia.’53 British Prime Minister Lloyd George was of the
opinion that ‘Palestine did not seem to give them [The Arabs] much
anxiety. For reasons which were obvious to them they realised that there
were genuine international interests in Palestine’.54 In 1918, Sir Gilbert
Clayton, the Head of British Intelligence in Cairo, wrote that Hussein ‘is
quite prepared to leave Palestine alone provided he can secure what he
wants in Syria’.55 The report of Faisal’s presentation at the Versailles
Peace Conference states that Faisal presented the Arab territorial claims
but, the report adds, ‘Palestine, for its universal character he left on one
side for the mutual consideration of all parties interested. With this
exception, he asked for the independence of all the Arabic areas enumer-
ated in his memorandum’.56 The official 1922 British White Paper on
Palestine affirmed:
It is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation that
during the war His Majesty’s Government gave an undertaking that an
independent national government should be at once established in
Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th
October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty’s High
Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif of Mecca, now King Hussein of
the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise
52
See the questions formulated by Iraq, Egypt and Syria in UN Yearbook 1947–8,
pp. 237–241.
53
F.O. 371/7797/ (1922) E 2821/65, McMahon to Shuckburgh, 12 March 1922, encl. in
Shuckburgh to Forbes-Adam, 13 March, quoted from Isaiah Friedman, The Question of
Palestine, p. 84.
54
Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (1918), vol. 2, p. 1032.
55
Clayton in a letter to the Gertrude Bell 17 June 1918, Clayton Papers quoted from
Friedman, The Question of Palestine, p. 91 n. 154.
56
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. III, p. 891.
. –   
to the Sharif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the
Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given
subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its
scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of
the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by
His Majesty’s Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the
independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the
Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon’s pledge.57
In a letter to High Commissioner Samuel, of 12 April 1923, Clayton who

had been McMahon’s principal assistant in the negotiations with Hussein,
wrote ‘it was never the intention that Palestine should be included in the
general pledge given to the Sherif; the introductory words of Sir Henry’s
letter were thought at the time-perhaps erroneously-clearly to cover that
point’.58 Lord Milner, the British Secretary of State for War, declared in the
House of Lords in 1923, ‘in the promise which we made to King Hussein a
distinct reservation was made of [Palestine].59 A recent study by a Canadian
cartographer concluded, ‘Hussein and his son Feisal, who were both
involved in the negotiations, were willing to concede parts of Palestine
and the south-eastern coast’.60 In the view expressed by the British govern-
ment representatives during the Arab–British Committee of 1939,61
Palestine was not a ‘purely Arab country’62 and the reservation ‘should
reasonably have been understood to exclude, the part of southern Syria,
consisting or portions of the former Vilayet of Beirut and the former
independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, now known as Palestine’.63 One author,
who believes Palestine was promised, nevertheless adds in this context:
‘There is little doubt that the British intended to reserve it [Palestine] for
57
British White Paper of June 1922, The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the
Middle East Conflict, Walter Laqueur and Dan Schueftan, eds. (8th ed. 2016), p. 25.
58
Viscount Samuel, Memoirs (1945), p. 173.
59
60
Culcasi, ‘Disordered Ordering’, pp. 2–17. Exact page numbers don’t appear in
online version.
61
Report of a Commission Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry
McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916. Presented by the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 16 March 1969, XIV
Parliamentary Papers (1938–39), Cmd. 5974. Quoted from Kattan, Coexistence to
Conquest, p. 107 n. 73.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid., n. 73.7, para. 13(b).
    
disposal, in agreement with France if necessary.’64 The British ‘reservation’
clause in the correspondence refers explicitly to ‘those regions lying within
those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the
interests of her ally, France’. During the negotiations of the Sykes–Picot
agreement France had strongly expressed its traditional interests in
Palestine. The Sykes–Picot Agreement promised an international regime for
Palestine, which presumably would include France and granted France a free
trade port in Haifa. It would seem to reinforce the fact that McMahon was
informing Hussein that Palestine was not being promised as a part of an Arab
Kingdom. The American-Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi describes the
McMahon promise of independence to the Arabs as referring to ‘an ill-
defined area as part of an ambiguous correspondence’.65 The British repre-
sentative to the 1939 Conference agreed that the language of the reservation
‘was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be’, but added, ‘on
proper construction of the Correspondence, Palestine was in fact excluded’.66
2.2.7 Concluding Remarks regarding

McMahon–Hussein Correspondence
It is doubtful that the correspondence was regarded as a treaty at the time,
nevertheless, it was a binding international commitment by Britain. The fact
that it was secret and conditional on Britain defeating the Ottomans does not
detract from its legal validity. Britain promised independence but apparently
intended the area to be under British control or influence. The British
intended to exclude Palestine from the area promised to Hussein and
Hussein apparently acquiesced at the time to such exclusion. It would seem
to be extremely doubtful that Britain intended to include Palestine in the
future kingdom of Hussein. Britain saw the need for control of Haifa as a vital
interest. It is also highly unlikely that Britain intended to place the Christian
holy places in Jerusalem under Muslim rule. Britain was also aware of the
French interests in Jerusalem and of the Jewish Zionist aspirations.
The correct conclusion would appear to be that although Hussein
originally demanded that Palestine be included in his Arab Kingdom,
64
Charles D. Smith, ‘The Invention of a Tradition: The Question of the Arab Acceptance of
the Zionist Right to Palestine during World War I’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 22, no. 2
(Winter 1993), pp. 48–61, 52.
65
Rashid Khalidi, ‘International Law and Legitimacy and the Palestine Question’, Hastings
International & Comparative Law Review, 30, no. 2 (2007), pp. 173–180, 175.
66
British Cmd. 5974 (1939), pp. 10, 24, 46, quoted from Friedman, The Question of
Palestine, p. 82 n. 97.
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Title: Au Hoggar
mission de 1922
Author: Conrad Kilian
Release date: March 30, 2024 [eBook #73291]
Language: French
Original publication: Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques

maritimes et coloniales, 1925
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***
AU HOGGAR
IL A ÉTÉ TIRÉ DE CET OUVRAGE
CENT TRENTE EXEMPLAIRES NUMÉROTÉS DE 1 A 130
ET NON MIS DANS LE COMMERCE
Conrad KILIAN
Au Hoggar
MISSION DE 1922
Ouvrage orné de trois cartes et de seize planches hors-texte
PARIS
SOCIÉTÉ D’ÉDITIONS
GÉOGRAPHIQUES, MARITIMES ET COLONIALES
ANCIENNE MAISON CHALLAMEL, FONDÉE EN 1839
17, rue Jacob (VIe)
1925
A
M. E.-F. GAUTIER
EN HOMMAGE
DE RESPECTUEUSE ADMIRATION
C. K.
INTRODUCTION
Au cours de l’année 1922, j’ai effectué une mission en Sahara

Central.
Le but de cet ouvrage est de faire connaître les observations
diverses que j’ai pu faire pendant cette mission, soit nouvelles, soit
confirmant les observations antérieures (quand des explorateurs
m’avaient précédé), ainsi que les vues d’ensemble, les idées,
auxquelles ces observations m’ont parfois conduit.
J’ai laissé de côté généralement ce qui avait trait aux difficultés
que j’ai rencontrées dans l’exécution de cette mission, non que je
n’en aie point eues, ou que je n’aie point lieu d’être fier de la manière
dont je les ai surmontées, mais parce qu’il m’a paru que cela ne
rentrait pas dans le cadre de cet ouvrage.
J’ai également laissé de côté en général toute allusion aux
dangers que j’ai pu courir ou affronter, à l’endurance dont j’ai pu
avoir à faire preuve, aux privations que j’ai pu avoir à subir ou à
m’imposer, bref au côté sportif de ma mission, non que tout cela n’ait
joué un rôle à certains moments et que je n’aie eu parfois à sourire
des situations auxquelles peuvent mener en certaines régions du
Sahara la curiosité scientifique, la passion de connaître, celle de la
pénétration, l’amour du nouveau, de l’inconnu, ainsi qu’un penchant
particulier à jouer avec le paradoxe, les difficultés et le danger. Il m’a
paru également que cela sortait du cadre de cette étude et n’avait
d’ailleurs guère d’intérêt[1].
J’ai enfin également, en général, peu traité des questions
d’influence, de pénétration française, de politique indigène (état de
pacification, tranquillité des tribus, apprivoisement), non que cette
activité ne m’ait également passionné et que je n’aie coopéré en
Français, et en officier de réserve, dans la mesure de mes moyens,
à la grande œuvre des Officiers du Sud, mais parce que d’une part
depuis lors (c’était au début de 1922) la situation ayant évolué, ce
que je pourrais dire ne serait plus d’actualité, et que d’autre part ce
n’est pas à moi qu’il convient de parler de cette œuvre collective,
mais aux chefs admirables qui la dirigent tout à l’honneur de la
France.
J’ai cru, par contre, devoir introduire dans ces études, afin de les
animer un peu, quelques impressions de voyage : on me pardonnera
peut-être le tour moins scientifique que j’ai tenté de donner ainsi à
cet ouvrage, si je suis arrivé, ce qui était mon but, par ce moyen à en
rendre la lecture moins aride.
La partie géologique de ce travail est extraite d’une étude
intitulée : « Essai de synthèse de la géologie du Sahara Sud-
Constantinois et du Sahara Central » livrée en mars 1923 pour
paraître dans les comptes rendus du Congrès Géologique
International de Bruxelles de 1922, dont l’impression subit un retard
inexplicable et imprévu, car ces comptes rendus auraient dû en effet
déjà paraître.
Ces résultats géologiques de ma mission sont donc en partie
inédits (en partie seulement, car certains points ont déjà fait l’objet
de notes à l’Académie des Sciences et à la Société Géologique).
Leur rédaction est de date antérieure à la publication des travaux
de M. Jacques Bourcart, de la Mission Danoise Olufsen, de même
que mon exploration, qui fut faite avant le voyage de cette mission.
M. Jacques Bourcart a confirmé en général les idées géologiques
nouvelles que j’avais émises sur le Sahara Central dans les
quelques notes publiées avant sa relation de voyage parue dans le
Bulletin du Comité de l’Afrique Française.
Au début de cet ouvrage, je considère comme un devoir de
témoigner de ma reconnaissance envers tous ceux qui m’ont
particulièrement aidé dans mon œuvre d’exploration :
Je remercie M. le Gouverneur Général de l’Algérie, M. Steeg, de
la haute bienveillance qu’il voulut bien me témoigner, ainsi que M. le
Général Paulinier, commandant le 19e Corps d’armée.
Je remercie également M. le Colonel Dinaux, MM. les
Commandants Béraud, Fournier et Duclos, les Capitaines Lhoilier,
de Saint-Martin, Dupré et Le Maître, le Dr Dario, les Lieutenants
Brunet et Vella, de la bienveillante attention avec laquelle ils m’ont
suivi, protégé, aidé, conseillé et renseigné.
Grâce aux Officiers des Territoires du Sud, j’ai pu triompher des
multiples difficultés que j’ai rencontrées, me tirer des situations très
critiques dans lesquelles je me suis trouvé et obtenir des résultats
scientifiques importants.
Je les remercie pour les services qu’ils ont ainsi rendus pour une
meilleure connaissance des pays du Sahara Central en rendant
possibles des investigations scientifiques.
[1] De ce « côté sportif » des explorations, je crois que l’on peut dire
qu’il est passionnant à vivre, agréable à raconter, supportable à
écouter et odieux à lire. C’est pourquoi je n’en ai point écrit ici.
Conrad KILIAN
MISSION DE 1922 AU HOGGAR
ITINÉRAIRE GÉNÉRAL
(Agrandissement)
Hoggar (Arabe). = Ahaggar (Tamahak).
PREMIÈRE PARTIE
DES PAYS CRÉTACICO-TERTIAIRES

SUD-CONSTANTINOIS
OU DU SAHARA ARABE SUD-CONSTANTINOIS
I
ÉTUDES GÉOLOGIQUES
Pour parvenir au Massif Central Saharien, il faut traverser tout un

pays de vastes plaines, le pays de la grande cuvette crétacico-
tertiaire sud-constantinoise, dont le fond est occupé par l’oued Rhir
et les chotts Melrir, Merouan et Djerid, dont une partie de la surface
est couverte par les sables du Grand Erg Oriental et dont les bords
sont constitués au N. par les monts de l’Aurès et de l’Atlas saharien,
à l’E. par les monts de Matmata, au S. E. et au S. par la Hamada de
Tinghert, au S. W. et à l’W. par les plateaux du Tademaït et du Mzab.
Nous avons effectué cette traversée par Touggourt, Ouargla,
Hassi el Khollal, le Gassi Touil et Tanezrouft dans la Hamada de
Tinghert.
Plusieurs problèmes se sont posés à nous dans ces régions. En
voici un exposé en passant :
De la mer saharienne plio-pléistocène.

La mer n’a-t-elle pas occupé le fond de cette vaste cuvette
crétacico-tertiaire sud-constantinoise dans les temps pliocènes et les
premiers temps pléistocènes (quaternaires).
*
* *
J’entends la mer, sous la forme d’un golfe lagunaire

méditerranéen, avec de vastes formations deltaïques et d’estuaires
dont l’ampleur serait explicable par le peu de résistance des
formations drainées crétacico-tertiaires.
Cette lagune aurait eu des relations variables avec la mer suivant
le rythme des mouvements eustatiques[2] et finalement, séparée au
Pléistocène d’une façon définitive de la Méditerranée, elle se serait
mutée en lac saumâtre, elle se serait asséchée progressivement et
se serait réduite à un certain nombre de lacs salés dont les derniers
survivants, les Chotts, subsistent peut-être parce que l’action de
l’évaporation est équilibrée par les venues considérables d’eaux
artésiennes qui se produisent dans ces régions et par l’apport des
eaux superficielles.
Les oueds sahariens, cherchant à suivre le niveau de base dans
ses positions successives, en un nombre de cycles encore
indéterminés, se seraient progressivement et par stades gravés plus
profondément à l’amont et auraient essayé de s’individualiser des lits
vers l’aval, de se creuser des chenaux, de faire drainage, en des
chapelets de lacs, communiquant peut-être seulement de façon
intermittente lors des grandes crues, et dans lesquels ces oueds
étalaient largement leurs alluvions.
L’asséchement progressif de ce vaste golfe lagunaire, de ce
grand lac saumâtre, puis de ces lacs salés, ainsi que celui analogue
d’autres golfes lagunaires sahariens (par exemple les golfes de
l’Océan Atlantique vers le Djouf et vers Tombouctou) aurait apporté
des perturbations dans l’humidité de l’atmosphère, à une période
humide aurait succédé une période sèche et ces oueds seraient
« venus » de moins en moins souvent, de plus en plus rarement,
pour finalement ne plus jamais « venir » d’un bout à l’autre, mais
seulement sur des fractions de leur cours et par extraordinaire,
suivant des lits compliqués de barrages, « limites de venues de
l’oued », de barrages de dunes faites par le vent, de bassins
d’épandage, etc., etc.
En même temps, le climat désertique s’accentuant, le vent aurait
pris de plus en plus d’importance comme facteur dans l’évolution du
modelé saharien, vannant d’un côté les plages détritiques, soit
marines, soit fluvio-marines et fluvio-lacustres, soit fluviatiles,
entassant de l’autre les sables ainsi triés en des endroits de
prédilection, et joint aux crises de ruissellement, à l’insolation diurne,
à la gelée nocturne, à la sécheresse, accentuant par creusement et
surtout élargissant de vastes dépressions ailleurs.
Le vent aurait mis un dernier accent aux modelés antérieurs en
leur donnant leur caractère essentiellement désertique.
*
* *
On sait que, depuis les travaux de Pomel et de Flamand

principalement, beaucoup d’auteurs ont rejeté l’hypothèse d’une mer
saharienne existant à la fin du Pliocène et au début du Pléistocène.
Et pourtant qu’y aurait-il d’invraisemblable à ce que la mer, ayant

eu un niveau[3] très supérieur à celui qu’elle a aujourd’hui — plus
élevé que le seuil de Gabès[4] — ait pénétré au Pliocène et occupé
une partie de cette cuvette, pour en disparaître au Pléistocène
suivant le processus indiqué, quand on constate sur les côtes
d’Algérie (d’après le Général de Lamothe) des rivages marins
anciens indiscutables de 60, 103, 148 et douteux de 204, 265 et 325
mètres d’altitude et qu’en Egypte on a fait des constatations de
même ordre.
La région du seuil de Gabès échapperait donc seule à ce
phénomène des variations du niveau de la Méditerranée[5].
Il n’est peut-être pas inopportun de rappeler :

1º Que le général de Lamothe a observé que les pouddingues
fluviatiles de l’oued Biskra se terminent brusquement près de l’oasis,
à 50 ou 60 mètres au-dessus de la plaine et à la cote 200 ;
2º Que Desor, Martin et Escher de la Linth ont trouvé dans le
Souf, près d’Hassi Bou Chama, des coquilles marines, entre autres
Nassa gibbosula L., vivant actuellement dans la Méditerranée ;
3º Que Pomel lui-même a comparé certaines formations
pléistocènes du Sahara aux atterrissements de l’estuaire de la
Macta ;
4º Que la présence de terrasses pliocènes, pléistocènes,
signalées par Flamand, de dunes anciennes dans le Souf, est très
compatible avec l’existence d’une lagune s’asséchant et faisant
varier les niveaux de base des cours d’eau sahariens ;
5º Que Flamand indique que le Terrain des Gours (oligo (?)
miocène) d’atterrissements continentaux est séparé des formations
plus récentes de la région déprimée oued Rhir-Ouargla-oued Mya de
la fin du Pliocène et du Pléistocène, par une falaise abrupte d’où se
détachent de nombreux gours (gara Krima entre autres) ;
6º Que les idées de Flamand relatives à la « Carapace
hamadienne » plio-pléistocène n’ont peut-être pas une grande valeur
pour les formations diverses du Sud-Constantinois. Ces idées,
fondées sur la seule découverte de deux exemplaires de Limnea
Bouilleti Mich. dans la région de l’oued Gharbi sont peut-être
excellentes pour la « Carapace hamadienne » des hauts pays de
l’oued Gharbi, mais ne peuvent certainement être adoptées pour
celle du Sahara sud-constantinois, qui, par ses très faibles altitudes,
en dessous de 300 mètres, est très distincte, sans des observations
qui les confirment.
(Les observations de Flamand ne sont d’ailleurs pas plus
probantes pour réfuter l’hypothèse d’un golfe de l’Océan Atlantique à
l’Ouest, car elles ne portent pas sur les régions basses de l’Ouest) ;
7º Enfin, que le Cardium edule L. est abondant dans certains
dépôts pléistocènes.
On a déclaré que le Cardium edule L. n’apportait ici aucune

certitude.
Evidemment, c’est un mollusque qui s’adapte à des milieux très
variés.
Dans la dépression qui suit le bord Sud de la Hamada de
Tinghert, près de Temassinin, dont il sera parlé plus loin, dépression
qui échappe pour le moment, par sa situation géographique et son
altitude (370 m.), à l’hypothèse d’avoir été, au Pléistocène, une
dépression marine ou en étroit voisinage avec la mer, j’ai rencontré
en abondance Corbicula saharica P. Fischer, Melania tuberculata
Mâll., mais pas de Cardium edule.
D’autre part, Flamand dit lui-même qu’il ne connaît pas de
gisements de Cardium edule dans le haut pays oranais. Il déclare
que les dépôts à Cardium edule sont les termes ultimes à l’aval des
dépôts des oueds pléistocènes vers les Chotts constantinois d’une
part, et vers le Bas-Touat, le Djouf-Taoudenni, d’autre part.
Comment se fait-il, s’il est vrai que le Cardium edule a pu vivre
dans des nappes d’eau n’ayant jamais eu aucun passé marin,
aucune connexion avec la mer ou aucun étroit voisinage laguno-
marin, comment se fait-il qu’il ne se trouve pas au Sahara, répandu
d’une façon générale à l’état fossile, là justement où on peut être à
peu près sûr que ce cas fut réalisé et qu’il se trouve constamment en
abondance à l’état fossile là précisément où il peut y avoir
discussion ?[6].
Quelle raison donner de cette absence en gros ?
Il est curieux d’autre part de constater, s’il est vrai que le Cardium
edule vivait alors dans des espèces de chotts sans liaison avec la
mer, que ce mollusque ne vit pas actuellement dans les chotts et
nappes d’eau de l’intérieur.
Enfin, on ne doit pas oublier que dans les étangs du bord de la
Méditerranée, en communication directe avec la mer, le Cardium
edule vit souvent actuellement sans être associé à d’autres
mollusques marins et qu’il vit généralement en nombre dans les
seuls étangs en communication avec la mer.
En général, il semble donc que le Cardium edule ait nécessité,
sinon toujours des eaux laguno-marines, du moins toujours un étroit
voisinage laguno-marin qui n’est plus conservé dans certaines
régions où on trouve actuellement le Cardium edule à l’état fossile[7].
Je conclus qu’on ne doit pas rejeter complètement pour le

moment l’hypothèse d’un golfe lagunaire méditerranéen dans le
Sahara sud-constantinois à la fin de l’époque pliocène et au début
du Pléistocène, ni même également d’un golfe de l’Océan Atlantique
vers le Bas-Touat, le Djouf et Taoudenni à la même époque[8].
La question est encore ouverte.
L’établissement d’une carte saharienne de répartition du Cardium
edule arriverait peut-être à jeter un jour décisif sur cette question. En
dressant cette carte, les Officiers du Sud rendraient un grand
service.
De l’origine de la dépression Sud-Tinghert.
N’y aurait-il pas dans ces régions des dépressions pour le

creusement desquelles on doit donner à l’action du vent un rôle
essentiel ?
*
* *
Jusqu’à maintenant, on avait admis l’existence, dans le Sahara

sud-constantinois, d’un immense oued, se formant dans les
montagnes de l’Ahaggar pour finir dans l’Oued Rhir et le Chott Melrir
après un cours de plus de 1.300 kilomètres : l’oued Igharghar.
Au cours de ma mission, j’ai fait au sujet de cet oued des

observations troublantes :
D’une part :
a) A mon passage à Tanezrouft, j’ai constaté qu’en ce point où
l’on fait traverser la Hamada de Tinghert par l’Igharghar, il y a bien
un oued, mais qu’il coule du Nord vers le Sud, du Nord de la daia
Tanezrouft à la daia Tanezrouft, au lieu de se diriger du Sud vers le
Nord ;
b) Il m’a semblé que la Hamada n’était franchie nulle part par
l’Igharghar. Des militaires qui avaient parcouru cette région m’ont
déclaré avoir eu la même impression. Je n’ai encore pu trouver
personne qui ait vu, autre part que sur la carte, l’Igharghar traverser
la Hamada ;
c) Dans la dépression qui suit le Bâten (versant à falaises) de la
Hamada au Sud, on rencontre en abondance Corbicula saharica P.
Fischer et Melania tuberculata Mâll., faune sub-actuelle qui semble
indiquer l’existence récente dans cette dépression d’une vaste
« daia » ou d’une série de « daia » dans laquelle ou dans lesquelles
les eaux venant du Sud se réunissaient.
Une partie de cette eau devait disparaître par évaporation, une
autre partie pouvait être absorbée par les graviers, grès friables et
autres formations crétacées perméables, s’enfoncer sous le plateau
crétacé suivant le pendage si régulier de ces terrains vers le Nord et
emprisonnées par les formations argileuses et marneuses
intercalées dans ce Crétacé, alimenter le Nord en eaux artésiennes
par une circulation sous pression en profondeur, dans le fond de la
vaste cuvette crétacée comme cela continue à se produire
actuellement.
Certaines « reculées » dans la Hamada de Tinghert, qui ont
d’ailleurs donné leur nom à la Hamada[9], semblent comme des
« manches » et des « culs-de-sac » d’absorption.
Et il convient de signaler également la présence d’entonnoirs
d’effondrements et d’absorptions dus aux formations de gypse dans
la Hamada, qui favorisent la disparition des eaux superficielles et
jouent un rôle important pour la compréhension de la circulation
souterraine de l’eau dans ces régions.
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International Law and the Arab-Israeli

Conflict Robbie Sabel

The Arab-Israeli Conflict : A Ringside View 1st Edition

Military Aspects of the Israeli Arab Conflict 1st

The Routledge Atlas of the Arab Israeli Conflict 10th

Historical Dictionary of the Arab Israeli Conflict 2nd

International law and armed conflict fundamental

Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian

Overcoming the Retributive Nature of the Israeli

International Conflict and Security Law: A Research

Drawing upon Robbie Sabel’s ﬁrst-hand involvement with many legal

  is Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law,

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

List of Abbreviations xvi

3 The Zionist Movement and the

6 Israel’s Declaration of Independence 102

9 The Arab Refugee Problem 156

12 Camp David 1978 209

14 Taba Arbitration 251

15 The Legality of Israeli Exploitation of Oil from Sinai 260

18 Post Oslo Developments 291

20 Israeli Settlements in the West Bank 316

22 Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways in

28 Implications for Future Negotiations 421

AJIL American Journal of International Law

On ne doit jamais écrire que de ce qu’on aime.

It is, I believe, legitimate to ask whether there is a substantial role for

Is International Law Relevant?

It is, I believe, legitimate to ask whether there is a substantive role for

The late American political columnist Krauthammer echoed the same

1.1 Is International Law Relevant to the Arab-Israeli Conﬂict?

1.2 Concluding Remarks

The World War I

2.1 Developments during the World War I, 1914–1918

History has, I believe, proved Kimche wrong, and these ‘arrangements’

Hussein subsequently initiated an insurrection against the Ottoman

2.2.1 Was the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Binding

2.2.2 Did the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence Promise

This 1918 Anglo-French declaration would seem to imply that the

2.2.3 The Issue of the Secrecy of the

2.2.5 Support for the Proposition That Palestine Was Included

In a letter to High Commissioner Samuel, of 12 April 1923, Clayton who

2.2.7 Concluding Remarks regarding

Author: Conrad Kilian

Release date: March 30, 2024 [eBook #73291]

Original publication: Paris: Société d'éditions géographiques

Credits: Galo Flordelis (This file was produced from images

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AU HOGGAR

Ouvrage orné de trois cartes et de seize planches hors-texte

Au cours de l’année 1922, j’ai effectué une mission en Sahara

DES PAYS CRÉTACICO-TERTIAIRES

Pour parvenir au Massif Central Saharien, il faut traverser tout un

De la mer saharienne plio-pléistocène.

J’entends la mer, sous la forme d’un golfe lagunaire

On sait que, depuis les travaux de Pomel et de Flamand

Et pourtant qu’y aurait-il d’invraisemblable à ce que la mer, ayant

Il n’est peut-être pas inopportun de rappeler :

On a déclaré que le Cardium edule L. n’apportait ici aucune

Je conclus qu’on ne doit pas rejeter complètement pour le

De l’origine de la dépression Sud-Tinghert.

N’y aurait-il pas dans ces régions des dépressions pour le

Jusqu’à maintenant, on avait admis l’existence, dans le Sahara

Au cours de ma mission, j’ai fait au sujet de cet oued des