Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice Digest
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice Digest
Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999
Puno, J.
FACTS:
The public respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
Resolution temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner. They argue that the Court's
decision has become final and executory, falling within the executive authority's exclusive ambit.
They express concern about the dangerous precedent set by issuing a temporary restraining
order, suggesting that it could lead to endless litigation if laws are subject to repeal by Congress.
The respondents highlight that Congress extensively deliberated on the death penalty law, and
any present questions were likely already debated. They also argue that the court has exceeded
its power of judicial review. The respondents present certain circumstances suggesting that the
repeal or modification of the death penalty law is unlikely. The petitioner, in their response,
contends that the court's stay order is within its judicial power and does not infringe on
executive or congressional authority. They argue that the court did not lose jurisdiction over
incidental matters related to the petition and that the respondents are estopped from
challenging the court's jurisdiction. The petitioner also questions the certainty of the law's repeal
or modification until Congress considers various resolutions and bills. The court emphasizes that
the motions concern matters in a different case where the constitutionality of the Lethal
Injection Law is challenged, and the petitioner lacks legal standing in the case at hand.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court’s issuance of the TRO is within the scope of judicial power and
duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives.
HELD:
No. The Court does not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents
that the Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the
execution of the petitioner.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial
power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Section 6 of
Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by
such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." What the Court
restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its
fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary
to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.
In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, the Court promulgated rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of
judgments. Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides the Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal,
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by the Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive.
The Court likewise rejects the public respondents' contention that its execution enters
the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department and that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function. Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution.
The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment,
and grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality. As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally
assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death
sentence upon a person who is insane at the time of execution." The suspension of such a death
sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential
power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary suspension of the execution of
the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can
the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive,
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents
therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.