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Contemporary Issues
on Governance,
Conflict and Security
in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Contemporary Issues on Governance, Conflict
and Security in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Contemporary Issues
on Governance,
Conflict and Security
in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Institute for Pan-African Thought
and Conversation
University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa
ISBN 978-3-031-29634-5 ISBN 978-3-031-29635-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29635-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
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Preface
Motivation and Objectives

This book offers a holistic understanding of the convergence between
governance, conflict and security in Africa. It adopts a political economy
approach and qualitative research method, funded on unstructured inter-
view and case studies, to unravel the governance and security questions in
Africa. There are exhaustive studies on conventional threats to security in
post-colonial Africa; however, there has been a dearth of rigorous research
on other emerging threats to human security, which have the potency to
aggravate Africa’s insecurity and underdevelopment. While cases of armed
insurrections and civil wars have reduced on the continent, diverse forms
of violent conflicts have endangered the security of lives and property.
What explains this trend? As well captured in the volume, the shrinking
of many African states and the deepening of structural violence engen-
dered new forms of violent conflict—terrorism, xenophobia, students-led
violent protests, gender-based violence, youth-led dissent—and the resur-
gence of old conflicts, as seen in the new waves of coups in the Sahel
and West Africa. Several African states continue to demonstrate their
incapacity to ensure peace and security within their territorial delineations.
A resurgence of conflict generated by water and land impedes the
quests for social stability, security and socio-economic sustainability in
many parts of Africa. In the case of land, it manifests as both structural
violence (a precondition for physical violence) and farm attacks as expe-
rienced in South Africa, where a high level of land-related inequality and
v
vi PREFACE
physical violence persist. Despite the optimism associated with the ‘Africa
rising’ conversation, conventional and contemporary threats to peace have
stunted its developmental projects. Indeed, there is a strong connec-
tion between security and development. While Paul Coulier’s insisted
that economic consideration causes and perpetuates conflict, the literature
identifies both economic and political variables—particularly the state and
the political power system—as the main determinants of conflict.
Africa’s shifting nature of conflict necessitates fresh conversation on
exploring effective contextual techniques to ensure Africa’s peace and
security. Furthermore, the changing character of the security landscape
reveals a rising gap between practice and classical thoughts on conflict,
security and governance. Thus, the editor of the book, Oye Akinola,
received support from the Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conver-
sation (IPATC) at the University of Johannesburg, to host an author’s
workshop and brainstorm new trends on conflict and security and the
imperativeness of proffering sustainable recommendations for policy-
making. The authors in this volume attended and made paper presenta-
tions at the workshop, between 10 and 11 March 2022, at the Sheraton
Hotel in Pretoria, South Africa.
As discussed during the workshop, many violent conflicts in Africa
are occurring outside the purview of government and without govern-
ment troops, which becomes alarming due to its volatility and difficulty
in mediation and reconciliation. Unlike the past when terrorism was asso-
ciated with ideological extremisms, contemporary forms of terrorism have
been linked to religious fundamentalism. The fall of Libya and the global
crusade against westernisation have led to the proliferation of armed
conflicts in Africa. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, evidence of
the state’s failures and the resultant insecurity abound.
Therefore, the edited volume seeks to unpack how the interactions
between the modern state, economy and society engender conflict. It is
decisive to also focus on the victims of violent conflict and engage on
the peculiarity of their vulnerabilities. Thus, it provides a robust engage-
ment on some of the trends of conflict and insecurity that are becoming
apparent in contemporary Africa. It also challenges the orthodox peace
architecture on the continent and examines the changing demographics,
economic and sociological factors that have implications for security. It
provides deeper understanding of the nuances and new forms of conver-
sation for addressing threats to African security, such as violent extremism,
violent mass movements and underreported gender-based violence. The
PREFACE vii
book is broad, multi-disciplinary and a knowledge pool for researchers,

think-tank community and postgraduate students, and policy practitioners
that are engaged in national and regional security and governance.
Reality of Conflict and Governance-Gap in Africa

Generally, African states have experienced incessant threats to human
security in various forms. In Nigeria, a United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) report recently revealed that attacks from the
dreaded Boko Haram, including its splinter group—Islamic State West
Africa Province (ISWAP) and Fulani herdsmen have resulted in 2.7
million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 350,000 deaths. Besides
the infiltration of Boko Haram’s terrorism in Chad, the spillover effects
of conflicts in its neighbouring countries—Cameroon, Libya, Sudan and
Niger—have compounded Nigeria’s quest for stability. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 237,000
refugees and 300,000 IDPs are living in Niger, which includes an addi-
tional 4000 refugees and 2000 newly displaced in 2021 due to attacks in
the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions.
In June 2021, local armed men unleashed violence on a village—
Solhan—in northeast Burkina Faso near the Nigerien border. This attack
claimed 138 lives and 40 sustained injuries. By January 2022, the Burk-
inabè military struck and toppled the civilian government of President
Roch Kaboré. The personalisation of political power has become one of
the major reasons for military incursions into politics in West Africa and
the Sahel. In Guinea, the military, and the populace, were frustrated by
the tenure elongation of two successive post-independence leaders—Pres-
ident Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté—who stayed in power for 26 and
24 years, respectively.
Cameroon, which nearly went to war with Nigeria over border
disputes, has become another concern. In 2016, what started as a protest
by the two anglophone regions against marginalisation by the majority
French-speaking government has turned the country into a war zone. The
violent conflict between the central government and minority separatist
groups has killed over 4000 people and displaced more than a million,
including 66,899 refugees who fled to Nigeria. The spillover of Boko
Haram’s terrorism from Nigeria to Cameron has led to the killing of over
3000 people and displacement of 250,000 in northern Cameroon. The
viii PREFACE
country has also played host to 441,000 refugees, mostly from Nigeria
and the Central African Republic.
On 30 May 2021, about 60 people were killed during an attack—
carried out by suspected Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—in Ituri
Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The
Ethiopian premier, Abiy Ahmed Ali, embarked on a military offensive
in November 2020 to ‘restore the rule of law’ in Tigray by confronting
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who had attacked a federal
military base. Ahmed Ali, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2019,
continues with a crackdown on Tigray, and African leaders and the African
Union (AU), that have initially ‘refused’ to respond effectively have now
managed to broker a deal between the two warring sides.
The resource-part of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province, is also
becoming a harbour for terrorism and lawlessness. This is too grave
for regional security and too close for Pretoria’s comfort. The regional
body—the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—is
currently exploring the best approach to curtail the threat that terrorism
poses to regional security. SADC deployed a regional task force, under
the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), to support the coun-
try’s effort at counterterrorism. The hitherto domestic Islamist insurgent
group operating in the country’s north-eastern Cabo Delgado Province
drew global attention in March 2021, when they attacked Palma in the
northern part of the country. According to the BBC, the attack killed
many foreigners working on a $20 billion gas plant—the biggest single
foreign investment in Africa.1 More than 35,000 housing facilities have
either been partially or totally destroyed at the start of the conflict,2 and
about 700,000 Mozambicans have now been displaced internally due to
the ensuing reign of terror.
1 See, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56886085.
2 For more information on the conflict in Mozambique, see d’Orsi, Cris-
tiano (2022). Catalogue of failures behind growing humanitarian crisis in northern
Mozambique, https://theconversation.com/catalogue-of-failures-behind-growing-humani
tarian-crisis-in-northern-mozambique-149343.
PREFACE ix
The Problematic
Despite slow efforts to silence the guns in Africa, there are cases of blood-
letting, and it does not look as if the gun-wielding groups are retreating.
What accounts for the expanding proliferation of conflicts? Colonial
legacy? While this is close to the heart, the false promise of liberal democ-
racy and capitalism systems have exposed the fragility of the disjointed
elitist states that are dependent on global financial oligarchs, many of
which are governed by greedy, corrupt and inept leaders. Democratisation
in Africa, which is regarded as the antidote to both internal resurrections
and external aggressions, has deepened poverty, structural violence, iden-
tity assertiveness and the politicisation of ethnic groups, as well as the
privatisation of power by the ruling elites.
Indeed, the liberal peace architecture has recorded failures on several
fronts in Africa. Proponents of this school of thought have continued to
celebrate the democratic peace theory, based on the so-called resilience of
political and representative institutions, as well as institutional constraints,
within the broad discourse on effective internal mechanisms, which
embrace peace, negotiation, accountability and reconciliation. The brand
of democracy exported to Africa is lacking in these attributes. Any
attempts by the citizens to discuss the nature of relations between them-
selves and the state, based on shared identity, common values and goals,
have been resisted by Africa’s ruling class, political entrepreneurs and
upper-level bourgeoisie, who have personalised public goods, expanded
the inequality gap and manipulated the political spaces. African societies
have been militarised to the extent that citizens celebrated the incursions
of the military in politics in West Africa and the Sahel. The term, ‘military
is an aberration’, is becoming unpopular in the Sahel.
The AU, including regional organisations such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has its hands full, in
attempting to restore order to troubled zones. While the institutional
capacity of the AU is becoming worrying and apparent, other foreign
powers are seizing the opportunity to consolidate their power and inter-
ests in Africa. The new ‘scramble’ for the soul of the Sahel and West Africa
by France, China and Russia, including the existing military visibility of
the United States (US), are reminders of imperial wars and colonialism.
There have been allegations of mercenaries on African soil, and Russia
continues to cut into Mali and Central Africa Republic (CAR). The US
military, which is active in about 20 African countries, has continued
x PREFACE
to make its military footprint in Africa by investing $100 million in its

armed MQ-9 Reaper drones base in Niger, with an annual maintenance
cost of $30 million.3 This became the largest ‘airman-built’ project in Air
Force history and the largest base-building project ever undertaken by
troops in US history. The AU should be worried. African states should
be concerned, and Africans should begin to confront the foreign siege on
the continent.
Johannesburg, South Africa Adeoye O. Akinola

January 2023 Head: Research and Teaching,
and Head of Unit: African Union
Studies
3 See, Turse, Nick (2018) “The U.S. is building a drone base in Niger that will cost
more than $280 million by 2024”, The Intercept, 21 August; https://theintercept.com/
2018/08/21/us-drone-base-niger-africa/.
Contents
1 Africa and the Scourge of Conflict and Insecurity 1

Adeoye O. Akinola and Emmaculate Asige Liaga
2 African Conflict and the “Post-colonial” State 17
Stephen Phiri
3 Climate Change and Emerging Conflict Between
Herders and Farmers in Nasarawa and Plateau States,
Nigeria 33
Samuel K. Okunade and Habila S. Kohon
4 Grassroots Conflict Over Ecosystem Services Provided
by the Inner Niger Delta: The Case of Mali 53
Ratidzo C. Makombe
5 Conflict, Police Impunity and the Governance
Question in Nigeria: Reflecting on the #EndSARS
Protest 69
Omololu Fagbadebo and Leke Oluwalogbon
6 Trapped in the Ivory Tower: Using Social Movement
Theory to Analyse a ‘Movement in Distress’ 91
Terri Maggott
xi
xii CONTENTS
7 Terrorism in Sub-Sahara Africa: Assessing its

Economic and Social Implications 109
Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi
8 Violent Conflict in the Sahel: Causes, Dynamics,
and Actors 125
Adeoye O. Akinola and Naledi Ramontja
9 The Resurgence of Military Coups in Africa: The Case
of West Africa and the Sahel 147
Gwinyai Regis Taruvinga
10 Media and Election Disputes in Nigeria 159
N. Oluwafemi ‘Femi’ Mimiko and Harrison Adewale Idowu
11 Governance, Security and Development Nexus
in Galkayo, Somalia: A New Approach to Explaining
Somalia’s Chronic Instability 175
Abdullahi Mohammed Odowa
12 Ceasefire Arrangements as a Pre-condition
for Independence in Southern Africa: Implications
for Land Conflicts in Zimbabwe and South Africa 191
Mzingaye Brilliant Xaba
13 The Security Sector in Zimbabwe’s Diamond
Governance (2006–2015) 213
Tyanai Masiya
14 Ethnic Federalism, Exclusionary Self-Determination
Rights and Conflict in Ethiopia: Consociational
Democracy as an Alternative Approach to Peace
and Security 227
Seyoum Mesfin
15 Somaliland’s Plural Justice System and Its Influence
on Peacebuilding and Development 249
Hamdi I. Abdulahi
CONTENTS xiii
16 Exploring the Impact of Women’s Organisations

in Peacebuilding in South Sudan: Post-independence
Progress 273
Tolulope Adeogun, Obianuju E. Okeke-Uzodike,
and Abidemi A. Isola
17 Gender-Based Violence in South Africa: The Second
Pandemic? 287
Nompumelelo Ndawonde
18 A Reflection on Gender-Based Violence in Nigeria 309
Bolanle Oluwakemi Eniola and Joseph I. Aremo
19 Food Security as a New Frontier of War:
A Geo-Historical Perspective of Food Security
and Armed Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa 327
Malaika Lesego Samora Mahlatsi
20 IGAD and the Quest for Economic and Security
Regionalism 343
Mohamed Farah Hersi
Index 363
CHAPTER 1
Africa and the Scourge of Conflict

and Insecurity
Adeoye O. Akinola and Emmaculate Asige Liaga
Introduction
Africa has been characterised as a conflict zone since the turn of the
twentieth century, and the continent experienced the highest number of
armed conflicts in the world between 2015 and 2016 (PRIO, 2013).
While conventional conflict such as civil war and communal clashes
continue unabated, new forms of conflict have also become part of the
African narrative. Indeed, conflict on the continent is assuming a shape
and space that was not the norm in the two decades following the
end of the Cold War. While conflict, violence and insecurity have been
approached from the standpoint of states as the decisive actors, as argued
by the securitisation school of thought, in Africa and beyond, it has also
involved non-state actors and human security issues (see, Buzan et al.,
A. O. Akinola (B) · E. A. Liaga

Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University
of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
A. O. Akinola, Contemporary Issues on Governance,
Conflict and Security in Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29635-2_1
2 A. O. AKINOLA AND E. A. LIAGA
1998). In many instances, non-state actors have taken up arms against

other non-state actors, armed groups have fought other armed groups,
and communal clashes have been characterised by socio-political and
economic undertones. Religious terrorism and xenophobia are further
forms of conflict in Africa. As such, conversations and discourses on
conflict are shifting from simplistic rhetoric to embrace deeper, historical
and non-exclusive understanding and approaches.
Despite various efforts by the state and non-state actors at the national,
regional and continental levels, conflict and insecurity continue to haunt
Africa. They have undermined social harmony and cut across faith move-
ments, impeding sustainable development of the continent and its people.
Failure to craft effective socio-economic interventions to combat poverty
has aggravated conflict, as poverty deepens the vulnerability of a cross-
section of the population, and the youth, in particular, regard violent
conflict as a means of survival (Ismail & Olonisakin, 2021). This has
hampered the attainment of peace in conflict zones, while hitherto
peaceful societies such as those in the Sahel confront security challenges.
There is a rich body of literature on the nexus between governance,
peace and security. Indeed, both the African Union (AU) Agenda 2063
and the United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
regard these three concepts as a precondition for sustainable development.
A lack of peace and security has stymied the democratic consolidation of
most governments in contemporary Africa. This negatively impacts not
only the continent’s ability to embrace effective governance, but also to
achieve the “Africa We Want”. The tenets of liberal democracy embraced
by African elites have failed to achieve peace and security. A democratic
state should be characterised by accountability and transparency, strong
political structures, inclusivity, tolerance and justice, which are necessary
to decrease violent conflict; however, the case of Africa is different.
The optimism that accompanied the waves of democracy that swept
through post-colonial Africa from the early 1980s led to fewer conflicts a
decade after the Cold War. During this period, around 11 of Africa’s 54
countries were considered ‘free’ or democratic states (Lynch & Crawford,
2011). However, by the end of the 1980s democracy’s inability to prevent
conflict in Africa became apparent as civil war erupted in countries such as
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. By 2017, ten countries, Nigeria,
Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, DRC, Burundi, South Africa and
South Sudan, were responsible for 70% of the conflict in Africa (Aremu,
2010). It should be noted that, in several of these countries, this took
1 AFRICA AND THE SCOURGE OF CONFLICT AND INSECURITY 3
the form of protests and riots, with South Africa accounting for 16% of
violent protests in 2017, followed by Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria and Tunisia.
Insecurity, and by extension violent conflict on the African conti-
nent, has evolved over time and became more complicated, complex
and protracted, generally involving various actors at any given time and
location. Many stakeholders in the African peace and security architec-
ture have categorised these conflicts as core and peripheral: brutal and
protracted, and less brutal and not protracted. There has been a tendency
to ignore those regarded as minor conflicts such as xenophobia and
violent protests, with a focus on civil war and ethnic conflict. In the past
decade, terrorism and resource-based conflicts in Nigeria, Congo DRC
and Mozambique have altered the nature of conflict due to the naked
display of ruthlessness and the monumental destruction of lives and prop-
erty. Furthermore, the herder-farmer conflicts that have rocked the Sahel
have aggravated security threats in the region and caused far more damage
than conventional warfare. In South Africa, xenophobia has resulted in
around 100 deaths since the first outbreak of xenophobic violence in
2008. It has thus become more complex to categorise conflict into core
and peripheral.
To engage the aforementioned emerging security threats and its
complex link to governance deficit in Africa, the Institute for Pan-African
Thought and Conversation (IPATC) at the University of Johannesburg,
South Africa hosted a workshop from 10 to 11 March 2022. This chapter
reflects on some of the important discussions on conflict and security
trends on the continent. The workshop explored the historical and imme-
diate causes of the conflicts and the manner in which neo-colonial African
states have been structured that makes violent conflict inevitable. Issues
of concern revolved around cases of conflict relapse, including the failure
of ceasefire and peace agreements in countries like South Sudan and the
protracted nature of the conflict in Congo DRC. The M-23 is cutting
into the country, while resource-politics by the neighbouring countries
are impeding sustainable peace in the resource-rich country. This chapter,
therefore, provides an overview of Africa’s security challenges and offers
sustainable policy options to curtail lawlessness and armed conflict on the
continent.
Contending Themes on Conflict

and Insecurity in Africa
It is pertinent to highlight the contending concerns in relation to Africa’s
insecurity regime. This section presents a case-by-case analysis of these
issues.
Youth, Dissent and Protest Action in Africa

The youth have both positively and negatively impacted the peace and
development trajectory in Africa. Population growth has also yielded
mixed results. While it could trigger development, Africa faces the
herculean task of utilising the population for development purposes.
Furthermore, given the extreme poverty that characterises society, the
youth, in particular, have been at the receiving end of Africa’s socio-
economic crisis. Taking the continent as a whole, youth unemployment
is estimated at 60%, while 34% of young Africans lived on less than
$1.9/day, 59% on less than $3.2 /day; and 80 to 83% on less than $5.5
/day in 2019 (Phiri & Jones, 2022; UNCTAD, 2021). The UN projects
that the global population will reach 10 billion by 2055, with 95% of the
growth occurring in low- and middle-income countries. Africa is expected
to contribute 57% of population growth (1.4 billion people). Currently,
60% of the continent’s population is under the age of 25, making it the
world’s most youthful continent (Policy Commons, 2020). The youth
will thus become the dominant force in Africa.
While research has shown that African youth exhibit low levels of
civil and political participation, they have nonetheless been active partici-
pants in many conflicts across the continent. For instance, the youth were
the backbone of the protests that led to the fall of Sudan’s president
Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. However, they remain largely excluded
from political decision-making processes and bear the brunt of the coun-
try’s economic hardships (Lovise, 2020). Libyan youth have been a
major driver of conflict since 2011. The growing youth population and
their increased activism should thus be of major concern to stakeholders
involved in regional peace and development efforts.
In Nigeria, youth militancy has been exacerbated by allegations of
police high-handedness and brutality. Given that they make up a substan-
tial portion of the Nigerian population, the youth interact with uniformed
police and the un-uniformed unit known as the Special Anti-Robbery
Squad (SARS) on a regular basis and, as in other parts of Africa, are

among those most frequently arrested. The lack of space for public
engagement for the many young people who graduated from university
but have no employment prospects creates fertile ground for confronta-
tions with law enforcement personnel.
This situation was exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic and
the subsequent national lockdowns between 2020 and 2021 when the
SARS’ nefarious activities reached their peak. There were widespread alle-
gations of police brutality and human rights violations in the course
of enforcing the lockdown restrictions (Obaji, 2020). While the consti-
tutional role of a police officer is to promote peace and security, and
maintain law and order, the Nigerian police have resorted to extorting
money from innocent civilians and crime rings for their personal benefit.
In 2020, police brutality during the lockdown led to around 18 deaths
(Arimie et al., 2021: 8). The youth in other African countries, including
South Africa, suffered the same fate. Police brutality is a reflection of
the government and the security system’s authoritarian culture which is
fuelled by corruption.
There is also a link between police brutality and larger issues of power.
Osha (2020) argues that ‘the colonial state established a police force as a
means of solely enforcing its will and not to protect its subjects’. Thus, any
form of resistance by civilians, even if legitimate, is usually met with brute
force. The police are regarded as untransformed and as an instrument of
post-colonial states to perpetuate domination and advance the interests
of the elites. Such behaviour has become the foundation that defines the
character of the state and by extension its security instruments. In 2021,
the friction between the youth and the police threatened the peace and
security of the most populous city in Nigeria and Africa, Lagos, when
police opened fire on the youth during peaceful protests against SARS
brutality and police complicity.
In South Africa, the power of the youth was recently felt during
the #Fees-must-fall social movement led by university students in 2015.
Unlike past student movements in Africa in general and South Africa in
particular, which constituted a challenge to the status quo, #Fees-must-fall
was restricted to the confines of the ivory tower. Nonetheless, this student
uprising, which was the largest in the history of post-apartheid universi-
ties, not only resulted in the closure of institutions, but also degenerated
into violent protests, accompanied by the destruction of property and
disruption of order in surrounding areas. Universities became ‘warzones’,
as locally manufactured bombs and firearms were used by students (Greeff

et al., 2021: 83). The South African police adopted a ‘zero tolerance’
approach, crushing erring and innocent students alike (Greeff et al., 2021:
89).
While, on the face of it, #Fees-must-fall centred around demands for
free education and curriculum transformation, at a deeper level, it consti-
tuted a critique of the commodification of education in South Africa,
given its apartheid history. The ruling African National Congress1 has
abandoned its socialist or welfarist legacy which promised to empower
black South Africans, particularly black students that have struggled to
access quality education due to economic, social and racial inequality.
It is important to appreciate the complex networks of established
student organisations that are in constant communication and contesta-
tion with one another. In several African countries, pursuit of knowledge
in universities is rooted in practices and a culture of exclusion based
on sexism, racism and exclusivity. These values translate into question-
able epistemological foundations and trends as well as discrimination
against black people and women. The post-apartheid government merged
several higher education institutions in the interests of increasing funding,
extending access to black people and implementing curriculum transfor-
mation. However, more than two decades later, universities remained
largely untransformed and many are still structured along race and class
lines.
The Security, Governance and Development Nexus

The links between governance, security and development have been
revealed in many African countries such as Nigeria and the DRC, while
the case of Somalia is cause for concern. The civil war that has been
raging in Somalia since 1991 has brought the country to the brink of
collapse. The prolonged conflict and emergence of the terrorist group,
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, known as al-Shabaab, has rendered
this a complex situation. While Somalia has managed to slowly make
some progress in its security, economic and political landscapes since the
formation of the Transitional Federal Government in 2004, the country,
particularly the capital Mogadishu, remains insecure due to sporadic
1 The ruling party since majority rule was attained in 1994.

terrorist attacks. With the adoption of the new provisional constitution,

the country is on the road to recovery with annual growth of 2.9% in
2019 and 1.4% in 2020. International coalitions against terrorism have
also yielded moderate success, with Al-Shabaab losing control of large
urban settings in south and central Somalia.
However, challenges remain that jeopardise Somalia’s efforts to
become a peaceful, prosperous and fully sovereign state. Continued
instability and conflict are directly linked to governance, security and
development. The interaction between these concepts offers an appro-
priate lens to understand the contemporary challenges preventing the
country from breaking the cycle of conflict and poverty. The govern-
ment has been unable to facilitate legitimate constitutional reform, and
the governance structure has failed to effectively address resource and
power-sharing.
A lack of proper governance has an exponential effect on insecurity,
economic development and political stability. For instance, in Galkayo
City and the wider Mudug region, the lack of trading seaports means that
local resources and exports are facilitated through Bossasso and Berbera
ports far from the region. This accounts for the high cost of imported
basic commodities.
The shortage of schools and poor-quality schooling in Somalia are
believed to have forced many to migrate abroad, leading to a skills
shortage with negative implications for the local economy. Weak capacity
for internal revenue collection in some areas has exacerbated unemploy-
ment and resulted in dilapidated basic infrastructure, fanning the flames
of discontent. The authorities are unable to cater for the basic needs of
security personnel, create jobs for the restless and unemployed youth or
implement successful disarmament and reintegration programmes for the
armed clan militias.
A lack of constitutional reform plagues various countries like South
Sudan, which after 10 adopted an interim constitution. However, there
is a need to differentiate between a government with a constitution and
constitutionalism, and one with a constitution, but without constitution-
alism.
Somalia’s neighbour, Somaliland, presents a different reality. Although
no state recognises Somaliland’s independence or sovereignty, it continues
to function autonomously, with an active centralised government. The
country has enjoyed peace and security since its disassociation from
Somalia. It has been able to retain its traditional structures based on
the clan governance arrangement, including a plural justice system. The

multiple legal systems comprise the state justice system, Shari⊂ah and
customary law. While the country has been able to maintain peace,
concerted efforts have been made to address the inadequate judicial and
policy frameworks that have restricted optimal performance of the state
justice system. This is mainly due to the priority given to security and
stability to the detriment of maintaining a strong judicial system and
improving citizens’ livelihoods.
The literature has also demonstrated the nexus between resource
exploration and conflict. In countries such as Zimbabwe, mining has
played a major role in insecurity. Rich in diamonds, Zimbabwe mani-
fests the attributes of a resource curse, where the availability of mineral
resources has led to a high level of political corruption and exploitation.
Public office is seen as a potential cash cow for political and business
elites. State security actors and the ruling elites have formed alliances that
have negatively affected the legitimacy of the entire governance system,
including the state bureaucracy and the security sector. The security sector
supports the ruling elite’s ambitions for power consolidation, while the
government has opened up diamond deposits to looting and pilfering.
It has become difficult to distinguish state security personnel from the
ruling elite and citizens have not benefitted from the mineral resources.
While citizens in resource-rich countries like Congo DRC, Nigeria and
Zimbabwe regard such resources as sources of hope, the lack of effective
governance has caused severe economic hardships and mismanagement of
natural resources has been the major driver of violent conflict.
The convergence between security and governance dates back to the
colonial period and remains deeply entrenched in post-colonial dispen-
sations across Africa. While resources are fed into global capitalist value-
chains, citizens suffer from poverty, abuse and environmental degradation.
International capitalists, with the complicity of local capitalists and politi-
cians, have politicised and commercialised societal resources and taken
advantage of conflict environments.
Conflict and security issues in Africa should be located within post-
Cold War dynamics, especially in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Land
resources have become an instrument of patronage and corruption,
with citizens relegated to helpless bystanders. While land expropriation
without compensation was part of Southern African liberation move-
ments’ agenda, the world order leaned very favourably towards the West.
Indeed, some of the South African military officials that were forced to
the negotiating table and right-wing groups and institutions like the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank were very influential during the
land negotiations. Ceasefire agreements thus adopted the willing buyer,
willing seller market-led approach. The capitalisation of land was further
reinforced in 2019 when the US government cautioned its South African
counterpart not to implement expropriation without compensation. Many
black South Africans reacted negatively to such decisions, causing friction
between the state and society, as well as the various political parties.
Military Coups and Terrorism in Africa

African governments’ military spending was estimated at $43 billion in
2020 (Faria, 2021). On average, Africa accounts for around 2% of global
military expenditure (Saleh, 2022). As at 2022, Algeria had the highest
defence budget on the continent ($10 billion), followed by Nigeria ($5.9
billion) and Morocco ($5.4 billion) (Saleh, 2022). Despite these large
amounts, violent conflict has become synonymous with Africa, while
terrorism continues to inflict fear and terror across the continent. Since
2010, Africa has experienced unprecedented intra-state conflicts, with
countries such as Nigeria, Mali, Algeria, Somalia and Burkina Faso unable
to secure peace within their borders.
Terrorist groups are one of the most powerful non-state actors and
are constantly increasing in number and force. Until 2021, Boko Haram,
which emerged in Nigeria, was ranked third in the Global Terrorism
Index, followed by terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition
to the loss of lives through their attacks, terror groups have caused large-
scale human displacement, as thousands of people continue to flee their
reigns of terror. For instance, in the northeast region of Nigeria where
Boko Haram operates, about two million people have been displaced
and are in need of humanitarian assistance. The agricultural sector has
been negatively impacted by terrorism, with most farmers having fled and
those who remain unable to access their farmland due to fear of being
attacked and kidnapped. Around 100 Nigerian rice farmers were slaugh-
tered in 2020. The multiplier effect has been food shortages in the areas
controlled by the terrorist groups. The fishing and tourism industries in
northern Nigeria have also been badly affected.
While terrorism has been on the rise in Africa, the past couple of years
have also witnessed a wave of military coups in West Africa and the Sahel.
Countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Sudan have been subjected
to military insurgency, raising questions about these states’ capacity to

deepen democracy as well as the role played by the military in securing
the state. In Mali and Burkina Faso, military insurgency has ridden on
the back of transnational crimes such as local insurgency and terrorism.
Governance failures and state fragility have also resulted in military incur-
sions, as have presidents’ attempts to extend their term of office (as was
the case in Sudan). While the military has not stepped out of line in
Southern Africa, terrorism is beginning to lay claim to the region through
Mozambique. This highlights the spillover effect of protracted terrorism
on the continent.
Despite the fact that military intervention has been condemned as an
unconstitutional aberration, the military has at times seen itself as an agent
of development and change. This thesis argues that the military should
be seen as a saviour that intervenes to protect democracy. Constitutional
governments in the Sahel have failed to deliver on effective governance
and have stifled civil society groups and silenced citizens, reducing the
likelihood of effective political opposition. For example, in Zimbabwe,
Robert Mugabe clung to power for decades before being overthrown in
a military coup. Sudan experienced a total of 17 military coups, of which
six were successful. A careful look at institutions that support democ-
racy reveals their inability to persist in times of strain. It is thus vital to
revisit the discourse of democracy in a region where democratic norms
and values have consistently been challenged due to democracy’s failure to
maintain the strong economic conditions necessary to improve the public
good.
Security Reform, Border Disputes and the Post-Colonial State

Africa’s border system was designed by the colonial powers at different
points in time. However, the partitioning of Africa during the infamous
1884–1885 Berlin Conference laid the foundation for border demar-
cation. Several societies were merged under administrative units which
became modern states, while societies of the same ethnic composition
were separated. Thus, African borders were arbitrarily constructed to
promote the colonial powers’ exploitative interests. One of the perhaps
unintended consequences is xenophobic conflict in many African coun-
tries. In South Africa, xenophobia has become a dire security concern
that goes beyond an attack on foreigners, including questions on identity
formation to expose one of the inadequacies of post-colonial Africa. The
conflict between the local population and foreign nationals has threatened
peace and harmony between heterogeneous populations in South Africa.
Why is the local population so hostile to non-locals? Firstly, people
fight when they are deprived of something or when they are being
discriminated against. While, as argued by the Marxist school of thought,
this falls within broader societal divisions, xenophobia has reinforced the
huge gaps between the suppliers and the absorber of labour. Secondly,
xenophobia should be seen as a historical effect of the African colo-
nial heritage: a heritage marked by control as well as divide and rule.
Through indirect rule, societies were mobilised against each other for easy
domination and control.
Several post-colonial African states have securitised xenophobia and
used it as weapon during election campaigns. In South Africa, the ANC
and other political parties have used xenophobic narratives to seek popular
support from the predominantly young population, who buy the rhetoric
that foreigners are responsible for the country’s social and economic
ills. As conceptualised by the Copenhagen school, political elites have
succeeded in elevating this human issue to a security issue. Xenophobia
was prevalent not only in South Africa but also in Ghana and Nigeria
in the early 1980s. While there are differences in its manifestation from
one country to another, South Africa’s manifestation has been particularly
violent. Xenophobia continues to challenge Africa’s quest for regional
integration and attainment of Pan-Africanism. Whatever lens is employed
to view it, it is antithetical to African personhood, communalism and
Pan-Africanism.
Women’s Peace and Security in Africa

Women are the most vulnerable group in Africa. While they make up
more than 50% of the continent’s population, their participation in lead-
ership remains minimal. Women occupy 25% of decision-making positions
and constitute less than 40% of the labour force in developing coun-
tries (World Bank, 2022). According to the World Health Organisation
(WHO), globally, one in three women experiences either intimate partner
violence or non-partner sexual violence during their lifetime. Gender-
based violence (GBV) is a public health emergency that has existed for
many years and poses a significant threat to lives. On a global scale,
around 38% of murders of women are committed by their partners and
violence against women is estimated to cost countries about 3.7% of
their GDP (World Bank, 2022). Constant references to GBV in media

headlines have desensitised people to the gravity of the situation.
Violence against women is rooted in gender inequality, the abuse of
power and harmful norms. Its nature and broad scope render it difficult to
analyse. It can be sexual, physical, mental and economic and can include
the threat of violence, coercion, manipulation and blackmail. It can also
manifest through sexual violence by a spouse or intimate partner and
includes child marriage and female genital mutilation. It is also important
to note the difference between GBV and violence against women. The
latter is an act of GBV that results in physical, sexual and psychological
harm or suffering to women, including coercion or arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. Therefore, the scope of GBV is wider than violence against
women. Due to the high number of women and children experiencing
such violence, males that suffer from GBV are not accorded as much
attention.
Unequal power relations in African society, especially in terms of socio-
economic status, contribute to violence against women. It is important
to understand the intersectionality of masculinity and femininity in a
patriarchal gender order, and how patriarchal masculinity sustains gender
inequality. It is critical to understand how social norms in a patriarchal
society promote GBV. Norms such as sexual purity and family honour
put women at a disadvantage and at risk of violence.
Climate Change, Conflict and Security in Africa

Climate change is directly linked to peace, conflict and security in Africa.
Studies show that violent conflict results in climate change, and vice-versa,
impacting the livelihoods of people in the area. Poor countries that already
lack food are most likely to be most affected due to the impact on water,
agriculture, infrastructure and health. Climate change and conflict not
only affect the environment, but also cause social grievances (Barnett &
Adger, 2007).
In the past few years, Nigeria has witnessed increased environmental
degradation due to climate change, with negative impacts on livelihoods.
Climate change has aggravated social destabilisation in the northern
part of the country, where there is a recurrence of desertification. The
northern region has been hardest hit by rising temperatures and declining
rainfall in the past five decades.
In other parts of the continent sea levels continue to rise, causing

flooding in countries like South Africa. In April 2022, the South African
port city of Durban experienced devastating floods that destroyed prop-
erty and infrastructure and claimed more than 300 lives (Nyoka, 2022).
African societies have also been hard hit by drought caused by shrinking
of Lake Chad and desertification that advanced rapidly into other parts
of the northern region, especially the Middle Belt. Apart from forced
migration and a humanitarian crisis, this has disrupted the lives of herders,
who depended on a nomadic lifestyle as their only source of livelihood.
Resource conflicts have erupted as a result of competition for pasture, land
and water. Herders have clashed with farmers on numerous occasions,
leading to the loss of lives and displacement. There is a sharp decline in
the value of human lives across the farming communities in the affected
northern states of Nigeria and Mali.
Women have also been caught up in this conflict, as many are farmers
or farm workers. In Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African countries,
women usually assist men in agricultural activities, such as planting and
harvesting crops. Therefore, in pastoral societies, women grow crops
while the men farm cattle. Climate change has, therefore, further disem-
powered women and rendered them vulnerable to hunger and starvation.
The African Union has projected that about $12.6 billion is required to
assist those in need (AU, 2022).
The wetlands that extend from Mali to Nigeria make an important
contribution to the ecosystem for animals and also serve as a source of
food security. They are also used for recreation purposes and as a source
of water. Wetlands cover around 14,000 km2 and constitute around 70%
of agricultural land in the Inner Niger Delta of Mali. They produce about
50% of the national livestock and fishery and support the livelihoods of
about half a million people. About 80% of Mali’s population engages
in agriculture that contributes 45% of the country’s GDP. Conflict has
affected agricultural productivity as 42% of the land is situated in the
conflict zone.
Conclusion
This chapter situated conflict in Africa in contemporary contexts. It drew
on the continent’s colonial history for a holistic understanding of the
trends, patterns and nature of conflict in Africa and depicted the nexus
between governance and security. Furthermore, it exposed African states’
fragility and their inability to address insecurity. The initial optimism that
marked the attainment of independence and the waves of democratisation
in the late 1980s and 1990s have been replaced by extreme pessimism.
The decline in the quality of life is starkly apparent, and African elites
seem unperturbed. While Africa is not the only continent experiencing
violent conflict, the rate at which it is spilling over from one society or
country to another as well as the depth of the violence and the protracted
nature of African conflicts are cause for concern.
The chapter highlighted the various challenges confronting African
states, including governance deficits, the colonial legacy, xenophobia,
increased fragmentation of local armed groups in the Sahel, the prolifer-
ation of coups in the Sahel and West Africa, and the competing interests
of foreign powers, such as France, China, Russia and Turkey in the
Sahel. Other regions are also confronting internal insurgency, ethnic or
communal conflict, political instability and terrorism. Africa’s security
actors need to reflect carefully on these threats and commit to finding
sustainable solutions by implementing policies that eradicate structural
violence, poverty, exclusive governance and institutional fragility.
There is an urgent need for a conscious shift from a state-centric
approach to the allocation of communal resources and facilitation of peace
processes. Civil society groups, think-tanks, communities, traditional
authorities and the private sector should be involved in state-building
and development. Regional organisations, particularly the AU, should be
more committed to governance issues and resuscitate the early warning
system to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Lastly, effective gover-
nance and human capacity development of the youth are important
preconditions for peace and security in Africa.
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en/topic/gender/overview
CHAPTER 2
African Conflict and the “Post-colonial”

State
Stephen Phiri
Introduction
This chapter is presented in six sections. The first section focuses on
conflict in general and African conflict in particular, while the second
demonstrates that drawing on colonial history to explain African conflicts
is not an excuse but a valid and genuine claim. Section three presents a
brief overview of the African predicament to contextualise the argument.
The fourth section outlines the architectural design of an African “mod-
ern” state drawing on Mahmood Mamdani’s seminal work, Citizens and
Subjects and his keynote address entitled Political Identity, Citizenship
and Ethnicity in Post-colonial Africa, which he presented at the Arusha
Conference in 2005. Section five uses the first chapter of Fanon’s The
Wretched of the Earth to describe an ideal post-colonial state, while section
S. Phiri (B)
Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study, University of Johannesburg,

Switzerland AG 2023
18 S. PHIRI
six examines the post-colonial state using both Mamdani and Fanon’s
work. As part of the conclusion, I highlight the limitations of using
Mamdani’s work as the lens for understanding conflict in Africa.
Conflict is described by Coser (cited by Aremu, 2010) as a struggle
over values and claims to “rare” status, power and resources. The objec-
tive of the conflicting parties is to injure or eliminate their opposition.
Conflict can be violent or uncontrollable, dominant or recessive, and
resolvable or insolvable (Aremu, 2010). In other words, conflict is not
necessarily violent; however, ‘unfolding events in world history suggest
that most conflicts are violent, inflicting life-long injures on their victims
apart from the monumental loss of lives’ (Aremu, 2010: 551).
Conflict in Africa can be categorised into two broad groups, namely
internal and international conflicts. The former ‘is one in which the
governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that
state seeking to overthrow those authorities with the force of arms’
(Eminue, 2004: 15). International conflict takes place between two or
more nations/states (Puchala, 1971 cited by Aremu, 2010). In addition
to these two categories, Africa has witnessed the third type of conflict,
which Aremu (2010) called internationalised internal armed conflict. This
generally refers to civil war, but also involves ‘varying degrees of external
involvement. Examples of such include the conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, and Sierra Leone’ (Aremu, 2010:
551).
It is important to highlight that conflict is not restricted to Africa, as
other parts of the world are also riddled with different kinds of conflict.
Indeed, it is so widespread that some scholars (Azar, 1990; Deutsch,
1991; Otite, 1999; Zartman, 1991) have concluded that it is an inevitable
aspect of human interaction. Nonetheless, Ajayi (2005: 143) highlights
that, ‘the regularity of conflicts in Africa has become one of the distinct
characteristics of the continent’. Aremu concurs and adds that:
The continent of Africa has been highly susceptible to intra and inter-state
wars and conflicts. This has prompted the insinuation that Africa is the
home of wars and instability. Most pathetic about these conflagrations is
that they have defied any meaningful solution and their negative impacts
have retarded growth and development in Africa while an end to them
seems obscure. (2010: 549)
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 19
This chapter argues that the conflicts in Africa are not merely products of
“normal” human interaction but can be attributed to European colonial-
ism’s profound and lasting impact on contemporary Africa’s development.
One of the legacies of the colonial period is the “artificial” creation of
ethnic conflict, which I explore further in the coming sections. Some
analysts of ethnic conflict have deployed a grievance-based model. This
model is premised on the understanding of conflict as ‘normal’ human
interaction as it emphasises ‘economic, political, and social deprivation or
discrimination as sources of ethnic strife… [but its] intuitive appeal…gen-
erate[s] little explanatory power with respect to ethnic conflict in Africa’
(Blanton et al., 2001: 474).
Therefore, exclusive reliance on deprivation-based grievances as predic-
tors of ethnic violence is inadequate empirically. It is also deficient
theoretically. Collective action and social movement theories point out
that widespread and deeply felt grievances are not likely to result in collec-
tive violence unless counter-elites and mobilising structures are available
to persuade aggrieved individuals to participate in the collective action,
convince them that others are likely to participate as well, and produce the
rewards—both public goods and selective incentives—that participants
demand in return for their support (Blanton et al., 2001: 474).
Hence, this chapter proposes that the colonial structural configu-
ration that was “passed on to” post-colonial states is the source of
prevailing conflict. The structural configuration of ethnic groups in a
society is itself a part of the colonial legacy. In other words, African soci-
eties were restructured to suit colonial needs to the detriment of local
people’s structured livelihoods. This restructuring occurred in both rural
(ethnicity—customary law) and urban (race—civil law) areas.
It Is Not an Excuse, but a Genuine Claim

The current problems associated with Africa cannot be exclusively
attributed to colonial history which is the focus of this chapter. The
post-colonial political leaders who took over from the colonists also
contributed to this crisis. In as much as the historical discourse is central
to my endeavour, I do not ignore the failures of those whose duty it
was to try to resolve this impasse, but who ended up being caught up
in and exacerbating prevailing conflictual incidents. Nonetheless, I argue
that this historical viewpoint is one of the major perspectives from which
African conflict can be understood.
20 S. PHIRI
Another argument that has been raised in relation to colonial history as

a logical explanation for Africa’s current predicament is that of “perpetual
victimhood”. Those who support this notion are not only the obvious
distractors who seek to derail small decolonial gains by maintaining white
privilege but include one of our own, Achille Mbembe. He seems to argue
that we are stuck in the past; rather than allowing our wounds to heal and
move on, we sit and lick them while lamenting past injustices (Mbembe,
2002).
For Mbembe, those who make constant reference to colonial history
are “stuck” on the gross injustices of slavery, colonisation and apartheid,
whose evil and violence resulted in Africans’ alienation from them-
selves, and their material, and spiritual world (Sekyi-Otu, 2003). Mbembe
favours a “progressive” post-colonial emancipatory mindset that embraces
and takes advantage of the opportunities afforded by globalisation rather
than wishing to go back or imagine what it was like to be an African
or a black person before slavery, colonisation and apartheid. Sekyi Otu1
responds to Mbembe in his paper, Fanon and the possibility of post-
colonial critical imagination, where he argues that what Mbembe fails to
recognise is that reference to the history of subjugation serves to highlight
how,
the effects of that history impose limits on being, action, and knowledge.
By virtue of that very plaintive knowledge of limits, however, they signal
the human refusal of abject captivity to their dominion. For they wonder
aloud what the world and the drama of human life would look like, what
promises and predicaments they might proffer, were they ever unshackled
from the constraints of a particular time and place, a particular historical
circumstance. A coherent historicism is predicated, has to be predicated,
on a consciousness of the possibility of freedom, intimations of what the
nature of things might have been. (Sekyi-Otu, 2003: n.p.)
How do we untie the shackles that bind us when we have little or no

idea how they were secured? A critical understanding of the rationale
of oppression and an uncompromising analysis of distorted historical
accounts are necessary. I argue that historical inquiry is fundamental to
such rigour. Such a search and demythologisation of colonial lies is not
1 Professor Ato Sekyi Otu, a Ghanaian political philosopher best known for his work
on Frantz Fanon and Ayi Kwei Armah.
an end in itself but a means and an irreplaceable foundation towards

emancipation. It is also important to note that such questioning does not
undermine the opportunities associated with globalisation. What it does
is to avoid premature associations with “global dynamics”, lest the colo-
nial vicious circle is promoted because globalisation normally promotes
strong, dominant cultures/identities.
A Brief Overview of the African Predicament

The crisis in which Africa finds itself is not a natural phenomenon, but
one that was strategically designed out of insatiable greed based on Euro-
pean expansionism that fed on egoistic claims of a civilising mission.
Onwutalobi Anthony-Claret states that modern/colonial African states
are essentially European, not African because they were created to serve
the needs of the former. The fundamental question in this chapter is,
why is Africa riddled with unceasing conflict? There is a need to explain
the complexity of African problems. Dube (2006) enlightens us on the
possible source of the complexity of the African situation by pointing
out that what distinguishes African problems from those in the rest of
the world is Africa’s status of marginality and exclusion. The continent
exists at the periphery of the world in both an economic and political
sense. However, this explains its economic status rather than its conflictual
nature. Ongoing domination by those who colonised it, which is also
raised by Dube, is only a partial explanation for conflict in Africa. In
other words, Africa remains in a state of subordination in comparison with
other regions in the world (Dube, 2006: 79). While Dube recognised the
colonisers’ major contribution to Africans’ woes, he also highlighted that
those who took over (nationalist leaders) should share the blame.
Dube used Berkeley’s research on Africa to argue that the root cause
of African problems can be traced to the continent’s colonial history, and
that African political leaders’ tendency to oppress their own people can
be understood against the backdrop of systemic colonial and institutional
tyranny where the majority was dominated by the minority in a system of
‘race-based tyrannies which relied upon institutionalized mechanisms of
coercion and co-option that were inherently divisive’ (Dube, 2006: 81).
The scramble for Africa was not based on European powers’ need to
secure African territories in order to carry out charity work, but was driven
by insatiable greed and the fear of a possible clash among themselves. In
order to fulfil their selfish and exploitative desires, they divided the states
22 S. PHIRI
in accordance with the location of potential resources while completely

ignoring the nature and function of existing African states. Those bound-
aries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution
of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. With the demise of colonial rule, the
former colonies, with their colonial borders essentially intact, were trans-
formed into some of the most ethnically fragmented states in the world
(Blanton et al., 2001: 473).
The colonial boundaries of the nineteenth century created political
units that divided ethnic groups and, in some cases, even combined
rival groups. The current boundaries of most African states were arbi-
trarily drawn without regard to ethnic and cultural affinities (Aremu,
2010). They influenced and controlled the means of production and
what was produced. Senegal, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Zimbabwe
that traditionally cultivated food for subsistence were forced to produce
exports such as palm oil, rubber, cotton, cocoa, peanuts and tobacco
for European markets (Gordon, 1996: 55–56). Malawi and Mozambique
which had very few material resources were used as labour reservoirs.
Crowder (1970: 237) notes that, in order to disguise their economic
interests and greed, the colonial powers ‘salved their consciences by intro-
ducing arguments about their own inherent moral and racial superiority to
the Africans’. In dividing Africa into states, they never bothered to under-
stand existing cultures and nations. While, like any human society, Africa
had its own problems and conflicts, this demarcation united enemies
and divided extended families. Outsiders ordered a society to behave
in a certain way without its consent. The fact that the colonies were
designed to benefit the West or minority white people meant that the
political structures that were put in place were also strategically designed
to promote their economic and political interests.
The Colonial Architectural Design

of an African “Modern” State
‘Economic expropriation of the native’ has been perceived as the greatest
crime of colonialism (Mamdani, 2005: 2). This position was supported
by Guyanese popular historian, Walter Rodney’s seminal work, How
Europe Colonised Africa that drew on political economy as the most reli-
able tool to analyse the colonial legacy. Mamdani (2005) argues that
political economy or colonial markets/market-based identities do not
adequately historicise colonial realities. He agrees with Blanton et al.
that ‘deprivation-based grievances as predicators of ethnic violence is

inadequate empirically’ (2001: 474).
Mamdani and Blanton assert that variables which are the result of
grievances may have the potential to spark ethnic conflict, but struc-
tural variables are effective predicators of grievances and mobilisation that
create fertile ground for such conflict. Thus, Mamdani (2005) argues
that an analysis based on political economy cannot adequately explain
non-revolutionary political violence, whose identity is state-generated
and divorced from both market and cultural-based identities. The colo-
nial states need to be historicised as the legal institution responsible for
creating political identities. Furthermore, race and ethnicity need to be
understood not as biological or cultural constructs, respectively, but as
constructs of the state’s legal system.
Mamdani (2005) problematises the issue of colonial boundaries raised
earlier. He notes that the symptoms of current African conflicts can be
traced to the senseless colonial demarcation of borders:
… in dividing Africa among themselves, the colonial powers showed

little regard for [existing] boundaries of “ethnic” groups. Each colony
encompassed multiple “ethnic” groups within its newly imposed territo-
rial boundaries, many “ethnic” nationalities were divided between two or
more colonial entities. With independence these boundaries gained inter-
national legitimacy as borders of newly sovereign nation-states. (Mamdani,
2005)
Mamdani (2005) contends that all borders are essentially artificial because
war and conquest have always been integral to state-building. A good
example is the formation of the Zulu kingdom. According to Mamdani
(2005), shifting power relations have always translated to shifting bound-
aries—each new boundary is declared more natural than the previous one.
For him, the real problem with boundaries is the assumption that polit-
ical boundaries are a product of culture; this also presupposes that the
state should be a nation-state and that rediscovering/redrawing what is
conceived as “natural” political boundaries will solve the political crisis
of the post-colonial state. Mamdani (2005) asserts that the post-colonial
state is not a product of shared common values that has evolved through
consensus and mutual respect, but is the consequence of legality or laws
prescribed by the state. These laws produce institutions that structure
and determine citizen participation. The colonial state that birthed the
24 S. PHIRI
post-colonial establishment distinguished between race and ethnicity. The

former was not biological as generally perceived and the latter was not
cultural; both were mere political identities.
Mamdani (2005) further argues that, according to the indirect rule
imposed by the coloniser in Africa, only natives belonged to ethnic
groups. This presupposes that the non-native had no ethnicity and could
only be racially identified. Among those who were non-African/native
and were identified by race there was a hierarchy, with “whites” at the
pinnacle with others such as coloureds and Asians following (Mamdani,
2005). Race was perceived as a measure of one’s civilised nature. Since
natives were not classified as a race but within ethnic ranks, they were not
considered as either civilised or belonging to civil society. In this sense,
the colonial state divided the population into two categories, namely
races and ethnicities. The former were governed by civil or European
law, and the latter by customary law (Mamdani, 2005). Unlike races,
ethnicities were not hierarchical but were horizontally demarcated. The
distinction between race and ethnicities is not the same as that between
the colonised and the coloniser. In as much as all natives were colonised,
not all non-natives were colonisers (Mamdani, 2005).
There was no single customary law for all natives, but a horizontal
distinction, in which each ethnic group had its own law and a native
authority (Mamdani, 2005). The colonial regime imposed one of the
chiefs as the native authority under indirect rule. ‘The tribal leadership
was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or
freshly imposed where none had existed, as in the so called “stateless
societies”’ (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 17). ‘Not only did the chief have
the right to pass laws and was the administrator in his area, he settled
all disputes’ (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 23). The remainder of the genuine
chiefs were officially silenced. By “sanctifying” the authoritarian version
of custom as genuine, the colonial powers constructed native customs
as unchanging and singular. Furthermore, the native authorities were
organised as despotic in a way that promoted colonial rule’s objective
of enabling a tiny white minority, mainly European, to rule over the
indigenous majority—the native question. Indeed,
customary local authority was reinforced and backed by central civil power.
The British depended much more heavily upon local elites to manage
the day-to-day affairs of the colony … Rather than colonize their African
holdings with a large number of British citizens, the British government
preferred to leave in place indigenous local elites and simply coopt or

coerce them into serving as agents of British rule … Through this means,
the British colonial state established a network of indigenous intermediaries
who combined the useful authority derived from some customary title to
office with the literate skills and exposure to basic administrative training
that would make them serviceable auxiliaries of the would-be Weberian
state. (Blanton et al., 2001: 479)
Also, ‘Colonial despotism was highly decentralized’ (Mamdani,

2017/1996: 23). The strategy of maintaining “different” customary laws
for “different” ethnicities created minorities out of the native population
so that they did not unite against the colonial master. It is important to
note that Mamdani’s account of indirect rule refers to the British colonial
system. While civil law was organised on the basis of a specific function
of power, customary law was based on a fusion of power, giving the
chiefs unlimited, unchecked powers (Mamdani, 2005). In other words,
customary authority was hinged on the customary “right” to use force
to coerce subjects, with corporal punishment encouraged under some
circumstances.
The language of rights claimed to set limits on power exercised
through the law; however, the language of custom did not circumscribe
power but enforced it in a way that was unchecked, rendering the rule
of law impossible (Mamdani, 2005). The natives had no rights under
civil law and were controlled by customary law. The colonial state was
essentially what Mamdani (2005) called a bifurcated world—one divided
into two, which Fanon dubbed the Manichaean world. The customary
law associated with ethnicities falls under the part of the bifurcated world
known as indirect rule. The other part fell under civil or European or
civilised law that directly ruled the so-called “races” that constituted the
hierarchy of civility. ‘Direct rule was the form of urban civil power. It was
about the exclusion of natives from civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens
in the civil society’ (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 18).
In the main, however, the colonial state was a double-sided affair. Its
one side, the state that governed a racially defined citizenry, was bounded
by the rule of law and an associated regime of rights. Its other side,
the state that ruled over subjects, was a regime of extra-economic coer-
cion and administratively driven justice (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 19). The
nationalist struggle fought for Africans to be regarded as a race in order
to be accepted in civil or civilised society. As noted earlier, it resorted to
deracialisation and abandoned detribalisation.
26 S. PHIRI
An Ideal Conception of a Post-Colonial State

An ideal image of a post-colonial state was vividly described by Frantz
Fanon in his seminal book The Wretched of the Earth in the first chapter,
‘On Violence’. While this chapter is controversial due to its pronounce-
ments on violence, it outlines the steps required to create a sustainable
post-colonial African state. The keys words articulated by Fanon are
“decolonisation” and “violence”. The former is synonymous with decolo-
niality, and the latter needs to be understood in the context that Fanon
was writing. The first paragraph sets the objective of its thesis by high-
lighting the relationship between decolonisation and violence in the
process of going beyond colonial subjugation:
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to

the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the heading used or the new
formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon. At
whatever level we study it – relationships between individuals, new names
for sports clubs, human admixture at cocktails parties, in the police, on
the directing boards of national or private banks – decolonization is quite
simply the replacing of a certain “species” of men [sic] by another “species”
of men [sic]. Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete
and absolute substitution. (Fanon, 2001/1967: 27)
He goes on to assert that a new state cannot be built from old ruins
because ‘the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social struc-
ture being changed from the bottom up’ (Fanon, 2001/1967: 27).
For Fanon, the order of the world needs to be changed and he called
this process a ‘programme of complete disorder’. He encourages one
to regard decolonisation as a historical process in which one should
understand the movements which give it historical form and content.
Decolonisation is not a fixed event but a process whose essential func-
tion is nourished by the situation that was meticulously designed by the
coloniser. One of the main constituents that characterised the colonial
logic of subjugation is violence, which the settler used to exploit the
native. The oppressor understands the language of violence; it is this
language that the native has to use to be free. It is important to note
that Fanon did not conceive of violence as a solution to any oppressive
situation, but as a necessary option in a world where alternative options
no longer apply.
The decolonisation process can be characterised as a force that ‘influ-

ences individuals and modifies them fundamentally…transforms specta-
tors crushed with their inessentiality into privilege actors…it brings a
natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men [sic], and with
it a new language and a new humanity’ (Fanon, 2001/1967: 28). The
context in which Fanon calls for decolonisation is a colonial world, which
he calls a Manichean world, and which Mamdani calls a bifurcated world.
This world is cut into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited
by two different species, the originality of the colonial context is that
economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life
never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quar-
ters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to
begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species… at times
this Manichean goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the natives,
or to speak plainly it turns him [sic] into an animal. (Fanon, 2001/1967:
30, 31, 32)
In other words, an ideal decolonised world cannot be a bifurcated or

Manichean world. It has to be ruled by one law that is a product of
a deracialised and detribalised society. It would seem that this chapter
was written just before the first African states’ transition to independence
as Fanon’s tone is optimistic. It is unfortunate that what Fanon antic-
ipated did not transpire. Fanonian decolonisation is synonymous with
decoloniality as it is not merely a transition but aims to build national
consciousness, which Fanon defines as ‘the all-embracing crystallization
of the inner most hope of the whole people’ (Fanon, 2001/1967: 119).
The “Post-Colonial” State

Reforms and changes were part of the formation of a post-colonial state,
even though they did not challenge the foundation of the colonial estab-
lishment. ‘Even if there was a change in the title of functionaries, from
chiefs to cadres, there was little change in the nature of power. If anything,
the fist of colonial power that was the local state was tightened and
strengthened’ (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 26). The post-colonial govern-
ment privileged a group of people whom they considered indigenous
over those that they considered non-indigenous; in effect, turning the
colonial world upside down without changing it (Mamdani, 2005). The
28 S. PHIRI
independent African states afforded chosen natives a place at the top of

the political world designed by the settler. In other words, even after the
colonial powers had left, citizens were still defined by binary categories
such as native or settler.
The question that Mamdani (2005) asks is, how does one address
the past without reproducing it, especially in situations where a culture
of entitlement is regarded as a form of justice, thereby making indi-
geneity the basis for entitlement. Such objective positioning ceases once
one realises that some identities that one considers as cultural are in
actual fact political identities that were strategically instituted by the
state. While some customs remained untouched by the colonial regime
and even fought against those structures that were colonially “sancti-
fied”, the overall customary system was colonially manipulated to appear
unchangeable, fixed and authentic.
The bifurcated state that was created with colonialism was deracialised,
but not democratised. If the two-pronged division that the colonial state
enforced on the colonised—between ethnicities—was its dual legacy at
independence, each of the two versions of the post-colonial state tended
to soften one part the legacy while exacerbating the other. The limits
of the conservative states2 were obvious: they removed the sting of
racism from a colonially fashioned stronghold but kept in place the native
authority, which enforced the division between ethnicities (Mamdani,
2017/1996: 26).
On the other hand, radical states3 joined the deracialisation process to
the detribalisation one. Unfortunately, ‘the deracialized and detribalized
power they organized put a premium on administrative decision-making.
In the name of detribalisation, they strengthened central control over
local authorities’ (Mamdani, 2017/1996: 26). As a result of these post-
colonial changes, both systems reproduced a part of the dual legacy of
the bifurcated state and in the process instituted their own versions of
despotism.
The optimism that defined most of chapter one of The Wretched of
the Earth is missing in chapter three. In Chapter 1, Fanon describes the
colonial situation, not in despair, but in the hope of change that will be
2 These African states opted to allow the hierarchy of local state apparatus, from chiefs
to headman, to continue after independence.
3 These states instituted a single customary law that transcended tribal boundaries as
part of post-colonial changes.
achieved through violence (Phiri, 2021). The first paragraph of Chapter 3

states that those who assumed power were unprepared and lacked prac-
tical links to work effectively with the masses of the people. Fanon issues
a fatalistic warning of the failure of the post-colonial state. His frustration
is due to his belief that those who want to take over are not interested
in fundamental change, but marginal reform of the colonial system as
highlighted by Mamdani. For Fanon, these middle-class people or leaders
seek to benefit from the colonial proceeds and become the custodians
that maintain the colonial legacy on behalf of the mother country (Phiri,
2021). He laments:
Before independence, the leaders generally embody the aspirations of the

people for independence, political liberty and national dignity. But as soon
as independence is declared, far from embodying in concrete form the
needs of the people in what touches bread, land and the restoration of
the country to the sacred hands of the people, the leader will reveal his
inner purpose: to become the general president of that company of profi-
teers impatient for their returns which constitutes the national bourgeoisie.
(Fanon, 2001/1967: 133)
Mamdani agrees with Fanon that the post-colonial African state is inher-
ently a colonial creation. They refer to such states as ‘weak’ as they did
not develop from the grassroots, but are an imposed colonial project;
their influence thus lacks deep roots in African communities (Phiri,
2020). Many writers such as Enerst Wamba dia Wamba (1996), Ngugi
Wa Thiongo (2005/1986) and Paul Gifford (1998) maintain that the
post-colonial African state is profoundly influenced by imperialism and is
essentially built on colonial ruins.
Fanon highlights a dialectical process that defines the failure of the
post-colonial state. As noted above, the leaders who took over served
as mere puppets of the system. Fanon (2001/1967: 122) uses the word
‘intermediary’ of the colonial regime to describe the national bourgeoisie.
It is unfortunate that even those that genuinely wanted to serve beyond
the colonial logic of rule failed because the very foundation of such a
state is built on that logic. The colonial structures that were uncritically
adopted in the transitional process are vulnerable to imperialist influence.
They were created to serve the minority and enable easy manipulation
of those in power. Similar to Mamdani’s explanation of the failure of
detribalisation and the effective introduction of indigeneity, Fanon points
to inverted post-colonial oppression expressed in the form of tribalism,
selfishness, unconscionable adherence to Western beliefs and xenophobia.
30 S. PHIRI
Conclusion
The structure of post-colonial states is inherently conflictual because it is
a product of a colonial structure that is essentially volatile and unstable.
Both Mamdani and Fanon are convinced that current conflicts associ-
ated with the post-colonial state are due to a compromised transition to
independence. For Fanon, the colonial structures were merely reformed
instead of being radically changed, while Mamdani asserts that the post-
colonial leader deracialised but did not detribalise colonial structures. In
this sense, conflict in Africa is the product of a failed transition process,
which resulted in artificial changes that maintained the essential colonial
logic of exclusion and discrimination.
Drawing on Fanon and Mamdani’s arguments, it is illegitimate to call
the current African “modern” state post-colonial as this presupposes that
we have gone beyond colonialism. This chapter challenged this misnomer
by renaming these states neo-colonial states because colonialism was not
eliminated but redefined. The chapter drew extensively on Mamdani who
bases his argument on the British colonial method of controlling the
native population. Hence, his account cannot conclusively represent all
African post-colonial states. Nonetheless, it is rendered credible due to
the fact that the Britain colonised the largest number of African countries,
followed by the French. However, Fanon’s account of the post-colonial
state is helpful since most colonial thinkers refer to his work.
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wean Church. The Edwin Mellen Press.
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Gordon, D. L. (1996). African politics. In A. A. Gordon & D. L. Gordon (Eds.),
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CHAPTER 3
Climate Change and Emerging Conflict

Between Herders and Farmers in Nasarawa
and Plateau States, Nigeria
Samuel K. Okunade and Habila S. Kohon
Introduction
In response to climate change, world leaders established the Conference
of Parties (COP) (Ati et al., 2018). Different countries have hosted these
conferences with the latest being held in Glasgow Scotland (COP 26)
from 31 October to 12 November 2021.1 Nigeria has been part of these
discussions. Climate change is severely affecting the country, manifesting
1 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/glasgow-climate-change-confer
ence.
S. K. Okunade (B)
Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg,
H. S. Kohon
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa

Switzerland AG 2023
34 S. K. OKUNADE AND H. S. KOHON
in drought, desertification, deforestation and soil erosion, displacement

and insecurity in northern Nigeria (Premium Times, 29 August 2020).
Environmental degradation has negatively affected people’s livelihoods
and triggered violence between Fulani herders (who are mainly Muslim)
from the north, and farmers (who are predominantly Christian) in the
south.
The farmer-herders conflict in Nigeria has become a further polit-
ical interface between the dominantly Muslim north and predominantly
Christian south with extremely destructive outcomes (International Crisis
Group [ICG], 2017). Although it essentially involves Fulani herders and
local farmers across the country, the crisis has been marked by polit-
ical distrust between the various ethnic and religious entities (Iloanya &
Ananti, 2018; Nwankwo, 2021). It is regarded as a political conflict due
to Nigeria’s political history. Akinyemi (2016) and Akerjiir (2018) trace
these tensions to the post-independence period when the northern reli-
gious and political elites sought to hold on to the reins of power by
asserting that political power resides in the north while economic power
resides in the south, particularly the south-east. This led to the Nigerian
civil war otherwise known as the Nigeria-Biafra war which was essentially
a political power tussle between the north and the south-east that sought
to gain political freedom (Adigun, 2019; Iloanya & Ananti, 2018).
Decades after the civil war, ill-sentiment persists due to the relegation
of southern politicians, particularly those of eastern stock to the economic
sector with little or no political recognition (Nwankwo, 2021). This is
compounded by the Boko Haram insurgency that threatens national secu-
rity and rumours of the complicity of the current president and his close
aides who are predominantly Muslims of Fulani extraction from northern
Nigeria (Iloanya & Ananti, 2018). These factors have influenced percep-
tions and management of the herders-farmers crisis, especially in the
southern region where politicians and citizens believe that the encroach-
ment by Fulani herders is an extension of the Boko Haram agenda to
Islamise the country with the backing of the presidency (ICG, 2017;
Iloanya & Ananti, 2018; Nwankwo, 2021).
However, climate change, especially unpredictable weather patterns, is
regarded as the main cause of the herders-farmers conflict that has, there-
fore, been located within the broad discourse on resource conflict due
to its focus on access to vegetation, water and land. In north-central
Nigeria, especially Nasarawa and Plateau States, the violence has esca-
lated to wanton destruction of lives and property worth millions of naira
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people and the place, without thinking and talking too much about
how things are in England.”
“All this is easy, Sir, for the sake of plenty and independence.”
“I trust you will find it so. But, Frank, there are other things to be
considered, both for your own sake and Ellen’s. You probably see
that in the present state of the colony, particular sobriety and
discretion are required in all the young women that go there.”
Frank was quite ready to answer for his sister; and hoped that a
settlement with a respectable husband would soon place her out of
reach of temptation. He perceived that he would find it less easy to
marry than he might wish; and this seemed the greatest drawback to
the plan: but, perhaps, when he should be prosperous enough to
marry, he might send over for a wife, as he heard some settlers did;
or might be fortunate enough to find one that he would like among
the new emigrants who would be coming over from time to time.
Mr. Jackson advised him not to think much about this at present, if
he really intended to go; and agreed with him that there appeared
still less chance of his marrying in England, if he continued to be too
conscientious to form such a pauper marriage as many of his
neighbours were venturing upon.
From this day, Frank began tutoring himself and his sister for the
new way of life they hoped to enter upon. They learned all they
could, from books and persons, about the changes they might look
for out of their own country. They inured themselves purposely to toil
and heat and cold, and strove to bear with patience the trials of
temper which continually arose. There was only one thing which they
did not try to bear patiently; and that was, receiving parish-pay. Their
father was as much disgusted at it as themselves; and this assisted
his reconcilement to the emigration plan. He would not give his
children the satisfaction of saying that he liked it, or hoped any thing
from it; but he vowed he would not stay where he was; and as there
was no other place to go to, this implied assent. He looked with
sullenness on the preparations that were made; but he did nothing in
the way of hinderance; nor did he contradict his neighbours when
they took for granted that he was going. So Frank and Ellen
considered the matter settled as far as he was concerned; and rather
expected to see him much disappointed if any thing should occur to
overthrow the plan. His wife seemed utterly indifferent whether she
went or staid, or what became of her; and the whole business
seemed to rest upon the two young people and their friend, Mr.
Jackson.
Chapter II.
HOMES ON THE WASTE.
While the deliberations were going forwards, some rumours which

arose out of them reached the ears of a very influential gentleman in
the neighbourhood, to whom they were not at all agreeable. Mr.
Fellowes was a young man of large property, who had just come of
age, and whose kindly disposition and activity of observation equally
inclined him to make the condition of the surrounding poor one of his
first objects of interest. He had for some time been investigating their
state and its causes, with a view to doing something for their relief
when he should have the control of his fortune. He had fully satisfied
himself of the evils of the poor-law system, and that the one thing
wanted was an increased production of food,—an object, in his
belief, very easy of accomplishment. This he intended to prove by an
experiment of his own; or that which his friends called an
experiment,—and he a demonstration. His plan became known to
Mr. Jackson in due time, as well as to many others less willing to
listen to what he had to say, and to regard his exertions with the
seriousness and kindness which their importance, and the
benevolence of their motives deserved. It was with equal good will
that these two gentlemen met at the parsonage-door one day, each
having questions to put to the other.
“Pray is it true,” inquired Mr. Fellowes, “that you are encouraging
the Castles and others of your parishioners to emigrate?”
“Perfectly true; and I was coming to you to make a request as to
something I wish you to do as soon as they are gone.”
“Let us see first whether it is necessary for them to go. Is it quite
settled? Are they past being persuaded?”
“Their passage is not taken, but their minds are made up, and
Ellen Castle’s name is sent in to government.”
“It may be refused; and in that case there is time to save them
yet.”
“Save them from what?”
“From what! From the manifold woes of the emigrant. Is it no evil
to leave the country, and the kindred, and the father’s house? Is it no
evil to be severed from old connexions, and wrenched from all that
has been beloved from birth? Is it no evil to be set down in a
wilderness, where climate, soil, the habits of the people where there
are any, and the solitude where there are not, are all uncongenial,
and whatever happens is new and strange? Is it no evil to be
banished?”
“All these are great evils, I grant: but from which of them are the
Castles likely to suffer so much as by remaining here? Their country
affords no kindly home for them. They will be disgraced in the eyes
of their kindred by becoming a public burden; and their father’s
house long ago passed into hands better able to keep it up than
theirs. They leave little behind that they love; for want has chilled
their affections towards their country, and hardship is fast breeding
hatred to the powers which have not hitherto succeeded in securing
the happiness of the people. As for the rest,—they are going to a fine
climate a fertile soil, and among inhabitants who speak their
language, and are under the same government with themselves.
While they have plenty and independence before them, and leave
only want and woe behind, I cannot think there is any cruelty in
assisting them to go whither they wish.”
“But, Sir, you are assuming that they must prosper abroad and be
destitute at home; whereas I assert that neither the one nor the other
need be the case. Look at the Swan-river settlement! There was no
end of the praise we heard of the climate, and the soil, and the
facilities of every kind; and yet where was there ever a more
complete failure?”
“Through these very facilities the failure happened,” replied Mr.
Jackson. “Land was so cheap, and required so little capital to be laid
out on it at first, that every labourer chose to have land, instead of
letting his labour to capitalists. The consequence was, that capitalists
could do nothing for want of labourers; and by the time their goods
were rotted on the beach, and their cattle had strayed or died for
want of proper care, the provisions they took out with them were
consumed, the new crops had not come up, and all were reduced to
equal distress. It was because all would be capitalists at first that all
became labourers,—and very poor labourers, at last. This need not
be the case again; and, in fact, the Castles hire themselves by
contract to capitalists long settled in the parts they are going to.—
And now tell me why it need not be that these people should be
exposed to want and woe at home.”
“Simply because they might be colonized here instead of abroad. I
am sure we have waste land enough and to spare for all our
population.”
“As to space, undoubtedly; but what say you to its quality? Why is
it still waste in the midst of a hungry population, if it is worth being
tilled?”
“Let us try whether it is not; that is all I ask. Send the Castles, and
twenty other families to me, and let us see whether corn will not
come up upon well-dug ground, as it has ever done till now.—
Remember that the condition of land varies under the influences of
nature, and that soil once barren need not remain barren for ever.
Nature works,—more slowly it is true,—but not less surely than man,
in preparing the waste for his support; and there is always a point of
time, sooner or later, when he may take the work out of her hands
and feed upon the fruits of her ministrations. Wherever there are
furrows, wherever there are mounds, there is a growth of fertile soil.
Particles of sand are brought by the winds to mix with decaying
herbage. Minute seeds of plants and the decomposed elements of
vegetable substances float in the atmosphere, are arrested by the
first elevation they come in contact with, and settle down to enrich
the land. The vegetation which springs up attracts the moisture of
the air, and thus is fertility again promoted. It spreads and spreads till
a desert becomes a field, or in a condition to be made one. O, you
may trust to nature to provide for man!”
“I question nothing of what you have said,” replied Mr. Jackson.
“On the contrary, when I preach of Providence, I use as arguments
whatever processes of co-operation and amelioration we can
distinguish among the workings of nature, from the counteracting
forces by which the planets are retained in their orbits, to the method
by which the crevice of the rock exchanges, in due time, its carpet of
moss for a crest of branching oaks. But nature is slow in her
workings; and since the life of man is short, his business is to work
with her, not to wait for her. Every acre of ground may in course of
ages become capable of tillage; but our business meanwhile is to
place our hungry brethren where nature’s work is forwardest. Among
the many grades of fertility prepared by her, it is our wisdom to
choose the highest. This is what I preach as the truest gratitude to
Providence.”
“I have rather wondered, I own, at the style of your preaching
lately. It would strike a stranger as unusual.”
“I do not preach for strangers, but for my own flock; and if they are
not enlightened enough to apply abstract principles, I must help them
to do so. I must not only tell them to be honest, but show that
honesty can scarcely subsist under overwhelming temptations to
theft and fraud. I must not only recommend the domestic affections,
but warn against turning them to bitterness by rashly incurring the
risk of that destitution under which parents and children learn to look
coldly on each other. I must not only speak of gratitude to God, but
show how it may be made to spring up by distributing to all a share
of his gifts, instead of being starved out by want and woe. If, as I
believe, it be true that hardness of the lot brings hardness of the
heart, and that blasphemy is a disease of the spirit-broken, how can I
and other ministers of the gospel promote its influences so well as by
teaching how to bring about that state of society which is most
congenial to those influences?”
“Yours is a more likely way to gain your object than theirs who
carefully separate the interests of the other world from those of the
present.—Well! I am about to preach to the same effect by my
actions as you from your pulpit.”
“Then, if you would second my doctrines, you must do the thing I
told you I meant to ask of you. You must take down the cottages
inhabited by those about to emigrate; and it must be done
immediately on their departure, or I shall have to publish the banns
of nobody knows how many young couples the very next Sunday.
Unless you have inquired into the fact, you will hardly believe how
many marry just because there is a house ready. We have too many
dwellings in proportion to our food.”
“I have had thoughts already of removing to my new farm some
cottages that belong to me, and of buying others from the
speculators in our parish funds, who are far too ready to build in our
neighbourhood. There will be little encouragement for them to build
again when all the surplus population of the parish is located on my
pauper farm, where no strangers may intermeddle. You must come
and see the ground I have laid out.”
Mr. Jackson readily agreed to go, but had great doubts about the
final results of the scheme. This seemed to Mr. Fellowes very
strange, as they agreed upon the extent of relief at present wanted,
and upon the capability of this farm to supply it.
“It was you yourself who told me, Jackson, that it is not the whole
of the people now distressed that it is necessary to relieve. It is only
the redundancy that we have to take care of.”
“Certainly: but it should be so relieved as not to produce a further
redundancy.—We have among us, as we agree, sixty labourers
more than we want. Of these none actually starve, and they
therefore deprive some others of a portion of necessaries. It appears
accordingly that three hundred are insufficiently fed and clothed
because there is a redundancy of sixty.”
“Well! my district farm will take off sixty at once, and more
afterwards.”
“And will therefore produce an immediate relief, restoring to the
remainder of the three hundred their proper share of necessaries; so
would the emigration of sixty. But mark the difference three
generations hence. Our young people who emigrate carry their
descendants with them to a land where they are wanted. The
descendants of your pauper cultivators must be turned out upon
society after all, in greater numbers than you now abstract from it. It
will be well if the grandchildren of your present dependants have not
to emigrate at last, after the expenditure of much capital that might
have been better employed, and at a much greater ultimate cost
than at present.”
“You seem to forget, Jackson, that the capital I am laying out is all
to be reproduced, and that the people on my farm are to work
themselves free. If any reliance is to be placed on calculations which
have been conducted with the utmost care, if experience is to be
trusted, if I may believe what I saw last month with my own eyes in
the Belgian colonies (which it is worth a long journey to see), a good
deal more than the cost of settling my paupers and providing for
them will be raised by their labour upon the ground. The best of them
will in time repay me, and go out with money in their pockets to make
room for others.”
“And where are they to go? To carry more labour and new families
into a market which is already overstocked. How much easier to
remove them at once to a labour market where they and their
children will be permanently welcome!”
“I am for ever met with objections about raising rents and
overstocking the labour-market,” cried Mr. Fellowes—“I that take no
rent, and bind myself to employ all the labour!”
“I said nothing about rent,” replied the clergyman. “I am quite
aware that a farm like yours, made out of a forced application of
capital, bears no relation to the natural process of rent. But I do not
see how you can escape the charge of ultimately obliging a portion
of society to pay too dear for their food.”
“What can you mean, when the very essence of my plan is——”
“Tell me your plan, and then I will tell you my meaning.”
“My plan is to show, on a small scale, how the charity-funds of this
country might be employed productively, and therefore so as to fulfil
the ends of charity. I would have the unappropriated wastes of Great
Britain, amounting to, some say, 15,000,000 of acres, (and some say
much more,) set apart to be the People’s Farm. It should be
cultivated by means of public funds, say our present poor-rates; and
it should be so portioned out as that every pauper should have the
interest of private property in his allotment.—The further internal
arrangements should be made according to the judgment of the
directors. Mine are to be as like as I can make them to those
adopted in the pauper farms in the Netherlands. Each family shall
have its portion of ground and its cottage, with food and clothing till
these can be procured by themselves. The soil shall be improved to
the utmost by spade-husbandry, and by preparations of manure
requiring more labour than can be devoted to the object in a general
way. The productiveness of the ground being usually very great
under these methods, I expect a considerable surplus every harvest;
of which a part will go to repay the original expenses, and a part to
set forward the family when they re-enter the world. Meanwhile, the
women and children will spin and weave, and we shall produce
within our own bounds all that we want. We shall not even need
money: for the people will pay one another in commodities.”
“That is, you are about to carry back a portion of society to a
primitive condition;—to delving, and a state of barter. If there was no
choice between the starvation of a number and this state of society, I
might be brought to look upon it with some degree of complacency:
but when other ways are open,—when the question is,—not whether
all shall relapse into barbarism or some starve,—but whether
multitudes shall pass their lives in unassisted digging at home, or a
few wander to distant parts of this fair earth to leave the many in
possession of the blessings of advanced civilization,—I am for
applying labour to its highest purposes, and for elevating instead of
depressing the pursuits of society. No one doubts that if every hand
was employed in tillage there would be food enough for all: the
question is whether it be not thus obtained at too great a cost,—
every higher pursuit being sacrificed to it. Only convey to fertile
regions abroad the half of those who are eager to go, and there will
be abundance of food for all,—and of many more things equally
essential to the full enjoyment of life. If the Greeks had not done so,
what would have become of all that they did to enlighten and bless
the world? If they had fed their surplus numbers by employing more
and more in tillage at home, as their numbers increased and the
produce required was greater, there would now have been little of
the philosophy, the literature, the fine arts, which have spread from
their country over the world; while, after all, fewer would have lived,
and fewer of the living would have been fed than under their system
of emigration.”
“They seem indeed never to have thought of the more obvious
mode of providing for the people. Away they sent them, as fast as
they overflowed their bounds.”
“Because they were so circumstanced as to perceive at once the
fallacy of the supposed remedies which you and other benevolent
persons here are advocating. The great body of the people among
the Greeks were slaves, maintained by masters, and not, as with us,
free labourers supported by their own toil. The deficiency of food was
there first felt by the masters, in the cost of supporting their slaves.
Here, it is felt mainly by the labourers in the fall of the real value of
wages. In Greece, there was no dispute about the fact, from the
moment that food became deficient. Here, such a deficiency is even
now questioned by multitudes who declare that we have not a
redundant, but only a poor population; that nobody wants food who
has enough to give for it; and that therefore it is money, or work that
is wanted, and not food. Such observers give alms, or pay their poor
neighbours for digging holes and filling them up again, or doing
things equally useless; never dreaming that all the while they are
taking food from somebody who has earned it by a better kind of toil.
Such follies as this could never be suggested by the state of things
in Greece; and I see no reason why, because our lower orders are
not slaves, we should not abjure our errors, and adopt such parts of
the Grecian policy as were wise.”
“Well, but, the long and short of the matter is this. If the quantity of
food in Great Britain is too small, cannot it be increased?”
“To be sure it can. If ten thousand individuals can live this year
only by taking a portion from their neighbours, we may raise as much
food in addition next year as may feed ten thousand people; but if
the people at the same time increase still faster, how are we better
off than we were before?”
“But cannot we raise enough that year for twenty thousand people
instead of ten thousand, to meet the difficulty? The People’s Farm
would admit of this.”
“It would: but here the question recurs, whether it will not answer
better to send the ten or twenty thousand people where they may
obtain food at much less cost of toil and capital, and where their
descendants will not be liable to tax the mother country for food for
generations yet unborn. At home it is only by a considerable sacrifice
that the growth of food can be made for any length of time to equal,
—or by any extraordinary effort to outstrip the demands upon it;
while, abroad, it spontaneously keeps ahead of population, and will
do so in many parts, till men have grown wise enough to regulate
population. Our best present policy, then, is to send our surplus
numbers abroad to eat and prosper, instead of obliging more and
more of our multitudes to dig at home. It is on your wish to make
them do so much labour for a lesser instead of a greater production,
that I founded my charge of your ultimately making a part of society
pay too dear for their food.”
“You mean because labour is the price of food?”
“Yes; and food would be almost as much too dear under your
system as under the present. At present, the competition for food is
so excessive that men bid their labour against each other to
desperation. Under your pauper-farm system, the same thing would
take place in time; and in the meanwhile, every bushel of wheat
would cost twice or thrice as much labour as in Van Diemen’s Land;
so that both immediately and ultimately, you oblige a certain number
to pay higher for their food than they need do and therefore ought to
do.—And this without taking into consideration the change in the
proportion of capital to population which is caused by emigration,—a
change most beneficial to the mother country.”
“And how extensive do you conceive that change to be? There is
very little difference between the cost of conveying persons to Van
Diemen’s Land, and settling them on a pauper farm,—too small a
difference to warrant such an expression as yours.”
“In addition to this difference, there is all the increase of production
which will take place abroad, and which is so much gained to the
mother country, since it maintains her people. Besides this, all that
would have been unproductively consumed by the pauper
descendants of these emigrants may be considered as so much
clear gain to the community. Again,—the thriving population of our
colonies will want more and more of our manufactures, and will send
us their agricultural produce in exchange; and I suppose you will not
question the advantage of investing our capital in manufactures, and
receiving wool and wheat of the best quality in return, instead of
laying it out on lands of inferior fertility at home, while the people
scantily supply themselves with the coarse manufactures of their
own firesides? You will not question the duty of availing ourselves of
the advantages of division of labour in the case of our greatest
need? Yet you would, by your plan of home colonization, deprive the
people of this reciprocity of benefits. You would set up new
manufactures instead of a new market for them; and all for the sake
of producing food at a greater cost than under the emigration
system. You are clearly wrong, Fellowes, depend upon it. What a pity
that you should not turn your zeal and benevolence and your other
resources to the best account!”
“The fact is,” replied Fellowes, “that on a matter of so much
importance as this, I am anxious to go on sure ground. I have heard
so much on good authority of the miseries of emigrants in Canada
and elsewhere, and I have seen so much with my own eyes of the
benefits of the Home-Colonization system in the Netherlands, that I
am induced to do that which I know will produce great and
immediate good, instead of that whose consequences I cannot
witness or calculate. I want to give our poor neighbours food; and I
dare not run the risk of having them perish with cold and hunger in
the woods before they can get any.”
“If you mix up the abuses of a system with its principles,—if you
take the conduct of a few ignorant adventurers as an example of
what is to be done by all emigrants,” continued Mr. Jackson, “I do not
wonder at our differing as we do. It is true that too many of our poor
neighbours, heartsick at their condition here, have wandered forth
with nothing but the clothes on their backs and a hatchet in their
hands, without the guidance and assistance which are necessary to
their very lives in a new climate and condition of society; but this
folly, and the consequent hardship, have nothing to do with
emigration. It is to preclude such evils that I would have benefactors
like you demonstrate to the people what is essential to a successful
emigration, and that emigration is sure to be successful if well
conducted. As for its ultimate results, time will teach them to all; but
you, my dear Sir, with your objects and your resources, will be
inexcusable if you do not endeavour to anticipate them. It will be
unpardonable in you to adopt a manifestly short-sighted policy while
the philosophy of principles and the evidence of facts lie open before
you.”
“Fact is enough for me, romantic as many of my friends think me,”
replied Fellowes, smiling. “The fact will be, as you will witness, if we
both live, that two years hence our sixty superabundant labourers
with their families will have food without burthening the parish. This
is enough for me.”
“It will not always be enough. If you should live to see the
multiplied descendants of these sixty persons either suffering
themselves under pauperism, or displacing an equal number from
the ranks of employed labourers, you may wish that they had been
located where there was room for all without any arbitrary direction
of capital, or factitious employment of labour. If, in your old age, you
do not witness this, it will be because others have repaired your
mistake by conveying elsewhere the surplus you have created.”
“If we both live ten years, friend, you shall come and see how I
send forth those who once were paupers, with money in their hands,
ready to establish themselves reputably in society. There will be
nothing in this to make me repent.”
“No; your time for repentance will be when each of these monied
men sends two paupers to your gates;—when you find poverty
growing up round you, which you can relieve,—if at all,—only by a
late emigration. I am sure you will make your confessions to me
honestly, if that day should ever come.”
“I will, if you will give me faithful tidings of the Castles, and the
others who are going with them. Let me hear of all their struggles
and trials, from the outset till the end.”
“You shall, as far as I know them myself. Meanwhile, let us help
one another where we agree. Do you be on the watch to lessen the
number of dwellings as much as you can, and I will use my pastoral
influence in inducing the young folks to delay the publication of their
banns till they have secured something besides a bare shelter to
begin with.”
Chapter III.
GOING IN SEARCH OF HOME.
Mr. Jackson’s interest in the subject of emigration to Van Diemen’s

Land first arose out of his friendship with a gentleman and lady who
were appointed by government to superintend the selection and
preparation of the young women who were assisted in their
settlement in the way already related. His recommendations were
received with the confidence naturally resulting from this intimacy;
and he had interest to get arrangements made for Frank’s convict
brothers to be settled near the rest of the family. In course of time,
which seemed very long to impatient paupers, all was settled. Ellen
had a summons to be in London by a certain day, with her 8l. in her
pocket, and a small sum over for the purchase of such necessaries
in the way of clothing as should be provided cheap for her by those
who were to receive her, see her safe on board, and furnish her with
a letter to the governor, stating her family circumstances.
Frank and his parents, with a few more labourers from the parish
of A——, were to sail in another ship about the same time, proposals
having been sent before them to Van Diemen’s Land, to bind
themselves to farmers for a term of years at a certain rate of wages,
out of which the parish was to be repaid for the expenses of their
passage and outfit.
The outfit was much less expensive in their case than in that of
settlers in Canada and the western states of America, both because
the climate of Van Diemen’s Land is more congenial to English
constitutions, and because wearing apparel and other necessaries
are much more easy to be had there, even if not supplied by settlers
as a portion of the wages of labour. Frank was furnished with a
complete set of tools; and the family with a stout suit of clothes each.
A stock of plain substantial provisions for six months was added, and
this was all. There were a few grumblers about the last-mentioned
article. They thought that the parish might, at parting, treat the
people with better cheer than they had been accustomed to; but the
parish authorities were wiser. They had heard how many lives had
been lost on the passage to America from the poor Irish, who had
been accustomed to nothing better than potatoes, being fed with an
abundance of more stimulating diet, under circumstances which
prevented their taking their usual exercise; and when, from having
nothing to do, they were tempted to eat more than they wanted of
good things that they could not get at home. The nearer the diet on
ship-board resembles that in common use, the better for the health
of the emigrant; and if he finds himself less disposed to eat than
when at the hard labour he has been accustomed to, no harm will
come of his temperance.
As the day of departure approached, Frank felt it a positive evil
that every thing was done for himself and his family by the parish, as
too much leisure was left for very unhappy thoughts. He had no idea
till the time came how much there was to be left behind which even
he could not help regretting. He had indeed no beloved cottage to
quit, no favourite stock to sell off, no circle of attached friends and
neighbours to say farewell to; but he would fain have had such
regrets as these to bear, for the sake of something to do at the last.
He envied his sister at her needle, making a gown for her mother
when she had finished her own linen, while he wandered over the
hills that looked towards the sea, or watched for the postman who
was to bring the final tidings for Ellen, or stood with his arms folded,
silently hearing his father’s murmurs or his mother’s taunts. He was
quite angry with himself for selfishly wondering what he should do
with the three days that were to pass between Ellen’s departure and
his own, when he ought to be glad that she would be out of hearing
of the uncomfortable sayings that now met her ears continually.
The hour came when the young people ought to be setting out to
meet the carrier’s cart which was to convey Ellen to London. When
Frank thought he had waited long enough before the door, he went
in to look for her, and found her with her bonnet on, her bundle by
her side, and little Susan on her knee. Her eyes were running over
with tears; but she smiled when he tapped her shoulder as a signal
that they must go.
“It seems like a long parting, just because I am going a long way,”
said she, trying to laugh. “But if we all go to the same place, and
there are meadows and cows, and the same sort of life we have
been accustomed to, there is little to mind in going, except Mr.
Jackson, to be sure, and grandfather, and—and——”
“Where is father?” asked Frank, distressed at her sobs; “surely he
is not gone out just now?”
Ellen ran to the door to look about for him, and saw her father
leaning against the wall.
“Where’s your money?” he asked. “You had need take care of
money when you have got it. All the rest is moonshine, to my
thinking.”
“There is very bright sunshine where we are going, if they all say
true,” said Ellen; “and that you will find, father, before a year is over.
You may trust Frank and Mr. Jackson, I am sure; and so——”
“I trust nobody. I have had enough of trusting people,” cried
Castle. “All this is your doing, remember, both of you; so never cast it
up to me. Go, go. ’Tis getting very late. Where’s your money, I ask
you, child?”
“Safe, father, sewed into my stays. But, father, what can happen to
us so bad as living here, as—as—we have done lately?”
“Go, children, go, and leave off talking about our meeting again at
the other side of the world. If I go to the bottom half-way, Ellen, it will
be none the worse for you, but the better, except that Frank must go
too, and you would not like that so well.”
“O father——!”
“Well, one kiss more; and God bless you, whatever becomes of
me!”
Ellen found her step-mother gossipping with a neighbour as if
nothing was happening. Her farewell words were few.
“Goodbye. If I find you an honest woman next time I see you, it’s
more than I expect, from what people say of the place you are going
to. Come, now, Frank, don’t be in a passion. Better take care of your
sister than look so proud about her.”
Frank now took care of his sister so far as to remove her while she
had strength to go.
“O Frank!” she cried, as he put her arm within his own, and led her
rapidly on, “what can there be about me that makes them all talk as
they do?”
“Nothing about you, dear, but about the place. It is a dangerous
place for vain, silly girls; but you need only mind your business, and
think of father and mother, and what we have agreed to do for them,
and you will do well enough.”
“And of Mr. Jackson, and grandmother, and how she almost broke
my heart last night. Look, look! do you see how yonder trees stoop
and shiver in the churchyard? What a shower of leaves!”
“’Tis a sudden gust. There have been many such of late.”
“Just so they went when Molly Shepherd’s funeral was going
under them, and grandmother bade me beware of her shame. ’Tis
just like a sign to me now! And here comes Mr. Jackson too.”
Mr. Jackson just stopped her to give her a little book as a
remembrance, and to beg her to write to her grandfather, of whom
he should inquire for her from time to time. It was now really very
late.
“Don’t hurry yourself,” said Frank. “Walk quick if you like, but don’t
be flurried. I’ll overtake the cart for you, I’ll be bound; and you had
better look like yourself as you get in.”
The carrier was just cracking his whip to proceed after a halt,
when the brother and sister made their appearance at the end of the
lane. Ellen cast one glance back upon the familiar spire and
hedgerows and cottage roofs, and summoned up one bright smile
and a few more words for Frank.
“’Tis not as if you were to stay behind, Frank.”
“To be sure not! Leave every thing to me dear, and be steady and
easy, that’s all; and don’t talk of Bob and Jerry, for your own sake.—
All right, carrier?—Well then, good bye!”
And high on the hedge stood Frank, gazing long after he had
ceased to distinguish the bright face looking out at the back of the
cart. Not till the vehicle had disappeared behind the hill did he
descend to the stubble-field below, and pick up straws, and cut hazel
switches like a truant boy, muttering to himself “In three days we
shall be off.”
The second departure was more public and more painful. The two
old folks would come out at the last moment; and their distress
moved the gazers to an outcry against the cruelty of deserting them,
and the unnatural behaviour of leaving one’s country and kindred. A
giddy young couple thanked the Castles for vacating their cottage
just when others were wanting one; and of the rest, some who were
disappointed of going looked on in silent envy, and others were loud
in their reports of the dangers of the sea, and the horrors of savage
life. Frank had seated his charge in the waggon and walked on,
intending to be overtaken out of hearing of these busy tongues. He
looked back from the first corner, and seeing that there was great
confusion, returned. Castle was motioning away the parish officers
and Mr. Jackson, and doggedly refusing to go after all. His wife was
laughing, and little Susan crying.
“You must please yourself, father,” said he firmly. “If you put
yourself out of the way of being helped by your own children, God
help you! I must go, and that this moment.”
“Come along!” cried the wife. “We may as well get out of reach of
these plaguy officers, with their talk of our debt to them. Let’s be off,
and then they may get their money as they can. We shall never drive
our carriage here, as they say my boys may do at Botany Bay. Come
along!”
Frank would allow of no force, His father should choose for
himself. So said Mr. Jackson.
While he was choosing, a ready pauper jumped into his place, and
the waggon drove off. Before it had gone two hundred yards, there
was a cry to the driver to stop, the new candidate was turned out
grumbling, and Castle scrambled in. Twenty times during the journey
to London, he asked how he and his were to pay the seventy pounds
required to send them out; and as often his wife bade him not mind
whether it was paid or not; and Frank assured him that he should not
be burdened with debt, if his children lived and prospered. Tears
came at last to the unhappy man’s relief. As he passed villages and
farmsteads where healthy and cheerful faces looked up at the
waggon as it went by;—as he heard the saw grinding in the saw-pit,
and the hammering at the forge, he wept at being reminded of his
younger and more prosperous days, and at the thought that while so
many were busy and happy in their occupations, there was no room
for him,—once as hearty in his toil, and now as willing to work as any
of them. Frank contrived to gather what was in his thoughts, and
spoke of the saw-pits and forges which are so busy in the land they
were going to, and of the increased dignity and profit of such
occupations in places where artificers are scarce. His own heart was
ready to sink when he fancied, instead of such a busy region as that
under his eye, plains and valleys with scarcely a roof visible from
end to end: but every glimpse of a workhouse, every notice by the
way-side about vagrants, restored his courage, and satisfied him that
it was best, at all events, to be where, whatever other evils might
exist, there was no pauperism.
The departure of Jerry and Bob took place in a somewhat different
style. A stranger would have fancied there was high holiday in
Newgate the day before they went. Parties of convicts from the
country arrived, and were lodged there previous to embarkation, and
the larger proportion were full of congratulations to one another on
their fine prospects. This was done in bravado by some, no doubt;
and a few looked downcast, and were laughed at by their
companions for the shame expressed in their countenances and
manners: but it was actually the belief of most that they were lucky
fellows to be carried free of expense to a country where they should
have little to do but get rich as fast as they liked. Two among them
had been transported before, and so wonderful and tempting were
the tales they had to tell, that they not only found willing listeners
among criminals wherever they went, but had induced more than
one of the present company to commit thefts in order to get
transported and put in fortune’s way. These men, Giles and Green,
held forth in all the vanity of superior experience, and in all the pride
of having cheated the law; and drew an attentive audience round
them while waiting for the cart which was to convey the company to
the convict-ship.
Bob was leaning rather despondingly against the wall, when his
brother clapped him on the shoulder, and asked him why he looked
so black on this the grandest day of his life.
“You should have said ‘thank’ee’ to the judge, Bob, as I did when
he finished with us; and so you would if you’d known how we were
obliged to him. We’ll have each a house and servants, and all
handsome about us by the time we’re one-and-twenty, and
meanwhile, there are fine pranks to be played. Come and hear
Green, about how he and his set got as much rum in one night as
they could drink in a month, and what frolics they had in the woods,
before he took it into his head to come back without leave.”
Bob shook himself free of his brother, who however would not long
let him alone.
“I say, Bob,” he continued, returning, “they call you sulky; and it will
be the worse for you in the colony if they report you sulky. You may
as well hear what we are to do when we get there.”
Bob listlessly followed, and took his place among the eager
hearers.
“Bet Turner!” cried one. “What is that she that belonged to
Greville’s gang? She that got transported for shop-lifting?”
“The same. Well; she has a large white house just out of Sidney,
on the right hand as you go out of Mount-street. Lord! you should
see her driving out, how grand she looks over her servants, and as
well behaved to her husband as if she had not left another behind
her. They say she sends Turner a bank note every year out of
charity. He has married again to give her satisfaction that he won’t
claim her; so they are both content.”
“Then there is Wilson,” cried Green. “You remember what a poor
ragged creature he was while he worked like other honest men, for
nine shillings a week. He got sent abroad for the first bad shilling he
tried to pass after he joined us; and all for looking like a bungler at a
new trick. He worked his way up into a farm of his own in four years,
and he has got his wife and children over, and is very much
respected. But Jack Lawe is the finest fellow of them all. He’s just
past thirty, and he is as rich as a London banker at sixty.”
“What, he that was within an hour of hanging?”
“Aye. They looked pretty close to him for a long while; but he is as
sharp in his wits as he is clever at whatever you set him to. He
cheated them all round, and got himself free in six years, and now
you should see him out hunting or betting at billiards. He is a good-

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Contemporary Issues on Governance,

Conflict and Security in Africa Adeoye

Conflict and Post-Conflict Governance in the Middle

Contemporary French Security Policy in Africa: On Ideas

The Governance, Security and Development Nexus: Africa

Resource Conflict and Environmental Relations in Africa

Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics 6th Edition

China and Africa: Building Peace and Security

The Palgrave Handbook of Democracy, Governance and

Challenging the United Nations Peace and Security

ISBN 978-3-031-29634-5 ISBN 978-3-031-29635-2 (eBook)

Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com

Motivation and Objectives

book is broad, multi-disciplinary and a knowledge pool for researchers,

Reality of Conflict and Governance-Gap in Africa

to make its military footprint in Africa by investing $100 million in its

Johannesburg, South Africa Adeoye O. Akinola

1 Africa and the Scourge of Conflict and Insecurity 1

7 Terrorism in Sub-Sahara Africa: Assessing its

16 Exploring the Impact of Women’s Organisations

Africa and the Scourge of Conflict

Adeoye O. Akinola and Emmaculate Asige Liaga

A. O. Akinola (B) · E. A. Liaga

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

1998). In many instances, non-state actors have taken up arms against

Contending Themes on Conflict

Youth, Dissent and Protest Action in Africa

Squad (SARS) on a regular basis and, as in other parts of Africa, are

as locally manufactured bombs and firearms were used by students (Greeff

The Security, Governance and Development Nexus

1 The ruling party since majority rule was attained in 1994.

terrorist attacks. With the adoption of the new provisional constitution,

the clan governance arrangement, including a plural justice system. The

Military Coups and Terrorism in Africa

to military insurgency, raising questions about these states’ capacity to

Security Reform, Border Disputes and the Post-Colonial State

Women’s Peace and Security in Africa

their GDP (World Bank, 2022). Constant references to GBV in media

Climate Change, Conflict and Security in Africa

In other parts of the continent sea levels continue to rise, causing

African Conflict and the “Post-colonial”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 17

It Is Not an Excuse, but a Genuine Claim

Another argument that has been raised in relation to colonial history as

How do we untie the shackles that bind us when we have little or no

an end in itself but a means and an irreplaceable foundation towards

A Brief Overview of the African Predicament

in accordance with the location of potential resources while completely

The Colonial Architectural Design

that ‘deprivation-based grievances as predicators of ethnic violence is

… in dividing Africa among themselves, the colonial powers showed

post-colonial establishment distinguished between race and ethnicity. The

preferred to leave in place indigenous local elites and simply coopt or

Also, ‘Colonial despotism was highly decentralized’ (Mamdani,

An Ideal Conception of a Post-Colonial State

National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to

The decolonisation process can be characterised as a force that ‘influ-

In other words, an ideal decolonised world cannot be a bifurcated or

The “Post-Colonial” State

independent African states afforded chosen natives a place at the top of

achieved through violence (Phiri, 2021). The first paragraph of Chapter 3

Before independence, the leaders generally embody the aspirations of the

Deutsch, M. (1991). Subjective features of conflict resolution: Psychological, social