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Contemporary Issues
on Governance,
Conflict and Security
in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Contemporary Issues on Governance, Conflict
and Security in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Contemporary Issues
on Governance,
Conflict and Security
in Africa
Adeoye O. Akinola
Institute for Pan-African Thought
and Conversation
University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
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Preface
v
vi PREFACE
physical violence persist. Despite the optimism associated with the ‘Africa
rising’ conversation, conventional and contemporary threats to peace have
stunted its developmental projects. Indeed, there is a strong connec-
tion between security and development. While Paul Coulier’s insisted
that economic consideration causes and perpetuates conflict, the literature
identifies both economic and political variables—particularly the state and
the political power system—as the main determinants of conflict.
Africa’s shifting nature of conflict necessitates fresh conversation on
exploring effective contextual techniques to ensure Africa’s peace and
security. Furthermore, the changing character of the security landscape
reveals a rising gap between practice and classical thoughts on conflict,
security and governance. Thus, the editor of the book, Oye Akinola,
received support from the Institute of Pan-African Thought and Conver-
sation (IPATC) at the University of Johannesburg, to host an author’s
workshop and brainstorm new trends on conflict and security and the
imperativeness of proffering sustainable recommendations for policy-
making. The authors in this volume attended and made paper presenta-
tions at the workshop, between 10 and 11 March 2022, at the Sheraton
Hotel in Pretoria, South Africa.
As discussed during the workshop, many violent conflicts in Africa
are occurring outside the purview of government and without govern-
ment troops, which becomes alarming due to its volatility and difficulty
in mediation and reconciliation. Unlike the past when terrorism was asso-
ciated with ideological extremisms, contemporary forms of terrorism have
been linked to religious fundamentalism. The fall of Libya and the global
crusade against westernisation have led to the proliferation of armed
conflicts in Africa. From the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, evidence of
the state’s failures and the resultant insecurity abound.
Therefore, the edited volume seeks to unpack how the interactions
between the modern state, economy and society engender conflict. It is
decisive to also focus on the victims of violent conflict and engage on
the peculiarity of their vulnerabilities. Thus, it provides a robust engage-
ment on some of the trends of conflict and insecurity that are becoming
apparent in contemporary Africa. It also challenges the orthodox peace
architecture on the continent and examines the changing demographics,
economic and sociological factors that have implications for security. It
provides deeper understanding of the nuances and new forms of conver-
sation for addressing threats to African security, such as violent extremism,
violent mass movements and underreported gender-based violence. The
PREFACE vii
country has also played host to 441,000 refugees, mostly from Nigeria
and the Central African Republic.
On 30 May 2021, about 60 people were killed during an attack—
carried out by suspected Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—in Ituri
Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The
Ethiopian premier, Abiy Ahmed Ali, embarked on a military offensive
in November 2020 to ‘restore the rule of law’ in Tigray by confronting
the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), who had attacked a federal
military base. Ahmed Ali, the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize 2019,
continues with a crackdown on Tigray, and African leaders and the African
Union (AU), that have initially ‘refused’ to respond effectively have now
managed to broker a deal between the two warring sides.
The resource-part of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado Province, is also
becoming a harbour for terrorism and lawlessness. This is too grave
for regional security and too close for Pretoria’s comfort. The regional
body—the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—is
currently exploring the best approach to curtail the threat that terrorism
poses to regional security. SADC deployed a regional task force, under
the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), to support the coun-
try’s effort at counterterrorism. The hitherto domestic Islamist insurgent
group operating in the country’s north-eastern Cabo Delgado Province
drew global attention in March 2021, when they attacked Palma in the
northern part of the country. According to the BBC, the attack killed
many foreigners working on a $20 billion gas plant—the biggest single
foreign investment in Africa.1 More than 35,000 housing facilities have
either been partially or totally destroyed at the start of the conflict,2 and
about 700,000 Mozambicans have now been displaced internally due to
the ensuing reign of terror.
1 See, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56886085.
2 For more information on the conflict in Mozambique, see d’Orsi, Cris-
tiano (2022). Catalogue of failures behind growing humanitarian crisis in northern
Mozambique, https://theconversation.com/catalogue-of-failures-behind-growing-humani
tarian-crisis-in-northern-mozambique-149343.
PREFACE ix
The Problematic
Despite slow efforts to silence the guns in Africa, there are cases of blood-
letting, and it does not look as if the gun-wielding groups are retreating.
What accounts for the expanding proliferation of conflicts? Colonial
legacy? While this is close to the heart, the false promise of liberal democ-
racy and capitalism systems have exposed the fragility of the disjointed
elitist states that are dependent on global financial oligarchs, many of
which are governed by greedy, corrupt and inept leaders. Democratisation
in Africa, which is regarded as the antidote to both internal resurrections
and external aggressions, has deepened poverty, structural violence, iden-
tity assertiveness and the politicisation of ethnic groups, as well as the
privatisation of power by the ruling elites.
Indeed, the liberal peace architecture has recorded failures on several
fronts in Africa. Proponents of this school of thought have continued to
celebrate the democratic peace theory, based on the so-called resilience of
political and representative institutions, as well as institutional constraints,
within the broad discourse on effective internal mechanisms, which
embrace peace, negotiation, accountability and reconciliation. The brand
of democracy exported to Africa is lacking in these attributes. Any
attempts by the citizens to discuss the nature of relations between them-
selves and the state, based on shared identity, common values and goals,
have been resisted by Africa’s ruling class, political entrepreneurs and
upper-level bourgeoisie, who have personalised public goods, expanded
the inequality gap and manipulated the political spaces. African societies
have been militarised to the extent that citizens celebrated the incursions
of the military in politics in West Africa and the Sahel. The term, ‘military
is an aberration’, is becoming unpopular in the Sahel.
The AU, including regional organisations such as the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has its hands full, in
attempting to restore order to troubled zones. While the institutional
capacity of the AU is becoming worrying and apparent, other foreign
powers are seizing the opportunity to consolidate their power and inter-
ests in Africa. The new ‘scramble’ for the soul of the Sahel and West Africa
by France, China and Russia, including the existing military visibility of
the United States (US), are reminders of imperial wars and colonialism.
There have been allegations of mercenaries on African soil, and Russia
continues to cut into Mali and Central Africa Republic (CAR). The US
military, which is active in about 20 African countries, has continued
x PREFACE
3 See, Turse, Nick (2018) “The U.S. is building a drone base in Niger that will cost
more than $280 million by 2024”, The Intercept, 21 August; https://theintercept.com/
2018/08/21/us-drone-base-niger-africa/.
Contents
xi
xii CONTENTS
Index 363
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Africa has been characterised as a conflict zone since the turn of the
twentieth century, and the continent experienced the highest number of
armed conflicts in the world between 2015 and 2016 (PRIO, 2013).
While conventional conflict such as civil war and communal clashes
continue unabated, new forms of conflict have also become part of the
African narrative. Indeed, conflict on the continent is assuming a shape
and space that was not the norm in the two decades following the
end of the Cold War. While conflict, violence and insecurity have been
approached from the standpoint of states as the decisive actors, as argued
by the securitisation school of thought, in Africa and beyond, it has also
involved non-state actors and human security issues (see, Buzan et al.,
the form of protests and riots, with South Africa accounting for 16% of
violent protests in 2017, followed by Nigeria, Kenya, Algeria and Tunisia.
Insecurity, and by extension violent conflict on the African conti-
nent, has evolved over time and became more complicated, complex
and protracted, generally involving various actors at any given time and
location. Many stakeholders in the African peace and security architec-
ture have categorised these conflicts as core and peripheral: brutal and
protracted, and less brutal and not protracted. There has been a tendency
to ignore those regarded as minor conflicts such as xenophobia and
violent protests, with a focus on civil war and ethnic conflict. In the past
decade, terrorism and resource-based conflicts in Nigeria, Congo DRC
and Mozambique have altered the nature of conflict due to the naked
display of ruthlessness and the monumental destruction of lives and prop-
erty. Furthermore, the herder-farmer conflicts that have rocked the Sahel
have aggravated security threats in the region and caused far more damage
than conventional warfare. In South Africa, xenophobia has resulted in
around 100 deaths since the first outbreak of xenophobic violence in
2008. It has thus become more complex to categorise conflict into core
and peripheral.
To engage the aforementioned emerging security threats and its
complex link to governance deficit in Africa, the Institute for Pan-African
Thought and Conversation (IPATC) at the University of Johannesburg,
South Africa hosted a workshop from 10 to 11 March 2022. This chapter
reflects on some of the important discussions on conflict and security
trends on the continent. The workshop explored the historical and imme-
diate causes of the conflicts and the manner in which neo-colonial African
states have been structured that makes violent conflict inevitable. Issues
of concern revolved around cases of conflict relapse, including the failure
of ceasefire and peace agreements in countries like South Sudan and the
protracted nature of the conflict in Congo DRC. The M-23 is cutting
into the country, while resource-politics by the neighbouring countries
are impeding sustainable peace in the resource-rich country. This chapter,
therefore, provides an overview of Africa’s security challenges and offers
sustainable policy options to curtail lawlessness and armed conflict on the
continent.
4 A. O. AKINOLA AND E. A. LIAGA
the negotiating table and right-wing groups and institutions like the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World Bank were very influential during the
land negotiations. Ceasefire agreements thus adopted the willing buyer,
willing seller market-led approach. The capitalisation of land was further
reinforced in 2019 when the US government cautioned its South African
counterpart not to implement expropriation without compensation. Many
black South Africans reacted negatively to such decisions, causing friction
between the state and society, as well as the various political parties.
conflict between the local population and foreign nationals has threatened
peace and harmony between heterogeneous populations in South Africa.
Why is the local population so hostile to non-locals? Firstly, people
fight when they are deprived of something or when they are being
discriminated against. While, as argued by the Marxist school of thought,
this falls within broader societal divisions, xenophobia has reinforced the
huge gaps between the suppliers and the absorber of labour. Secondly,
xenophobia should be seen as a historical effect of the African colo-
nial heritage: a heritage marked by control as well as divide and rule.
Through indirect rule, societies were mobilised against each other for easy
domination and control.
Several post-colonial African states have securitised xenophobia and
used it as weapon during election campaigns. In South Africa, the ANC
and other political parties have used xenophobic narratives to seek popular
support from the predominantly young population, who buy the rhetoric
that foreigners are responsible for the country’s social and economic
ills. As conceptualised by the Copenhagen school, political elites have
succeeded in elevating this human issue to a security issue. Xenophobia
was prevalent not only in South Africa but also in Ghana and Nigeria
in the early 1980s. While there are differences in its manifestation from
one country to another, South Africa’s manifestation has been particularly
violent. Xenophobia continues to challenge Africa’s quest for regional
integration and attainment of Pan-Africanism. Whatever lens is employed
to view it, it is antithetical to African personhood, communalism and
Pan-Africanism.
Conclusion
This chapter situated conflict in Africa in contemporary contexts. It drew
on the continent’s colonial history for a holistic understanding of the
trends, patterns and nature of conflict in Africa and depicted the nexus
between governance and security. Furthermore, it exposed African states’
14 A. O. AKINOLA AND E. A. LIAGA
fragility and their inability to address insecurity. The initial optimism that
marked the attainment of independence and the waves of democratisation
in the late 1980s and 1990s have been replaced by extreme pessimism.
The decline in the quality of life is starkly apparent, and African elites
seem unperturbed. While Africa is not the only continent experiencing
violent conflict, the rate at which it is spilling over from one society or
country to another as well as the depth of the violence and the protracted
nature of African conflicts are cause for concern.
The chapter highlighted the various challenges confronting African
states, including governance deficits, the colonial legacy, xenophobia,
increased fragmentation of local armed groups in the Sahel, the prolifer-
ation of coups in the Sahel and West Africa, and the competing interests
of foreign powers, such as France, China, Russia and Turkey in the
Sahel. Other regions are also confronting internal insurgency, ethnic or
communal conflict, political instability and terrorism. Africa’s security
actors need to reflect carefully on these threats and commit to finding
sustainable solutions by implementing policies that eradicate structural
violence, poverty, exclusive governance and institutional fragility.
There is an urgent need for a conscious shift from a state-centric
approach to the allocation of communal resources and facilitation of peace
processes. Civil society groups, think-tanks, communities, traditional
authorities and the private sector should be involved in state-building
and development. Regional organisations, particularly the AU, should be
more committed to governance issues and resuscitate the early warning
system to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Lastly, effective gover-
nance and human capacity development of the youth are important
preconditions for peace and security in Africa.
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en/topic/gender/overview
CHAPTER 2
Stephen Phiri
Introduction
This chapter is presented in six sections. The first section focuses on
conflict in general and African conflict in particular, while the second
demonstrates that drawing on colonial history to explain African conflicts
is not an excuse but a valid and genuine claim. Section three presents a
brief overview of the African predicament to contextualise the argument.
The fourth section outlines the architectural design of an African “mod-
ern” state drawing on Mahmood Mamdani’s seminal work, Citizens and
Subjects and his keynote address entitled Political Identity, Citizenship
and Ethnicity in Post-colonial Africa, which he presented at the Arusha
Conference in 2005. Section five uses the first chapter of Fanon’s The
Wretched of the Earth to describe an ideal post-colonial state, while section
S. Phiri (B)
Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
six examines the post-colonial state using both Mamdani and Fanon’s
work. As part of the conclusion, I highlight the limitations of using
Mamdani’s work as the lens for understanding conflict in Africa.
Conflict is described by Coser (cited by Aremu, 2010) as a struggle
over values and claims to “rare” status, power and resources. The objec-
tive of the conflicting parties is to injure or eliminate their opposition.
Conflict can be violent or uncontrollable, dominant or recessive, and
resolvable or insolvable (Aremu, 2010). In other words, conflict is not
necessarily violent; however, ‘unfolding events in world history suggest
that most conflicts are violent, inflicting life-long injures on their victims
apart from the monumental loss of lives’ (Aremu, 2010: 551).
Conflict in Africa can be categorised into two broad groups, namely
internal and international conflicts. The former ‘is one in which the
governmental authorities of a state are opposed by groups within that
state seeking to overthrow those authorities with the force of arms’
(Eminue, 2004: 15). International conflict takes place between two or
more nations/states (Puchala, 1971 cited by Aremu, 2010). In addition
to these two categories, Africa has witnessed the third type of conflict,
which Aremu (2010) called internationalised internal armed conflict. This
generally refers to civil war, but also involves ‘varying degrees of external
involvement. Examples of such include the conflicts in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, and Sierra Leone’ (Aremu, 2010:
551).
It is important to highlight that conflict is not restricted to Africa, as
other parts of the world are also riddled with different kinds of conflict.
Indeed, it is so widespread that some scholars (Azar, 1990; Deutsch,
1991; Otite, 1999; Zartman, 1991) have concluded that it is an inevitable
aspect of human interaction. Nonetheless, Ajayi (2005: 143) highlights
that, ‘the regularity of conflicts in Africa has become one of the distinct
characteristics of the continent’. Aremu concurs and adds that:
The continent of Africa has been highly susceptible to intra and inter-state
wars and conflicts. This has prompted the insinuation that Africa is the
home of wars and instability. Most pathetic about these conflagrations is
that they have defied any meaningful solution and their negative impacts
have retarded growth and development in Africa while an end to them
seems obscure. (2010: 549)
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 19
This chapter argues that the conflicts in Africa are not merely products of
“normal” human interaction but can be attributed to European colonial-
ism’s profound and lasting impact on contemporary Africa’s development.
One of the legacies of the colonial period is the “artificial” creation of
ethnic conflict, which I explore further in the coming sections. Some
analysts of ethnic conflict have deployed a grievance-based model. This
model is premised on the understanding of conflict as ‘normal’ human
interaction as it emphasises ‘economic, political, and social deprivation or
discrimination as sources of ethnic strife… [but its] intuitive appeal…gen-
erate[s] little explanatory power with respect to ethnic conflict in Africa’
(Blanton et al., 2001: 474).
Therefore, exclusive reliance on deprivation-based grievances as predic-
tors of ethnic violence is inadequate empirically. It is also deficient
theoretically. Collective action and social movement theories point out
that widespread and deeply felt grievances are not likely to result in collec-
tive violence unless counter-elites and mobilising structures are available
to persuade aggrieved individuals to participate in the collective action,
convince them that others are likely to participate as well, and produce the
rewards—both public goods and selective incentives—that participants
demand in return for their support (Blanton et al., 2001: 474).
Hence, this chapter proposes that the colonial structural configu-
ration that was “passed on to” post-colonial states is the source of
prevailing conflict. The structural configuration of ethnic groups in a
society is itself a part of the colonial legacy. In other words, African soci-
eties were restructured to suit colonial needs to the detriment of local
people’s structured livelihoods. This restructuring occurred in both rural
(ethnicity—customary law) and urban (race—civil law) areas.
the effects of that history impose limits on being, action, and knowledge.
By virtue of that very plaintive knowledge of limits, however, they signal
the human refusal of abject captivity to their dominion. For they wonder
aloud what the world and the drama of human life would look like, what
promises and predicaments they might proffer, were they ever unshackled
from the constraints of a particular time and place, a particular historical
circumstance. A coherent historicism is predicated, has to be predicated,
on a consciousness of the possibility of freedom, intimations of what the
nature of things might have been. (Sekyi-Otu, 2003: n.p.)
1 Professor Ato Sekyi Otu, a Ghanaian political philosopher best known for his work
on Frantz Fanon and Ayi Kwei Armah.
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 21
Mamdani (2005) contends that all borders are essentially artificial because
war and conquest have always been integral to state-building. A good
example is the formation of the Zulu kingdom. According to Mamdani
(2005), shifting power relations have always translated to shifting bound-
aries—each new boundary is declared more natural than the previous one.
For him, the real problem with boundaries is the assumption that polit-
ical boundaries are a product of culture; this also presupposes that the
state should be a nation-state and that rediscovering/redrawing what is
conceived as “natural” political boundaries will solve the political crisis
of the post-colonial state. Mamdani (2005) asserts that the post-colonial
state is not a product of shared common values that has evolved through
consensus and mutual respect, but is the consequence of legality or laws
prescribed by the state. These laws produce institutions that structure
and determine citizen participation. The colonial state that birthed the
24 S. PHIRI
customary local authority was reinforced and backed by central civil power.
The British depended much more heavily upon local elites to manage
the day-to-day affairs of the colony … Rather than colonize their African
holdings with a large number of British citizens, the British government
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 25
He goes on to assert that a new state cannot be built from old ruins
because ‘the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social struc-
ture being changed from the bottom up’ (Fanon, 2001/1967: 27).
For Fanon, the order of the world needs to be changed and he called
this process a ‘programme of complete disorder’. He encourages one
to regard decolonisation as a historical process in which one should
understand the movements which give it historical form and content.
Decolonisation is not a fixed event but a process whose essential func-
tion is nourished by the situation that was meticulously designed by the
coloniser. One of the main constituents that characterised the colonial
logic of subjugation is violence, which the settler used to exploit the
native. The oppressor understands the language of violence; it is this
language that the native has to use to be free. It is important to note
that Fanon did not conceive of violence as a solution to any oppressive
situation, but as a necessary option in a world where alternative options
no longer apply.
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 27
This world is cut into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited
by two different species, the originality of the colonial context is that
economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life
never come to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quar-
ters the colonial context, it is evident that what parcels out the world is to
begin with the fact of belonging to a given race, a given species… at times
this Manichean goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes the natives,
or to speak plainly it turns him [sic] into an animal. (Fanon, 2001/1967:
30, 31, 32)
2 These African states opted to allow the hierarchy of local state apparatus, from chiefs
to headman, to continue after independence.
3 These states instituted a single customary law that transcended tribal boundaries as
part of post-colonial changes.
2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 29
Mamdani agrees with Fanon that the post-colonial African state is inher-
ently a colonial creation. They refer to such states as ‘weak’ as they did
not develop from the grassroots, but are an imposed colonial project;
their influence thus lacks deep roots in African communities (Phiri,
2020). Many writers such as Enerst Wamba dia Wamba (1996), Ngugi
Wa Thiongo (2005/1986) and Paul Gifford (1998) maintain that the
post-colonial African state is profoundly influenced by imperialism and is
essentially built on colonial ruins.
Fanon highlights a dialectical process that defines the failure of the
post-colonial state. As noted above, the leaders who took over served
as mere puppets of the system. Fanon (2001/1967: 122) uses the word
‘intermediary’ of the colonial regime to describe the national bourgeoisie.
It is unfortunate that even those that genuinely wanted to serve beyond
the colonial logic of rule failed because the very foundation of such a
state is built on that logic. The colonial structures that were uncritically
adopted in the transitional process are vulnerable to imperialist influence.
They were created to serve the minority and enable easy manipulation
of those in power. Similar to Mamdani’s explanation of the failure of
detribalisation and the effective introduction of indigeneity, Fanon points
to inverted post-colonial oppression expressed in the form of tribalism,
selfishness, unconscionable adherence to Western beliefs and xenophobia.
30 S. PHIRI
Conclusion
The structure of post-colonial states is inherently conflictual because it is
a product of a colonial structure that is essentially volatile and unstable.
Both Mamdani and Fanon are convinced that current conflicts associ-
ated with the post-colonial state are due to a compromised transition to
independence. For Fanon, the colonial structures were merely reformed
instead of being radically changed, while Mamdani asserts that the post-
colonial leader deracialised but did not detribalise colonial structures. In
this sense, conflict in Africa is the product of a failed transition process,
which resulted in artificial changes that maintained the essential colonial
logic of exclusion and discrimination.
Drawing on Fanon and Mamdani’s arguments, it is illegitimate to call
the current African “modern” state post-colonial as this presupposes that
we have gone beyond colonialism. This chapter challenged this misnomer
by renaming these states neo-colonial states because colonialism was not
eliminated but redefined. The chapter drew extensively on Mamdani who
bases his argument on the British colonial method of controlling the
native population. Hence, his account cannot conclusively represent all
African post-colonial states. Nonetheless, it is rendered credible due to
the fact that the Britain colonised the largest number of African countries,
followed by the French. However, Fanon’s account of the post-colonial
state is helpful since most colonial thinkers refer to his work.
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2 AFRICAN CONFLICT AND THE “POST-COLONIAL” STATE 31
Introduction
In response to climate change, world leaders established the Conference
of Parties (COP) (Ati et al., 2018). Different countries have hosted these
conferences with the latest being held in Glasgow Scotland (COP 26)
from 31 October to 12 November 2021.1 Nigeria has been part of these
discussions. Climate change is severely affecting the country, manifesting
1 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/glasgow-climate-change-confer
ence.
S. K. Okunade (B)
Institute for the Future of Knowledge, University of Johannesburg,
Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
H. S. Kohon
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa