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Integration and
Differentiation in the
European Union
Theory and Policies
Dirk Leuffen · Berthold Rittberger
Frank Schimmelfennig
Integration and Differentiation in the European
Union
Dirk Leuffen · Berthold Rittberger ·
Integration
and Differentiation
in the European
Union
Theory and Policies
Dirk Leuffen Berthold Rittberger
Department of Politics Department of Political Science
and Public Administration Ludwig-Maximilians-University
University of Konstanz Munich, Germany
Konstanz, Germany
Center for Comparative
and International Studies
ETH Zurich
Zurich, Switzerland
ISBN 978-3-030-76676-4 ISBN 978-3-030-76677-1 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76677-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover credit: Eoneren
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface to the 2nd edition
When we started writing the first edition of this book, the EU seemed
well on track. The Lisbon Treaty had entered into force and the big
bang of Eastern enlargement appeared well digested. The euro crisis at
first appeared to be a punctuation, an exception to the broader trend of
both consolidation and differentiation of the integration process. Almost
a decade has passed since then, and rather than experiencing a period
of consolidation, it has been a decade of internal and external crises in
rapid succession. First, the UK voters’ decision to leave the EU was a
shock to the integration project, by making disintegration become real.
Brexit and the new EU-UK relations certainly underline the importance
of looking at the integration of outside states into the EU, a relation we
termed ‘external differentiation’ in the first edition. Second, the so-called
refugee crisis with its peak in 2015 revealed structural shortcomings in the
Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. The negotiations on a mandatory
refugee relocation scheme resulted in gridlock, highlighting the severe
ideological divisions among EU member states. Seemingly, unsurmount-
able tensions between supranational demands for solidarity and burden
sharing and the constraints imposed by domestic politics and politiciza-
tion became apparent. Third, the Crimean crisis, the presidency of Donald
Trump, and the rise of China in world politics underlined the need for
closer European cooperation in external affairs. While we diagnose some
changes in this area, the factual development of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy still lags behind declaratory ambitions. Fourth, the Corona
v
vi PREFACE TO THE 2ND EDITION
crisis has underlined growing inequalities among the EU member states,

aggravating gaps and cleavages already prominent during the eurozone
crisis. Calls for stronger intra-EU redistribution and a more social Europe
have become louder and carry political clout.
On the academic playing field, too, some noteworthy developments
occurred in the past years, related to some extent to the EU’s polycrisis.
First, the literature on differentiated integration has matured and became
an established subfield of EU studies. Second, the crises have rejuvenated
the debate on European integration theories, as highlighted by numerous
special issues published on the topic. Third, the debate on integration has
shifted in focus from ‘ever closer Union’ to threats of ‘disintegration’.
Fourth, postfunctionalism now occupies its own register in the choir of
integration theories. While the politicization and the domestic politics of
integration already were important ingredients of the first edition of this
book, we now account for the growing importance of postfunctionalism
by dedicating a new theoretical chapter to it.
Revising the book turned out more demanding but also more exciting
than we had first expected and, truth be told, also hoped. To some extent
this echoes the experience of the first edition. Fortunately, however, it
turned out that our theoretical synthesis still remains valid today and the
update has not led to a substantive revision of our understanding of Euro-
pean integration. If you are impatient to learn where the ship is steering,
you may read the Conclusion first.
In response to reactions to the first edition, we decided to change the
book’s title. The old title, ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Varia-
tion in the European Union’, is still correct analytically. However, many
readers apparently had mistakenly thought the book was only about ‘dif-
ferentiated integration’, in a narrow sense, while it actually addresses
European integration in general: it presents the main integration theories
and examines the major policy areas of the European Union. In addition,
this new version contains self-tests and discussion questions to improve
its use as a textbook.
At a personal level, the past decade also left an imprint on us. Dirk,
after the end of his term as vice rector for research at Konstanz in 2019,
together with his family bought a beagle that keeps him busy and in close
touch with nature. Berthold left Mannheim for Munich and since then
has become a connoisseur of the Upper Bavarian mountains and enjoys
the proximity to South Tyrol. Frank academically is as restless as ever, but
also frees up time to devote himself to amateur jazz guitar playing.
PREFACE TO THE 2ND EDITION vii
We finally thank our students for engaged discussions on differentiated

integration. Simon Bulmer and a number of anonymous referees provided
very useful comments in preparation of the second edition. Thanks also
go to Max Heermann, Daniela Kroll, and Jonathan Scholz for research
support and to Buket Buse Demirci for preparing the index.
Konstanz, Germany Dirk Leuffen

Munich, Germany Berthold Rittberger
Zurich, Switzerland Frank Schimmelfennig
September 2020
Contents
1 Introduction 1
A Story of Integration—and Differentiation 1
Differentiated Integration in EU Studies 7
The How and Why of Differentiated Integration: A Preview 8
Structure of the Book 17
References 19
2 The European Union as a System of Differentiated
Integration 21
Between International Organization and State 22
Membership 22
Delimitation 24
Authority 25
Governance Capacity 26
Legitimacy 27
Differentiated Integration 29
Measuring Differentiated Integration 33
Mapping Differentiated Integration 40
Differentiation: A Persistent Feature of European
Integration 46
References 48
ix
x CONTENTS
Part I Theory
3 Intergovernmentalism 63
From Realist to Liberal Intergovernmentalism 63
Rationalist Institutionalism 66
General Assumptions: International Interdependence
and Rational Choice 66
Explanatory Theories: The Functional Theory
of Institutions, Endogenous Trade Theory, Bargaining
Theory, and Club Theory 67
Intergovernmentalism and European Integration 70
National Preferences 70
Interstate Bargaining 72
Institutional Choice 74
General Hypotheses 75
Intergovernmentalism and Differentiated Integration 77
Realist Intergovernmentalism: Autonomy-Driven
Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Heterogeneity
of Interdependence, Interests, and Capacities 79
The Supply Side of Differentiated Integration: Size,
Externalities and Bargaining Power 82
Conjectures 84
Self-Test and Discussion Questions 85
Further Reading 86
References 87
4 Supranationalism 89
General Assumptions: Boundedly Rational Actors
in a Path-Dependent Process of Institutionalization 91
Explaining the Dynamics of Integration 94
Supranationalism and European Integration 97
Spillover 98
The Constitutionalization of the Treaties 100
European Integration and Path Dependence 103
Supranationalism and Differentiated Integration 106
Intensity of Transnational Exchange 107
Capacity and Preferences of Supranational actors 110
Conjectures 111
CONTENTS xi

Further Reading 113
References 113
5 Constructivism 117
General Assumptions: Ideas and Appropriateness 119
Explanatory Theories: Community Institutions,
Argumentation, and Socialization 121
Constructivism and European Integration 124
Ideas and Integration Preferences 125
Negotiations in a Community Environment 128
Integration and Socialization 131
Constructivism and Differentiated Integration 135
Conditions 135
Conjectures 137
Further Reading 139
References 139
6 Postfunctionalism 143
Multi-Level Governance and the Democratic Politics
of Regional Integration 145
Multi-Level Governance 146
Democratic Mass Politics 149
Postfunctionalism and European integration 152
Integration Progress 153
Cleavage Transformation and Party Competition 155
Identity Politics 157
Negotiations in the Shadow of National Democratic
Politics 158
Postfunctionalism and Differentiated Integration 162
Conjectures 164
Further Reading 165
References 166
xii CONTENTS
Part II Policies
7 The Single Market 177
The Development of the Single Market 180
The Treaties of Rome 180
The Single European Act 181
After the SEA 185
Horizontal Integration 186
Conclusion of the Historical Overview 188
Intergovernmentalism 190
The Beginnings of Integration: Post-World War II
Europe, Economic Interdependence 191
Integrative Dynamics: Growing Interdependence
and Preference Convergence Before the SEA 193
(Differentiated) Horizontal Integration 195
Supranationalism 200
The Beginnings of Integration: Transnational Exchanges
and the EEC Treaty 201
Explaining the Single Market Programme:
Transnational Exchanges, Institutionalization,
and Spillover 203
Horizontal Integration and Differentiation 205
Constructivism 206
The Beginnings of Integration: Ideas Matter 206
Integrative Dynamics: Shared Understandings
of Common Challenges 207
(Differentiated) Horizontal Integration: Constructivism 209
Postfunctionalism 210
Postfunctionalism and the Single Market 211
Conclusion 214
Further Reading 218
References 218
8 Economic and Monetary Union 223
The Development of Monetary and Fiscal Integration 225
The Bretton Woods system 225
The Snake and the European Monetary System 227
Economic and Monetary Union 230
The Eurozone Crisis and the Reform of EMU 233
CONTENTS xiii
Conclusion 238
Realist Intergovernmentalism: Monetary Integration
to Increase State Autonomy? 240
Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Interdependence,
Preference Convergence, and Credible Commitments 242
Differentiated Horizontal Integration 246
Differentiated Vertical Integration 249
Integration in the Eurozone Crisis 250
EMU: Spillover and Transnational Networks 254
Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation 256
From Differentiation to Uniformity? 258
Transnational Interdependence and Supranational
Capacity in the Eurozone Crisis 259
Constructivism 262
EMU: Macroeconomic Policy Consensus 263
Vertical Integration in the Eurozone Crisis: Socialization
and Learning? 266
Integration and Differentiation in Macroeconomic
Policies 269
Postfunctionalism and Integration in the Eurozone
Crisis 271
Conclusion 273
Further Reading 278
References 278
9 Security and Defence 281
The Development of Security and Defence Policy in the EU 282
A Bold Move: The Pleven Plan and the EDC 283
De Gaulle’s ‘certaine Idée’ and the Fouchet Plans 286
Informal Intergovernmental Coordination: The EPC 288
Picking up Speed: Maastricht, Amsterdam, and the CFSP 290
Change of Tide: St Malo, ESDP, and CSDP 292
The 2010s: Times of External and Internal Turbulence 295
Conclusion 299
xiv CONTENTS
Explaining the European Defence Community and Its

Failure 300
Constructivism 308
The Return of Defence Policy 313
Constructivism 323
Conclusion 328
Further Reading 331
References 332
10 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 337
The Development of the Area of Freedom, Security,
and Justice 338
Early Intergovernmental Beginnings 339
Integration of Justice and Home Affairs into the EU:
Maastricht and Beyond 341
The Refugee Crisis as a Turning Point 343
Horizontal Integration 348
Conclusion 350
Formation and Development of the AFSJ: Sovereignty,
Interdependence, Member State Preferences,
and Bargaining 352
Formation and Development of the AFSJ: Transnational
Networks and Spillover 357
Horizontal and Vertical Differentiation 362
From Differentiation to Uniformity? 363
Constructivism 364
Formation and Development of the AFSJ: Shared Ideas
and Inclusive Identities 365
CONTENTS xv
Conclusion 369
Further Reading 372
References 373
11 Conclusion: Integration and Differentiation
in the European Union 377
Differentiated Integration in the European Union 380
Evaluating the Theories 381
Assumptions and Expectations 382
Vertical Integration and Differentiation 383
Horizontal Integration and Differentiation 390
A Synthetic Framework 394
Common Ground 395
Scope Conditions 398
Summary 401
Where Do We Go from Here? 403
References 404
References 407
Index 429
Abbreviations
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CEEC Central and Eastern European Country
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
EBU European Banking Union
EC European Community
ECB European Central Bank
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
ECU European Currency Unit
EEA European Economic Area
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EMA European Monetary Agreement
EMS European Monetary System
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
EPC European Political Cooperation
EPU European Payment Union
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESFS European System of Financial Supervision
ESM European Stability Mechanism
xvii
xviii ABBREVIATIONS
EU European Union
EUMC European Union Military Committee
EUMS European Union Military Staff
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HG Headline Goals
HHG Helsinki Headline Goals
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO International Organization
IR International Relations
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
LI Liberal Intergovernmentalism
MEP Member of the European Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OLP Ordinary Legislative Procedure
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC Political and Security Committee
RI Realist Intergovernmentalism
SEA Single European Act
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
US United States
USA United States of America
WEU Western European Union
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Country Codes for Figure 2.3

A Austria
B Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CH Switzerland
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
D Germany
DK Denmark
E Spain
EST Estonia
ABBREVIATIONS xix
F France
FIN Finland
GR Greece
HR Croatia
HU Hungary
I Italy
IRL Ireland
IS Iceland
L Luxembourg
LT Lithuania
LV Latvia
M Malta
N Norway
NL Netherlands
P Portugal
PL Poland
RO Romania
S Sweden
SK Slovakia
SLO Slovenia
TR Turkey
UK United Kingdom
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 The EU: between state and international organization 23

Fig. 2.2 A three-dimensional representation of polity-types 31
Fig. 2.3 Differentiated membership in the EU 40
Fig. 2.4 Vertical (all policies, 1950–2020) and horizontal
integration 42
Fig. 2.5 Vertical differentiation (selected policies, 1950–2020) 43
Fig. 2.6 Horizontal differentiation across selected policies 45
Fig. 2.7 Types of horizontal differentiation over time 46
Fig. PI.1 Development of European integration theory 53
Fig. PI.2 Analytical framework of integration 57
Fig. 11.1 A synthetic model of integration 402
xxi
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Measurement of vertical and horizontal integration

of European states 35
Table 2.2 Types of horizontal differentiation 38
Table 2.3 Vertical integration across EU policies at the time
of treaty changes 41
Table PI.1 Keywords of integration theories 59
Table 3.1 Building blocks of intergovernmentalism 65
Table 3.2 Intergovernmentalist conjectures 85
Table 4.1 Building blocks of supranationalism 91
Table 4.2 Supranationalist conjectures 111
Table 5.1 Building blocks of constructivism 118
Table 5.2 Constructivist conjectures 138
Table 6.1 Building blocks of postfunctionalism 145
Table 6.2 Postfunctionalist conjectures 164
Table PII.1 Conjectures compared 171
Table 7.1 Integration theories and the Single Market 215
Table 8.1 Integration theories and explanations of EMU 274
Table 9.1 Integration theories and explanations of ESDP 329
Table 10.1 Integration theories and the AFSJ 371
Table 11.1 Ordering integration and differentiation across policy
areas (ranging from ‘1’ as ‘early or high’ to ‘4’ as ‘late
or low’) 380
Table 11.2 Analytical framework of integration theories (see
also Table PI.1) 382
Table 11.3 Expectations of integration theories (see Table PII.1
for more detail) 384
xxiii
List of Boxes
Box 2.1 Timeline: Major steps of integration 34

Box 7.1 Timeline: EC market integration 187
Box 7.2 Enhanced Cooperation in Practice: EU patent 199
Box 8.1 Timeline: Macroeconomic integration 226
Box 8.2 Close Cooperation in the European Banking Union 236
Box 9.1 Timeline: Security and defence integration 283
Box 9.2 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 317
Box 10.1 Timeline: Integration in the AFSJ 342
Box 10.2 Enhanced Cooperation in Practice: Divorce Rules 361
xxv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A Story of Integration---and Differentiation

Since its beginnings in the 1950s, the European integration project has
come a long way. Starting with six member states in the European
Communities, the EU has expanded to 28 in 2013, to shrink to 27 when
the UK left the union in 2020. From its initial specialization in coal and
steel, it has evolved into an organization dealing with all major policies.
While it had embraced the principle of ‘supranationalism’ from the start,
a strong judiciary and an increasingly powerful parliament complemented
its technocratic and intergovernmental beginnings in the course of time.
This remarkable expansion of membership, tasks, and competences is only
part of the story of European integration. From its early days, European
integration has varied between policies that were strongly integrated and
policies that remained predominantly intergovernmental. In this book,
we call this variation ‘vertical differentiation’. Moreover, many of the new
steps taken towards integration do not apply uniformly to all member
states, while EU non-members participate selectively in EU policies. This
is ‘horizontal differentiation’. Integration in the EU thus varies across
both policies and countries. It is differentiated integration.
Today, the monetary union is the most vertically integrated policy
of the EU. It is directed by the independent European Central Bank
(ECB) having the exclusive competence to make monetary policy. At the
same time, monetary union is weakly horizontally integrated. The euro is
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
D. Leuffen et al., Integration and Differentiation in the European Union,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76677-1_1
2 D. LEUFFEN ET AL.
legal tender in only 19 of the 27 member states. During the Maastricht

Treaty negotiations, the UK and Denmark secured a formal ‘opt-out’.
Whereas Sweden is legally obliged and economically capable to join,
it stopped the process unilaterally after holding a referendum in 2003.
Other countries—Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania—would like to join the
eurozone but do not yet fulfil the criteria. Moreover, the non-member
states Kosovo and Montenegro, together with several micro-states, have
introduced the euro without participating in the European System of
Central Banks. Moreover, since the sovereign debt crisis began in 2010,
speculation about a break-up of the eurozone has repeatedly surfaced.
Some suggested that individual countries (the most prominent being
Greece) abandon the euro, others recommended dividing the eurozone
into a ‘northern’ and a ‘southern’ currency area. A structural feature of
the eurozone that many identified as the deep cause of the crisis is the
dualism of highly integrated monetary policy and weakly integrated fiscal
policy—an instance of vertical differentiation. In response, some demand
that fiscal union follow monetary union whereas others fervently oppose
slipping into what they call a ‘transfer union’.
A number of measures designed to rescue the eurozone might have
contributed to deepening already existing divisions within the EU,
thereby aggravating horizontal differentiation. The crisis thus constituted
a critical juncture. For instance, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination,
and Governance was agreed outside the formal EU treaty framework to
circumvent opposition from the UK and the Czech Republic (the latter
country actually ratified the treaty in 2019 after a change of govern-
ment). An important part of this treaty is the so-called Fiscal Compact,
which only binds the 19 member states of the eurozone, plus Bulgaria,
Denmark, and Romania. The Banking Union is yet another example of
intensified horizontal differentiation as it fosters deeper integration of the
banking system with a particular focus on eurozone member states.
The cross-border movement of people is another policy area displaying
differentiated integration. Travel and migration have long remained
national policies in the European Community. In a first attempt to inte-
grate these policies, a small group of member states signed the Schengen
Agreement in 1985, outside the Community framework. During the
1990s, these policies were integrated into the EU, and the Union’s
competences in these policy areas have augmented since. Yet, five member
states have remained outside ‘Schengenland’. Britain and Ireland on its
coat-tails did not wish to participate. Bulgaria and Romania would like to
1 INTRODUCTION 3
participate, but have not been allowed into in the Schengen club, because
some member states continue to block their entry. In principle, Cyprus is
also expected to join the Schengen border regime but the division of the
island remains a major obstacle. By contrast, four non-member states—
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland—are full members of
the Schengen area. Croatia has a special arrangement for passport-free
travel of its citizens to the neighbouring EU member states. In addition,
visa requirements were abolished for the other Western Balkan countries
(except Kosovo) in 2009 and 2010. Similar to the vertical differentiation
between monetary and fiscal policy in the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), we find a discrepancy between rather strongly integrated travel
and migration policies, and more weakly integrated judicial and police
cooperation.
The euro and Schengen are only the most prominent examples of
how the expansion of tasks, competences, and membership in Euro-
pean integration has developed side by side with differentiation across
issue areas and countries. Horizontal differentiation both within the EU
and beyond its organizational borders has become a pervasive feature of
the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 first introduced ‘enhanced
cooperation’, a general procedure for formal differentiated integration
in EU legislation. In July 2010, the EU authorized its first use when
14 member states moved forward to cooperate more closely on divorce
rules for transnational couples. Another application is the introduction of
the EU Patent by 25 member states (circumventing Italian and Spanish
opposition against the proposed language regime). However, there is
much more differentiation in secondary law than the few instances of
enhanced cooperation suggest—especially in EMU, in the area of interior
and justice policies, as well as in defence policy.
Differentiation is also a typical by-product of enlargement. Accession
treaties usually contain a host of transitional arrangements that qualify the
membership rights of the new entrants or exempt them from applying
EU rules for a certain time. The acceding member states of Central and
Eastern Europe, for instance, had to accept that the free movement of
workers could be limited for their citizens by the old member states for
up to seven years after accession. In return, the new member states were
granted transitional exemptions (e.g. with regard to the application of EU
environmental or agricultural standards). But transitional arrangements
from the accession treaties are just that—transitional. They typically expire
a few years after new member states joined the EU.
4 D. LEUFFEN ET AL.
Finally, non-member states participate to varying degrees in a large

number of EU policies. The European Economic Area (EEA), comprising
the internal market and a number of flanking policies, extends to Iceland,
Norway, and Liechtenstein; the Customs Union includes Turkey; Switzer-
land has concluded a series of bilateral treaties with the EU that are based
on EU rules, and it incorporates individual EU rules autonomously into
its domestic legislation. Candidate countries adopt the acquis communau-
taire, the body of EU law, in a process that can stretch over many years.
The Eastern European, Middle Eastern, and Northern African countries
that participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy also adopt parts
of the EU acquis, even though there will be no opportunity for them to
join the EU in the foreseeable future.
As in the case of transitional arrangements in EU accession treaties,
some differentiation across policies and countries is temporary. Weakly
integrated policy areas may catch up with those that are more strongly
integrated. For instance, monetary policy lagged behind market integra-
tion for four decades before reaching an even higher level of integration
at the end of the 1990s. Over time, the eurozone has grown from 11 to
19 members. Schengen started as an intergovernmental regime of five
member states; it now has 26 member states and involves the supra-
national actors of the EU—the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU.
Overall, both vertical and horizontal differentiations have expanded
and there is reason to believe that they are here to stay. First, whereas
the level of EU competences and supranational centralization has
markedly increased during the course of European integration, the gap
in vertical integration between policies regarding market-making and
market-correcting regulation, on the one hand, and core state policies
of internal and external security as well as the redistributive welfare
state, on the other, has remained. Even though the EU has acquired
some competences in the areas of security and welfare, these areas have
clearly remained predominantly national and intergovernmental. Second,
the euro and Schengen differentiations have proven remarkably durable,
and each treaty revision since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 has
produced new opt-outs. Candidates, such as Turkey, together with many
of the Western Balkan countries, will take a considerable time to become
member states—if they accomplish this goal at all. It is also highly unlikely
that a large number of countries participating in the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy will ever become candidates. Finally, the EEA countries
1 INTRODUCTION 5
and Switzerland are not on the verge of accession even as they increasingly
adapt to the EU’s rules.
There are also theoretical reasons to assume that European integra-
tion will remain differentiated. Differentiated integration is intrinsically
linked to increasing heterogeneity among European states. The expan-
sion of Community tasks and competences is one cause of heterogeneity.
It is relatively easy for member states to agree on abolishing tariffs and
creating a single market, as such policies are generally perceived to benefit
the economies of all member states. It is more controversial to agree
on directly redistributive (social) policies that imply massive fiscal trans-
fers or to negotiate monetary and security policies that affect the core
of sovereign state powers. The more the EU moves into such areas, the
more it meets diverging interests and heightened resistance. Moreover, it
is easier for the member states to agree on intergovernmental cooperation
than on supranational centralization, because of the limits it imposes on
member state autonomy. The more that European integration deepens,
the more likely it meets opposition by societies and governments eager to
protect their identity and sovereignty. In other words, increasing identity
and sovereignty costs increase anti-integrationist politicization.
The expansion of Community membership is another cause of growing
heterogeneity. European integration started with a set of countries most
willing to integrate, and comparatively similar in socio-economic struc-
ture and economic and administrative capabilities. As the Community
enlarged, it admitted countries that were less enthusiastic about Euro-
pean federalism, had different beliefs and interests, or were less capable of
meeting the demands of market and policy integration.
Politicization has added to the trend towards differentiation. In the
first decades of European integration, policy-making was an elite affair:
policies were negotiated among governments, facilitated by package deals,
and integration benefited from a ‘permissive consensus’ that character-
ized member state societies. Since the 1990s, however, integration has
become more politicized. Eurosceptic parties and movements have prolif-
erated in the member states and have mobilized the economic losers of
integration as well as those who cherish national identity and sovereignty.
The politicization of European integration has become most influential
in national referendums on EU treaties, and many opt-outs are a result
of actual or anticipated negative votes. From this perspective, it is no
surprise that differentiation has increased tremendously since the early
1990s when the Community embarked on a new phase of ambitious task
6 D. LEUFFEN ET AL.
expansion, supranational centralization, and enlargement and generated

domestic politicization.
In order to adequately understand European integration, we need to
keep track of and analyse both the expansion of tasks, competences, and
membership, and the differentiation of integration across policies and
states. Despite the interdependence of these two dimensions, existing
theories and analyses of European integration have focused almost exclu-
sively on expansion. Moreover, disintegration has captured scholars’
interest only recently (cf. Vollaard 2018); turning points were the growing
concerns about the EU in the wake of the eurozone crisis and the
2016 Brexit referendum in the UK. During the Corona crisis, polls in
Italy showed growing discontent about membership in the EU and the
eurozone.
We argue throughout this book that both integration and disintegra-
tion are theoretically and empirically linked to differentiated integration.
On the one hand, differentiation facilitates integration by accommo-
dating disgruntled member states through opt-outs from and selective
participation in contested EU policies. On the other hand, differentiation
and disintegration are driven by increasing heterogeneity and politiciza-
tion. Disintegration indicates a failure to manage these dynamics by way
of differentiation. In sum, studying differentiation is important for two
reasons: first, because the EU is best understood as a system of differenti-
ated integration and should be analysed accordingly; and, second, because
the analysis of differentiation allows us to better trace and understand the
dynamics and mechanisms of European integration and disintegration,
more generally.
By conceptualizing the EU as a system of differentiated integration,
this book takes a novel approach to the study of European integration.
Rather than understanding differentiation as an accidental or transitional
feature, we take differentiation to be a fundamental and durable feature
of European integration and the EU. We describe and explain Euro-
pean integration as the interplay of expansion and differentiation. For
this purpose, we draw on and further elaborate integration theories to
address not only the conditions under which the EU is likely to deal
with new issues, acquire new competences, and admit new members, but
also to explain why policy integration varies across European policies and
EU member states. In our presentation of EU policies, we analyse both
the major steps towards supranational integration of these policies and
their differentiated membership. As a result, we aim at conveying a more
adequate understanding of the nature and the development of the EU.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
Differentiated Integration in EU Studies

Differentiation is not a new topic in the study of European integration.
The analysis of vertical differentiation, i.e. the explanation why policies
were integrated at different points in time and at different levels of
centralization, has been a major issue for integration theorists from the
very beginning—even though they did not use the term. By contrast, inte-
gration theories have not had much to say on horizontal differentiation
until more recently.
Vertical differentiation was a core issue in the early dispute between
neofunctionalist and intergovernmentalist integration theories. Whereas
both agreed that the integration process was most likely to start with
economic integration, they differed on how far it would go. Neofunction-
alism initially assumed an incremental spillover process that could encom-
pass, in principle, all policy domains; intergovernmentalism assumed
that the ‘logic of integration’ would remain restricted ‘to the area of
welfare’ (Hoffmann 1966: 882). Or, according to Stanley Hoffmann’s
famous metaphor, after the leaves of the artichoke (the low-politics areas
conducive to economic integration) are peeled off, its heart (the high-
politics areas resistant to political integration) would still remain intact
(Hoffmann 1966: 883). In the foreword to the second edition of the
Uniting of Europe, the seminal work of neofunctionalism, Ernst Haas
adopted the distinction between integration-friendly (low or) ‘pragmatic-
interest politics’ and ‘high politics’ (1968: xxiii). Yet he attributed their
varying conduciveness to integration to policy goals and styles (‘dramatic-
political aims’ vs. ‘incremental-economic aims’) rather than essential and
structural distinctions between policy areas (Haas 1968: xxv). Analysing
the variation in timing, progress, level, and mode of integration between
policy areas has since been a staple of European integration studies.
Elaborating on the early dichotomies, Philipp Genschel and Markus Jacht-
enfuchs have more recently proposed to distinguish market integration
and the integration of core state powers (2014).
Horizontal differentiation did not feature in the neofunctionalist-
intergovernmentalist debate. Rather, it started being discussed in political
circles as a strategy to overcome stagnation in European integration from
the 1970s onwards, and it featured in numerous conceptual proposals
to rethink European integration and policy proposals for EU reform
(Holzinger and Schimmelfennig 2012). It took a long time until EU
studies and integration theories picked up horizontal differentiation. To
8 D. LEUFFEN ET AL.
name just a few seminal contributions, Alexander Stubb (1996) suggested

an influential classification, distinguishing ‘multi-speed’, ‘variable geome-
try’, and ‘à la carte’ integration; Alkuin Kölliker (2001, 2006) drew on
collective goods theory to explain the centrifugal or centripetal dynamics
of horizontal differentiation, and Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014) used a
sociological approach to study the interactions and strategies of in- and
out-groups. These contributions have used concepts and theories outside
of the canon of classical integration theories, however.
In recent years, horizontal differentiation has resurfaced as a major—
and contested—issue in the EU reform debate. For instance, the
European Commission’s 2017 ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe’
proposed a scenario of ‘those who want more do more’ as one of
the options for reforming the EU. In his programmatic speech at the
Sorbonne in the same year, French President Emmanuel Macron champi-
oned differentiation as a core principle of EU renewal. At the same time,
horizontal differentiation has become a subject of normative and positive
integration theoretical as well as systematic empirical analysis (Lord 2015;
Bellamy and Kröger 2017; Heermann and Leuffen 2020; Schimmelfennig
et al. 2015; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020). It is now commonplace
to employ ‘differentiated integration’ and ‘horizontal differentiation’
as synonyms. In this book, however, we continue to distinguish hori-
zontal and vertical differentiation as two dimensions of differentiated
integration.
The How and Why of Differentiated

Integration: A Preview
In this section, we preview the main arguments of our book. The book
first describes a number of core patterns of integration over time and
across policy areas. We then introduce a repertoire of explanations that
will guide us to make sense of these patterns. In our mapping of European
integration, we distinguish vertical and horizontal integration as well as
vertical and horizontal differentiation.
• Vertical integration is the transfer of policy-making competences

from the national to the European level and, at the European level,
from intergovernmental coordination and cooperation to suprana-
tional centralization.
1 INTRODUCTION 9
• Horizontal integration is the territorial expansion of integrated poli-

cies among the member states, to new member states, and to
non-member states.
• Vertical differentiation refers to the fact that the level of vertical inte-
gration varies among policies. Some policies remain exclusively under
the purview of the states, whereas others are in the domain of EU
supranational policy-making.
• Horizontal differentiation captures the variation in horizontal inte-
gration across policies. Some integrated policies apply to the entire
EU, others even extend to non-member states, and still others
exempt a number of EU member states.
Our mapping of European integration over time reveals a distinct pattern:

overall progress in integration is accompanied by increasing horizontal
as well as vertical differentiation. European integration is a process of
growth, expansion, and differentiation. There are periods of accelerated
growth (the 1950s and the 1990s) and periods of relative stagnation. By
contrast, disintegration has remained the exception. No other member
state has, until now, decided to follow the UK out of the EU, and in
the euro and migration crises, the EU has been able to prevent major
renationalization of integrated policies. Average vertical integration across
policies has risen from the level of intergovernmental coordination in
the first phase of integration to the level of supranational policy-making.
Qualified majority voting in the Council and co-decision of the European
Parliament is now the standard decision-making mode. Horizontal inte-
gration has increased significantly, too. Integration commenced with six
countries. Now, around three quarters of all European countries take part
in EU integrated policies. In addition, vertical integration and horizontal
integration have developed at roughly the same speed and have reached
approximately the same level. At first glance, it therefore seems that the
much-discussed dilemma of deepening versus widening does not exist.
The increase in vertical and horizontal integration is accompanied by
vertical and horizontal differentiation. Vertical differentiation has been
present from the very beginning when commercial policy was integrated
while other policies remained at the national level. Over time, more
policies were integrated and vertical integration progressed. Horizontal
differentiation barely existed with respect to primary law during the first
three decades of European integration. Since the early 1990s, it has
steadily increased. In addition to internal differentiation, a constellation
in which some member states do not participate in an EU policy, we
10 D. LEUFFEN ET AL.
find external differentiation (i.e. non-member states participating in an

EU policy), and policies in which internal and external differentiation is
mixed. Moreover, the EU crises have intensified the differentiation pres-
sures in European integration. In sum, the history of the EU is a history
of integration and differentiation.
We further find that the major policies of the EU—the internal market,
monetary union, defence policy, and the justice and home affairs policies
covered by the so-called Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ)—
display highly diverse patterns of integration and differentiation.
• The internal market is characterized by early and high vertical and

horizontal integration. The Common Market was one of the first
major policies of the European Economic Community, and it was
supranationally integrated from the beginning. It also marked the
beginning of the deepening of integration in the 1980s and 1990s:
the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 established the Internal
Market programme and was the first important treaty revision after
the 1957 Treaties of Rome. The internal market not only applies to
all member states, but non-members—such as Norway and Switzer-
land—also participate to a large extent. It thus combines a lack
of internal differentiation with high external horizontal differentia-
tion. The exit of the UK constitutes a major case of (horizontal)
disintegration from the internal market.
• The supranational integration of monetary policy followed the estab-
lishment of the internal market and has also reached a high level
of vertical integration. In fact, monetary policy is both the most
vertically integrated and the least horizontally integrated policy of
the EU. Of the 27 member states, only 19 form the eurozone, and
there are no formal agreements with non-member countries (except
for some micro-states). EMU is thus characterized by a high degree
of internal, but no (formal) external differentiation. Disintegration
threats (‘Grexit’) were tangible in the euro crisis but did not mate-
rialize. Rather, the euro crisis has led to a significant leap in vertical
integration.
• Integration in interior policies also followed market integration but,
initially, remained at the level of intergovernmental cooperation. In
the treaty changes since the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997,
it has increasingly turned more supranational. The AFSJ shows a
unique pattern of external and internal horizontal differentiation:
some non-member states participate in the Schengen/Dublin regime
of border control and asylum policy, whereas a number of member
1 INTRODUCTION 11
states have opted out from it. The migration crisis of 2015 brought
the Schengen/Dublin regime to the brink of breakdown, but in spite
of several restrictions, disintegration was prevented. In contrast to the
eurozone, the crisis did not lead to additional vertical integration in
the AFSJ.
• Finally, vertical integration in defence policy is not only a latecomer,
but has also remained at a low level. Defence policy is, furthermore,
the least horizontally differentiated of the policies we compare in
this book. Only Denmark has fully opted out of this policy, and
non-member states do not participate formally. At the same time,
the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ (PESCO), the policy-specific
scheme of enhanced cooperation, has gained momentum recently
with the Council proposing a plethora of projects, suitable for a closer
moving together of willing EU member states in the area of defence
capability development.
In this book, we introduce readers to the differentiated vertical and hori-

zontal integration of these major EU policy areas. In addition, we seek
to explain the overall pattern of differentiated integration and the policy-
specific differences in integration and differentiation. For this purpose, we
develop a synthetic explanatory account that builds on and elaborates four
major theories of integration: intergovernmentalism, supranationalism,
constructivism, and postfunctionalism.
• Intergovernmentalism attributes integration to the interests of state
governments to preserve and increase their autonomy and effi-
ciency in the face of international interdependence. Its liberal variant
assumes that governmental preferences are largely shaped by soci-
etal interests. Integration outcomes result from intergovernmental
constellations of preferences and bargaining power, and governments
remain in control of the integration process.
• Supranationalism explains integration as a response to transna-
tional interactions supported by supranational organizations. Initial
integration strengthens interdependence and supranational capacity.
‘Spillovers’ into other policy areas and countries generate further
integration.
• Constructivism stipulates that integration depends on the strength of
an international ideational consensus and a shared community iden-
tity. In absence thereof, integration is likely to stagnate or to fail
in the first place. The formation of supranational ideas, norms, and
identities in the process of integration facilitates further integration.
• Postfunctionalism focuses on explaining integration backlash. Deep-

ening and widening have led to the domestic politicization of
European integration and a ‘constraining dissensus’ in the EU. The
strength of national identities, Eurosceptic parties, and domestic
institutions, such as referendums, affect the course of integration,
differentiation, and disintegration.
In the policy chapters of this book, we apply these theories to the Single
Market, the Economic and Monetary Union, the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity, and Justice as well as Security and Defence. We argue that none of
the established integration theories fully explains the complex processes
and patterns of differentiated integration. Roughly speaking, intergov-
ernmentalism establishes a useful baseline model. Moreover, it provides a
satisfactory account of the initial stages of integration; it has difficulties,
however, capturing the endogenous dynamics of subsequent integration.
Intergovernmentalism further struggles to account for identity-driven
processes of politicization that generate patterns of horizontal differ-
entiation. For these developments, supranationalist, constructivist and
postfunctionalist integration theories provide important insights.
In line with this observation, the synthetic explanation that we develop
in this book starts from an intergovernmental analytical framework. Inte-
gration theories generally agree that governments remain key actors in
the integration process, as they negotiate integration outcomes, which
are then submitted to national ratification processes. Demand for inte-
gration is primarily created by international interdependence. At the
same time, whether and how this demand translates to integration is
conditioned by domestic preferences, international preference constella-
tions, states’ bargaining power, and the agenda-setting and policy-shaping
powers of supranational institutions. As integration progresses, demand
becomes more endogenous and the relevance of supranational institu-
tions increases. Once integration reaches a critical level of centralization,
the path of integration bifurcates. If politicization remains low, integration
is likely to progress further. If politicization is high, but states are highly
vulnerable to interdependence, we are likely to see more integration, too.
Otherwise, high politicization produces stagnation or differentiation.
International interdependence is the fundamental driving force of inte-
gration. Interdependence means that it is impossible for states to solve
certain problems or achieve certain goals unilaterally. Oftentimes societal
actors are the first to become aware of interdependence. When they are
1 INTRODUCTION 13
confronted with international policy externalities such as barriers to trade,

exchange rate risks, transboundary pollution, or crime, they may demand
of their governments, but also of supranational actors, to engage in policy
coordination.
Interdependence is not sufficient for integration. First, the prefer-
ences of governments need to be compatible. Interdependence does not
automatically lead to common interests: governments may be affected
in different ways by interdependence, or they may disagree about the
appropriate policy to address interdependence. Second, politicization
reduces demand for integration, or creates obstacles to negotiating inte-
gration. Politicization is low for technical issues. The more, however,
an issue is perceived as reducing the sovereignty of the state, under-
mining the collective identity of the nation, and involving the transna-
tional redistribution of welfare, the more politicized it tends to become.
When citizens and political parties successfully mobilize against integra-
tion, international negotiations may stall due to constrained negotiators.
Whereas homogeneous preferences and technical issues facilitate integra-
tion, heterogeneous preferences and politicization inhibit integration and
abet differentiation.
Intergovernmental bargaining power and supranational institutions
can counteract the effects of preference heterogeneity and politiciza-
tion. Governments with superior bargaining power may prevail over less
powerful governments and supranational institutions potentially facili-
tate the harmonization of preferences (e.g. by upgrading the common
interest or by triggering learning and socialization processes). They may
also depoliticize issues by transforming them into technical issues and
by removing them from the domestic political arena. Finally, they can
propose compensation measures or create linkages to other issues in order
to make potential losers accept a specific integration policy.
In addition, the level of attained integration makes a difference. First,
demand becomes more endogenous. Integration is not only a response to
interdependence that created the demand for integration in the first place,
but integration is also the source of new interdependence. Integration
stimulates further and denser interactions between societies, affects addi-
tional countries and policy areas, and limits the ability of governments to
respond to such effects unilaterally. Endogenous interdependence alters
the preferences of at least some societal actors and governments, and
generates demand for further integration. Second, integration strengthens
supranational institutions. Supranational organizations such as the Euro-

pean Commission, the European Courts, or the European Parliament
have attained competences and resources that they frequently use to
promote their own integration agenda. Supranational norms and rules
emerge that may shape the expectations and the behaviour of member
states, too. This dynamic of progressive vertical and horizontal inte-
gration works best if politicization remains low. By contrast, in those
policy areas or countries that are particularly sensitive to sovereignty
and identity concerns, politicization heightens sensitivity, mobilizes citi-
zens and domestic political actors, generates opposition to (further)
integration, and leads to divergence in governmental preferences and
tougher bargaining behaviour. In particular, in areas traditionally linked
to state sovereignty—‘core state powers’—politicization is an obstacle
to deeper integration. If these obstacles to integration are unevenly
distributed across states and policy areas, we encounter horizontal or
vertical differentiated integration.
The conditions and processes emphasized by intergovernmentalism—
exogenous international interdependence, national preferences, and inter-
governmental bargaining—form a useful baseline explanation of Euro-
pean integration. In our view, they are particularly suitable for explaining
the early stages and low levels of integration. At the same time, inter-
governmentalism has a static orientation, neglecting feedback processes
and other integration dynamics. Here supranationalism has a word to
add. Supranationalists stress the impacts of both the endogenous demand
for integration (as triggered by previous integration steps) and the policy
entrepreneurship of supranational agents. However, these processes do
not operate automatically and detached from domestic politics. Instead,
recent developments have cautioned, for instance, against an automatic
and a-political understanding of ‘spillover’ dynamics. In particular, politi-
cization—occurring oftentimes in the colours of nationalism—can limit
the influence of supranational actors and restrict governments in heeding
to integrationist calls.
We designed our synthetic explanation to capture the most general
temporal and policy-related patterns of integration and differentiation.
The overall progress and the absence of rollback during the first sixty years
of the European integration project highlight strong demands for inte-
gration triggered by interdependence and amplified by spillover dynamics
and institution building. We should not overlook, however, the cases of
stagnation and integration failure that have accompanied this process. For
1 INTRODUCTION 15
instance, the French Parliament vetoed the European Defence Commu-

nity in 1954, and it was French President Charles de Gaulle, who not only
blocked further supranational centralization, but also the first enlargement
of the European Communities in the 1960s. In the 1990s, as the EU
began to centralize policies traditionally linked to the core of national
identity and state sovereignty, politicization has resulted in increasing
non-participation of the more Eurosceptic EU member states. At the
same time, outsider states increasingly felt the pressure to join the integra-
tion trajectory in those policy areas, which affected them strongly due to
their interdependent nature. A paradigmatic example is the Single Market.
In sum, the variegated interplay of spillover and politicization dynamics
has shaped the vertical and horizontal patterns of European integration
throughout its history.
The increasing differentiation across policies in European integration
is in line with the dualism of the spillover and politicization dynamics,
too. This dualism leads to more vertical integration in areas of low
politicization, on the one hand, and stagnation in areas of high politi-
cization, on the other. The result is vertical differentiation. Moreover,
the dualism generates horizontal differentiation. Whereas the spillover
dynamic ensures full participation of EU member states and even
attracts non-member states in areas of low politicization, the politiciza-
tion dynamic leads countries to abstain from, or to be excluded from,
participation in areas of high politicization.
Our explanation further suggests that policies characterized by high
interdependence and low politicization are integrated early, attain a high
level of vertical and horizontal integration, and are unlikely to lead
to internal horizontal differentiation. The establishment of the internal
market confirms this expectation. Commerce is the archetypical area
of high transnational exchange and international interdependence. For
liberal states, it is also an area in which the autonomy and identity costs
of integration are low. Under these conditions, the spillover dynamic of
vertical and horizontal integration could unfold without major imped-
iments. Commercial policy was thus conducive for getting European
integration started and for revitalizing it in the mid-1980s. The internal
market quickly reached high levels of vertical integration, triggered the
demand of non-member states to join the Community, and had no opt-
outs. Rather, neighbouring countries that cannot join or do not want to
the EU for various reasons still seek access to the Union market. This
gives rise to the characteristic pattern of no internal differentiation, but

significant external differentiation.
The characteristics of market integration contrast starkly with policy
areas that were integrated at a later stage. Monetary policy and policies
of border control, immigration, internal security, and defence have tradi-
tionally been exclusive domains of the state, and transnational interactions
in these areas have been more limited than in trade. The supranational
integration of these policies causes a substantial loss of autonomy for
the participating states. Giving up the national currency, the national
army, and the control of borders and migration are also likely to create
strong concerns about the preservation of national identity. The fact
that these policies came under the purview of European integration at
all has mainly to do with prior market integration and the endogenous
interdependence it created. Monetary union and the AFSJ followed the
deepening of market integration, the liberalization of capital controls, and
the free movement of persons inherent in the internal market programme
of ‘1992’.
Whereas spillovers from market integration generated demand for
more integration in these and related policy areas, their relevance for state
sovereignty and national identity gave rise to politicization. EMU and
AFSJ have therefore caused horizontal differentiation. The fact that EMU
was extremely centralized from the start produced less horizontal inte-
gration than in the initially more intergovernmental AFSJ. In both areas,
the spillover dynamic created by integration has attracted further member
states and—in the case of Schengen—non-member states, but politiciza-
tion still limits horizontal integration. In particular, the most Eurosceptic
governments or societies among the member states have refrained from
adopting the euro.
By contrast, the internal market has not significantly boosted interde-
pendence in defence policy, with the notable exception of the market for
defence procurement. With levels of security interdependence low, given
the continued prominence of NATO, the pressure for integration has
also remained lower in this policy area than in others. At the same time,
defence policy is arguably at the core of state sovereignty. As a result, it
has not moved beyond intergovernmental coordination and cooperation
and, because it has remained at this low level of integration, a politiciza-
tion dynamic that would have resulted in major differentiation has failed
to develop.
1 INTRODUCTION 17
Structure of the Book

This is a book about European integration. The study of European inte-
gration is concerned with the development of the EU, and theories of
European integration explain why and how the EU has become what it is
today. We therefore focus on the provisions of EU treaties and treaty revi-
sions, which change the functional scope of integration, the competences
of EU actors, and the membership of the EU and its policies. Conversely,
this is not a book about EU politics and policy-making (i.e. on how the
EU decides and works). While recent research has unveiled that differ-
entiation has been quite prominent in the area of secondary law as well
(Duttle et al. 2017), legislative differentiation generally follows the logic
of treaty-based differentiated integration and has decreased over time
(Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020). We therefore only partially refer to
differentiation dynamics in the area of secondary law; in particular, we
take a closer look at a number of cases considered for enhanced coopera-
tion in the EU (Kroll and Leuffen 2015), such as permanent structured
cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence.
This book is dedicated to the theory-based analysis and explanation
of European integration. Rather than describing and tracing the histor-
ical development of European integration, it seeks to provide students
with the tools for theory-based explanation and to demonstrate how
these tools can be applied to enhance our understanding of European
integration.
The book is further based on our strong belief that the study of
European integration remains an important and indispensable aspect
of studying the EU. The EU is not merely about ordinary politics
and policy-making that we find in any political system. It is also a
highly dynamic and unsettled polity, which has been involved in a
quasi-permanent process of changing its institutions, competences, and
membership. The ‘polycrisis’ of the EU in the past decade underlines this
point. As any political actor, political actors in the EU are concerned with
remaining in office, winning votes, and obtaining their preferred policies.
But they also deal with a number of questions that national policy-
makers are very rarely confronted with: Which peoples and territories do
we admit? Where are our borders? How do we distribute competences
and policies? Which members of the polity obtain an exemption from
our common rules? Finally, whereas national policy-makers mainly worry
about citizens’ support for their policies, parties, and government, EU
policy-makers must also be concerned about support for the polity, as

such.
The book has eleven main chapters. In Chapter 2, we describe the
EU and its development. We ask what kind of polity the EU is. We
compare the EU to the state and the international organization—the two
typical political organizations in the modern international system—and
show that it does not fit either type well. Rather, we propose to concep-
tualize the EU as a system of differentiated integration. We then describe
how this system has developed since the beginnings of European integra-
tion. We show, first, and notwithstanding phases of stagnation, that the
Community has significantly expanded its tasks and competences since its
inception. This is what we call ‘vertical integration’. Second, the expan-
sion of membership in EU policies (or ‘horizontal integration’) has kept
pace with the expansion of tasks and competences. We also show that
vertical and horizontal integration varies significantly, depending on the
issue. EU members and competences change both across time and across
policies. This variation requires explanation.
Part I introduces the theories of integration that offer explanations:
supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, constructivism, and postfunc-
tionalism. In Chapters 3–6, we present the general assumptions of each
theory, portray the main conditions and mechanisms for explaining
vertical and horizontal integration as well as differentiation, and, finally,
develop propositions, and formulate hypotheses about differentiated inte-
gration. These hypotheses are then be applied to EU policies in the
second part of this book.
In Part II, we describe and analyse a diverse sample of major EU
policy areas: the internal market, EMU, defence policy, and the AFSJ.
These policies are not only politically important in their own right; they
also represent different levels of vertical integration and different types
of differentiated membership. They thus allow us to apply and evaluate
theories of integration in highly varied settings. Chapters 7–10 are each
dedicated to the analysis of one policy (area). The Conclusion presents a
comparison of these policies and the synthetic theoretical framework that
explains the variation in integration and differentiation across time and
policies.
1 INTRODUCTION 19
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European Public Policy 22 (3): 353–373.
Lord, Christopher. 2015. Utopia or Dystopia? Towards a Normative Analysis of
Differentiated Integration. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (6): 783–798.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Thomas Winzen. 2020. Ever Looser Union? Differ-
entiated European Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Dirk Leuffen, and Berthold Rittberger. 2015. The Euro-
pean Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence,
Politicization, and Differentiation. Journal of European Public Policy 22 (6):
764–782.
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Journal of Common Market Studies 34: 283–295.
Vollaard, Hans. 2018. European Disintegration. A Search for Explanations.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
CHAPTER 2
The European Union as a System

of Differentiated Integration
Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission, once

called the European Union a UPO—an Unidentified Political Object.
Already in the early 1970s, Donald Puchala (1971) likened students of
European integration to blind men each examining a different body part
of an elephant and, predictably, coming to divergent conclusions about
the object of their study. Indeed, since its beginnings, scholars have
debated the ‘nature of the beast’ without reaching consensus.
We argue that conceiving the EU as a ‘system of differentiated inte-
gration’ is an indispensable key to better understand its nature. In this
chapter, we will make the case for this notion in two steps. First, we
explore the particularities of the EU by contrasting it with the two
traditional and most widespread types of polities in the contemporary
international system: the state and the international organization. The
comparison serves to show that the EU fits neither type and that it is
like an international organization in some respects but more akin to a
state in others. Second, we argue that the classic comparison obscures the
differentiated nature of European integration which unfolds along three
dimensions: the level of centralization, functional scope, and territorial
extension. Because the EU’s centralization and territorial extension vary
across policies, the EU is a system of differentiated integration.
In the second part of the chapter, we measure and map differentiated
integration. For each policy area, we measure its level of centralization
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2022
D. Leuffen et al., Integration and Differentiation in the European Union,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76677-1_2
(vertical integration) and its territorial extension (horizontal integration)

over time. This allows us to capture both integration and differentiation
at the level of the EU and its individual policies. We show that vertical
integration has generally increased over time. The data further highlight
that vertical and horizontal integration are less conflicting than is often
claimed. ‘Deepening’ and ‘widening’ go largely hand in hand in the
history of European integration. The analysis also reveals that integration
has been accompanied by differentiation. The difference in the level of
centralization across policies (vertical differentiation) is pronounced and
has increased, rather than shrunk, over time. So has horizontal differen-
tiation: following the 1980s, the territorial extension of EU integration
has begun to vary increasingly across policies.
Between International Organization and State

The European Union (EU) defies the classic dichotomous categories of
public law, which distinguish two basic types of contemporary polities: the
modern state and the international organization. Figure 2.1 contrasts the
characteristics typically associated with the two types. Whereas there are
differences in degree and individual exceptions, most states and interna-
tional organizations cluster at either end of the spectrum. Figure 2.1 also
shows where the EU fits in the picture. The further a cross (‘X’) is located
to the right, the more the EU resembles an international organization; the
further it is located to the left, the more it is akin to a state.
Membership
States are composed of citizens who mostly acquire their citizenship or
nationality by birth. It is rare for individuals to change their citizenship
or to be a citizen of more than one country. By contrast, the members
of international organizations are states. The individual is not a subject
of classic international law. Moreover, states become members of inter-
national organizations on a voluntary, contractual basis—usually by an
international treaty. States are free to leave an international organization
(although this is rather rare) and usually belong to many international
organizations.
The EU’s membership regime is that of an international organization.
Only states can become EU members. Accession is voluntary. It results
from an accession treaty that needs to be ratified by all member states
2 THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SYSTEM … 23
Fig. 2.1 The EU: between state and international organization (Source own
illustration)
and the candidate state. The member states are also free, in principle, to
leave the EU. The most recent of the EU’s treaty revisions, the Treaty
of Lisbon, formally introduced an exit procedure (Article 50), which was
triggered for the first time by the UK in 2017. In contrast to other inter-
national organizations, there is an EU citizenship, as well. Among other
things, the EU accords its citizens the right of free movement and resi-
dence throughout the EU, and the right to vote and stand in local and
European elections in any member state. Yet, EU citizenship is derivative
of and subordinated to national citizenship. Individuals acquire EU citi-
zenship as an automatic consequence of citizenship in any of its member
states, and the Treaty stipulates that EU citizenship shall supplement
rather than replace national citizenship.
Delimitation
The system of states is a territorially delimited system. The borders
between states are physical, geographical lines. State territories are also
generally exclusive and exhaustive. It is rare for (land) territories to be
governed by two or more states at the same time, or by no state at
all. By the same token, states are functionally integrated. They possess
the authority to deal with all areas of public policy on their territory:
external and internal security, economy and welfare, individual rights and
freedoms. By contrast, international organizations are typically function-
ally delimited. Their authority is mostly task-specific: the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is a security organization, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) covers trade and the World Health Organization
(WHO) deals with public health issues. Obviously, the borders between
these organizations are institutional rather than physical, and their compe-
tences are partially overlapping. For instance, both NATO and the United
Nations Security Council may be involved in the same security issue either
in cooperation or in competition, and both the WTO and World Intellec-
tual Property Organization regulate intellectual property rights. Whereas
states tend to integrate all task-specific competences on a single territory,
(global) international organizations strive to regulate one specific issue for
multiple territories.
In this respect, the EU is more like a state than an international organi-
zation. The EU has a clearly demarcated (and fairly contiguous) territory,
as well as a physical border. People enter the EU much as they would
enter the United States of America—and not as they would ‘enter’ the
WTO or NATO. European integration has also thoroughly transformed
border regimes among its member states. Borders between member states
have largely lost their traditional functions as barriers to the free move-
ment of persons and goods, except in times of crisis. In many places, they
look more like borders between administrative districts within a state,
rather than traditional borders between states. By contrast, the borders
between member states and non-member states have become external EU
borders at which the EU’s border regime is applied.
The EU covers all policy fields: having started as an economic orga-
nization, it has expanded into all areas of public policy including foreign
policy, internal and external security, and the protection of civil and social
rights. Although its competences vary from issue-area to issue-area, there
is hardly a field of policy-making that is not regulated and affected in some
2 THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SYSTEM … 25
way by the EU. In contrast to the typical state the territorial extension is
not the same for all policies: the European Research Area is larger than
the internal market, which is again larger than the eurozone. That territo-
rial extension varies by functional regime is characteristic of international
organizations—and a core feature of the EU as system of differentiated
integration that we will discuss in more detail below.
Authority
The modern state is sovereign—regardless of whether sovereignty ulti-
mately rests with the people, an autocratic class, or a dictator. Its
relationship to its citizen-members is hierarchical. The state alone has the
authority to make and enforce laws that are binding for all people living
on its territory. International organizations do not have these attributes
of sovereignty. Their powers derive from the consent of the member
states, which do not give up their individual sovereignty upon founding or
joining an international organization. The relationship between the inter-
national organization and its members (as well as among the members
themselves) is anarchical: every state has no master other than itself.
Rather than being subordinated to an international organization, the
member states coordinate their policies within its institutional framework.
Decision-making is typically based on intergovernmental consensus. The
member state executives that participate in international policy-making
are not checked and balanced at the international level by parliamentary
(citizen) representations or by independent judiciaries. Adherence to the
rules of an international regime is voluntary, and international law is typi-
cally soft law. Many rules are not legally binding and, even if they are,
their interpretation and the settlement of disputes are subject to negoti-
ations between the member states. Third-party adjudication is rare—and
mostly voluntary, where it exists.
To qualify as sovereign, the EU would have to be able to decide
its constitutional order autonomously. Yet, its basic principles and rules
remain treaty-based, and the member states remain the ‘masters of the
treaties’. Any change in the EU’s formal ‘constitution’ needs to be nego-
tiated among the member governments, agreed by unanimity, and ratified
in each member state. This is typical for international organizations.
Short of sovereignty, however, the EU’s institutions resemble those
of a state. First and foremost, its legal system is highly integrated. The
EU produces legislation taking direct effect in the member states and
are superior to competing domestic law. Cases of non-compliance and

legal disputes are ultimately settled by an independent court, the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which makes binding deci-
sions and is entitled to fine the member states, if need be. National
courts refer cases involving European law to the Court for binding
preliminary rulings. Second, the separation of powers is more similar to
(liberal-democratic) states than to international organizations. The EU
not only has an independent judiciary, but also a directly elected Euro-
pean Parliament (EP). Nevertheless, executives play an important role
in legislation and jurisdiction, as well. The most powerful chamber of
the legislature, the Council, is composed of member state governments,
and the European Commission is not only the EU’s executive, but also
formally initiates all legislation and monitors member state compliance.
Third, decision-making in the EU is mainly majoritarian. Most EU laws
are passed under the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’, which combines
majority voting in the Council and the EP and covers virtually all areas
of EU policy-making. However, EU decisions generally require large
(‘qualified’) majorities, and the Council, in practice, takes most of its deci-
sions by consensus. In sum, the EU has arguably travelled half way from
anarchy to hierarchy. Whereas rule-making and adjudication are clearly
hierarchical, ultimately, the EU is not sovereign and cannot order the
use of force against non-compliant member states. In other words, EU
authority is characterized by hierarchy in the shadow of anarchy.
Governance Capacity
International organizations have weak policy-making capacity. Whereas in
states, including most federal states, the centre normally has the strongest
administration and receives the biggest share of state revenues, the
bureaucracies of international organizations are typically small, weak, and
without independent income, let alone the power of taxation. Whereas
the modern welfare state can use its powers to intervene in the economy
and engage in redistribution, international organizations typically focus
on regulatory policies: they make rules that coordinate and constrain the
actions of states, rather than intervening directly in market or social rela-
tions. And, whereas the state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of
force, international organizations do not have the means to physically
coerce their members into compliance with their rules.
Another random document with
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earned seventy-five dollars a month, put her baby out to nurse and
returned to the White House, where we got regular reports as to the
progress of the invalid and the infant, each of whom proceeded to do
as well as could be expected.
The other servants in the White House are paid the usual wages,
from twenty-five to fifty dollars, and are no more and no less efficient
than other good houseworkers in other homes. The entire White
House staff is paid by the Government, the only private servants in
our employ being a Filipino valet who had been with Mr. Taft for a
number of years, and my personal maid.
© Harris & Ewing.
TWO CORNERS OF THE WHITE

HOUSE KITCHEN
In fact, all White House expenses are paid by the Government
except actual table supply bills, and Mr. Taft is fond of insisting upon
his conviction that the country treats its President exceedingly well.
He was the first President to receive a salary of $75,000.00 a year,
and when the subject of his nomination was uppermost in political
discussions he did not hesitate to say that he thought this increase
from $50,000.00 was an absolute necessity. He did not expect to
spend $75,000.00 a year, but he knew by careful calculation and by a
knowledge of President Roosevelt’s expenditures that he would have
to spend at least $50,000.00 a year and he thought he had a citizen’s
right, even as President, to provide a small competence for his
family, a thing which in his twenty years of poorly paid official
service he had never had an opportunity to do. He was fifty years old
with two sons and a daughter in school and college and, as Secretary
of War at least, he had long been working for a wage which was
insufficient. But the country really is good to its President. It does
not make him rich by any means, but it enables him to banish the
wolf a fair distance from his door if he is sensible enough to assist its
generosity by the exercise of a mild form of prudence.
My first inspection of the White House on the evening of my
husband’s Inauguration was casual, but the next day I assumed the
management of the establishment in earnest and proceeded upon a
thorough investigation which resulted in some rather disquieting
revelations.
Mrs. Roosevelt, as the retiring Mistress of the White House,
naturally would make no changes or purchases which might not meet
with the approval of her successor, so I found the linen supply
depleted, the table service inadequate through breakages, and other
refurnishing necessary. There is a government appropriation to meet
the expense of such replenishments and repairs, and every
President’s wife is supposed to avail herself of any part of it she
requires to fit the mansion for her own occupancy.
Perhaps nothing in the house is so expressive of the various
personalities of its Mistresses as the dinner services which each has
contributed. For my part I was entirely satisfied with the quiet taste
displayed by Mrs. Roosevelt and contented myself with filling up the
different broken sets in her service to the number necessary for one
hundred covers.
I always enjoyed, however, using some of the old historic plates
and platters at small luncheons and dinners. There are enough plates
left of the Lincoln set to serve a course to a party of thirty. Though I
speak of the different designs as expressive of personalities they
represent, perhaps, various periods of popular taste rather than
individual preference. Samples of all the different services, displayed
in cabinets in the long eastern corridor, are among the most
interesting exhibits in the White House.
From the day my husband became President I never knew for
certain until I entered the dining-room just how many persons there
would be at luncheon. He always did credit me with a miraculous
ability to produce food for any number of persons at a moment’s
notice and when he was Governor of the Philippines and Secretary of
War I always had to keep an emergency supply cupboard, but I did
not feel that I could carry with me into the White House the happy-
go-lucky attitude toward the formalities which I had enjoyed in those
days, so meeting his sudden demands became a slightly more serious
matter. His haphazard hospitality was of more concern to the
servants than to me, however, and I think it is only his own gift for
inspiring respectful devotion on the part of his household staff that
ever enables me to keep a cook more than a week at a time.
During our first spring in the White House Congress was in extra
session for the purpose of revising the tariff and Mr. Taft was in
constant conference with the different Senators and Representatives.
We had members of Congress at luncheon and dinner daily, and at
breakfast quite frequently.
Always, in consultation with my housekeeper and the head cook, I
made out the daily menus.
“How many for luncheon, Madame?” was the cook’s invariable
question.
“I haven’t any idea,” was my invariable reply.
If no guests had, to my knowledge, been invited I would give
instructions to have luncheon prepared for the family only,
emergency provision being a thing understood. My day’s plans would
then be sent over to Mr. Young, the Executive Social Officer, who had
his office in the Executive wing of the building, and I would go on
about my accustomed duties and pleasures knowing that no surprise
would find us quite surprised.
Along about eleven o’clock the house telephone would ring, or a
note would be sent over, and announcement would be made that Mr.
So and So would lunch with the President and Mrs. Taft. The table
would be laid while the kitchen staff stood calmly by awaiting final
orders. In another half hour might come the announcement of a
second guest, or group of guests, whereupon the amiable butler
would have to make a complete change in table arrangements. Only
about a half hour before the stated luncheon hour did the cook ever
consider it safe to begin final preparations, but too often for the
maintenance of entire smoothness in domestic routine Mr. Taft
would come across from the Executive offices anywhere from a half
hour to an hour late, bringing with him an extra guest, or even a
number of extra guests whose coming had not been announced at all.
This system, or this lack of system, obtained throughout my four
years in the White House, but I and my capable and willing staff, all
of whom were devoted to the President, eventually adjusted
ourselves to it and I began to take great delight in the informal
meeting of so many interesting and distinguished men at our open
luncheon table.
I tried to insist that the dinner hour should always be properly
respected, and it usually was. While we gave many informal, small
dinners,—nearly every night as a matter of fact,—there were crowded
into my first season from March until I became ill in May most of the
big official functions which are a part of White House life always, as
well as a number of entertainments which were a part of my own
scheme of innovations.
Our first official entertainment was the Diplomatic Tea on the 12th
of March, just eight days after the Inauguration, and before I had
time to settle myself in the midst of my own belongings which were
to fill the empty spaces left by the removal of Mrs. Roosevelt’s
personal effects. At this tea we received the entire Diplomatic Corps,
including all heads of Missions, and all Secretaries and Attachés,
with their wives.
Nothing could be more statelily important. It was the first
presentation of the Diplomatic Corps to the new President and
though, having been for several years in Washington society, we
knew many of them quite well, the method of procedure was as
formal as the State Department could make it. Explicit directions as
to the manner in which they were to present themselves were sent in
printed form to every diplomatic representative in Washington, but
while an almost oppressive dignity marked the proceedings, our wide
acquaintance made it possible for us to depart somewhat from the
rigid form decreed and to lend to the occasion an air of general
friendliness it could not otherwise have had.
It might be interesting to those not familiar with Washington life
to know just what the prescribed ceremonies are for such an event. I
confess that at first they seemed to me to be rather formidable,
accustomed as I was to the dignities of government.
The guests are not received by the President and his wife as they
arrive. They are requested to “present themselves (in uniform) at the
East entrance and to assemble in the East Room at a sufficient
interval before five o’clock to enable them by that hour to place
themselves in the order of precedence, each Chief of Mission being
immediately followed by his staff and ladies of his Embassy or
Legation.” They are met in the East Room by the Secretary of State
and other State Department officials, and by some of the aides-de-
camp on duty at the White House.
In the meantime the President and his wife take their positions in
the Blue Room and exactly at five o’clock the doors are thrown open
and announcement is made in the East Room that they are ready to
receive.
The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps then steps forward, past the
military aides stationed at the door leading into the Blue Room and
is presented by the senior military aide to the President. He in turn
presents each member of his suite, all of whom pass promptly on and
are presented by another aide to the President’s wife, the head of the
Mission being presented to her at the end of these ceremonies. Each
Ambassador or Minister, in strict order of precedence, passes by with
his staff, and they all proceed through the Red Room and into the
state Dining Room where tea and other refreshments are served.
At the conclusion of the presentations the President and his wife
usually retire and leave their guests to be entertained for a few
formal moments by whomever has been invited to preside at the tea-
table, but Mr. Taft and I followed them into the dining-room to have
tea with them. I knew this was a departure from established custom,
but it seemed a perfectly natural thing for us to do. I forgot to take
into consideration the attitude of our guests, however. Our
unaccustomed presence rather bewildered the diplomats for a
moment. There were no rules to guide them in such an emergency
and they didn’t know exactly what was expected of them. I had
finally to instruct one of the aides to announce unofficially to the
wives of some of the more important of them that nothing at all was
expected, and that they should retire without making any adieus
whenever they so desired. I was told afterward that nearly everybody
was pleased with the innovation, and in the official White House
Diary—kept for the purpose of establishing precedents, I suppose—it
was recommended that it be followed on all future occasions of a
similar nature.
At our first state dinner, given to the Vice-President and Mrs.
Sherman, there were thirty-two guests, all Cabinet Officers, Senators
and Representatives. To prove my claim to a natural tendency
toward simple and everyday methods I need only say that even as the
President’s wife it seemed strange to me to have our guests arrive
without immediate greetings from their host and hostess. Many a
time at Malacañan Palace and in other homes I have gone through
the not unusual experience of a hostess who spends the last possible
moments in putting “finishing touches” to preparations for a dinner,
then hurries off to dress in record time that she may be able to meet
her first arriving guest with an air of having been ready and waiting
for ever so long.
But at the White House the guests assemble in whatever room may
be designated and there, grouped in order of rank, await the entrance
of the President and his wife. At this first formal dinner of ours the
guests assembled in the Blue Room, the Vice-President and Mrs.
Sherman being first, of course, and nearest the door leading into the
corridor, while beyond them were the Cabinet officers, then the
Senators and Representatives in order of seniority.
Upon our appearance the band began to play “The Star Spangled
Banner”—which, let me say parenthetically, is almost as difficult a
tune to walk by as Mendelssohn’s Wedding March—and played just
enough of it to bring us to the door of the Blue Room. After we had
shaken hands with everybody the senior aide approached Mr. Taft
with Mrs. Sherman on his arm and announced that dinner was
served, whereupon Mr. Taft offered his arm to Mrs. Sherman and
started for the dining-room.
© Harris & Ewing.
THE EAST ROOM
For my first dinner I chose pink Killarney roses for table

decorations and it would be difficult to express the pleasure I felt in
having just as many of them as I needed by merely issuing
instructions to have them delivered. The White House greenhouses
and nurseries were a source of constant joy to me. I had lived so long
where plants are luxuriant and plentiful that a house without them
seemed to me to be empty of a very special charm and the head
horticulturist remarked at once that during my régime his gems of
palms and ferns and pots of brilliant foliage were to be given their
due importance among White House perquisites. I filled the windows
of the great East Room with them, banked the fireplaces with them
and used them on every possible occasion.
The state Dining Room is one of the many splendid results of the
McKim restoration and, next to the East Room, is the handsomest
room in the White House. It is not so tremendously large, its utmost
capacity being less than one hundred, but it is magnificently
proportioned and beautifully finished in walnut panelling with a
fireplace and carved mantel on one side which would do honour to
an ancient baronial hall. A few fine moose and elk heads are its only
wall decorations.
We had table-tops of all sizes and shapes, but the one we had to
use for very large dinners was in the form of a crescent which
stretched around three sides of the room. For any dinner under sixty
I was able to use a large oval top which could be extended by the
carpenters to almost any size. Indeed, I have seen it so large that it
quite filled the room leaving only enough space behind the chairs for
the waiters to squeeze their way around with considerable
discomfort. On this table I used the massive silver-gilt ornaments
which President Monroe imported from France along with his
interesting collection of French porcelains, clocks and statuettes
which still occupy many cabinets and mantels here and there in the
house.
These table ornaments remind one of the Cellini period when
silversmiths vied with each other in elaborations. Based on oblong
plate glass mirrors, each about three feet in length, they stretch down
the middle of the table, end to end, a perfect riot of festooned railing
and graceful figures upholding crystal vases. Then there are large
gilded candelabra, centre vases and fruit dishes to match. In their
way they are exceedingly handsome, and they certainly are
appropriate to the ceremony with which a state dinner at the White
House is usually conducted.
The White House silver is all very fine and there are quantities of
it. It is all marked, in accordance with the simple form introduced at
the beginning of our history, “The President’s House,” and some of it
is old enough to be guarded among our historic treasures.
When I went to live at the White House I found, much to my
surprise, that this silver had always been kept in a rather haphazard
fashion in chests, or boxes, in the storeroom. I decided to remedy
this even though in doing so I was compelled to encroach somewhat
upon the White House custodian’s already limited quarters. These
quarters are a good-sized office with the house supply rooms opening
off it, and a smaller room adjoining. They are on the ground floor
just across the wide corridor from the kitchen. At one end of the
smaller room I had built a closet with regular vault doors and
combination locks. I had the space divided into compartments, with
a special receptacle for each important article, and velvet-lined trays
in drawers for flat silver, each one of which could be slipped out
separately. This silver closet became the joy of Arthur Brooks’ life, he
being the War Department Messenger who was my right hand man
all the time my husband was Secretary of War and who was
appointed White House Custodian at our request a short time before
Mr. Taft was inaugurated.
I was “at home” informally at the White House about three
afternoons a week when my friends came to see me and when I
received many ladies who wrote and asked for an opportunity to call.
I always received in the Red Room which, with fire and candles
lighted, is pleasant enough to be almost cosy, large and imposing
though it be. I usually had twenty or more callers and I found this a
delightful way of meeting and getting close to people as I could not
hope to do at the great formal receptions.
As an example of one of these, I might cite my first afternoon
reception to the Congressional ladies for which something like four
hundred invitations were issued. I intended to carry this off without
assistance, other than that rendered by the ladies I had asked to
preside over the refreshment tables, but in the end I asked Mr. Taft
to receive with me, a task never very difficult for him. There were no
men invited, so he had the pleasure of shaking hands and exchanging
pleasantries with several hundred women, and he did it without a
single protest. I made the mistake on this occasion of receiving in the
East Room as the guests arrived, thinking that by so doing I could
make the party somewhat less formal. But I only succeeded in having
the stairway leading up from the east entrance overcrowded and in
making the affair much more formal than it would have been had I
followed the usual course of permitting the people to assemble in the
East Room and to be received in the Blue Room on their way through
to the Dining Room. It amuses me to find that Captain Butt in the
Official Diary has carefully recorded all my mistakes as well as my
successes for the supposed benefit of other Mistresses of the White
House.
I do not wish to convey an impression that life in the White House
is all a public entertainment, but there are a certain number of set
functions during every season which are as much a part of
Washington life as is a Congressional session. But even with teas,
luncheons, musicals, small dinners, garden parties and dances
coming at short intervals between the more official entertainments,
we still had many evenings when there were so few guests as to make
us feel quite like a family party. Indeed, once in a while we dined
alone.
We began immediately, as our first spring advanced, to make
almost constant use of the porches and terraces which are among the
most attractive features of the White House. The long terrace
extending from the East Room I found to be a most delightful
promenade for guests on warm spring evenings, while the
corresponding terrace leading out from the Dining Room proved
most useful for large dinner parties at times when dining indoors
would have been rather unpleasant.
With Congress in session nearly all summer Mr. Taft gave a series
of Congressional dinners and the last one he had served on this
terrace. A curious incident marked the occasion for special
remembrance. It was known that one of the Senators invited had
never crossed the White House threshold because of his unfriendly
feeling toward the administration. He paid no attention whatever to
his invitation—a formal one, of course, requiring a formal answer—
until the day before the dinner. He then called the White House on
the telephone and asked if he would be expected to wear a dress suit.
Mr. Hoover, who received the inquiry, replied that evening dress was
customary at White House dinners, whereupon the Senator
mumbled something at the other end of the line. Mr. Hoover asked
him whether or not he intended to come. He replied that he guessed
he would, and abruptly rang off.
The next evening the party waited for him for a full half hour
before they decided to sit down without him, and even then his
vacant place was kept open for him. He did not come nor did he ever
offer any kind of apology or excuse for his extraordinary conduct.
There are certain manifestations of so-called Jeffersonian simplicity
in this country of ours that I am sure Jefferson would deplore if he
lived in this day and generation.
MRS. TAFT ON THE POTOMAC DRIVE
The north verandah of the White House is pleasant enough, but it

lacks the charm of seclusion peculiar to the south portico which runs
around the oval Blue Room and looks out upon the broad south
garden with its great fountain, and with Potomac Park, the River and
Washington’s Monument in the background. This soon became our
favourite retreat and we used to sit there in the ever lengthening
spring evenings, breathing the perfume of magnolia blossoms,
watching the play of lights on the tree-dotted lawns and on the
Monument—which is never so majestic as in the night—and realising
to the full the pleasant privilege of living in this beautiful home of
Presidents.
Mr. Taft had a Victrola in the Blue Room and he never failed, when
opportunity offered, to lay out a few favourite records for his
evening’s entertainment. Melba and Caruso, the Lucia Sextette, some
old English melodies, a few lively ragtime tunes; in those delightful
surroundings we found a Victrola concert as pleasant a diversion as
one could desire. With no applause, no fixed attention, no
conversation, no effort of any kind required, my husband found on
such quiet evenings a relaxation he was fully able to appreciate
during that first trying summer.
That Manila could lend anything to Washington may be an idea
that would surprise some persons, but the Luneta is an institution
whose usefulness to society in the Philippine capital is not to be
overestimated. At least it was so in my day; and for a long time
before Mr. Taft became President I had looked with ambitious
designs upon the similar possibilities presented in the drives, the
river-cooled air and the green swards of Potomac Park. I determined,
if possible, to convert Potomac Park into a glorified Luneta where all
Washington could meet, either on foot or in vehicles, at five o’clock
on certain evenings, listen to band concerts and enjoy such
recreation as no other spot in Washington could possibly afford.
The Army officer in charge of Public Buildings and Grounds had a
bandstand erected in an admirable location at the end of an ellipse,
and we decided that the long drive theretofore known as “The
Speedway” should be renamed Potomac Drive. Arrangements were
made to have band concerts every Wednesday and Saturday
afternoon from five to seven o’clock.
Saturday, the 17th of April, the concert began, and at five o’clock
Mr. Taft and I, in a small landaulette motor-car, went down to the
driveway and took our places in the throng. The Park was full of
people. As many as ten thousand crowded the lawns and footways,
while the drive was completely packed with automobiles and vehicles
of every description. Everybody saw everybody that he or she knew
and there was the same exchange of friendly greetings that had
always made the Luneta such a pleasant meeting place. I felt quite
sure that the venture was going to succeed and that Potomac Drive
was going to acquire the special character I so much wished it to
have.
I also thought we might have a Japanese Cherry Blossom season in
Potomac Park. Both the soil and climate encouraged such an
ambition, so I suggested that all the blooming cherry trees obtainable
in the nurseries of this country be secured and planted. They were
able to find about one hundred only. Then the Mayor of Tokyo,
having learned of our attempt to bestow the high flattery of imitation
upon his country, offered to send us two thousand young trees. We
accepted them with grateful pleasure, but one consignment was
found to be afflicted with some contagious disease and had to be
destroyed. I watched those that were planted later with great interest
and they seem to be doing very well. I wonder if any of them will ever
attain the magnificent growth of the ancient and dearly loved cherry
trees of Japan.
One of the delights of living in the White House is in being able to
entertain one’s friends from a distance with a confidence that they
are being given a real pleasure and an experience of an unusual kind.
More often than not we had house guests, old friends from
Cincinnati, from New Haven, from the Philippines, from here, there
and everywhere; friends with whom we had been closely associated
through the years and who felt whole-hearted satisfaction in my
husband’s attainment of the Presidency.
To be stared at is not pleasant because it keeps one selfconscious
all the time, but one gets more or less used to it. And anyhow, I
enjoyed a sort of freedom which Mr. Taft did not share in any way.
While he would probably have been recognised instantly in any
crowd anywhere, I found that in most places I could wander about
unobserved like any inconspicuous citizen. It was a valued privilege.
My daughter Helen likes to tell about an experience she had one
day in Philadelphia. She was a student at Bryn Mawr College and she
went in to Philadelphia to do some shopping. Among other things
she had to get herself some shoes. At the shoe store she was waited
on by a girl who was anything but intelligently attentive. She had
tried Helen’s patience considerably by suggesting in a certain
nagging way that her superior knowledge of what was “being worn”
deserved respect, and that Helen didn’t know what she wanted
anyhow.
Helen selected some shoes and decided to have them charged to
me, and she thought what a satisfaction it was going to be to reveal
her identity to the patronising and offensive young person. The
young person produced pad and pencil to make out the check.
“Please have them charged to Mrs. William Howard Taft,” said
Helen with what I am sure was her loftiest air.
“Address?”
“Washington.”
The salesgirl held her pencil poised over the pad and with the
familiar expression of satisfaction over a sale accomplished said
pleasantly:
“D. C.?”
THE SOUTH PORTICO FROM THE END OF THE GARDEN

CHAPTER XVIII
SOME WHITE HOUSE FORMALITIES
My very active participation in my husband’s career came to an

end when he became President. I had always had the satisfaction of
knowing almost as much as he about the politics and the intricacies
of any situation in which he found himself, and my life was filled
with interests of a most unusual kind. But in the White House I
found my own duties too engrossing to permit me to follow him long
or very far into the governmental maze which soon enveloped him.
I was permitted fully to enjoy only about the first two and a half
months of my sojourn in the White House. In May I suffered a
serious attack of illness and was practically out of society through an
entire season, having for a much longer time than that to take very
excellent care of myself. During this period my sisters, Mrs. Louis
More, Mrs. Charles Anderson, Mrs. Laughlin and Miss Maria
Herron, came from time to time to visit us and to represent me as
hostess whenever it was necessary for me to be represented.
But even in my temporary retirement, as soon as I was strong
enough to do anything at all, I always took a very lively interest in
everything that was going on in the house, and from my apartments
on the second floor directed arrangements for social activities almost
as if I had been well.
I didn’t even have the privilege of presiding at all my first year
garden parties, though this was a form of hospitality in which I was
especially interested and which, I believe, I was able to make a
notable feature of our administration. Garden parties are very
popular in the Far East and I think, perhaps, I acquired my very
strong liking for them out there, together with a few sumptuous
notions as to what a garden party should be like.
The Emperor and Empress of Japan give two each year; one in the
spring under the cherry blossoms to celebrate the Cherry Blossom
season, and one in the autumn in the midst of chrysanthemums and
brilliant autumn foliage. These are the events of the year in Tokyo,
marking the opening and the close of the social season, and society
sometimes prepares for them weeks ahead, never knowing when the
Imperial invitations will be issued. The time depends entirely on the
blossoming of the cherry trees or the chrysanthemums in the
Imperial Gardens. When the blooms are at their best the invitations
are sent out, sometimes not more than two days in advance, and
society, in its loveliest garments, drops everything else and goes. It
would be very nice, of course, to have always some such special
reason for giving a garden party, but it is only in the “Flowery
Kingdom” that the seasons are marked by flowers.
Nothing could be finer than the south garden of the White House.
With its wide lawns, its great fountain, its shading trees, and the two
long terraces looking down upon it all, it is ideally fitted for
entertaining out of doors. And I must mention one other thing about
it which appealed to me especially, and that is the wholesomeness of
its clean American earth. This is lacking in the tropics. There one
may not sit or lie on the ground, breathing health as we do here; the
tropic soil is not wholesome. Not that one sits or lies on the ground
at garden parties, but the very feel of the earth underfoot is
delightfully different.
I determined to give my first garden party at the White House as
soon as spring was sufficiently far advanced to make it possible. I
issued invitations, 750 of them, for Friday, the 7th of May, planning
at the same time three others to complete the season, one each
Friday during the month.
In order to put possible bad weather off its guard, I made the
invitations simply for an “At Home from 5 to 7 o’clock,” because all
my life the elements have been unfriendly to me. Whenever I plan an
outdoor fête I begin to consult the weather man with the hopeful
faith of a Catherine de Medici appealing to her astrologer, but for all
my humble spirit I very frequently get a downpour, or else a long
drawn out and nerve-trying threat. Quite often the lowering clouds
have passed and my prayers for sunshine have been rewarded, but
quite often, too, I have had to move indoors with an outdoor throng
for whom no indoor diversions had been arranged.
By way of preparation for my first garden party I had a large
refreshment tent put up in the northwest corner of the garden where
it would be handy to the kitchen and serving rooms, while under the
trees here and there I had tables spread at which a corps of waiters
were to serve tea during the reception. The Marine Band I stationed
behind the iron railing just under the Green Room. For any kind of
outdoor entertainment at the White House the band had always been
placed in the middle of the lawn between the south portico and the
fountain, but I thought, and correctly, that the house wall would
serve as a sounding board and make the music audible throughout
the grounds. I arranged to receive under one of the large trees in a
beautiful vista looking south.
No sooner were my plans completed, however, than the weather
man predicted rain. It was coming, sure. Of course, I knew it would,
but I had had too much experience to think of coming in out of the
rain before it began to come down. I always sustain my hopeful
attitude until the deluge descends.
About half past three it began to rain in torrents and I saw all of
my festive-looking preparations reduced to sopping wrecks before
there was even time to rush them indoors. By five o’clock, when it
was time for the people to begin to arrive, it had stopped raining, but
the lawns were soaked and the trees were dripping dismally, so I
directed the band to move into the upper corridor, as usual for
afternoon affairs, had the refreshment tables spread in the state
Dining Room and took my by that time accustomed position to
receive the long line of guests in the East Room.
A week later I had better luck. I sent out the same kind of
invitations, made the same kind of preparations, slightly elaborated,
and was rewarded with a perfect mid-May day.
The guests arrived at the East Entrance, came down the Long
Corridor, out through one of the special guest dressing-rooms, and
down the long slope of the lawn to the tree where Mr. Taft and I
stood to receive them, with Captain Archibald Butt to make the
presentations. At the next garden party I requested the gentlemen to
come in white clothes, in thin summer suits, or in anything they
chose to wear, instead of in frock coats. Some young people played
tennis on the courts throughout the reception; it was warm enough
for bright-coloured parasols and white gowns; the fountain made
rainbows and diamond showers in the sun, and altogether it was a
most pleasing picture of informal outdoor enjoyment. Each year after
that the four May garden parties were among the most popular
entertainments of our social season.
The question of a “Summer Capital,” as the President’s summer
home is called, was quite a serious one for us to settle. We had been
going to Murray Bay for so many years that we had few affiliations
with any other place, and we were most uncertain as to what we
might be able to do.
We finally selected a number of likely places and made our choice
by the process of elimination. One location was too hot, another had
a reputation for mosquitoes, another was too far away, another
hadn’t first-class railway, postal and telegraph facilities, and another,
worst drawback of all, had no good golf links. It wouldn’t have been a
livable place for Mr. Taft without golf links because golf was his
principal form of exercise and recreation. Also the whole family
agreed that we must be near the sea, so our search finally narrowed
to the Massachusetts coast. I decided on the North Shore, as the
coast from Beverly to Gloucester is called, because it had every
qualification for which we were seeking, including excellent golf at
the Myopia and Essex County clubs. Then, too, it had a further
attraction in that the summer homes of a number of our friends were
located there, or in the near vicinity.
© Harris & Ewing.
THE WHITE HOUSE GARDEN AND WASHINGTON’S

MONUMENT FROM THE SOUTH PORTICO
I went up in the spring to Beverly Farms, with my friend Miss

Boardman, and inspected houses for three days, finally selecting one,
principally for its location. It stood near the sea and its velvety green
lawns sloped all the way down to the sea-wall. From its verandah one
could see out across Salem Harbour to Marblehead.
The house itself was a modern frame cottage, as simple as
anything well could be, with a fine verandah and a dormer windowed
third story. It was large enough for the family and for such visitors as
we inevitably would have to accommodate, but besides the Taft
family, which was numerous enough at that time, there were Captain
Butt and a large corps of secretaries and stenographers, to say
nothing of the Commander of the Sylph, the President’s smaller
yacht, who all had to be within call when they were wanted. Then,
too, there was the necessity for Executive Offices and I didn’t think it
would seem like having a vacation at all if the Executive Offices could
not be somewhere out of sight so that they might sometimes be out
of mind. The President didn’t expect to be able to spend much of his
time away from Washington the first summer but when he did come
to Beverly I wanted him to feel that he was at least partially
detaching himself from business. So another house was found in the
town, yet on the seashore, and was fitted up for Executive Offices and
as a home for the office staff and Captain Butt. The secret service
men, like the poor, we had with us always, but it never seemed to me
that they “lived” anywhere. They were merely around all the time.
They were never uniformed, of course, and looked like casual
visitors. They used to startle callers by emerging suddenly from
behind bushes or other secluded spots—not I am sure because of a
weakness for detective methods, but because they concealed
comfortable chairs in these places—and asking them what they
wanted. It was sometimes most amusing and sometimes rather
trying, but as long as there are cranks and unbalanced persons such
precautions will be necessary for the protection of Presidents, and
anyhow, one gets so used to the men as almost to forget what they
are there for.
We did not go to Beverly the first summer until the third of July.
Captain Butt preceded us to make final arrangements for our
reception on the Fourth, and the servants and motor cars had been
sent on several days before. I was still in such ill health that it was
necessary to avoid the excitement of the inevitable crowds, so when
our private car “Mayflower” arrived in Beverly the welcome
ceremonies were purposely subdued. A great crowd was present at
the station, but at Mr. Taft’s request no speeches were made. Shortly
after we arrived at the house the Mayor of Beverly, with a committee
of citizens, called, an address of welcome was delivered, to which Mr.
Taft responded and cordial relations were established. But nothing
more occurred even though it was the Fourth of July.
Mr. Taft spent just one day with us, then hurried away to keep a
bewildering number of engagements here and there before he
returned to Washington, where Congress was still in stormy session
over the tariff bill.
He came back in August to spend a month with us, and then the
little sea-side colony, which we had found as quiet as the woods,
except for the lavish hospitality of its people, became indeed the
nation’s summer capital. Nobody found it inconvenient to come to

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Integration and Differentiation in the

European Union: Theory and Policies

The EU between Federal Union and Flexible Integration:

The Constitutional Theory of the Federation and the

The European Ombudsman and Good Administration in the

Aspects of the Energy Union: Application and Effects of

Education and Solidarity in the European Union:

Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration

The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed

The European Union And The Technology Shift 1st Edition

ISBN 978-3-030-76676-4 ISBN 978-3-030-76677-1 (eBook)

Cover credit: Eoneren

crisis has underlined growing inequalities among the EU member states,

We finally thank our students for engaged discussions on differentiated

Konstanz, Germany Dirk Leuffen

Self-Test and Discussion Questions 112

Explaining the European Defence Community and Its

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

Country Codes for Figure 2.3

Fig. 2.1 The EU: between state and international organization 23

Table 2.1 Measurement of vertical and horizontal integration

Box 2.1 Timeline: Major steps of integration 34

A Story of Integration---and Differentiation

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

legal tender in only 19 of the 27 member states. During the Maastricht

Finally, non-member states participate to varying degrees in a large

expansion, supranational centralization, and enlargement and generated

Differentiated Integration in EU Studies

name just a few seminal contributions, Alexander Stubb (1996) suggested

The How and Why of Differentiated

• Vertical integration is the transfer of policy-making competences

• Horizontal integration is the territorial expansion of integrated poli-

Our mapping of European integration over time reveals a distinct pattern:

find external differentiation (i.e. non-member states participating in an

• The internal market is characterized by early and high vertical and

In this book, we introduce readers to the differentiated vertical and hori-

• Postfunctionalism focuses on explaining integration backlash. Deep-

confronted with international policy externalities such as barriers to trade,

supranational institutions. Supranational organizations such as the Euro-

instance, the French Parliament vetoed the European Defence Commu-

gives rise to the characteristic pattern of no internal differentiation, but

Structure of the Book

policy-makers must also be concerned about support for the polity, as

The European Union as a System

Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission, once

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

(vertical integration) and its territorial extension (horizontal integration)

Between International Organization and State

are superior to competing domestic law. Cases of non-compliance and

© Harris & Ewing.

TWO CORNERS OF THE WHITE

© Harris & Ewing.

THE EAST ROOM

For my first dinner I chose pink Killarney roses for table

The north verandah of the White House is pleasant enough, but it

THE SOUTH PORTICO FROM THE END OF THE GARDEN

My very active participation in my husband’s career came to an

THE WHITE HOUSE GARDEN AND WASHINGTON’S

I went up in the spring to Beverly Farms, with my friend Miss

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