IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR ZAMBIA APPEAL NO.

21812012

HOLDEN AT LUSAKA SCZ/8/342/2012

(Civil Jurisdiction)

BETWEEN:

PAMELA MTHUNZI ZULU APPELLANT

AND

PETER ZULU (SR) 1ST RESPONDENT

IDAH CHULU ZULU 2ND RESPONDENT
PETER ZULU (JR) 3RD RESPONDENT

CORAM: Mwanamwambwa D.C.J., Muyovwe and Kaoma, J.J.S.,

On 22nd July, 2015 and 1st March, 2017

For the Appellant: Mr. M Chibiya, of Messrs. Lusitu Chambers

For the ist Respondent: In person
For the 2" Respondent: In person
For the .31'd Respondent: In person

JUDGMENT

Mwanamwambwa D.C.J., delivered the Judgment of the Court.

Legislation Referred to:

The Intestate Succession Act, Chapter 59 of the Laws of Zambia
The Lands and Deeds Registry Act, Chapter 187 of the Laws of Zambia
The Wills and Administration of Testate Estates Act, Chapter 60 of the Laws
of Zambia
The Births and Deaths Registration Act, Chapter 51 of the Laws of Zambia

Cases Referred to:

Rosemary Chibwe v Austine Chibwe (2000) ZR 1
Watchtel v Watchtel (1973) 1 ALL ER 113
Wesley Mulungushi v Catherine Bwale Mizi Chomba (2004) ZR 96
 - J2 -

Wilson Masauso Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Ltd (1982) ZR 172

Lindiwe Kate Chinyanta v Doreen Chiwele and Judith Tembo (2007) ZR 246

This appeal is from a Judgment of the High Court, in

which the learned trial Judge revoked the appointment of the

appellant as co-administratrix for the estate of the late Peter

Paul Zulu.

Brief facts are that the late Peter Paul Zulu, died intestate

in a road traffic accident on loth December 2004. The deceased

was survived by a wife, who is the appellant in this appeal. He

married her on 28th December 2002, at Lusaka Civic Centre. He

had one child with her, called Monase Zulu. The 1st respondent

is the father to the deceased. The 2nd respondent is the mother.

And the 3rd respondent is the brother. Evidence was led by the

respondents in the court below, that the deceased also had a

relationship with another woman by the name of Claudina

Sakala. That relationship resulted in the birth of a child called

Belita Zulu, who was also being referred to as Bertha Zulu in

the Court below. The respondents testified that the deceased

left Claudina Sakala pregnant at the time he died. Belita Zulu

was born on 15th May 2005, five months after he had died. In
 - J3 -

terms of property, the deceased left house No. 10375, Nyumba

Yanga, Lusaka. It was registered in his name. There is a letter

on record which was purportedly written by the deceased to his

mother, giving her the said house.

The appellant and the 3rd respondent were appointed by

the Local Court as co-administratrix and co-administrator,

respectively, on 21st December 2004. A dispute arose between

the appellant and the respondents, over the administration of

the estate. The appellant filed an Originating Summons against

the 3rd respondent, seeking an order from the Court that House

No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka, was property of the late

Peter Paul Zulu and that the house should devolve upon her as

the surviving spouse, and Monase Zulu, as the deceased's only

child. She wanted the house sold so that the proceeds could be

used to purchase another house for Monase Zulu or in the

alternative, that ownership of the house be transferred to

Monase Zulu to be held in trust for her by the appellant. On the

other hand, the respondents wanted the appellant removed as

co-administratrix of her late husband's estate on grounds that

she had mismanaged the estate They made an application for

 - 14 -

an order for the appellant to render an account of the money

she had collected in her capacity as co-administratrix.

Before the matter could be heard, on 27th May 2008, the

appellant applied for the proceedings to be continued as if the

matter was commenced by Writ of Summons. The lower court

granted the application and ordered that the appellant's action

be prosecuted as a counterclaim to the respondents' claims.

Thereafter, a trial was conducted at which the parties adduced

evidence to support their respective cases.

On 20th September 2012, the learned trial Judge rendered

his judgment on the matter. He addressed his mind to the

issue of whether house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga was family

property or matrimonial property of the deceased and the

appellant as his surviving spouse. He reviewed the evidence

and found that at the time the deceased bought the house in

dispute, the appellant was not yet married to him and she

never even lived in that house. He took the view that the

deceased bought the house for the benefit of his family

 - .15 -

members. And as such, the learned trial Judge found that the

house belonged to the deceased's parents and siblings.

The learned trial Judge used Section 3 of the Intestate

Succession Act and the cases of Rosemary Chibwe v Austine

Chibweni and Watchtel v Watchte1121, to determine what

constitutes family property. He was of the opinion that

property acquired before marriage could only become

matrimonial property if the party who buys it makes it clear

and known to the spouse that such property was intended to be

matrimonial property. He observed that in this case, the

appellant had admitted that she never knew anything about the

said house and that her late husband never told her about it.

The learned trial Judge found that house No. 10375, Nyumba

Yanga, Lusaka was not matrimonial property but that it was

the property of respondents' family, to which the Intestate

Succession Act did not apply. He was of the view that the
house did not form part of the estate of the deceased. He

ordered that it should vest in the deceased's mother, in

accordance with his wish as expressed in a letter that was

produced in court.
 - J6 -

The learned trial Judge went on to consider the issue of

whether the appellant had properly executed her duties as co-

administratrix in accordance with the law. He found that the

appellant squandered the estate of her husband and it had

suffered massive waste at her hands as co-administratrix. He

observed that the appellant had admitted the various

allegations which the respondents made against her but she

offered flimsy explanations to justify her conduct. He found as a

fact that the appellant largely kept the deceased's family out of

the administration of the estate and that she had displayed

extreme selfishness, greed and lack of accountability. He stated

that the evidence on record proved that the appellant was guilty

of property grabbing and looting with no accountability of any

kind to anyone. He formed the view that the appellant

committed offences for which she could be investigated,

prosecuted and punished under the Intestate Succession Act.

He came to the conclusion that that the appellant's conduct

was contrary to the law.

 - J7 -

For this reason, he revoked the appellant's appointment

as co-administratrix and ordered her to provide an inventory

and to render an account of all the money she had collected, to

the exclusion of her co-administrator. The learned trial Judge

ordered that the 3rd respondent should continue as sole

administrator for the remaining portion of the estate. He further

ordered that adequate and equal provisions should be made in

the estate to provide for the deceased's biological children,

Monase Zulu and Belita Zulu and that the remainder of the

estate be strictly administered in accordance with the

provisions of the Intestate Succession Act. He held that since

the appellant squandered a substantial portion of the state, she

would be at the mercy of the sole administrator of the estate

only if and when she had rendered a satisfactory account of

how she used the money, documents and properties that she

single handedly collected and used. He upheld the respondents'

claims and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower court, the

appellant appealed to this Court advancing four grounds of

appeal. These read as follows:-

 1. That the learned High Court Judge erred both in fact and law when
he held that house 10375, Nyumba Yanga should vest in Wall Chulu
Zulu and that it does not form part of the estate of the late Peter Paul
Zulu;
2 That the learned High Court Judge erred in both law and fact when
he held that the appellant had squandered monies in the estate other
late husband late Peter Paul Zulu;
3 That the learned High Court Judge erred both in law and fact when
he revoked the letters of administration held by the appellant in the
estate of the late husband Peter Paul Zulu;
4. That the learned High Court Judge erred in fact when he ordered that
Belita Zulu was Peter Paul Zulu's child.

Based on these grounds of appeal, the parties filed written

heads of argument which they relied on at the hearing of this

appeal. For convenience's sake, we will start by addressing

ground one and then will move to ground four. Thereafter, we

shall deal with grounds two and three together because they

are interrelated. In fact, counsel for the appellant argued the

two grounds together.

Submitting on behalf of the appellant on ground one, Mr.

Chibiya argued that the fact that the deceased bought house

No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga and it was registered in his name at

the time of his death, automatically made it part of his estate.

He contended that there was no valid legal document which

 -J9 -

had transferred the property to someone else. He referred us to

Section 9 of the Intestate Succession Act, which provides

that where the estate includes a house, the surviving spouse or

child or both, shall be entitled to that house. He argued that

there is no requirement that the family should have lived in the

said house for the surviving spouse or child to be entitled to it.

Counsel submitted that the letter which the trial Judge

said expressed the deceased's wish to give the house to his

mother did not satisfy the requirements under the Statute of

Frauds because it did not name the person it was addressed to

or the full names of the author. He relied on the case of Wesley

Mulungushi v Catherine Bwale Mizi Chomba13) for this

submission. He argued that the said letter was not a legally

binding document; that it was void and unenforceable because

it was not registered as required by Section 4 of the Lands

and Deeds Registry Act. He contended that the said letter

does not qualify to be a Will' because it does not meet the

requirements stipulated in Section 6 of the Wills and

Administration of Testate Estates Act

 - J10 -

He submitted that there was no proof that the 1St and 2nd

respondents gave money to the deceased as top up towards the

purchase of the house in issue. He stated that there was no

evidence that the house belonged to the respondents' family as

a whole. He pointed out that the fact that the deceased was

helping his family members once in a while after receiving some

rentals from the house, did not qualify the house to be family

property. He further argued that the case of Rosemary Chibwe

v Austin Chibwei and that of Watchtel v Watchteloc which

the trial Judge used in arriving at his decision, are authorities

in divorce matters. They do not apply to a case such as this,

where a person dies intestate. He submitted that in the cases

of death, property forms part of the estate for as long as the

property belongs to the deceased. He drew our attention to the

definition of 'estate" under Section 3 of the Intestate

Succession Act where it is defined as "all the assets and

liabilities of the deceased including those accruing to him by

virtue of death or after his death and for the purposes of

administration of the estate, including personal chattels".

 -Ill -
The respondents opposed ground one of this appeal. They

jointly submitted that the appellant was not married to the

deceased at the time the family bought the house and that she

did not know anything about it. The appellants stated that the

family registered the house in the name of the deceased,

because he was the oldest son to the 1st and 2nd respondents

and he substantially contributed towards the purchase of the

house through the loan he obtained from the Public Service

Pension Board. It was their submission that the house belonged

to the respondents' family as a whole and it was not part of the

estate. The respondents stressed that the appellant did not

contribute anything towards the purchase of the house and

that the appellant and her late husband never even lived in the

said house. They pointed out that it was not their claim that

the letter which was written by the deceased to his mother was

a Will.
The real issue as we see it in ground one of this appeal is

whether house No. 10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka, formed part

of the estate of the late Paul Peter Zulu and whether the

appellant is entitled to it under Section 9 of the Intestate

 - J12 -

Succession Act or it is family property for the respondents and

the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act do not apply to

it. It is abundantly clear that the appellant's claim to the house

in dispute is anchored on Section 9 of the Intestate

Succession Act, which provides that where an estate includes

a house the surviving spouse or child or both, shall be entitled

to that house.
In deciding whether the appellant was entitled to the

house, the learned trial Judge used the case of Rosemary

Chibwe v Austine Chibwetil and the case of Watchtel v

Watchte1l2 to define what constitutes family property. As

rightly observed by Mr. Chibiya, the two cases are leading

authorities on what constitutes matrimonial property in divorce

matters. We agree with him that it was wrong in principle for

the learned trial Judge to have used the two cases in deciding

this matter because the issue that was before him was not

whether the house in dispute was matrimonial property. The

issue was whether the house formed part of the estate and the

appellant was entitled to it under Section 9 of the Intestate

Succession Act. A perusal of Section 9 of the Intestate

 - J13 -

Succession Act will reveal that a house which a surviving

spouse or child is entitled to under that provision, does not

necessarily need to be matrimonial property as defined by the

two cases. It can be any house provided it forms part of the

deceased's estate where the estate includes a house. Such a

house can be, but it ought not to be, matrimonial property.

However, if a house happens to be family property, then

the Intestate Succession Act cannot apply to it and the

ultimate result is that it would not form part of an intestate

estate and a surviving spouse or child would not be entitled to

it. We say this because Section 2(2)(c) of the Intestate

Succession Act expressly provides that the Intestate

Succession Act does not apply to family property. It does not

matter whether such family property is registered in the name

of the deceased, as happened in this case. We cannot,

therefore, accept Mr. Chibiya's argument that simply because

the house in dispute was registered in the deceased's name at

the time of his death, then it automatically formed part of his

estate and the surviving spouse is entitled to it.

 -114 -

The respondents' claim in this case is that house No.

10375, Nyumba Yanga, Lusaka is their family property and the

Intestate Succession Act does not apply to it; and the

appellant is not entitled to it. Family property is defined by

Section 3 of the Intestate Succession Act as:

"'family property' means any property, whether movable or
immovable, which belongs to the members collectively of a
particular family or is held for the benefit of such members and
any receipts or proceeds from such property."

It does not matter in whose name the property is

registered, provided property falls within this definition of

family property as defined by Section 3 of the Intestate

Succession Act a surviving spouse or child cannot be entitled

to it. Family property can be registered in the names of any

member of the family as it is impracticable for each and every

member of the family to be registered as joint owner. The

question of whether a particular property is family property, is

usually a question of mixed law and fact which has to be

decided by the court based on the evidence before it.

In this case, there is evidence on record that the late Paul

Peter Zulu bought the house in dispute for the benefit of his

family. The respondents testified that they agreed as a family,

 -115 -

to the deceased's decision to obtain a loan to buy a family

house in order to supplement his father's pension who had just

retired as a police officer. That the deceased bought the house

in dispute on 10th December 2002, using the money he got from

the loan he obtained from his employers, the Public Service

Pensions Fund, as well as from his father's pension. That the

deceased had a shortfall of K5 million which his parents topped

up. That he allowed his father and his brother to occupy it

immediately after he bought the house. The house was later

leased out to the Drug Enforcement Commission and the

rentals were being used to educate the deceased's siblings. The

respondents testified that the deceased married the appellant

on 28th December, 2002, after he had already bought the

house. It was their evidence that the deceased had opted to live

in a rented house in Kamwala with his wife so that the house

he bought could continue assisting his family.

On the other hand, the appellant's evidence was that her

late husband never told her anything about the house. She

conceded that her late husband bought the house before he

married her and that she was not aware that the respondents
 - J16 -

had a family meeting before the deceased bought the house.

The learned trial Judge who had the advantage of seeing and

hearing the witnesses, accepted the respondents' evidence and

found as a fact that the house in dispute is family property. In

Wilson Masauso Zulu v Avondale Housing Project Lte) we

held that:
"Before this court can reverse findings of fact made by a trial judge,
we would have to be satisfied that the findings in question were
either perverse or made in the absence of any relevant evidence or
upon a misapprehension of the facts or that they were findings
which, on a proper view of the evidence, no trial court acting
correctly could reasonably make."

As we have already shown, there is sufficient evidence on

record to support the learned trial Judge's finding that house

No. 10375, Nyurnba Yanga, Lusaka is family property. We are

satisfied, from the evidence, that the house falls within the

definition of family property as defined by Section 3 of the

Intestate Succession Act and the Intestate Succession Act

does not apply to the house. It follows, therefore, that the said

house does not form part of the estate of the late Peter Paul

Zulu and the appellant is not entitled to it.

Although counsel for the appellant advanced arguments

concerning the letter which the appellant purportedly wrote to

 - J17 -

his mother, we see no dispute about it because the respondents

in their submissions conceded that the letter is not a Will. As

such, the letter has no force of law. A Will must meet the

requirements of Section 6 of the Wills and Administration of

Testate Estates Act to qualify to be a Will. We take the view

that the said letter served no useful purpose other than to

buttress the respondents' evidence that the deceased bought

the house in dispute for the benefit of his parents and siblings.

There being no dispute about its legal effect, we shall say no

more. The net result is that ground one lacks merit. We

accordingly dismiss it.

We shall move to ground four.

In support of the fourth ground of appeal, Mr. Chibiya

submitted that the 3rd respondent swore an affidavit on 11th

January, 2006, in which he had indicated that Monase Zulu

was the deceased's only daughter. Counsel pointed out that the

first mention of another child only came up in an affidavit of

August, 2006. He argued that the evidence of Claudina Sakala

that the deceased was taken to court for impregnating her was

unreliable in that there was no evidence to prove that indeed

 -118 -

there were proceedings in the Local Court concerning the

matter. He pointed out that the Birth Certificate of Belita Zulu

indicates that the deceased is the father of the child. In this

regard, he drew our attention to Section 15 of the Births and

Deaths Registration Act which provides that 'no person shall

be bound as a father to give notice of the birth of an illegitimate

child, and no person shall be registered as the father of such

child except on the joint request of the mother and himself and
upon his acknowledgement in writing to be the father of the

child." He submitted that in this case there was no evidence on

record to show that the deceased acknowledged in writing to be

the father of Sento Zulu.

It was counsel's contention that the court below

misdirected itself to have found that Belita Zulu was the

deceased's child, who should rank as a beneficiary under

Section 5 of the Intestate Succession Act. He quoted from P.

M. Bromley's book on Family Law without giving a full

citation, saying: "... entry of a man's name as that of the father

on the registration of a child's birth will be prima fade evidence

of paternity; if the child is illegitimate, however, this can be done

 - J19 -

only with his consent unless an affiliation order has been made

against him." He submitted that an application should have

been made under the Affiliation and Maintenance of Children

Act in the Subordinate Court but this was not done in this

case. He stated that since there were no affiliation proceedings

taken in this matter, the arguments by the respondents that

the child was the deceased's child, were not justified and not

supported in law, as to proof of paternity.

The respondents countered ground four of this appeal.

The gist of their submissions was that there was evidence to

support the finding by the trial Judge that the deceased had

another daughter called Belita Zulu. They stated that Claudina

Sakala, the mother of that child, had testified in the court

below how she met the deceased and became pregnant. The

respondents pointed out that Claudina Sakala had produced

the child's Birth Certificate to prove that the deceased had

another child. They stated that as parents to the deceased, the

181 and 2nd respondents knew about the pregnancy and they

accepted the baby. The respondents stated that the matter was

even taken to the Local Court where it was resolved. They

 - J20 -

contended that Belita Zulu was born after the deceased had

died and he could not have possibly signed any documents

relating to the child. They submitted that the appellant denied

the child because of greed.

The question that lies at the centre of ground four, in our

view, is whether the late Paul Peter Zulu was the father of 1

Belita Zulu As rightly pointed by Mr. Chibiya, Section 15 of

the Births and Deaths Registration Act stipulates that no

person should be registered as a father of an illegitimate child

except on the joint request of the mother and himself and upon

his acknowledgement in writing to be the father of the child.

However, we are of the considered view that on the facts of this

case, it would be unreasonable to insist on the strict

application of Section 15 of the Births and Deaths

Registration Act to this matter. The late Paul Peter Zulu died

in a road traffic accident five months before Belita Zulu was

born. It was, therefore, practically impossible for him to

acknowledge, in writing, that he was the father of Belita Zulu.

The mother to the child, Claudina Sakala, appeared before

the court below and testified how she knew the late Paul Peter
 - J22 -
never had any other child other than Monase Zulu. Based on

the facts in this case, the appellant could not have known the

existence of the child when her husband was alive since her

late husband died before the child was born. We have not found

any basis on which to overturn the learned trial Judge's

decision. Ground four of this appeal has no merit. Accordingly,

we dismiss it.

We shall now address grounds two and three.

In support of grounds two and three, which he argued

together, learned counsel for the appellant referred us to

Section 15 of the Intestate Succession Act, which provides

that where the deceased has died intestate, the Court may, on

application of any interested person, grant letters of

administration of the estate to that interested person. He

pointed out that Paragraph (b) of Section 15 of the Intestate

Succession Act stipulates that the court shall take into

account greater and immediate interests in the deceased's

estate in priority to lesser or remote interests. His submission

was that maintaining the appellant as co-administratrix would

 - J23 -

ensure that her interest as surviving spouse and the interest of

their only child is taken into consideration.

Regarding the learned trial Judge's finding that the

appellant never accepted Belita Zulu as the deceased's child,

Mr. Chibiya submitted that this issue remains in dispute and

the appellant does not believe that the child exists and if it

does, the appellant does not believe that she is the child of the

deceased. He therefore argued that money could not be

extended to the child. When it came to the allegations that the

appellant had ex-communicated her co-administrator, counsel

pointed out that the 3rd respondent had admitted in his

affidavit evidence that he was unavailable most of the time. He

submitted that rentals could not be shared because the

appellant believed that it was only her and her child who were

entitled and there was no other child. He stated that the

appellant believed that she was entitled to the money she had

used.

The respondents opposed grounds two and three of this

appeal. They argued that there was evidence on record that the
 - I24 -

appellant collected money from the estate of the late Peter Paul

Zulu, without the knowledge and consent of the co-

administrator and that she did not distribute the money to the

beneficiaries. The gist of their submissions was that the

appellant breached the provisions of the Intestate Succession 1

Act The respondents supported the decision of the learned

trial Judge to revoke the appointment of the appellant as co-

administratrix and argued that the appellant did not rebut the

evidence that she squandered the estate of the late Paul Peter 1

Zulu. They submitted that the appellant had failed to account

for the money that she had collected.

It is clear to us that in grounds two and three, the

appellant is challenging the learned trial Judge's decision to

revoke the appointment of the appellant as co-administratrix,

on the basis that she squandered the money from her late

husband's estate and the estate had suffered massive waste at

her hands. The issue therefore, is whether sufficient grounds

existed on which the learned trial Judge found that the

appellant mismanaged the estate and revoked her appointment.

 - J25 -

In a case such as this one, where there are two

administrators appointed to manage an estate, it is in the

interest of justice that those co-administrators should co-

operate and exercise their powers unanimously, unless the

letters of administration provide otherwise. Where there are

several administrators, their powers should be exercised by the

majority of them. This is in line with Section 20 of the

Intestate Succession Act, which provides that:-

"Where there are several administrators, their powers may, in the

absence of any direction to the contrary contained in the letters of
administration, be exercised by the majority of them."

When it comes to the relationship between the appellant

and the 3rd respondent, it is clear that there was no cooperation

and unanimity as co-administrators. There is evidence that the

appellant ex-communicated the 3rd respondent. She single

handedly went to various institutions and collected money

belonging to the estate, for her own use, without his knowledge
and authority. She single handedly:

(a) collected arrears of rent from the Drug Enforcement

Commission for the house which was on rent;

(b)collected the deceased's social security contributions from

National Provident Fund;

•

- J26 -

(c) collected money from Standard Chartered Bank where the

deceased used to receive his salary;

(d)collected money from the deceased's account at Madison

Life Insurance;

collected money to the deceased's credit at National

Pension Service Scheme (NAPSA);

collected money from Zambia Education Publishing House

where the deceased was once working;

removed the tenants from the house and put up a poster

which indicated that it was available for either sale or

rent. That she then attempted to obtain authority from the

co-administrator to execute a Deed of Assent, which would

have vested the house in her and when he refused, she

sued.

All these allegations were not denied by the appellant. She

in fact admitted them in her evidence and claimed that she

used the money for her upkeep and that of the child since she

was not working. Sadly, she never distributed any of the

money she had collected, as required by the law. An

administrator or administratrix has a duty under Section

•

3
- 127 -

19(1)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act to effect distribution

of an estate in accordance with the rights of the persons

interested in the estate under the Intestate Succession Act.

Failure to do so is a breach of the law. And the court is entitled

to intervene, by calling upon an administrator to render an

account for the administration of an estate or, to revoke his or

her appointment. This is what we said in Lindiwe Kate

Chinvanta v Doreen Chiwele and Judith Tembols), where we

held that:
"An Administrator has legal duties to the beneficiaries and other
interested parties including creditors; an Administrator may be
called upon by a court to account for the administration of the estate
or for default. There are many cases where Administrators have
been found liable for conduct in breach of the law. Even an
Administrator who is a surviving spouse can also be required to
account for the distribution of the estate by any interested person...
We wish to make it clear that courts will intervene in matters of
administration of deceased's estates where there is sufficient
evidence of breach of provisions of the law... courts would intervene
where sufficient reasons exist and would remove an Administrator,
nullify or revoke a grant under the Intestate Succession Act...""

We have no doubt that the appellant breached the law

when she singlehandedly, collected money without the
authority of the co-administrator and used it without
distributing some of it to all those who were entitled under the
law. We agree with the learned trial Judge that the appellant
displayed extreme selfishness. Everything was just centred
around her and her child, Monase Zulu. She consistently
refused to accept Belita Zulu as the deceased's child, even at
 - J28 -

the time we heard this appeal, because she did not want to
share the money with this child. We are satisfied that sufficient
reasons existed upon which the learned trial Judge intervened
and revoked the appointment of the appellant as co-
administratrix and ordered her to provide an inventory and to
render an account of all the money she had collected to the
exclusion of her co-administrator. It is our considered view that
grounds two and three have no merit. We hereby dismiss them.

Since all the four grounds of appeal in this appeal have

failed, this appeal stands dismissed for lack of merit. We hereby
uphold the decision of the learned trial Judge in this matter.
We shall, in the circumstances, order the parties to bear their
respective costs.

. C. ICAOMA
E. N. C. MUYOVWE
SUPREME COURT JUDGE SUPREME COURT JUDGE