G.R. No.

119800 November 12, 2003

FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and BERNARDINO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. Respondents.

Tinga, J.:

FACTS:

State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) alleged that Filipinas Textile Mills (Filtex) applied for domestic letters of
credit to finance the purchase of various raw materials for its textile business. Finding the application to be in
order, SIHI issued on various dates domestic letters of credit authorizing IndoPhilippine Textile Mills, Inc.,
Texfiber Corporation, and Philippine Polyamide Industrial Corporation "to value" on SIHI such drafts as may
be drawn by said corporations against Filtex for an aggregate amount not exceeding ₱3,737,988.05.

Filtex used these domestic letters of credit to cover its purchase of various textile materials from IndoPhil,
Texfiber and Polyamide. Upon the sale and delivery of the merchandise, Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide
issued several sight drafts on various dates payable to the order of SIHI, which were duly accepted by Filtex and
paid the value thereof for the account of Filtex. In order to ensure the payment of the sight drafts
aforementioned, Filtex executed and issued to SIHI several trust receipts of various dates covering the
merchandise sold.

Because of Filtex's failure to pay its outstanding obligation despite demand, SIHI filed a Complaint on praying
that the petitioners be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the principal amount, plus interest and penalties,
attorney's fees, exemplary damages, costs of suit and other litigation expenses.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, Filtex interposed special and affirmative defenses, i.e., the provisions of the
trust receipts, as well as the comprehensive surety agreement, do not reflect the true will and intention of the
parties, full payment of the obligation, and lack of cause of action. For his part, Villanueva interposed the same
special and affirmative defenses and added that the comprehensive surety agreement is null and void and
damages and attorney's fees are not legally demandable. The petitioners, however, failed to specifically deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents upon which the Complaint was
based.

The RTC of Manila rendered judgment holding Filtex and Villanueva jointly and severally liable to SIHI. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners' contention that the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust
receipts and comprehensive surety agreement are inadmissible in evidence ruling that the petitioners had "in
effect, admitted the genuineness and due execution of said documents because of their failure to have their
answers placed under oath, the complaint being based on actionable documents in line with Section 7, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of said documents
because of their failure to have their answers placed under oath.

RULING:

Yes. As correctly noted by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of Filtex and
Villanueva, respectively, did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust
receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which SIHI's Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the
implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents. Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court, when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts.
In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and
due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which
it lacks, are waived by him.

G.R. No. 197122 June 15, 2016

INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA and ASTRID SALA BOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THOMAS CLEARY, Respondent. x - - - - - - - -
---------------x
G.R. No. 197161
KATHRYN GO-PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
THOMAS CLEARY, Respondent.

FACTS:

Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint for specific performance
and damages against Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria
(Santamaria), Astrid Sala Boza (Boza), and Kathryn Go-Perez (Go-Perez) before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation, for which Cleary
paid US$191,250.00.

In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify "in support of the allegations of his
complaint, either on the witness stand or by oral deposition." Cleary then moved for court authorization to take
deposition. He prayed that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los
Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. Santamaria and Boza opposed the Motion and argued that the right
to take deposition is not absolute. They claimed that Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet
he deprived the court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions
on him. Go-Perez filed a separate Opposition, arguing that the oral deposition was not intended for discovery
purposes if Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. Since he elected to file suit in the Philippines, he should submit
himself to the procedures and testify before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

The trial court denied Cleary’s motion. It held that depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual
testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral examination at trial as required under
Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which was granted. It held that Rule 23, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions, and that it is immaterial that Cleary is the plaintiff himself.
It likewise denied reconsideration. Hence, the present Petitions were filed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court
apply in this case.
2. Whether or not the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies
to a non-resident foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony.1

âwphi1
RULING:
1. Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the widest scope in the gathering of
information by and for all parties in relation to their pending case. As regards the taking of depositions,
Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any party.
 San Luis explained that this provision "does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail
of deposition." Thus, this Court found it immaterial that the plaintiff was a non-resident foreign
corporation and that all its witnesses were Americans residing in the United States. On the use of
depositions taken, we refer to Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This Court has held that
"depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes."

2. Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court includes a full range of protective orders, from designating the
place of deposition, limiting those in attendance, to imposing that it be taken through written
interrogatories. At the extreme end of this spectrum would be a court order that completely denies the
right to take deposition. This is what the trial court issued in this case. While Section 16 grants the
courts power to issue protective orders, this grant involves discretion on the part of the court, which
"must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained."
A plain reading of this provision shows that there are two (2) requisites before a court may issue a
protective order: (1) there must be notice; and (2) the order must be for good cause shown.
Thus, we consider the trial court’s explanation for its denial of respondent’s Motion for Court
Authorization to Take Deposition. The trial court’s Order was based on two (2) premises: first, that
respondent should submit himself to our court processes since he elected to seek judicial relief with our
courts; and second, that respondent is not suffering from any impairment, and it is best that he appear
before our courts considering he is the plaintiff himself.

G.R. No. 202618 April 12, 2016

CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
BENJAMIN V. ZABAT, ROMEO JUGADO, JR., AND NANCY QUINO, Petitioner, VS. ARNEL
PACIANO D. CASANOVA, ENGR. TOMAS Y. MACROHON, LOCAL HOUSING BOARD OF
TAGUIG CITY, AND THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGUIG, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
In 1992, Congress enacted RA 7227, which created the BCDA who was authorized to own, hold, and administer
portions of the Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President and to raise funds by
the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps. In this relation, EO No. 40 was issued, identifying Fort
Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA
projects. Located in Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas subject of this case.
The JUSMAG is where military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families,
had occupied housing units and facilities. The Diplomatic and Consular Area was declared as alienable and
disposable land.

On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a certificate for the demolition of structures
within the JUSMAG Area. Consequently, respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the
BCDA, sent a letter informing petitioner and its members that they should coordinate with BCDA officials
should they choose to either accept the relocation package being offered to them, or voluntarily dismantle their
structures and peacefully vacate the property.

Petitioner filed the present case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which they claimed are within the
Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area. They averred that the BCDA itself declared in its
own website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is not its property, and that its members are occupying the
Diplomatic and Consular Area with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines given at the time of their
assignments in the military service, and hence, cannot be demolished, especially in the absence of a court order.

In their Comment, respondents Casanova and Engr. Macrohon maintained that the clearing operations
undertaken by the BCDA covered only the JUSMAG area, on which the structures possessed by petitioner's
members are located. They also argued that under Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, eviction or demolition is allowed
when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, even in the
absence of a court order.
Respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig likewise contended that
the instant petition should have been filed before the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area,
instead of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should have been filed before the RTS instead of the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal of the same reveals that it
is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of injunction be issued to permanently stop
"respondents, or any other person acting under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry
out, the demolition of petitioner’s properties." More significantly, respondents are not asked to be prevented
from exercising any judicial or ministerial function on account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave
abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an action for prohibition.

Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being to prevent
courts or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not
vested.

It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of
the complaint but rather its allegations. Hence, considering the above-discussed allegations, the petition, albeit
denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which means that Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court would not apply.

Instead, it is Section 21 of RA 7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain
or enjoin "the implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive uses of the military
reservations," that would govern:
Section 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. - The implementation of the projects for the conversion
into alternative productive uses of the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be
restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY, Petitioner VS.

GINA V. BUTLER, Respondent GR No. 219408,
November 8, 2017

Facts:
Donald Gaffney filed a complaint against Gina Butler for a sum of money. Donald alleged that
sometime in 2006-2007, Gina and her husband, Anthony, invited Donald to invest in Active Fun Corporation.
Anthony then died in 2004. When the proposed investment did not materialize, Donald demanded the return of
his investments from Gina. Because no full relief can be had against the heirs/Estate of Anthony Richard Butler
under the original complaint, Donald filed a motion for leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of
impleading the estate or the heirs of the late Anthony Richard Butler (as additional party-defendant) allegedly
represented by Gina as his surviving spouse. Gina opposed the motion primarily on the ground that “only
natural or juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action.”

Issue:
Whether or not the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving spouse Gina, could be
named as an additional defendant in the present case.

Ruling:
No, a deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court states that “Only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action”. Applying this legal provision, the Court, in Venture v.
Militante, declared that neither a deceased person nor his estate has the capacity to be sued. Nether may a dead
person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not have such legal
entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by
the court. Considering the capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a
decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be a party defendant in a court action. Hence, there
can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they
lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and could no longer be impleaded
as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such the complaint against him should be
dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
CONCHITA S. UY, et al. , Petitioners vs.
CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO, et al., Respondents
July 24, 2017, GR No. 223610

Facts:

Crispulo filed an action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages and attorney’s fees against Jaime
Uy. Jaime dies 6 years before the case was filed, hence the complaint was amended impleading Jaime’s
children, herein petitioners. Crispulo dies and thus, his heirs, which are herein respondent was substituted.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents declaring them as owners. Petitioners appealed before the CA
but was denied. The ruling became final and executory. In the motion for issuance of writ of execution.
Petitioners filed their opposition. They pray for the writ be quashed on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction
over them in the quieting of title case since no summons was served, they were merely impleaded as substitute
for their father Jaime and thus the action should have been proceeded against the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners can be held liable personally or must the estate be held liable solely.

Ruling:
Yes. The respondents are not mere substitutes.

1) Petitioner’s through their counsel admitted that summons was received by them. Even assuming that no
summons was served, petitioners actively participated in the proceedings by filing an answer and even
presented as witness.

2) As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate, it is well to
point out that based on the records, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant;
rather, they were impleaded in their personal capacities because Jaime died before the case was filed. In this
regard, petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any monetary
judgment or award must necessarily fail.

At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the
Quieting of Title Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earliest
opportunity. Obviously, they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the case, adopted the answer
earlier filed by Conchita, and even litigated the case all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot now question
the final and executory judgment in the Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to them.

It should be noted however that as successors-heirs, they cannot be personally bound to respond to the
decedent's obligations beyond their distributive shares. Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance
which would necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
.:

Facts:
Manuel Dy initiated a criminal case against Hao and Tan, accusing them of syndicated estafa. Dy alleged that he
was lured into investing a significant amount of money in State Resource Development Management
Corporation. He issued multiple checks totaling nearly P114 million to the corporation, which in turn issued
checks to him that bounced due to insufficient funds.

A resolution from Prosecutor Nicdao found sufficient evidence to charge the petitioner and others with
syndicated estafa. The articles of incorporation of the corporation listed the petitioner as an incorporator and
director, indicating their involvement and awareness of its operations.

The Court determined that these documents established probable cause, defined as facts and circumstances
leading a reasonable person to believe that an offense was committed by the accused.

The petitioner then sought relief through a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul the arrest warrant
issued by Judge Marquez for estafa. The petitioner argued that the judge was mistaken in finding probable cause
for the warrant against them and their coaccused.

1. May De Joya seek relief from Court/trial even though he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the
Court's jurisdiction?
Ruling:

NO. If an individual persistently declines to surrender and submit to the court's authority, they cannot expect to
seek redress from either the Supreme Court or the trial court. The fact that the person continues to evade the
court's jurisdiction provides stronger justification for the respondent judge's actions to be upheld. The primary
aim of an arrest warrant is to place the accused under legal custody for the trial of the alleged offenses. It is
essential to note that one must accept the court's jurisdiction before seeking its intervention or protection.

Jaurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.

CATALINA B. CHU, THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU, THEAN LEEWN B. CHU,
and MARTIN LAWRENCE B. CHU, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FERNANDO C. CUNANAN and TRINIDAD N. CUNANAN, BENELDA ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPOUSES AMADO E. CARLOS and GLORIA A. CARLOS,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 156185 September 12, 2011

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
Couple sold five parcels of land to another party, who only paid a portion of the agreed amount. The buyer
transferred the title to her name without the sellers’ knowledge and borrowed money using the lots as security.
Later, she transferred two lots to another couple. The sellers filed a case to recover the unpaid balance and later
sought to annul the sale and recover damages. The defendants raised various defenses, including failure to state
a cause of action and bar by prior judgment. A compromise agreement was reached between the parties. Some
defendants sought dismissal, but their motions were denied. The Court of Appeals ruled in their favor, stating
that the compromise agreement resolved the dispute, and filing a new case contravened the rule against splitting
a cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the
deed of sale.

Ruling:
Yes. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several
parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them. single cause of action or entire claim or demand
cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions. Thus, Section 4,
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of action. Section 4. Splitting a single
cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
(4a)
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was
sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to be presented in another
suit; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of
suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Their contravention of
the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case on the ground of bar by res judicata
SPOUSES RODOLFO CARPIO and REMEDIOS ORENDAIN, Petitioners,
vs.
RURAL BANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 153171 May 4, 2006
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS:
On May 17, 1999, spouses Rodolfo Carpio and Remedios Orendain, petitioners, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83, Tanauan, Batangas, a Complaint (for annulment of foreclosure sale and
damages) against the Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc., respondent, and Jaime Ozaeta, clerk of court
and ex-officio sheriff of the same court. In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the absolute owners
of a parcel of land with an area of 19,405 square meters, more or less, located at Barangay San Vicente, Sto.
Tomas, Batangas. On May 30, 1996, they obtained a loan from respondent bank in the amount of P515,000.00,
payable on January 27, 1996. To secure the loan, they executed on May 30, 1996 a real estate mortgage over the
same property in favor of respondent bank. On July 26, 1996, without prior demand or notice to petitioners,
respondent bank filed a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. On September 26, 1996, sheriff
Jaime Ozaeta conducted a public auction sale of the mortgaged property. Respondent bank was the only bidder
for P702,889.77. They claimed that they were not notified of the foreclosure sale and were not given an
opportunity to redeem their property.
On August 9, 1999, respondent bank filed its Answer with Counterclaim, denying specifically the
material allegations of the complaint. It alleged inter alia that oral and written demands were made upon
petitioners to pay their loan but they ignored the same; that they were properly notified of the filing of the
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage; that there was proper publication and notices of the
scheduled sale through public auction; and that petitioners were actually given more than two (2) years to
redeem the property but they failed to do so.
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that respondent bank’s counterclaim
was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. RTC issued an Order denying the motion to
dismiss the counterclaim for lack of merit

ISSUE:
Whether or not compulsory counterclaim need to be accompanied by a Certification Against Forum
Shopping.

RULING:

The petition must fail.

Section 5, Rule 74 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasijudicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no
such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Petitioners’ contention is utterly baseless. It bears stressing that the Rule distinctly provides that the required
certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient
application of a party asserting a claim for relief." Certainly, respondent bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a
responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners’ complaint that initiates the civil action. In other words,
the rule requiring such certification does not contemplate a defendant’s/respondent’s claim for relief that is
derived only from, or is necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the
plaintiff to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the "dismissal of the case without
prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent’s counterclaim.
G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004
Foster-Gallego v. Spouses Galang

Facts:

On 22 June 1984, the Spouses Galang purchased the Property from VRC through a Deed of Absolute
Sale. In April 1989, Romeo Galang came home from Saudi Arabia and discovered a hollow block fence along
the perimeter of the Property. Gallego built the fence in March 1989. On 16 May 1989, the Spouses Galang
filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against Gallego. In his Answer with Counterclaim,
Gallego alleged that his brother, Bernabe Foster-Gallego, owned the Property. On 10 March 1990, Bernabe
Foster-Gallego filed a motion for intervention with an attached answer-in-intervention. The trial court
eventually decided the original case in favor of the Spouses Galang, and denied petitioner's (Foster-Gallego)
intervention and third-party complaint. Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, Gallego and the Spouses
Galang appealed to the Court of Appeals. Instead of filing his own brief, however, petitioner (Foster-Gallego)
joined in Gallego's appeal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the
award of damages to the Spouses Galang. Gallego and the Spouses Galang did not appeal the appellate court's
Decision of 22 July 1997. However, petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title.

Ruling:

No. An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. Further, the assailed
decision does not bind petitioner. Given that the trial court denied petitioner's intervention and struck it off from
the records, petitioner is not a party to the instant case. Suits to quiet title are actions quasi in rem, and the
judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties to the action. There is also no legal basis
for petitioner's argument that the order declaring Gallego in default rendered petitioner the ipso facto defendant
of this case. Petitioner could have but did not move to substitute Gallego during the proceedings before the
court a quo. On a final note, the Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not without other
remedy. Assuming petitioner can prove his allegations, petitioner is at the least entitled to recover damages
from the parties that defrauded or deprived him of due process.

G.R. No. 98177, June 8, 1993

Barfel Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the petitioners, Barfel
Development Corporation and spouses Victor and Aida Barrios. The complaint alleges that the defendants made
misrepresentations regarding the existence of liens and encumbrances on the properties being sold. The
defendants allegedly failed to comply with their contractual obligation of securing the release of the second
mortgage on the subject properties, preventing the consummation of the sale. During the presentation of
evidence by the defendants, the private respondents filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and
motion to admit the same. The amendment sought to implead PISO Bank as an additional partydefendant and
compel it to accept payment of the existing second mortgage. The trial court admitted the amended complaint.
The defendants filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the
allowance of the amendment.

Issue:

Whether or not the amendment to the complaint, impleading PISO Bank as an additional partydefendant, should
be allowed.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that PISO Bank was not an indispensable party to the case. Moreover, the
amendment sought by the private respondents was not a formal but a substantial one. Private respondents will
have to present additional evidence on the PISO second mortgage and the amendment would delay the
proceedings. The effect would be to start trial anew with the parties recasting their theories of the case. As a
general policy, liberality in allowing amendments is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, decreases as it
progresses and changes at times to a strictness amounting to a prohibition. This is further restricted by the
condition that the amendment should not prejudice the adverse party or place him at a disadvantage.

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN

ABAGATNAN, JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY
ABAGATNAN, Petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents, G.R. No.
211966, August 7, 2017 DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS:
The spoused Abagatnan and his late wife acquired a parcel of land. Lydia died, leaving her children, who are
co-petitioners in this case, to succeed in the ownership of her conjugal share of said property. The petitioners
decided to sell portions of Lot 14 72-B, including the subject property which was then still being occupied by
respondents. They offered to sell said portion to respondents, but the latter declined.
Consequently, petitioners sent respondents a Demand Letter dated October 2, 2006 requiring the latter to vacate
the subject property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter, which the respondents refused to heed.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against respondents
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City, where they claimed to have been
unlawfully deprived of the use and possession of a portion of their land.
Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-condition
for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City. Specifically,
petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn)
resided in Pasig City.
Respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with,
considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a Special Power of Attomey (SPA) in favor of their
co-petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Paree (Josephine), who is a resident of Roxas City.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the structures they
erected on the subject property and to vacate the same. Respondents thereafter appealed the MTCC Decision to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Roxas City.
The RTC denied the appeal for lack of merit. The RTC, too, held that the lack of barangay conciliation
proceedings cannot be brought on appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order.
The CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners' Complaint, albeit without prejudice, for lack of prior
referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. It pointed out that majority of petitioners actually resided in Barangay
Cogon, Roxas City, while the two nonresidents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in favor of Josephine,
whom they authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents. Since respondents
also reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the ambit of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but CA denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the prior barangay
conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties in interest
resided in the same city or municipality.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes," subject to certain exceptions enumerated in the law.
One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior
referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-petitioner,
Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As previously
explained, the residence of the attorney-infact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual
residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.
Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought on
appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order. In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-
Trial Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is but consistent with the rule that parties are bound by
the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.

G.R. No. 193158

November 11, 2015

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs.

OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, Respondent.

Facts: PHIC filed a Complaint with its Legal Sector Prosecution Department against OLLH for the
administrative offense of filing multiple claims. (which is penalized under Section 145, Rule XXVIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7875) On its part, OLLH moved to defer the
submission of its position paper pending the answer of the PHIC President and CEO to the written
interrogatories as well as the inspection and copying of the original transmittal letter and all other claims that
accompanied Annex B of the Complaint. OLLH states that these modes of discovery were availed of because its
representatives were denied and/or not given access to documents and were not allowed to talk to PHIC
personnel with regard to the charge. Then, PHIC filed its Comment on OLLH's motion. The PHIC Arbitration
Department denied OLLH's motion. The interrogatories and motion for production and inspection of documents
filed by OLLH cannot be given due course by this Office. For an obvious reason as can be inferred from the
purpose of the said pleadings, the allowance of the same would not practically hasten the early disposition of the
instant case, instead undermine the objective of the rules which clearly and explicitly demand or call for an
immediate resolution of the subject case. OLLH elevated the issue to the CA via petition for certiorari. CA
reversed the Resolution and Order of the PHIC arbitration department. OLLH's resort to modes of discovery
was necessary for the preparation of its defense and the full determination of petitioner the issue raised in the
administrative case. Upon petition to the SC, PHIC holds that OLLH's resort to modes of discovery is not a
matter of right as it is provided neither in the PHIC Charter nor in the IRR, and that even if the Rules may be
applied in suppletory character, the Arbiter may exercise his sound discretion on whether to resort to modes of
discovery.
ISSUE: WoN the written interrogatories shall be granted?
Held: No, in this case, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110444, which reversed the
August 11, 2009 Resolution and September 4, 2009 Order of the Arbitration Department of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation that denied Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital's resort to modes of discovery, is
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and received
sought to elicit facts that could already be seen from the allegations as well as attachments of the Complaint and
the Verified Answer. Specifically, the entries in the three (3) Validation Report that OLLH sought to be
identified and/or explained by PHIC are either immaterial or irrelevant (to the issue of whether OLLH is guilty
of filing multiple claims and OLLH's defense that it inadvertently attached a second copy of the subject
PhilHealth Claim Form 2 to the Transmittal Letter filed on June 19, 2007) or, even if material or relevant, are
selfexplanatory and need no further elaboration from PHIC. Thus, the interrogatories were frivolous and need
not be answered. Aside from this, the PHIC Arbitration Department correctly observed that the written
interrogatories were mistakenly addressed to the President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently
answer, either based on his job description or first-hand experience, issues that arose from and related to the
filing and processing of claims.
G.R. No. 192223. July 23, 2018
DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, petitioner vs. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
The petitioner asserted he was a confidential informant for the government and that his information aided in the
recovery of assets allegedly ill-gotten by former President Marcos and associates. For years, he persistently
sought an informer's reward. He initiated contact by writing letters to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the office of the President, and eventually the
Department of Finance (DOF). Despite these repeated attempts, He did not receive a response that satisfied his
demands. Frustrated, in 2010, he took the extraordinary step of filing a Petition for Mandamus and Damages
directly with the Supreme Court.
This action sought to legally compel the DOF Secretary and the Treasurer of the Philippines to grant him the
informer's reward he believed he was entitled to. However, this procedural maneuver proved problematic as it
bypassed several crucial steps established in legal doctrine and the Philippine judicial structure.

ISSUE:
Whether the case should have first been resolved at a lower level in accordance with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies available to him before resorting to the courts. He should have pursued his claim for
an informer's reward through the appropriate channels within the relevant government agencies.
Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, it requires courts to defer to the expertise of administrative agencies
on matters within their specialized competence. In this case, the determination and granting of informer's
rewards falls under the purview of the DOF, BIR, and Bureau of Customs. His direct filing with the Supreme
Court bypassed both the administrative process and the lower court system, violating established legal
procedures.
Claimants must first exhaust available administrative remedies and initiate cases in lower courts before seeking
relief from the Supreme Court. Failure to follow these procedures can result in cases being dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds.

G.R. No. 155736 March 31, 2005

DANILO, Petitioner vs. PEDRO, Respondent
FACTS:
Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena, owners of a property in Parañaque, entered a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) to sell it to Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero. The petitioners filed a Complaint in the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan, seeking annulment of the sale, recovery of possession, and damages. The respondents argued
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the principal action for rescission and recovery of
possession was a real action that should have been filed in Parañaque City.
ISSUE:
Whether the venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos.
RULING:
No. The court ruled that Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, allowing joinder of causes of action in the
RTC for different venues, did not apply. The petitioners had only one cause of action – the breach of the MOA.
The claim for damages was incidental. The real action for rescission should have been filed in Parañaque City,
where the property is located. Since the petitioners, residing in Malolos, Bulacan, filed in the wrong venue, the
trial court's dismissal was proper under Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA Petitioners,

-versus- SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.

BERSAMIN, C.J.

FACTS: The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance, averring that they were
the true and real owners of the parcel of land, having inherited the land from their late father. The respondents,
as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case due to the land being friar land. RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Director of Lands has
the exclusive administration and disposition of the friar land, and it had no jurisdiction. The petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but RTC denied the motion.

Therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but CA dismissed the petition holding
that the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. When the court rendered the assailed decision, the
remedy of the petitioners was to have appealed the same to this Court. But petitioners did not. Instead, they
filed the present special civil action for certiorari on May 15, 2002 after the decision of the court a quo has
become final.

ISSUE: Was the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?

The court answer the query in the affirmative.

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,23 as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691,24 which provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title
involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in which
instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of
which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the
property) and the principal relief thereby sought.

GEORGE LEONARD S. UMALE, petitioner, VS. CANOGA PARK DEVELOPMENT

 CORPORATION, respondent

G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011

BRION, J.

FACTS:
George Leonard S. Umale (petitioner) and Canoga Park Development Corporation (respondent) entered
into a Contract of Lease, for an 860-square-meter lot in Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The lease agreement
contained provisions prohibiting certain business activities on the property without prior written consent.

Subsequently, before the expiration of the lease contract, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case
against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case
No. 8084. The respondent alleged that the petitioner violated the lease contract by constructing restaurant
buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot without the necessary consent and permits. The MTC
ruled in favor of the respondent, but this decision was later reversed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch
267, Pasig City. While the appeal was pending, the respondent filed another unlawful detainer case against the
petitioner, this time before the MTC-Branch 71, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9210. This case was
based on the expiration of the lease contract. The MTC-Branch 71 ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered
the petitioner to vacate the premises and pay damages.

The petitioner appealed the decision of the MTC-Branch 71 to the RTC-Branch 68, Pasig City, which
reversed the decision and dismissed Civil Case No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia, despite ordering the
petitioner to pay rent. The respondent then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 with the Court of Appeals,
arguing that there was no litis pendentia between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 because they involved
different causes of action.

ISSUE:
Whether there is litis pendentia between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210.

RULING:
The Court ruled that there is no litis pendentia between the two cases because they involve different
causes of action. The first case was based on violations of the lease contract, while the second case was based
on the expiration of the lease contract. Since the cause of action in the second case did not exist at the time of
filing the first case, litis pendentia does not apply.

The Court applied the test for litis pendentia, which requires identity of parties, substantial identity in
causes of action and reliefs sought, and the possibility of res judicata. Since the causes of action in the two
cases were different, litis pendentia did not apply. Additionally, the Court examined the Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to determine whether forum shopping occurred. Finding no willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of the Court of
Appeals.

ADELFO MACEDA, plaintiff

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CEMENT CENTER, INC., complainants

G.R. No. 83545 August 11, 1989

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS:
Adelfo Maceda (petitioner) entered into a lease agreement for a property with the spouses Arturo
Victoria and Maxima Monserrat. Under the terms of the lease, he proposed to undertake extensive repairs and
improvements to the property, with the understanding that he would be reimbursed for his expenses. He then
proceeded to make significant renovations and enhancements to the property, including repairs to the existing
structure and additional construction work, such as a new driveway, a basketball court, and landscaping. The
total cost of these improvements amounted to P40,000. When Cement Center, Inc. (respondent) acquired the
property and planned to develop it, Maceda refused to vacate until reimbursed for his improvements. This led
to an ejectment suit by Cement Center, Inc. Maceda counterclaimed for P240,000, but it was dismissed by
MTC due to jurisdiction limits.

On appeal, RTC awarded him P182,000, but this was overturned by the Court of Appeals. Maceda's
final appeal to the Supreme Court was unsuccessful, upholding the prior rulings on jurisdictional grounds.

ISSUES:
Whether the municipal trial court has jurisdiction over Maceda's counterclaim for the value of improvements
exceeding P20,000.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed CA’s ruling that MTC San Juan did not have original jurisdiction over his
counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000. Correspondingly, the RTC did not have appellate jurisdiction over the
claim.

The decision of the MTC San Juan awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of the
Regional Trial Court raising the award to P182,200, were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of
the MTC in a civil action for sum of money (Maceda's counterclaim for the value of his improvements is one
such action) is limited to a demand that "does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs
but inclusive of damages of whatever kind." A counterclaim in the municipal or city court beyond that
jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiffs claim, but not to obtain
affirmative relief. (Agustin vs. Bacalan, 135 SCRA 340)

FRANCISCO A. LABAO, Plaintiff, vs.

LOLITO N. FLORES, AMADO A. DAGUISONAN, PEPE M. CANTAR, JULIO G. PAGENTE, JESUS
E. ARENA, CRISPIN A. NAVALES, OSCAR M. VENTE, ARTEMIO B. ARAGON, ARNOLD M.
CANTAR, ALBERTO T. CUADERO, RASMI E. RONQUILLO, PEDRO R.
GABUTAN, ELPEDIO E. MENTANG,* WILFREDO R. MIÑOSA,** RODERICK P.
NAMBATAC, MARCIAL D. RIVERA, SANDE E. CASTIL,*** CRISOSTOMO B. ESIC, and
AMBROSIO M. CANTAR,**** Complainants.

G.R. No. 187984 November 15, 2010

BRION, J.

FACTS:
Francisco A. Labao (plaintiff) is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective
Security Agency (SMPSA), which provided security services to the National Power Corporation, Mindanao
Regional Center (NPC-MRC). Lolito N. Flores, et al. (complainants), were SMPSA security guards assigned to
NPC-MRC. When the respondents failed to comply with the petitioner's directive to submit updated
documents, they were relieved from duty. The respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal and money
claims with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), alleging constructive dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for lack of merit, ruling that the plaintiff's actions were a
legitimate exercise of management prerogative. The NLRC affirmed the decision, finding no grave abuse of
discretion. The complainants then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), challenging the
NLRC ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents' petition despite its late filing.

RULING:
 The CA erred in acting on the respondents' petition for certiorari despite its late filing. Procedural rules
regarding reglementary periods are strictly applied to prevent unnecessary delays and ensure the orderly
disposition of cases.

The Court emphasized the importance of strict adherence to procedural rules, particularly regarding
reglementary periods, to prevent delays and ensure the orderly administration of justice. It also underscored the
finality and immutability of decisions that have acquired finality, highlighting the need for litigants to comply
with prescribed timelines to avoid jeopardizing their substantive rights. While the Rules are liberally construed,
the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied as they are deemed indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business and
strict compliance therewith is mandatory and imperative.

In light of the foregoing, the Court granted the petition, reversing the CA decision and reinstating the
Labor Arbiter's ruling. The NLRC decision, having become final and unalterable due to the late filing of the
petition for certiorari, could no longer be reviewed. No costs were awarded.

JAO & CO., INC V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 93233, December 19, 1995

FACTS:
During the hearing, the petitioner, Jao & Company, Inc., failed to appear, leading the court to declare them in
default and allow the presentation of evidence by the respondent, Top Service, Inc. Despite this, the petitioner
did file an answer but did not receive notice of the default order or the subsequent decision. The court deemed
the petitioner's recourse to be through a timely appeal, which they failed to pursue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the party wrongly declared in default.
RULING:
Yes. It is well-settled that, under ordinary circumstances, the proper remedy of a party wrongly declared in
default is either to appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment, and not
certiorari. A default judgment is an adjudication on the merits and is, thus, appealable. Since appeal is the
proper remedy, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF TANON STRAIT V. REYES

G.R. No. 180771; April 21, 2015

FACTS:
The petition filed challenges the validity of SC-46, which grants permission for petroleum exploration within
Tañon Strait. It alleges that the implementation of SC46 violates both the 1987 Constitution and various
international and municipal laws. Specifically, the petitioners, who represent marine mammals inhabiting the
area, argue that the activities permitted under SC-46, particularly those carried out by JAPEX, have resulted in
detrimental impacts on the ecosystem and biodiversity of Tañon Strait.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Petitioners have a Locus Standi to file the instant petition.
RULING:
Yes, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which allow for a
"citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws: SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause
of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the
case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order. Citizen suits filed
under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.
The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named
cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be
possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to
possess the legal standing to file this petition.

G.R. No. 179488

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. vs. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY Ponente:
PERALTA, J.

Facts:

The petitioner, Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc., and the respondent, Kemper Insurance Company, are involved
in a dispute regarding an insurance claim. The respondent insured a shipment of frozen boneless beef owned by
Genosi, Inc., which was imported to the Philippines through the petitioner. But a portion of the shipment was
rejected due to spoilage, and Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both the petitioner and respondent. After
investigation and evaluation, the respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc., and Genosi, Inc. executed a Loss
and Subrogation Receipt, subrogating the respondent to its claims against the petitioner.

The respondent, Kemper Insurance Company, then filed a complaint against the petitioner, Cosco Philippines
Shipping, Inc., for insurance loss and damages, alleging that the petitioner, Inc. failed to pay the amount of the
insurance claim despite demands. The petitioner filed an answer, denying liability and raising various defenses.

But during pre-trial proceedings, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the certification against
forum shopping was signed by counsel and not by the petitioner itself, rendering it fatally defective. The trial
court granted the Motion to Dismiss, but the CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order, ruling that while
the certification of non-forum shopping is mandatory, the circumstances of the case warranted the liberal
application of the rules.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.

Issue:

Whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum shopping
on its behalf.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties involved in a case. If the
principal party is unable to sign, someone duly authorized must sign on their behalf. For corporations, the
certification can be signed by a lawyer authorized by the corporation, provided that the lawyer has personal
knowledge of the facts required in the certification.

Therefore, the petition is granted. The decision of CA are reversed and set aside. The decision of the RTC are
reinstated.

G.R. No. 232189

BLAY vs. BANA
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts:

The petitioner filed a petition for the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Respondent filed
her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. However, petitioner later lost interest and filed a motion to
withdraw the petition. Respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, and prayed that her
counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent adjudication. In reply, petitioner contended
that respondent's counterclaims should be barred due to her failure to timely manifest her desire to prosecute
them. The RTC granted the motion to withdraw but allowed the counterclaims to remain for independent
adjudication. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting an appeal to the CA. The CA
upheld the RTC's decision, stating that under Rule 17, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has
been filed before the service of the motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA, leading to the current petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Orders declaring respondent's counterclaim for
independent adjudication before the same trial court.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

Under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
However, if the defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a
manifestation within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be
prosecuted in a separate action.

The court found that the CA erroneously upheld the RTC's decision, which allowed the counterclaim to remain
for independent adjudication despite the respondent's failure to file the required manifestation within the
prescribed fifteen-day period.

Therefore, the court granted the petitioner's motion to withdraw the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and dismissed it without prejudice. The dismissal does not affect the respondent's right to prosecute
her counterclaim in a separate action.

ADA vs. BAYLON

G.R. NO. 182435 | August 13, 2012 Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes
Digested by: Hanifa D. Manabilang
FACTS:
This case concerns the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon), who
passed away. At the time of their death, they were survived by their legitimate children: Rita Baylon (Rita),
Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon), and
petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia). The petitioners filed a Complaint for partition, accounting, and damages against
Florante, Rita, and Panfila, alleging that after the death of Spouses Baylon, Rita took possession of 43 parcels of
land situated in Negros Oriental and appropriated the income for herself. They claimed that Rita used this
income to purchase two parcels of land. During the case, Rita conveyed these two lands to Florante through a
Deed of Donation. Rita died intestate and without issue. Subsequently, upon learning of the donation to
Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, seeking the rescission of the donation rescinded in
accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code, citing Rita's alleged weakness at the time of the deed's
execution. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, ordering the rescission of the donation and directing the
partition of Rita’s properties among the heirs. However, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision on rescission and
property inclusion on the ground that the petitioners' action for rescission could not be combined with their
action for partition, accounting, and damages through a mere supplemental pleading. The petitioners then
appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present case.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners' action for rescission could be properly joined with their action for partition, accounting,
and damages through a mere supplemental pleading.

RULING:
The Petition is meritorious. YES, the action for rescission could be properly joined with their action for
partition, accounting, and damages through a mere supplemental pleading. Thus, the court denied the CA’s
decision.

The Court elucidated in its decision in Young vs. Spouses Sy that, although a supplemental pleading only serves
to bolster or add something to the primary pleading, it exists side by side with the original. It does not replace
that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and
that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of
relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will enlarge or change
the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts which further develop the
original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way of supplemental complaint even
though they themselves constitute a right of action. Thus, a supplemental pleading may properly allege
transactions, occurrences or events which had transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be
supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts constitute another cause of action

G.R. No. 200567, June 22, 2015

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CPR

PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC. AND SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. AND
LEONIZA* F. REYNOSO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing Inc. obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans
were covered by fifteen promissory notes all signed by respondents, spouses Leoniza Reynoso and Cornelio
Reynoso jr, as Treasurer and
President of CPR Promotions, respectively. With a total Principal amount of php
12,891,397.78

To secure the loans, spouses Reynoso executed two deed of real estate mortgage on separate dates. The
first mortgage, securing the amount of php 6,500,000 and the second mortgage, in the amount of php 2,500,000.
 Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety agreement binding themselves solidarily
with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have obtained from petitioner MBTC,
including those covered by the said PN’s, but not to exceed php 13,000,000.

Upon maturity of the loans, respondent defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. wherein, MBTC participated and won as the highest bidder.

Notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of php 13,614,000,
Petitioner alleged that there remained a deficiency balance of php 2,268,520.73, plus interest and charges.

RTC, ruled in favor of Metrobank. However, on appeal, the appellate court found that petitioner was not
able to prove the amount claimed, reversed the lower court’s decision, and ordered petitioner to refund or return
to defendant the amount of php 722,602.22 or the amount representing the remainder or excess of the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale.

Petitioner claims that respondent spouses should be made to answer for certain specific expenses
connected with the foreclosure. In their comment, respondents maintained the propriety of the CA’s grant of a
refund, arguing that in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, they laid down in detail the excess of the
prices of the foreclosed properties over their obligation.

ISSUE: WON the court shall allow the counterclaim

HELD:

SC fully agrees with the CA that Metrobank was not able to prove the amount claimed, However, it also
found that neither the respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund.

Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.

Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the
RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have, in several cases, utilized

the following tests:
1. Are the issue of fact or law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
claim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the
defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the
conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the
amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by
the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor

It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his
Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records, what
respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Then,
realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents
set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents'
belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their
Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.

NORLINDA S. MARILAG, Petitioner, vs.

MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201892, JULY 22, 2015

FACTS:
Rafael Martinez (Rafael), the respondent's father, obtained- from the petitioner a loan for PHP 160,000.00, with
a stipulated monthly interest of five percent (5%), payable within a period of six (6) months. The loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
208400. Rafael failed' to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands, prompted the
petitioner to file a Complaint about Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. Rafael failed to file his answer and upon the petitioner's motion, it was declared in default. RTC Imus
declared a decision in the foreclose case, but the record does not show that this Decision had already attained
finality.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to the
petitioner, which was pegged at PHP 689,000.00. After making a total payment of PHP 400,000.00, he executed
a promissory note dated February 20, 1998 (subject PN), binding himself to pay on or before March 31, 1998,
the amount of PHP 289,000.00, "representing the balance of the agreed financial obligation of his father to
petitioner." After learning the decision, the respondent refuse to pay the amount stated in PN. The petitioner
filed a case for the sum of money and damages and the respondent contends that the petitioner has no cause of
action against him.
ISSUE:
Whether litis pendentia applies in the present case.
RULING:
YES.
Litis pendentia applies in the present case. Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers
to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second act becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties as representing the same interests
in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other. Splitting a cause of action is a
mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers,
where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia or res judicata, as the

case may be. In loan contracts secured by a real estate sum of money or the institution of a real action to
foreclose on the mortgage security. mortgage, the rule is that the creditormortgagee has a single cause of action
against the debtor mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of
sum of money or institution of real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.

DIVINAGRACIA vs. PARILLA et. al.

G.R. No. 196750 | March 11, 2015
Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
Digested by: Hanifa D. Manabilang

FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. owned a 313-square meter parcel of land. During his lifetime, he contracted two
marriages and had twelve heirs both legitimate and illegitimate children. Upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, nine of the
heirs sold their respective interests in the subject land to Santiago Divinagracia (Petitioner) for a consideration
of 447,695.66, as documented in a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale.
However, this document was not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares. On
December 22, 1989, the same parties executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and
Santiago agreed that out of the aforementioned consideration, only 109,807.93 would be paid upfront, with
Santiago agreeing to pay the remaining balance upon the partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was
unable to have the Transfer Certificate of Title cancelled and the subject document registered due to the refusal
of other heirs to surrender the said title. This, coupled with the failure of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude
(Respondents) to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint for judicial partition and
receivership on January 3, 1990. The respondents maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an action
for judicial partition nor compel them to surrender the said land title because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay
the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and
Eusela Niangar (second wife) and, thus, only their legitimate children may validly inherit the same. The RTC
ordered the partition of the land between Santiago and others, canceled TCT No. T12255, and issued a new one
to Santiago. Santiago was deemed a co-owner but did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.’s share. Santiago was
directed to pay 337,887.73 as per the Supplemental Contract upon partition. However, The CA dismissed
Santiago's complaint because it deemed Felcon's siblings and
Maude's children indispensable parties, leading to its dismissal of the complaint due to their omission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-joinder of indispensable parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action.

RULING:
NO. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.

The Court partially granted the petition where it ruled that the CA correctly dismissed Santiago's complaint due
to the non-joinder of indispensable parties; however, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint
instead of directing the impleadment of the indispensable parties. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. Therefore, the remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable and not to dismiss the case. Consequently, the case is
remanded to the RTC to include all indispensable parties and proceed with the case on its merits promptly.

SPOUSES ERORITA vs. SPOUSES DUMLAO

G.R. No. 195477 | January 25, 2016
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
Digested by: Hanifa D. Manabilang

FACTS:
Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land where San Mariano Academy
structures stand. They acquired the property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale due to the failure of the
former owners, Spouses Herminio and Editha Erorita, to redeem it. The Dumlaos alleged that the Eroritas
agreed on a monthly rent but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. In response, the Eroritas countered that the
Dumlaos allowed them to continue running the school without paying rent. Years later, the Dumlaos asked the
petitioners to vacate the property. Although the Eroritas wanted to comply, they couldn't immediately close the
school without clearance. After some time, the Dumlaos filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the
RTC against the defendants Hernan, Susan, and the Eroritas. In their joint answer, the defendants prayed for
dismissal of the complaint, arguing that they couldn't be forced to vacate or pay rent under their factual
circumstances. Despite notice, the defendants-Eroritas failed to appear for pre-trial, resulting in a default
judgment in favor of the Dumlaos. Subsequently, prompting the Eroritas to appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA), claiming that the complaint clearly indicates a case for unlawful detainer, thus making the RTC lack
jurisdiction over the case. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision, denying the Eroritas' motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO, the RTC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of
an action and jurisdiction over the case, irrespective of the complaint’s caption. A review of the complaint
reveals that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow the petitioners to continue operating the school on
the disputed property; (b) in a demand letter, Spouses Dumlao instructed the petitioners to pay and/or vacate the
property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint
within a year from the last demand to vacate. Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of
possession," its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an
action for unlawful detainer falls within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the property’s assessed
value. In this case, the complaint clearly contains the elements of an unlawful detainer case. Therefore, the case
should have been filed with the MTC, and the RTC had no jurisdiction. Since a decision rendered by a court
without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s decision is also void.

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered into a Dealership
Agreement for Sales and Services of the former's products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The Agreement contained a stipulation that “All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with the
proper Courts of Quezon City.”
Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, Reynaldo Go and
Metrobank for damages and breach of contracts, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order.
Kubota filed two motions, one for the dismissal of the case on the ground of improper venue, the other
prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing because its counsel is unavailable on the given date.
The court denied the motion to dismiss on the reason that Unimasters’ place of business is in Tacloban City
while Kubota’s principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accordance with the Rules of Court, the proper
venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Hence, the filing in the RTC
of Tacloban is proper.
Kubota appealed to both orders on the grounds they were issued with grave abuse of discretion in a special
action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC of Tacloban had no jurisdiction
was improperly laid.
The Court of Appeals decided in favor of Kubota and it held that: “the stipulation respecting venue in its
Dealership Agreement with Unimasters did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and
exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City.” Subsequently, Unimasters filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was turned down by the appellate court.
ISSUE: Whether the venue stipulated in the contract has the effect of limiting the venue to a specified place.
HELD: NO.
According to the court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations in a contract should
be considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. Unless the
parties make it clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of
actions between them be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule
4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule.
In light of all the cases surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question should receive a
negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties'
desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the
place selected by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and
intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place,
Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff.
Kubota's theory that the RTC had no jurisdiction considering that the venue was improperly laid is not an
accurate statement of legal principle. It equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with
jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. This is fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an
amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00, is assuredly within the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court.
Assuming that venue was improperly laid in the Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC,
that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of the case before that
Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within its jurisdiction. However, if the
objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, the RTC would proceed in
perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action.

Rev. Luis Ao-As, et al.v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
This petition involves an intra-corporate dispute concerning the management of the Lutheran Church of the
Philippines (LCP), a religious organization which led SEC to organize and create a Management Committee.
Subsequent to the establishment of the said committee, LCP held a national convention where members
initiated an election, in line with the organizations.
By-Laws for a new set of church leaders because the incumbent directors were enjoined to act as Board. As
provided for in the LCP By-Laws, directors are elected by division, to the exception of the President which is
elected through the National Convention. Various issues were raised by the parties before the SEC, which were
all denied in favor of the SEC Management Committee. When appealed to the CA, the latter aside from ruling
on other relevant issues also nullified the manner of election conducted by LCP for being in violation of the
Corporation Code which requires the presence of majority of the members entitled to vote at the election.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the manner of election of the BOD of LCP as provided in its By-Laws is invalid.
Ruling:
No. The matter of how the directors or other leaders of a church shall be chosen is a matter of ecclesiastical law
or custom which is outside the jurisdiction of civil courts. In any case, the stipulation in the By-Laws is not
contrary to the Corporation Code. Section 89 of the Corporation Code pertaining to non-stock corporations
provides that "(t)he right of the members of any class or classes (of a non-stock corporation) to vote may be
limited, broadened or denied to the extent specified in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. This is an
exception to Section 6 of the same code where it is provided that "no share may be deprived of voting rights
except those classified and issued as ‘preferred’ or ‘redeemable’ shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code."
The stipulation in the By-Laws providing for the election of the Board of Directors by districts is a form of
limitation on the voting rights of the members of a non-stock corporation as recognized under the aforesaid
Section 89. Section 24, which requires the presence of a majority of the members entitled to vote in the election
of the board of directors, applies only when the directors are elected by the members at large, such as is always
the case in stock corporations by virtue of Section 6

G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD, TIJAM, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Nustad, as represented by Atty. Lucila, filed a petition before the RTC and prayed that
Tujan-'Militante be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner's duplicate copy of
the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T- 387158 and T-387159, which 'were all issued in
Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles. RTC set the petition for a
hearing.
Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul Proceedings and
averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons.
Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty
that she is in possession of the subject titles.
 RTC denied TujanMilitante' s Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC stated
that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender TCT Nos.
because it merely set the petition for a hearing. Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The court a
quo denied Tujan- Militante's Motion for Reconsideration.
CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw
was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her Motion Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by the CA in a Resolution. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
RULING:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is
equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. 11 Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction.
In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the
ground of improper service of summons, the ·subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought
for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to · the authority of such court.
Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask
for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein.
Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the RTC of
Quezon City. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas,
Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be
one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative. The probate court issued an Order denying the entry of
appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the
estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by Section
16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an
administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said
deceased.
Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor,
Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr.,
be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased.
San Juan filed a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient” maintaining
that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the
case. RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. The court held that there was, after all, no need for
the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. San Juan filed a motion
for reconsideration thereof and was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a person nominated as "administrator" by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a will under
probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that such
"administrator" is not the court-appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased devisee or legatee.
RULING:
The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Death of party. – After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper
notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by
the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified
period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period,
to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the
deceased.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his
estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as
devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of
the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as
representatives of the estate. 42 Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the
trial court.

G.R. No. 208232 March 10, 2014

HEIRS OF ALFREDO BAUTISTA vs. LINDO, VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land. Years later, he subdivided the property
and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale. Three years after,
Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC, anchoring his cause of action on
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141 (Public Land Act) which reads: SECTION 119. Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.
Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches, as defenses.
during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner Epifania. Some Respondents
later entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three
thousand two hundred and thirty square meter portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender,
and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the RTC.
Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state the value of
the property sought to be recovered. Since BP 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is more than
PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista
seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws. Jurisdiction
of RTCs, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. ―Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: 1) In
all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
xxxx
The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
 The course of action embodied in the complaint by the present petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista, is
to enforce his right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a freepatent holder under
Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a
free patent is a civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in determining whether
an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the
criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction
is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest therein which falls under
the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way
below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water.
This is because respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively
defended their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC
following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED.

ANICETO BANGIS substituted by his heirs, namely: RODOLFO B. BANGIS, RONNIE B. BANGIS,
ROGELIO B. BANGIS, RAQUEL B. QUILLO, ROMULO B. BANGIS, ROSALINA B. PARAN,
ROSARIO B. REDDY, REYNALDO B. BANGIS, and REMEDIOS B. LASTRE, Petitioners, vs.
HEIRS OF SERAFIN AND SALUD ADOLFO, namely: LUZ A. BANNISTER, SERAFIN ADOLFO,
JR., and ELEUTERIO ADOLFO rep. by his Heirs, namely: MILAGROS, JOEL, MELCHOR, LEA,
MILA, NELSON, JIMMY and MARISSA, all surnamed ADOLFO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 190875

June 13, 2012

FACTS:

The spouses Serafin, Sr. and Saludada3 Adolfo were the original registered owners of a 126,622 square meter
lot, located in Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. This property was mortgaged to the then Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation on August 18, 1955,4 and upon default in the payment of the loan obligation, was foreclosed and
ownership was consolidated in DBP's name Serafin Adolfo, Sr., however, repurchased the same on December 1,
1971, a year after his wife died in 1970.

Sometime in 1975, Serafin Adolfo, Sr. (Adolfo) allegedly mortgaged the subject property for the sum of
P12,500.00 to Aniceto Bangis (Bangis) who immediately took possession of the land. 7 The said transaction was,
however, not reduced into writing.8

When Adolfo died, his heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the said property was subdivided and
separate titles were issued in names of the Heirs of Adolfo/

In June 1998, the Heirs of Adolfo expressed their intention to redeem the mortgaged property from Bangis but
the latter refused, claiming that the transaction between him and Adolfo was one of sale. During the conciliation
meetings in the barangay, Bangis' son, Rudy Bangis, showed them a copy of a deed of sale and a certificate of
title to the disputed lot.12 The parties having failed to amicably settle their differences, a certificate to file
action13 was issued by the barangay.

On July 26, 2000, the Heirs of Adolfo filed a complaint 14 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for annulment
of deed of sale and declaration of the purported contract of sale as antichresis, accounting and redemption of
property and damages against Bangis, Atty. Phoebe Loyola Toribio of the Registry of Deeds, Malaybalay City
which states that the said title was of "dubious" origin since there was no deed of conveyance upon which the
said transfer certificate of title was based and that its derivative title, TCT No. T-10566, does not exist in the
files of the Registry of Deeds.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,19 Bangis claimed to have bought the subject property from Adolfo for which
TCT No. T-1056720 was issued. He also alleged to have been in open and adverse possession of the property
since 1972 and that the cause of action of the Heirs of Adolfo has prescribed. On November 11, 2001, Bangis
died and was substituted in this suit by his heirs, namely, Rodolfo B. Bangis, Ronie B. Bangis, Rogelio B.
Bangis, Raquel B. Quillo, Romulo B. Bangis, Rosalina B. Paran, Rosario B. Reddy, Reynaldo B. Bangis and
Remedios B. Lastre (Heirs of Bangis).21

On December 29, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision 28 in favor of the Heirs of Adolfo, the dispositive portion of
which reads Declaring TCT No. 10567 in the name of Aniceto Bangis as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO and
directing the Office of the Register of Deeds to cause its cancellation from its record to avoid confusion
regarding the ownership thereof; and

Aggrieved, the Heirs of Bangis appealed the foregoing disquisition to the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, aggrieved party filed a motion for reconsideration

ISSUE: Whether or not that the CA erred in not considering the extra judicial settlement with

HELD: No, For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that "the amount
of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis shall be
void." In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce any document in support of their
claim that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis was an antichresis, hence, the CA properly held that no such
relationship existed between the parties. 40

On the other hand, the Heirs of Bangis presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale dated
December 30, 197141 to justify their claimed ownership and possession of the subject land. However,
notwithstanding that the subject of inquiry is the very contents of the said document, only its photocopy 42 was
presented at the trial without providing sufficient justification for the production of secondary evidence, in
violation of the best evidence rule embodied under Section 3 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court

In sum, the Heirs of Bangis failed to establish the existence and due execution of the subject deed on which
their claim of ownership was founded. Consequently, the RTC and CA were correct in affording no probative
value to the said document.49

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the assailed
Decision dated March 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station (CA) and its Resolution dated
December 2, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00722-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION: (1) cancelling
TCT No. T-10567; and

(2) ordering respondent Heirs of Adolfo to pay petitioner Heirs of Bangis the sum of
₱12,500.00 with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from March 30, 2009 until the finality of this
Decision and thereafter, 12% annual interest until its full satisfaction.

The rest of the Decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

VIRGILIO S. DAVID v. MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,

G.R. NO. 194785

July 11, 2012

FACTS:Private respondent Virgilio S. David (hereinafter, David), a supplier of electrical hardware, 8 filed a case
for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric cooperative in Misamis Occidental
"Virgilio David v. Misamis Occidental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II)." The said case, which was
essentially a collection suit..10
MOELCI II filed its Answer to Amended Complaint11 which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which
also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were lack of cause of action, there being
allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II under the Statute of Frauds pursuant to
Section 1 (g) and (i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and improper venue.12

In his opposition to MOELCI II’s Motion, David contended in the main that because a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the
"quotation letter," being merely an attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be
inquired into.16

MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition in which it asserted, citing extensively the ruling of the Court in
World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Macrohon, 17 that a complaint cannot be separated from its annexes;
hence, the trial court in resolving a

motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action must consider the complaint’s annexes. 18

After the parties filed their respective memoranda, Judge Olalia issued an order dated 16 November 1995
denying MOELCI II’s motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses. MOELCI II’s motion for
reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in another order issued by Judge Olalia on 13 March
1996.19

MOELCI II elevated this incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Olalia in the issuance of the two aforesaid orders.

On 14 March 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed MOELCI II’s petition holding that the allegations in
David’s complaint constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and in holding that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion.

HELD: We find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, consistent with our ruling in The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v.

30
Genato, as MOELCI II’s Motion is anchored on the ground that the Complaint allegedly stated no cause of
action, a preliminary hearing thereon is more than unnecessary as it constitutes an erroneous and improvident
move. No error therefore could be ascribed to the trial court in the denial of such Motion. The Court ruled in the
cited case, thus:

. . . . respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private respondent’s
affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is
hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the sufficiency of the cause of
action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous
matter may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would require evidence and therefore must be raised as
defenses and await the trial. In other words, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no other should be considered.

To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly
considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to
determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can
be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.32

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said
complaint.33

We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny to Annex "A,"
which is after all deemed a part of the Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in our conclusion.
Finally, we do not agree with MOELCI II’s contention that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the trial court’s
deferment of the resolution of MOELCI II’s Motion. The trial court squarely denied the Motion and not merely
deferred its resolution.39 Thus, there is no deferment to speak of that should be enjoined.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 March 1997 and
its Resolution dated 14 July 1997 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM

EDGARDO PINGA, vs. THE HEIRS OF GERMAN, SANTIAGO,

G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006, TINGA, J

FACTS:

Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed with the RTC
by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The Complaint alleged that
petitioner and co-defendant Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent,
cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees therein. Respondents prayed that
petitioner and Saavedra be enjoined from committing "acts of depredation" on their properties, and ordered to
pay damages.

In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents’ ownership
of the properties in question, asserting that petitioner’s father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived
their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s.

Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint
but later reconsidered and allowed the defendants to present their evidence ex-parte.

The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, not seeking the reinstatement of their complaint, but instead
requesting the dismissal of the entire action and the disallowance of the defendants' presentation of evidence ex-
parte.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the counterclaim. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.

RULING:

No. Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a
counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to
have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the
corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he
choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he
must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him regardless of whether his counterclaim
is compulsory or permissive.

Accordingly, the RTC clearly erred when it ordered the dismissal of the counterclaim, since Section 3, Rule 17
mandates that the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the
counterclaim in the same or separate action. If the RTC were to dismiss the counterclaim, it should be on the
merits of such counterclaim.
Here, the RTC, in dismissing the counterclaim, did not expressly adopt respondents’argument that the dismissal
of their complaint extended as well to the counterclaim. Instead, the RTC justified the dismissal of the
counterclaim on the ground that "there is no opposition to [plaintiff's] Motion for Reconsideration [seeking the
dismissal of the counterclaim]."

SPLITTING OF A SINGLE CAUSE

OF ACTION AND ITS EFFECT

SPOUSES SIMON YAP AND MILAGROS GUEVARRA vs. FIRST E-BANK CORPORATION
(previously known as PDCP DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC.),

G.R. NO. 169889; SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

FACTS:

On August 30, 1990, Sammy Yap obtained a ₱2 million loan from PDCP Development Bank, Inc.1 (PDCP). As
security, Sammy’s parents, petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra, executed a third-party mortgage on
their land and warehouse standing on it. The mortgage agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially
foreclose the property in case Sammy failed to pay the loan.

Sammy also issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor of PDCP as additional securities for the
loan.

When Sammy defaulted on the payment of his loan, PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee bank but the
said checks were dishonored. This prompted PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for six counts of
violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) on February 8, 1993.

On May 3, 1993, PDCP filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of
petitioners which served as principal security for Sammy’s loan.

On December 16, 1993, on motion of Sammy and without objection from the public prosecutor and PDCP, the
BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed.

The petitioners filed a complaint before RTC for injunction, damages, and accounting of payments against
PDCP to stop the foreclosure sale, arguing that PDCP waived its right to foreclose when it filed the complaint
against Sammy.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. It held that PDCP had three options when Sammy defaulted in the
payment of his loan: enforcement of the promissory note in a collection case, enforcement of the checks under
the Negotiable Instruments Law and/or BP 22, or foreclosure of mortgage. The remedies were alternative and
the choice of one excluded the others. Thus, PDCP was deemed to have waived its right to foreclose on the
property of petitioners when it elected to sue Sammy for violation of BP 22.

The CA reversed the RTC. It opined that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right to foreclose on the
property of petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation of BP 22. The purpose of BP 22 was to punish the act
of issuing a worthless check, not to force a debtor to pay his debt. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether PDCP waived its right to foreclose on the petitioner’s property when it filed a complaint against
Sammy for violation of BP 22.

RULING:

No. Under Circular 57-97 which has been institutionalized as Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
provides that Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation
of the civil and criminal actions.

Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and
collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction
had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to
pay the amount of the check(s).

In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of Sammy)
was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have still
foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.

POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO

SUSPEND THE RULES OF COURT.

SARMIENTO vs. ZARATAN

G.R. No. 16747, February 5, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

On 2 September 2002, petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case2 against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.

Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City.

The RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15
days from receipt.

Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file
the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his
failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one
week, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers
because the wirings got wet.

On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the appeal, the
required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003, or six (6) days beyond the
expiration of the aforesaid fifteen day period.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted. The appellate
court nullified and set aside the Orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of respondent’s appeal.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in
her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a worthless
piece of paper with no legal effect, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15
of the 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s petition for certiorari should have been dismissed in the first place

RULING:

No. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion
and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. The
test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or
circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive
rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due
to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood, compounded by the
grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As
it appears, respondent sought extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was
subsequently filed within the requested extended period.

Parenthetically, it must be noted also that when the appeal was dismissed on 19 June 2003, the memorandum
was already filed in court on 9 June 2003.

CRESCENCIO ARRIETA v. MELANIA T. ARRIETA

G.R. NO. 234808, NOVEMBER 19, 2018

FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari to annul judgment of CA which annulled and set aside RTC decision declaring
the marriage of petitioner Crescencio Arrieta (Cris) and respondent Melania T. Arrieta (Melania) void ab initio.
Petitioner and respondent got married in August 1973, but after years of being together respondent Melanie flew
to the US and later on obtained a divorce decree and got married to another man in California.
Later on, petitioner Cris filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Cris filed a Motion for
Issuance of Summons by Publication since respondent was abroad. It was approved and thus the summons and
the copy of the petition were published in San Pedro Express. Melania did not file an answer.
RTC later on granted the petition for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. After seven years of finality,
Melania filed for a petition for annulment of judgment claiming that the RTC Decision was rendered without
jurisdiction and tainted with extrinsic fraud. CA later on declared RTC decision as null and void.
ISSUE
Whether or not summons properly served based on the extraterritorial service rule.
RULING
Yes. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules specifically authorizes a court to a court to effect extraterritorial service of
summons “in any other manner the court may deem sufficient,” “when the defendant does not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff.” As Cris correctly argues, this mode of
service is separate and distinct from second mode of service under the same rule, which prescribes “publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant.”
If the RTC intended to direct extraterritorial service of summons under the second mode, then it should have so
indicated that the publication be complemented by sending a copy thereof to the last known address of Melania
through registered mail. However, it clearly did not. At the very least, the publication of summons should be
considered as substantial compliance with the rules on service. To reiterate, Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules
authorizes the RTC to effect extraterritorial service of summons “in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient,” for as long as all the parties’ due process rights are duly regarded. Besides, to invalidate the service
of summons in this case would unduly prejudice Cris who was merely subscribing to a duly issued court
directive.

LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. MARVIN SEDANO

G.R. NO. 222711, AUGUST 23, 2017

FACTS
Petitioner leases its land to Philippine National Construction (PNCC) and of the same land is subleased to
herein respondent. The lease contract has a provision that states “all actions or case[s] filed in connection with
this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others."
Respondent allegedly failed to pay rental fees and thus petitioner, instituted a complaint for collection of sum of
money against the respondent with RTC-Valenzuela. The respondent pointed out that the venue was improperly
laid and the complaint should be dismissed
Petitioner contended that the said provision on venue should be considered as void because it is a stipulation on
jurisdiction. It allegedly deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which,
under the law, are within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer.
Petitioner further contends that respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any objections on venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said
court when he asked several times for additional time to file his responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims
against petitioner, and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant.
ISSUE
Whether or not the venue was improperly laid.
RULING
YES. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the stipulation restricting the venue is valid. The fact that this
stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay
City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail
the jurisdiction of all other courts. Law is deemed written in every contract and must not be construed as made
to make the law ineffective. Moreover, the parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time
they enter into the contract and at the time it is to become operative. Thus, without any clear showing in the
contract that the parties intended otherwise, the questioned stipulation should be considered as a
stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic principles of procedural law.
Second, filing several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, or interposing a counterclaim
or third-party complaint in the answer does not necessarily mean that he waived the affirmative defense of
improper venue. The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the same must be raised at the
earliest opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Respondent timely
raised the ground of improper venue since it was one of the affirmative defenses raised in his Answer with
Third-Party Complaint.
Further, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be a compulsory counterclaim, which he was prompted
to file only because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money, else the same would be barred.
The damages for the filing of a purported baseless suit is not covered by the venue stipulation, since he is not
asserting a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease contract, but rather an independent right which
arose only because of the complaint. The same goes for his third-party complaint, whereby he only pleaded that
the rental payments remitted to PNCC.

JOSE C. MIRANDA v. VIRGILIO TULIAO

G.R. NO. 158763, MARCH 31, 2006
 FACTS
On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the
witness protection program.
Two Information for murder were filed against five police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of
Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and
sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time
being at large. Upon automatic review, the Supreme Court acquitted the accused on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
In September 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the
ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall
or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
ISSUE
Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court.
Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
RULING
NO, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of the Court. Adjudication
of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
of law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the
person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required
for the adjudication of other relief sought by the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a
waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

Insigne vs. Abra Valley Colleges, Inc.,G.R. No. 204089, Jul 29, 2015

Facts:

In a case involving petitioners who are siblings, they filed a complaint against Abra Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra
Valley) and their half-brother, Francis Borgoña, who served as the president of Abra Valley. The complaint
aimed to gain access to Abra Valley's corporate books and records, as well as to obtain financial statements.
Initially, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the petitioners. However, Abra Valley appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which subsequently remanded the case for further proceedings. During
these proceedings, the RTC ordered the petitioners to present their stock certificates as evidence of their
shareholding in Abra Valley. Unfortunately, the petitioners failed to comply with this order, resulting in the
dismissal of their case by the RTC. Seeking recourse, the petitioners appealed the dismissal to the CA, but their
appeal was denied. Consequently, they brought the case to the Supreme Court for review.

Issue:

 Whether the RTC properly dismissed the case based on the petitioners' failure to present their stock
certificates.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The presentation of a stock certificate should not be the
sole determining factor of one's stock ownership, as it is merely evidence of the holder's interest in the
corporation. In the case at hand, the petitioners had submitted other competent means to establish their
shareholdings, such as official receipts of their payments for shares and certified copies of documents
demonstrating their ownership. Additionally, the respondents had allowed the petitioners to become members of
the Board of Directors, further supporting their status as stockholders. Therefore, the dismissal of the case based
on the petitioners' failure to present stock certificates was unwarranted and unreasonable. The power to dismiss
a case should not be exercised indiscriminately, but only when the non-compliance with a court order
constitutes a willful violation. In this instance, the petitioners had provided sufficient evidence of their
shareholdings, rendering the non-production of stock certificates unnecessary. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the decision of the Court of Appeals, nullified the Regional Trial Court's order of dismissal, declared the
petitioners as stockholders of Abra Valley, and ordered the reinstatement of the case. Furthermore, the
respondents were directed to bear the costs of the suit.

Momarco Import Co., Inc. vs. Villamena, G.R. No. 192477, Jul 27, 2016

In the case filed by Felicidad Villamena against Momarco Import Co., Inc., the defendant, Villamena sought the
nullification of a deed of absolute sale and transfer certificate of title pertaining to a registered real property and
its improvements in Caloocan City. Villamena alleged that the said documents were based on a forged special
power of attorney and that the sale was, in fact, a mortgage to secure a loan. However, Momarco Import Co.,
Inc. failed to file an answer to the complaint, resulting in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City
declaring them in default. As a consequence, the RTC issued a default judgment, thereby nullifying the deed of
absolute sale and the transfer certificate of title.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC,
ordering the stricken off of Momarco Import Co., Inc.'s answer, allowing the respondent to present
evidence ex parte, and rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that the appeal in the case lacked
merit. The Court determined that the formal entry of appearance filed by Momarco Import Co., Inc.'s counsel
constituted a voluntary appearance, which was equivalent to being served with summons. As a result, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court also concluded that all the necessary
requirements for declaring the defendant in default were met, and the RTC appropriately struck off the answer,
allowing the respondent to present evidence ex parte. It was emphasized that the petitioner had the obligation to
provide an explanation for the failure or delay in filing the answer and demonstrate a valid defense before the
default judgment was issued. Since the petitioner failed to fulfill these requirements, the default judgment was
upheld.

Momarco Import Co., Inc. vs. Villamena, G.R. No. 192477, Jul 27, 2016

In the case filed by Felicidad Villamena against Momarco Import Co., Inc., the defendant, Villamena sought the
nullification of a deed of absolute sale and transfer certificate of title pertaining to a registered real property and
its improvements in Caloocan City. Villamena alleged that the said documents were based on a forged special
power of attorney and that the sale was, in fact, a mortgage to secure a loan. However, Momarco Import Co.,
Inc. failed to file an answer to the complaint, resulting in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City
declaring them in default. As a consequence, the RTC issued a default judgment, thereby nullifying the deed of
absolute sale and the transfer certificate of title.

Issue:
  Whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC,
ordering the stricken off of Momarco Import Co., Inc.'s answer, allowing the respondent to present
evidence ex parte, and rendering the default judgment based on such evidence.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that the appeal in the case lacked
merit. The Court determined that the formal entry of appearance filed by Momarco Import Co., Inc.'s counsel
constituted a voluntary appearance, which was equivalent to being served with summons. As a result, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court also concluded that all the necessary
requirements for declaring the defendant in default were met, and the RTC appropriately struck off the answer,
allowing the respondent to present evidence ex parte. It was emphasized that the petitioner had the obligation to
provide an explanation for the failure or delay in filing the answer and demonstrate a valid defense before the
default judgment was issued. Since the petitioner failed to fulfill these requirements, the default judgment was
upheld.

Specified Contractors & Dev Inc v. Pobocan G.R. No. 212427-28, Jan 11, 2018

Facts:

Respondent Jose A. Pobocan had been employed by Specified Contractors &

Development, Inc. until his retirement in March 2011. Pobocan claims that Architect Enrique Olonan, one of the
petitioners, had agreed to provide him with one unit for each building constructed by Specified Contractors as
part of his compensation package. Two of the projects involved in this alleged agreement were the Xavierville
Square Condominium in Quezon City and the Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I in Alfonso, Cavite. According
to the oral agreement, Specified Contractors had transferred Unit 708 of Xavierville Square Condominium and
Unit 208 of Sunrise Holiday Mansion Bldg. I to Pobocan. However, when Pobocan requested the execution of
Deeds of Assignment or Deeds of Sale for these units, his demand went unanswered. As a result, Pobocan filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, seeking the execution of the appropriate
deeds of conveyance and damages. The petitioners, in response, filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the
alleged oral agreement was unenforceable due to the violation of the statute of frauds and that the cause of
action had already prescribed. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed Pobocan's complaint. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's decision, stating that the dismissal based on the violation of the
statute of frauds was unwarranted. The CA found evidence of partial performance of the alleged obligation,
such as Pobocan's possession of the subject units and his payment of condominium dues and realty tax.
Consequently, the CA declared that a trial on the merits is necessary to determine the nature of Pobocan's
possession of the subject units.

Issues:
• Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
• Whether Pobocan's cause of action had already prescribed.
• Whether the action was barred by the statute of frauds.

Ruling:

In its ruling, the court affirmed that the complaint fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
as it involved a personal action for specific performance. The court clarified that a personal action seeks the
recovery of personal property, enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages for its breach.
Specifically, in this case, the court explained that specific performance is a remedy sought to compel a party to
fulfill a specific act agreed upon in a contract. The court emphasized that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint because it sought the execution of the appropriate deeds of conveyance, which falls under the realm
of specific performance.

Regarding the issue of prescription, the court referred to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which states that
actions based on an oral contract prescribe within six years from the the time the cause of action arises. The
court determined that the cause of action accrued when the alleged oral agreement was breached, which
occurred when Pobocan's demand for the execution of the deeds of conveyance was ignored. As the complaint
was filed beyond the sixyear prescriptive period, the court held that the action had already prescribed.

The court also addressed the statute of frauds, which requires certain contracts, including those involving the
sale of real property, to be in writing. The court clarified that the statute of frauds is a rule of evidence and does
not affect the validity or enforceability of a contract. In this case, the court acknowledged that the Court of
Appeals (CA) found evidence of partial performance of the alleged oral agreement, such as Pobocan's
possession of the subject units and payment of condominium dues and realty tax. However, the court ruled that
the CA's finding of partial performance did not extend the prescriptive period for filing an action based on an
oral contract. The court emphasized that partial performance does not alter the prescribed timeframe for filing
such an action.

Consequently, the court concluded that the action was barred by prescription and upheld the dismissal of the
case.

The Supreme Court has rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners. The court concluded that the complaint
filed by Jose A. Pobocan was essentially a claim for specific performance, which falls under the category of a
personal action within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, the court determined that
the action had already prescribed, as it was filed beyond the six-year period from the alleged oral agreement.
Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of the case on the grounds of prescription.

Verzosa v. Fernandez, 49. Phil. 627 (1926)

Facts:
The action in Verzosa v. Fernandez was brought by Monsefior Alfredo Verzosa, the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Bishop of Lipa, against the defendants, who were trustees of the Brotherhood (Archicofradia) of the Most Holy
Sacrament in Pagsanjan. The Brotherhood was established in 1807 to raise funds for religious activities, and the
fund was administered by the Brotherhood's Directorate. Over time, the fund grew, and its administration was
regulated by a royal cedula issued in 1819. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were misusing the fund and
not fulfilling their obligations as trustees.

Issues:

1. Whether the plaintiff, as the Bishop of Lipa, had the right to maintain the action and enforce the
trust.

2. Whether the facts alleged in the complaint constituted a cause of action.

3. Whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Ruling:
The court held that the demurrer raised by the defendants was not well-founded. It recognized the plaintiff's
right, as the Bishop and the ecclesiastical superior of the parish priest who served as the Brotherhood's Rector,
to enforce the trust and hold the defendants accountable. The court concluded that the plaintiff had a legitimate
interest in the proper administration of the fund. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's judgment,
overruled the demurrer, and ordered the defendants to answer the complaint. No pronouncement was made
regarding costs.
In summary, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, recognizing their right to enforce the trust and compelling
the defendants to account for their actions as trustees of the Brotherhood's fund.

NOCUM VS TAN

Ponente:

Associate Justice Minita Chico-Nazario Mode of Appeal:

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Facts:

• The case involves a dispute over jurisdiction and venue in a civil action for damages arising from libel.
• The petitioners, Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., filed a petition for review on
certiorari after the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
• The original complaint was filed by respondent Lucio Tan against Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP, and Inquirer, seeking damages for alleged malicious and defamatory imputations in two articles
published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
• The RTC initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
• Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended
complaint, which included additional allegations regarding the place where the libelous articles were
printed and first published.
• The lower court admitted the amended complaint and set aside the previous order of dismissal.

Issue:
• Whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages.
Contention:

They argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the latter’s
actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were printed and first published, the
original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower
court.
Ruling:
The court rule on the affirmative as having jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages.

Doctrine:
• The RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when it was filed because the cause of action was for
damages arising from libel, which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
• The additional allegations in the amended complaint regarding the place of printing and publication only
pertained to venue, not jurisdiction.
• Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction.
• Venue is a procedural matter that relates to the place of trial, while jurisdiction is a matter of substantive
law.

• In civil actions, venue is not jurisdictional, unlike in criminal actions.

 • The failure of the original complaint to allege the place of printing and publication would have been
fatal if it were a criminal case, but it did not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court in this civil case.

• The amendment to the complaint merely laid down the proper venue of the case.

Application to the doctrine of the case:

In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were
printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s
failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.

DAVID VS AGBAY

Ponente:

Associate Justice Villarama Jr.

Mode of Appeal:

Petition for Review under Rule 45 to reverse the order.

Facts:
• Petitioner Renato M. David, a Canadian citizen who migrated to Canada in 1974, returned to the
Philippines with his wife upon their retirement.

• In 2000, they purchased a lot in Oriental Mindoro and built a residential house on it.
• In 2004, they discovered that the portion of land where their house was built was public land and part of
the salvage zone.
• In 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the land, indicating that he is a
Filipino citizen.
• Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against David.
• David later re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003.

Issue:

• Whether the court has jurisdiction over David considering his citizenship changes.

Contention:

David asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-
determination of probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest; and second, the March 22, 2011
Order disregarded the legal fiction that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another
country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been
lost on account of said naturalization.

Ruling:
The court affirmed the denial of David's motion for re-determination of probable cause and held that he can be
indicted for falsification of public documents. The court has jurisdiction over David.

Doctrine:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner), the Solicitor General opines that in seeking
an affirmative relief from the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Redetermination of Probable Cause,
petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person to the said court’s jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance.
Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner’s motion after a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties’ arguments contained in
their respective pleadings, and the evidence submitted before the court.

Application to the doctrine of the case:

• In David's case, since he was naturalized as a Canadian citizen before the effectivity of the law, he is
deemed to have re-acquired his Philippine citizenship.

• However, this does not excuse his falsification of public documents.

• The court clarified that the MTC had jurisdiction over David's person when he filed his motion for re-
determination of probable cause, as he sought an affirmative relief.

• Therefore, the MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion.

CCC KAWASAKI
INSURANCE VS STEEL CORPORATION CORPORATION
Petitioner Respondent

]Ponente:

Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Mode of Appeal:

Petition for Review on Certiorari Facts:

Kawasaki, represented by its Manager and F .F. Mañacop Construction Company, Inc. (FFMCCI), represented
by its President, executed a Consortium Agreement. Kawasaki and FFMCCI formed a consortium (Kawasaki-
FFMCCI Consortium) for the purpose of contracting with the Philippine Government for the construction of a
fishing port network in Pangasinan. According to their Consortium Agreement, Kawasaki and FFMCIA
undertook to perform and accomplish their respective and specific portions of work in the intended contract
with the Philippine Government. In accordance with the Consortium Agreement, Kawasaki, on behalf of the
Consortium, secured from the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) Letter of Credit. Said Letter of
Credit guaranteed the faithful performance by Kawasaki-FFMCCI Consortium of its obligation under the
Construction Contract. Kawasaki filed before the RTC a Complaint against CCCIC to collect on Surety Bond
and Performance Bond.

CCCIC subsequently filed on August 19, 1991 before the RTC a Third-Party Complaint against FFMCCI and
its President Mañacop based on the two Indemnity Agreements which FFMCCI and Mañacop executed in favor
of CCCIC. The RTC issued summonses but FFMCCI and Mañacop failed to file any responsive pleading to the
Third-Party Complaint of CCCIC. Upon motion of CCCIC, the RTC issued an Order dated December 2, 1991
declaring FFMCCI and Mañacop in default.

Issue:
Whether or not The Court of Appeals erroneously ruled that there was no valid service of summons upon
FFMCC.

Contention:
CCCIC insists that there was proper service of summons upon FFMCCI, through one of its directors, as
authorized by the Rules of Court.

Ruling:
The Court disagrees with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no proper service of summons upon
FFMCCI.

Doctrine:
Rule 14, Section 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which was then in force, allowed the service of summons upon
a director of a private domestic corporation:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president,
manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

Application to the doctrine of the case:

The appellate court overlooked the fact that the service of summons on FFMCCI at its principal address at #86
West A venue, Quezon City failed because FFMCCI had already vacated said premises without notifying
anyone as to where it transferred. For this reason, the RTC, upon the motion of CCCIC, issued an Order dated
September 4, 1991, directing the issuance and service of Alias Summons to the individual directors of FFMCCI.
Eventually, the Alias Summons was personally served upon FFMCCI director Vicente Concepcion on
September 25, 1991.
Hence, the personal service of the Alias Summons on an FFMCCI director was sufficient for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over FFMCCI itself.

TERESITA TAN, petitioner, vs. JOVENCIO F. CINCO, SIMON LORI HOLDINGS, INC.,
PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, FORTUNATO G. PE, RAYMUNDO G. PE,
JOSE REVILLA REYES, JR., AND DEPUTY SHERIFF ROMMEL IGNACIO, respondents.
Facts.
Fortunato G. Pe, Raymundo G. Pe, Jovencio F. Cinco, and Jose Revilla Reyes, Jr. (individual lenders)
extended a loan to one Dante Tan (Dante) in the amount of P50,000,000.00. The loan was facilitated by
Investment Corporation (PentaCapital) and was secured by Dante's shares in Best World Resources
Corporation (BWRC). When Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and despite demands, he proposed
to settle the same by selling his shares in BWRC.
Respondents filed an action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
After due proceedings, the Makati RTC rendered judgment. Deputy Sheriff Rommel Ignacio (Sheriff
Ignacio) levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 126981 registered in
Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was then conducted. Dante sought the quashal of the writ
by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, herein petitioner Teresita Tan (Teresita) attesting to the
conjugal nature of the subject property.
Dante filed an Omnibus Motion. The Makati RTC denied said motion. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration before the Parañaque RTC, in an Order dated January 6, 2011, reversed its initial
disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in
favor of respondents. Moreover, she had not waived her right to institute a separate action to recover the
subject property, and the nullification case was not. And was barred by res judicata.
Issue:
Whether or not Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the
nullification case filed by the petitioner.
Ruling.

Yes. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
 acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a
writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy,
however, is not the resort to another co-equal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action
of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated
falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated January 6, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 257 in Civil Case No. 07-0134, the proceedings therein, as well as all
orders issued thereafter are hereby declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. First cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit
from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was
against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to
January, 1982.
Counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of
BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation
was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
Counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rule

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint taking into account the totality rule.

RULING:

The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties
under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom
or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of
transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
 provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question
of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court
may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put
to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. In cases of permissive
joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the
claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being joined
in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6
of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a
misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate
and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
SY-VARGAS vs. OGSOS
Associate Justice Estela M Perlas-Bernabe
Mode ofAppeal:
Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
Rolando Ogsos, Sr. leased the agricultural land owned by the Heirs of Fermina Pepico. Petitioner Elizabeth Sy-
Vargas, and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against respondents claiming that the lease rentals for a two-crop year period were not paid. In their
answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as stated in the lease
contract. They also claimed that petitioner unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and appropriated
for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof to
the unpaid rent. Respondents also averred that they lost profits when petitioner took possession of the leased
premises. Accordingly, the respondents filed a counterclaim for the lost profits plus damages.

The case filed by petitioner was dismissed and now respondents moved for the hearing of their counterclaim,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss respondents’ counterclaim, arguing that the same were permissive and that
respondents had not paid the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, denied the said motion, declaring respondents’
counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the payment of the required docket fees was no longer
necessary. The RTC granted respondents’ counterclaim, and ordered petitioner to pay respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents' counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no
payment of docket fees is required.
Contention:
Respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied in the lease contract
and its subsequent amendments. They denied abandoning the leased premises and claimed that sometime in
December 1998, petitioner and Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and appropriated for
themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof to the
unpaid rent.
Thus, when petitioner and Kathryn took possession of the leased premises, respondents lost their profits
equivalent to the aforesaid production starting from crop year 1999-2000 until the
termination of the lease contract on crop year 2003-2004. Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for
these lost profits plus damages
Ruling:
No. The nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay
docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaimants is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect
to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

Doctrine:
In Spouses Mendiola v. CA, the Court had devised tests in determining whether or not a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive: The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the
following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the
conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? If these tests result in affirmative
answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
Application to the doctrine of the case:
Based on the abovementioned standards, the Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in
nature. This is because: (a) the issue in the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable to pay lease
rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether or not petitioner and Kathryn are
liable for damages for taking over the possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating
respondents' crops planted therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents' respective causes of action arose from
completely different occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its
counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner's claim that respondents
failed to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim
that petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and (d) the recovery of
petitioner's claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting
separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.

FIRST DIVISION

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. AND GEORGE C. GO, Petitioners, v. BPI FAMILY
SAVINGS BANK, INC., SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT ONE [SPV-AMC],
INC.,* Respondent.

FACTS:
 Respondent filed a complaint5 against petitioners Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. (Go Tong
Electrical) and its President, George C. Go (Go; collectively petitioners), docketed as Civil Case No. 02-
1203, seeking that the latter be held jointly and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan
obligation
 Go Tong Electrical had applied for and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank of South East
Asia (BSA). Subsequently, DBS7 Bank of the Philippines, Inc. (DBS) became the successor-in-interest
of BSA.
 In their Answer with Counterclaim18 (Answer), petitioners merely stated that they "specifically
deny"19 the allegations under the complaint.
 By way of special and affirmative defenses, petitioners argued, among others, that: (a) the real party-in-
interest should be DBS and not respondent; (b) no demand was made upon them; and (c) Go cannot be
held liable under the CSA since there was supposedly no solidarity of debtors. 21 Petitioners further
interposed counterclaims for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation and
attorney's fees in the total amount of P1,250,000.00.
 The RTC ruled in favor of the defendant as affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: WON Go Co Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. and George C. Go are liable for the unpaid obligation.

RULLING:
  The Court concurs with the CA Decision holding that the genuineness and due execution of the loan
documents in this case were deemed admitted by petitioners under the parameters of Section 8, Rule 8 of
the Rules
 A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of the Credit
Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above-quoted rule. The mere statement in paragraph
4 of their Answer, i.e., that they "specifically deny" the pertinent allegations of the Complaint "for being
self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiffs’ purposes,"44 does not constitute an effective
specific denial as contemplated by law.
 Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a
general denial does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." 46 Neither does it become
so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations
contested are "self-serving" or are intended "to suit plaintiffs purposes."
 The Court clarifies that while the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise,
payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the
defense in his answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing,
or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there
is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," 53 none of these defenses were adequately argued or proven
during the proceedings of this case.

 Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in
a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.

G.R. No. 127692

GOMEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TROCINO Ponente:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J

Facts:

A petition for review on certiorari was filed assailing the decision of CA in nullifying the decision and orders of
RTC of Cebu City for want of Jurisdiction.

Petitioners Fortunato and Aurora Gomez filed an action for specific performance and rescission against the heirs
of Trocino, Sr., including respondents Adolfo and Mariano Trocino. The two parcel of land was sold to the
petitioner. But Trocino spouses (Caridad and Jesus) refused to convey ownership of the properties to the
petitioners. The summon was served to the respondents through Caridad Trocino. They filed an Answer. The
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering the defendants to execute a Deed of Sale. The
defendants failed to comply, leading to the nullification of the titles and the issuance of new titles in the name of
the petitioners. Respondents filed a petition for the annulment of the RTC's judgment, alleging that they were
not validly served with summons and that they have a meritorious defense. The CA granted the petition and
annulled the RTC's decision, ruling that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the respondents' persons.

Issue:

Whether or not there was valid service of summons on the respondents.

Ruling:

The judgment rendered against the respondents was null and void due to lack of jurisdiction, except for Caridad
Trocino who was validly served with summons. The decision of the trial court is considered valid and binding
with regard to Caridad Trocino, but only in proportion to her share of the inheritance. This means that the
judgment applies to Caridad Trocino because she was properly served of summon.

Since other respondents were not properly served of Summons and did not voluntarily submit to the Jurisdiction
of the trial court, the judgment does not apply to them. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and
the petition for review was denied.
G.R. No. 128464 June 20, 2006
REV. LUIS AO-AS, REV. JOSE LAKING, EUSQUICIO GALANG, REV. ISABELO MONONGGIT,
REV. EDWINO MERCADO, REV.DANIEL PONDEVIDA, REV. TEODORICO TARAN and DR.
BENJAMIN GALAPIA, Petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THOMAS P. BATONG, JUANITO BASALONG, AUGUSTO CATANGI,
PAUL GARCIA, QUIDO RIVERA, VICTORIO Y. SAQUILAYAN and DANILO ZAMORA,
Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
- The Lutheran Church in the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the LCP) is a religious organization
duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 8, 1967.
- The governing body of the LCP is its national board of directors (hereinafter referred to as the LCP
Board) which was originally composed of seven (7) members serving a term of two years.
- During the 1976 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed dividing the North Luzon district
(NLD) into two districts: the NLD Highland District (NLHD) and the NLD Lowland District (NLLD) --
thereby increasing the number of directors from seven (7) to nine (9).
- Again in the 1984 LCP national convention, a resolution was passed creating another district, namely,
the Visayan Islands District (VID) thereby increasing further the number of directors to eleven (11).
- Certain controversies arose involving the resolutions of the Board terminating the services of the LCP
business manager and corporate treasurer since 1979, Mr. Eclesio Hipe. The termination of Mr. Hipe sparked
a series of intracorporate complaints lodged before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For the
first time, the legality of the eleven (11) member Board was put in issue as being in excess of the number of
directors provided in the Articles of Incorporation since no amendments were made thereto to reflect the
increase.
- On August 17, 1990, [the Ao-As group] filed SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 for accounting and damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction and appointment of a management committee.
- During the hearings on the application for creation of a management committee, [the Batong group]
filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend the Proceedings of the Case in view of an amicable settlement agreed upon
by the parties entitled "A FORMULA FOR CONCORD". However, notwithstanding the FORMULA FOR
CONCORD, the SEC-SICD denied [the Batong group’s] motion to suspend proceedings.
- On January 23, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging again the FORMULA OF
CONCORD. Again, the SEC-SICD denied [the Batong group’s] motion.
- Subsequently, on September 3, 1992, the SEC-SICD Hearing Officer after the presentation of the
parties’ respective evidence, issued an Order creating a management committee.
- On September 23, 1992, [the Batong group] filed with the SEC En Banc a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for a temporary restraining order alleging that the SEC-SIDC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
creating the management committee.
- On October 16, 1992, the SEC-SIDC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting
[the Batong group] from "acting as a board of directors or officers of Lutheran Church in the Philippines, Inc.
(LCP) and from holding any convention or general or special membership meeting as well as election of the
members of the LCP board of directors, until further orders".

- [The Batong group] then filed with the SEC En Banc a Supplemental Petition dated November 13, 1992
alleging the supervening events in the case which took place after the filing of the original petition on
September 23, 1992.
 - On July 21, 1993, [the Batong Group] filed a Second Supplement to its petition for certiorari in the SEC
En Banc alleging the supervening events and seeking the review of an Order of the Hearing Officer dated June
9, 1993 which enlisted the aid of the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government and the
PNP Director General to enforce the writ of preliminary injunction.
- On 30 June 1994, the Batong group filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction. On 12 July 1994, the Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Ao-As group "from implementing the contract to sell between the
Lutheran church in the Philippines (LCP) and Solid Gold Realty Corporation and from selling, transferring,
assigning and/or disposing of any other property of the LCP; to enjoin the Ao-As group and/or those officers
elected in their convention from enforcing or implementing the Order dated October 16, 1992 and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in SEC Case 3857.
- On 10 October 1996, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Batong group.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case
of forum shopping.
RULING:
- The Ao-As group did not commit willful and deliberate forum shopping in the filing of SECSIDC Case
No. 3857. Since a ruling upholding the Court of Appeals on the issue of forum shopping would render all the
other issues in this petition moot, we resolve to pass upon the same at the onset.
- The Ao-As group claims that the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in ruling that SEC-SICD Case No.
3857 is a case of forum shopping.
- SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a petition for accounting with prayer for the appointment of a management
committee and the issuance of a writ of injunction. The Ao-As group claims that the issue involved in the case
is whether the Ao-As group is entitled to an accounting and to the creation of a management committee due to
the Batong group’s alleged dissipation and waste of the assets of the LCP, and the subject matter is the act of
dissipation and waste committed by the Batong group.
- As elucidated above, the causes of action under SEC-SIDC Case No. 3857 are the following:
First, the alleged non-liquidation and/or non-accounting of a part of the proceeds of the La Trinidad land
transaction in the amount of P64,000.00 by petitioner Thomas Batong;
Second, the alleged non-liquidation and/or unaccounting of cash advances in the aggregate amount of
P323,750.00 by petitioner Thomas Batong;
Third, the alleged dissipation and/or unaccounting of the LCP general fund in the amount of 4.8 million;
Fourth, the non-registration of the Leyte land purchased with LCP funds by petitioner Victorio Saquilayan;
Fifth, severance of church-partnership relationship with Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (LCMS); and
Sixth, the transfer of LCP corporate books from the Sta. Mesa office to the Caloocan office.
- The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
- Otherwise stated, there is forum shopping where a litigant sues the same party against whom another
action or actions for the alleged violation of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still
pending. The defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other/others; and, a final judgment is one that
would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the dismissal of the rest. Absolute identity of the parties is
not required. It is enough that there is substantial identity of the parties. It is enough that the party against whom
the estoppel is set up is actually a party to the former case. There is identity of causes of action if the same
evidence will sustain the second action. The principle applies even if the relief sought in the two cases may be
different. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
- As the present jurisprudence now stands, forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been
resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer,
the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also
either litis pendentia or res judicata). If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the
subsequent cases shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if
the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
- The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are entirely
different from the causes of action in NLRC Cases No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90, Civil Cases No. 133394-
CV and 131879-CV, and SEC-SICD Cases No. 3556 and 3524. It is true that the causes of action in the latter
cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 for the appointment of the management
committee and for accounting "of all funds, properties and assets of LCP which may have come into their
possession during their incumbency as officers and/or directors of LCP." However, the creation of a
management committee and the prayer for accounting could not have been asked for in the labor (NLRC Cases
No. 03-01935-90 and 04-01979-90) and forcible entry (Civil Cases No. 133394-CV and 131879- CV) cases.
- As regards the other SEC Cases, though, the Ao-As group could have indeed prayed for the creation of
the management committee and the accounting of the funds of the LCP. In fact, as stated by the Court of
Appeals, the petitioner in SEC-SICD Case No. 3556 had prayed for the appointment of a management
committee in a motion dated 18 June 1991. This motion, however, was subsequent to the filing of SEC-SICD
Case No. 3857 on 17 August 1990, for which reason the SEC-SICD ruled that such motion cannot be given due
course considering that it was one of the incidents of SEC-SIDC Case No. 3857. In effect, the SEC-SIDC had
denied the subsequent motion on the ground of litis pendentia. But should SEC-SICD Case No. 3857, which
contains the earlier prayer to create a management committee, be likewise dismissed? Following the rules set
forth in the preceding paragraphs, it would depend on whether the different SEC cases constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping on the part of Ao-As group.
- We hold that this is not a case of willful and deliberate forum shopping and, hence, the SECSICD Case
No. 3857, which contains the earlier prayer to create a management committee, should not be dismissed. The
reason for this is the strict evidentiary requirement needed to grant a prayer to create a management committee.

G.R. No. L-48652 September 16, 1942

LUCIA BERNABE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
DOMINGO L. VERGARA, defendant-appellant.
Dantis, Rivera & Vergara for appellant.
Harmogenes Concepcion for appellees.
MORAN, J.
FACTS:
- Civil case No. 5714, as we have examined it, was an action for partition of an inheritance left by the
deceased Victoriano Zafra.
- Dominga Zafra, in her answer, pleaded a counterclaim, alleging that she had paid certain debts
contracted by Apolonia Zafra, the deceased mother of plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara. These debts
constituted an equitable lien upon the property left by said deceased Apolonia Zafra.
- At the trial, evidence was presented as to such debts, and the trial court in its decision awarded the
plaintiffs Lucia, Hipolito, and Barbara one-third of the common property and, at the same time, ordered them to
pay the debts of their deceased mother, Apolonia Zafra, in the amount of P350. Appeal was interposed by them
from this judgment, and in this Court no question was raised as to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render a
 judgment in the said amount of P350. This Court accordingly assumed jurisdiction over the case and affirmed
the judgment.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment for the sum of money above
mentioned is unsubstantial.
RULING:
- There can be absolutely no doubt that the trial had such jurisdiction not only because there was a
counterclaim wherein the amount adjudged was within the amount pleaded, but because the proceeding was in
the nature of one for liquidation and partition of inheritance wherein debts left by the deceased ancestors may
be determined and ordered paid if the creditors are parties, as was the case. Plaintiffs-appellees knew that the
trial court had such jurisdiction as is shown by their omission to raise any question with respect thereto in their
appeal to this Court. And such question may be deemed to have been passed upon impliedly by this Court when
it acted on the case and decided the same on the merits.
- And, furthermore, the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised in this case is not the kind of
question that confers jurisdiction upon this Court. The jurisdiction involved is not one over the subject matter
but at most over the issue or over the persons of the parties. A Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the
case involving P200 or more, and therefore the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had jurisdiction to render
judgment in the amount of P350. The question of whether or not there was a proper issue raised in the pleading
as to said amount, is not a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but jurisdiction over the issue.
- We hold therefore, that the question of jurisdiction raised in the instant case is not only unsubstantial but
is also not the kind of question that may deprive the Court of Appeals of its appellate jurisdiction over the case.
It is hereby ordered that this case be returned to the Court of Appeals for hearing and decision on the merits.
HERBERT CANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES RONALD CLAVANO AND MARIA
CLARA CLAVANO

G.R. NO. 105308; SEPTEMBER 25, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children,
namely: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony. Not long thereafter, Anna Marie learned of her husband's
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony
pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision
approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart or
from bed and board."

Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie which was granted
by the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V.
Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special
Proceedings No. 1744-CEB for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. The
petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption.

Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed
an opposition thereto. Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody
over his children. On March 27, 1990, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption. Before
the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to
divest him of parental authority.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating Art. 188 of the Family Code requires the
written consent of the natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been held however that the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action should govern the
case.

RULING:

Yes, the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action should govern the case.

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents
filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.

During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended
the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity
"insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188.
The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The
illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the
latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph
Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano.

NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, ET. AL. vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 157447; April 29, 2005

FACTS:

Evangelista, et al. occupied and possessed parcels of land in Montalban, Rizal, based on Deeds of Assignment
from Ismael Favila. These deeds claimed the land was originally part of “Hacienda Quibiga” awarded to Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain. They later discovered that Santiago was planning to evict them,
and they challenged authenticity of Santiago’s title, which was originated from a decision of the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands and a subsequent Deed of Donation from his mother, Isabel.

Petitioners filed a complaint for the nullity of Santiago’s titles, alleging various irregularities. Santiago filed his
answer, denying the allegations and raising affirmative defenses. He claimed that petitioners had no legal
capacity to sue, questioned the authenticity of the Spanish titles, and argued that the action was barred by
prescription.

During a preliminary hearing, petitioners presented an expert witness who stated that the State should file for
the annulment or cancellation of the title if it was obtained through fraud. The trial court dismissed petitioners’
complaint by relying on the expert statement. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
They appealed to the CA, and the CA affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:
 Whether the petitioners have legal capacity to file the complaint.

RULING:

No, the petitioners have no legal capacity to file the complaint.

The complaint should be dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. The petitioners lacked legal or
equitable title to the property and therefore had no personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on or
quieting of title. The Spanish title were no longer valid evidence of ownership under the law.
Petitioners were mere possessors of the land based on Deeds of Assignment, which did not confer
ownership rights. The petitioners’ claim was barred by prescription. The petitioners failed to present any
evidence to prove their ownership or possession of the property within the prescribed period. The law requires
the registration of land under the Torrens system, and the petitioners’ claim based on Spanish title was
insufficient to establish ownership under the current legal framework.
ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and
DANILO ARAHAN CHUA vs. TRADERS ROYAL BANK
G.R. No. 151098; March 21, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners (Chua and Gajudos) filed a complaint before the RTC against Traders Royal Bank (TRB), the City
Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The complaint sought the annulment of the
extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by the City Sheriff of a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
16711 of the Register of Deeds, the conventional redemption thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Summons were served on the bank but they failed to file their answer. Thus, the petitioners were allowed
to present ex parte to claim for damages. The petitioners contend that since the bank was declared in default the
pieces of evidence they presented must already be sufficient for them to have a favorable judgment. But
evidence presented not sufficient. The RTC issued an Order of default against the bank.
Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial decision by default against TRB and admit that
the erroneous filing of said answer was due to an honest mistake of the typist and inadvertence of its counsel.
The CA ruled in favour of respondent bank. CA stated that the petitioners had not convincingly established their
right to relief as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property. Petitioners
argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a default order under Sec. 3 of Rule 9 is not the
same as that provided for in Sec.1 of Rule 133 Preponderance of Evidence rule – which basically states that the
party having a burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the provisions of Sec 3, Rule 9 and in
applying instead the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
No. The CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the
application of either one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure the trial court is directed to take
when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render
judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on
whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the
nature and extent of the relief that may be granted.
Regarding judgments by default, it was explained in the case of Pascua v. Florendo that complainants are
not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief
can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the
facts proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that “it would be meaningless to require
presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be
rendered in favour of the nondefaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not
contemplated by the
Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause.”
In this case, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, they
were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Sec. 1 of
Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence
does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules.

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP OF THE LATE HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ G.R. No.
182645; December 15, 2010 PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and
Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez was filed before the RTC
of Iriga City. Henry, Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late
Antonio Rodriguez and Hermogenes Rodriguez.

Having no oppositors to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the
Republic of the Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC
allowed Henry, Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition.

On 31 May 1990, a Partial Judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs and appointing Henry
as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator
to the estate of Hermogenes. Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject
estates.

Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually. In his
opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of Antonio
and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes.

After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an
Order dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus
qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of
the entire estate of Hermogenes.

On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding. The RTC re-
affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez, Bienvenido
Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez. Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a
Notice of Appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles'
failure to file a record on appeal.

Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On
12 October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. The
RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by
the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999
Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to
entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality.

The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be
adversely affected or injured or benefited by the judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of
service upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was
not required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to the said petition nor served with any
order, resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to
due process.

In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the
instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Robles is an Indispensable Party.

RULING:

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear
and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.

In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of
the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that
the courts cannot proceed without his presence. Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted Section 5,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he
would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for certiorari defective.
Chavez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159411; March 18, 2005 PUNO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease whereby the
former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. for a term of six (6) years.
The rental for the whole term was two million two hundred forty thousand (P2,240,000.00) pesos, of which one
million (P1,000,000.00) pesos was to be paid upon signing of the contract.

Paragraph 5 of the contract further provided that respondent shall undertake all
construction and preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of
the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from petitioner. During the course of the lease, a powerful
typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not immediately undertake the
necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later, the respondent was informed by a
barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the use of a crane.
Respondent found out that there pairs were at the instance of petitioner who had grown impatient
with his delay in commencing the work.

Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip,
Bulacan, Bulacan. He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster
of his personnel from the leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and
subsisting lease contract. After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. Alleging non-compliance
by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing “Kasunduan,” respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had
jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation
of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for
enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of complaint in the RTC is valid.

RULING:

YES, the institution of complaint in the RTC is valid.

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached after
barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a
petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its
date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong
tagapamayapa within six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court,
if beyond the six-month period. This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of
the Civil Code which provides that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata;
but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which
remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041
of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself
which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months
from its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word
"may" clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.

Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the
Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s noncompliance paved the
way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.

Memita vs. Masongsong

G.R. No. 150912, May 28, 2007CARPIO, J. Topic: (e.g. Answer – Specific Denials)

Doctrine: Section 10. Specific denial. - A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial.

Facts: Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the distributor of San Miguel
Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day
payment credit to Memitas Vicor Store (“Memitas”) in Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City. Masongsong filed
a complaint for collection of sums of money against Memitas for its alleged non-payment of purchased goods
from the former. In his answer, while Memitas did not deny that he purchased goods on credit from
Masongsong, he claimed, however, that there were questionable deliveries, short deliveries and discrepancies,
and possible manipulation of delivery receipts, hence his refusal to pay. The trial court ruled in favor of
Masongsong. Memita appealed to the CA assigning as an error the admission in evidence of machine copies of
the 72 pieces of sales invoices despite the patent lack of proof of due execution and authenticity. RTC’s
decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals; hence, this petition. Memita assails, among others, the
admissibility of the sales invoices presented by Masongsong.

Issue: Whether Memita was able to contest the genuineness and due execution of the 72 sales invoices
Ruling: No. Section 8 of Rule 8 provides that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to
be the facts. Section 10 of the same Rule further describes how a specific denial should be made: “A defendant
must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.” Memita, in alleging
"questionable" and "short" deliveries, in effect alleges that Masongsong committed fraud. Whoever alleges
fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns have been fair and regular. Memita chose to present evidence
which did not "set forth the facts" nor the "substance of the matters upon which here lies to support his denial.”
Memita’s evidence reveal that Memita failed to prove fraud on Masongsong’s part. Therefore, the trial court is
correct in stating that Memita is liable to Masongsong in the amount of P603,520.50 plus interest of 12% per
annum as agreed upon by the parties and as stated in the sales invoices

Sps. Trayvilla V. Sejas

G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016

Doctrine: In real actions, the proper filing fee must be paid based on the fair market value of the property
subject of the litigation as declared in the complaint, and failure to pay the correct docket fees deprives the court
of jurisdiction over the case.

Facts:

Spouses Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla (Petitioners) filed a Complaint for specific performance and
damages against Respondent Sejas in 2005. They claimed ownership of a parcel of land based on a private
handwritten document and sought to compel Sejas to execute a final deed of sale and transfer the property to
them.

In an Amended Complaint, they impleaded Respondent Paglinawan, alleging that the land was also sold to her
and she caused the cancellation of the title and issuance of another in her name. Respondents moved for
dismissal, arguing lack of jurisdiction and prescription.

The RTC denied the motion, considering the case as one for specific performance incapable of pecuniary
estimation. However, the CA ruled that the case was a real action affecting title to real property and dismissed it
due to non-payment of correct docket fees.

Issue: Whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint due to Petitioners’ alleged nonpayment of docket
fees.

Ruling: Yes, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint due to non-payment of docket fees. Since it is a real
action, the correct filing fee should have been paid based on the fair market value of the property. The value as
stated in the Amended Complaint, which is P6,000.00, should have been the basis for determining jurisdiction
and docket fees. As the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case due to the low value of the property, it
should have been dismissed. The trial court’s failure to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
petition is denied, and the Decision and Resolution of the CA are affirmed.

Spouses Khonghun V. United Coconut Planters Bank

G.R. No. 154334, July 31, 2006

Doctrine: The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial conference without valid cause may result in the court
allowing the opposing party to present evidence ex parte and render judgment based on such evidence.

Facts:

Petitioners, Spouses Jeffrey and Josephine Khonghun, obtained loans from respondent United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) in October 1984. They failed to repay the loans, leading UCPB to file a case for a sum of money
with preliminary attachment in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

The case was assigned to Judge Manuel Victorio.Despite admitting the material allegations in UCPB's
complaint, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference and did not submit a pre-trial
brief. As a result, Judge Victorio allowed UCPB to present its evidence ex parte and rendered judgment in favor
of UCPB.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, citing the interment of their counsel's wife and Mr. Khonghun's
illness as reasons for their absence, but it was denied. They also filed a notice of appeal, which was dismissed
for being filed late.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which was dismissed on various
grounds including forum-shopping.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in allowing UCPB to present evidence ex parte and in dismissing petitioners'
notice of appeal.

Ruling: The petition is denied. The RTC's actions were upheld as justified under Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of
the Rules. The failure of petitioners and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial conference without valid cause
warranted the court's decision to allow UCPB to present evidence ex parte. Additionally, petitioners' failure to
dispute the genuineness and due execution of the promissory notes, as well as their admission regarding the
agreed interest rate, led to the dismissal of their claims. The judicial admissions made by petitioners were
deemed conclusive, and their appeal was denied.