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i

The Compleat Victory

ii

PIVOTAL MOMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Series Editors
David Hackett Fischer
James M. McPherson
David Greenberg

James T. Patterson Lynn Parsons

Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson,
Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828
Maury Klein Elliott West
Rainbow’s End: The Crash of 1929 The Last Indian War: The Nez Perce Story

James McPherson Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin

Crossroads of Freedom: The Battle of Antietam The GI Bill: A New Deal for Veterans

Glenn C. Altschuler Richard Archer

All Shook Up: How Rock ’n’ Roll Changed As If an Enemy’s Country: The British Occupation
America of Boston and the Origins of Revolution

David Hackett Fischer Thomas Kessner

Washington’s Crossing The Flight of the Century: Charles Lindbergh and
the Rise of American Aviation
John Ferling
Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election Craig L. Symonds
of 1800 The Battle of Midway

Joel H. Silbey Richard Moe

Storm over Texas: The Annexation Controversy Roosevelt’s Second Act: The Election of 1940 and
and the Road to Civil War the Politics of War
Emerson W. Baker
Raymond Arsenault
Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial A Storm of Witchcraft: The Salem Trials and the
Justice American Experience
Louis P. Masur
Colin G. Calloway
Lincoln’s Last Speech: Wartime Reconstruction
The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the
and the Crisis of Reunion
Transformation of North America
David L. Preston
Richard Labunski
Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela
James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill
and the Road to Revolution
of Rights
Michael A. Cohen
Sally G. McMillen American Maelstrom: The 1968 Election and the
Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women’s Politics of Division
Rights Movement
Marc Gallicchio
Howard Jones Unconditional: The Japanese Surrender in World
The Bay of Pigs War II
iv


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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Weddle, Kevin John, author.
Title: The compleat victory : Saratoga and the American
Revolution / by Kevin J. Weddle.
Other titles: Battle of Saratoga and the American Revolution
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Series: Pivotal moments in American history |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020041604 (print) | LCCN 2020041605 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780195331400 (hardback) | ISBN 9780199912537 (epub) |
ISBN 9780199715992 (epdf) | ISBN 9780197549445 (ebook other)
Subjects: LCSH: Saratoga Campaign, N.Y., 1777. | Burgoyne’s Invasion, 1777.
United States—History—Revolution, 1775–1783—Campaigns. |
New York (State)— History—Revolution, 1775–1783.
Classification: LCC E241.S2 W43 2021 (print) |
LCC E241.S2 (ebook) | DDC 973.3/33—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020041604
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020041605

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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
iii

The Compleat
Victory
SARATOGA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Kevin J. Weddle


v

For Jeanie
vi
vi

CONTENTS

List of Maps ix

Editors’ Note xi

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction: Fatal Ambition 1

Chapter 1: Opening Moves 7
Chapter 2: The First Invasion 25
Chapter 3: A New British Strategy 51
Chapter 4: A Question of American Command 73
Chapter 5: Laying the Groundwork 86
Chapter 6: The Fall of Fort Ticonderoga 102
Chapter 7: Defeat, Retreat, Disgrace 123
Chapter 8: Aftershocks 144
Chapter 9: Burgoyne Moves South 151
Chapter 10: The Ordeal of Philip Schuyler 164
Chapter 11: The Murder of Jane McCrea 172
Chapter 12: Not to Make a Ticonderoga of It 178
Chapter 13: Oriskany and Relief 195
Chapter 14: Cat and Mouse 219
Chapter 15: Burgoyne’s Dilemma 230
Chapter 16: The Battle of Bennington 236
Chapter 17: Gates Takes Command 258
Chapter 18: The Battle of Freeman’s Farm 272

vii
vi

viii Contents

Chapter 19: Sir Henry Clinton to the Rescue 294

Chapter 20: The Battle of Bemis Heights 307
Chapter 21: Retreat, Pursuit, and Surrender 329
Chapter 22: British Strategic Reassessment 351
Chapter 23: The Fruits of Victory 361
Conclusion: Men and Measures 379

Appendix A: What Became of Them? 391

Appendix B: Chronology of the Saratoga Campaign, 1776–1778 395

Appendix C: Key British Letters/Orders/Meetings, 1776–1777 401

Appendix D: Orders of Battle 407

Notes 417

Bibliography 485

Index 497
xi

LIST OF MAPS

1. Northern Theater of Operations, September 1775 through December

1776 49
2. Burgoyne’s Plan for 1777 60
3. Howe’s Plan for 1777 68
4. Saratoga Campaign, June through October 1777 97
5. Burgoyne’s Capture of Fort Ticonderoga, July 2‒6, 1777 115
6. Battle of Hubbardton, July 7, 1777 131
7. Siege of Fort Stanwix, August 2‒22, 1777 191
8. Battle of Oriskany, August 6, 1777 202
9. Battle of Bennington, August 16, 1777 247
10. Battle of Freeman’s Farm, September 19, 1777 275
11. Clinton’s Relief Expedition, October 3‒16, 1777 301
12. Battle of Bemis Heights, October 7, 1777 319
13. Burgoyne’s Final Camp at Saratoga, October 11‒17, 1777 332

ix
x
xi

E D I T O R S ’ NOTE

Most historians of the American War for Independence agree that

Saratoga was a pivotal moment in that long struggle. The victory of
American citizen-soldiers and the surrender of an entire British army
caused Europe’s leading military power to intervene in support of
the American cause. When France entered the war, other European
states followed. The fighting spread from America to Europe, Africa,
and Asia. A colonial rebellion became a world war. Great Britain
suffered the worst defeat in its modern history, and the new United
States won their independence.
That understanding of Saratoga’s importance is widely shared by
scholars. But precisely how and why it happened is a more difficult
and complex question. Saratoga was not a single battle. It came as
the climax of a long campaign, after many other events that drew in
a diversity of American Continentals, State militia, British regulars,
Canadian troops, German mercenaries, and Indian warriors. Their
commanders had different traditions of leadership, and the many
men who served with them had profoundly different ideas of why
they were there.
These events have drawn the attention of Kevin Weddle, an histo-
rian who has distinguished himself in two professional careers. He
is a graduate of West Point who, like other leading graduates of that
great institution, joined the Army Corps of Engineers. His long mil-
itary career has spanned a broad range of assignments, including as
battalion commander, as well as service in Operations Desert Storm
and Enduring Freedom. At the same time, Weddle actively pursued
another career as a professional historian. He earned a doctorate in
American history at Princeton, published a major dissertation on the
American Civil War, and produced other important works of schol-
arship. And he brought his two professional careers together as a
professor at the Army War College, where he rapidly rose to become
its Deputy Dean.
We invited Weddle to contribute a volume to the Pivotal Moments
in American History series at Oxford, on a subject of his own choosing.

xi
xi

xii Editors’ Note

He selected the Saratoga campaign, which had first drawn his atten-
tion when he began to study it as a cadet. His continuing interest in
the campaign centered on problems of leadership. For many years,
the study of leaders had been at the heart of much historical scholar-
ship. More recent generations of scholars have shifted their primary
inquiries to other questions of high importance in social, economic,
demographic, cultural, and intellectual history. Much was gained by
this enlargement of historical research, but something important
has been lost.
In recent years, we in the United States have suffered a decline
in the quality of leadership in high elective offices of our American
Republic. The primary cause is not only a pattern of failure in our
leaders themselves, but in those of us who choose them. Our cul-
ture on many levels has tended to move away from the vital task of
preparing Americans for their primary civic responsibilities in the
choice of those who should lead in a free and open society.
In consequence, historians are returning to the study of lead-
ership. Weddle’s book on Saratoga centers not merely on a few at
the top. It is broadly conceived to include a diversity of people who
functioned in many prominent roles in a world-historical event and
who made a difference, both positive and negative, in its outcome.
It studies a broad array of leaders, senior and junior, civilian and
military, who functioned in the thirteen American states, in Britain’s
constitutional monarchy, in French and British Canada, in German
professional forces, and within American Indian nations. Some have
given rise to an historical literature that is large and often deeply
divided. Weddle, who commands a large range of primary and sec-
ondary materials and whose inquiries draw on his own personal ex-
perience and background, comes to his own balanced conclusions.
His inquiries combine the precise thinking of a professional soldier
with a scholar’s concern for the evidence. At the same time, he has
written a fluent, graceful, and engaging book that brings out the
drama of pivotal moments.
The Saratoga campaign occurred in a flow of events that began
in 1775 and continued to 1777 and beyond. Each of its battles fea-
tured different sets of commanding officers and supporting leaders.
Weddle’s book takes the form of a braided narrative, centering on
several sequences of leaders who made choices, choices that made a
difference in the world. Military history can be confusing to the non-
professional reader, especially when it involves so many characters
operating over such a wide geographic area. Weddle’s skill keeps
xi

Editors’ Note xiii

the story of Saratoga moving forward with a clarity that conquers

confusion.
More than any other book on its subject, Weddle’s narrative
studies the central role of an American leader who was not present
on the field at Saratoga—George Washington, who was learning
by trial and error to master his role as commander-in-chief of the
Continental army and as a leader in the American cause. Washington
began with a near-fatal failure to perceive the vital importance of
events on the distant northern frontier. Then, through a process of
learning and growth, he worked constructively with individual mil-
itary commanders and civilian leaders in the Saratoga campaign,
sending some of his most able officers and best fighting units from
his own forces. Weddle reconstructs a pattern of change and growth
in the man and the event. Altogether it enlarges and refines our un-
derstanding of the man, the event, and problems of leadership in a
long sequence of critical moments.
Weddle does something similar for major leaders on every side and
is always very careful, creative, and independent in his judgments. In
that way he makes fresh and original contributions to our under-
standing of a number of individual leaders on the American side, in-
cluding St. Clair at Ticonderoga; Gansevoort at Stanwix; Herkimer at
Oriskany; Stark at Bennington; Morgan and Dearborn at Freemans
Farm; Gates and Learned and Arnold at Bemis Heights; and British,
Hessian, Canadian, and American Indian leaders in equal measure.
In this book, Weddle reflects on general models of leadership,
such as Bernard Montgomery’s idea of “grip.” And through it all,
he also gives particular attention to forms of effective leadership in
open systems. All of us can put his knowledge and judgment to work,
when we choose our own leaders or when we find ourselves chosen
to lead in a free society.
David Hackett Fischer
James M. McPherson
xvi
xv

AC K N OW L E D G M ENT S

No one can complete a book that takes more than ten years to re-
search and write without being indebted to many people. First and
foremost, David Hackett Fischer not only brought me into the pro-
ject, but he went above and beyond the call of duty by reading at
least two full drafts of the book and many other versions of impor-
tant sections. His feedback and suggestions were instrumental in
fleshing out key themes, and he enthusiastically endorsed my focus
on strategy and leadership. David is an exceptional historian and
a national treasure, and I am fortunate to call him a mentor and
a friend. Jim McPherson, another mentor and friend, provided
helpful feedback and support.
Eric Schnitzer, chief historian at the Saratoga National Historical
Park, cheerfully offered his time and considerable expertise. He
not only shared his own research, he also reviewed and provided
timely expert feedback on major portions of the book. He patiently
answered all my queries, which was especially critical to my under-
standing of how the two major battles unfolded and the details of
the often-confusing orders of battle. His deep knowledge of the
campaign, the sources, and the period came to my rescue time and
time again.
My colleagues at the United States Army War College have been
encouraging and helpful at every stage. My boss, Dr. Clay Chun, was
an enthusiastic supporter. Several of my good friends and fellow fac-
ulty members read and provided invaluable feedback on early drafts,
including Pete Haas, Chris Bolan, Joel Hillison, Bill Johnsen, and
John Paterson. The book is much better because of their generous
efforts.
I spent many days exploring the various sites associated with the
Saratoga campaign. I profited from numerous discussions and cor-
respondence with park rangers and other staff members at the Fort
Ticonderoga Museum, the Mount Independence State (Vermont)
Historic Site, the Hubbardton Battlefield State (Vermont) Historic
Site, the Fort Stanwix National Monument, the Oriskany Battlefield

xv
xvi

xvi Acknowledgments

State (New York) Historic Site, and the Saratoga National Historical
Park. They all enthusiastically responded to my many questions.
While serving as the William L. Garwood Visiting Professor at
Princeton University in 2019, I taught a course on World War II
strategy and leadership, which helped crystalize my thinking about
the two topics that figure so prominently in this book. I owe many
thanks to Robbie George and Brad Wilson of the James Madison
Program for offering me the appointment, the Army War College’s
leadership for approving it, my hardworking and supportive pre-
ceptor, Mark O’Brien, and last but never least, my wonderful
students.
I am indebted to the extremely helpful staffs at all the archives
and libraries I physically and virtually visited during my research.
Librarians and archivists at the British Library, the Library of
Congress, Ellen McCallister Clark and Rebecca Cooper at the
Society of the Cincinnati Library, Miranda Peters and Christopher
D. Fox at the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, and April Miller at the
Firestone Library at Princeton University, promptly responded to
my many requests. Also, the Interlibrary Loan staff at the Army War
College Library was extremely efficient and always cheerful. Three
institutions, at which I spent many weeks researching the book, and
their staffs deserve special mention: the William L. Clements Library
at the University of Michigan, the Army Heritage and Education
Center (AHEC), and the David Library of the American Revolution
(DLAR). Terese Austin and Valarie Proehl helped me negotiate the
marvelous collection of the papers of British senior leaders at the
Clements Library. AHEC, a part of the Army War College, was inval-
uable for its extensive collection of secondary sources and published
primary material as well as the microfilm collection of Horatio Gates’s
papers. Finally, I spent the most time at the DLAR (now the David
Center for the American Revolution at the American Philosophical
Society in Philadelphia), which was one of the most user-friendly
places to conduct research I have ever visited. Its librarian, Kathy
Ludwig, has an encyclopedic knowledge of the DLAR’s unsur-
passed collection of material—British and American—related to the
American Revolution, and I benefitted many times from her wise
counsel and suggestions.
I was very fortunate to receive a Society of the Cincinnati Scholar’s
Grant and a United States Military Academy Omar N. Bradley
Research Fellowship, which helped defray the cost of travel and re-
search. Many thanks to Ellen McCallister Clark, Clifford Rogers, and
Lee Johnston.
xvi

Acknowledgments xvii

My editor, Tim Bent, and the entire staff at the Oxford University
Press were always professional, encouraging, and responsive. Tim
did a superb job of editing, counseling me to let the story unfold,
to keep things moving, to cut extraneous detail, and, whenever pos-
sible, to show not tell. Not only that, but Tim displayed almost infi-
nite patience with me when the project was delayed for an extended
period due to a serious family health crisis. I will be forever grateful
for his support. Joellyn Ausanka carefully and skillfully shepherded
the project through to competition. Joellyn and her team were a joy
to work with.
Finally, my wonderful wife, Jeanie, has cheerfully allowed Saratoga
to live with us for more than a decade. She also patiently and with
great forbearance listened to me for hours as I read major portions
of the book out loud to her, and she offered many useful critiques
and suggestions. Jeanie’s support was essential, and her courage
while successfully fighting a terrible disease was inspirational. This
project would have never reached a conclusion without her.
xvi
xi

The Compleat Victory

x
1

Introduction: Fatal Ambition

T HE QUEEN’S HOUSE WAS modest as royal palaces went

in eighteenth-century England. In 1761, King George
III purchased the former country home of the Duke of
Buckingham for his young wife, Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg-
Strelitz. This unpretentious retreat for the royal family—later ex-
panded substantially—would one day be known as Buckingham
Palace. A family home, only a few steps from St. James Palace, the
official royal residence, the Queen’s House provided the king and
queen with some respite from their official duties.
It was there, in late August 1777, that the king received a mes-
sage. It so thrilled him that he burst into his wife’s chambers, waving
the paper in the air, exclaiming, “I have beat them! I have beat
the Americans!”1 The message informed His Majesty that British
Lieutenant General John Burgoyne had captured Fort Ticonderoga,
the strategically important American fortress located on the southern
narrows of Lake Champlain. Achieved with minimal casualties, the
victory convinced the king and his ministers that the military strategy
they had put in place that spring was unfolding according to plan.2
In October 1777, two months after the king’s impromptu cele-
bration and three months after taking Ticonderoga, Burgoyne
surrendered his entire army of almost six thousand officers and men
to an American force of Continental soldiers and militia under the
command of Major General Horatio Gates at a place called Saratoga.
Only one year earlier, the American Revolution looked to be on its
last legs. The Americans had been forced out of New York, and the
rebel army was slowly evaporating. However, the Americans were able
to stave off their seemingly inevitable defeat by winning at Trenton
and Princeton in late 1776 and early 1777. After these surprising
2

2 The Compleat Victory

setbacks, the British were determined to end the war once and for
all. They devised a complicated plan. Three different British armies
would converge on Albany, New York, take control of the Hudson
River, and split the newly self-proclaimed independent nation in two.
Burgoyne would command the army from Canada; the main army,
under the British commander-in-chief, General Sir William Howe,
was to first seize Philadelphia, then support Burgoyne by moving up
the Hudson. The strategy miscarried badly.
When word of Burgoyne’s surrender reached London on the
evening of December 2, 1777, the country was stunned. Everyone
had been led to believe that victory over the upstart American
colonists was just around the corner. Politicians, newspapers, and the
public clamored for blame to be assigned. Opposition members in
Parliament demanded the resignation of key ministers. Senior mil-
itary officers were embarrassed.3 The American victory at Saratoga
was a major military setback for the British. It profoundly affected
the course of events over the next five years, not least because it led
directly to France’s decision to enter the war on the Patriot side,
which changed the entire character of the American Revolution,
from a colonial rebellion to a world war.
Given that the focus of this series about pivotal moments in
American history is on historical contingency, it would be unthink-
able to omit the Saratoga campaign. The planning and execution of
the campaign are replete with critical decisions by leaders on both
sides, and chance played a major role, as it always does in war. This
book covers the entire campaign in all its complexity, including its
origins, execution, and aftermath, and a more dramatic and conse-
quential American story is hard to find.
I first became interested in the American Revolution and the
Saratoga campaign while a cadet at the United States Military
Academy at West Point, located 130 miles south of the main bat-
tlefield. Throughout a long military career, I have been fortunate
to lead hundreds of staff rides and battlefield tours to sites in the
United States and Europe, ranging from the Battle of Agincourt
to Saratoga to Waterloo to Gettysburg to Gallipoli to the D-Day
landings in Normandy. These trips, combined with two combat
deployments, command of a battalion, and teaching posts at West
Point and the US Army War College, sharpened my interest in lead-
ership and military strategy, which are the two major themes that
run through this book.
Essential to understanding the Saratoga campaign’s outcome is
an appreciation of the origins of the strategy that drove the military
3

Introduction 3

operations and of the leaders whose decisons drove the British and
American forces to their final clashes along the Hudson River.
Who was to blame for Britain’s ignominious defeat? Most have
assigned the lion’s share of the responsibility to Lord George
Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the minister re-
sponsible for British military operations in North America. Howe is
also blamed for wasting time and resources on other campaigns when
he should have been assisting the army from Canada. Yet I argue
that it was the strategy itself that was ultimately responsible. The
foundations for the British defeat at Saratoga were laid in London,
New York, and Quebec, where the strategy was devised in the winter
and spring of 1777.
Indeed, responsibility for the loss at Saratoga spreads wide.
Germain tried to micromanage the war from a continent away and
failed to ensure that all the British commanders in North America,
especially Burgoyne and Howe, coordinated their efforts. By the
summer of 1777, Howe understood that the only way to win the war
was to destroy the American Army under the command of General
George Washington. However, he did not move quickly or synchro-
nize his actions with those of Burgoyne’s army to make this happen.
Finally, Burgoyne, the man who surrendered to Gates, proved to be
simply out of his depth. Despite being an experienced and popular
commander, Burgoyne never understood until it was too late just
how challenging the American environment would be for moving
and supplying and fighting with a large European army.
Despite their ultimate victory, the Americans were not immune to
failures of leadership during the Saratoga campaign. Major General
Arthur St. Clair, commanding Fort Ticonderoga, committed a series
of blunders that led directly to the fortress’ evacuation and ensured
that Burgoyne’s invasion got off to a fast start with a major success.
For the most part, Major General Philip Schuyler, commander of
the so-called Northern Department, made decisions that helped
lay the groundwork for ultimate American success. Still, his wildly
pessimistic reports to Congress and General Washington caused his
superiors to lose confidence in his ability to stem Burgoyne’s seem-
ingly inexorable advance south toward Albany.4
Schuyler’s replacement was Horatio Gates, who built on the foun-
dation that Schuyler had already laid. Later in the war, events would
demonstrate just how fortunate Gates had been in August 1777 to in-
herit a situation in which his talents meshed with the circumstances.
Major General Benjamin Lincoln, Gates’s second-in-command late
in the campaign, proved invaluable to his superiors in handling
4

4 The Compleat Victory

the sometimes unreliable militia units from the New England states
and in the substantive reinforcement of the Northern Army when it
mattered the most. The Americans also had a depth of strong lead-
ership in many outstanding field officers and junior general officers
who performed admirably during the campaign. Brigadier General
John Stark led his troops to victory at the Battle of Bennington, an
engagement that proved the beginning of the end for Burgoyne and
his army. Though heavily outnumbered, Colonel Peter Gansevoort
successfully defended Fort Stanwix. Colonel Daniel Morgan led his
riflemen at the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and the Battle of Bemis
Heights. All of these American senior leaders—and many more
besides—contributed to the victory at Saratoga.
Perhaps the most dynamic combat leader on either side was Major
General Benedict Arnold. From the moment he joined the Northern
Army, he made a difference—helping to restore morale, managing
militia, conducting reconnaissance missions and raids, and person-
ally leading the final assault at the Battle of Bemis Heights. There is
no doubt that Arnold’s role was central to the American success at
Saratoga, even though he was volatile and easily took offense. But the
advantages Gates derived from having Arnold as one of his combat
commanders far outweighed the disadvantages.
The Americans in the Northern Department were also fortu-
nate that their commander-in-chief was George Washington, even
though he was more than 200 miles away to the south and distracted
by the challenge of facing Howe’s main British Army. Washington
underestimated the threat to and the readiness of the Northern
Department in the winter and spring of 1777. Nonetheless, he
more than made up for his earlier inattention to the theater after
the loss of Ticonderoga in July. Washington patiently counseled
and mentored the anxious Schuyler and provided sound advice. He
also appealed to New England governors and assemblies to muster
and dispatch militia forces to join the Northern Army, hurried
significant reinforcements northward, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, assigned Benedict Arnold and Benjamin Lincoln to report to
Schuyler. Washington’s contributions to the Saratoga campaign are
generally glossed over, but they were essential for American victory.
Washington could have neglected or even ignored the Northern
Army while he faced General Howe, but he did not. He continued
setting priorities and allocating his resources accordingly.
While preparing one of my Army War College courses,
I encountered British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery’s no-
tion of “grip,” a term he used to describe a commander who was
5

Introduction 5

able to manage a battle or campaign by personally scrutinizing and

supervising all elements of a military operation.5 These attributes
are essential elements of leadership. However, I wanted to take
the concept a step farther. For this book, I have expanded on
Montgomery’s definition of grip to include the ability to antic-
ipate how operations might unfold and how to react to change,
something closer to what Carl von Clausewitz called “genius.”6
“Grip” results when superior leadership combines with experi-
ence and expertise. According to my formulation, Alexander the
Great, Napoleon, Lord Nelson, Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee,
and (closer to Montgomery’s own time) General George Patton
all had “grip,” in their ability to sense how a battle or maneuver
was unfolding, how the overall engagement was playing out, and
when to take the right action, even in uncertain environments and
in the absence of critical information. Montgomery’s definition
mainly concerned tactical actions on the battlefield. My concept of
grip can equally be applied at the operational and strategic levels
of war.7 Simply put, the Saratoga campaign turned out the way it
did because American leaders displayed more grip—at all levels of
war—than their British counterparts.
In war, geography is everything. The Saratoga campaign was
epic in both its scope and its impact. Few operations in American
history—with exceptions in the Civil War and World War II—took
place over such vast distances in such forbidding terrain. It ranged
across thousands of square miles and involved dozens of separate
battles, engagements, sieges, and maneuvers, some relatively minor,
but others pivotal.
To understand this reality and make sense of a very complex
campaign, I spent many days walking the sites. The beauty of the
Lake Champlain region and the Mohawk River valley in central and
western New York made this a very pleasurable experience. It also
drove home just how challenging it would have been for eighteenth-
century armies to manage operations over such rugged terrain.
The experience increased the respect I already had for those on
both sides who marched through these woods, across these rivers
and creeks, and over these hills and mountains from June through
October 1777.
Native Americans played a major role in the Saratoga campaign,
and they participated on both sides of the conflict. I use the terms
Native and Native American frequently in the book, but for the most
part employ Indian or Indians, as most people, Indian and non-
Indian, did at the time.
6

6 The Compleat Victory

I have relied on many earlier works on the Saratoga campaign,

including those by Hoffman Nickerson, John Elting, Richard
Ketchum, Brendon Morrissey, John Luzader, and others. This book
benefits from and, I hope, complements theirs, while at the same
time, I have made my own interpretations and conclusions. As much
as possible, I have tried to let the participants tell the story and have
also addressed some errors and misunderstandings about the op-
eration that sometimes have made for a good story if not for good
history.
Saratoga changed the American Revolution. The campaign’s out-
come reverberated everywhere—in Quebec, New York, Philadelphia,
Boston, York, London, and Paris. It has become almost a cliché to
describe Saratoga as a turning point in the war, but this should not
diminish the fact that Saratoga was decisive. It was, as one of the
campaign’s participants labeled it, “The Compleat Victory.”
7

CHAPTER 1

Opening Moves

W HEN THE ROYAL NAVY frigate HMS Cerberus arrived

in Boston harbor on May 25, 1775, she was carrying
three British Army major generals—William Howe,
Henry Clinton, and John Burgoyne. One London wit seized on
the occasion to create one of the most memorable rhymes of the
war: “Behold the Cerberus, the Atlantic plough, Her precious cargo,
Burgoyne, Clinton, Howe, Bow, wow, wow!”1 Seldom had so much
military experience and expertise been concentrated in one (appro-
priately named) vessel. Only two years after they arrived in America,
all three would be involved in arguably the most significant cam-
paign of the American Revolution. They were sent from England
to reinforce a British army trying to control the increasingly un-
ruly colonists in Massachusetts and its neighboring provinces. War
had already broken out in Lexington and Concord with the re-
treat of British soldiers back into Boston, and a ragtag American
army was now besieging the city. Howe commanded four thousand
reinforcements, intended to bring General Thomas Gage’s small
army there up to a total of about nine thousand redcoats, and, al-
though the senior general among the three, was assigned to serve as
Gage’s second-in-command.
To break the siege, the generals conducted a frontal assault on
entrenched American positions on Bunker Hill and Breed’s Hill
on June 17, 1775. The attack was led by Howe, with Clinton in a
supporting role. Howe’s action resulted in a pyrrhic victory. Clinton
reportedly wrote after the battle that Bunker Hill was a “dear-bought
8

8 The Compleat Victory

victory; another such would have ruined us.”2 Howe, writing to an-
other officer, called the battle “this unhappy day” and “I freely con-
fess to you, when I look at the consequences of it, in the loss of so
many brave officers, I do it with horror.”3 Howe soon replaced the
unfortunate Gage and became the commander-in-chief of the British
Army in America in October 1775.
Howe’s counterpart, George Washington, was named the
American commander-in-chief three days before Bunker Hill, arrived
in Boston several weeks after the battle. The fledgling Continental
Army was formed by an act of Congress on June 14, 1775, the
day before Washington received his commission. Two weeks later,
Congress directed that the state militias be incorporated into the
Continental Army.
After Bunker Hill, both sides settled down to a siege that lasted for
months. While the two sides eyed each other from their fortifications,
General Howe (promoted to full general in January 1776, as befitted
his position as commander-in-chief) delayed conducting any major
operations and was content to hunker down in the city. Burgoyne,
who was unable to secure a meaningful position in the army at
Boston, returned to Britain to seek new opportunities.
While the siege of Boston dragged on, Clinton, now Howe’s
second-in-command, became increasingly disenchanted with his
boss, and the feeling was mutual. Clinton thought that a part of his
job was to provide military advice and counsel to the commander-in-
chief. Howe did not see it that way. He believed Clinton should ac-
complish the tasks assigned to him and keep his mouth shut. Where
Clinton was outspoken, if introverted, Howe was amiable and easy-
going. It was almost inevitable that they would clash, and they were
simply unable to reach a meeting of minds, especially involving the
proper strategy to fight the Americans.4 The relationship between
Howe and Clinton was emblematic of one of the major problems
facing the British in America: disagreements among the senior polit-
ical and military leadership.
The siege of Boston finally ended in the midwinter of 1776. The
Americans were able to mount heavy cannon, dragged overland
from Fort Ticonderoga, which had been seized without difficulty by
Patriots under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold on May 10, 1775,
under the supervision of Colonel Henry Knox. They placed the ar-
tillery on Dorchester Heights, overlooking the town and the harbor.
Although Howe thought about attacking the heights, memories of
Bunker Hill were fresh in his mind, and he decided to evacuate
Boston. On March 17, 1776, British troops and their equipment were
9

Opening Moves 9

embarked on ships and sailed for Halifax, Nova Scotia. By the end of
March, there were no British troops in the American Colonies.
Howe’s frustration with Clinton, newly promoted to lieutenant
general, came to a head in January 1776, when the commander-
in-chief sent his second-in-command on an expedition to the
Southern colonies to explore possible military operations in North
or South Carolina.5 Most British leaders thought that the Southern
colonies were home to large numbers of Loyalists who were being
oppressed by the rebels. Supported by the presence of British
troops, they would be instrumental in putting down the rebellion
and securing territory. Howe both wanted to explore this opportu-
nity and rid himself of his talented but annoying subordinate, at
least for a while.
Further, Howe sought to take advantage of the unsurpassed mo-
bility that the Royal Navy gave him. Howe’s older brother, Vice
Admiral Lord Richard Howe, was the commander-in-chief of the
naval forces in America, ensuring that much of the service parochi-
alism that typically hamstrings joint operations between naval and
ground forces would not be a problem. Clinton’s southern expe-
dition involved only about fifteen hundred troops and never had
much of a chance to accomplish any meaningful objectives. The
joint operation between Clinton and Commodore Sir Peter Parker
in June 1776 went badly when a landing of the troops and a naval
bombardment at Charleston, South Carolina, failed to dent the
American coastal defenses. Horace Walpole, the famous British man
of letters, called the Charleston raid “a disgraceful miscarriage.”6
Clinton’s troops rejoined Howe’s army in Halifax; the British would
not return to the Carolinas again until late in 1778.
After the British Army evacuated Boston in March 1776,
Washington surmised that Howe would return in short order. He
also guessed that Howe would not try to retake Boston, but would in-
stead try to seize the greatest port city in North America: New York.
Consequently, Washington moved the nineteen-thousand-man
Continental Army, augmented by militia units, from Boston to
New York, stationing his troops in forward positions on Brooklyn
Heights on Long Island against an invasion by sea. Major General
Charles Lee, one of Washington’s key leaders, gauged the mas-
sive British advantage as the Americans prepared to defend the
city: “What to do with the city, I own puzzles me; it is so encircl’d with
deep navigable water, that whoever commands the sea must com-
mand the town.”7 This would be an advantage that the British would
enjoy for much of the war.
01

10 The Compleat Victory

On July 2, 1776, Howe landed nine thousand troops unopposed

on Staten Island, but he delayed the offensive operation he believed
would end the rebellion until reinforcements and naval transports
arrived. Over the next several weeks, thousands of British and
German mercenary troops joined the army until it grew to almost
thirty-two thousand well-trained soldiers. Finally, on August 22, 1776,
twenty thousand of them landed on Long Island. Still studiously
avoiding a frontal attack after Bunker Hill, Howe outmaneuvered
and routed the Americans. Washington was able to save his army
only by retreating across the East River into Manhattan, mainly due
to the skill and courage of Colonel John Glover’s Massachusetts reg-
iment, made up largely of fishermen who were able to improvise a
Dunkirk-like evacuation.8
Two weeks later, Howe renewed his offensive against the hastily
prepared American positions on Manhattan, using the Royal Navy
to land forces near Kip’s Bay. The landing was accompanied by an
overwhelming naval bombardment that shocked militia units, which
broke and ran despite Washington’s efforts to stop them. Howe
failed to trap the Continental Army, however, and the campaign
settled into a month-long standoff when the American troops were
able to retreat into fortifications on Harlem Heights. Howe finally
broke things open in October, when he landed another force in
Washington’s rear at Pell’s Point, forcing another evacuation, this
time of Manhattan itself, with the exceptions of Forts Washington
and Lee in the northern end of the island. Washington hoped that
these forts would deny the British ships access to the upper part
of the Hudson River and, ultimately, the Hudson Highlands. With
Washington trying to keep the Continental Army intact and avoid
direct combat, Howe was able to capture Fort Washington and its
three-thousand-man garrison on November 16, and the Americans
were forced to evacuate Fort Lee, a dual disaster.9
In the space of two and a half months, Howe had completely turned
the tables on the Americans, who had celebrated the departure of
the last British soldier from Boston only a short time before. By mid-
November 1776, Washington’s army was a shadow of its former self
and beginning a slow retreat across New Jersey; New York and its
magnificent harbor were now in the hands of the British Army, and
the river route up the Hudson was open.10
Washington was widely criticized after the multiple defeats on
Long Island and Manhattan and the loss of Fort Washington. Charles
Lee wrote to his friend Major General Horatio Gates in December,
complaining that its loss “completely unhinged the goodly fabric
1

Opening Moves 11

we have been building.” It was a devastating blow and “entre nous,”

Lee confided to Gates, “a certain great man is most damnably de-
ficient.”11 Washington himself was disheartened by the multiple
debacles, writing to John Hancock, president of the Continental
Congress, that the loss of soldiers and officers would be “severely
felt.”12
Over the next few weeks, the demoralized Continental Army and
even the cause of independence itself suffered what were prob-
ably their worst moments. As it made its way westward, the army
hemorrhaged soldiers—through desertions, illness, and the ex-
piration of short-term enlistments. For his part, Howe leisurely
followed its retreat. Clinton repeatedly urged his superior to crush
Washington and his rapidly evaporating army, and, as he always did,
peppered Howe with advice on how to fight the rebels. Howe, who
sympathized on many levels with the Americans, preferred instead to
overawe them, hoping they would disperse and come back to their
senses and to the Crown.13 It was not the first time Howe would un-
derestimate American resolve.
As the days grew shorter, Washington was forced into a steady re-
treat through New Jersey, a state with a significant Tory population.
Although the army continued to shrink, the commander-in-chief
tried to put the best face on the situation. At the end of November,
Washington learned that Howe wanted to seize Philadelphia and as-
sured his erstwhile critic, Charles Lee, that the British general would
not be successful: “Should they now really risk this undertaking then
there is a great possibility that they will pay dearly for it and I shall
continue to retreat before them so as to lull them into security.”14
Washington was also beginning to formulate a new strategy, one
that had been suggested by Major General Nathanael Greene back
in September. The strategy involved neither holding terrain nor
fighting pitched battles against the British Army, which was superior
in numbers, equipment, and training. Instead, Washington would
wait for the opportunity to strike only when the Americans had a
marked advantage.15
The battles of Long Island and Manhattan had demonstrated that
fighting set-piece battles, or luring the British to attack defended
positions, a war of posts against one of the best armies on the planet,
was simply not feasible, at least not in the fall of 1776. The New York
campaign also confirmed to Washington the advantages and
disadvantages of the militia. Militia was usually a short-term force.
Unless the enemy threat was particularly grave and imminent, it was
difficult to muster units during planting and harvest seasons, prime
21

12 The Compleat Victory

campaigning periods for eighteenth-century armies. While militia

tended to do well when defending their own homes, towns, or state,
and when behind stout fortifications, without capable leadership
they were apt to melt rapidly away in dicey situations. Asking militia
to fight regular troops in a standup battle was asking too much.
Washington had argued from almost the beginning that the
Continental Army enlistments had to be long-term, preferably for
the duration of the war, and not merely for a few months.16 A well-
trained army that was supplemented by properly employed and
led militia was essential to the implementation of the new strategy.
While this strategy was, in part, forced on him by circumstances,
Washington recognized its necessity and implemented it despite his
critics. It almost guaranteed that the war would be a protracted one
and would try the patience of the American people.
Several months after Washington abandoned the war of posts
and embraced the new strategy, his young aide, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Hamilton, observed that the “Fabian conduct”—referring
to the Roman general who avoided giving battle and patiently waited
for the enemy to wear down—would be “imputed either to cow-
ardice or to weakness” but that the “more discerning” would realize
that “it proceeds from the truest policy.” Because the British could
expect few if any reinforcements from Europe, Hamilton argued, it
was “Howe’s business” to take advantage of the situation, given that
the enemy’s “only hope lies in fighting us and giving a general de-
feat at one blow.” He acknowledged some of the disadvantages of the
strategy, such as leaving “a part of the inhabitants a prey to [British]
depredations,” but Americans must take the long view; “a part must
be sacrificed to the whole, and passion must give way to reason.”17
Whether it worked or not, the strategy was not in the short term
going to halt the inexorable advance of Howe and his army or the
desultory retreat of Washington’s deteriorating army.
Washington’s strategy was, in fact, a modified Fabian strategy.
Maintaining the army was paramount, but Washington and his senior
commanders were also constantly on the alert for targets of oppor-
tunity. These limited offensive operations were essential to maintain
the will of the American leaders and people to continue the war.
In late December 1776, an opportunity for just such a strike
presented itself. Earlier in the month, the Continental Army made its
way into Trenton, on the banks of the Delaware River, with fewer than
four thousand soldiers.18 In the space of four months, Washington
had lost almost 80 percent of his original force. On December 8, the
army started crossing the river into Pennsylvania—a maneuver that
31

Opening Moves 13

took five days to complete—to prepare for Howe’s onslaught. Two

days later, a despairing Washington wrote his cousin that so far they
had prevented an enemy crossing, “but how long we shall be able to
do it God only knows, as they [the enemy] are still hovering about
the river.”19
Washington began a campaign to keep what was left of the army
together. A year earlier, Thomas Paine had published Common Sense,
which argued eloquently for the independence of the American col-
onies from Great Britain. Now in December 1776, Paine, a British-
born writer who accompanied the Americans during their retreat
through New Jersey, wrote The American Crisis, which urged his
new countrymen to do their bit for the war, and appealed to the
troops already serving to stay on. Washington was so impressed that
he not only ordered Paine’s tract printed and distributed but read
aloud to the troops: “These are the times that try men’s souls. The
summer soldier and the sunshine Patriot will, in this crisis, shrink
from the service of their country; but he that stands it now deserves
the love and thanks of man and woman.”20 Whether Paine’s plea ac-
complished its objective is debatable. What’s not in doubt is the fact
that Washington, the army, and the newly formed United States of
America were at rock bottom in late December 1776.
While Washington and his army were clinging to their defensive
positions on the west bank of the Delaware, Howe ended his pursuit.
The British commander-in-chief sent Clinton and a small force to
take Newport, Rhode Island, and then ordered the garrisoning of
several outposts throughout New Jersey, including New Brunswick,
Princeton, and Trenton. Howe evidently thought Washington’s
ragtag forces would disperse and go back home as their enlistments
expired on January 1, 1777. Congress, reacting to the threat of
Howe’s approach, left Philadelphia for Baltimore.
On December 20, Washington wrote Congress to ask that since
Howe was about to take Philadelphia and “ten days more will put
an end to the existence of our Army,” that he be given the authority
to take charge of the recruitment of soldiers and the raising of
regiments. Were these issues “to be referred to Congress, at the dis-
tance of 130 or 40 miles, so much time must necessarily elapse as to
defeat the end in view.” Washington reminded Congress of his re-
peated warnings “that short inlistments, and a mistaken dependence
on the Militia, have been the Origin of all our misfortunes. . . . I can
only add, that desperate diseases, require desperate remedies, and
with truth declare, that I have no lust for power.”21 Congress reluc-
tantly agreed a few days later. Given Washington’s understanding of
41

14 The Compleat Victory

the necessity for healthy civil-military relations in the newly formed

republic, only a crisis of the magnitude that faced the Americans in
late December 1776 would have forced him to seek this authority.
Taking advantage of Howe’s army entering winter quarters,
Washington devised an operation to attack the enemy outposts.
He was able to scrape together almost seven thousand men, in-
cluding two thousand soldiers under Major General John Sullivan
and another eight hundred under Major General Gates, joining
Washington’s force from New Jersey and Fort Ticonderoga, respec-
tively. Gates himself begged off the upcoming action due to illness
and promptly decamped for Baltimore.22
On Christmas Day, Washington crossed the Delaware with three
columns and attacked the enemy garrisons, a brigade of Hessian
soldiers, stationed at Trenton and Bordentown. Two of his columns
were forced to abort the crossing because of heavy ice on the river.
Only about twenty-five hundred troops, under Washington’s per-
sonal command, made it across the river in a driving snowstorm.
Once again, John Glover’s Massachusetts fishermen led the effort
to cross the Delaware—this time toward instead of away from the
enemy. After a march through snow and sleet, during which two
men died of exposure, Washington’s detachment arrived on the out-
skirts of Trenton early on the morning of December 26, 1776.
With volleys of musketry, skillful use of artillery, and a well-timed
bayonet attack, the Americans overpowered the enemy troops. The
battle was over in an hour. Only two Americans were killed (the
ones lost on the march) and five were wounded in action. Twenty-
two Hessians were killed in action, including their commander,
eighty-three wounded in action, and between nine hundred and
one thousand men captured.23 The day after the battle, now safely
back on the Pennsylvania side of the river with his catch of Hessian
prisoners, Washington wrote Hancock praising the soldiers under
his command, something he had seldom been able to do before
Trenton. “In justice to the Officers and Men, I must add, that their
Behavior upon this occasion, reflects the highest honor upon
them.”24
In his first report of Trenton to Lord Germain, Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Howe attempted to downplay the defeat, but the
royal governor of New York, William Tryon, recognized Trenton for
what it was: a disaster for the British that breathed new life into the
American cause. “The moment was critical, and I believe the Rebel
chiefs were conscious if some stroke was not struck that would give
life to their sinking cause, they should not raise another Army.”25
51

Opening Moves 15

Tryon was right. Howe tried to pass off the loss at Trenton as nothing
more than a skirmish, of little importance to the overall war effort.
A month later, he admitted that Trenton might be more critical
“than what was at first apprehended.”26
Having achieved the first real victory of American arms since the
siege of Boston and knowing that the British would react strongly to
the Trenton defeat, Washington followed up with another offensive
action. With the additional emergency powers granted to him by
Congress, he used the victory, and a ten-dollar bounty, to convince
soldiers to stay on past the January 1 expiration of their enlistments.
Washington was able to field a force of about five thousand men to
cross the Delaware and again take the war to the enemy.
This time there would be no surprise. Howe ordered Lieutenant
General Lord Charles Cornwallis in New York to gather a force
of about nine thousand men, march to Trenton, and confront
Washington should he dare to attack. Washington and his small
force crossed the Delaware on New Year’s Eve day and marched
to Trenton. On January 2, 1777, Cornwallis attacked at Assunpink
Creek. Three times his troops attacked the American positions, and
each time they were driven back. Nightfall convinced Cornwallis to
reconvene the battle the next day. During the evening and into the
early morning hours of January 3, Washington led his men around
Cornwallis’s positions, heading toward the town of Princeton, where
he knew the British had a small detachment.
The resulting Battle of Princeton saw heavy fighting in and
around Nassau Hall, the main building of the College of New Jersey,
now Princeton University. Washington attacked as the British force
was getting ready to join Cornwallis at Trenton. This time instead of
facing sleepy Hessian mercenaries, his men faced British regulars.
After a short, sharp fight, the outnumbered and outgunned British
fled Princeton, leaving behind nearly five hundred casualties, in-
cluding dozens killed in action, and almost three hundred prisoners.
American casualties were less than half that, though Washington
grieved the loss of two key officers, Brigadier General Hugh Mercer
and Colonel John Haslet.27
Hoping to encounter another isolated British or German detach-
ment, Washington wanted to push on to New Brunswick but ulti-
mately decided against it. As he explained to Hancock two days after
the battle, the risk “of losing the advantage we had gained by aiming
at too much induced me by the advice of my Officers to relinquish
the attempt.”28 Instead, he moved the army into winter quarters at
Morristown, New Jersey.
61

16 The Compleat Victory

For their part, the British also decided to end active operations
and consolidated their outposts at New Brunswick and Perth Amboy
to better defend themselves against American raids. They had been
impressed by Washington’s attacks. Horace Walpole noted that after
the news reached London, it was “now the fashion to cry up the
manoeuver of General Washington in this action,” noting that the
campaign to defeat the colonists “has by no means been wound up.”29
While Washington’s audacious operations at Trenton and
Princeton were expertly carried out, he was undoubtedly aided by
Howe’s desire to capture and hold territory instead of destroying
the American Army. The British Army was overextended, and the
isolated detachments of British and Hessian soldiers made them vul-
nerable. Howe’s strategy, one that began with so much promise after
the succession of British victories on Long Island and Manhattan,
would have to change if the British were to subdue the rebellion.
Trenton and Princeton not only renewed and galvanized sup-
port for the war, they also ensured that Washington would be able to
maintain the army, and indeed increase its size. They also convinced
Howe that he could no longer hope to beat the Americans by simply
intimidating them. He had to adjust his overall strategy. Washington’s
triumphs at Trenton and Princeton, while not sufficient for ultimate
victory, were enough to ensure that the fight would continue.
Eighteen months before Trenton and Princeton, while
Washington and his army surrounded Boston, Congress had begun
to consider an invasion of Canada, which would form a vital ele-
ment of the strategy for both sides. Colonial Americans had long
coveted Canada. Indeed, since the French and Indian War (a sepa-
rate North American theater of the larger Seven Years War), many
Americans served in Canada alongside and in the British Army.
They had been impressed by the vast lands, teeming with game and
rich in resources. On June 27, 1775, two months after Lexington
and Concord, Congress directed Philip Schuyler, then a newly
commissioned major general, in charge of the forces in New York,
that if he “finds it practicable,” to seize as much Canadian territory as
possible, “which may have a tendency to promote peace and security
of these Colonies.”30 Congress hoped the French-Canadians would
join their efforts, assuming that British occupation since their defeat
in the French and Indian War had disaffected them. The Americans
also wanted to strike preemptively, since they had heard that General
Sir Guy Carleton, the British governor of Canada, had very few avail-
able troops and was actively recruiting Indians to help put down the
rebellion.31
71

Opening Moves 17

By June 1775, Carleton was a thirty-three-year veteran of the

British Army. The most well-known portrait of him gives him aris-
tocratic bearing, belying his modest beginnings in life. Born in
Ireland to Scotch-Irish middle-class parents, he joined the British
Army at age seventeen and served over three decades before finally
reaching the rank of full general by the outbreak of the rebellion.
He served during the Jacobite Rebellion, an effort to regain the
English throne for the Stuarts, during which he became friends with
fellow officer, James Wolfe. He also served in the War of Austrian
Succession in 1747, the Europe-wide war over the rightful heir to
the Habsburg monarchy. He fought in America for the first time
during the French and Indian War, serving with Major General
Jeffrey Amherst when the British captured the French fort of
Louisbourg in present-day Nova Scotia in 1758. He was then asked
by Wolfe, now a major general, to act as quartermaster general for
his upcoming expedition to take Quebec. Carleton happily agreed,
and he proved invaluable both to Wolfe and the army. He was not
only responsible for securing provisions for the army, he also acted
as a military engineer and led a battalion of grenadiers during the
campaign. Carleton was wounded during the final and successful
assault on the French-held city.32 The oldest city in Canada, Quebec
was founded by French explorer Samuel de Champlain in 1608
and had long been the most important settlement in the province.
During the French and Indian War, the city was taken by British
forces under General Wolfe on September 13, 1759 (Wolfe was
killed in the battle and immortalized in Benjamin West’s famous
painting). Sixteen years later, Quebec was still central to the de-
fense of Canada.
Carleton was wounded again in 1761 during operations off the
coast of France (as part of the larger Seven Years War). In 1766,
after the war ended, Carleton returned to Canada as the lieutenant
governor of Quebec. Later, he was appointed captain general and
governor of the province of Quebec. During his two tours of duty
in Canada, he developed skills in dealing with the French-Canadian
population as well as with British and British-American colonists.
Returning to England, he was promoted to major general. He pro-
vided advice to Parliament as it debated the 1774 Quebec Act, which
outlined how the newly won province would be governed. Carleton
argued that the province’s French heritage made it unique and that
it could not be managed merely as a British colony.33 He favored
allowing the Canadian population to retain many of their customs,
laws, and the free practice of Catholicism within the province, which
81

18 The Compleat Victory

was adopted along with other provisions such as partially restoring

French civil law. While this liberal and humane policy seems em-
inently sensible today, the program was often cited as one of the
great British crimes against the American colonists, who viewed the
Quebec Act as facilitating the resurgence of the defeated French
enemy right on their doorstep. Carleton returned to Canada in 1774
to help implement the provisions of the act, which he found chal-
lenging. The British community hated some provisions of the act,
and the French population hated others. In any case, he soon found
himself dealing with more important issues as the American rebel-
lion broke out, and with it came the threat of invasion.34
Carleton’s counterpart on the American side was Philip Schuyler.
Schuyler came from a long line of Dutch settlers, the Schuylers being
one of New York’s most prominent and wealthy families.35 He spoke
French and Mohawk, the latter from traveling widely throughout the
western part of the colony, now upstate New York. Schuyler served as
a militia captain in the French and Indian War. He proved adept at
handling transportation and supply missions for various expeditions;
the lessons he learned about overcoming the logistical challenges in-
herent in conducting operations in the northern wilderness would
serve him well. In 1768 he was elected to the New York Assembly,
then named a delegate to the Second Continental Congress be-
cause of his opposition to the Crown’s increasingly restrictive meas-
ures. Not long afterward, at the urging of the New York Provincial
Congress, he was appointed a major general, and later was among
the first four major generals of the Continental Army.
Schuyler was the same height as Washington (6 feet, 2 inches) and
looked every bit the soldier. Almost every description of Schuyler
from contemporary observers is that of a patrician who demanded
esteem and obedience. He developed a good relationship with
Washington and was the obvious choice to command the Northern
Department. As an Albany native, he was already intimately familiar
with the region, and with the challenges involved in conducting op-
erations there.36
Congress had given Schuyler an almost impossible mission. An in-
vasion of Canada—which is essentially what it was—would not be easy.
Although the Americans had seized Fort Ticonderoga and now had
possession of Crown Point (located 10 miles north of Ticonderoga),
Schuyler had very few troops, provisions, and transports with which
to conduct offensive operations. Throughout the summer of 1775,
he was only able to scrape together a little more than one thousand
men from various militia units. Placing Brigadier General Richard
91

Opening Moves 19

Montgomery in command of them, he sent them north, planning to

join them once he had completed all logistical preparations for the
campaign.37
While Schuyler worked to prepare a force that could invade
Canada, Benedict Arnold resigned in a huff over who was to com-
mand Fort Ticonderoga. This was the first of many times that Arnold
would react to actual or perceived slights. Arnold was born in
Norwich, Connecticut, in January 1741 to a well-to-do and influential
family. His early life was almost idyllic. However, during young adult-
hood, his father fell on hard times due to failing business ventures.
Arnold apprenticed to an apothecary for a few years and then set up
his own business in New Haven. He briefly served in the Norwich mi-
litia during the French and Indian War but saw no active service. The
life of a simple merchant did not satisfy his ambition, and, captivated
by the sea, he invested in several merchant ships. Soon he had gained
enough experience to become a ship’s master himself. In 1767,
he married Margaret Mansfield, the daughter of a prominent New
Haven citizen, and they had three sons in quick succession.
Because of his new profession, which had made him wealthy,
Arnold became involved with other merchants and ship owners who
started to push back against what they viewed as overly restrictive
British mercantilism. The step to becoming a radical was a short one.
As a prosperous and prominent member of the community and with
obvious and instinctive leadership talents, Arnold was the natural
choice to command a company of local militia. News of the outbreak
of hostilities in Massachusetts in 1775 made its way to New Haven.
Despite opposition from local leaders, Arnold and his militia com-
pany joined the Patriot army surrounding Boston.38
Knowing that the new army had very little artillery, Arnold
proposed that an attempt be made to capture Fort Ticonderoga,
then of course still in British hands, where he knew there were
many heavy cannons. Fort Ticonderoga was crucial for controlling
the Lake Champlain–Hudson River invasion corridor to and from
Canada, and though it has already been introduced in this account,
to appreciate its significance to the story of Saratoga (since, for
the first three years of the American Revolution, both the British
and American forces would focus much of their attention on
Ticonderoga), we need to more fully address its construction and
situation. First built by the French in 1755 during the French and
Indian War, and named Fort Carillon, Fort Ticonderoga adopted
the classic star shape popularized by the famous late-seventeenth-
and early-eighteenth-century French military engineer Sébastien
02

20 The Compleat Victory

Le Prestre de Vauban. The stone fortress itself was dominated

by Rattlesnake Hill (later renamed “Mount Independence” by
the Americans) on the eastern shore of Lake Champlain directly
across from the fort to the southeast, and Sugar Loaf Hill (called
“Rattlesnake Mountain” by the French and later renamed “Mount
Defiance” by the Americans), located southwest of the fort across
from the mouth of the La Chute River.
Arnold persuaded the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, the
colony’s revolutionary government, to assign him the mission to
capture the fort and set out with a small force of newly recruited
Massachusetts soldiers. On his way west, he discovered that
Connecticut had also sent an expedition under Ethan Allen to seize
Ticonderoga. This was mainly due to information about the fort
that Arnold had unwittingly passed on to another officer. The two
men fought over who was to command the expedition. In the end,
the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, Congress, and Washington
choose Allen—he had the larger force—and Arnold essentially went
along for the ride.
As we’ve seen, the capture of the fort and its artillery and other
valuable military stores was easier than anyone anticipated, but
resolving the conflict between Arnold and Allen was not. Their
disagreements induced Arnold to resign his commission and return
home. His wife, Margaret, had died while he was gone, and his sister
had assumed care of his three boys. Arnold stayed in New Haven
for a short time then traveled back to Massachusetts to petition the
Committee of Safety to reimburse him for his out-of-pocket expenses
from the Ticonderoga expedition.39
While he was in Massachusetts, Arnold convinced Washington—
still managing the siege of Boston—to give him command of a de-
tachment to conduct a supporting attack against Quebec. Thus,
when Montgomery began his journey from Fort Ticonderoga via
Lake Champlain to Montreal on August 25, 1775, with about twelve
hundred troops, Arnold, with a new commission as a Continental
Army colonel, was leading his supporting detachment of one thou-
sand men up the Kennebec River.
Shortly after sending Arnold off on his expedition to Canada,
Washington reminded him that “You are intrusted with a Command
of the utmost Consequence to the Interests & Liberties of America.”
This was a campaign to win hearts and minds.40 Washington sent a
proclamation with the expedition to be distributed among Canadians
by Arnold in the hope of enticing them to join the American cause.41
Meanwhile, Schuyler, who was away from the army negotiating
12

Opening Moves 21

with Indian tribes, caught up with Montgomery and his troops as

they moved northward. However, illness soon forced his return to
Ticonderoga, leaving Montgomery and Arnold to conduct the first
American invasion of Canada.42
When Washington agreed to send Arnold on his expedition to
Canada, he was still adjusting to the responsibilities of being the
American commander-in-chief. As he would throughout the war, he
now had to deal with Congress’s desire to direct military operations,
especially those of the Northern Department. Not willing to inter-
fere with his civilian masters, Washington had to tread lightly when
dealing with issues surrounding that department. Early in the war
he contented himself with prodding and coaxing and mentoring
Schuyler. On August 2, Schuyler wrote Washington that he hoped to
hear from him soon regarding Canada and what was happening. “I
am extreamly Anxious to hear from your part of the world, reports
prevail that a body of [British] troops have left Boston and are
Gone to Canada.”43 Washington allayed Schuyler’s fears, assuring
him that “no Troops have been detached from Boston to Canada
or elsewhere.”44 Washington had to wonder about Schuyler’s lack of
confidence.
Arnold departed Cambridge, Massachusetts—then headquarters
of the Continental Army—on September 11, 1775, with his small
force of one thousand men. With the assistance of Abenaki warriors,
he led his men through almost 400 miles of trackless wilderness
crisscrossed with nearly unnavigable watercourses, through chal-
lenging portages and poor weather. Arnold later praised his men
and described the march as “not to be paralleled in history.” Despite
all the challenges, the officers and men, “inspired and fired with
the love of liberty and their country, pushed on with a fortitude
superior to every obstacle.”45 Arnold had led through his personal
example sharing the hardships with his men and would continue
to demonstrate superior leadership skills in the months and years
to come. The thrust toward Quebec through the wilderness of
present-day Maine was one of the most memorable and epic mili-
tary expeditions in American history.
On November 14, Arnold and six hundred survivors from the
grueling march climbed the bluffs and arrived on the Plains of
Abraham, outside the walled city of Quebec. Arnold’s weakened
force could not hope to take the city by themselves, so it was
compelled to fall back to Point aux Trembles (trembles are aspen),
west of the city.46 There he awaited the arrival of Montgomery and
his army.
2

22 The Compleat Victory

Montgomery’s advance “down” Lake Champlain (Lake Champlain

drains northward) might have been less memorable than Arnold’s
through the Maine wilderness, but it was not without its own
challenges. Montgomery departed Fort Ticonderoga on August 25,
1775, and arrived on September 4 at Île aux Noix, an island in the
Richelieu River, which runs from the north shore of Lake Champlain
to the Saint Lawrence River. The Americans moved downriver to Fort
Saint-Jean (known to the Americans as Fort Saint Johns), a fortifica-
tion first constructed by the French in 1666 and which guarded the
approaches to Montreal. After several false starts and a few indecisive
skirmishes against British forces, Montgomery settled into a siege
of the fort, one that lasted from September 17 until the garrison
surrendered on November 3. One American officer wrote that the
fall of the fort would be “a most fatal stab to the hellish machinations
of the foes of freedom, as it will facilitate the reduction of Canada
and secure the Canadians in our favour.”47 Actually, the seven-week
delay would have rather different consequences. After Fort Saint-
Jean fell, Montgomery quickly moved to Montreal and occupied the
town almost without a shot after General Carleton decided he could
not possibly defend it.48
Carleton had seen holding Fort Saint-Jean as his best chance
to defend the province from an American offensive from Fort
Ticonderoga. Now that the fort was lost and Montreal occupied,
only Quebec remained. After a daring escape, Carleton traveled
northeast down the Saint Lawrence River to Quebec to direct the
city’s defense, arriving on November 19. While the American forces
invading Canada were small even by the standards of the day, the
British defenses were even thinner. Carlton had been forced to
send several regiments to join the siege at Boston and had only a
few militia and about eight hundred regulars to defend the entire
province. Immediately upon his arrival in Quebec, Carleton moved
to strengthen the defenses and to augment his meager force. He
directed that all civilian men of military age take up arms to supple-
ment his small force, and he strengthened the city’s defenses with
additional earthworks and obstacles. Quebec became the last line of
defense.49
Once he occupied Montreal, Montgomery traveled northeast with
about five hundred men, hot on Carleton’s heels, and arrived out-
side Quebec on December 2, 1775, when he linked up with Arnold’s
surviving force. Montgomery informed Schuyler of the union of
the two small armies on December 5, expressing optimism over
their chances to take the imposing citadel. Carleton, according to
32

Opening Moves 23

Montgomery, was only putting on a “show of defence.” Still, he added,

“The works of Quebeck are extremely extensive, and very incapable
of being defended.” Montgomery also had a very favorable impres-
sion of the New England troops and their commander: “There is a
style of discipline among them much superior to what I have been
used to see this campaign.” He found Arnold “active, intelligent and
enterprising.” Montgomery planned to take Quebec by beginning a
traditional siege that would mask a frontal attack against the “lower
town, which is the weaker part. . . . I do think there is a fair prospect
of success.”50
Twice Montgomery demanded that Carleton surrender the
city and the garrison; twice the British general refused. Although
Montgomery tried bombarding the fortifications with the few
cannons he had on hand, the result was disappointing. He found
himself facing the same dilemma that would later confront
Washington: the imminent expiration of short-term enlistments of
many of his troops. Thus, Montgomery and Arnold were forced to
hurry the assault on Carleton’s defenses before their small army
melted away. Several attacks were planned and canceled.
Finally, on December 30, conditions were deemed favorable, and
the Americans attacked the lower town the next morning in the
middle of a blizzard. Both American commanders led their men for-
ward. Montgomery was killed, Arnold was severely wounded in the
leg, and their forces were repulsed. In a letter written a week later
to his sister, a convalescing Arnold described Montgomery’s death
as the deciding factor. Had he not been killed, “the town would
have been ours.”51 Whether or not this was true, the assault failed,
with the Americans losing approximately fifty men killed in action,
more than thirty wounded, and more than four hundred captured.
Carleton reported only five killed (although the actual number was
probably higher) and fourteen wounded.52
Although now heavily outnumbered, Arnold decided to con-
tinue the siege as newly recruited units had augmented his force
throughout the winter. But there were never enough troops for the
Americans to resume offensive operations. If Carleton’s superior
forces sitting behind the walls of the city, a mere cannon shot from
his tent, was not enough, Arnold also had to deal with a shortage of
provisions and an outbreak of smallpox.
For his part, Carleton decided to wait for reinforcements that he
knew were on the way before venturing out of the city. Finally, on
May 6, 1776, they began to arrive by sea on the newly ice-free Saint
Lawrence River “to the inconceivable joy of all the garrison,” and the
42

24 The Compleat Victory

American Army, diminished and devastated by illness, began to pull

back.53 Over the next month, almost nine thousand British troops
arrived under General Burgoyne, who became Carleton’s second-
in-command, and four thousand German mercenaries, mostly from
Brunswick, under the command of Major General Friedrich Adolf
Riedesel.54 When the news arrived in London that Carleton had
withstood the American siege, Horace Walpole wrote that it “greatly
raised the spirits of the King and Court, who now talked of nothing
but reducing the Americans to a state of never rebelling again.”55
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Rhymes from
the Russian
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Rhymes from the Russian

Being faithful translations of selections from the best
Russian poets

Translator: John Pollen

Release date: September 9, 2023 [eBook #71595]

Language: English

Original publication: United Kingdom: Kegan Paul, Trench,

Trübner & Co., Ltd, 1891

Credits: The Online Distributed Proofreading Team at

https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from
images generously made available by The Internet
Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RHYMES

FROM THE RUSSIAN ***
 RHYMES
FROM THE RUSSIAN
 RHYMES
FROM THE RUSSIAN
BEING

FAITHFUL TRANSLATIONS OF SELECTIONS

FROM THE BEST

RUSSIAN POETS
PUSHKIN, LERMONTOF, NADSON,
NEKRASOF, COUNT A. TOLSTOI, TYOUTCHEF,
MAIKOF, LEBEDEF, FET, K. R., Etc.

BY
JOHN POLLEN, LL.D., T.C.D.
INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER & CO., Ltᴰ.
1891
(The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.)
 TO

THE MARQUESS OF DUFFERIN AND AVA,

TO WHOSE EXAMPLE AND KIND WORDS OF
ENCOURAGEMENT
THE AUTHOR TRACES THE SOURCE OF HIS
RUSSIAN STUDIES,
THIS LITTLE EFFORT IS GRATEFULLY
DEDICATED.
 PREFACE.

The chief merit the Translator claims for this little effort is
“faithfulness of translation.” He has endeavoured to translate every
word and every thought of the Russian writer, and to avoid additions.
Most of the poems selected for translation are popular, not only
amongst the higher classes of Russian society, but also with the
Russian soldiery and peasantry, who are very fond of poetry, and
amongst whom education has spread, and continues to spread, with
marvellous rapidity.
The Translator trusts that this little volume may not only prove
interesting to ordinary English readers wishing to get a general idea
of Russian poetry, but may also be found of some service to
Englishmen studying Russian, and Russians studying English.
J. POLLEN.

Sebastopol,
March 21, 1891.
 CONTENTS.

PAGE
FROM VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.
Rhymes and Reason 1
FROM LERMONTOF.
The Angel 3
The Voyage 5
Prayer 6
Thanksgiving 7
On Death of Pushkin 8
Dream 9
Clouds 11
Prayer 12
How weary! How dreary! 14
Alone I pass along the lonely Road 15
Men and Waves 17
Ballad: The Queen of the Sea 18
The Prophet 21
When—Then 23
My Native Land 24
To —— 26
The Dagger 27
No! not for thee 29
Dispute 30
“Why” 35
Moscow 36
FROM PUSHKIN.
I wander down the noisy Streets 37
Anacreontic 39
To his Wife 40
Let me not lose my Senses, God 41
I’ve overlived Aspirings 43
Peter the Great 44
The Prophet 45
Play, my Kathleen 47
A Monument 48
The Poet 49
FROM NADSON.
Pity the stately Cypress Trees 51
FROM NEKRASOF.
Te Deum 52
The Prophet 54
Offer my Muse a Friendly Hand 55
Dream 56
A Sick Man’s Jealousy 57
The Landlord of Old Times 59
The Russian Soldier 61
FROM MAIKOF.
A Midsummer Night’s Dream 62
Who was He? 64
The Easter Kiss 66
On Lomonossof 67
Propriety 68
The Singer 69
A Little Picture 70
The Alpine Glacier 73
The Mother 74
The Kiss refused 77
The Snowdrop 78
A Smile and a Tear 79
FROM COUNT TOLSTOI.
Believe it not 80
The Scolding 81
FROM VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.
Reflection 82
The Would-be Nun 83
The Schoolboy’s Devil 84
POPULAR SONG.
The Gipsy Maid 87
FROM TYOUCHEF.
Scarce cooled from Midday Heat 89
The Spring Storm 90
FROM PRINCE VYAZEMSKI.
The Troika 91
FROM LEBEDEF.
Theodora 93
FROM H.
The Lie’s Excuse 95
FROM DERJAVIN.
The Stream of Time 96
NATIONAL SONGS.
Marriage 97
The Grain 98
Wedding Gear 99
FROM DOROSHKEVISH.
Sebastopol 101
FROM POLONSKI.
On Skobelef 102
FROM KRYLOF.
Fable—The Swan, the Pike, the Crab 103
CHILD’S SONG.
Little Birdie 105
FROM LAL.
Advice 107
THE TITULAR COUNCILLOR.
The Titulyárnyi Sovétnik 109
FROM K. P.
No! I can ne’er believe 110
To the Poet Maikof 112
FROM SHENSHIN (FET.).
A Russian Scene 113
Tryst 114
FROM PLESHEEF.
Spring 115
Passion 116
FROM E. KYLAEF.
Billows 117
 FROM COUNT T.
No Half-measures 118
 FROM THE RUSSIAN OF
VLADIMIR VLADISLAVLEF.

From my poor rhymes you turn your face,

From my allurements flee;
So shuns the vane the wind’s embrace,
And scorns his minstrelsy.
FROM LERMONTOF.
 THE ANGEL.

Thro’ the midnight heavens an angel flew,

And a soft low song sang he,
And the moon and the stars and the rolling clouds
Heard that holy melody.

He sang of the bliss of sinless souls

’Neath the tents of Eden-bowers;
Of God—the Great One—he sang; and unfeigned
Was his praise of the Godhead’s powers.

A little babe in his arms he bore,

For this world of woe and tears,
And the sound of his song in the soul of the child
Kept ringing, though wordless, for years.

And long languished she on this earth below,

With a wondrous longing filled,
But the world’s harsh songs could not change for her
The notes which that angel trilled.
 THE VOYAGE.

Glitters a white, a lonely sail,

Where stoops the grey mist o’er the sea.
What does his distant search avail?
At home, unfound, what leaveth he?

Whistles the wind; the waves at play

Sport round the bending, creaking mast;
Ah! not for Fortune does he stray,
Nor yet from Fortune flees he fast.

’Neath him, like sapphire, gleams the sea;

O’er him, like gold, the sunlight glows;
But storms, rebellious, wooeth he,
As if in storms he’d find repose.
 PRAYER.

In moments of life’s trial,

When sorrows crowd the soul,
A single prayer of wondrous power
From fervent lips I roll.

There dwells a force God-given

In harmony of sound;
In living words there breathes a charm
All holy and profound.

From soul, like burden, leaping,

Far off all doubting flies;
From prayers of faith with weeping
How light, how light we rise!
 THANKSGIVING.

For all, for all, I render thanks to Thee—

For passion’s secret pangs and misery,
For burning tears, the poison of the kiss,
For warmth of soul wasted on emptiness,
For foeman’s hate, for friends’ malicious spleen,
For all by which in life I’ve cheated been.
But oh! dispose it so, that from this day
I may not long have need such thanks to pay.