2023 INSC 649 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 5263 of 2023

M/S UNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL …PETITIONER(S)

INSURANCE CO. LTD.

VERSUS

SURESH CHAND JAIN & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

J. B. PARDIWALA, J.:

1. This petition seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the

Constitution is at the instance of M/s Universal Sompo General
Insurance Company Limited, Original appellant before the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the NCDRC’)
in the First Appeal No. 376 of 2016 by which the NCDRC dismissed
the appeal filed by the petitioner herein thereby affirming the order
passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for
short, ‘the SCDRC’) of Delhi, holding that the respondent No. 1
/complainant was entitled to receive the claim amount and appropriate
compensation from the petitioner and its joint venture partner viz.
Allahabad Bank (respondent No. 2) for the goods stolen from the
premises in question.

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FACTUAL MATRIX

2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent Bank,

acting as an intermediary issued a Standard Fire and Special Perils
Policy dated 05.12.2011 in favour of the complainant through the
petitioner herein. Similarly, a Burglary Insurance Policy was also
issued in favour of the complainant dated 08.12.2011. Both the
policies covered a sum of Rs. 50 lakh for the risk of fire and burglary.
The policies were for the period between 25.11.2011 and 24.11.2012.

3. By way of letter dated 28.03.2012, the complainant informed the

respondent Bank that the construction of his new premises at Bawana,
Delhi had been completed and he had transferred his stock to the
above premises situated in Bawana from the premises situated in
Rajgarh Ext., Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and Bhagirath Palace, Chandni
Chowk, Delhi. In this letter the complainant had also instructed the
Bank to inform the petitioner.

4. The respondent Bank acknowledged the aforesaid intimation and

claims to have informed the petitioner by way of letter dated
31.03.2012. The Bank claims to have also forwarded the letter dated
28.03.2012 of the complainant to the petitioner.

5. On 29.06.2012, a theft took place at the Bawana premises and for that
FIR No. 213/2012 was lodged on 30.06.2012 at the PS Bawana. Both,
the petitioner and the Bank were also informed about the theft. A
surveyor was appointed by the petitioner to inspect the premises and
on 01.07.2012, a formal complaint was lodged by the complainant
with the petitioner.

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6. After the theft, the complainant informed that a fire had also broken
out in the premises at Bawana on 18.10.2012, and the status report in
that regard was issued by the fire department. Subsequently, the
complainant filed claims for both, theft and fire amounting to Rs. 49
lakh. The petitioner repudiated the theft claim vide letter dated
22.08.2013 and the fire claim was closed on account of non-
submission of documents by the complainant.

7. On 03.06.2013, the complainant aggrieved by the inaction on the part

of the petitioner approached the SCDRC, Delhi under Section 17 of
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, ‘the Act 1986’), by way
of Complaint No. 357/2013. He prayed for his claim of Rs. 49 lakh to
be processed along with compensation of Rs. 20 lakh and interest at
the rate the respondent Bank was charging from the complainant, with
costs of the complaint.

8. By order dated 18.03.2016, the SCDRC partly allowed the complaint

holding that the petitioner and the respondent bank were jointly and
severally liable for the deficiencies in providing services to the
complainant and the complainant was entitled to be compensated for
the theft of goods worth Rs. 41,31,180/- @ 12 % interest per annum
from the date of the claim. The petitioner and the bank were also
directed to pay Rs. 2 lakh to the complainant towards compensation
for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in providing services.
The petitioner was further directed to finalise the fire claim of Rs. 4
lakh of the complainant.

9. The petitioner herein feeling aggrieved with the order passed by the
SCDRC challenged the same before the NCDRC by filing the First
Appeal No. 376 of 2016 under Section 19 of the Act 1986. The

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 petitioner prayed before the NCDRC to set aside the SCDRC’s order
in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and grant costs against the
complainant in favour of the petitioner.

10. By order dated 16.01.2023, the First Appeal filed by the petitioner
herein came to be dismissed.

11. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is here before

this Court with the present petition, seeking special leave to appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution.

DISCUSSION

12. In the course of the hearing of this matter, manyfold contentions were
raised on either side. However, the moot question that falls for our
consideration is whether we should entertain this petition seeking
special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution directly
against the order passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction or relegate the petitioner to avail the remedy of filing a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a petition
invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution?

13. Before, we proceed to answer the aforesaid question, we must look

into the few relevant provisions of the Act 1986.

14. Section 21(a) of the Act 1986 is titled ‘Jurisdiction of the National
Commission’. The same reads thus:

“21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. - Subject to

the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall
have jurisdiction —

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 (a)to entertain —

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services

and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one
crore; and
(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;
….”

15. Section 23 of the Act 1986 provides for an ‘Appeal’. The same reads
thus:

“23. Appeal.- Any person, aggrieved by an order made

by the National Commission in exercise of its powers
conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 21,
may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme
Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the
order:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if
it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing
it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person who is
required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the
National Commission shall be entertained by the
Supreme Court unless that person has deposited in the
prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or
rupees fifty thousand, whichever is less.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

16. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stood repealed on 20.07.2020

(Section 106, the Act 1986) and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019
(for short, ‘the Act 2019’) came into force. In the instant case, the
complaints were instituted under the Act 1986. However, we must
highlight the relevant provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari
materia to the provisions of the Act 1986.

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“58. Jurisdiction of National Commission. – (1) Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall
have jurisdiction—
(a) to entertain—

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as

consideration exceeds rupees ten crore:
Provided that where the Central Government deems it
necessary so to do, it may prescribe such other value, as it
deems fit;
(ii) complaints against unfair contracts, where the value of
goods or services paid as consideration exceeds ten crore
rupees;
(iii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission;
(iv) appeals against the orders of the Central Authority;……..

Xxx xxx xxx

67. Appeal against order of National Commission. - Any

person, aggrieved by an order made by the National
Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-
clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section
58, may prefer an appeal against such order to the Supreme
Court within a period of thirty days from the date of the
order:
Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it
is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it
within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person who is
required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the
National Commission shall be entertained by the Supreme
Court unless that person has deposited fifty per cent. of that
amount in the manner as may be prescribed.”

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17. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act 1986 and Act
2019, respectively would indicate that the remedy of appeal to this
Court is available only with respect to the orders passed by the
NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i) of the
Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. In other
words, both the Acts provide for the remedy of appeal to this Court
only with respect to the orders which are passed by the NCDRC in its
original jurisdiction or as the court of first instance (original orders)
and no further appeal lies against the orders which are passed by the
NCDRC in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, the appeal before the NCDRC was
against the order passed by the SCDRC under Section 17(1)(a)(i) of
the Act 1986. Such appeal to the NCDRC was maintainable, as
provided under Section 21(a)(ii) of the Act 1986. As per Section 23 of
the Act 1986, any person, aggrieved by an order made by the NCDRC
in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 21(a)(i), may prefer an
appeal against such order to this Court. Therefore, an appeal against
the order passed by the NCDRC to this Court would be maintainable
only in case the order is passed by the NCDRC in exercise of its
powers conferred under Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986. No further
appeal to this Court is provided against the order passed by the
NCDRC in exercise of its powers conferred under Section 21(a)(ii) of
the Act 1986. There is no provision for filing any further appeal
against the order passed on the appeal filed against the order of the
SCDRC. In such circumstances, the petitioner has come before this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

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SCOPE AND GRANT OF SPECIAL LEAVE UNDER ARTICLE 136
OF THE CONSTITUTION

19. This Court has held in Pritam Singh v. State reported in 1950 SCC
189 : 1950 SCR 453 at p. 459: “Generally speaking this Court will
not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and
special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has
been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against”. It was
also said in that case that the view that once an appeal has been
admitted by special leave the entire case is at large and that the
appellant is free to contest all the findings of fact and raise every point
which could be raised in the High Court is wrong. Only those points
can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be
urged at the preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for. This
principle was stated, it is true, in a criminal case but it is of as much
significance in civil cases as in the trial of criminal appeals. [See:
Murtaza and Sons and Another v. Nazir Mohd. Khan and Others
reported (1970) 3 SCC 876].

20. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd.

v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, reported in (1955) 1
SCR 941 : AIR 1955 SC 65 made the following observations:

“7. … It is not possible to define with any precision the

limitations on the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
vested in this Court by the constitutional provision made in
article 136. The limitations, whatever they be, are implicit in
the nature and character of the power itself. It being an
exceptional and overriding power, naturally it has to be
exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special and
extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter
the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that
8
 can be said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom
and good sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that
itself is a sufficient safeguard and guarantee that the power
will only be used to advance the cause of justice, and that its
exercise will be governed by well established principles which
govern the exercise of overriding constitutional powers. It is,
however, plain that when the Court reaches the conclusion
that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or
tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal
to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the
finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of
the exercise of this power because the whole intent and
purpose of this article is that it is the duty of this Court to see
that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of
Courts and tribunals because certain laws have made the
decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and
conclusive. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

21. In Ujagar Singh and Another v. State (Delhi Administration) reported

in (1979) 4 SCC 530, Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Bench
observed as under:

“1. … There is hardly a case, civil or criminal, which does not

raise some question of law or the other. But no question of law
of general public importance is involved in these petitions. It
is time that it was realised that the jurisdiction of this Court to
grant special leave to appeal can be invoked in very
exceptional circumstances. A question of law of general public
importance or a decision which shocks the conscience of the
Court are some of the prime requisites for the grant of special
leave. … ”
(Emphasis supplied)

22. In the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union
v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and Another, (1986) 2
SCC 624, this Court observed in para 6 as under:

9
 “6. The Union has directly come to this Court in appeal
against the said order of the Industrial Court without first
approaching the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the
Constitution for the purpose of challenging the said order. The
powers of this Court under Article 136 are very wide but as
clause (1) of that article itself states the grant of special leave
to appeal is in the discretion of the court. Article 136 is,
therefore, not designed to permit direct access to this Court
where other equally efficacious remedy is available and where
the question is not of public importance….”
(Emphasis supplied)

23. This Court in Jyotendrasinhji v. S.I. Tripathi and Others, reported in

1993 Supp (3) SCC 389 observed in para 16 as under;

“16. It is true that the finality clause contained in Section 245-

I does not and cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 or the jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 32 or under Article 136, as the case may be. But that
does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Court in the appeal
preferred directly in this Court is any different than what it
would be if the assessee had first approached the High Court
under Article 226 and then come up in appeal to this Court
under Article 136. A party does not and cannot gain any
advantage by approaching this Court directly under Article
136, instead of approaching the High Court under Article 226.
This is not a limitation inherent in Article 136; it is a
limitation which this Court imposes on itself having regard to
the nature of the function performed by the Commission and
keeping in view the principles of judicial review….”
(Emphasis supplied)

24. Thus, what is discernible from the aforesaid decisions of this Court is
that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to
appeal can be invoked in very exceptional circumstances. The
question of law of general public importance or a decision which
shocks the conscience of the Court are some of the prime requisites

10
 for the grant of special leave. The provisions of Article 136 of the
Constitution as such are not circumscribed by any limitation. But
when the party aggrieved has alternative remedy to go before the High
Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction as the
case may be, this Court should not entertain petition seeking special
leave thereby short-circuit the legal procedure prescribed. The
limitation, whatever, they be are implicit in the nature and character of
the power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power,
naturally it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in
very exceptional situations. The power will only be used to advance
the cause of justice and its exercise will be governed by well-
established principles which govern the exercise of overriding
constitutional powers.

25. Almost six decades back, this Court speaking through M.

Hidayatullah, J. in the case of the State of Bombay v. M/s Ratilal
Vadilal and Bros., reported in (1961) 2 SCR 367 observed as under:

“3. … We have frequently noticed that all the remedies which

are open to an appellant are not first exhausted before moving
this Court. Ordinarily, this Court will not allow the High
Court to be bypassed in this manner, and the proper course for
an appellant is to exhaust all his remedies before invoking the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

26. We shall now look into a very recent pronouncement of this Court in
the case of Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited
reported in 2022 INSC 573. In the said case, the appellant had booked
a flat in the project floated by the respondent. The appellant paid the
entire amount of consideration but the respondent did not hand over
the flat within the time stipulated in the agreement. Therefore, the

11
 appellant filed a consumer complaint before the SCDRC on
10.08.2013, alleging deficiency of service on the part of the
respondent. The SCDRC allowed the complaint filed by the appellant
vide its order dated 16.10.2020. The SCDRC directed the respondent
to hand over the flat to the possession of the appellant subject to their
meeting the requirements. The SCDRC further directed the
respondent to pay compensation for the deficiency of service of the
respondent in the form of nine per cent simple interest till the date of
delivery of the flat in possession of the appellant.

27. The appellant filed an execution and contempt petition against the
respondent since he did not comply with the order of the SCDRC.
Vide its order dated 12.03.2021, the SCDRC directed the respondent
to produce the details of bank accounts or properties for the purpose
of attaching the same and to implement the order passed by the
SCDRC.

28. The respondent filed an appeal before the NCDRC. On 30.03.2021,

the NCDRC stayed the order of SCDRC subject to the deposit of the
cost of entire flat along with nine per cent interest on the amount paid
till date in the Registry of the SCDRC.

29. The respondent, being aggrieved against the order of NCDRC filed a
writ petition before the High Court, challenging the order passed by
the NCDRC. Before the High Court the respondent contended that the
NCDRC ought not to have directed the respondent, the builder, to
deposit the entire cost of the apartment along with the compensation
awarded by the SCDRC. The High Court stayed the order of National
Commission, vide its order dated 25.05.2021. The said stay order was
issued subject to the condition that the respondent is to deposit with
the State Commission fifty per cent of the amount directed to be

12
 deposited by way of interest towards compensation, within four weeks
from the date of stay order issued by the High Court.

30. In the meantime, the NCDRC passed the final order, confirming the
order passed by the State Commission, vide its order dated
09.12.2021. The respondent also filed a writ petition before the High
Court, challenging the final order passed by the NCDRC. The High
Court, in this petition, also granted interim stay vide its order dated
22.12.2021. Against this order the appellant filed an SLP before this
Court. This Court vide its order dated 21.03.2022 directed the High
Court to decide the jurisdictional issue under Article 227 of the
Constitution against the order passed by the NCDRC on or before
18.04.2022 and intimate the outcome to this Court. The High Court
vide its order dated 31.03.2022 held that the writ petition before the
High Court against the order of NCDRC was maintainable. This order
was challenged by the appellant before this Court.

31. The appellant submitted the following before this Court:

(a) Against the order of NCDRC, a petition before the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable.

(b) Only appeal is maintainable before this Court against the order
of NCDRC as per the provisions of the Consumer Protection
Act.

(c) Without exhausting the appellate remedy, the High Court ought
not to have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution.

(d) The High Court ought not to have stayed the order passed by
the NCDRC in the limited jurisdiction available under Article
227 of the Constitution.
13
32. The respondent submitted the following before this Court:

(a) The provisions of the Act 2019 do not have appeal provisions
against the order of NCDRC passed in exercise of
appellate/revisional jurisdiction and therefore writ petition
under Article 226 or petition under Article 227, as the case may
be, is maintainable before the High Court against the order of
NCDRC.

(b) For the aforesaid purpose the respondent relied on the following

judgments:

 Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma,

AIR 1965 SC 1595; and

 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC

261.

33. This Court considered the question for its decision as to whether
against the order passed by the NCDRC in an appeal under Section
58(1)(a)(iii) of the Act 2019, petition before the High Court under the
Article 227 of Constitution of India would be maintainable.

34. After due analysis of the provisions of the Act 2019, which are pari
materia to the provisions of the Act 1986, this Court in Ibrat Faizan
(supra) held as under:

“11. ….Therefore, an appeal against the order passed by the

National Commission to this Court would be maintainable
only in case the order is passed by the National Commission in
exercise of its powers conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or
under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act. No further appeal
to this Court is provided against the order passed by the
National Commission in exercise of its powers conferred
under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or under Section 58(1)(a)(iv) of the

14
 2019 Act. In that view of the matter, the remedy which may be
available to the aggrieved party against the order passed by
the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)
(iii) or Section 58(1)(a)(iv) would be to approach the
concerned High Court having jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.”

xxx xxx xxx

14. ….while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the
rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court
has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the
parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be
exercised.”
(Emphasis supplied)

35. In Ibrat Faizan (supra), this Court took notice of its earlier decision in
the case of Associated Cement (supra), wherein, a Constitution Bench
held as under:

“9. … Special matters and questions are entrusted to them for

their decision and in that sense, they share with the Courts one
common characteristic; both the courts and the tribunals are
“constituted by the State and are invested with judicial as
distinguished from purely administrative or executive
functions”, (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj
Singh, 1955 1 SCR 267 at p. 272: (AIR 1954 SC 520 at p.
522). They are both adjudicating bodies and they deal with
and finally determine disputes between parties which are
entrusted to their jurisdiction. The procedure followed by the
Courts is regularly prescribed and in discharging their
functions and exercising their powers, the Courts have to
conform to that procedure. The procedure which the tribunals
have to follow may not always be so strictly prescribed, but
the approach adopted by both the Courts and the tribunals is
substantially the same, and there is no essential difference
between the functions that they discharge. As in the case of
Courts, so in the case of tribunals, it is the State's inherent
15
judicial power which has been transferred and by virtue of the
said power, it is the State's inherent judicial function which
they discharge. Judicial functions and judicial powers are one
of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on
considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial
functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the
Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the
State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part of its
judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to
them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and
disputes between parties. It is really not possible or even
expedient to attempt to describe exhaustively the features
which are common to the tribunals and the Courts, and
features which are distinct and separate. The basic and the
fundamental feature which is common to both the Courts and
the tribunals is that they discharge judicial functions and
exercise judicial powers which inherently vest in a sovereign
State.

Xxx xxx xxx

44. An authority other than a Court may be vested by statute

with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it
would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to
define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case
as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the
authority can be truly described as judicial functions or
judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is
sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the
State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more
contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy
between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the
judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal
within the meaning of Art. 136. Such a power of adjudication
implies that the authority must act judicially and must
determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on
the materials before it and by application of the relevant law
to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be
exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this
test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential
that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute

16
 or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of
adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a
private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under S. 10A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a
tribunal within Art. 136. It matters little that such a body or
authority is vested with the trappings of a Court. The
Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the
trappings of a Court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
vests an authority acting under S. 10 A of the Act with many of
such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not
tribunals.
45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Art. 227 of the
Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the
same meaning as in Art. 136.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. Having regard to the aforesaid, this Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra)
observed as under:

“12. … Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be

a ‘Tribunal’ which is vested by Statute the powers to
determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending
parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them.
Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision,
it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial
powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a
‘Tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the
Constitution of India. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

37. This Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), while explaining the importance
of approaching the High Court, more particularly when a remedy is
available by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution or by way of a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution (supervisory jurisdiction) observed as under:

“12. ….Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its
powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view
of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party
17
before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party
approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Xxx xxx xxx

13. Now so far as the remedy which may be available

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it
cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by
special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
may be too expensive and as observed and held by this Court
in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy can
be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective.
Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India before the concerned High Court is
provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right
of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a
complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a
lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution.

Xxx xxx xxx

14.1. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the

Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case
of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97,
which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the
recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment
Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 29).
Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of
the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the
parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution. It goes without saying that even while
considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court
has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence
under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while
granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article
227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the
National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the
18
 rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.”
(Emphasis supplied)

38. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion
that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the
petitioner herein to first go before the jurisdictional High Court either
by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution or
by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High
Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either
of the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special
leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution.

39. We take notice of the order passed by this Court dated 29.03.2023
which reads thus:

“2. In the meantime, there shall be stay of the impugned

judgment and order, subject to deposit of 50 per cent of the
awarded amount in this Court.”

40. However, in the aforesaid context, it is also necessary for us to look

into the office report dated 03.07.2023, which reads thus:

“It is further submitted that Dr. S.K. Verma, Advocate for

respondent no.1 has on 28.06.2023 filed an application for
release of deposited amount made by the Petitioner. However,
the same is defective as original property papers are not filed.
Also, the documents relating to valuation of property are not
filed as in the lease papers the amount mentioned is Rs.
6,30,000/-. Hence, the amount was not disbursed to the
respondent no.1.”

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41. It appears from the aforesaid that the complainant was not in a
position to withdraw the fifty per cent amount deposited by the
petitioner herein. It further appears that the amount deposited by the
petitioner herein is still with the Registry of this Court. Since we are
not entertaining this petition on merits, we direct the Registry to
refund the amount to the petitioner after due and proper verification.

42. In the result, this petition is disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to
approach the jurisdictional High Court and challenge the order passed
by the NCDRC, in accordance with law.

43. It is needless to clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case. The merits of the case shall be looked into by the
jurisdictional High Court.

…….………………………J.
(J.B. PARDIWALA)

…………………………….J.
(MANOJ MISRA)

NEW DELHI;
JULY 26, 2023.

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