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Preface vii
Acknowledgments
William Vatter and George Benston motivated my interest in managerial accounting. The
genesis for this book and its approach reflect the oral tradition of my colleagues, past
and present, at the University of Rochester. William Meckling and Michael Jensen stimu-
lated my thinking and provided much of the theoretical structure underlying the book, as
anyone familiar with their work will attest. My long and productive collaboration with
Ross Watts sharpened my analytical skills and further refined the approach. He also fur-
nished most of the intellectual capital for Chapter 3, including the problem material. Ray
Ball has been a constant source of ideas. Clifford Smith and James Brickley continue to
enhance my economic education. Three colleagues, Andrew Christie, Dan Gode, and Scott
Keating, supplied particularly insightful comments that enriched the analysis at critical
junctions. Valuable comments from Anil Arya, Ron Dye, Andy Leone, Dale Morse, Ram
Ramanan, K. Ramesh, Shyam Sunder, and Joseph Weintrop are gratefully acknowledged.
This project benefited greatly from the honest and intelligent feedback of n umerous
instructors. I wish to thank Mahendra Gupta, Susan Hamlen, Badr Ismail, Charles Kile,
Leslie Kren, Don May, William Mister, Mohamed Onsi, Ram Ramanan, Stephen Ryan,
Michael Sandretto, Richard Sansing, Deniz Saral, Gary Schneider, Joe Weber, and
William Yancey. This book also benefited from two other projects with which I have been
involved. Writing Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture (McGraw Hill
Education, 2016) with James Brickley and Clifford Smith and Management Accounting
in a Dynamic Environment (Routledge, 2016) with Cheryl McWatters helped me to better
understand how to present certain topics.
To the numerous students who endured the development process, I owe an enormous
debt of gratitude. I hope they learned as much from the material as I learned teaching them.
Some were even kind enough to provide critiques and suggestions, in particular Jan Dick
Eijkelboom. Others supplied, either directly or indirectly, the problem material in the text.
The able research assistance of P. K. Madappa, Eamon Molloy, Jodi Parker, Steve Sand-
ers, Richard Sloan, and especially Gary Hurst, contributed amply to the manuscript and
problem material. Janice Willett and Barbara Schnathorst did a superb job of editing the
manuscript and problem material.
The very useful comments and suggestions from the following reviewers are greatly
appreciated:
To my wife Dodie and daughters Daneille and Amy, thank you for setting the right
priorities and for giving me the encouragement and environment to be productive. Finally,
I wish to thank my parents for all their support.
Jerold L. Zimmerman
University of Rochester
Brief Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Nature of Costs 22
3 Opportunity Cost of Capital and Capital Budgeting 85
4 Organizational Architecture 127
5 Responsibility Accounting and Transfer Pricing 161
6 Budgeting 216
7 Cost Allocation: Theory 280
8 Cost Allocation: Practices 327
9 Absorption Cost Systems 392
10 Criticisms of Absorption Cost Systems: Incentive to Overproduce 448
11 Criticisms of Absorption Cost Systems: Inaccurate Product Costs 483
12 Standard Costs: Direct Labor and Materials 538
13 Overhead and Marketing Variances 575
14 Management Accounting in a Changing Environment 609
ix
Contents
1 Introduction 1
A. Managerial Accounting: Decision Making and Control 2
B. Design and Use of Cost Systems 4
C. Marmots and Grizzly Bears 8
D. Management Accountant’s Role in the Organization 9
E. Evolution of Management Accounting: A Framework for Change 12
F. Vortec Medical Probe Example 15
G. Outline of the Text 18
H. Summary 18
4 Organizational Architecture 127
A. Basic Building Blocks 128
1. Self-Interested Behavior, Team Production, and Agency Costs 128
2. Decision Rights and Rights Systems 133
3. Role of Knowledge and Decision Making 134
4. Markets versus Firms 135
5. Influence Costs 137
B. Organizational Architecture 139
1. Three-Legged Stool 139
2. Decision Management versus Decision Control 143
C. Accounting’s Role in the Organization’s Architecture 145
D. Example of Accounting’s Role: Executive Compensation Contracts 147
E. Summary 148
6 Budgeting 216
A. Generic Budgeting Systems 219
1. Country Club 219
2. Large Corporation 222
B. Trade-Off between Decision Management and Decision Control 226
1. Communicating Specialized Knowledge versus Performance
Evaluation 226
2. Budget Ratcheting 227
3. Participative Budgeting 229
4. New Approaches to Budgeting 230
5. Managing the Trade-Off 232
C. Resolving Organizational Problems 233
1. Short-Run versus Long-Run Budgets 233
2. Line-Item Budgets 235
3. Budget Lapsing 236
4. Static versus Flexible Budgets 236
5. Incremental versus Zero-Based Budgets 239
D. Summary 241
Appendix: Comprehensive Master Budget Illustration 242
Introduction
Chapter Outline
A. Managerial Accounting: Decision Making
and Control
B. Design and Use of Cost Systems
C. Marmots and Grizzly Bears
D. Management Accountant’s Role in the
Organization
E. Evolution of Management Accounting:
A Framework for Change
F. Vortec Medical Probe Example
G. Outline of the Text
H. Summary
1
2 Chapter 1
No matter what the firm’s objective, the organization will survive only if its inflow of
resources (such as revenue) is at least as large as the outflow. Accounting information is
useful to help manage the inflow and outflow of resources and to help align the owners’
and employees’ interests, no matter what objectives the owners wish to pursue.
Throughout this book, we assume that individuals maximize their self-interest. The
owners of the firm usually want to maximize profits, but managers and employees will do
so only if it is in their interest. Hence, a conflict of interest exists between owners—who,
in general, want higher profits—and employees—who want easier jobs, higher wages, and
more fringe benefits. To control this conflict, senior managers and owners design systems
to monitor employees’ behavior and incentive schemes that reward employees for generat-
ing more profits. Not-for-profit organizations face similar conflicts. Those people responsi-
ble for the nonprofit organization (boards of trustees and government officials) must design
incentive schemes to motivate their employees to operate the organization efficiently.
All successful firms must devise mechanisms that help align employee interests with
maximizing the organization’s value. All of these mechanisms constitute the firm’s control
system; they include performance measures and incentive compensation systems, promo-
tions, demotions, and terminations, security guards and video surveillance, internal audi-
tors, and the firm’s internal accounting system.1
As part of the firm’s control system, the internal accounting system helps align the
interests of managers and shareholders to cause employees to maximize firm value. It
sounds like a relatively easy task to design systems to ensure that employees maximize
firm value. But a significant portion of this book demonstrates the exceedingly complex
nature of aligning employee interests with those of the owners.
Internal accounting systems serve two purposes: (1) to provide some of the knowledge
necessary for planning and making decisions (decision making) and (2) to help motivate
and monitor people in organizations (control). The most basic control use of accounting is
to prevent fraud and embezzlement. Maintaining inventory records helps reduce employee
theft. Accounting budgets, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, provide an example of both
decision making and control. Asking each salesperson in the firm to forecast his or her sales
for the upcoming year is useful for planning next year’s production (decision making).
However, if the salesperson’s sales forecast is used to benchmark performance for compen-
sation purposes (control), he or she has strong incentives to underestimate those forecasts.
Using internal accounting systems for both decision making and control gives rise to
the fundamental trade-off in these systems: A system cannot be designed to perform two
tasks as well as a system that must perform only one task. Some ability to deliver knowl-
edge for decision making is usually sacrificed to provide better motivation (control). The
trade-off between providing knowledge for decision making and motivation/control arises
continually throughout this text.
This book is applications oriented: It describes how the accounting system assembles
knowledge necessary for implementing decisions using the theories from microeconomics,
finance, operations management, and marketing. It also shows how the accounting system
helps motivate employees to implement these decisions. Moreover, it stresses the continual
trade-offs that must be made between the decision making and control functions of a ccounting.
1
Control refers to the process that helps “ensure the proper behaviors of the people in the organization.
These behaviors should be consistent with the organization’s strategy,” as noted in K. Merchant, Control in
Business Organization (Boston: Pitman Publishing Inc., 1985), p. 4. Merchant provides an extensive
discussion of control systems and a bibliography. In Theory of Accounting and Control (Cincinnati,
OH: South-Western Publishing Company, 1997), S. Sunder describes control as mitigating and resolving
conflicts among employees, owners, suppliers, and customers that threaten to pull organizations apart.
4 Chapter 1
2
Ernst & Young and IMA, “State of Management Accounting,” www.imanet.org/pdf/SurveyofMgtAcctingEY
.pdf, 2003.
Introduction 5
FIGURE 1–1
Taxing Board of
The multiple role of Regulation
Authorities Directors
accounting systems
External Debt
Shareholders SEC/FASB Bondholders
Reports Covenants
Accounting
System
Internal
Reports
Control of
Decision
Organizational
Making
Problems
Figure 1–1 portrays the functions of the accounting system. In it, the accounting
system supports both external and internal reporting systems. Examine the top half of
Figure 1–1. The accounting procedures chosen for external reports to shareholders and
taxing authorities are dictated in part by regulators. In the United States, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
regulate the financial statements issued to shareholders. The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) administers the a ccounting procedures used in calculating corporate income taxes. If
the firm is involved in international trade, foreign tax authorities prescribe the accounting
rules applied in c alculating foreign taxes. Regulatory agencies constrain public utilities’
and financial institutions’ accounting procedures.
Management compensation plans and debt contracts often rely on external reports.
Senior managers’ bonuses are often based on accounting net income. Likewise, if the firm
issues long-term bonds, it agrees in the debt covenants not to violate specified accounting-
based constraints. For example, the bond contract might specify that the debt-to-equity
ratio will not exceed some limit. Like taxes and regulation, compensation plans and debt
covenants create incentives for managers to choose particular accounting procedures.3
As firms expand into international markets, external users of the firm’s financial state-
ments become global. No longer are the firm’s shareholders, tax authorities, and regula-
tors domestic. Rather, the firm’s internal and external reports are used internationally in a
variety of ways.
The bottom of Figure 1–1 illustrates that internal reports are used for decision making
as well as control of organizational problems. As discussed earlier, managers use a vari-
ety of sources of data for making decisions. The internal accounting system provides one
3
For further discussion of the incentives of managers to choose accounting methods, see R. Watts and
J. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986).
6 Chapter 1
Managerial Multiple accounting systems are confusing and can lead to errors. An extreme example
Application: of this occurred in 1999 when NASA lost its $125 million Mars spacecraft. Engineers
Spaceship at Lockheed Martin built the spacecraft and specified the spacecraft’s thrust in English
Lost Because pounds. But NASA scientists, navigating the craft, assumed the information was in
Two Mea- metric newtons. As a result, the spacecraft was off course by 60 miles as it approached
sures Used Mars and crashed. When two systems are being used to measure the same underlying
event, people can forget which system is being used.
SOURCE: A. Pollack, “Two Teams, Two Measures Equaled One Lost Spacecraft,” The New York Times. October 1, 1999, p. 1.
important source. These internal reports are also used to evaluate and motivate (control)
the behavior of managers in the firm. The internal accounting system reports on manag-
ers’ performance and therefore provides incentives for them. Any changes to the internal
accounting system can affect all the various uses of the resulting accounting numbers.
The internal and external reports are closely linked. The internal accounting system
affords a more disaggregated view of the company. These internal reports are generated
more frequently, usually monthly or even weekly or daily, whereas the external reports
are provided quarterly for publicly traded U.S. companies. The internal reports offer costs
and profits by specific products, customers, lines of business, and divisions of the com-
pany. For example, the internal accounting system computes the unit cost of individual
products as they are produced. These unit costs are then used to value the work-in-process
and finished goods inventory, and to compute cost of goods sold. Chapter 9 describes the
details of product costing.
Because internal accounting systems serve multiple users and have several purposes,
the firm employs either multiple systems (one for each function) or one basic system that
serves all three functions (decision making, performance evaluation, and external report-
ing). Firms can either maintain a single set of books and use the same accounting methods
for both internal and external reports, or they can keep multiple sets of books. The decision
depends on the costs of writing and maintaining contracts based on accounting numbers,
the costs from the dysfunctional internal decisions made using a single system, the addi-
tional bookkeeping costs arising from the extra system, and the confusion of having to
reconcile the different numbers arising from multiple accounting systems.
Inexpensive accounting software packages and falling costs of information technol-
ogy have reduced some of the costs of maintaining multiple accounting systems. However,
confusion arises when the systems report different numbers for the same concept. For
example, when one system reports the manufacturing cost of a product as $12.56 and
another system reports it at $17.19, managers wonder which system is producing the
“right” number. Some managers may be using the $12.56 figure while others are using
$17.19, causing inconsistency and uncertainty. Whenever two numbers for the same con-
cept are produced, the natural tendency is to explain (i.e., reconcile) the differences.
Managers involved in this reconciliation could have used this time in more productive
ways. Also, using the same accounting system for multiple purposes increases the
credibility of the financial reports for each purpose.4 With only one accounting system,
the external auditor monitors the internal reporting system at little or no additional cost.
4
A. Christie, “An Analysis of the Properties of Fair (Market) Value Accounting,” in Modernizing U.S.
S ecurities Regulation: Economic and Legal Perspectives, K. Lehn and R. Kamphuis, eds. (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh, Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, 1992).
Introduction 7
Historical “. . . cost accounting has a number of functions, calling for different, if not inconsistent,
Application: information. As a result, if cost accounting sets out, determined to discover what the
Different cost of everything is and convinced in advance that there is one figure which can be
Costs for found and which will furnish exactly the information which is desired for every pos-
Different sible purpose, it will necessarily fail, because there is no such figure. If it finds a figure
Purposes which is right for some purposes it must necessarily be wrong for others.”
SOURCE: J. Clark, Studies in the Economics of Overhead Cost. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923), p. 234.
Interestingly, a survey of large U.S. firms found that managers typically use the same
accounting procedures for both external and internal reporting. More than 80 percent of
chief financial officers (CFOs) report using the same accounting methods and report the
same earnings internally and externally. In other words, most firms use “one number” for
both external and internal communications. One CFO stated, “We make sure that every-
thing that we have underneath—in terms of the detailed reporting—also rolls up basically
to the same story that we’ve told externally.”5 Nothing prevents firms from using separate
accounting systems for internal decision making and internal performance evaluation
except the confusion generated and the extra data processing costs.
Probably the most important reason firms use a single accounting system is it allows
reclassification of the data. An accounting system does not present a single, bottom-line num-
ber, such as the “cost of publishing this textbook.” Rather, the system reports the components
of the total cost of this textbook: the costs of proofreading, typesetting, paper, binding, cover,
and so on. Managers in the firm then reclassify the information on the basis of different attri-
butes and derive different cost numbers for different decisions. For example, if the publisher
is considering translating this book into Chinese, not all the components used in calculating
the U.S. costs are relevant. The Chinese edition might be printed on different paper stock with
a different cover. The point is, a single accounting system usually offers enough flexibility for
managers to reclassify, recombine, and reorganize the data for multiple purposes.
A single internal accounting system requires the firm to make trade-offs. A system
that is best for performance measurement and control is unlikely to be the best for decision
making. It’s like configuring a motorcycle for both off-road and on-road racing: Riders on
bikes designed for both racing conditions probably won’t beat riders on specialized bikes
designed for just one type of racing surface. Wherever a single accounting system exists,
additional analyses arise. Managers making decisions find the accounting system less useful
and devise other systems to augment the accounting numbers for decision-making purposes.
Concept Q1–1 What causes the conflict between using internal accounting
Questions systems for decision making and control?
Q1–2 Describe the different kinds of information provided by the
internal accounting system.
Q1–3 Give three examples of the uses of an accounting system.
Q1–4 List the characteristics of an internal accounting system.
Q1–5 Do firms have multiple accounting systems? Why or why not?
5
Dichev, I.D., Graham, J.R., Campbell, H., and Rajgopal, S., 2013. “Earnings quality: evidence from the
field,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56 (2–3), pp. 1–33.
8 Chapter 1
6
This example is suggested by J. McGee, “Predatory Pricing Revisited,” Journal of Law & Economics.
XXIII (October 1980), pp. 289–330.
7
See A. Alchian, “Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy. 58
(June 1950), pp. 211–21.
Introduction 9
Economic Darwinism suggests that in successful (surviving) firms, things should not
be fixed unless they are clearly broken. Currently, considerable attention is being directed
at revising and updating firms’ internal accounting systems because many managers
believe their current accounting systems are “broken” and require major overhaul. Alter-
native internal accounting systems are being proposed, among them activity-based costing
(ABC), balanced scorecards, economic value added (EVA), and Lean accounting systems.
These systems are discussed and analyzed later in terms of their ability to help managers
make better decisions, as well as to help provide better measures of performance for man-
agers in organizations, thereby aligning managers’ and owners’ interests.
Although internal accounting systems may appear to have certain inconsistencies with
some particular theory, these systems (like the bears searching for marmots) have survived
the test of time and therefore are likely to be yielding unobserved benefits (like claw sharp-
ening). This book discusses these additional benefits. Two caveats must be raised concern-
ing too strict an application of economic Darwinism:
1. Some surviving operating procedures can be neutral mutations. Just because a
system survives does not mean that its benefits exceed its costs. Benefits less
costs might be close to zero.
2. Just because a given system survives does not mean it is optimal. A better system
might exist but has not yet been discovered.
The fact that most managers use their accounting system as the primary formal infor-
mation system suggests that these accounting systems are yielding total benefits that
exceed their total costs. These benefits include financial and tax reporting, providing infor-
mation for decision making, and creating internal incentives. The proposition that surviv-
ing firms have efficient accounting systems does not imply that better systems do not exist,
only that they have not yet been discovered. It is not necessarily the case that what is, is
optimal. Economic Darwinism helps identify the costs and benefits of alternative internal
accounting systems and is applied repeatedly throughout the book.
Historical The well-known Italian Medici family had extensive banking interests and owned tex-
Application: tile plants in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They also used sophisticated cost
Sixteenth- records to maintain control of their cloth production. These cost reports contained
Century detailed data on the costs of purchasing, washing, beating, spinning, and weaving the
Cost Records wool, of supplies, and of overhead (tools, rent, and administrative expenses). Modern
costing methodologies closely resemble these fifteenth-century cost systems, suggest-
ing they yield benefits in excess of their costs.
SOURCE: P. Garner, Evolution of Cost Accounting to 192. (Montgomery, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1954), pp.
12–13. Original source R de Roover, “A Florentine Firm of Cloth Manufacturers,” Speculu. XVI (January 1941), pp. 3–33.
FIGURE 1–2
Board of Directors
Organization
chart for a typical
corporation
President and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO)
Controller–
Internal
Operating Treasury Controller
Audit
Divisions
Financial Cost
Tax
Reporting Accounting
and research and development, are combined and shown under a single organization, “oper-
ating divisions.” The remaining staff and administrative functions include human resources,
chief financial officer, legal, and other. In Figure 1–2, the CFO oversees all the financial
and accounting functions in the firm and reports directly to the president. The CFO’s three
major functions include controllership, treasury, and internal audit. Controllership involves
tax administration, the internal and external accounting reports (including statutory filings
with the Securities and E xchange Commission if the firm is publicly traded), and the plan-
ning and control systems (including budgeting). Treasury involves short- and long-term
financing, banking, credit and collections, investments, insurance, and capital budgeting.
Depending on their size and structure, firms organize these functions differently. F
igure 1–2
shows the internal audit group reporting directly to the CFO. In other firms, internal audit
reports to the controller, the chief executive officer (CEO), or the board of directors.
The controller is the firm’s chief management accountant and is responsible for data
collection and reporting. The controller compiles the data to prepare the firm’s balance
sheet, income statement, and tax returns. In addition, this person prepares the internal
reports for the various divisions and departments within the firm and helps the other man-
agers by providing them with the data necessary to make decisions—as well as the data
necessary to evaluate these managers’ performance.
Usually, each operating division or department has its own controller. For example, if
a firm has several divisions, each division has its own division controller, who reports to
both the division manager and the corporate controller. In Figure 1–2, the operating divi-
sions have their own controllers. The division controller provides the corporate controller
with periodic reports on the division’s operations. The division controller oversees the
division’s budgets, payroll, inventory, and product costing system (which reports the cost
of the division’s products and services). While most firms have division-level controllers,
some firms centralize these functions to reduce staff so that all the division-level controller
functions are performed centrally out of corporate headquarters.
The controllership function at the corporate, division, and plant levels involves assist-
ing decision making and control. The controller must balance providing information to
other managers for decision making against providing monitoring information to top exec-
utives for use in controlling the behavior of lower-level managers.
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Some four or five weeks had passed quietly over the heads
of our friends since the events recorded in our last chapter.
Jack had made more than one journey to Holford to visit his
uncle and Arthur, between whom and himself had grown up
a warm and intimate friendship. This friendship, though
approved by Sir John, was not viewed with altogether
favorable eyes either by my lady or Master Lucas. My lady,
though she acknowledged the obligations of the family to
Jack, nevertheless thought it rather beneath her son's
dignity to be so familiar with the son of a citizen; and
Master Lucas, who was fully as proud in his way as my lady
was in hers, did not like to have Jack visit at a house where
he was likely to be looked upon as a presumptuous intruder.
"If it had been my son who had done such a thing, I would
never see him more."
"I do not see the treachery," said Anne. "If he warned his
sister beforehand what he was going to do, in case she
persisted in her error as you call it, she had no cause of
complaint. His duty as a Christian stood before his duty to
his family, or any other carnal and fleshly ties. I think he did
right," said Anne, flushing as she spoke. "I do not see how
he could do otherwise."
"I beg, Jack, that you will not interfere," said Anne, who
seemed bent upon raising a storm. "It does not become you
to meddle. Let my father say his will."
"Well, I don't wish Master Arthur any ill, but I wish he and
our Jack were not so intimate," remarked Cicely. "The next
thing we shall have Jack, himself, infected with Lutheran
notions. They say Father William has come round to be an
out-and-out Gospeller, and is all for having folk read the
Scripture for themselves. Not that I see why the Gospellers
are to be blamed for that," added Cicely simply. "Because,
of course, if it were the true Bible, the more they read it,
the more devout Catholics they would be."
"Father William has been nothing else but a heretic this long
time," said Anne angrily. "I am glad if he has at last had
honesty enough to confess it."
"All will yet be well," returned Sister Barbara. "It cannot but
be well if we are only faithful; but I doubt we shall see
terrible times first. Let us pray for one another that our
faith fail not in the fiery trial."
"I have been suspecting as much, this long time," said he.
"Ever since your return from Holford, I could not but see
that you were greatly changed and improved—yes, I will
say improved. But to think that you should have heard all
this from Uncle Thomas. Truly, one never knows where
danger lies. Had I been told to select a safe place for a lad,
I could not have thought of a better one."
"Did you not, then, know the story of his father?" asked
Jack.
"Your secret has not been so well kept but I have had a
shrewd guess at it," said his father, smiling somewhat
sadly; "but I waited till you should tell it me yourself, as I
felt quite sure you would do, sooner or later. But, my son,
have you counted the cost? You know to what all this may
lead."
"Nay, dear son, be not grieved for that," said his father
kindly. "I see not but a man must follow his conscience
wherever it leads. Neither can I see why the priests should
so angrily oppose the reading of the Scripture."
"If you should read it yourself, you would see," replied Jack.
"There is not one word in the whole New Testament about
the worship of the Holy Virgin, nor of purgatory, nor vows of
chastity, nor a hundred other things which the priests teach
us to believe. St. Peter himself was married, and so were
St. James, and St. Philip."
"But the priests say this Lutheran Gospel is not the true
Scripture," remarked his father.
"I know they do, and for that reason they discourage with
all their might the Greek learning that is spreading so much
at the universities. But, father, the Greek Testament is the
very same."
"And nothing about purgatory or about the masses for the
dead, either?" asked his father. "Art sure, Jack?"
"Only read for yourself, dear sir, and you see," said Jack.
Jack told his father, as she had desired him, the story of
Sister Barbara. Perturbed in mind as he was, Master Lucas
was considerably amused.
"I think I could bear all, if I had it to bear alone," said Jack.
"It is that which has made the cross so heavy to me. But,
father, you would not have me false to my conscience, and
traitor to my friends, like the man Arthur told us of?"
"My son, I cannot help having great fears for her. I would
she were in some place of safety. I should miss her sorely
from the house, that is the truth, for she is like sunshine
itself."
"I will talk to Father William about the matter," said Jack. "I
will go to him this very evening. Dear father, I am so glad I
have told you all, and that you are not angry with me."
"I could not be angry, son Jack, though I do not deny that I
am greatly grieved. I would fain spend the remnant of my
days in peace. Not but I would gladly see the Church
reformed, and especially some order taken with all these
lazy monks and begging friars, who eat honest, industrious
folks out of house and home, and carry off silly girls to
convents; but I fear your friends are too sweeping. I cannot
bring myself to believe that so much we have been taught
to receive as Gospel truth is no more than men's invention."
"I cannot think that Anne would betray me, for all she
says," he added.
"I do not know," said Master Lucas, shaking his head. "Anne
is a true nun. She thinks all family affections are carnal and
fleshly ties, and to be trampled under foot. I cannot—I will
not think of your mother's daughter, that she would do such
a deed, but I hope she may not be tried. But after all, we
may be borrowing trouble. Father William makes no secret
of his new ideas, nor does Arthur Brydges of his, and I hear
my Lord Harland is as open, and he is very great with the
bishop. Anyhow, I wish we were well out of the scrape."
CHAPTER XIX.
A SORROWFUL PARTING.
Jack found him sitting at his frugal supper table, not eating,
but leaning back in his chair; and he could not but remark
how worn and thin the good man looked.
"They are but rustic folk," said the priest, "and, though of
gentle blood, far behind our town burghers in refinement
and luxury. Sister Barbara must be content to rough it not a
little, but that is a small matter. Any home, however rude, is
better than a prison."
"I care nothing for roughing it," she said; "the good father
well says that any home is better than a prison, and
doubtless I can find ways to make myself useful to the lady
and her daughters."
"And if this storm blows over, as I still hope it may, you will
return to us, dear madam," said Master Lucas. "Truly the
house will seem empty and dreary without you. Meantime,
let no word of this matter be dropped in the household—
before Anne, least of all."
"Yes, if the poor man have any breath left to speak," said
Jack, as he threw himself hastily from his own beast. "I
should think that doubtful."
"Well, we must give him all the welcome and refreshment in
our power," said the master baker, dismounting more
leisurely. "Your reverence is heartily welcome to my poor
dwelling," he added, addressing the poor old priest, who
had dropped exhausted on the first seat. "I would we had
been at home to receive you in more fitting form. I pray you
to walk into the parlor."
The old man rose with some difficulty, and, accepting the
support of Master Lucas's arm, he made out to walk into the
sitting-room. Jack ran before to bring forward the easiest
seat and place a footstool before it, and then to bring a cup
of ale, which Father John drank without a word.
"Alack, you may well say so. I did not believe I should ever
ride so far again—and it is all for your sake. I would I were
safe home again, that is all. These vile footpads would as
soon rob a priest as a layman, I believe, and I am shaken to
a very jelly."
"It is well," said Father John; "but yet we will speak low. My
business is this: Father Barnaby has returned from his
travels somewhat suddenly, and, it is said, with
extraordinary powers from the Cardinal, to search out
heretical books, and apprehend the owners thereof."
"But you must not say so, for the world, my dear son," said
Father John hastily. "Remember, I am not supposed to know
anything of this matter, and have come to consult your
father on the investing of certain moneys left me by my
brother, lately dead. I would not hear a word—supposing
there were any such thing to hear—lest I should be called
on to testify. Do you understand?"