Expressio Unis
Expressio Unis
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
LLB 406
BBALLB SEM 8
L 40
Date of releasing assignment: 1/04/2020
Date of submission Of Assignment: 2/04/2020 By 8 am
Rules of Interpretation
For example, where certain specific things are taxed or subjected to charge it seems probable that
it was intended to exclude everything else even of a similar nature, and a fortiori, all things different
in genus and description from those which are enumerated. On the principle of interpretation that
what is left is unexpressed, was in all probability not intended at all
In Morgan vs Crawshry LR5 HL 304 section 1 of Poor Relief Act 1601 was in question. It was given
in the section “that every occupier of lands, houses, coal mines or saleable underwood, should be
rated for the relief of the poor”. It was decided by the House of lords, that as coal mines alone were
mentioned in the Act as ratable, iron mines were not therefore iron mines will not be subject to the
Act.
In R vs Midland Railway (1855)4 E&B 958 it was observed that when an Act imposed a rate on
houses, buildings, works, tenements and hereditament, but exempted ‘land’, it was construed to
mean land without buildings, houses or works upon it.
It is a rule of statutory and constitutional interpretation that, where a restriction is not general but
is provided in a specific instance, such application of the specific instance will not be carried into
other statements, which do not provide such limitations.
Before the principle of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius can be applied at all, the
court must find an express mode of doing something that is provided in the statute, which, by its
necessary implication, could exclude the doing of that very thing and not something else in some
other way. There is no room whatever for applying expressio unis rule to exclude what falls within
an expressly provided legislative entry. The maxim is a useful servant but a dangerous master.
Historically it was first applied to legislation where the statute designated a particular remedy for
enforcing a right or power, which did not previously exist. Tis use was gradually extended, so that it
has received mention in the interpretation of practically all types of statutes, including legislation
on taxation, administrative bodies, corporations, contracts, marriage, dower, liens, exemptions,
crimes, procedure, evidence and others. This maxim properly applies only when in the natural
association of ideas in the mind of the reader, which is expressed, is so set over by way of strong
contrast to that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment.
Where the intention clearly reveals that the lawmakers did not mean that express mention of one
thing should operate to exclude all others, in such case the principle is not applicable. Consequently,
where statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there can be no implied exclusion. In other
words, the principle is to be sed only as a means of defeating the apparent intent of the legislature.
In Parbhani Transport vs Road Transport Authority AIR 1960 SC 801, permits to ply buses
having been given to the State of Bombay under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the petitioner argued
that since the Act entitled the government to ply buses under the scheme, buses could not be run by
it otherwise. The maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius was quoted in support. The Supreme
Court disallowed the application of the maxim on the ground that the language of Section42(3)(a) is
unambiguous to the effect that the government has to apply for permits under Section 42(1) for
plying buses.
In Benett Coleman vs Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106 and in R. C. Cooper vs Union of India AIR
1970 SC 564 the Supreme Court interpreted the term citizen and clearly laid down that the
freedoms under Article 19 cannot be claimed by non citizens nor by the legal persons as they are
not citizens. However, Indian citizens may claim these freedoms through their legal persons
because the relief ultimately goes to the citizen and not to the legal persons.
In Khemka and Company vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1975 SC 1549 interpretation of Section 9
(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was involved. The first part of the provision vested powers in
the State officials to act on behalf of the Central Government for assessing, re assessing and
enforcing payment of tax while the latter part of the provision says that this will be as if the tax or
penalty payable under the General Act is a tax or penalty under the general Sales Tax law of the
State. The Supreme Court said that penalty provisions in Central and State legislations were special
provisions in each Act and are not part of the general sales tax law of the Central or the State.
Therefore, the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable in the present case so
interpreted the reference to penalties in the latter part of Section 9(2) must apply only to special
penalty provisions in the Central Act.
In Nandini Satpathi vs P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 interpretation of the term confession used in
Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was in question. It was argued that confession is a kind
of admission and hence the Miranda exclusionary rule or the American law of evidence is applicable
in India. The said rule means that to statement made by a person in police custody shall be relevant.
Rejecting the argument, the Supreme Court ruled that the legislature has intentionally incorporated
the word confession in Section 26 of the Act and hence it is applicable only to the confessional
statements made by the accused and the other statements ae expressly excluded. Thus, if an
accused makes an admission in police custody, it becomes relevant because it is not attracted by the
provisions of Section 26 of the said Act.
Assignment:
1. Explain with example the rule of interpretation “expressio unis est exclusion alterius”. Also
mention the situation when such rule cannot be applied.( 200 words)
• Assignment has to be submitted through email within 8am next day i.e. 2.04.2020