July 27, 2022

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER,

VS. S
POUSES NESTOR AND FELICIDAD VICTOR AND SPOUSES REYNALDO AND GAVINA VICTOR. RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO, J.
In 2009, Spouses Nestor and Felicidad Victor and Spouses Reynaldo and Gavina Victor (collectively,
respondents spouses) filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage, extra-
judicial foreclosure, and cancellation of title of a parcel of land against PNB before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 9. Said complaint questioned the mortgage and transfer of
title in favor of PNB.
PNB filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, in turn respondents spouses filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, to which PNB failed to file any comment or opposition. The complaint was
deemed submitted for decision. In April 2011, the RTC of Malolos City, Branch 9 adjudged that PNB's
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings as null and void, hence, it cancelled PNB's title on the
subject properties. It likewise denied PNB's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration because of failure to strictly adhere to the 15-day period provided under the rules.
In June 2011, the RTC of Malolos City, Branch 9 denied PNB's Motion to Nullify Proceedings with
Opposition to Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, because PNB's counsel failed to appear during
the hearing for said motion. In July 2011, the RTC of Malolos City, Branch 9 granted the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution.
On July 15, 2011, PNB filed a Petition for Relief asseverating that it was deprived of due process
because it failed to present its defenses due to the gross negligence of its previous counsel.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 12, 2011 Order, the RTC ofMalolos City, Branch 9 resolved to deny said petition as it was
filed out of time. The trial court anchored its denial on Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. It
reads:
It has been held that sixty days begin to run from the date the petitioner's lawyer is notified of the
decision, x x x, and that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration did not suspend the period
provided for in Rule 38. xx x.
Perusal of the record shows that a copy of the Decision dated April 19, 2011 was received by its then
counsel Atty. Nye Orquillas on April 27, 2011. Hence, defendant bank has sixty (60) days therefrom or
until June 27, 2011 within which to file the instant petition.
However, as borne out by the records, the instant Petition for Relief was filed by registered mail
only on July 15, 2011. Furthermore, if the filing and pendency of a motion for reconsideration cannot
toll the period for filing the instant petition, more so that a mere motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration or the denial thereof will not affect the period for filing a
petition for relief.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition for Relief is hereby DENIED for having been filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA
raising the following grounds for the allowance of the petition, to wit:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S COUNSEL IS NOTICE TO PETITIONER.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FOR HAVINO BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its December 21, 2012 Decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition. It initially observed
that PNB failed to attach the required pleadings for a petition for certiorari. This failure alone
would be sufficient to warrant dismissal of the petition. However, even based on the substance of the
petition, the appellate court found no merit in the averment of PNB. It resolved that strict
compliance with the periods set forth in Rule 38 is required because a petition for relief from
judgment is a final act of liberality. Following the period, the last day to file such petition would
have been June 27, 2011, yet PNB filed the same only on July 15, 2011. Furthermore, despite the
alleged gross negligence of PNB's counsel, the appellate court held that PNB was not deprived of due
process as it was given the opportunity to be heard such that notices were sent to its counsel and an
answer was filed in response to the complaint. PNB had the chance to present its side of the issue.
The appellate court concluded that PNB was bound by any action of its counsel in the conduct of the
case, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
The decretal portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court likewise denied PNB's Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated April 29,
2013.
Thus, PNB elevated the case before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari on the
following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE BANK'S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE BANK'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.

PNB essentially contends that the appellate court disregarded the fact that it only knew of its
counsel's negligent filing of the Motion for Extension to File Motion for Reconsideration on May 18,
2011, when it already lost the period to file an appeal or any remedy other than a petition for relief
from judgment. Consequently, it never had the opportunity to present and prove its case. Furthermore,
it avers that the omissions and negligence of its counsel resulted to the abandonment and total
disregard of its case, and that the application of technical rules should be relaxed when it would
result to the deprivation of the client's liberty or property. Also, PNB expounds on instances when
adherence to the technical rules may be excused. In drawing its last straw, PNB likewise asseverates
that it was never remiss of its duties as client for it instructed its counsel to move for the proper
remedy, hence, it had no participatory negligence.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
The crux of the controversy revolves around Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Said
provisions read in this wise:
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. - When a judgment or final
order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
x x x x
SECTION 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. - A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must
be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. (Emphases supplied)
The appellate court committed no reversible error in dismissing PNB's Petition for Certiorari and in
denying the latter's Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC of Malolos City, Branch 9 acted within the
bounds of the law in issuing the August 12, 2011 Order which denied PNB 's petition for relief from
judgment.
The following requirements must be shown in order for a petition for relief from judgment to prosper.
First, no adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or an appeal is available to the petitioner.
Second, the petitioner was prevented through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence from
availing said remedies. Third, the petitioner should comply with the twin-period of within 60 days
from the time the petitioner learned of the judgment or final order, and not more than six months
after the judgment or final order was entered, in filing the petition for relief from judgment.
The twin-period is mandatory, jurisdictional, and must be strictly complied with, otherwise, the
petition may be dismissed outright. Evidently, PNB failed to file its petition for relief from
judgment within the twin-period.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, PNB' s counsel was notified of the decision on April 27,
2011; however, the Petition for Relief from judgment was filed only on July 15, 2011, or beyond the
60th day which fell on June 27, 2011 (June 26, 2011 being a Sunday). PNB's averment, that the
reckoning period should have been counted from May 18, 2011, the time it had knowledge of its
counsel's gross negligence when it received the trial court's denial of the Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration, is misplaced. It has been a long-standing principle that
notice sent to a counsel of record is equivalent to notice to the client-litigant. Hence, the correct
reckoning point of the twin-period was when PNB' s counsel received the decision on April 27, 2011.
Taningco v. Fernandez is reflective to such effect:
When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said
attorney. Notice sent to counsel of record binds the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for
setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face. (Citations Omitted)
PNB's failure to observe the twin-period alone merits the outright dismissal of its Petition for
Relief. However, PNB is steadfast in its claim that it was deprived of its day in court because its
counsel: (1) failed to file a comment or opposition to a motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2)
filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration; (3) did not notify it of
the trial court's Decision dated April 27, 2011; and (4) did not appear at the hearing in order to
oppose the motion for execution of judgment. For PNB, these negligent acts resulted in a total
disregard of its case, hence, it was deprived of its property without having the opportunity to
present its defenses and side of the controversy. Consequently, PNB asserts that the strict
application of the technical rules must be relaxed.
This Court is not convinced. In Duremdes v. Jorilla, excusable negligence was characterized as "so
gross 'that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it.' This excusable
negligence must also be imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or her counsel whose negligence
binds his or her client." However, this admits of exceptions:
Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as: "(1) where the reckless
or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process oflaw; (2) when the rule's
application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or (3) where the
interests of justice so require." Certainly, excusable negligence must be proven.
In Spouses Que v. Court of Appeals, this Court adjudged that clear abandonment of the client's cause
must be established in order that the exception would apply, viz.:
Petitioners nevertheless seek exemption from the above rule because their counsels' negligence
allegedly deprived them of their day in court and, if the ruling of the Court of Appeals stands, they
will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law.
x x x x
For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
client's cause must be shown. Here, what petitioners' first, second, and third counsels did was fail
to file the Answer, file a belated and defective motion for reconsideration or new trial, and
belatedly and erroneously file a petition for relief from judgment, respectively. While these acts and
omissions can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, they do not amount to gross negligence to
justify the annulment of the proceedings below. (Citation omitted)
In this instant case, the alleged negligent acts of PNB's counsel did not deprive it of due process or
the opportunity to be heard as it was in fact able to submit its answer with compulsory counterclaim
to the complaint, and subsequently the trial court resolved the case upon motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The essence of due process is to afford parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
order to defend and support their case, and the prohibition points to the total and absolute absence
of such opportunity to be heard. PNB, by filing its answer with compulsory counterclaim, had a chance
to forward its case, hence, it was not deprived of due process, and resultantly there was no outright
deprivation of its property.
All told, the appellate court committed no reversible error. As it aptly concluded:
To cater to petitioner's arguments and reinstate its petition for relief from judgment would put a
premium on the negligence of its former counsel and encourage the non-termination of this case by
reason thereof. After all, if the negligence of counsel be admitted as a reason for opening cases,
there would never be an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be hired every time it is shown
that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed December 21, 2012 Decision and the April 29, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Number 121847 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.