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Art. 1723 WORK AND LABOR 695

Contract for a Piece of Work

son of a defect in those plans and specifications, or

due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is
likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice
falls, within the same period, on account of defects in
the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily li-
able with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does
not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceeding
paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building. (n)

Liability of engineer or architect/contractor

for collapse of building constructed.
(1) Liability of engineer or achitect. — The engineer or architect
who drew up the plans and specifications shall be liable for dam-
ages, if:
(a) The collapse took place within 15 years from the com-
pletion of the structure;
(b) it took place by reason of a defect in the plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground; and
(c) The action for damages is brought within 10 years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building.
(2) Liability of contractor. — The contractor is likewise respon-
sible for the damages if:
(a) The edifice falls within the same period;
(b) The collapse took place on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality fur-
nished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the con-
tract; and
(c) The action for damages is brought within 10 years fol-
lowing the collapse of the building.
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696 LEASE Art. 1723

(3) Solidary liability. — In case the engineer or architect super-

vised or directed the construction he shall be solidarily liable (see
Arts. 1207, 1216.) with the contractor.
Note that Article 1723 speaks of a building that should “col-
lapse’’ or edifice that “falls’’; hence, it does not apply to minor
defects. (see Bosque vs. Chipco, 14 Phil. 95 [1909].) However, a
third person suffering damage as a result of any defect in the con-
struction may proceed, against the engineer or architect or con-
tractor. (Art. 2192.)
(4) Effect of acceptance of work. — The general rule in a contract
for a piece of work is that acceptance of the work by the employer
relieves the contractor of liability for any defect in the work. (Art.
1719.) But mere acceptance of the building after competition, does
not imply waiver of any of the causes of action arising from any
defect in the construction.
The owner of a building is not estopped from claiming dam-
ages for defective construction by the circumstance that the cost
of construction has been paid to the contractor, before discovery
of the defects, upon certificates as to the progress of the work is-
sued by the architect representing the owner. (Hospicio de San
Jose vs. Findley Miller Timber Co., 50 Phil. 277 [1926].) A contrac-
tor’s engagement is to build according to plans and specifications.
Since the designs are made by the architect, the builder-contrac-
tor is not responsible as to the sufficiency or inadequacy of the
structure carrying the weight of the building. (Koster vs. Zulueta,
97 Phil. 945 [1956].)

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE:
After an earthquake, the building in question sustained major
damage, but after three subsequent earthquakes, the damage caused
resulted in its eventual demolition for which the architect and the
builder-contractor were sought to be held liable.
Facts: The Philippine Bar Association (PBA) decided to con-
struct an office building. For the plans, specifications, and de-
signs, it contracted the services of J.F. Nakpil & Sons (Nakpils)
and for the construction, United Construction Company, Inc.
(United). The building was completed in June 1966.
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Art. 1723 WORK AND LABOR 697

Contract for a Piece of Work

On August 2, 1998, an unusually strong earthquake hit Ma-

nila and its environs, and the building sustained major dam-
age. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the
building to tilt foreward dangerously. As a temporary meas- ure,
the building was shored up by United. On November 29, 1968,
PBA commenced an action against United claiming that the
collapse of the building was caused by defects in the con-
struction. United, in turn, filed a third party complaint against
Nakpils, alleging that the collapse of the building was due to the
defects in the architects’ plans, specifications, and designs.’
At the pre-trial, the court, with the agreement of the par-
ties, appointed a lawyer and structural engineer as commis-
sioner to make findings on technical issues. On April 30, 1979,
the building was authorized to be demolished at the expense of
PBA, but not before another earthquake of high intensity on
April 7, 1970 followed by other strong earthquakes on April 9
and 10, 1970, caused further damage to the property. The ac-
tual demolition was undertaken by the buyer of the damaged
building.
The commissioner submitted his report on September 25,
1970 with the findings that while the damage sustained by the
building was caused directly by the August 2, 1968 earthquake,
they were also caused by the defects in the plans and specifica-
tions prepared by Nakpils; United deviations from said plans
and specifications and its failure to observe the workmanship
in the construction of the building; and failure of PBA to exer-
cise the requisite degree of supervision in the construction of
the building.
This is a motion for reconsideration of the October 3, 1986
of the Supreme Court, filed by United.
Issues: (a) Did the findings of the commissioner, adopted by
the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court,
negate the premise that the subject building collapsed; hence,
Article 1723 is not applicable?
(b) Had PBA the legal duty to provide full time and active
supervision in the construction of the building?
(c) Was there bad faith on the part of Nakpils and United?
Held: (1) After partial collapse, there was unavoidable collapse.
— “United gave considerable emphasis on the fact that the PBA
building did not collapse as found by the trial court and af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals. Otherwise stated, United
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698 LEASE Art. 1723

wishes to stress that subject building did not disintegrate com-

pletely as the term ‘collapse’ is supposed to connote.
Be that as it may, it will be observed that in the assailed
decision, this Court is in complete accord with the findings of
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that after
the April 2, 1968 earthquake, the building in question was not
totally lost, the collapse was only partial and the building could
still be restored at the expense of P900,000.00. But after the sub-
sequent earthquakes on April 7, 9, and 12, 1970, there was no
question that further damage was caused to the property re-
sulting in an eventual and unavoidable collapse or demolition (com-
plete collapse). In fact, on April 30, 1970, the building was au-
thorized by the trial court to be demolished at the expense of
the plaintiff. Note that a needed demolition is in fact a form of
‘collapse’.
The bone of contention is, therefore, not on the fact of col-
lapse but on who should shoulder the damages resulting from
the partial and eventual collapse. As ruled by this Court in said
decision, there should be no question that the NAKPILS and
UNITED are liable for the damage.
Citing the case of Tucker v. Milan (49 O.G. 4379, 4380) as the
case in point, the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
‘One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable conse-
quences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an
act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to
precipitate the loss.’’’
(2) Charging PBA with full supervision of construction with-
out legal or contractual basis. — “United argues that it is the legal
duty of PBA to provide full-time and active supervision in the
construction of subject building. Failing to cite any provision of
law to support its arguments, United insists on the inherent
legal duty of the owner, reinforced by practice, usage and cus-
tom, to exercise such supervision. Apart from the fact that
United seems to have completely contradicted its own view
that this construction involves highly technical matters and,
therefore, beyond the ambit of ordinary understanding and
experience, the contrary appears to be more in accord with or-
dinary practice, which is to avail oneself of the services of ar-
chitects and engineers whose training and expertise make them
more qualified to provide effective supervision of the construc-
tion. In fact, it was on the suggestion of Juan F. Nakpil, one of
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Art. 1724 WORK AND LABOR 699

Contract for a Piece of Work

the petitioners herein, that the construction was undertaken on

an administration basis. Thus, the trial court did not err in hold-
ing that charging the owner with full time supervision of the
construction has no legal or contractual basis.’’
(3) Wanton negligence of United and Nakpils equivalent to bad
faith. — United points out that bad faith is a question of fact
which was not established. The Commissioner, the trial court,
and the Court of Appeals, all of which are triers of fact, alleg-
edly concede that there was negligence but not bad faith.
A careful study of the decision will show that there is no
contradiction between the above finding of negligence by the
trial court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
ruling of this Court. On the contrary, on the basis of such find-
ing, it was held that such wanton negligence of both the de-
fendant and the third-party defendants in effecting the plans,
designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building is
equivalent to bad faith in the performance of their respective
tasks. (Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 334 [1988].)
Note: United and Nakpils were held solidarily liable for
damages under Article 1723. (Ibid., 144 SCRA 596 [1986].)

ART. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build

a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in
conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon
with the landowner, can neither withdraw from the
contract nor demand an increase in the price on ac-
count of the higher cost of labor or materials, save
when there has been a change in the plans and speci-
fications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the pro-
prietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contrac-
tor has been determined in writing by both parties.
(1593a)

Right of contractor to withdraw

or ask for increase in price.
An owner may withdraw at will from the construction of the
work (Art. 1725.) but not the contractor.