IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. Case No. 23-80101-CR

CANNON/REINHART
DONALD JOHN TRUMP, et al.,

Defendant.

MOTION FOR CONDITIONAL INTERVENTION

Comes now “John Doe,” in propria persona, stating the following in support of this

Motion for Conditional Intervention, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution:

INTRODUCTION

A long time ago, in a galaxy, far, far away, there once was a Republic called the United

States of America, where “[t]he law [was] no respecter of persons,” Trist v. Child, 88 U.S.

441, 453 (1875), and "[e]veryone [stood] alike as equals under the law.” Wilson v. Vermont

Castings, 977 F. Supp. 691, 699 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (jury instructions). Where “the kind of

trial a man [got did not depend] on the amount of money he has," Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.

12, 19 (1956) or his station in life.

1
 In that happy land, the people entrusted the power of resolving disputes to “judges,” who

were given lifetime sinecures on the sole condition that they do their jobs faithfully, so they

could be insulated to the extent possible from the pressure of partisan politics. They believed

that judges should be more like Caesar’s wife than Stormy Daniels: paragons of virtue, who

maintained strict impartiality—in fact and appearance—in every case they presided over.

They intended that the judge be “a mere machine,” expecting that the law “be dispensed

equally & impartially to every description of men,” Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to Edmund

Pendleton), Aug. 26, 1776, leaving personal bias and ambition at home.1 The expectation of

impartiality was not aspirational: All Article III judges swear oaths to “administer justice

1
Lord Bacon observed that the office of the judge "is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to
make law, or give law." Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620). Lord Coke maintained that "[i]t is
the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to the golden mete-wand of the law and
not by the crooked cord of discretion." 1 E. Coke, Institutes of the Lawes of England 51 (1642). Blackstone
adds that a judge is "sworn to determine, not according to his own judgments, but according to the known
laws.” 1 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *69 (1765). “The judicial power to deter-
mine law is a power only to determine what the law is, not to invent it.” Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d
898, 901, vacated as moot, 234 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
Mindful that “the discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The History of the
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson, and Co. 1856), Alexander Hamilton
argued that to "avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that [judges] should be bound by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case before them."
The Federalist No. 78, 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987). As in all but the most exotic cases,
the “law” is established, the judge was expected to be little more than an administrator, playing what Professor
Llewellyn called “the game of matching cases.” Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 49 (1960).

2
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.” 28 U.S.C. § 453.2

To ensure that this expectation was met, the people enacted laws such as 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),

which explicitly provides that “[any judge] of the United States shall disqualify himself in

any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” But the Framers

were practical men. They knew that power without accountability inexorably precipitates

tyranny. They left us with tools, honed by centuries of common law experience, designed

to encourage judges to color inside the lines. The first is the Seventh Amendment jury trial,

the signal feature of which is that jurors are final arbiters of both fact and law3 and the judge,

2
The judge’s oath is substantially unchanged from the days of Magna Carta. Henry de Bracton: De Legibus
Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ, Vol. 2, 309 (Yale Pr. 1915; in Latin) (~1268)
3
In his charge to the jury, Chief Justice John Jay explains:
It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule that on questions of fact, it is
the province of the jury; on questions of law it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be
observed that by the same law which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have
nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as
the fact in controversy. On this and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt you will pay
that respect which is due to the opinion of the court: for, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are
the best judges of facts, it is, on the other hand, presumable that the court is the best judge of law. But
still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision."
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1 at 4 (jury instructions of Jay, C.J.; emphasis added).3
The singular virtue of the jury trial was that it ensured that claims would be heard by a fair and independent
tribunal. It was a “security against corruption,” as “it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury” to
subvert justice. The Federalist No. 83 at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton); see Sir John Hawles, The Englishman's
Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at Law and a Juryman 71-2 & fn. (1844) (1680). What today’s courts
are doing is spectacularly unconstitutional. See e.g, Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional,
93 U.Va. L. Rev. 139, 144 (2007).
It "is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, of wish for, that he cannot be affected
either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and
equals." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries at *379; see, Bushel’s Case [1670] 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.C.P). It “is a
fundamental law, made sacred by the Constitution, and cannot be legislated away." Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dor-
rance, 2 U.S. 304 (D.Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J, riding circuit). According to Framer (and signatory to the Decla-
ration of Independence) Elbridge Gerry, its purpose was to “guard agst. corrupt Judges.” 2 Farrand, The Rec-
ords of the Federal Convention of 1787 587 (1909)—a sentiment unanimously echoed by his contemporaries.
See also, 1 J. Elliot, Debates at 504 (remarks of Mr. Lee, of Virginia); accord, e.g., The Federalist No. 83 at
465 (Alexander Hamilton); Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to William C. Jarvis), Sept. 28, 1820, at 1; 2 John Adams,
The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States 253 (Charles F. Adams ed., Little, Brown &
Co. 1850). See also, Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
There is no contrary authority.

3
reduced to an administrator. This venerable institution, revered by the Founding Fathers,4

was intended to be preserved intact in perpetuity.5 Appellate review and j.n.o.v. protected

the loser from a corrupt or partisan jury,6 creating a double security for our liberties.

The second is enforcement of the Article III Good Behaviour Clause via the writ of scire

facias, formally incorporated into federal law in the Judiciary Act of 1789.7 Article III judges

“shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, and “[i]t cannot

be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, there-

fore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). English law sourced in Coke, Blackstone, and the Year Books

defines this facially abstruse term of legal art with remarkable precision. By making a public

official subject to removal for violating it, the condition of “good behavior” defined the

powers of any given office. Coke and Blackstone listed four separate grounds for violation

4
Concurrences read like a Brandeis brief. Quoting Blackstone and Matthew Hale, Elbridge Gerry observed
“that property, liberty and life, depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by jury,” and
that it “is adapted to the investigation of truth beyond any other the world can produce.” Elbridge Gerry, Ob-
servations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions (1788), as reprinted in, Pam-
phlets on the Constitution of the United States, Published During its Discussion by the People, 1787-1788 10
(P. Ford ed. 1888). John Dickenson viewed it as a "Heaven-taught institution," Fabius, Letter (to the editor),
Delaware Gazette (1788), as reprinted in, John Dickinson, The Letters of Fabius, in 1788, on the Federal
Constitution; and in 1797 on the Present Situation of Public Affairs 32 (1797), and one of "the corner stones
of liberty." Id. at 34. Criticism of the institution is notable only by its absence.
5
The Seventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "the right to trial by jury shall be preserved," U.S.
Const. amend. VII—"the right which existed under the English common law when the Amendment was
adopted," Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)—and an unbroken two-cen-
tury line of Supreme Court decisions, holds that if a court procedure alters the substance of the English common
law jury trial as it existed back in 1791, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("common law"
refers to the English common law, in 1791), it is unconstitutional. But today’s judges don’t do precedent.
6
Although generally provided for via statute, the remedy devolves from the common law. E.g., Minor v. The
Mechanics Bank of Alexandria, 26 U.S. 46 (1828).
7
“And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to
issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may
be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of
law.” Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 81 [Sept. 24, 1789]. Whereas the formal writ itself has been abolished,
relief in the nature of scire facias remains available, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), as the All-Writs Act is a sort of legal
Swiss Army knife, fashioning remedies on an as-needed basis. See e.g., In the Matter of the Search of an Apple
I-Phone, No. ED 15-0451M (C.D.Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).

4
of good behavior: tenure relevant to judges: abuse of office, nonuse of office, willful refusal

to exercise an office, and oppression and tyrannical partiality.8 The oath of office—which

has not changed since 17919—is coterminous, providing all judges with fair notice of their

obligations.10

"When an office held ‘during good behavior’ is terminated by the grantee’s misbehavior,

there must be an ‘incident’ power to ‘carry the law into execution’ if ‘good behavior’ is not

to be an impotent formula." Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 2d

ed., 132 (Harvard U. Pr. 1999). Congress concluded that it does not have that power.11 At

8
Coke listed three grounds for forfeiture of good behavior tenure: abuse of office, nonuse of office, and willful
refusal to exercise an office. R. v. Bailiffs of Ipswich [1706] 91 Eng. Rep. 378 (K.B.) (corporate recorder
forfeited office for failure to attend corporate meetings); Henry v. Barkley [1596] 79 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224
(K.B.); see generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 Yale L.J. 1475
(1970); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72, 88-128
(2006). Blackstone adds "oppression and tyrannical partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the
administration and under the colour of their office." 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *140 (1765). When an Article
III judge is elevated to the federal bench, s/he swears an oath to "administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and ... faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon" him or her, 28 U.S.C. § 453, thereby defining the scope of his duties and obligations.
9
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at 81.
10
As Blackstone was the Colonial lawyer’s Bible, this understanding was common currency among the Fram-
ers. In the Federalist, in arguing against judicial removal by the legislature via the power of address, Alexander
Hamilton observed that “the standard of good behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy,
... [is] the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.” The Federalist No. 87, 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987). “Bru-
tus,” though expressing his misgivings, agreed that “judges holding their commissions during good behavior
[was] a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible.” “Brutus,” The Power of the Judiciary,
New-York Journal, Mar. 20, 1788.
11
During debate over the Chase impeachment, Congress acknowledged its inability to enforce good behavior
tenure. Senator Hemphill recounted the Framers’ intent that "the words in the Constitution rendered the judges
independent of both the other branches of government." 5 Elliot’s 444 (remarks of Sen. Hemphill (F-PA). As
the right to decide what is or is not "good behavior" sua sponte is a de facto power of address, it does not appear
to have been the intent of the Framers to entrust that power to Congress. This view was reinforced and estab-
lished a century ago in the investigation of Judge Emory Speer of the District of Georgia, who was charged
with "despotism, tyranny, oppression, and maladministration" in the course of his judicial decision-making.
Charles Geyh, When Courts and Congress Collide: The Struggle for Control of America’s Courts 160 (U.
Mich. Press 2008). Specifically, the congressional committee concluded that "a series of legal oppressions
[constituting] an abuse of judicial discretion" did not constitute an impeachable offense, id. at 160-61 (quota-
tions omitted), despite their being self-evident serial violations of Speer’s good behavior tenure.

5
common law, it resided with the sovereign12 but that did not translate well in a system where

the judiciary is separated from the legislative and executive powers. See Montesquieu, Spirit

of Laws, Bk. IX, ch. VI (1754). And at least in the Framers’ Constitution, as Framer (and

Justice) James Wilson explains,13 the Supreme Court had a separate mechanism for disci-

plining wayward judges. Thus by process of elimination, the power to enforce good behav-

ior tenure must lie with the people alone, for they are America’s sovereign.

12
Good behavior tenure, and use of the scire facias to enforce it, is almost as old as Magna Carta. The writ
itself can be traced to the early fourteenth century; it was used to punish abuses of office since the reign of
Edward VI. 2&3 Edw. 6, c. 8, §13 (ca. 1540). Whereas most agents of the Crown served "at the pleasure of the
King," some public officials were granted a freehold in their offices, conditioned on "good behavior." See e.g.,
4 E. Coke, Inst. of the Laws of England 117 (Baron of the Exchequer). Lesser lords were also given authority
to bestow freeholds, creating an effective multi-tiered political patronage system where everyone from pay-
masters to judges to parish clerks had job security. See e.g., Harcourt v. Fox [1692], 1 Show. 426 (K.B.) (clerk
of the peace). The writ was in use before Parliament thought to grant all British judges good behaviour tenure,
and the law was well-developed.
At common law, good behavior tenure was originally enforced by the sovereign. But as this power con-
cerned only the interests of his subjects, and as the King exercised it only in parens patriae, he was bound by
law to allow the use of it to any subject interested. Blackstone explains:
WHERE the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent, which ought not to be granted,
or where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture of the grant, the remedy to repeal
the patent is by writ of scire facias in chancery. This may be brought either on the part of the king, in
order to resume the thing granted; or, if the grant be injurious to a subject, the king is bound of right to
permit him (upon his petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in a scire facias.
3 Blackstone, Commentaries at 260-61 (1765) (emphasis added); see, United States v. American Bell Tel. Co.,
28 U.S. 315, 360 (1888) (explaining the process).
13
In a lecture on the nature of courts, Justice (Professor) Wilson—a literal author of Article III—explains why
a supreme court is an essential feature of any rational system of jurisprudence:
In every judicial department, well arranged and well organized, there should be a regular, progressive,
gradation of jurisdiction; and one supreme tribunal should superintend and govern all the others.
An arrangement in this manner is proper for two reasons. 1. The supreme tribunal produces and pre-
serves a uniformity of decision through the whole judicial system. 2. It confines and supports every
inferior court within the limits of its just jurisdiction.
If no superintending tribunal of this nature were established, different courts might adopt different and
even contradictory rules of decision; and the distractions, springing from these different and contradictory
rules, would be without remedy and without end. Opposite determinations of the same question, in dif-
ferent courts, would be equally final and irreversible.
2 The Works of James Wilson 149-50 (James D. Andrews ed., 1896) (emphasis added).
Whereas the Framers relied on implication, McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819), New Mex-
ico’s constitution is explicit: “The supreme court shall have ... a superintending control over all inferior courts.”
N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3. Whereas our Supreme Court can be divested of the power of final appellate review
via passage of a mere statute, its duty of superintendence is fixed and permanent.

6
 The appropriate forum for such a proceeding is a proper Seventh Amendment jury trial, with

jurors properly being instructed that they are ultimate arbiters of questions of both law and fact.

Judges can’t be trusted, as they are polluted by self-interest; as Senior Judge John L. Kane of the

District of Colorado related to the Washington Post regarding an ethics case where the Circuit

declined to discipline a judge who solicited a bribe, one of his colleagues said: “'John, think about

it. The next time it could be you or me. We've got to stick together.'" Ronald Rotunda, The Courts

Need This Watchdog, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 2006, at A-29.14

14
As Jefferson famously observed, “permanent judges acquire an Esprit de corps, that being known they are
liable to be tempted by bribery, that they are misled by favor, by relationship, by a spirit of party, [or] by a
devotion to the Executive or Legislative,” Thomas Jefferson, Letter (to L’Abbe Arnoux), Jul. 19, 1789, and
faction would corrode safeguards built into their elegant system. George Washington, The Address of Gen.
Washington to the People of America on His Declining the Presidency of the United States, Claypoole's Amer-
ican Daily Advertiser (Sept. 19, 1796).
By way of example, as Galveston Daily News editor Heber Taylor caustically writes, in connecting the dots
regarding disgraced United States District Judge Samuel B. Kent:
In 2001, there was grumbling about favoritism in Kent’s court on Galveston Island. The Southern District
removed 85 cases from the court. The attorney on all 85 was Richard Melancon, Kent’s close friend and
the host of the reception for the judge’s wedding.
The judicial system looked into it and moved the cases. The judges in charge told the public the reason
was a heavy caseload. ...
Last week, after Kent was sentenced to prison for lying about the assaults, the House Judiciary Committee
agreed to conduct an inquiry to determine whether he should be impeached.
That response is inadequate because it’s incomplete. What’s missing is an inquiry into the way the judicial
system itself responded to complaints. ...
Before the judicial council took any significant action against Kent—action, say, that would have cost
him a single paycheck—The Daily News found that 671 complaints had been filed against judges in
the 5th Circuit since 2000. Not one had resulted in formal discipline.
We wonder whether members of Congress have faith in that system. We wonder how they could possibly
ask us—the people who are served by this court—to trust it.
Heber Taylor, Judicial Discipline Needs a Full Probe, Galveston County Daily News (TX), May 15, 2009
(emphasis added).
Let’s put this in proper perspective. Eighty-five litigants. Eighty-five litigants, denied their constitutional
right to have their cases heard by a fair and independent tribunal. Eighty-five separate acts of honest services
mail fraud. E.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003) (elements of honest services mail
fraud). And one felony, committed by judges charged with ensuring that incidents like these do not happen.
Misprision of felony has four elements: (1) the commission of the felony alleged; (2) the accused had full
knowledge of that fact; (3) the accused failed to notify authorities; and (4) the accused took an affirmative step
to conceal the crime. United States v. Baez, 732 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1984). But being a federal judge means
never having to obey the law; that’s how we got Edward Nottingham, Manuel Real, and Thomas Porteous,
among others. "Heavy caseload?" No. The judges on the Fifth Circuit obviously knew what they were doing,

7
 The third remedy—and the one with the most direct impact here—is the prerogative of

the citizen to initiate a private criminal prosecution. From time immemorial, it has been the

common duty of every Englishman—including the King—to keep the King’s peace; central

to this duty was the right of the subject to enforce the law by prosecuting criminals.

As our society and law became more complex, we delegated this task to professionals.

But “one of the ultimate sanctions [of the common law] is the right of private persons to lay

informations and bring prosecutions.” Lund v Thompson [1958] 3 All E.R. 356, 358. As

Canada’s Department of Justice observes, it is "a valuable constitutional safeguard against

inertia or partiality on the part of authority," flourishing a pedigree as old as the common

law itself.15

and that what they were doing was a crime. And of course, Judge Kent was not prosecuted for criminal mal-
feasance on the bench but rather, for criminal sexual abuse. U.S. District Court Judge Sentenced to 33 Months
in Prison for Obstruction of Justice (press release), Dept. of Justice, May 11, 2009 (plea deal).
Through diligent and collective effort, our judiciary has insulated itself from any accountability for their
actions. Criminal prosecution of judges is exceedingly rare, unless you commit truly weird acts like using a
penis pump on the bench. Penis Pump Judge Gets 4-Year Jail Term, USAToday.com, Jun. 18, 2006. In Judge
Edward Nottingham’s case (taking bribes to pay for weekly trysts with expensive courtesans, as evidenced by
EIGA forms), Bouldergeist, How much is that judge in the window? DailyKos, Jan. 4, 2009, at
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2009/1/4/679395/ (copy on file), it probably helped that the U.S. Attorney
was a former associate of the notorious Jack Abramoff. GreenburgTraurig, Troy A. Eid,
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/professionals/e/eid-troy-a; Anna Palmer, Out of Abramoff’s Ashes, Politico, Jan
23, 2015. Even a major Los Angeles Times expose doesn’t seem to do any good. Michael C. Goodman and
William J. Rempel, In Las Vegas, They’re Playing With a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. Times, Jun. 8, 2006; see
Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice In Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot Always be Trusted
to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 Ky. L.J. 439 (2009) (a detailed analysis of
Manuel Real’s disciplinary case, cryptically styled "In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct," 425 F.3d 1179
(9th Cir. 2005).
For as long as there have been judges, there have been judges willing to accept bribes—and litigants pre-
pared to pay them. Sir Francis Bacon reputedly said that he would "usually accept bribes from both sides so
that tainted money can never influence my decision." Judges and the Rule of Law, Thomas Grieber, ed. (IUCN
Environmental Law Centre, 2006), at 83 and n. 34; see Linda Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early
Stuart England (Urwin Hyman 1990) at 187 (re: impeachment of Sir John Bennett, in 1621). Bottom line,
when judges judge their fellow judges, they display a pronounced and well-documented propensity for showing
what the Breyer Commission calls “undue ‘guild favoritism.’” Stephen Breyer, et al., Implementation of the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice (Sept. 2006) at 1.
15
“A private citizen's right to initiate and conduct a private prosecution originates in the early common law.
From the early Middle Ages to the 17th century, private prosecutions were the main way to enforce the criminal
law. Indeed, private citizens were responsible for preserving the peace and maintaining the law.” Canada Dept.
of Justice, The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Part IV, ch. 26 (undated; copy on file).

8
 In 1789, private criminal prosecution was a practical necessity. The world’s first bona

fide police force would form decades into the future,16 and essentially by default, the re-

sponsibility of enforcing public order fell upon the populace.17 The federal government re-

lied on qui tam actions for enforcement of the law,18 and for centuries, “it was not only the

privilege but the duty of the private citizen to preserve the King's Peace and bring offenders

to justice.”19 For that reason alone, it is absurd to suggest that the Framers had any intention

of extinguishing it.

What we can say with confidence is that there was nothing in the Framers’ Constitution

extinguishing the right. The constitutional charge to the President that “he shall take Care

that the Laws be faithfully executed,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, did not do so, as both the New

York, N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XIX (1822), and Pennsylvania constitutions, Pa. Const. of

1776, § 20 (1820), had virtually identical clauses, and were not interpreted as banning it; in

Philadelphia, it had devolved into a sort of “blood sport.” Allen Steinberg, "The Spirit of

Litigation:" Private Prosecution and Criminal Justice in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia,

20 J. Social History 231 (1986). Nor can vestment of the executive power in the President,

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, for the same reason. Moreover, it is a well-established principle of

statutory construction that "[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed,

unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose." Fairfax's Devisee v.

Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, 623 (1813). "Statutes which invade the common law ... are to

16
Charles P. Nemeth, Private Security and the Law 6 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
17
See e.g., People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837 (mandamus); People ex rel.
Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 Denio. 617, 618 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (general rule unless statute provides otherwise).
18
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371,
1406-08 (Jul. 1988).
19
Supra. n. 15, see also, R. v. Comm’r of Police, Ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893 (C.A.) (England)
(mandamus available to any citizen of London at common law; standing is implicit in prerogative writs).

9
be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles,

except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident [and] to abrogate a common-law

principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.”

United States v. Texas, 507 US 529, 534 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted).

Still, the most compelling proof that this right survived the centuries is a practical one.

Assume for a moment that you were father of Jaycee Dugard, the Nevada girl kidnapped and

held for two decades, forced to bear two children sired by her kidnapper.20 Now assume,

arguendo, that the local prosecutor, invoking "prosecutorial discretion," refused to prosecute

her kidnapper. As a father, what would you do? The rest of us can make an educated guess.

To prevent that, every civilised society built on the rule of law has devised a mechanism for

compelling the prosecution of criminals.21

20
'She's A Survivor': Jaycee Dugard 30 Years Later And Why Investigators Recently Questioned Kidnapper
Again, CBS News Sacramento, Jun. 11, 2021, at https://www.cbsnews.com/gooddaysacramento/news/jaycee-
dugard-30-years-later-garrido/
21
The power to either force officials to prosecute a crime or prosecute it yourself is ubiquitous in democratic
countries—and even in countries that are not exactly staunch redoubts of human rights, such as Zimbabwe.
Even in Harare, a victim of a crime has the legal right to prosecute if their Attorney-General declines:
In all cases where the Attorney-General declines to prosecute for an alleged offence, any private party,
who can show some substantial and peculiar interest in the issue of the tri-al arising out of some injury
which he individually has suffered by the commission of the offence, may prosecute, in any court com-
petent to try the offence, the person alleged to have committed it.
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, 2004, [Chapter 9:07], Part 13 (Zimbabwe).
The salutary purpose of such a rule, according to Justice Holmes, was to accommodate a natural desire for
revenge within the law by avoiding "the greater evil of private retribution." Oliver W. Holmes, The Common
Law 41-42 (1881). Accordingly, in all common-law countries, the idea that the State can be trusted with the
exclusive, uncontrolled franchise in prosecution of crimes is simply unthinkable, as Professor Nreseko of the
University of Botswana notes, relating comments in an unpublished case of Tanzania’s Court of Appeals:
We are surprised because we did not think anyone in our country could be vested with such absolute and
total powers. It would be terrible to think that any individual or group of individuals could be empowered
by law to act even mala fide. As it turned out to our great relief the exercise of the powers by the DPP
under the Criminal Procedure Act is limited by the Act. Although the powers of the DPP appear to be
wide, the exercise is limited by three considerations. That wherever he exercises the wide powers he must
do so only in the public interest, in the interest of justice and in the need to prevent abuse of the legal
process.

10
 Even as late as 1875, there was never any doubt that in America, the citizen had standing

to prosecute crimes. See, Winter, Metaphor of Standing at 1403 (a minority of states re-

quired the relator to allege a private right). In that year, the Supreme Court found "a decided

preponderance of American authority in favor of the doctrine that private persons may move

for a mandamus to enforce a public duty, not due to the government as such, without the

D. N. Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Trials and Int'l Tribunals, Int'l Soc'y for the Reform
of Criminal Law (undated), http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Nsereko.pdf, quoting Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Mehboob Akbar Haji & Another, Cr, App. No. 28 of 1992 (unreported).
No other country in the civilised world—and not even Zimbabwe!—thinks it is a good idea to grant the
State an exclusive franchise to decide which crimes it will prosecute, and which it will ignore, without any
external control whatever. The right exists throughout the Commonwealth, even if invoked only rarely. E.g.,
Barrymore Facing Pool Death Case, BBC News, Jan. 16, 2006 (Great Britain); Plans for Private Prosecution
Against Winnie, BBC News, Nov. 26, 1997 (South Africa: prosecution of Winnie Mandela proposed). Malaysia
allows private criminal prosecution by the aggrieved party, Criminal Procedure Code, Act 593, Sec. 380 (Ma-
laysia) and even citizen's arrests. Id., Sec. 27(1). While this appears to be a relatively new development, India
limits the citizen's standing to initiate a criminal prosecution of public servants to those directly impacted by
their alleged acts. Private complaint can't be based to prosecute public servant: Court, DNAIndia.com (Press
Trust India), Oct. 16, 2010, at http://www.dnaindia.com/india/1453552/reportprivate-complaint-can-t-be-
used-to-prosecutepublic-servant-court. The procedure is robust in Jamaica, Private citizens can initiate criminal
prosecutions without fiat from DPP - AG's Chambers, The Gleaner (Jamaica), Nov. 30, 2015, https://jamaica-
gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20151202/private-citizens-can-initiate-criminal-prosecutions-without-fiat-
dpp, and perhaps unsettled in Kenya, Kenya: DPP Urges Court to Drop Private Prosecution Case, The Star
(Nairobi), Aug. 5, 2013, reprinted at http://allafrica.com/stories/201308052173.html (the right itself appears to
be intact, but the procedure is uncertain), but for the most part, Commonwealth nations follow the example of
Mother England.
Pretty much every other reasonably civilized country on the face of this earth has devised some formal
mechanism for controlling reluctant prosecutors. A brief survey of established Western democracies reveals
that, in most instances, prosecutors have little or no discretion as to whether to prosecute a crime. Italy includes
an express duty to prosecute in its constitution. Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana [Constitution] art. 112
(Italy 1947). As anyone who has been following the news already knows, Martin Sieff, Spain Wants Torture
Charges Against Bush Six Dropped, UPI, Apr. 16, 2009, Spain trusts her citizens with wide latitude to initiate
criminal proceedings. Constitución Espanola de 1978 [1978 Constitution] art. 125 (Spain). Prosecutorial dis-
cretion in most states is governed by statute and often, quite limited. See e.g., Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The
Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 Amer. J. Comp. L. 508 (1970). In the
Netherlands, whereas public prosecutors have sole prosecuting authority and statutory discretion as to whether
to forego prosecution in the "public interest," an aggrieved victim can take her prosecutors to court to force a
prosecution. Openbaar Ministerie, The Principle of Expediency in the Netherlands (Power Point presentation),
Oct. 27, 2006, at http://eulec.org/Downloads/intstrafrecht/expediency-china.pps. The Phillippines has a sepa-
rate court—the Sandiganbayan—quite literally dedicated to prosecuting public corruption, where private pros-
ecutors may intervene in specified circumstances. See, Magno v. People, G.R. No. 171542 (S.C. Apr. 6, 2011)
(discussing limits on intervention). And unlike the United States, our former protectorate still has the writ of
certiorari. Id.
In our own hemisphere, most countries have robust private prosecution systems, see generally, Kathryn
Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (Norton, 2001),
and of course, our nice neighbours to the North are light-years ahead of us on the human rights front. Gouriet
v. Union of Post Ofc. Workers, [1978] A.C. 435, 477 (H.L.) (Canada) (citizen had standing to prosecute).

11
intervention of the government law officer." Union Pacific R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 355

(1875). The Court drew a "reasonable implication" that by virtue of its silence, Congress

"did not contemplate the intervention of the Attorney General [to compel compliance with

the law] in all cases." Id. at 356.

If the Framers ever intended to deprive citizens of that right, one is left to search in vain

for evidence of that intent. And as the prosecution of crime was not seen as an executive

function in 1791 but rather, one of the well-established prerogatives of the people, it is un-

likely that they would have even perceived the threat that it could be divested by congres-

sional fiat. The question has never been resolved, see, Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton

et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 816 and n. 2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), but it is hard

to imagine that the “inestimable right ... of invoking the penalties of the law upon those who

criminally or feloniously attack our persons or our property,” Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S.

581, 598 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting), would be willingly yielded by an informed popu-

lace, or identify the constitutional mechanism by which it was divested.

A. AMERICAN COUP 2.0

In a manner eerily reminiscent of National Enquirer chairman David Pecker’s criminal

scheme to “catch and kill” salacious stories about Defendant Trump to aid him in his 2016

12
run for the Presidency,22 federal judges appear to have entered into a conspiracy to delay his

trials until after the 2024 election. Defendant Trump has already pledged to pardon fellow

co-conspirators, Hannah Rabinowitz and Katelyn Polantz, Trump’s January 6 pardon pledge

baffles some attorneys, CNN, Feb. 5, 2022, and “[i]f he took office again, Trump could

indeed order his attorney general to simply drop any federal charges he still faces even

if the cases were in progress.” Maggie Haberman and Alan Feuer, Blame Shifting, Attacks

and Legal Gaslighting, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2023 (emphasis added). The catch, of course,

is that he has to get elected.

The apparent plan was for the Conspiring Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices

Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett—to abuse their high offices to aid him in

his re-election bid by delaying his trials; in an August 2023 poll, “nearly half of Republican

supporters [said they] wouldn’t vote for Donald Trump in the upcoming election if the for-

mer president is convicted of a felony.” Alisha R. Sarkar, Trump could lose half his voters

if he’s convicted, poll shows, The Independent (U.K.), Aug. 4, 2023. But to aid Trump in

this manner is a felony: “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has

been committed ... assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his ... trial or pun-

ishment ... is an accessory after the fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).

The first and most essential step in this scheme was to ensure that Defendant Trump could

run for the Presidency. On December 19, 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opin-

ion in Anderson v. Griswold, 2023 CO 63 (Colo. 2023), holding that Defendant Trump “was

disqualified from holding the office of President under Section Three of the Fourteenth

22
Jeremy Herb, et al., Second day of testimony wraps in Trump hush money trial, CNN, April 23, 2024,
https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-hush-money-trial-04-23-24.

13
Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id., slip op. at 1.23 The controlling question

was whether the Amendment was self-executing; the answer was provided by Chief Justice

Marshall, in the first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,

or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the consti-
tution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Consistent with Marbury, there is no support in precedent or logic for the proposition that

a constitutional provision must be activated by legislation to become effective.24 Moreover,

according to the Senator who introduced said Amendment to that body, Section Five was

remedial in scope, “enabl[ing] Congress, in case the State shall enact laws in conflict with

the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional en-

actment.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2768 (1868) (statement of Sen. Jacob M.

Howard (R-MI) (emphasis added)). In the Conspiring Justices’ majority opinion, they

quoted from that exact paragraph and as such, were on notice as to the Amendment framers’

expressed intent. Trump v. Anderson, No. 23–719, 601 U.S. ___ (2024), slip op. at 5. But

if Defendant Trump loses, they lose.

23
It provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall … hold any office, civil or military, under the United States
… who, having previously taken an oath … to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.” U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 3.
24
United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the Thirteenth amendment, as well as
the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U. S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth). While
there is no enforceability provision in the original Bill of Rights, that is a function of the fact that they were
not enforceable as against the States. Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). En-
forceability provisions were added to every subsequent Amendment.

14
 Trump v. Anderson was outcome-driven ‘jurisprudence’ in its most grotesque form. “In a

stunning disfigurement of the Fourteenth Amendment,” the Conspiring Justices “impressed

upon it an ahistorical misinterpretation that defies both its plain text and its original mean-

ing.” J. Michael Luttig and Laurence H. Tribe, Supreme Betrayal, The Atlantic, Mar. 14,

2024. There is no rational way to get from the text and the “strict rules and precedents,

which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case before them," The

Federalist No. 78, at 470, to a conclusion that “States have no power under the Constitution

to enforce Section 3 with respect to federal offices, especially the Presidency,” Trump v.

Anderson, slip op. at 6, given that there is no such thing as a federal election.25

Next, in a move that would make Coach Smith shed tears of joy, the Conspiring Justices

went into “Four Corners” mode. In a flagrant break with precedent, e.g., United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Supreme Court refused to decide the question of the scope

of the President’s immunity from criminal prosecution [not that there was any] in certiorari

prior to judgment. Order, Trump v. United States, No. 23-939 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2023). Failing

that, they could have decided the matter in a matter of hours, cf., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98

(2000) (argued Dec. 11, 2000; decided Dec. 12, 2000), or at least, lifted the stay on the

25
As a matter of definition, there is no such thing as a national election in the United States. Individual States
appoint slates of Electors, chosen “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. Accordingly, there is no compelling reason why the federal government should ever get involved.
The choice of Electors has always been a matter for each State, and the Electors were free to vote for anyone
they cared to, Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225 (1952), though States may enforce “pledge laws” restricting their
freedom of action. Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 2316 (2020).
As state courts of general jurisdiction are perfectly capable of applying federal law, Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876), there is no reason why a State cannot answer the question of whether a candidate for high
office has “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. And
as state courts generally follow persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions, see e.g., Evans v. Bd. of County
Com'rs, 482 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1971) (abolishing state sovereign immunity; collecting cases), and the Supreme
Court could fashion a uniform rule where a conflict existed, there was never a compelling need for Congress
to provide guidance on this question. However, if the final resolution by the courts was intolerable, Congress
is empowered to enact remedial legislation. Of course, they presupposed existence of a functional Congress.

15
prosecution in the D.C. Circuit to allow trial preparations to ensue. But instead, they chose

to hear it on the last possible day of oral argument; if the Conspiring Justices succeed in

delaying Trump's coup trial beyond Election Day by slow walking their opinion and ordering

an unnecessary remand, it will have granted him de facto immunity, increasing his odds of

being re-elected. The Conspiring Justices’ criminal intent could not be any more plain. But

don’t take Movant’s word for it. Take that of conservative icon Judge J. Michael Luttig.

Judge Luttig CALLS OUT Supreme Court Over Trump DELAY Tactic, MeidasTouch (pod-

cast), May 1, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPKkjR_QQw4

Trump’s actual argument—that a President can be immune from criminal prosecution

for ordering the assassination of a political rival, selling our nuclear secrets, or orchestrating

a coup ďêtat—blazed a new trail in the wilderness of juridical absurdity.26 And the response

of Justice Kagan--the only first-rate intellect left on that “Court”— was priceless: “That an-

swer sounds to me as though it's like, yeah, under my test, it's an official act, but that sure

sounds bad, doesn't it?”27 The only question left is why Justice Thomas, who quoted Justice

Iredell for the utterly sensible proposition that "[i]f [the President] commits any crime, he is

punishable by the laws of his country," Trump v. Vance, 591 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2435

(2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting), would ever think that Presidential criminal immunity was a

thing.

But the fate of this criminal scheme—and indeed, the fate of our Republic—sits on the

shoulders of one woman.

26
At the risk of stating the painfully obvious, if everyone understood that a President enjoyed blanket immunity
for his conduct in office, the infamous pardon of President Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Presidential Statement,
Sept. 8, 1974, would have been both redundant and superfluous.
27
Trump v. United States, supra., Transcript of Oral Arg. at 43 (Apr. 25, 2024). Counsel for Trump hemmed
and hawed frantically in his effort to evade having to state that position with clarity before the Court, for rea-
sons which should be abundantly apparent.

16
B. “ARE YOU IN OR OUT?”

Your Honor intervened in the federal investigation into alleged criminal activity by Mr.

Trump and co-conspirators, pursuant to a Motion, styled “In the Matter of the Search of Mar-

a-Lago.” Trump v. United States, 9:22-cv-81294 (S.D. Fla.). On or about December 1, 2022,

the Eleventh Circuit ordered the matter to be dismissed because you had improperly exer-

cised equitable jurisdiction over it, writing: “This appeal requires us to consider whether the

district court had jurisdiction to block the United States from using lawfully seized records

in a criminal investigation. The answer is no.” Trump v. United States, No. 22-13005 (11th

Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (slip op. at 2). The Panel noted that "The law is clear,” reasoning that:

“We cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government
investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can we write a rule that allows
only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of our
caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both
would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations.”

Id., slip op. at 20-21.

On information and belief, any reasonably competent federal district court judge would

know that Mr. Trump’s request was objectively frivolous and thus, you are charged with the

knowledge it was frivolous, and that your Orders had no possible chance of surviving appel-

late review. By inference, your apparent intent was to assist Plaintiff Trump to “hinder or

prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3. The delay in the eventual

indictment of Defendant Trump occasioned by your interference exceeded four months.

When you were ultimately assigned this case, Your Honor had a statutory obligation to

ascertain whether you could preside over it—and “shall” means “shall.” 28 U.S.C. 455(a).

And on the face of it, the impartiality of a judge who was (1) appointed by the defendant and

(2) improperly interfered in a criminal investigation (3) in a matter where the outcome would

17
have a substantial likelihood of affecting her career prospects and (4) who failed to disclose

lavish ‘gifts’ from known allies of the defendant28 might reasonably be questioned, and a

competent federal judge—or, any judge who could read newspapers29—would be aware of

the appearance of a conflict. Five minutes of research would have revealed that you had no

business presiding here.30 Criminal intent can readily be inferred from these facts alone.

But it gets worse. As of August of 2023, Your Honor was on reasonable notice of the fact

that Defendant Trump is known to demand loyalty oaths from subordinates, including

judges.31 As only younger judges are chosen for ascension, Trump was your ‘golden ticket’

to a seat on the Supreme Court … provided you do The Don ‘a solid.’

28
Lucian K. Truscott IV, Judge Cannon's secret right-wing getaway: Why didn't we know about this?, Salon
(May 7, 2024), https://www.salon.com/2024/05/07/cannons-secret-right-wing-getaway-why-didnt-we-know-
about-this/
29
E.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Appointee Will Remain Judge in Documents Case, Clerk Says, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 10, 2023, at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/10/us/politics/judge-aileen-cannon-trump-docu-
ments.html; Jay Weaver, Some want judge to recuse herself in Trump case. Can and should that still happen?,
Miami Herald, (Jun. 23, 2023), at https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/arti-
cle276631871.html (Calls for recusal “came largely from the political left but also from some legal experts, all
citing Cannon’s controversial decisions favoring Trump in a civil dispute last year over the FBI’s seizure of
government records from his Palm Beach estate”).
30
Even a marginally competent judge would have turned to Charles C. Geyh, Judicial Disqualification: An
Analysis of Federal Law, 3d. ed. (Federal Judicial Center, 2020), for advice. Therein, Professor Geyh observes
that “There may be circumstances in which the ties between the judge and the public official are so close, and
the consequences of a ruling adverse to the official are so dire, that disqualification is appropriate regardless
of the capacity (if any) in which the official is sued.” Id. at 27. This situation this Court faced is sui generis,
as no former President has ever been indicted before; the closest analogue is a case involving Alabama Gover-
nor Don Siegelman, where the district judge recused sua sponte on the grounds that his “‘distant relationship’
to [Siegelman’s political rival] Governor Riley [not a party to the action], plus mere attendance at private
political functions for Bob Riley two years ago, "could raise some public confidence issues.” United States v.
Bobo, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1240 (N.D.Ala. 2004).
While it is technically not precedent, in Bobo, Judge Smith referred to the infamous Scalia duck hunting
case, observing that “the recusal inquiry must be made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is
informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." Id. at 1241 (emphasis in original) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
31
“Trump sought three things in his judicial appointees, or as he sometimes called them, ‘my judges.’ First, he
wanted justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade. Second, he wanted ‘jurists in the mold of Justices Antonin
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.’ Third, he wanted judges who would be loyal to him.” David
Lat and Zachary B. Shemtob, Trump’s Supreme Court Picks Are Not Quite What You Think, N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 2023 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Ashley Parker, et al., ‘Ready, Shoot, Aim': President Trump’s Loy-
alty Tests Cause Hiring Headaches, Wash. Post (Apr. 29, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt, Obstruction Inquiry

18
 If there were vestigial doubt remaining as to criminal intent, it was expunged in the in-

scrutable Order of March 18 [ECF #407], inexplicably, ordering the parties to “engage with

the following competing scenarios and offer alternative draft text that assumes each scenario

to be a correct formulation of the law to be issued to the jury,” assuming a reading of the

Presidential Records Act that did violence to the statutory text. The Order made no conceiv-

able earthly sense, for if the text of 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) is to mean anything, the President

has exactly zero authority to recategorize Presidential records, and if the text of 44 U.S.C. §

2201(3) is to mean anything, it is essentially impossible for any information “relating to the

national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the pos-

sessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the ad-

vantage of any foreign nation,” 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), could be a personal record, unless it were

in a diary.32 By definition, there is no circumstance in which either of the scenarios proposed

in ECF #407 could ever be “a correct formulation of the law to be issued to the jury.” The

first rule of statutory construction is to read the damn statute. (Justice) John P. Stevens, The

Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. Penn. L.Rev. 1373 (April 1992).

Movant would need another twenty pages to recount every act of misconduct or stagger-

ing ineptitude contained in the “yard sale” of a docket Your Honor has left here. The damage

has been done and may not be remediable, but you can start by recusing yourself or at least,

declare that Defendant Trump is in breach of his release agreement and introduce him to a

jail cell. Your Honor can take judicial notice of his conviction on nine counts of criminal

contempt in the Supreme Court of New York, Decision and Order, People v. Trump, No.

Shows Trump’s Struggle to Keep Grip on Russia Investigation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2018 (“Mr. Trump then
asked, “Where’s my Roy Cohn?”).
32
The only exception is Presidential diaries, see United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1990)
(access to Reagan diaries); see generally, Guidance on Presidential Records (National Archives, undated).

19
SMZ 71762-24 and SMZ 71764-24, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Part 59 (Apr. 30, 2024), and there appear

to be more crimes, see e.g., ECF # 592 (wire fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1343) where that came from.

CONCLUSION

With all due respect, Your Honor, this IS my point. “No man in this country is so high

that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity.”

United States v. Lee, 106 US 196, 220 (1882). It is of no moment that Defendant Trump is

running for the Presidency, as Eugene Debs literally ran for the office from prison. Terence

McArdle, The socialist who ran for president from prison—and won nearly a million votes,

Wash. Post (Sept. 22, 2019).

While Movant has other remedies at law, the sole purpose of this Motion is to preserve

this criminal prosecution, should the Government cease to pursue this matter. To that end,

Movant respectfully requests that he be named as co-prosecutor, keeping the existing indict-

ment intact and assuming all attendant powers including access to the grand jury should the

Government cease to pursue this case. Movant has no desire to interrupt Special Counsel’s

work and will not step in unless it becomes necessary, but the rule of law must be defended.

“No man is an island … therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for

thee.” John Donne, Meditation XVII (1624).

Respectfully submitted this ___ day of June, 2024,

/s/ [email protected]

20
 LOCAL RULE 7.1 CERTIFICATION OF GOOD-FAITH CONFERRAL

In accordance with Local Rule 7.1(a)(3), S.D. Fla. L.R., the undersigned hereby certifies
that he has endeavored to confer with all parties who may be affected by the relief sought in
the motion in a good faith effort to resolve the issue raised in the motion.

Owing to the extreme danger Defendant Trump and his army of berserkers pose to anyone
who participates in his trials who is not hopelessly corrupt and/or displaying tyrannical par-
tiality toward him, Movant has limited conferral attempts to emails and/or submission of a
draft motion via First Class Mail. None of the parties have responded as of this writing.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June _, 2024, I sent a copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
CONDITIONAL INTERVENTION to:

Jack Smith, Esq.,

Special Counsel Office of the United States Attorney
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Rm. B-206
Washington, D.C. 20530

John F. Lauro, Esq.

Lauro & Singer
400 N. Tampa St., 15th Floor,
Tampa, FL 33602,
Counsel for former President Donald J. Trump

Sasha Dadan, Esq.

Dadan Law Firm, PLLC
201 S. 2nd Street, Suite 202
Fort Pierce, FL 34950,
Counsel for Defendant Waltine Nauta

John S. Irving, Esq.

E&W Law
1455 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20004
Counsel for Carlos De Oliveira

The last known address, by way of certified United States Mail:

/s/ [email protected]

21