Authentication Functions

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Authentication Functions

Introduction: -Any message authentication or digital signature


mechanism has two levels of functionality. At the lower level, there
must be some sort of function that produces an authenticator: a value
to be used to authenticate a message. This lower-level function is then
used as a primitive in a higher-level authentication protocol that
enables a receiver to verify the authenticity of a message.

Following functions can be used to produce an authenticator:-

Message encryption: The cipher text of the entire message serves as


its authenticator.

Message authentication code (MAC): A function of the message


and a secret key that produces a fixed-length value that serves as the
authenticator. C(M,K)

C = Authentication function

M= Message

K= Key

Hash function: A function that maps a message of any length into a


fixed-length hash value, which serves as the authenticator.

H(M)

Message Encryption:-Message encryption by itself can provide a


measure of authentication. The analysis differs for symmetric and
public-key encryption schemes.
Symmetric Encryption: A message M transmitted from source A to
destination B is encrypted using a secret key K shared by A and B. If
no other party knows the key, then confidentiality is provided: No
other party can recover the plaintext of the message.

B is assured that the message was generated by A. Why? The message


must have come from A because A is the only other party that
possesses K and therefore the only other party with the information
necessary to construct ciphertext that can be decrypted with K.
Furthermore, if M is recovered, B knows that none of the bits of M
have been altered, because an opponent that does not know K would
not know how to alter bits in the ciphertext to produce desired
changes in the plaintext.

So we may say that symmetric encryption provides authentication as


well as confidentiality. However, this flat statement needs to be
qualified. Consider exactly what is happening at B. Given a
decryption function D and a secret key K, the destination will accept
any input X and produce output Y = D(K, X). If X is the ciphertext of
a legitimate message M produced by the corresponding encryption
function, then Y is some plaintext message M. Otherwise, Y will
likely be a meaningless sequence of bits. There may need to be some
automated means of determining at B whether Y is legitimate
plaintext and therefore must have come from A.

Public-Key Encryption:The straightforward use of public-key


encryption provides confidentiality but not authentication. The source
(A) uses the public key PUb of the destination (B) to encrypt M.
Because only B has the corresponding private key PR b, only B can
decrypt the message. This scheme provides no authentication because
any opponent could also use B's public key to encrypt a message,
claiming to be A.

o provide authentication, A uses its private key to encrypt the


message, and B uses A's public key to decrypt. This provides
authentication using the same type of reasoning as in the symmetric
encryption case: The message must have come from A because A is
the only party that possesses PRa and therefore the only party with the
information necessary to construct ciphertext that can be decrypted
with PUa. Again, the same reasoning as before applies: There must be
some internal structure to the plaintext so that the receiver can
distinguish between well-formed plaintext and random bits.

Basic Uses of Message Encryption

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