Competition policy

竞争政策
The growing demand for more vigorous antitrust action
对更强有力的反垄断行动的需求日益增长
Greater concentration of market power is leading to a trustbusting revival
市场力量更趋集中正导向反托拉斯复兴【专题《新干预主义》系列之三】
OBSERVERS OF CHINA’S rise have grown used to seeing old edifices bulldozed to
make way for the new. As with bricks and mortar, so with intellectual constructs. In
just 12 months President Xi Jinping has replaced a “cautious and tolerant” approach
to the private sector with something much less so. Nowhere has the shift towards
tougher rules and enforcement been more striking than in competition policy.
观察中国崛起的人们已经对推倒旧楼给新大厦腾地的景象习以为常。钢筋水泥
的楼房是如此，思想建构也一样。在短短 12 个月里，中国国家主席习近平已经
推翻了对私营部门“包容审慎”的监管思路，朝着相反的方向大步迈进。没有
什么比竞争政策更能体现这种向更严苛的规则和执行的转变了。
A year ago the Communist Party’s body for political and legal affairs vowed to take
trustbusting more seriously. Within months China revised its antitrust law of 2008,
increasing sanctions and agencies’ discretion. The State Administration for Market
Regulation (SAMR), the antitrust watchdog, has blocked mergers and, says Angela
Zhang of Hong Kong University, levied fines totalling $3.7bn on tech giants for sins
ranging from price discrimination to merchant abuse. The agency’s antitrust bureau is
more than doubling in size, from 40 to 100 officials, and it plans to expand to 150.
一年前，中共中央政法委誓言要加强反垄断。几个月内，中国修订了 2008 年实
施的反垄断法，加大处罚力度并扩大了政府机构的自由裁量权。香港大学的张
湖月说，国家反垄断监管部门市场监管总局已经否决了一些合并案，并就价格
歧视和欺压小商户等各种问题对科技巨头处以总计 37 亿美元的罚款。总局下属
的反垄断局规模扩大了一倍多，从 40 名官员增至 100 名，并计划继续扩编至
150 名。
Chinese bureaucrats have used state media to arouse outrage against firms’ abuse of
market power, enough to clobber a miscreant’s sales and share price. Despite having
no overt antitrust role, the People’s Bank of China uses financial regulation and its
bully pulpit to cow payments firms. Tencent and Alibaba, two tech titans with a
payments duopoly, are being forced to drop the model in which shopping and
payments are exclusive to one platform. In moves ostensibly aimed at curbing big
tech, the National Press and Publication Administration has prohibited children from
playing more than three hours of video games a week most of the year. Another
agency barred Didi Global from Chinese app stores for data violations, days after the
ride-hailing firm went public in New York before later shifting to Hong Kong.
中国官员利用官方媒体激起公众对企业滥用市场支配地位的愤怒，足以重挫涉
事企业的销售额和股价。尽管并不具有公开的反垄断职能，中国人民银行借金
融监管和自身地位威吓支付公司。两大科技巨头腾讯和阿里巴巴在支付业务上
形成双头垄断，如今正被迫放弃相互屏蔽购物和支付的模式。在表面上为遏制
科技巨头的各种行动之中，国家新闻出版署规定在一年绝大部分时间里，未成
年人每周玩电子游戏不得超过三小时。网约车公司滴滴出行刚在纽约上市了几
天，另一个政府机构就以数据违规为由将其从中国的应用商店下架。之后滴滴
开始准备转至香港上市。
Such actions mark a departure from the antitrust philosophy that has dominated
regulatory thinking and judicial decisions in the past half-century. Associated with
Robert Bork, an American judge from the late 1970s, it held that consumer welfare
and the protection of competition, rather than of particular competitors, should be the
only goals of antitrust law. Business practices were deemed fine so long as they did
not result in harm to consumers from excessive prices. Most mergers were either
competitively neutral or enhanced efficiency, even if they led to oligopoly; only those
creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to be bad for consumers.
这类行动标志着中国正在背离过去半个世纪以来主导全球监管思维和司法决策
的 反 垄 断 理 念 。 这 一 理 念 由 1970 年 代 末 的 美 国 法 官 罗 伯 特 · 博 克 （ Robert
Bork）提出，主张消费者福利和保护竞争——而非保护特定的竞争者——应是
反垄断法的唯一目标。商业行为只要不导致以过高的价格损害消费者就没问题。
大多数合并要么是无关竞争，要么提高了效率，即便它们导致了寡头垄断；只
有那些打造出一家独大局面的合并才很可能对消费者不利。
Bork’s work was itself a reaction to an earlier approach linked to Louis Brandeis, a
former US Supreme Court justice. Brandeis believed that size was nefarious in itself.
Curbing market power was a tool to fight other ills, such as mistreatment of workers,
the stiffing of suppliers or even threats to democracy. This may have led to some
perverse outcomes. In one notorious example in 1966, the Supreme Court blocked a
merger between two grocers in Los Angeles with a combined market share of 8%.
博克 的理论本 身又反 驳了 早先 前最高 法院大法官路 易斯· 布兰代 斯（ Louis
Brandeis）主张的理念。布兰代斯认为，规模本身就是邪恶的。遏制市场支配力
是对抗其他弊病的工具，例如虐待工人、压榨供应商甚至威胁民主。这种思路
可能导致了一些不合情理的结果。一个臭名昭著的例子是最高法院在 1966 年阻
止了洛杉矶的两家食品杂货店合并，而它们的市场份额加起来不过区区 8%。
Chinese trustbusters are now the most enthusiastic in disavowing the price-centricity
of Bork’s “consumer-welfare standard”. But it has fallen out of favour everywhere,
gradually in Europe and now, tentatively, in America. One reason is a global trend
towards greater corporate concentration, from medicines to manufacturing. According
to The Economist’s calculations, two-thirds of 900-odd sectors covered by America’s
economic census became more concentrated between 1997 and 2012. In half of these
concentration has edged up further in the subsequent five years. In the two decades to
2017 the weighted average market share of the top four firms in each industry
increased from 26% to 32%. The four biggest British firms accounted for a larger
share of revenue in 2018 than a decade earlier in 58% of 600-odd subsectors.
Concentration in the EU has been going in the same direction, albeit more slowly.
中国的反垄断官员现在对推倒博克专注价格的“消费者福利标准”最为积极。
但这项标准在世界各地都已失宠：欧洲逐渐抛弃它，而眼下美国也开始尝试转
向。背后原因之一是从药品到制造业的全球产业集中度提高的趋势。根据本刊
计算，美国的经济普查所涵盖的 900 多个部门中，有三分之二在 1997 年至 2012
年间变得更加集中。这三分之二之中又有一半在接下来的五年里进一步集中。
在截至 2017 年的二十年间，每个行业前四大公司的加权平均市场份额从 26%提
高到 32%。2018 年，英国 600 多个细分行业中，有 58%的行业的前四大公司所
占收入份额比十年前更大。在欧盟，行业集中度朝着同样的方向发展，尽管速
度要慢些。
Another good reason to bin Bork was technological change. The world’s biggest tech
giants charge consumers either nothing (Alphabet, Google’s parent company, and
Meta, formerly Facebook) or as little as possible (Amazon). Critics say this does not
stop them abusing their dominance. Amazon is attacked for its treatment of workers,
suppliers and third-party sellers. Google and Apple are accused of monopolistic
practices against developers in their app stores. Facebook is taken to task for “killer
acquisitions” aimed at neutralising innovative challengers such as Instagram and
WhatsApp. (All four companies deny all these claims.)
抛弃博克的另一个理由是技术变迁。全球最大的一批科技巨头要么不向消费者
收取任何费用（谷歌的母公司 Alphabet，和前身为 Facebook 的 Meta），要么收
取尽可能少的费用（亚马逊）。批评人士说这并不妨碍它们滥用自己的支配地
位。亚马逊因其对待工人、供应商和第三方卖家的方式受到攻击。谷歌和苹果
被指在自己的应用商店中对开发者施加垄断行为。Facebook 被指斥开展“杀手
式收购”以消除 Instagram 和 WhatsApp 等创新挑战者的威胁。（四家公司全都
否认了所有这些指控。）
Choice and quality
选择与质量
“We need to push for a broader notion of consumer harm,” declares Margrethe
Vestager, the EU’s competition commissioner. It is no excuse that “the econometrics
of price may be more straightforward than the econometrics of quality and choice”,
she adds. Britain’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has made similar
noises. Like China’s SAMR, it is staffing up fast, going from around 650 officials to
850 in the past five years, catching up with Ms Vestager’s directorate-general.
“我们需要推动更广义的消费者伤害概念。”欧盟竞争事务专员玛格丽特 ·维斯
塔格 （Margrethe Vestager）宣称。“价格的计量经济学或许比质量和选择的计
量经济学更一目了然”这一点不应是借口，她补充道。英国竞争与市场管理局
（CMA）也发出了类似的声音。和中国的市场监管总局一样， CMA 正在迅速
增加人手，过去五年里从大约 650 名官员增加到 850 名，赶上了维斯塔格带队
的欧盟竞争总司。
Antitrust voices in America go further, arguing that the consumer-welfare standard
was never as scientific as its advocates claimed and that Brandeis’s vision deserves a
second look. Mr Biden has installed “neo-Brandeisians” in senior trustbusting roles.
Lina Khan, a 32-year-old academic, chairs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Jonathan Kanter, a long-time Google-basher, heads the Department of Justice (DoJ)’s
antitrust division. Tim Wu, a law professor whose books include “The Curse of
Bigness”, is the White House adviser on technology and competition. “The speed of
the takeover by the neo-Brandeisians of the regulatory apparatus has been
extraordinary,” says one big asset manager.
美国的反垄断声势更进一步，指出消费者福利标准从来都不像其倡导者声称的
那般科学，而布兰代斯的理念值得重新审视。拜登已经在反垄断高级职位上安
排了“新布兰代斯派”。32 岁的学者莉娜·汗（Lina Khan）出任联邦贸易委员
会（FTC）主席。长期炮轰谷歌的乔纳森·坎特（Jonathan Kanter）出任司法部
（DoJ）反垄断部门负责人。著有《巨头的诅咒》（The Curse of Bigness）等书
的法学教授吴修铭出任白宫技术和竞争顾问。“新布兰代斯派接管监管部门的
速度非常惊人。”一家大型资产管理公司表示。
This new competition doctrine remains a work in progress. But its contours are
becoming sharper. It expands the goals of antitrust policy in two main areas: merger
control and business-model regulation. For most mergers and acquisitions (M&A),
regulators used to restrict scrutiny to a small number of “horizontal” deals between
firms active in the same market that, if combined, could reduce competition and allow
incumbents to raise prices. Today all these tenets are going out of the window.
新的竞争原则仍未定型，但它的轮廓日渐清晰。它在两个主要方面扩展反垄断
政策的目标：兼并控制和商业模式监管。对于大多数并购案，监管机构过去将
审查局限在活跃于同一市场的公司之间发生的少数“横向”交易上，如果其合
并可能减少竞争并允许既有企业抬高价格的话。今天，所有这些基本原则被抛
向九霄云外。
Trustbusters now investigate “vertical” integrations between companies with separate
lines of business, as well as horizontal ones with combined revenues that would not
historically have warranted attention. A new procedure allows EU regulators to ask
national authorities to submit deals that are potential killer acquisitions, particularly in
the digital, pharma and biotech industries. They have used this to investigate Meta’s
$1bn acquisition of Kustomer, an American business-software firm with low
European sales, and the purchase by Illumina, a gene-sequencing giant, of Grail, a
developer of diagnostic tests that does no business in the EU. Germany’s competition
authority has been pushing cases like Illumina “to test its jurisdiction”, says an EU
official. Britain’s CMA has demanded that Meta undo its recent takeover of Giphy, a
database of animated GIF files.
如今反垄断官员调查具有不同业务线的公司之间的“垂直”整合，以及合并营
收额在过去并不需要关注的横向整合。一项新程序让欧盟监管官员可以要求成
员国当局上报潜在的杀手式收购，特别是在数字、制药和生物技术行业里的交
易。他们据此调查了 Meta 以 10 亿美元收购在欧洲销售额很低的美国商业软件
公司 Kustomer，以及基因测序巨头 Illumina 收购在欧洲并无业务的诊断测试开
发商 Grail。一位欧盟官员表示，德国的竞争主管部门一直在推动审查 Illumina
这样的案子来“测试其管辖权”。英国的 CMA 要求 Meta 撤销其最近对 GIF 动
画文件数据库 Giphy 的收购。
In America the FTC and DoJ are making merger guidelines more stringent. M&A
lawyers say the agencies are asking more questions, including about the impact of
deals on the labour market. They already look beyond direct pecuniary harm to
consumers. The FTC is backing a suit that seeks to break up Meta into Facebook,
Instagram and WhatsApp, even though earlier regulators waved these takeovers
through. Justifying its challenge to a merger between Simon & Schuster and Penguin
Random House, the Do J said it would give the new entity “outsized influence over
who and what is published, and how much authors are paid for their work”. Ms Khan
is expected to oppose Amazon’s $8.5bn purchase of MGM Studios, arguing that it
would further strengthen the e-empire’s online hegemony. The fact that the
entertainment market is fragmented and Amazon lets Prime-subscription customers
binge-watch its videos for a fixed fee is, on this expansive view of antitrust, beside the
point.
在美国，FTC 和司法部正在制定更严格的合并准则。并购律师表示，这些机构
正在提出更多问题，包括交易对劳动力市场的影响。它们关注的点已经超越了
对 消 费 者 的 直 接 金 钱 损 害 。 FTC 支 持 的 一 项 诉 讼 寻 求 把 Meta 拆 分 为
Facebook、Instagram 和 WhatsApp，尽管之前的监管机构已经批准了这些收购。
司法部对西蒙与舒斯特（Simon&Schuster）和企鹅兰登书屋的合并计划提起诉
讼，理由是合并后的新实体将获得“在选择出版谁的作品、什么内容，以及支
付作者多少报酬上的过度影响力”。外界预期莉娜·汗将反对亚马逊以 85 亿美
元收购米高梅，她会说这将进一步加强这个电子帝国的网上霸权。在这种扩展
的反垄断理念中，娱乐业市场仍很分散以及亚马逊让其 Prime 订户以固定费用
任意收看视频的事实都无关紧要了。
The second avenue of antitrust expansion—dictating what dominant businesses can
and can’t do—is more inchoate than tougher merger control. But it could prove more
consequential. Especially for America’s trillion-dollar tech giants it would be the first
serious constraints on their activities since the internet made them the world’s most
valuable companies.
反垄断扩张的第二条途径是规定占主导地位的企业能做什么，不能做什么。相
比收紧合并控制，这方面还处于起步阶段。但它可能产生更重大的影响。特别
是对美国价值万亿美元的科技巨头来说，这将是互联网让它们成为世界上最有
价值的公司以来，头一回被真正限制经营活动。
Some edicts come from regulatory agencies. White House staff look on antitrust as a
“Swiss-army knife”: a tool to fix lots of different problems, including such ills as
inflation. It is early in Mr Biden’s term and they are still revving up, says one
lobbyist. But “once they start going, they will be pretty muscular.” Last July Mr Biden
issued an executive order, written by Mr Wu, instructing more than a dozen agencies
vigorously to curb anticompetitive behaviour across the economy. It encourages
agencies to create rules from weeding out “unfair methods of competition on internet
marketplaces” to requiring railway owners “to provide rights of way to passenger
rail”. In a memo outlining her priorities, Ms Khan declared that she would look into
whether private-equity firms contribute to extractive business models in which
companies raise prices or muscle out rivals.
一些规定来自监管机构。白宫班子把反垄断看作“瑞士军刀”：一种能解决许
多不同问题的工具，包括通胀这样的弊病。一位说客说，目前还是拜登任期的
早期，他们还在热身中。但“一旦他们开始行动，将会非常强硬。”去年 7 月，
拜登发布了吴修铭起草的行政令，大力指示十多家机构在经济的方方面面遏制
反竞争行为。它鼓励机构制定各种规则，从清除“互联网市场上的不公平竞争
方式”，到要求铁路所有者“提供客运铁路通行权”等。莉娜 ·汗在一份概述她
的工作优先事项的备忘录中宣布，她将审视私募股权公司是否有助于榨取式经
营模式，让企业得以抬高价格或强行驱逐竞争对手。
The 107-year-old FTC Act grants Ms Khan wide latitude, so long as her rules are
designed to forestall “conduct that is unfair or deceptive”. Congress may grant her
even more power. Several proposals would outlaw practices deemed anticompetitive.
One would treat Amazon’s marketplace or Google’s search engine as essential to
commerce, rather like a dominant railway operator, prohibiting them from favouring
their own products over others. Another would force Apple and Google to open up
their app stores to alternative in-app payment methods and search results. A third
would shift the burden of proof from regulators to dominant companies, which would
need to show that any merger or acquisition does not hurt competition, rather than the
other way around. All three have Democratic and Republican co-sponsors.
有 107 年历史的《联邦贸易委员会法》（FTC Act）赋予莉娜·汗很大的自由度，
只要她制定的规则旨在预防“不公平或欺骗性的行为”。国会可能会授予她更
多权力。一些提案将把一些被视为反竞争的做法列为非法。其中一项提案把亚
马逊的平台市场或谷歌的搜索引擎定性为商业必需品，就像主导的铁路运营商
那样，据此禁止它们特别照顾自家产品。另一项将迫使苹果和谷歌在自家应用
商店中纳入其他应用内支付方式和搜索结果。第三项提案将举证责任从监管机
构转移到主导企业，需要由后者证明自己的任何并购交易都不会削弱竞争，而
不是反之。这三项提案都有两党的提案人。
Other places are further along the regulatory route. The EU is preparing to adopt two
laws, the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. South Korea has enacted
one that eliminates app stores’ monopoly on payments. Britain is considering new
rules, including on self-preferencing by large platform companies.
其他地方在监管的路线上走得更远。欧盟正准备通过两项法律：《数字市场
法》和《数字服务法》。韩国颁布了一项法案，以消除应用商店对支付的垄断。
英国正在考虑新的法规，包括约束大型平台企业偏袒自家产品。
If in doubt, litigate
法庭上见
Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Western businesses will not take this lying down,
let alone vow “comprehensive self-examination and rectification”, as Meituan, a food-
delivery giant, did after being fined $530m by SAMR in October. America’s tech
giants are deploying high-powered lobbyists to scupper or water down rules before
they see the light of day. In November the US Chamber of Commerce sent three
strongly worded letters to the FTC accusing Ms Khan of overstepping her brief and
dismantling procedural safeguards at the agency. It will be “active in litigating”, vows
Mr Bradley, its policy chief.
与中国同行不同的是，西方企业不会乖乖接受这一切，更不会像外卖巨头美团
在 10 月被市场监管总局罚款 5.3 亿美元后那样发誓“全面自查整改”。美国的
科技巨头正在部署强大的游说队伍，要把新规则扼杀在摇篮中或让它们大打折
扣。11 月，美国商会（US Chamber of Commerce）向 FTC 发出三封措辞强硬的
信函，控诉莉娜·汗在该机构越权及破坏程序保障。其政策主管布拉德利誓言商
会将“积极兴讼”。
Meta, Illumina and Penguin Random House are fighting regulators in court. Judges
used to the consumer-welfare standard may resist attempts to redefine it. Corporate
lawyers will remind them that, by prioritising outcomes other than price, the neo-
Brandeisians “want people to pay for [their] policy preferences”, as the chief counsel
at a big tech firm puts it.
Meta、Illumina 和企鹅兰登书屋正在法庭上与监管机构斗争。习惯了消费者福
利标准的法官们可能会抵制重新定义它的尝试。公司律师会提醒他们，如果把
其他结果摆在价格之前，新布兰代斯派——用一家科技巨头的首席法律顾问的
话说——“要人们为［他们的］政策偏好付费”。
Big firms argue that, as they expand into adjacent markets, they increasingly compete
with one another. This is especially true of big tech, whose rise has fuelled the
Brandeisian revival. Amazon is the third-biggest online advertiser behind Alphabet
and Meta. Apple is building a search engine to challenge Google. Google’s cloud-
computing division is taking on Amazon Web Services and Microsoft’s Azure. Meta is
getting into e-commerce. The research papers cited in Mr Biden’s executive order date
back half a decade. Concentration in America may since have plateaued.
大公司辩称，随着自己向相邻市场扩张，它们之间的竞争越来越激烈。这一点
对科技巨头尤其适用，而正是它们的崛起推动了布兰代斯派的复兴。亚马逊是
仅次于 Alphabet 和 Meta 的第三大线上广告商。苹果正在构建一个搜索引擎来挑
战谷歌。谷歌的云计算部门正向亚马逊 AWS 和微软 Azure 宣战。Meta 正在打
入电子商务。拜登的行政令中引用的研究论文发表于五年前，而自那时以来，
美国的行业集中度可能已趋于稳定。
This resistance ensures that the competition authorities’ multipronged assault on big
business will take time to play out. The new trustbusting zeal also rubs up against a
rekindled affection for national champions, which are by definition big and powerful.
European bosses urge Ms Vestager to take into account how competitive global
markets are, not just the EU’s, when deciding on mergers. The single-market
commissioner, Mr Breton, is receptive to such ideas. Even Ms Vestager, who ignored
Franco-German calls to permit the creation of the Alstom-Siemens rail champion,
now speaks warmly of the battery consortium.
这种抵抗确保了竞争管理部门对大企业的多线进攻将需要时间才能看到结果。
这股新兴的反托拉斯热也与对国家领军企业重燃的热情相抵触——领军企业自
然是大而强的。欧洲的老板们敦促维斯塔格在审议合并案时考虑全球市场的竞
争度，而不仅仅是欧盟市场。单一市场专员布雷顿对这种看法还比较接纳。即
使是维斯塔格，虽然之前曾无视法德两国让阿尔斯通和西门子合并创造铁路领
军企业的呼吁，现在也在热情地谈论着打造电池联盟了。
That may be why, for all the antitrust commotion, M&A activity remains strong in
Europe and America, as companies take advantage of cheap capital and a surfeit of
pandemic-distressed targets. Chinese tech titans have shed a collective $1.4trn in
stockmarket value since China started turning the screws on them in earnest last
February. America’s five biggest tech firms have added $2.1trn in the same period.
The neo-Brandeisians may have “achieved political success prematurely”, suggests
Mr Furman from Harvard.
这可能就是为什么尽管反垄断的雷声如此之大，欧洲和美国的并购活动却依然
活跃：企业抓住机会利用廉价资本，还有大量因疫情陷入困顿的收购目标。自
中国于去年 2 月开始奋力打压自己的科技巨头以来，它们的股票市值累计已缩
水 1.4 万亿美元。同一时期美国最大的五家科技公司增值了 2.1 万亿美元。哈佛
的弗曼表示，新布兰代斯派可能“过早地取得了政治上的成功”。
Yet bosses, lobbyists and corporate lawyers acknowledge that a chill has descended as
regulators test their powers. The dealmaking frenzy may partly reflect a desire to get
in under the wire. Without clear rules, companies no longer know when to notify
regulators about a deal and must think about competition from the outset. One
lobbyist claims that clients with deals pending at the FTC are not getting answers.
They may face an investigation halfway through a deal or even after it closes—and in
a growing number of jurisdictions. Just one hold-out can put paid to a merger. In
March 2021 Applied Materials, an American semiconductor company, scrapped its
acquisition of a Japanese rival, which had been approved in America, Europe and
Japan, but not in China. Boeing got clearance to merge parts of its business with
Embraer, a Brazilian planemaker, everywhere except Europe.
不过，老板、游说者和公司律师承认，随着监管机构测试自己的权力上限，一
股寒意已经袭来。眼下的交易热在一定程度上可能是因为大家急着要搭上末班
车。没有明确的规则，企业不再清楚何时该就交易通知监管部门，并且必须从
一开始就考虑竞争问题。一位说客声称，其客户在 FTC 的待批交易得不到任何
回复。它们可能会在交易进行到一半甚至完成后受到调查——而且是在越来越
多司法辖区被调查。只要有一个辖区不通过就可以让一宗合并交易流产。2021
年 3 月，美国半导体厂商应用材料公司（Applied Materials）取消了对一个日本
竞争对手的收购，该交易已在美国、欧洲和日本获批，在中国没有。波音原本
计划将部分业务与巴西飞机制造商巴西航空工业公司（Embraer）合并，在各地
都已获准，唯欧洲除外。
The uncertainty over mergers and rules that might curtail certain practices adds hassle,
risk and cost to potential deals. Some business decisions that might once have been
made will now never be considered. Value not created as a result is impossible to
quantify, but it is surely there.
围绕合并的不确定性和可能限制某些操作的法规增加了潜在交易的麻烦、风险
和成本。一些在过去可能会做出的商业决策如今绝不会被考虑。因此而未被创
造的价值无法量化，但肯定存在。