Spouses Dr. John O.

Maliga and Annielyn Dela Cruz Maliga, Petitioners -versus- Spouses

Abrahim N. Tingao and Bai Shor Tingao, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211089 | July 11, 2023; and

Spouses Dr. John O. Maliga and Annielyn Dela Cruz Maliga, Petitioners -versus- Dimasurang
Unte Jr., Respondent.
G.R. No. 211135
Zalameda, J.

Facts:

Between February 2009 and October 2012, Annielyn Dela Cruz Maliga obtained loans from
Dimasurang Unte, Jr., initially for ₱110,000.00 with a 15% monthly interest, later increasing to
25%. Annielyn also borrowed from spouses Abrahim N. Tingao and Bai Shor Tingao, for
₱330,000.00 with a 10% monthly interest. Annielyn's husband, Dr. John O. Maliga, discovered
these transactions and halted payments after realizing excessive interest payments totaling
₱8,660,250.00 to Unte and ₱1,452,000.00 to Spouses Tingao. Petitioners filed complaints
against respondents seeking loan extinguishment and refund. Unte filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing jurisdictional matters.

Issue:

WON the SDC correctly dismissed the complaints for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No. Under Art. 143(1) of PD 1083 the SDC has original jurisdiction over the complaint if it is
sufficiently alleged that: (1) the action arose from a customary contract; (2) the parties are Muslims;
and (3) the parties have not specified which law shall govern their relations. So long as the
jurisdictional requirements are met, the SDC may adjudicate cases ordinarily cognizable by regular
courts. These include cases where the applicable law may not be found in PD 1083, such as, for
instance, an ordinary action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land. In this
case, the supposed lack of applicable provision on interest under PD 1083 per se does not deprive
the SDC of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

The Sharia District Courts (SDCs), with expertise in Muslim and customary law, possess the same
capabilities as regular courts. They are designed to effectively resolve disputes among Muslims, as
indicated by a catchall provision in the law and RA 11054, which grants them exclusive jurisdiction
over personal and real actions involving Muslims. Thus, the SDC has jurisdiction over the petitioners'
complaints. The Court found error in the SDC's dismissal, as further proceedings are needed to
determine applicable law, contract validity, and excess payment liability. Thus, dismissing the case
based solely on a perceived lack of applicable Muslim law was erroneous.
Francis D. Malaki and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin-Malaki, Petitioners, -versus- People of the
Philippines, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 221075 | November 15, 2021
Leonen, J.

Facts:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45, contesting the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the
Regional Trial Court's finding of Francis D. Malaki, Sr. and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin guilty of
bigamy. Francis and Jacqueline, charged with bigamy, admitted to marrying while Francis' prior
marriage was intact but claimed conversion to Islam before their marriage. The RTC found them
guilty, which the Court of Appeals upheld, stating that any subsequent marriage without the
dissolution of the prior one constitutes bigamy. Francis and Jacqueline argue that as Muslims, they
are governed by Muslim law. They claim a prior Islamic marriage, challenging the lack of evidence
provided by the prosecution. Respondent asserts that the guilt of Francis and Jacqueline was
adequately proven and disputes their claim of Muslim status, citing Jacqueline's Roman Catholic
religion on their marriage certificate.

Issue:

WON petitioners Francis D. Malaki, Sr. and Jacqueline Mae A. Salanatin are guilty of bigamy.

Ruling:

Yes. Contracting a second marriage without the previous declaration of nullity of the first
consummates the crime of bigamy. To successfully prosecute this crime, the following elements
must be proven:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

Petitioners admit that Francis was legally married to Nerrian and that the marriage was not
dissolved. They likewise admit that they subsequently married despite the subsistence of Francis'
marriage to Nerrian. These admissions sufficiently establish all the elements of bigamy which prove
petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Muslim Code applies to marriages, their nature, consequences, and incidents between fellow
Muslims, between a male Muslim and a non-Muslim solemnized in Muslim rites, between spouses
who both converted to Islam after their marriage, and between a male Muslim and a non-Muslim
entered into prior to the Code's effectivity.
The Civil Code (superseded by the Family Code), governs marriages not solemnized under Muslim
rites, including those between a Muslim and a non-Muslim.

Francis' prior marriage falls under the Civil Code, making his subsequent marriage to Jacqueline
bigamous. Whether petitioner Francis converted to Islam before or after his marriage with petitioner
Jacqueline, the subsequent marriage consummated the crime of bigamy. He cannot successfully
invoke the exculpatory clause in Article 180, considering that the Muslim Code finds no application in
his then subsisting marriage with Nerrian, the marriage recognized by law that bars and penalizes a
subsequent marriage.

In any case, even granting that the parties' circumstances fell exclusively within the coverage of the
Muslim Code, noncompliance with the condition precedent to subsequent marriages belies
petitioners' good faith and manifests their intent to circumvent the law.

All told, this Court affirms the Court of Appeals' ruling that petitioners are guilty of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

Cristita Anaban et. al., Petitioners, -versus- Betty Anaban-Alfiler et. al. Respondents.
G.R. No. 249011 | March 15, 2021
Lazaro-Javier, J.

Facts:
Pedrito and Virginia married in 1942 under Ibaloi Tribe customs, having three children. In 1947, their
divorce was approved by the tribe due to Virginia's insanity, allowing Pedrito to remarry. He then
married Pepang in 1952, also under tribal customs, and had eight children together. After Pedrito's
death, his children sued for estate settlement, claiming their legitimacy and rights to land.
Respondents averred that during the marriage of their father Pedrito to their mother Virginia, Pedrito
acquired from his father Pedro Anaban a portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-14574. But the new certificate of title issued to Pedrito reflected that he was married to
petitioners' mother Pepang. Although in truth, his marriage with their mother Virginia was not yet
legally dissolved. Thus, petitioners are actually the illegitimate children of their father Pedrito.

Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that they are the legitimate children of their father Pedrito with
their mother Pepang. Pedrito and respondents' mother Virginia were married in accordance with the
Ibaloi Tribe customs and their marriage was also dissolved in accordance with Ibaloi tribe customs
and traditions. Thereafter, Pedrito married their (petitioners') mother Pepang similarly in accord with
the Ibaloi customs. Since the celebration of marriage pursuant to a tribe's customs was recognized
under the Old Civil Code of the Philippines, then its dissolution in accordance with that tribe's
customs must also be recognized. Thus, both the marriage and the subsequent divorce between
Pedrito and Virginia are valid. Consequently, the marriage of their parents must also be deemed
valid.

Issue:

Whether the marriage between Pedrito and Pepang is bigamous and void, and if the children from
the second marriage are illegitimate.

Ruling:

Yes. All of the courts resolved the validity of the so-called divorce between Pedrito and Virginia
through the lens of the old Civil Code. But, in reality, when Pedrito and Virginia got married and even
when they later on supposedly divorced, the old Civil Code was not yet in effect. For it took effect on
June 18, 1949, or two (2) years after the divorce decree was purportedly handed down by the Ibaloi
council of elders. The law in effect prior thereto was still the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Article 5.
During the Spanish colonization, divorce, then, can be granted only on two (2) grounds, i.e., adultery
and concubinage. This was the prevailing law when Pedrito and Virginia got married in 1942.

The Court ruled that since there was no legal and valid ground for the divorce of Pedrito and
Virginia, in the eyes of the law, they were still married and their marriage was not dissolved as to
permit Pedrito to remarry. Pedrito's subsequent marriage to petitioners' mother Pepang, therefore, is
void for being bigamous. Verily, the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err when they ruled so
and declared petitioners as Pedrito's illegitimate children.

Rohaina Sumagka, Petitioner -versus- Abdulgani Sumagka, Respondent.

G.R. No. 200697 | June 10, 2019

Facts:

Abdulgani Sumagka (Abdulgani) filed a Petition for Divorce by Talaq against Rohaina
Sumagka (Rohaina) in the 8th Shari'a Circuit Court (SCC) of Tacurong City. He filed his
petition based on Article 462 of Presidential Decree No. 1083 or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code). Abdulgani alleged in his petition that he and
Rohaina, who are both Muslims, married in accordance with Muslim law at Tinagacan, General
Santos City on July 18,1998. On February 4,2004, they renewed their marriage vows under civil rites
before Hon. Narciso RA. Grafilo Jr., the Municipal Mayor of Alabel, Sarangani Province.Their
blissful marriage turned sour when Abdulgani became a policeman in 2006 and was
frequently assigned to different posts. The couple would often quarrel because of Rohaina's
jealousies and suspicions that Abdulgani was being unfaithful. As the couple often quarreled
because of Rohaina’s jealousies and suspicions, Abdulgani filed a Petition for Divorce by Talaq in
the SCC based on Art. 46 of PD 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code). The SCC granted Abdulgani’s petition and declared the divorce by Talaq
in accordance with the provisions of theMuslim Code. Rohaina appealed the SCC’s ruling to the
SDC, asserting that civil law governs her marriage with Abdulgani. She also contended that the
Agama Council’s report was invalid as it was not signed personally by one of its members,
Limbong Mamalompong. In the assailed November 2, 2011 ruling, the SDC ruled that the law on
marriage that will govern parties who are both Muslims is the Muslim Code and that SCC has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether or not Civil law governs the marriage of Rohaina and Abdulgani.

Ruling:

No. The Muslim Code governs their marriage. The High Court noted that it was “undisputed that
Rohaina and Abdulgani are Muslims whose marriage was first celebrated under Muslim rites.” It held
that the subsequent civil law marriage did not supersede their previous marriage and that the Muslim
Code under which their first marriage was celebrated still applies. “We agree with the SCC and SDC
that the first marriage of Rohaina and Abdulgani is the validating rite while the second marriage is
merely ceremonial....Considering that the Muslim Code governs the marriage of Rohaina and
Abdulgani, the latter may legally avail of divorce by Talaq under the Code,” held the Court. Likewise,
it reiterated that “[f]actual findings of the trial court are accorded high respect and are generally not
disturbed by the appellate courts, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or baseless.”

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim law is
complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in
accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage
rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial
one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply.

Samson R. Pacasum, Sr., Petitioner -versus- Atty. Marieta D. Zamoranos, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193719 | March 21, 2017
Jardeleza, J.

Facts: